Makati Leasing and Finance Corp., vs Wearever Textile Mills, Inc.,122 SCRA 296GR No. L-58469May 16, 1983FACTSWearever Textile Mills, Inc. executed a chattel mortgage contract in favor of Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation covering certain raw materials and machinery. Upon default, Makati Leasing fi led a petition for judicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged. Acting on Makati Leasings application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of seizure. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff enforcing the seizure order seized the machinery subject matter of the mortgage. In a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the Court of Appeals ordered the return of the machinery on the ground that the same can-not be the subject of replevin because it is a real property pursuant to Article415 of the new Civil Code, the same being attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from Wearever textiles plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete fl oor. When the motion for reconsideration of Makati Leasing was denied by the Court of Appeals, Makati Leasing elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.ISSUEWhether the machinery in suit is real or personal property from the point of view of the parties.HELDThere is no logical justification to exclude the rule out the present case from the application of the pronouncement inTumalad v Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143.If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in theTumaladcase,may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereonas long as theparties to the contract so agreeandno innocent third party will be prejudicedthereby, there is absolutelyno reason why a machinery, which ismovable in its natureand becomesimmobilized only by destination or purpose,may not be likewise treated as such. This is really becauseone who has so agreed is estopped from the denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.In rejecting petitioners assertion on the applicability of theTumaladdoctrine, the CA lays stress on the fact that the house involved therein was built on a land that did not belong to the owner of such house. Butthe law makes no distinction with respect to the ownership of the land on which the house is builtand We should not lay down distinctions not contemplated by law.It must be pointed out thatthe characterization by the private respondent is indicative of the intentionandimpresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. As stated inStandard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630,it isundeniable that the parties to a contract may, by agreement,treat as personal property that which by nature would be a real propertyas long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby.The status of the subject matter as movable or immovable property was not raised as an issue before the lower court and the CA, except in a supplemental memorandum in support of the petition filed in the appellate court. There is no record showing that the mortgage has been annulled, or that steps were taken to nullify the same. On the other hand, respondent has benefited from the said contract.Equity dictates that one should not benefit at the expense of another.As such, private respondent could no longer be allowed to impugn the efficacy of the chattel mortgage after it has benefited therefrom.Therefore, the questioned machinery should be considered as personal property.

Author:ArcellanaRubiso and Gelito v RiveraPetition: appeal by bill of exceptionsPlaintiffs and appellees:Fausto Rubiso and BonifacioGelitoDefendant and Appellant:Florentino RiveraPonencia: Torres, JDOCTRINE:The requisite of registration in the registry ofthe purchase of a vesselis necessary and indispensable in order that the purchaser's rights aremaintained against a claim by third persons.FACTS:1.It was alleged in the complaint that the plaintiffs were the owners ofa pilot boatValentinastranded in Tingloy in Bauan, Batangas andRivera took charge of the boat, claiming to be the owner, and plaintiffsthus unable to derive profit from it.2. The boat is owned by "Gelito and Co" with co-partners Gelito for 2/3share and Sy Qui for 1/3 share. Afterwards Gelito sold his share to SyQui.3. Sy Qui then sold the boat to Rivera for 2500 pesos on Jan 4, 1915andhad it registered in the Bureau of Customs on March 17,1915.4. Then to enforce a payment of a certain sum of money, the boat wasbought by Rubiso in a public auction on January 23, 1915 andhad itregistered in the Collector of Customs on January 27, 1915.5.The complaint asks the defendant for indemnification and thedelivery of the boat.ISSUE:1.WoNRubiso has a better right to the boatValentina.PROVISIONS:Article 573 of the Code of Commerce:Merchant vessels constituteproperty which may be acquired and transferred by any of themeans recognized by law. The acquisition of a vessel mustappear in a written instrument, which shall not produce any effectwith respect to third persons if not inscribed in the registry ofvessels.RULING + RATIO:1.YES.Even thoughRivera wasthe firstone who boughtthe boat,it was Rubiso who registered the vessel first in the office ofthe Collector of Customs. Rivera only registered the vesselon March 17, 1915 while Rubiso had it registered onJanuary 27, 1915 in the same month of the purchase.With respecttotherights ofthetwopurchasers, whicheverof them who registered the vessel first is the one entitledby the protection of the law, which considers him theabsolute owner of the boat and free from encumbrancesand claims.Rivera isnowconsidered athird personwhowasdirectlyaffected by the registration. Ships and vessels, whethermoved by steam or sail, partake the nature of real propertyon account of their value in the world of commerce.DISPOSITION:Judgment is affirmed with costs against appellant.

G.R. No. L-3279 March 11, 1908THE CITY OF MANILAvs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL.(10 Phil., 327)

FACTS:The city of Manilafiled a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land situated in Paco, a district of the said city.The said city alleged that it was the absolute owner of the said land; that said land was assessed by the city of Manila in the sum of $1,780; that there existed no liens of whatever character against said land; that the land was unoccupied; that the said city obtained title to the said land by reason of being the successor to all the rights and actions of the old city of Manila (ayuntamiento de Manila), to which said property formerly belonged.The Insular Government opposed the inscription of the said land to the petitioners name upon the ground that the land in question is the property of the Government of the United States under the control of the Insular Government.One of the examiners of titles of the Court of Land Registration made an examination of the title claimed by the petitioner and reported to the judge of the Court of Land Registration the application filed by the city of Manila is not accompanied by any document relative to its alleged ownership; that in the office of the register of deeds there is no record of any act or contract opposing the claim of the applicant; nor does there appear, from the investigations held, any fact contrary to those quoted in the application; and that the city of Manila, in order to acquire title to the land above mentioned, must show the ownership which the formerayuntamientohad over said land. Therefore, the examiner was of the opinion that the title of the City of Manila is defective and cannot be registered.The cause was duly brought on for trial and during the trial of said cause the petitioner attempted to establish that the old city of Manila, its predecessor, had rented said land, had received rents therefor, and in a general way had administered the same.The respondent maintained that the land in question was public land, belonging to the Central Government and the same had never been granted to any person or corporation or municipality by the Spanish Government. The judge of the said court granted the registration of the rest of said described property in favor of the city.Against this order the respondent gave notice of his intention to appeal.

ISSUE:Whether or not the questioned property is owned by the city of Manila.

HELD:No. The Supreme Court ruled that the mere renting of property and receiving the rent therefor cannot, of themselves, in the absence of other proof, support a claim of ownership of such property.One of the earliest provisions of law relating to the rights of pueblos in the insular possessions of the Spanish Government is that of settlements and pueblos of natives.Article 53 of the Ordinances of Good Government indicates that 1) that the King continued to be the absolute owner of said lands; 2) that the pueblos were only given the mere usufruct of the same; 3) that the King might at any time annul such grant; and 4) that a designation, of the particular land so granted, was a necessary prerequisite for the holding of the same for the purposes indicated, by the said pueblo.The municipalities of the Philippine Islands are not entitled, by right, to any part of the public domain for use as communal lands. The Spanish law provided that the usufruct of a portion of the public domain adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the Government for communal purposes, upon proper petition, but, until granted, no rights therein passed to the municipalities, and, in any event, the ultimate title remained in the sovereign.The petitioner herein not having presented proof showing that the land in question had been granted to it by the former sovereign in these Islands, and not having shown that it was entitled to said lands by virtue of some law of the present sovereign of these Islands, the Court of Land Registration was not empowered to grant the registration of said lands in favor of said petitioner. The judgment, therefore, of the lower court is hereby reversed.

Government v. Cabangis53 Phil. 112

FACTS: In 1986, A owned a parcel of land, but because of the action of the waves of Manila Bay, part of said land was gradually submerged in the sea. It remained submerged until 1912 when the government decided to make the necessary dredging to reclaim the land from the sea. As soon as the land had been recovered A took possession of it.

ISSUE: To which does the ownership of the reclaimed land belong to?

HELD: The government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property of public dominion, because in letting it remained submerged, A may be said to have abandoned the same. Having become part of the sea or the seashore, it became property for public use. When the government took steps to make it land again, its status as public dominion remained unchanged; therefore, A is not entitled to the land.

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