PASTOR vs. CITY OF PASIGG.R. No. 146873. May 9, 2002.Reassignment An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency: Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary.

FACTS:Petitioner Remedios Pastor is Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. In 1992, she was reassigned to the Office of the Municipal Administrator pending investigation of reports against her concerning the issuance of Advice of Allotments by her. In 1995, after three years with no case filed against her, she asked for reinstatement to her former position. But she was instead reassigned to another unit of the now city government. Upon her complaint, the Civil Service Commission ordered her reinstatement as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. However, on appeal of the city government, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Hence petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:Whether or not the decision of CA should be set aside and that of the CSC reinstated.

HELD:YES.It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status, and salary is in effect a constructive removal from the service. In this case, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, petitioners reassignment to different offices in the local government of Pasig City is indefinite. Petitioner has been on virtual floating assignments, which cannot but amount to a diminution of her rank, hence impermissible under the law. As already noted, her reassignment began in 1992 with her detail to the Office of the (now) City Administrator pending investigation of reports that she had issued Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections. However, no investigation appears to have ever been conducted on the said charge. To justify her continuing reassignment, respondent City Mayor claimed that the same was due to petitioners long years of experience in finance which especially fitted her for studies regarding the citys revenues.The SC with the CSC that petitioner should now be returned to her original position for her indefinite detail to other positions would amount to her removal without cause from the position to which she has been permanently appointed. There is no question that we recognize the validity and indispensable necessity of the well established rule that for the good of public service and whenever public interest demands, [a] public official may be temporarily assigned or detailed to other duties even over his objection without necessarily violating his fundamental and legal rights to security of tenure in the civil service. But as we have already stated, such cannot be undertaken when the transfer of the employee is with a view to his removal and if the transfer is resorted to as a scheme to lure the employee away from his permanent position because such attitude is improper as it would in effect result in a circumvention of the prohibition which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the civil service.Petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Respondent City of Pasig is ordered to forthwith REINSTATE petitioner Remedios Pastor to her original position as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig.

CORREA vs CFI OF BULACANNo. L-46096. July 30, 1979

FACTS:There were two policemen involved that were illegally dismissed by the petitioner during his incumbency as the Mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan (reason fo the said dismissal was not mentioned in the case).December 13, 1968, CFI of Bulacan rendered judgment in favor of the policemen and ordered personally to pay the salaries which the policemen failed to receive by reason of their illegal dismissal from office until they are actually reinstated. August 24, 1976, CA affirmed the decision of the CFI and became final and executory.On April 22, 1977, respondent Court issued the Order denying the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. Petitioner thus came to this Court, maintaining that he could no longer be required to pay the back salaries of the private respondents because payment on his part presupposes his continuance in office, which is not the case. He contends that it is the Municipality of Norzagaray that is liable for said payment, invoking Aguador v. Enerio.3 and Sison v. Pajo.4 Further, petitioner alleges that the fact that he is no longer municipal mayor of Norzagaray, constitutes a substantial change in the situation of the parties which makes the issuance of the writ of execution inequitable.Petitioner prays, among others, that judgment be rendered declaring that the payment of back salaries of private respondents should be made by the incumbent mayor and by the municipality of Norzagaray; Bulacan, and that petitioner is no longer liable for the payment thereof; and annulling the Order dated April 22, 1977 of respondent court denying the motion to quash the writ of execution.

ISSUE:Whether or not Correa as a public official (Mayor) who wrongfully/illegally dismissed an employee during his incumbency is still liable to the case personally.

HELD:YES.Liability of public official who wrongfully dismissed an employee is personal; Principle of personal liability applicable to cases where public officer discharges an employee wrongfully. In the discharge of governmental functions, municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof.A public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable therefor like any private individual. This principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office, the officials were acting outside their official authority.Instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.