Additional Election Offenses

8/3/2019 Additional Election Offenses

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G.R. No. 94521 October 28, 1991OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner,vs.HON. COMMISSIONER HAYDEE B. YORAC OF THECOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

G.R. No. 94626 October 28, 1991OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONER ON ELECTIONS and JEJOMAR C.BINAY, respondents.

Pedro Q. Quadra for petitioner.Romulo B. Macalintal for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:p

Petitioner Oliver L. Lozano filed these two special civil actionsfor certiorari, namely: G.R. No. 94521 which seeks the reviewof the undatedorder 1 of respondent Commissioner Haydee B. Yoracdenying the motion for her voluntary inhibition and/ordisqualification in SPC No. 88-040, entitled "Oliver O. Lozano,et al. vs. Mayor Jejomar C. Binay"; and G.R. No. 94626 whichprays for a reversal of the en banc resolution 2 promulgatedby respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) onAugust 7, 1990 3 dismissing the disqualification petition andcriminal complaint for vote buying against respondent Mayor

Jejomar C. Binay in connection with the January 18, 1988local elections, and its minute resolution of August 15,1990 4 denying due course to petitioner's motion forreconsideration.

The backdrop of this case on record reveals the followingantecedent facts:

1. On January 11, 1988, prior to the January 18, 1988 localelections, petitioner and Bernadette Agcorpa, a registeredvoter of Makati, filed with the COMELEC a petition for

disqualification against then candidate for mayor Jejomar C.

Binay on the ground that respondent Binay used P9.9 millionof municipal funds to enhance his candidacy and his entireticket under the Lakas ng Bansa.

2. The disqualification case was assigned to the SecondDivision of the COMELEC composed of Commissioner HaydeeB. Yorac, as presiding officer, and Commissioners Andres R.

Flores and Magdara B. Dimaampao, as members.

3. The Second Division, through its Presiding Commissioner,referred the case to the Law Department of respondentcommission for preliminary investigation of the criminalaspect. On February 4, 1988, Binay filed his counter-affidavitwith said department.

4. On June 21, 1988, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motionpraying for the inhibition and/or disqualification ofCommissioners Yorac and Africa. This was the first of several

motions for inhibition filed by petitioner before respondentcommission. Petitioner also prayed that the disqualificationpetition be referred for consideration en banc. CommissionerYorac denied the motion for inhibition. On August 10, 1988,the COMELEC en banc denied the prayer that the case beheard en banc, ruling that "no substantial reason exists why

this case should be taken en banc; and considering finallythat the case is set for hearing by the Second Division."

5. On October 26, 1988, petitioner Lozano himself filed amotion to disqualify Commissioner Yorac because she

postponed motu proprio a hearing set on the ground that shewill study the issue of jurisdiction. Said motion was denied.

6. On November 3, 1988, the COMELEC en banc promulgatedResolution No. 2050 which provides that petitions fordisqualification filed prior to the January 18, 1988 localelections based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Codebut not resolved before the elections shall be referred forpreliminary investigation to the Law Department which shallsubmit its report to the Commission en banc. Pursuant tosaid resolution, the Second Division on even date referred


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back the disqualification case against respondent Binay tothe Law Department "before taking any action thereon."

7. On November 8, 1988, petitioner filed another motionpraying that the disqualification case be heard anddecided en banc invoking therein COMELEC Resolution No.2050. Instead of issuing a formal resolution, respondent

COMELEC authorized then Chairman Hilario G. Davide, Jr.(now a member of this Court) to reply to petitioner's counsel.

8. On May 23, 1990, the Law Department submitted itsinvestigation report 5 recommending that criminal chargesbe filed against respondent Binay for violation of Section261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department(Investigation and Prosecution Division)RECOMMENDS as follows:

1. To file the necessary information againstMayor Jejomar Binay before the proper Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region forviolation of Section 261(a) of the OmnibusElection Code, the prosecution thereof to behandled by the Special Prosecution Committee;

2. To dismiss the charge against Mayor JejomarBinay for threats and intimidation under Section261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code for lack of

evidence; and

3. To dismiss the charge against ConchitinaBernardo for insufficiency of evidence.

9. On July 2, 1990, petitioner filed a motion praying that thedisqualification case be, resolved jointly with theinvestigation report of the Law Department.

10 On July 9, 1990, petitioner filed a third motion for the

voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification of CommissionerYorac for having issued a previous memorandum addressed

to the chairman and members of respondent commissionexpressing her opinion that Binay should first be convictedby the regular courts of the offense of vote buying before hecould be disqualified. The full text of saidmemorandum 6 reads:

I submit for the Commission's consideration the

matter of the procedural problems in the abovecase.

The chronology of events, so far as this case isconcerned, is as follows:

1. SPC No. 88-040 for the disqualification of Jejomar Binay, then candidate for Mayor ofMakati was filed on January 11, 1988. It wasassigned to the second Division.

2. On July 29, 1988, petitioners filed a motion toset the case for hearing alleging that theCommission on Audit (COA) had officiallyconfirmed the allegations of the complainants.

3. Hearings were actually conducted on August11, September 12, October 12 and October 19,1988.

4. On November 3, 1988, the Commission enbanc adopted Resolution No. 88-2050,which, inter aliaprovides that:

1. . . .

In case such complaint was notresolved before the election, thecommission may motu proprio, oron motion of any of the parties,refer the complaint to the LawDepartment of the Commission as

an instrument of the latter in theexercise of its exclusive power to


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conduct a preliminary investigationof all cases involving criminalinfractions of the election laws.Such recourse may be availed ofirrespective of whether therespondent has been elected orhas lost in the election;

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3. The Law Department shallterminate the preliminaryinvestigation within thirty (30) daysfrom receipt of the referral andshall submit its study, report andrecommendation to theCommission en banc within five (5)days from the conclusion of the

preliminary investigation. If itmakes a prima faciefinding ofguilt, it shall submit with suchstudy the information for filing withthe appropriate court.

5. On the same date, conformable withResolution No. 88-2050, the Second Divisionreferred SPC No. 88-040 to the Law Department.

6. In the course of the investigation by the Law

Department, the case became entangled withprocedural difficulties the resolution of whichhas been sought in the Second Division.

My own personal thinking on the matter is thatsince the preliminary investigation is thedetermination of criminal liability, with theadministrative consequence of removalimposable only as long term sanction, i.e., afterfinal criminal conviction, the matter ofprocedure in the preliminary investigation is one

that should be addressed to the commission enbanc rather than to either of its divisions.

11. On August 2, 1990, petitioner received a notice settingthe promulgation of judgment en banc for August 6, 1990.Petitioner on August 3, 1990 filed an objection to thepromulgation of judgment en banc, allegedly because there

was no showing that the case was referred to thecommission

en banc upon unanimous vote of all themembers of the Second Division.

12. In its aforestated August 7, 1990 resolution which isherein assailed, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petitionfor disqualification and the criminal complaint for vote buyingagainst respondent Binay. During the promulgation ofjudgment, petitioner asked that the same be suspended until

after the resolution of the legal issues raised involvingconstitutional and jurisdictional questions. Commissioner

Yorac was likewise requested by petitioner to decide themotion for her inhibition. In her undated order subject of thepetition in G.R. No. 94521, as stated in limine, CommissionerYorac denied the motion for for inhibition, stating that:

During the deliberations on this case, I seriously

considered inhibiting myself from participatingand voting despite the flimsy basis which wascited for it. But I became convinced, from theinformation that was coming in, that the motionwas really part of a numbers game, being

played out on the basis of informationemanating from the Commission itself as to thedevelopments in the deliberation and thevoting. Reliable information also shows thatapproaches have been made to influence thevoting.

It is for this reason that I do not inhibit myselffrom the voting in this case consistent with myreading of the law and the evidence.


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13. The aforesaid resolution of August 7, 1990 dismissed thepetition for disqualification for lack of merit. The motion forreconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied in aresolution dated August 15, 1990, on the ground that"pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules ofProcedure, a motion for reconsideration of an en banc rulingof the Commission is one of the prohibited pleadings, andtherefore not allowed under the Rules.

Succinctly condensed, the petition filed against respondentsCOMELEC and Binay raises the following issues:

1. Contrary to the requirement under Section 2,Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, SPCNo. 88-040 was referred to the Comission enbanc without the required unanimous vote of all

the members of the Second Division.

2. The minute resolution of August 15, 1990 isnull and void for having been issued withoutprior notice to the parties and without fixing adate for the promulgation thereof.

3. Respondent commission committed a graveabuse of discretion amount to lack of jurisdictionin not finding Binay guilty of vote- buying,contrary to the evidence presented bypetitioner. 7

In G.R. No. 94521, this Court issued on August 16, 1990 atemporary restraining order 8 ordering respondentCommissioner Yorac to cease and desist from participating inthe deliberation and resolution of the motion forreconsideration dated August 9, 1990 filed in SPC No. 88-040, entitled "Oliver O. Lozano, et al. vs. Jejomar Binay."Theorder was served in the office of Commissioner Yorac onAugust 17, 1990 at 11:25 A.M. 9 It appears, however, thatthe motion for reconsideration was denied by respondentcommission en banc in a resolution dated August 15, 1990,copy of which was served on petitioner on August 17, 1990

at 12:35 P.M. Consequently, the issue on the inhibition and

disqualification of Commissioner Yorac has been renderedmoot and academic.

Granting arguendo that the petition for inhibition ofCommissioner Yorac has not been mooted by theresolution en banc dismissing the main case fordisqualification, petitioner's postulation that she should haveinhibited herself form hearing the main case, for allegedly

having prejudged the case when she advanced the opinionthat respondent Binay could only be disqualified afterconviction by the regional trial court, is of exiguous validity.In the first place, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,specifically Section 1, Rule 4 thereof, prohibits a memberfrom, among others, sitting in a case in which he has proof. There is no showing that the memorandum whereinCommissioner Yorac rendered her opinion was ever madepublic either by publication or dissemination of the same tothe public. Furthermore, the opinion of Commissioner Yorac

was based on prior cases for disqualification filed with theCOMELEC wherein prior conviction of the respondent wasconsidered a condition sine qua non for the filing of thedisqualification case. 10 We accordingly find no compellingreason to inhibit Commissioner Yorac from participating inthe hearing and decision of the case.

Similarly, we find the petition in G.R. No. 94626 devoid ofmerit. Petitioner first avers that under Section 2, Rule 3 ofthe COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a case pending in adivision may be referred to and decided by the

Commission en banc only on a unanimous vote of all themembers of the division. It is contended that SPC No. 88-040which was pending before the COMELEC's Second Divisionwas referred to the Commission en banc without the requiredunanimous vote of all the division members, petitioneralleging that Commissioner Andres R. Flores voted for thereferral of the petition for disqualification to the division. It is,therefore, the submission of petitioner that the resolution ofthe Commission en banc dated August 17, 1990 is null andvoid for lack of jurisdiction and for being unconstitutional.


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The argument of petitioner is not well taken. COMELECResolution No. 1050 issued by the commission en banc onNovember 3, 1988 is the applicable law in thisdisqualification case. It provides:

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RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulatethe following rules governing the disposition ofcases of disqualification filed by virtue ofSection 68 of the Omnibus Election Code inrelation to Section 6 of R.A. 6646 otherwiseknown as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:

1. Any complaint for the disqualification of aduly registered candidate based upon any of thegrounds specifically enumerated under Section68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly

with the Commission before an election in whichthe respondent is a candidate, shall be inquiredinto by the Commission for the purpose ofdetermining whether the acts complained ofhave in fact been committed. Where the inquiryby the Commission results in a finding before

election, that the respondent candidate did infact commit the acts complained (of), theCommission shall order the disqualification ofthe respondent candidate from continuing assuch candidate.

In case such complaint was not resolved beforethe election, the Commission may motuproprio, or on motion of any of the parties, referthe complaint to the Law Department of theCommission as the instrument of the latter inthe exercise of its exclusive power to conduct apreliminary investigation of all cases involvingcriminal infractions of the election laws. Suchrecourse may be availed of irrespective ofwhether the respondent has been elected or has

lost in the election.

2. Any complaint for disqualification based onSection 68 of the Omnibus Election Code inrelation to Section 6 of the Rep. Act No. 6646filed after the election against a candidate whohas already been proclaimed as winner shall bedismissed as a disqualification case. However,the complaint shall be referred for preliminaryinvestigation to the Law Department of theCommission.

Where a similar complaint is filed after electionbut before proclamation of the respondentcandidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, bedismissed as a disqualification case. However,the complaint shall be referred for preliminaryinvestigation to the Law Department. If, beforeproclamation, the Law Department makesa prima faciefinding of guilt and the

corresponding information has been filed withthe appropriate trial court, the complainant mayfile a petition for suspension of the proclamationof the respondent with the court before whichthe criminal case is pending and the said courtmay order the suspension of the proclamation ifthe evidence of guilt is strong.

3. The Law Department shall terminate thepreliminary investigation within thirty (30) daysfrom receipt of the referral and shall submit its

study, report and recommendation to theCommission en banc within five (5) days fromthe conclusion of the preliminary investigation.If it makes aprima facie finding of guilt, it shallsubmit with such study the information for filingwith the appropriate court. 11

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Contrary to petitioner's submission that said resolution hasbeen repealed by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which

took effect on November 15, 1988, there is nothing in the


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resolution which appears to be inconsistent with theprocedural rules issued by the COMELEC.

Firstly, Resolution No. 2050 was passed by reason of thevariance in opinions of the members of respondentcommission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases ofdisqualification filed pursuant to Section 68 of the OmnibusElection Code in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No.

6646, or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, and the mannerof disposing of the same had not been uniform. Hence, theCOMELEC decided to lay down a definite policy in thedisposition of these disqualification cases. Within thispurpose in mind, the Commission en banc adoptedResolution No. 2050. The transitory provision under Section2, Rule 44 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides thatthese rules shall govern all cases pending at the time ofeffectivity thereof, except to the extent that in the opinion ofthe commission, or the court in appropriate cases, an

application would not be feasible or would work injustice, inwhich event the former procedure shall apply. We believethat Resolution No. 2050 qualifies and should be consideredas an exception to the generally retroactive effect of saidrules.

Secondly, prior to the issuance of Resolution No. 2050,petitioner had filed several motions with the Second Divisionasking for the referral of the disqualification case to theCommission en banc. After the COMELEC en banc issuedResolution No. 2050, petitioner filed another motion for the

referral of the case to the Commission en banc, specificallyinvoking Resolution No.2050. 12 In the words of petitioner in his said motion, underthe aforesaid resolution, "once the petition fordisqualification is forwarded to the Law Department, the caseis deemed en banc because the report is submittedEnbanc by the law Department." Petitioner having invoked thejurisdiction of the Commission en banc is now estopped fromquestioning the same after obtaining an adverse judgmenttherefrom.

Thirdly, Commissioner Andres R. Flores, who opined that thedisqualification case should first be resolved by the SecondDivision, has since then clarified his position after he wasreminded that Resolution No. 2050, which he had admittedly"completely forgotten" had "laid down a definite policy on thedisposition of disqualification cases contemplated in Section68 of the Omnibus Election Code. 13

Lastly, Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a definitepolicy and procedure for disqualification cases. The COMELECRules of Procedure speak of special actions, which includedisqualification cases, in general. Hence, as between aspecific and a general rule, the former shall necessarilyprevail.

Anent the propriety of the issuance of the resolution denying

petitioner's motion for reconsideration, suffice it to say thatthe requirement of notice in the promulgation of resolutions

and decisions of the COMELEC embodied in Section 5 of Rule18 of the Rules does not apply in the case at bar for thesimple reason that a motion for reconsideration of an enbanc ruling, resolution, order or decision is not allowed underSection 1, Rule 13 thereof.

Respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition fordisqualification and in holding that respondent Binay is notguilty of vote buying, ruled as follows:

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The commission concurs with the findings of theLaw Department on enumeration Nos. 2 and 3but rejects exception to the recommendation forprosecution of respondent Binay under No. 1therefor, it appearing that there is a clearmisappreciation of the evidence submittedconsidering the inconsistencies in thetestimonies of material witnesses for thepetitioners, as well as the correct interpretationand application of the law cited as basis for the

prosecution of respondent Binay.


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The seventeen (17) Affidavits submitted bypetitioners attached to their original petition fordisqualification dated January 11, 1988, differform the twenty (20) affidavits attached to thememorandum of petitioners filed with theCommission (Second Division) on August 22,1988. The records of the case do not show thatthese seventeen (17) affidavits attached to theoriginal petition were affirmed by the affiantsduring the investigation conducted by the LawDepartment of this Commission. Of the twenty(20) affidavits appended to the Memorandum ofAugust 22, 1988, only five (5) of the affiantswere able to affirm their testimonies beforehearing officer Alioden Dalaig of the LawDepartment of this Commission . . .

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In his counter affidavit, respondent Jejomar C.Binay denied the allegations in the petition fordisqualification and interposed the defense that:

The Christmas gift-giving is anannual project of the MunicipalGovernment of Makati ever sincethe time of Mayors Estrella and

Yabut in the spirit of yuletideseason wherein basic and essentialitems are distributed to the lessfortunate and indigent residents ofMakati out of funds appropriatedfor the purpose duly budgeted andsubject to audit by the Commissionon Audit and same were preparedsometime on October 1987 longbefore I filed my certificate ofcandidacy and ceased to be the

Acting Mayor of Makati, . . .

The alleged ticket bearing myname, assuming its existence,indicates nothing of significanceexcept that of a Christmas andNew Year greeting and is notsuggestive of anything which maybe considered or interpreted to bepolitical in nature such as indorsingmy candidacy for that matter. . . .

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It is undisputed that at the time the supposed"gift-giving" transpired between the periods ofDecember 22-30, 1987, respondent Binay wasno longer Mayor of the Municipality of Makatihaving resigned from the position on December2, 1987, to pursue his candidacy for re-election

to the same position. The OIC Mayor of Makation the dates complained of, December 22-30,1987, was OIC Mayor Sergio S. Santos whostated in his affidavit dated February 4, 1988,that he was Officer-in-Charge of Makati, MetroManila, from December 2, 1987 to February 2,1988, and that as such he implemented onDecember 18, 1987 the municipal government'sannual and traditional distribution of Christmasgifts.

There is ample evidence to show that it was notrespondent Binay who "gave" the plastic bagscontaining Christmas gifts to the witnesses whoexecuted affidavits for the petitioners. The"giver" was in fact the Municipality of Makati.And this is evidenced by the followingdocuments attached to the records of this case:

1) Certification dated January 11,1988 issued by OIC Roberto A.Chang attached as Annex A to


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respondent Binay's counteraffidavit dated February 5, 1988.

2) COA Report dated January 11,1988 attached as Annex "R" to thepleading denominated as Motion toSet Hearing filed by complainantOliver Lozano dated July 26, 1988,filed in connection with SPC No. 88-040 for disqualification againstrespondent Binay;

The findings of the COA Report itself (dated June21, 1988) upon which petitioners rely heavily intheir disqualifications case against respondentBinay, identify the "giver" of the Christmas giftsas the Municipality of Makati and notrespondent Binay. . . .

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Respondent Binay's allegation that the gift-giving was an annual project of the MunicipalGovernment of Makati was not denied nordisputed by the petitioners who in fact madecapital of the aforequoted findings of theCommission on Audit in their charge againstrespondent Binay for alleged misuse of publicfunds. Also, petitioners in their latest pleading

filed with the Commission on July 2, 1990,entitled "Motion To Resolve The DisqualificationCase Jointly With The Investigation Report of theLaw Department" instead of rebuttingrespondent Binay's allegation that theChristmas gift giving is an annual project of theMunicipal Government of Makati ever since thetime of Mayors Estrella and Yabut, merely statedthat:

. . . Assuming arguendo that Mayor

Estrella had practiced this gift-

giving every Christmas, the fact is,that there had been no electoralcampaign on-going during suchdistribution and/or no election wasscheduled during Mayor Estrella'stenure.

"This is also true in the case ofMayor Yabut."

More Petitioners' documentary evidence, amongwhich are Exhibits "A", "A-1"; "A-2"; "A-20";"B";"B-1"; "B-2"; "B-25"; "C-1"; "C-2"; "C-27"; "D";"E" and "F", all show indubitably that theChristmas packages which were distributedbetween the periods of December 22-30, 1987,were ordered, purchased and paid for by theMunicipality of Makati and not by respondent

Binay. There is more thanprima facieproofs toshow that those gift packages received by thewitnesses for petitioners were intended asChristmas presents to Makati's indigents inDecember 1988.

It would therefore appear from the evidencesubmitted by the petitioners themselves thatthe giver, if any, of the Christmas gifts whichwere received by the witnesses for thepetitioners was in fact, the Municipality of

Makati and not respondent Jejomar C. Binay.The presence of respondent Binay, if at all trueat the time the gifts were distributed by theMunicipality of Makati to the recipients of theChristmas gifts, was incidental. It did not makerespondent Binay as the "giver" of thoseChristmas gifts. Nor did the giving of such giftsby the Municipal Government of Makatiinfluence the recipients to vote for respondentBinay considering that the affiants themselveswho testified for the petitioners admitted and

were aware that the gift packages came from


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the Municipality of Makati and not fromrespondent Jejomar C. Binay.

The foregoing conclusion is confirmed bypetitioners' witnesses in the persons of LolitaAzcarraga, Johnson Carillo, Rommel Capalungan,Renato Leonardo, Manuel Allado, Edwin Pascua,Wilberto Torres, Apolonio De Jesus, CaridadReposar, Artemus Runtal and Jose Ermino who,in their sworn statements, uniformly describedthe gift package as labelled with the words"Pamaskong Handog ng Makati", a clearindication that the "giver" of the Christmas giftswas indeed the Municipality of Makati and notrespondent Binay.

There is one aspect of this case which somehowlends credence to respondent Binay's claim that

the instant petition is a political harassment. Itis noted by the commission that while thecriminal indictment against respondent Binay isfor alleged violation of Section 261 (a) of theOmnibus Election Code, petitioners did notimplead as party respondents the affiants whoreceived the Christmas packages apparently inexchange for their votes. The law on "votebuying" [Section 261 (a) supra] also penalizes"vote-buying" and "vote-selling", then thepresent indictment should have been pursued

against both respondent Binay and against theaffiants, against the former for buying votes andagainst the latter for selling the votes. 14

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We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as theconclusions reached by respondent COMELEC, in dismissingthe petition for the disqualification of respondent Binay. Noclear and convincing proof exists to show that respondentBinay was indeed engaged in vote buying. The traditional

gift-giving of the Municipality of Makati during the Christmas

season is not refuted. That it was implemented byrespondent Binay as OIC Mayor of Makati at that time doesnot sufficiently establish that respondent was trying toinfluence and induce his constituents to vote for him. Thiswould be stretching the interpretation of the law too far.Petitioner deduces from this act of gift-giving that respondentwas buying the votes of the Makati residents. It requiresmore than a mere tenuous deduction to prove the offense ofvote-buying. There has to be concrete and direct evidence or,at least, strong circumstantial evidence to support thecharge that respondent was indeed engaged in vote-buying.We are convinced that the evidence presented, as swell asthe facts obtaining in the case at bar, do not warrant suchfinding.

Finally, we have consistently held that under the 1935 and1973 Constitutions, and the same is true under the presentone, this court cannot review the factual findings of the

Commission on Elections absent a grave abuse of discretionand a showing of arbitratriness in its decision, order orresolution. Thus:

The principal relief sought by petitioner ispredicated on the certiorari jurisdication of thiscourt as provided in Section 11, Article XII-C,1973 Constitution. It is, as explained in Aratucvs. Commission on Elections, "not as broad as itused to be" under the old Constitution and it"should be confined to instances of grave abuse

of discretion amounting to patent andsubstantial denial of due process." Moreover,the legislative construction of the constitutionalprovision has narrowed down "the scope andextent of the inquiry the Court is supposed toundertake to what is strictly the officeofcertiorarias distinguished from review." Andin Lucman vs. Dimaporo, a case decided underthe Constitution of 1935, this Court speakingthrough then Chief Justice Concepcion, ruledthat "this Court can not . . . review rulings or

findings of fact of the Commission on Elections,"as there is "no reason to believe that the


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framers of our Constitution intended to placethe [said] Commission created and explicitlymade "independent" by the Constitution itself on a lower level" than statutory administrativeorgans (whose factual findings are not"disturbed by courts of justice, except whenthere is absolutely no evidence or no substantialevidence in support of such findings.") Factualmatters were deemed not proper forconsideration in proceedings brought either "asan original action for certiorari or as an appealby certiorari. . . [for] the main issuein . . . certiorari is one of jurisdiction lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretionamounting to excess of jurisdiction" while"petitions for review oncertiorari are limited tothe consideration of questions of law."

The aforementioned rule was reiterated in thecases of Ticzon and Bashier. Indeed, as early asthe year 1938, applying Section 4, Article VI ofthe 1935 Constitution, this Court held that theElectoral Commission's "exclusive jurisdiction"being clear from the language of the provision,"judgment rendered . . . in the exercise of suchan acknowledged power is beyond judicialinterference, except "upon a clear showing ofsuch arbitrary and improvement use of thepower as will constitute a denial of due process

of law." Originally lodged in the legislature, thatexclusive function of being the "sole judge" ofcontests "relating to the election, returns, andqualifications "of members of the legislaturewas transferred "in its totality" to the ElectoralCommission by the 1935 Constitution. Thatgrant of power, to use the language of the late justice Jose P. Laurel, "was intended to be ascomplete and unimpaired as if it had remainedoriginally in the legislature . . . " . . .

. . . A review of the respondent Commission'sfactual findings/conclusions made on the basis

of the evidence evaluated is urged by thepetitioner, "if only to guard against or preventany possible misuse or abuse of power." To doso would mean "digging into the merits andunearthing errors of judgment" rendered onmatters within the exclusive function of theCommission, which is proscribed by the Aratucand other decisions of this Court. . . . 15

The charge against respondent Binay for allegedmalversation of public funds should be threshed out andadjudicated in the appropriate proceeding and forum having jurisdiction over the same. Consequently, it was properlydismissed by the Commission on Elections.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of respondentCommissioner Haydee B. Yorac in G.R. No. 94521 and thechallenged resolutions of respondent Commission on

Elections subject of the petition in G.R. No. 94626 are herebyAFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued in G.R. No.94521 is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea JJ., concur.Davide, Jr., J., took no part.Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.=====================================

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G. R. Nos. 148948 & 148951-60 February 17,2003COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner,vs.HON LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Presiding Judge, RegionalTrial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:


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In this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus,petitioner Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeks thenullification of the orders of 16 March 20011 and 9 May20012 of respondent Judge Lucenito N. Tagle of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, denyingpetitioners motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to7959-00 and 7980-00 and motion for reconsideration,respectively.

During the 11 May 1998 elections, Florentino A. Bautista ranfor the position of mayor in the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite.On 8 July 1998, he filed with the COMELEC a complaintagainst then incumbent mayor Atty. Federico Poblete,Bienvenido Pobre, Reynaldo Aguinaldo, Arturo Ganibe,Leonardo Llave, Diosdado del Rosario, Manuel Ubod, AngelitoPeregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes and Pedro Paterno,Jr., for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the OmnibusElection Code. The complaint was supported by the separate

affidavits of forty-four (44) witnesses attesting to the vote-buying activities of the respondents and was docketed asE.O. Case No. 98-219.

On 25 February 1999, upon the recommendation of its LawDepartment, the COMELEC en banc issued aresolution3 directing the filing of the necessary informationagainst the respondents in E.O. Case No. 98-219 andauthorizing the Director IV of the Law Department todesignate a COMELEC prosecutor to handle the prosecutionof the cases and to file the appropriate motion for the

preventive suspension of the respondents.

The Law Department filed the corresponding informationagainst the respondents in E.O. Case No. 98-219 before theRTC, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, which was docketed asCriminal Case No. 7034-99.

Before the trial of Criminal Case No. 7034-99 commenced, oron 2 December 1999, a complaint was filed by InnocencioRodelas and Gerardo Macapagal with the Office of theProvincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite, for violation of Section

261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code against the witnesses in

the criminal case for vote-buying, who were the witnesses inE.O. Case No. 98-219. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No.1-99-1080.

On 10 April 2000, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutorresolved to file separate informations for vote-selling in thevarious branches of the RTC in Imus, Cavite, against therespondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. The cases were docketedas (1) Criminal Cases Nos. 7940-00 to 7949-00 and 7981-00,which were assigned to Branch 22; (2) Criminal Cases Nos.7973-00 to 7979-00 and 7970-00, assigned to Branch 21; (3)Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00,assigned to Branch 20; and (4) Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00to 7969-00, assigned to Branch 90.

On 23 June 2000, the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080appealed before the COMELEC the 10 April 2000 Resolutionof the Provincial Prosecutor. On 6 July 2000, the COMELEC en

banc denied the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.4

However,upon the urgent motion to set for hearing the appeal, theCOMELEC en banc resolved to defer action on the appeal andrefer the same to the Law Department for comment andrecommendation.5

The Law Department of the COMELEC filed motions tosuspend proceedings before Branches 20, 21, 22 and 90 ofthe RTC of Imus, Cavite, until the COMELEC would haveresolved the appeal of the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080.The Presiding Judge of Branch 22 granted the motion for the

suspension of proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 7940-00 to7949-00 and 7981-00.1awphi1.nt

In its Minute Resolution No. 00-2453,6 the COMELEC en banc,upon the recommendation of its Law Department, declarednull and void the resolution of the Office of the ProvincialProsecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. It held that the respondentstherein are exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to thefourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646,7 otherwiseknown as "The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987," which grantsimmunity from criminal prosecution persons who voluntarily

give information and willingly testify against those liable for
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vote-buying or vote-selling. It further directed the LawDepartment to file the necessary motions to dismiss thecriminal cases filed against the said respondents.

Pursuant to Minute Resolution No. 00-2453, the LawDepartment filed a motion to dismiss8 Criminal Cases Nos.7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 before Branch 20 of theRTC of Imus, Cavite, presided by herein respondent judge.The latter, however, denied the said motion and the motionfor reconsideration.1a\^/phi1.netAccording to respondentjudge, before one can be exempt from prosecution under thefourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, it isnecessary that such person has already performed the overtact of voluntarily giving information or testifying in anyofficial investigation or proceeding for the offense to whichsuch information or testimony was given. It was thuspremature to exempt the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080from criminal prosecution, since they have not yet testified.

Hence, this petition, ascribing to the respondent judge graveabuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack ofjurisdiction in peremptorily denying the prosecutions motionto dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00.

This Court referred the petition to the Office of the SolicitorGeneral (OSG) and required it to manifest whether it isadopting the petition.9 In a Manifestation and Motion10 filedwith this Court, the OSG stated that it repleads the

submissions contained in the petition and adopts the petitionas its own.

The petition is meritorious.

A free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible election isindispensable in a democratic society. Without it, democracywould not flourish and would be a sham. Election offenses,such as vote-buying and vote-selling, are evils whichprostitute the election process. They destroy the sanctity ofthe votes and abet the entry of dishonest candidates into the

corridors of power where they may do more harm. As the

Bible says, one who is dishonest in very small matters isdishonest in great ones. One who commits dishonesty in hisentry into an elective office through the prostitution of theelectoral process cannot be reasonably expected to respectand adhere to the constitutional precept that a public officeis a public trust, and that all government officials andemployees must at all times be accountable to the peopleand exercise their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity,loyalty, and efficiency.

The provision of law alleged to have been violated by therespondents in E.O. Case No. 98-219, who are the accused inCriminal Case No. 7034-99, reads as follows:

SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of anelection offense:

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. - (1) Any person who

gives, offers or promises money or anything of value,gives or promises any office or employment, franchiseor grant, public or private, or makes or offers to makean expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause anexpenditure to be made to any person, association,corporation, entity, or community in order to induceanyone or the public in general to vote for or againstany candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or tovote for or against any aspirant for the nomination orchoice of a candidate in a convention or similarselection process of a political party.

(2) Any person, association, corporation, groupor community who solicits or receives, directlyor indirectly, any expenditure or promise of anyoffice or employment, public or private, for anyof the foregoing considerations.

(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. - Two or more personswhether candidates or not, who come to an agreementconcerning the commission of any violation ofparagraph (a) of this section and decide to commit it.
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One of the effective ways of preventing the commission ofvote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is thegrant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the partywhose vote was bought. This grant of immunity willencourage the recipient or acceptor to come into the openand denounce the culprit-candidate, and will ensure thesuccessful prosecution of the criminal case against the latter.Congress saw the wisdom of this proposition, and so Section

28 of R.A. No. 6646 on Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-Selling concludes with this paragraph:

The giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor,acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs(a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shallbe liable as principals: Provided, That any person, otherwiseguilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily givesinformation and willingly testifies on any violation thereof inany official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from

prosecution and punishment for the offenses with referenceto which his information and testimony were given: Provided,further, That nothing herein shall exempt such person fromcriminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony.

However, to avoid possible fabrication of evidence againstthe vote-buyers, especially by the latters opponents,Congress saw it fit to warn "vote-sellers" who denounce thevote-buying that they could be liable for perjury or falsetestimony should they not tell the truth.

It must be stressed that the COMELEC has the exclusivepower to conduct preliminary investigation of all electionoffenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecutethe same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.11 TheChief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, ortheir respective assistants are, however, given continuingauthority, as deputies of the COMELEC, to conductpreliminary investigation of complaints involving electionoffenses and to prosecute the same.12 This authority may berevoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever, inits judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to

protect the integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the

common good, or when it believes that the successfulprosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC.13

In this case, when the COMELEC nullified the resolution of theProvincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, which was thebasis of the informations for vote-selling, it, in effect,withdrew the deputation granted to the prosecutor. Suchwithdrawal of the deputation was clearly in order,considering the circumstances obtaining in these caseswhere those who voluntarily executed affidavits attesting tothe vote-buying incident and became witnesses against thevote-buyers now stand as accused for the same acts theyhad earlier denounced. What the Prosecutor did was tosabotage the prosecution of the criminal case against the"vote-buyers" and put in serious peril the integrity of theCOMELEC, which filed the said case for vote-buying. If theProsecutor had listened to the command of prudence andgood faith, he should have brought the matter to the

attention of the COMELEC.

Petitioner COMELEC found that the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, who executed affidavits and turned witnesses inCriminal Case No. 7034-99, voluntarily admitted that theywere the acceptors or recipients in the vote-buying done bythe accused in said case. It was precisely because of suchvoluntary admission and willingness to testify that theCOMELEC en banc, in its Minute Resolution No. 00-2453,declared null and void the resolution of the Office of theProvincial Prosecutor of Cavite in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 and held

that the respondents therein are exempt from criminalprosecution pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 28 ofR.A. No. 6646. Hence, it directed its Law Department to file amotion to dismiss the criminal cases which the Office of theProvincial Prosecutor filed in court against the respondents inI.S. No. 1-99-1080.

We agree with the petitioner and hold that the respondentsin I.S. No. 1-99-1080, who are the accused in Criminal CasesNos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, are exempt fromcriminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the proviso

in the last paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646.
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Respondent judge lost sight of the fact that at the time thecomplaint for vote-selling was filed with the Office of theProvincial Prosecutor, the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080had already executed sworn statements attesting to thecorrupt practice of vote-buying in the case docketed asCriminal Case No. 7034-99. It cannot then be denied thatthey had already voluntarily given information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly testified in Criminal Case

No. 7034-99 per petitioners Memorandum filed with thisCourt.14

In a futile attempt to justify his denial of the motion todismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, respondent judge averred in his comment on the petitionthat nothing was mentioned in the motion to dismiss that theaccused in said cases had already given information ortestified in any proceeding.1a\^/phi1.netBesides, no recordof any preliminary investigation was attached to the motionto dismiss. The petitioner merely referred to the dispositiveportion of Minute Resolution No. 00-2453 without mentioningany preliminary investigation conducted by the LawDepartment of the COMELEC.

This contention is without basis. A reading of the motion todismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00shows that a certified true copy of COMELEC MinuteResolution No. 00-2453 was attached thereto and was madean integral part thereof. The attached resolution indicatedthat the accused in the cases sought to be dismissed had

voluntarily given information and were willing to testifyagainst the vote-buyers, and are therefore utilized aswitnesses in the pending case for vote-buyers docketed asCriminal Case No. 7034-99.

Clearly then, respondent judge committed grave abuse ofdiscretion when he denied the motion to dismiss CriminalCases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 despiteCOMELECs determination that the accused therein areexempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling pursuant tothe proviso in the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No.

6646.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged ordersdated 16 March 2001 and 9 May 2001 of respondent judge inCriminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 beforeBranch 20 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite, arehereby SET ASIDE, and said criminal cases are orderedDISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales and Azcuna, JJ., concur.Callejo, Jr., J., no part.
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Documents

Additional Election Offenses