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AD/AS Models and Macro Policy Debates Phillips Curve Adaptive vs. Rational Expectations Policy Impotency Hypothesis Ricardian Equivalence

AD/AS Models and Macro Policy Debates Phillips Curve Adaptive vs. Rational Expectations Policy Impotency Hypothesis Ricardian Equivalence

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AD/AS Models and Macro Policy Debates

Phillips Curve

Adaptive vs. Rational Expectations

Policy Impotency Hypothesis

Ricardian Equivalence

Introduction

In previous models, we assumed the price level P was “stuck” in the short run. This implies a horizontal SRAS curve.

Now, we consider two prominent models of aggregate supply in the short run: Sticky-price model Imperfect-information model

Introduction

Both models imply:

( )Y Y P EP

natural rate of output

a positive parameter

expected price level

actual price level

agg. output

Other things equal, Y and P are positively related, so the SRAS curve is upward-sloping.

The sticky-price model

Reasons for sticky prices: long-term contracts between firms and

customers menu costs firms not wishing to annoy customers with

frequent price changes

Assumption: Firms set their own prices

(i.e., firms have some market power)

The sticky-price model

An individual firm’s desired price is:

where a > 0.

Suppose two types of firms:

• firms with flexible prices, set prices as above

• firms with sticky prices, must set their price before they know how P and Y will turn out:

p P a Y Y ( )

p EP a EY EY ( )

The sticky-price model

Assume sticky price firms expect that output will equal its natural rate. Then,

To derive the aggregate supply curve, first find an expression for the overall price level.

s = fraction of firms with sticky prices. Then, we can write the overall price level as…

p EP a EY EY ( )

p EP

The sticky-price model

Subtract (1s)P from both sides:

price set by flexible price firms

price set by sticky price firms

Divide both sides by s :

1 [ ] ( )[ ( )]P s EP s P a Y Y

1 [ ] ( )[ ( )]sP s EP s a Y Y

1

( )( )

s aP EP Y Y

s

The sticky-price model

High EP High PIf firms expect high prices, then firms that must set prices in advance will set them high.Other firms respond by setting high prices.

High Y High P When income is high, the demand for goods is high. Firms with flexible prices set high prices. The greater the fraction of flexible price firms, the smaller is s and the bigger is the effect of Y

on P.

1

( )( )

s aP EP Y Y

s

The sticky-price model

Finally, derive AS equation by solving for Y :

( ),Y Y P EP

01

s

s awhere

( )

1

( )( )

s aP EP Y Y

s

The imperfect-information model

Assumptions: All wages and prices are perfectly flexible,

so that all markets clear. Each supplier produces one good, consumes

many goods. Each supplier knows the nominal price of the

good she produces, but does not know the overall price level.

The imperfect-information model Supply of each good depends on its relative

price: the nominal price of the good divided by the overall price level.

Supplier does not know price level at the time she makes her production decision, so uses EP.

Lucas Island Metaphor

Suppose P rises but EP does not. Supplier thinks her

relative price has risen, so she produces more.

With many producers thinking this way, Y will rise whenever P rises above EP.

PA = 1

PB = 1

PC = 1

PD = 1

PE = 1

PA = 2

Summary & implications

Both models of agg. supply imply the relationship summarized by the SRAS curve & equation.

Both models of agg. supply imply the relationship summarized by the SRAS curve & equation.

Y

P LRAS

Y

SRAS

( )Y Y P EP

P EP

P EP

P EP

Summary & implications

Suppose a positive AD shock moves output above its natural rate and P above the level people had expected.

Y

P LRAS

SRAS1

SRAS equation: ( )Y Y P EP

1 1P EP

AD1

AD22EP

2P3 3P EP

Over time, EP rises, SRAS shifts up,and output returns to its natural rate.

1Y Y 2Y3Y

SRAS2

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0

Unemployment Rate

Inflation Rate The 1960s

Inflation, Unemployment, and the Phillips Curve

The Phillips curve states that depends on expected inflation, E.

cyclical unemployment: the deviation of the actual rate of unemployment from the natural rate

supply shocks, (Greek letter “nu”).

where > 0 is an exogenous constant.

Comparing SRAS and the Phillips Curve

SRAS curve: Output is related to unexpected movements in the price level.

Phillips curve: Unemployment is related to unexpected movements in the inflation rate.

Y Y P EP SRAS: ( )

( )nE u u Phillips curve:

Adaptive expectations

Adaptive expectations: an approach that assumes people form their expectations of future inflation based on recently observed inflation.

A simple version: Expected inflation = last year’s actual inflation

1 ( )nu u

1E

Then, P.C. becomes

Inflation inertia

In this form, the Phillips curve implies that inflation has inertia:

In the absence of supply shocks or cyclical unemployment, inflation will continue indefinitely at its current rate.

Past inflation influences expectations of current inflation, which in turn influences the wages & prices that people set.

1 ( )nu u

Two causes of rising & falling inflation

cost-push inflation: inflation resulting from supply shocksAdverse supply shocks typically raise production costs and induce firms to raise prices, “pushing” inflation up.

demand-pull inflation: inflation resulting from demand shocksPositive shocks to aggregate demand cause unemployment to fall below its natural rate, which “pulls” the inflation rate up.

1 ( )nu u

Graphing the Phillips curve

In the short run, policymakers face a tradeoff between and u.

In the short run, policymakers face a tradeoff between and u.

u

nu

1

The short-run Phillips curveE

1970

1971

19721973

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1975

1976

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1978

1979

0.0

1.0

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3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0

Unemployment Rate

Inflation Rate The 1970s

1980

1981

1982

19831984

1985

1986

1987

19881989

0.0

1.0

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5.0

6.0

7.0

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15.0

3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5 10.0 10.5

Unemployment Rate

Inflation Rate The 1980s

Unemployment Rate

Inflation Rate

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

19951996

1997

19981999

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0

The 1990s

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5

Unemployment Rate

Inflation Rate The 2000s

1968

19601961

1962

19631964

1965

1966

1967

1969

1970

1971

19721973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

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1983

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19881989

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10.0

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13.0

14.0

15.0

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Unemployment Rate

Inflation Rate

Shifting the Phillips curve

People adjust their expectations over time, so the tradeoff only holds in the short run.

People adjust their expectations over time, so the tradeoff only holds in the short run.

u

nu

1E

2E

E.g., an increase

in E shifts the short-run P.C. upward.

E.g., an increase

in E shifts the short-run P.C. upward.

The sacrifice ratio

To reduce inflation, policymakers can contract agg. demand, causing unemployment to rise above the natural rate.

The sacrifice ratio measures the percentage of a year’s real GDP that must be foregone to reduce inflation by 1 percentage point.

A typical estimate of the ratio is 5.

The sacrifice ratio

Example: To reduce inflation from 6 to 2 percent, must sacrifice 20 percent of one year’s GDP:

GDP loss = (inflation reduction) x (sacrifice ratio) = 4 x 5

This loss could be incurred in one year or spread over several, e.g., 5% loss for each of four years.

The cost of disinflation is lost GDP. One could use Okun’s law to translate this cost into unemployment.

Rational expectations

Ways of modeling the formation of expectations:

adaptive expectations: People base their expectations of future inflation on recently observed inflation.

rational expectations:People base their expectations on all available information, including information about current and prospective future policies.

Painless disinflation?

Proponents of rational expectations believe that the sacrifice ratio may be very small:

Suppose u = un and = E = 6%,

and suppose the Fed announces that it will do whatever is necessary to reduce inflation from 6 to 2 percent as soon as possible.

If the announcement is credible, then E will fall, perhaps by the full 4 points.

Then, can fall without an increase in u.

Calculating the sacrifice ratio for the Volcker disinflation

1981: = 9.7%

1985: = 3.0%

year u u n uu

n

1982 9.5% 6.0% 3.5%

1983 9.5 6.0 3.5

1984 7.4 6.0 1.4

1985 7.1 6.0 1.1

Total 9.5%

Total disinflation = 6.7%

Calculating the sacrifice ratio for the Volcker disinflation

From previous slide: Inflation fell by 6.7%, total cyclical unemployment was 9.5%.

Okun’s law: 1% of unemployment = 2% of lost output.

So, 9.5% cyclical unemployment = 19.0% of a year’s real GDP.

Sacrifice ratio = (lost GDP)/(total disinflation)

= 19/6.7 = 2.8 percentage points of GDP were lost for each 1 percentage point reduction in inflation.

The natural rate hypothesis

Our analysis of the costs of disinflation, and of economic fluctuations in the preceding chapters, is based on the natural rate hypothesis:

Changes in aggregate demand affect output and employment only in the short run.

In the long run, the economy returns to the levels of output, employment, and unemployment described by the classical model (Chaps. 3-8).

Stabilization Policy

Should policy be active or passive?

Should policy be by rule or discretion?

Should policy be active or passive?

Growth rate of U.S. real GDPPercent change from 4

quarters earlier

Average growth

rate

Increase in unemployment during recessions

peak troughincrease in # of

unemployed persons (millions)

July 1953 May 1954 2.11

Aug 1957 April 1958 2.27

April 1960 February 1961 1.21

December 1969 November 1970 2.01

November 1973 March 1975 3.58

January 1980 July 1980 1.68

July 1981 November 1982 4.08

July 1990 March 1991 1.67

March 2001 November 2001 1.50

Increase from 12/2007 thru 6/2009: 7.2 million!!!Increase from 12/2007 thru 6/2009: 7.2 million!!!

Arguments for active policy

Recessions cause economic hardship for millions of people.

The Employment Act of 1946: “It is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to…promote full employment and production.”

The model of aggregate demand and supply (Chaps. 9-13) shows how fiscal and monetary policy can respond to shocks and stabilize the economy.

Arguments against active policy

Policies act with long & variable lags, including:inside lag: the time between the shock and the policy response.

takes time to recognize shock takes time to implement policy,

especially fiscal policy

outside lag: the time it takes for policy to affect economy.

If conditions change before policy’s impact is felt, the policy may destabilize the economy.

If conditions change before policy’s impact is felt, the policy may destabilize the economy.

Automatic stabilizers

definition: policies that stimulate or depress the economy when necessary without any deliberate policy change.

Designed to reduce the lags associated with stabilization policy.

Examples: income tax unemployment insurance welfare

Forecasting the macroeconomy

Because policies act with lags, policymakers must predict future conditions.

Two ways economists generate forecasts:Leading economic indicators

data series that fluctuate in advance of the economy

Macroeconometric models

The LEI index and real GDP, 1990s

source of LEI data:The Conference Board

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

annu

al p

erce

ntag

e ch

ange

Leading Economic Indicators

Real GDP

Forecasting the macroeconomy

Because policies act with lags, policymakers must predict future conditions.

Two ways economists generate forecasts:Leading economic indicators

data series that fluctuate in advance of the economy

Macroeconometric modelsLarge-scale models with estimated parameters that can be used to forecast the response of endogenous variables to shocks and policies

Mistakes forecasting the 1982 recessionU

ne

mp

loym

en

t ra

te

Forecasting the macroeconomy

Because policies act with lags, policymakers must predict future conditions.

The preceding slides show that the forecasts are often wrong.

This is one reason why some economists oppose policy activism.

The Lucas critique

Due to Robert Lucaswho won Nobel Prize in 1995 for rational expectations.

Forecasting the effects of policy changes has often been done using models estimated with historical data.

Lucas pointed out that such predictions would not be valid if the policy change alters expectations in a way that changes the fundamental relationships between variables.

An example of the Lucas critique

Prediction (based on past experience):An increase in the money growth rate will reduce unemployment.

The Lucas critique points out that increasing the money growth rate may raise expected inflation, in which case unemployment would not necessarily fall.

The Jury’s out…

Looking at recent history does not clearly answer Question 1:

It’s hard to identify shocks in the data.

It’s hard to tell how outcomes would have been different had actual policies not been used.

The Great Moderation?

Question 2:

Should policy be conducted by Should policy be conducted by rule or discretion?rule or discretion?

Should policy be conducted by Should policy be conducted by rule or discretion?rule or discretion?

Rules and discretion: Basic concepts

Policy conducted by rule: Policymakers announce in advance how policy will respond in various situations, and commit themselves to following through.

Policy conducted by discretion:As events occur and circumstances change, policymakers use their judgment and apply whatever policies seem appropriate at the time.

Arguments for rules

1. Distrust of policymakers and the political process misinformed politicians politicians’ interests sometimes not the same

as the interests of society

Arguments for rules

2. The time inconsistency of discretionary policy def: A scenario in which policymakers

have an incentive to renege on a previously announced policy once others have acted on that announcement.

Destroys policymakers’ credibility, thereby reducing effectiveness of their policies.

Examples of time inconsistency

1. To encourage investment, govt announces it will not tax income from capital.

But once the factories are built, govt reneges in order to raise more tax revenue.

Examples of time inconsistency

2. To reduce expected inflation, the central bank announces it will tighten monetary policy.

But faced with high unemployment, the central bank may be tempted to cut interest rates.

Examples of time inconsistency

3. Aid is given to poor countries contingent on fiscal reforms.

The reforms do not occur, but aid is given anyway, because the donor countries do not want the poor countries’ citizens to starve.

Monetary policy rules

a. Constant money supply growth rate Advocated by monetarists. Stabilizes aggregate demand only if velocity

is stable.

Monetary policy rules

b. Target growth rate of nominal GDP Automatically increase money growth

whenever nominal GDP grows slower than targeted; decrease money growth when nominal GDP growth exceeds target.

a. Constant money supply growth rate

Monetary policy rules

c. Target the inflation rate Automatically reduce money growth whenever

inflation rises above the target rate. Many countries’ central banks now practice

inflation targeting, but allow themselves a little discretion.

a. Constant money supply growth rate

b. Target growth rate of nominal GDP

Central bank independence

A policy rule announced by central bank will work only if the announcement is credible.

Credibility depends in part on degree of independence of central bank.

Inflation and central bank independence

aver

age

infl

atio

n

index of central bank independence

Government Debt and Budget Deficits The size of the U.S. government’s debt, and

how it compares to that of other countries.

Problems with measuring the budget deficit.

How does government debt affect the economy?

Deficit = G – T

Gov’t Debt = Σ Deficits

Indebtedness of the world’s governments

Country Gov Debt (% of GDP)

Country Gov Debt (% of GDP)

Japan 173 U.K. 59

Italy 113 Netherlands 55

Greece 101 Norway 46

Belgium 92 Sweden 45

U.S.A. 73 Spain 44

France 73 Finland 40

Portugal 71 Ireland 33

Germany 65 Korea 33

Canada 63 Denmark 28

Austria 63 Australia 14

Ratio of U.S. govt debt to GDP

Revolutionary War

Civil WarWW1

WW2

Iraq War

The U.S. experience in recent years

Early 1980s through early 1990s debt-GDP ratio: 25.5% in 1980, 48.9% in 1993 due to Reagan tax cuts, increases in defense

spending & entitlements

Early 1990s through 2000 $290b deficit in 1992, $236b surplus in 2000 debt-GDP ratio fell to 32.5% in 2000 due to rapid growth, stock market boom, tax

hikes

The U.S. experience in recent years

Early 2000s the return of huge deficits, due to Bush tax cuts,

2001 recession, Medicare expansion, Iraq war

The 2008-2009 recession fall in tax revenues huge spending increases (bailouts of financial

institutions and auto industry, stimulus package)

The troubling long-term fiscal outlook

The U.S. population is aging.

Health care costs are rising.

Spending on entitlements like Social Security and Medicare is growing.

Deficits and the debt are projected to significantly increase…

Percent of U.S. population age 65+

Percent of pop.

5

8

11

14

17

20

2319

50

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

actual projected

U.S. government spending on Medicare and Social Security

Percent of GDP

0

2

4

6

819

50

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

CBO projected U.S. federal govt debt in two scenarios

Pe

rce

nt o

f GD

P

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

optimistic scenario

pessimistic scenario

Problems measuring the deficit

1. Inflation

2. Capital assets

3. Uncounted liabilities

4. The business cycle

MEASUREMENT PROBLEM 1:

Inflation Suppose the real debt is constant, which implies a

zero real deficit.

In this case, the nominal debt D grows at the rate of inflation:

D/D = or D = D

The reported deficit (nominal) is D even though the real deficit is zero.

Hence, should subtract D from the reported deficit to correct for inflation.

MEASUREMENT PROBLEM 1:

Inflation Correcting the deficit for inflation can make a huge

difference, especially when inflation is high.

Example: In 1979,

nominal deficit = $28 billion

inflation = 8.6%

debt = $495 billion

D = 0.086 $495b = $43b

real deficit = $28b $43b = $15b surplus

MEASUREMENT PROBLEM 2:

Capital Assets Currently, deficit = change in debt

Better, capital budgeting:deficit = (change in debt) (change in assets)

EX: Suppose govt sells an office building and uses the proceeds to pay down the debt. under current system, deficit would fall under capital budgeting, deficit unchanged,

because fall in debt is offset by a fall in assets.

Problem w/ cap budgeting: Determining which govt expenditures count as capital expenditures.

MEASUREMENT PROBLEM 3:

Uncounted liabilities

Current measure of deficit omits important liabilities of the government:

future pension payments owed to current govt workers

future Social Security payments

contingent liabilities, e.g., covering federally insured deposits when banks fail(Hard to attach a dollar value to contingent liabilities, due to inherent uncertainty.)

MEASUREMENT PROBLEM 4:

The business cycle

The deficit varies over the business cycle due to automatic stabilizers (unemployment insurance, the income tax system).

These are not measurement errors, but do make it harder to judge fiscal policy stance. E.g., is an observed increase in deficit

due to a downturn or an expansionary shift in fiscal policy?

MEASUREMENT PROBLEM 4:

The business cycle

Solution: cyclically adjusted budget deficit (aka “full-employment deficit”) – based on estimates of what govt spending & revenues would be if economy were at the natural rates of output & unemployment.

The actual and cyclically adjusted U.S. Federal budget surpluses/deficits

actual

cyclically-adjusted

The bottom line

We must exercise care We must exercise care

when interpreting when interpreting

the reported deficit figures.the reported deficit figures.

We must exercise care We must exercise care

when interpreting when interpreting

the reported deficit figures.the reported deficit figures.

Is the govt debt really a problem?Consider a tax cut with corresponding increase in the government debt.

Two viewpoints:

1. Traditional view

2. Ricardian view

The traditional view

Short run: Y, u

Long run: Y and u back at their natural rates closed economy: r, I

Crowding Out

The Ricardian view

due to David Ricardo (1820), more recently advanced by Robert Barro

According to Ricardian equivalence, a debt-financed tax cut has no effect on consumption, national saving, the real interest rate, investment, net exports, or real GDP, even in the short run.

The logic of Ricardian Equivalence

Consumers are forward-looking, know that a debt-financed tax cut today implies an increase in future taxes that is equal – in present value – to the tax cut.

The tax cut does not make consumers better off, so they do not increase consumption spending.

Instead, they save the full tax cut in order to repay the future tax liability.

Result: Private saving rises by the amount public saving falls, leaving national saving unchanged.

Problems with Ricardian Equivalence

Myopia: Not all consumers think so far ahead, some see the tax cut as a windfall.

Borrowing constraints: Some consumers cannot borrow enough to achieve their optimal consumption, so they spend a tax cut.

Future generations: If consumers expect that the burden of repaying a tax cut will fall on future generations, then a tax cut now makes them feel better off, so they increase spending.

Evidence against Ricardian Equivalence?

Early 1980s: Reagan tax cuts increased deficit. National saving fell, real interest rate rose

1992:Income tax withholding reduced to stimulate economy. This delayed taxes but didn’t make consumers

better off. Almost half of consumers increased consumption.

Evidence against Ricardian Equivalence?

Proponents of R.E. argue that the Reagan tax cuts did not provide a fair test of R.E. Consumers may have expected the debt to be

repaid with future spending cuts instead of future tax hikes.

Private saving may have fallen for reasons other than the tax cut, such as optimism about the economy.

Because the data is subject to different interpretations, both views of govt debt survive.

OTHER PERSPECTIVES: Balanced budgets vs. optimal fiscal policy

Some politicians have proposed amending the U.S. Constitution to require balanced federal govt budget every year.

Many economists reject this proposal, arguing that deficit should be used to: stabilize output & employment smooth taxes in the face of fluctuating income redistribute income across generations when

appropriate

OTHER PERSPECTIVES:

Debt and politics“Fiscal policy is not made by angels…”

– Greg Mankiw, p.487

Some do not trust policymakers with deficit spending. They argue that:policymakers do not worry about true costs of their

spending, since burden falls on future taxpayers since future taxpayers cannot participate in the

decision process, their interests may not be taken into account

This is another reason for the proposals for a balanced budget amendment

OTHER PERSPECTIVES: Fiscal effects on monetary policy

Govt deficits may be financed by printing money A high govt debt may be an incentive for

policymakers to create inflation (to reduce real value of debt at expense of bond holders)

Clicker Questions

a) The target real wage rate

b) The target nominal wage rate

c) The proportion of firms with flexible prices

d) The implicit agreements between workers and firms

In the sticky-price model, the relationship between output and the price level depends on:

a) b) c) d)

31%

15%

54%

0%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

Both models of aggregate supply discussed in Chapter 13 imply that if the price level is higher than expected, then output ______ natural rate of output.

a) b) c) d)

54%

0%

8%

38%

a) Exceeds the

b) Falls below the

c) Equals the

d) Moves to a different

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

The classical dichotomy breaks down for a Phillips curve, which shows the relationship between a nominal variable, _____, and a real variable, _____.

a) b) c) d)

0%

15%

85%

0%

a) Output; prices

b) Money; output

c) Inflation; unemployment

d) Unemployment; inflation

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

According to the natural rate hypothesis, fluctuations in aggregate demand affect output in:

a) b) c) d)

0% 0%0%

100%a) Both the short run and long run

b) Only in the short run

c) Only in the long run

d) In neither the short run nor the long run

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

The time between a shock to the economy and the policy actions responding to that shock is called the:

a) b) c) d)

0%

23%

62%

15%

a) Automatic stabilizer

b) Time inconsistency of policy

c) Inside lag

d) Outside lag

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

The fact that traditional methods of policy evaluation do not take into account the impact of policy on expectations is known as:

a) b) c) d)

15%

8%8%

69%a) The political business cycle

b) The Lucas critique

c) Okun’s Law

d) Stabilization policy

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

Policy is conducted by rule if policymakers:

a) b) c) d)

100%

0%0%0%

a) Announce in advance how policy will respond to various situations and commit themselves to following through on this announcement

b) Are free to size up the situation case by case and choose whatever policy seems appropriate at the time

c) Set policy according to election results

d) Manipulate policy to ensure both low inflation and unemployment on election day

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

A monetary policy rule that targets nominal GDP would _____ money growth when nominal GDP rises above the target and ______ money growth when nominal GDP falls below the target.

a) b) c) d)

100%

0%0%0%

a) Reduce; raise

b) Raise; reduce

c) Reduce; reduce

d) Raise; raise

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

The amount by which government spending exceeds government revenues is called the _____, and the accumulation of past government borrowing is called the ____.

a) b) c) d)

92%

0%0%8%

a) Deficit; debt

b) Debt; deficit

c) Devaluation; deflation

d) Deflation; devaluation

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

Assume that the nominal interest rate is 11 percent, the inflation rate is 8 percent, and government debt at the beginning of the year equals $4 trillion. By how much is the government budget deficit overstated as a result of inflation?

a) b) c) d)

38%

0%0%

62%a) $0.12 trillion

b) $0.32 trillion

c) $0.44 trillion

d) $0.80 trillion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

The debt of the US government is underreported in the view of many economists because all of the following liabilities are excluded except:

a) b) c) d)

0% 0%

23%

77%a) Future pensions of government employees

b) Debt owed to foreigners

c) Future Social Security benefits

d) Government guarantees of student loans

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

According to the traditional viewpoint, a tax cut without a cut in government spending:

a) b) c) d)

92%

0%0%8%

a) Stimulates consumer spending and reduces national saving

b) Stimulates consumer spending and increases national saving

c) Has no effect on consumer spending but reduces national saving

d) Has no effect on consumer spending but reduces private saving

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According to the theory of Ricardian equivalence, if consumers are forward-looking, they will view a tax cut that has no plans to reduce government spending as ______, so their consumption will ______.

a) b) c) d)

0%

92%

0%8%

a) Additional disposable income; increase

b) Additional disposable income; remain unchanged

c) A rescheduling of taxes into the future; increase

d) A rescheduling of taxes into the future; remain unchanged

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