-University Institute of Legal Studies-

-University Institute of Legal Studies-

Administrative law

Topic Principles of Natural Justice

Submitted To Mrs. Jasmeet Walia Submitted By Kunal Kapoor Roll No. 42/11 UILS Panjab University

Acknowledgment

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher Mrs. Jasmeet Walia who gave me the golden opportunity to do this wonderful project on the topic Principles of Natural Justice, which also helped me in doing a lot of Research and I came to know about so many new things. I am really thankful to her. I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me a lot in finishing this project within the limited time.

I am making this project not only for marks but to also increase my knowledge.THANKS AGAIN TO ALL WHO HELPED ME.

Contents

1. List of Abbreviations------------------------------------------- 2. Table of Cases-------------------------------------------------------- 3. Introduction-------------------------------------------------------- 4. Nemo 5. Conclusion----------------------------------------------------------- 6. Bibliography and Webliography ------------------------------

List of Abbreviations

paraAIRAll India Reporter Honble Honorable etcet cetera i.e.id est (that means) r/w read with S. Section LJ Law JournalRe. Reference US United StatesNo. NumberOrs. OthersCri. Criminalp.Pagew.e.f with effect fromPC Privy CouncilFC Federal CourtSCSupreme CourtSCCSupreme Court Casesv. VersusVol. VolumePat. Patna & and

Table of Cases1. Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40..62. Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC 18263. Union of India v. P.K. Roy, AIR 1968 SC 850..74. R.S. Oass v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 593..75. Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, 1948 AC 8786. Bonham Case, (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 113(b)..107. Manak Lal v. Dr. Pram Chand, AIR 1957 SC 425.108. Visakapatnam Co-op. Motor Transport Ltd. v. Bangaruraju, 1953 Mad. 709109. Mineral Development Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1960 SC 4681110. Meengless Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719.1111. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1501112. Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 454..1213. R.v. Deal Justice exparte Curling, (1881) 45 LT 439..1214. Murlidhar v. Kadam Singh, AIR1964 MB 111..15. Gullapalli Nageshwar Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (Gullapalli.1), AIR1959 SC 309..1216. Gullapalli 11, AIR 1959 13761317. T. Govindraj Mudaliar v. State of T.N., AIR 1973 SC 9741318. Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Lannon, 1960 WLR 8151419. Municiple Board Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, AIR 1965 SC 4581620. N.R. Co-op, Society v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1967 SC 1182..1621. Cooper v. Wardsfrotth Beat Board of Works, (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180..1622. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.16, 2123. Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 8181724. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 8181725. Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyamsundar Jhunjhwala, AIR 1961 SC 16691926. M.P. Industries v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 6711927. Mahabir Prasad v. State of M.P., AIR 1970 SC 13021928. Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 15712029. Bhagat Raja v. Union of India. AIR 1967 SC 16062030. Union of India v. M.L. Kapoor, AIR 1974 SC 8731. Siemens Engineering and Mfg. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785.32. S.N. Mukherji v. Union of lndia, AIR 1990 SC 198433. Ridge v. Baldwin,. 1964 AC 4034. Durayappah v. Femando, (1967) 2 AC 33735. State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambier, (1996) 1 SCC 435.

IntroductionThe doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. In Ridge v. Baldwin,[footnoteRef:1] it was held that the doctrine of natural justice was incapable of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances. [1: 1964 AC 40.]

In India, a reasonable man cannot but be a common man similarly placed.[footnoteRef:2] Over the years there has been a steady refinement as regards this particular doctrine, but no attempt has been made and cannot be made to define the doctrine in a specific manner or method. Strait-jacket formula cannot be made applicable but compliance with the doctrine is solely dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The totality of the situation ought to be taken note of and if on examination of such totality, it comes to light that the executive action suffers from the vice of non-compliance with the doctrine, the law Courts in that event ought to set right the wrong inflicted upon the person concerned and to do so would be a plain exercise of judicial power.[footnoteRef:3] As a matter of fact the doctrine is now termed as a synonym of fairness in the concept of justice and stands as the most accepted methodology of a Government action.[footnoteRef:4] [2: Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC 182.] [3: Jain, M.P. Principle Of Administrative Law, 6th ed. New Delhi: Wadhwa & Co. Nagpur (2007).] [4: State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna, (2001) 2 SCC 330]

Natural justice is not a fixed but flexible concept. The standards of natural justice vary with situations. In Union of India v. P.K. Roy,[footnoteRef:5] speaking for the Supreme Court, Ramaswami, J. observed : [5: AIR 1968 SC 850.]

"The extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, upon the chain-the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case." Again, in R.S. Oass v. Union of India,[footnoteRef:6] the Supreme Court stated: [6: AIR 1987 SC 593.]

"It is well established that rules of natural justice are not rigid rules: they are flexible and their application depends upon the setting and background of statutory provisions, nature of the right which may be affected and the consequences which may entail, its application depends upon facts and circumstances of each case." Natural justice represents higher procedural principles developed by judges which every administrative agency must follow in taking decision adversely affecting the rights of private individuals. The concept of natural justice entails two principles: (1) Nemo judex in causa sua - No man shall be Judge in his own cause or the deciding authority must be impartial and without biasRule against Bias. (2) Audi alteram partem - Hear the other side, or both sides must be heard, or no man should be condemned unheard or that there must be fairness on the part of deciding authorityRule of hearing or fair hearing.

1. Nemo Judex in Causa Sua

(a) General The first principle of natural justice is rule against bias. It means that the deciding authority must be impartial and neutral. That bias disqualifies an individual from acting as Judge flows from two principles : (1) No one should be a Judge in his own cause; and (2) Justice should not only be done but seen to be done. Proceedings before a deciding authority may be vitiated if he is biased or has his own interest in the case before him. Franks[footnoteRef:7] has rightly observed that the rule against bias is justified on the ground that impartiality is a characteristic of good administration. [7: Franks Committee Report, 21.]

(b) Meaning of BiasA predisposition to decide for or against one party without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias. In Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning,[footnoteRef:8] Lord Thankerton defines bias as follows: [8: 1948 AC 87.]

"My Lords, I could wish that the use of the word 'bias' should be confined to its proper sphere. Its proper significance in my opinion is to denote a departure from the standard of even handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator."(c) Principle explained It is well settled principle of law that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done. Justice can never be seen to be done if a man acts as a judge in his own cause or is himself interested in its outcome. This principle is applicable not only to judicial proceedings but also to quasi-judicial as well as administrative proceedings. It is the minimal requirement of natural justice that the authority must consist of impartial persons who are to act fairly and without prejudice and bias. A decision which is a result of bias is a nullity and the trial is Coram non-judicie.[footnoteRef:9] [9: Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611.]

(d) Types of Bias Bias appears in various forms which may affect the decision in variety of ways. The various types of bias are (i) Pecuniary bias (ii) Personal bias (iii) Subject-matter bias(iv) Departmental bias; and (v) Policy bias. (i) Pecuniary biasAs regards pecuniary bias the least pecuniary interest in the subject-matter of litigation will disqualify any person from acting as a judge. According to Griffith and Street,[footnoteRef:10] [10: Principles of Administrative Law, 4th ed., p. 156.]

"a pecuniary interest, however slight, will disqualify, even though it is not proved that the decision is in any way affected."In Bonham Case,[footnoteRef:11] Dr. Bonham, a Doctor of Cambridge University was fined by the College of Physicians for practicing in the city of London without the license of the College. The statute under which College acted provided that the fines should go half to the King and half to the College. Adjudicating upon the claim, Coke, C.J., disallowed the claim as the College had a financial interest in its own judgment and was Judge in its own cause. [11: (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 113(b).]

In India also, the same principle is accepted. In Manak Lal v. Dr. Pram Chand,[footnoteRef:12] Gajendragadkar, J. observed [12: AIR 1957 SC 425.]

"It is obvious that pecuniary interest, however small it may be in a subject matter of the proceedings, would wholly disqualify a member from acting as a Judge." In Visakapatnam Co-op. Motor Transport Ltd. v. Bangaruraju,[footnoteRef:13] a cooperative society wanted a permit. The Collector was the President of that society and at the same time he was also Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority granting permit in favour the society. The decision was quashed by the Court as it was in violation of the principles of natural justice [13: 1953 Mad. 709.]

(ii) Personal BiasPersonal bias arises in a number of circumstances involving a certain relationship equation between the deciding authority and the parties which incline him unfavorably or otherwise on the side of one of the parties before him. Here a Judge may be relative, friend or business associate of a party. He may have some personal grudge, enmity or grievance or professional rivalry against him. In view of these factors there is very likelihood that the Judge may be biased towards one party or prejudiced towards the other. However, the list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Thus, in Mineral Development Ltd. v. State of Bihar,[footnoteRef:14] the petitioners were granted mining licence for 99 years in 1947. But the Minister who had political rivalry with the petitioners cancelled the licence. This action of the government was challenged on the ground of personal bias. The challenge was accepted by the Court and it was held that there was personal bias against the petitioners and the Minister was disqualified from taking any action against the petitioners. [14: 1960 SC 468.]

In Meengless Tea Estate v. Workmen,[footnoteRef:15] the Manager conducted an inquiry against a workman for the allegation that he had beaten the Manager. The Supreme Court held that the inquiry was vitiated because of personal bias. [15: AIR 1963 SC 1719.]

In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India,[footnoteRef:16] one Naquishbund was candidate for selection to the Indian Foreign Service and was also a member of the Selection Board. Naquishbund did not sit on the Selection Board when his name was considered. Naquishbund was recommended by the Board and he was selected by the Public Service Commission. The candidates who were not selected challenged the selection of Naquishbund on the ground that principles of natural justice were violated. The Supreme Court quashed the selection and observed: [16: AIR 1970 SC 150.]

it is against all canons of justice to make a man Judge in his own cause. It is true that he did not participate in deliberations of the Committee when his name was considered. But then the very fact that he was member of the Selection Board must have its own impact on decision of the Selection of the Board. The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased."About the importance of this case, Bhagwati, J. has observed: A.K. Kraipak is a landmark in the development of administrative law and it has contributed in large measure to strengthening of the rule of law in this country. We would not like to whittle down in the slightest measure the vital principle laid down in this decision which has nourished the roots of the rule of law and injected justice and fair play in legality.[footnoteRef:17] [17: Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 454.]

(iii) Subject-matter bias.Subject-matter bias may arise when the Judge has a general interest in the subject-matter. According to Griffith and Street,[footnoteRef:18] "Only rarely will this bias invalidate proceedings". A mere general interest in the general object to be pursued would not disqualify a Judge from deciding the matter. There must be some direct connection with the litigation. Thus, in R.v. Deal Justice exparte Curling,[footnoteRef:19] Magistrate was not held disqualified for trying a case of cruelty to an animal on the ground that he was a member of the Royal Society for prevention of cruelty to animals because this did not create a real likelihood of bias. Similar was the decision in Murlidhar v. Kadam Singh[footnoteRef:20], the Chairman of an Election tribunal was not declared disqualified from deciding the dispute relating to the petitioners election on the ground that the Chairman's wife was member of Congress Party whose candidate the petitioner had defeated. [18: Administrative law, 4th ed., p. 156.] [19: (1881) 45 LT 439.] [20: AIR1964 MB 111.]

(iv) Departmental biasDepartmental bias is inherent in administrative process. If it is not checked it will negate the concept of fairness in administrative process. The leading case on this point is Gullapalli Nageshwar Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (Gullapalli.1),[footnoteRef:21] in this case the Transport Ministry issued a direction to the Secretary to the Transport Department to hear objections under Section 68 (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act to the proposed scheme of Nationalization. The objections filed by the petitioners were received and heard by the secretary and thereafter the scheme was approved by the Chief Minister. The Supreme Court accepted the contentions of the petitioner that the official who heard the objections was in substance' one of the parties to the dispute and this was against the principles of natural justice. [21: AIR1959 SC 309.]

But in Gullapalli 11[footnoteRef:22], the Minister heard the objections and decided the case rejecting the objections. The decision of the Minister was upheld. The Supreme Court observed that the proceedings were not vitiated as the secretary was a part of the department whereas the Minister was only primarily responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to that department. [22: AIR 1959 1376.]

(v) Policy bias.Sometimes it happens that the Minister or the official concerned may announce beforehand the general policy which he intends to follow. The question is whether such a statement would disqualify him from acting as the deciding authority on the ground that this indicates his partiality to the issues in dispute. According to Wade,[footnoteRef:23] Ministerial or departmental policy cannot be regarded as disqualifying bias. [23: Administrative Law, 1988, p. 489.]

The point of policy bias came for consideration before the Supreme Court in T. Govindraj Mudaliar v. State of T.N.[footnoteRef:24] In this case the government decided in principle to Nationalize Road Transport and appointed a committee to frame the Scheme. This Committee consisted of Home Secretary as a member. Later on, the scheme of nationalization was finalized, published and the objections were heard by the Home Secretary. It was contended that the hearing was vitiated on account of bias as the Secretary had already made up his mind on the question of nationalization because he was a member of the Committee which took this policy decision. Rejecting the contention, the Court said that the Secretary as a member of the Committee did not finally decide any issue as to foreclose his mind. He simply assisted the government in preparing the scheme. [24: AIR 1973 SC 974.]

Policy bias is inherent in administrative process and it cannot be eliminated. It is useless to condemn a public officer on ground of bias merely because he is pre-disposed in favour of some policy in public interest. In this respect a statement of Frank J. is often quoted : "If, however, 'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to mean the total absence of pre-conceptions in the mind of the Judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one will. The human mind, even, at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with pre-dispositions Much harm is done by the myth that,- merely by taking the oath of office as a Judge, a man ceases to be human and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking machine.

(e) Tests of bias The position in case of pecuniary bias is that an interest, however small it may be disqualifies a person from acting as a Judge. But that is not se in case of personal bias. In order to challenge administrative action successfully on the ground of personal bias, it is necessary to prove that there is a "reasonable suspicion of bias" or a "real likelihood of bias". According to De Smith,[footnoteRef:25] "reasonable suspicion" test looks mainly to outward appearances, "real likelihood" test focuses on the Court's own evaluation of the probabilities. This is because of the maxim that justice is not only to be done but seen to be done. In Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Lannon,[footnoteRef:26] the test of real likelihood of bias was given a somewhat broader content. As Lord Denning says, [25: Judicial Review of Aministrative Action, 1980, p. 262.] [26: 1960 WLR 815.]

the reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking that the Judge was biased The test as now formulated boils to the "reasonable suspicion" test.

2. Audi Alteram PartemRule of Hearing - The audi alteram partem rule means that no one should be condemned unheard. In a civilized society it is assumed that a person against whom any action is sought to be taken, or whose right or interest is being affected, shall be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. This jural postulate is the kernel of natural justice. Professor. H.W.R. Wade rightly says that audi alteram partem embraces the whole nation of fair procedure or due process. According to de Smith,"no proposition can be more clearly established than that a man cannot incur the loss of liberty or property for an offence by a judicial proceeding until he has had a fair opportunity of answering the case against him." "A party is not to suffer in person or in purse without an opportunity of being heard." It is the first principle of civilized jurisprudence and is accepted by the laws of Men and God. In short. the principle is that before an order is passed against any person reasonable opportunity of being heard must be afforded to him. Generally, the maxim includes two ingredients (i) Notice; and (ii) Hearing.

(i) Notice A basic principle of natural justice is that before any action is taken, the affected person must be given notice to show cause against the proposed action and seek his explanation. It is a sine qua non of fair hearing. Any order passed without giving notice is against the principles of natural justice and is void ab initio.[footnoteRef:27] [27: Municiple Board Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, AIR 1965 SC 458.]

Even if there is no provision in the statute about giving of notice, if the order adversely affects the rights of an individual, the notice is required to be given. Further it is necessary that the notice must be clear, specific and un-ambiguous and the charges should not be vague and uncertain.[footnoteRef:28] [28: N.R. Co-op, Society v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1967 SC 1182.]

(ii) Hearing The second requirement of the audi alteram partem is that the party concerned must be given an opportunity of being heard before any action is taken against him. In the leading case of Cooper v. Wardsfrotth Beat Board of Works[footnoteRef:29], the Board had power to demolish any building without giving an opportunity of hearing if it was erected without prior permission. The Board issued order under at, re noose of the plaintiff was demolished. The action was brought against the Board because it had used that power without giving the owner an opportunity of being heard Although the action of the Board was not in violation of the statutory provision, the Court held that the Boards power was subject to the qualification that no man can be deprived of his property without having an opportunity of being heard. [29: (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180. ]

In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,[footnoteRef:30] the passport of the petitioner was impounded by the Government of India in public interest. No opportunity was afforded to the petitioner before taking the impugned action. The Supreme Court held that the order was violative of the principles of natural justice. [30: AIR 1978 SC 597.]

In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India,[footnoteRef:31] the Government of India by exercising its power conferred on it by Section 18A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 took over the management of the petitioner Company. The Company challenged the said action, inter alia, on the ground of non-observance of the principle of audi alteram partern. The High Court of Delhi held that the requirements of prior notice and hearing were excluded by the statute. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held [31: AIR 1981 SC 818.]

in order to ensure fair play in action it was imperative for the government to comply substantially with this fundamental rule of prior hearing before passing the impugned order". In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,[footnoteRef:32] under the statute the Commissioner was empowered for removal of construction without notice. However, the Court held that it was merely an enabling provision and not a command not to issue notice before demolition of structure. The discretion was, therefore, required to be exercised according to the principles of natural justice. [32: AIR 1986 SC 818.]

3. Reasoned Decisions or Speaking Order (A) MeaningA reasoned decision means a decision which must contain reasons in support of it. (B) SignificanceThe value of reasoned decisions as a check upon the arbitrary use of administrative power is quite clear. A party has right to know not only the result of inquiry but also the reasons in support of the decision. But the requirement that reasons be given does more than merely vindicate the right of the individual to know why a decision injurious to him has been given. This is so because the obligation to give a reasoned decision is a substantial check upon the abuse of power. A decision supported by reasons is much less likely to rest on caprice or careless consideration. The giving of reasons serves both to convince those subject to the decision that they are not arbitrary and to ensure that they are not, in fact, arbitrary. The need publicly to articulate the reasoning process, upon which a decision is based, requires the administrative authority to work out all the factors which are present in a case. Lord Denning rightly says, 'the giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.' In India - Natural justice postulates that party has right to know not only the decision but also the reasons. But this is not a universally established rule although in certain situations it is rigidly enforced. The duty to give reasons may be statutory or non-statutory. Where the duty is required by the statute, the authority is bound to give reasoned decisions in all cases to which that provision applies. But in the absence of statutory requirement, the Courts have been emphatic to advise judicial or quasi-judicial bodies to assign reasons in such a form as to justify the orders being called what are described as speaking orders.[footnoteRef:33] [33: Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyamsundar Jhunjhwala, AIR 1961 SC 1669.]

A speaking order means an order which speaks by itself. Thus every order must contain reasons for support of it. Speaking orders are necessary to make judicial review effective. The affected party must know why and on what grounds an order has been passed against him. This is a cardinal principle of natural justice. In M.P. Industries v. Union of India,[footnoteRef:34] it was contended that the obligation to give reasons might involve delay. Rejecting this contention, the Court observed : [34: AIR 1966 SC 671.]

"The least a tribunal can do is to disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure guarantees consideration. The condition to give reasonsminimizes arbitrariness: it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made; and it also enables an appellate or supervisory Court to keep the tribunals within bounds."(i) Implied Statutory Requirement The obligation to give reasons for judicial or quasi-judicial decision has been particularly implied where the statute provides for appeal, review or revision against those orders. In Mahabir Prasad v. State of M.P.,[footnoteRef:35] the Supreme Court ruled, if a quasi-judicial decision is subject to appeal, the law necessarily implies the requirement of reasons otherwise the right of appeal shall become an "empty formality." Even where the statute does not provide for an appeal or revision, the administrative authorities are required to give reasons, if they are discharging quasi-judicial functions. [35: AIR 1970 SC 1302.]

In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab,[footnoteRef:36] the Supreme Court rightly observed that where severe penalty is imposed, the absence of appeal rather makes it essential to give reasons. [36: AIR 1972 SC 1571.]

(ii) Reasons by appellate authoritiesIn general, if the decision of the authority of first instance is wholly or partially reversed in appeal, the authority must give reasons for such reversa1. However, where the decision in appeal or revision is simply confirmed reasons are not to be given. Thus in M. P. Industries v. Union of India,[footnoteRef:37] the Supreme Court ruled that since the State Government had given reasons, the Central Government confirming the decision in appeal was not required to give reasons. But this ruling was disapproved by the Supreme Court in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India.[footnoteRef:38] In this case the Central Government affirmed the order of the State Government which had rejected the appellant's application for granting a mining lease. No reasons were given by the government. In appeal the Supreme Court held that the Central Government was bound to give reasons. [37: AIR 1966 SC 671.] [38: AIR 1967 SC 1606.]

(iii) Disclosure of reasonsThe compass of reasoned decisions is expanding. There does not seem any rationale why reasons should not be disclosed for all determinations. Disclosure of reasons is the only possible safeguard against possible injustice and arbitrariness, and affords protection to the person adversely affected. In Union of India v. M.L. Kapoor,[footnoteRef:39] Justice Beg has succinctly stated the importance of disclosure of reasons. The learned judge says: [39: AIR 1974 SC 87.]

"Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision, whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinion or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable." Similarly, Chandrachud, J. has observed in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,[footnoteRef:40] that the power to refuse to disclose reasons in support of the order is "exceptional in nature and it ought to be exercised fairly, sparingly and only when fully justified by the exigencies of an uncommon situation." [40: AIR 1978 SC 597.]

(iv) Natural justice perspective Eventually, a general obligation to give reasons has been laid down as regards all quasi-judicial decisions. In Siemens Engineering and Mfg. Co. v. Union of India,[footnoteRef:41] the requirement to give reasons has been raised to the pedestal of "a basic principle of natural justice" "like the principle of audi alteram partem". In this case speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. observed : [41: AIR 1976 SC 1785.]

"It is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders woof give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram pattern, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law." This requirement would apply not only quasi-judicial functions like assessment or deciding an appeal but would extend to all administrative decisions affecting the civil rights of individuals, like impounding of a passport, as the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative decisions has broken down. Now it is well established that the requirement of giving reasoned decision is one of the principles of natural justice. In S.N. Mukherji v. Union of lndia,[footnoteRef:42] the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court following Simens Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Union of India[footnoteRef:43] observed: [42: AIR 1990 SC 1984.] [43: AIR 1976 SC 1785.]

"Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion that the requirement to record reasons can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which. governs exercise of power by the administrative authorities.

Effect of Breach of Natural Justice: Void or Voidable(a) General If any decision is rendered in violation of the principle of natural justice, it is said to be void or voidable. A voidable order is an order which is legal and valid, unless it is quashed by a competent Court, that is, it has legal effect up to the time until it is quashed. On the other hand, a void order is no order in the eye of law. It is a still-born order, a nullity and void ab initio.According to Professor Wade, any decision which is rendered in violation of the rules of natural justice is void. However, according to Kelson, a norm is always valid and is never a nullity but it can be made ineffective. Accordingly, any decision which is rendered in violation of the principles of natural justice is voidable. A full scale examination of this question came in Ridge v. Baldwin.[footnoteRef:44] According to the majority, the decision of the Watch Committee which terminated the services of the Constable was void because the rule of fair hearing had been violated . On the other hand, the minority considered that it was merely voidable. This uncertainty is found in later decisions as Well. [44: 1964 AC 40.]

In Durayappah v. Femando,[footnoteRef:45] the Privy Council expressed the view that the denial of the principles of natural justice makes decision voidable and not void. In State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambier,[footnoteRef:46] the Supreme Court laid down that mere use of the word 'void' is not determinative of its legal impact. The word 'void' has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only connotes the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. A void order can not be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations. Ordinarily such an order will, in fact, be effective inter partes until it is successfully avoided or challenged in a higher forum. [45: (1967) 2 AC 337.] [46: (1996) 1 SCC 435.]

(b) Rule against bias: Effect of Violation According to Rubinstein, a decision vitiated by bias is voidable because bias does not touch the jurisdiction. On the other hand, the view as expressed by Wade is that a decision in violation of the rule against bias is void. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court of India is that a decision in violation of the rule against bias is null and void. A judgment which is the result of bias or want of impartiality is nullity and the trial `coram non judice'.

(c) Audi alteram partem : Effect of violation In India, it is fairly well settled that whenever there is violation of the rule of fair hearing, the order is null and void. Thus, where an order retiring a civil servant on ground of reaching superannuation age was issued without giving opportunity to the employee, or where a passport of a journalist was impounded without giving notice, or where liability was imposed by the Commission without giving an opportunity of being heard to the assessee, the actions were held to be null and void. An interesting question arose in Nawab Khan v. State of Gujarat,[footnoteRef:47] In this case, the Supreme Court held that 'an order which infringes fundamental freedom passed in violation of the audi alteram pattern rule is a nullity'. The appellant in this case had been prosecuted and convicted for disobeying an externment order which was later held invalid for want of hearing. The Supreme Court emphasized that an externrnent order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is of no effect and the petitioner was never guilty of flouting 'an order which never legally existed'. [47: AIR 1974 SC 1471.]

Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court in AR. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,[footnoteRef:48] stands for the proposition that any action in violation of the principles of natural justice is nullity. One of the question posed for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the Supreme Court's direction given suo motu directing the withdrawal of a criminal case against Mr. Antulay Ex-Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra from special judge and transferring the same to High Court without giving an opportunity to him is void and as such liable to be quashed? Replying the poser in the affirmative, the Supreme Court ruled that an action in violation of natural justice is null and void. [48: AIR 1988 SC 1531.]

Courts in India have consistently taken the view that whenever there is violation of any rule of natural justice, the order is nullity and void ab-initio, invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. A void order cannot be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations. Ordinarily such an order will, in fact, be effective inter partes until it is successfully avoided or challenged in a higher forum.

ConclusionTo sum up, one finds that initially the principles of natural justice used to be applied to courts of law alone but later on from judicial sphere it extended, to the tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions and then to the statutory authorities and the administrative authorities, who have upon them, the responsibility of determining civil rights or obligations of the people. In normal conditions, an action or a decision, judicial or administrative, affecting rights of an individual and resulting in civil consequence is unthinkable. In the present day, without affording hearing by an unbiased and impartial authority who must act objectively and must also give out his mind, as to what weighed in decision making process, by incorporating reasons to support the decision or, to say so, by giving a speaking order. This is necessary for a society, which is governed by Rule of law. How substantive laws are applied and rights are determined is a question not less important, to say it again, the principles of -natural justice are great humanizing principles intended to invest law with fairness to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice.

Bibliography

1. Jain, M.P. Principle Of Administrative Law, 6th ed. New Delhi: Wadhwa & Co. Nagpur (2007).

2. Upadhyaya, J.J.R. Administrative Law, 8th ed. Allahabad: Central Law Agency (2012).

Webliography

1. www.lawnotes.in/Principles_of_Natural_Justice.

2. www.slideshare.net/AlexThottathil/natural-justice-notes.

1. -Principles of Natural Justice-Page 27