Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
AEROSPACE REPORT NO.ATR-72(7316-01 ) -1 . VOL 111-2
11 876
Advanced Missions SafetyVolume I I I : A p p e n d i c e s
Part 2, Experiment Safety -- Suppor t ing Analyses
Prepared bySYSTEMS P L A N N I N G DIVISION
15 O( tobcr 1972
Prepared tor
OFFICE OF M A N N E D SPACE FLIGHTNATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Washington, D. C.
Contract No. N A S w - 2 3 0 1
Systems E n g i n e e r i n g O p e r a t i o n s
THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19730003149 2020-03-26T00:52:13+00:00Z
. Aerospace Report No.ATR-72(7316-01)-1 Vol. HI-2
ADVANCED MISSIONS SAFETY
VOLUME III - APPENDICES
Part 2, Experiment Safety - Supporting Analyses
Prepared by
Systems Planning Division
15 October 1972
Systems Engineering OperationsTHE AEROSPACE CORPORATION
El Segundo, California
Prepared for
OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHTNATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Washington, D. C.
Contract No. NASw-2301
Aerospace Report No.ATR-72(7316-01)-1 Vol. Ill-2
ADVANCED MISSIONS SAFETY
Volume III: Appendices
Part 2, Experiment Safety - Supporting Analyses
Prepared by
Systems Planning Division
Submitted by
M. G. Hinton, Jr.
Approved by
>. / ^A^AipT^&r%L-E. PerchonokStudy Manager
Samuel M. (TennantAssociate General ManagerSystems Planning DivisionSystems Engineering Operations
PREFACE
This study on Advanced Missions Safety has been performed as Task 2. 6 of
Contract NASw-2301, entitled, "Advanced Space Program Analysis and
Planning." The task consisted of three subtasks.
Subtask 1 — Space Shuttle Rescue Capability
Subtask 2 - Experiment Safety
Subtask 3 - Emergency Crew Transfer
Each subtask is an entity not related to or dependent upon any activity under
either of the other two subtasks.
The results of Task 2. 6 are presented in three volumes.
Volume I; Executive Summary Report presents a brief, con-
cise review of results and summarizes the princi-
pal conclusions and recommendations for all three
subtasks.
Volume II: Technical Discussion is in three parts, each pro-
viding a comprehensive discussion of a single
subtask.
Part 1 provides an assessment of Earth Orbit
Shuttle (EOS) capability to perform a rescue mis-
sion. It treats several concepts for augmenting
this capability and increasing EOS rescue mission
utility.
Part 2 presents an analysis of potential hazards
introduced when experimental equipment is carried
aboard the EOS. It identifies safety guidelines and
requirements for eliminating or reducing these
hazards.
Part 3 discusses the applicability and utility of
various means of emergency crew transfer between
a disabled and a rescuing vehicle.
Volume III; Appendices is in two parts, each devoted to an
individual subtask. Part 1 contains detailed sup-
porting analysis and backup material for Subtask 1,
and Part 2 contains similar material for Subtask 2.
Volume III is of interest primarily to the technical
specialist.
Since the reader is not necessarily interested in all three subtasks, each
part of Volumes II and III is a separate document.
All calculations were made using the customary system of units, and the data
are presented on that basis. Values in the International System of Units (SI)
are also given. Data taken from reference sources are presented in the sys-
tem of units employed in the original reference.
The Advanced Missions Safety Task was sponsored by NASA Headquarters
and managed by the Advanced Missions Office .of the Office of Manned Space
Flight. Mr. Herbert Schaefer, the study monitor, provided guidance and
counsel that significantly aided the effort. Mr. Charles W. Childs of the
Safety Office, NASA Headquarters, and Miss Ruth Weltmann of the Aerospace
Safety Research and Data Institute, NASA-Lewis, also provided valuable con-
tributions by reviewing the Experiment Safety Study results and making posi-
tive suggestions for improving the visibility of the results.
SUMMARY OVERVIEW
In contrast to safety considerations in experiment ground facilities, which
emphasize experimenter safety first, an experiment laboratory in space has
to give prime safety considerations to the operational functioning of the
Orbiter to enable a safe crew return.
In ground facilities, hazardous experiments are separated from other experi-
ments and personnel. For space operations, experiment equipment of a
hazardous nature may be densely packed, because flight costs are high. For
this reason special attention has to be given to potential interferences and
interactions such as overheating, permeating fields, spurious signals, high-
voltage potential, etc. Such interaction between experiments could lead to a
malfunction of otherwise safe equipment and might influence the safe operation
o f t h e Orbiter. ' • , - • - . . .
Many hazardous materials on board the Orbiter, such as cryogenics, storable
propellants, etc. , will add to the hazards of some of the experiments and the
crew. The location of such materials in relation to any experiment or
Orbiter equipment, as well as the access and egress routes for the experi-
menters, requires serious consideration.
In contrast to most ground laboratories, the Orbiter structure outside the
crew compartment can withstand a pressure difference of only a few psi. .
Therefore, experiments with components of a potential high pressure or
explosive source have to be constrained, shielded, or safed to prevent inad-
vertant activation by other experiments.
Toxic and hazardous materials (especially in gaseous or powder form), which
present a health hazard to men or which can damage materials or equipment,
may have to be double-contained with special environmental conditioning
systems, as complete cleanup of contaminants in zero gravity might be
impossible to achieve.
Venting of effluents into space, even in small amounts, will create a thrust
that has to be counteracted if the Experiment Module or the Orbiter are to
remain in a given orbit and prevented from tumbling. Thus, effluent outlets
should be designed and located so that any undesired thrust is compensated
by a counteracting thrust. If this cannot be achieved in an emergency, suf-
ficient Orbiter thrust should be available to keep the Orbiter on course, even
if all effluent has to be vented by emergency relief in one direction. Similar
considerations apply also to the case of rotating equipment producing reaction
torques.
Many of the experiments being considered for shirtsleeve operation will re-
quire venting of one or more fluids because they are conducted in an artificial
environment that has to be maintained for crew life support. Different fluid
lines require prominent marking, ready accessibility for repair, and arrange-
ment to permit convenient access or egress. All fluid lines require markings
and connectors that are unique to any one fluid.
Many of the experiments being considered have high-voltage components with
the potential of fire, shock, etc. which could result in .injury to the crew and
damage to the Orbiter. The clear indication of the operational status of such
components is required. In case of emergency, provisions for automatic
shut-down and rapid discharge after shutdown are required. Ground circuits
should be avoided.
Emergency situations resulting from experiment equipment and/or its opera-
tion that could lead to Orbiter damage and/or loss require immediate assess-
ment by the Orbiter crew. This can be accomplished by providing warning
signals in the crew compartment which indicate the hazard, its severity, its
location, etc. Normal procedures provide the commander with the authority
to determine actions necessary to save the Orbiter and crew. This may in-
volve sacrificing an experiment, an Experiment Module, and perhaps even a
crew member, if the emergency warrants such drastic means and the Orbiter
and most of the crew can be saved by such an action.
Radiation sources, such as radioisotopes, X-rays, lasers, etc., which can
cause injury to men and damage to materials, equipment, experiments, and
the operation of the Orbiter, should be clearly marked, monitored, shielded,
and located so that no interference is possible under normal operating con-
ditions. Emergency procedures and plans should be prepared and executed
if an emergency or malfunction is indicated by the monitoring system.
In ground facilities the safety plan for any complex experiment usually iden-
tifies start-up, operating, and normal and emergency shutdown procedures.
For the case of an Orbiter, where a number of experiments might be operated
simultaneously, safety procedures should consider not only single experi-
ments but also the interactions of all experiments to be operated at any one
time. A certain shutdown procedure might be safe for one experiment but
might create an emergency situation in another experiment, thus endangering
the Orbiter and crew. Such procedures might indicate, for example, that if
an emergency occurs in experiment A, experiment B has to be shut down prior
to taking action on experiment A. In another situation the Orbiter may be re-
quired to make a certain maneuver before shutdown action can be taken on
either experiment, in order to ensure the safety of the Orbiter.
In the case of hazardous experiment equipment such as lasers and X-rays,
there should be a trade-off study made to determine whether the experiment
should be conducted within or exterior to the Experiment Module or Orbiter.
If located within the Experiment Module, the experimenter can closely super-
vise the experiment operations and ensure compliance with all safety pro-
cedures. If located exterior to the Module or Orbiter, docking or EVA may
be required. Such operations also have safety implications, such as collisions
and EVA hazards.
CONTENTS
SUMMARY OVERVIEW 7
1. INTRODUCTION 23
1. 1 Background 23
1. 2 Study Objectives 23
1.3 Study Scope 24
2. EXPERIMENT AND HARDWARE DEFINITION 25
2. 1 Experiment Equipment and Support Requirements . . . . . . 25
2. 1.1 Blue Book Definitions 25
2 . 1 . 2 SOAR Study Definitions 26
2. 2 Orbiter Accommodation Modes 27
2. 2. 1 Blue Book 27
2. 2. 2 SOAR Study . . . . . 32
2. 2. 3 Present Study Assumptions 34
2. 3 Generic Experiment Categories 36
2. 4 Orbiter/Experiment Module Interfaces 38
2. 4. 1 Module Mounting . 38
2. 4. 2 Module Manipulation 38
2 .4 .3 Module Utilities/Support 38
2. 4. 3. 1 Electrical Power 38
2 .4 .3 .2 Life Support/Crew Systems 39
2. 4. 3. 3 Thermal Control 39
2 . 4 . 3 . 4 Guidance, Navigation, and Control. ... 39
2. 4. 3. 5 Controls and Displays . • 39
2. 4. 3. 6 Data Management 39
2 .4 .3 :7 Checkout System . 40
2. 4. 3. 8 Voice Communications 40
11
CONTENTS (Continued)
3.
4.
3. 1
3.2
3.3
3.4
General .
Experiment Modules
3 .2 .1 Hazard Source Identification
3 . 2 . 2 Hazard Analysis
Orbiter
3.3. 1 Hazards and Emergency Situations . .
3 .3 .2 Effects of Experiment Modules
Summary of Potential Emergency Situations
PREVENTIVE MEASURE ASSESSMENT
4. 1 Hazard Elimination/Avoidance
PREVENTIVE MEASURE STATEMENTS. . .
5. 1
(See also Table 5-1)
Design Features
5. 1. 1 Venting . . . .
5 .1 .2 Purging .
5. 1.3 Safing
5.1.4 Conditioning
5 .1 .5 Shielding
5. 1.6 Source Strength . .
5. 1.7 Fail -Safe Configurations . . . .
5. 1. 8 Protective Safety Devices
5. 1. 8. 1 Interlocks
5 .1 .8 .1 .1 Automatic
5. 1.8. 1.2 Manual Actuation . . . ' . .
5. 1. 8. 2 Covers . .
5. 1. 8. 3 Stops
5. 1. 8.4 Guards
41
41
41
42
. . 48
48
48
. . 51
55
. . 55
59
62
62
. . 63
64
. . 64
. . 64
65
65
66
66
66
67
68
69
69
12
CONTENTS (Continued)
5. 1. 8. 5 Discharge Devices 69
5 .1 .8 .6 Laser Energy Absorbing Means .. ... 69
5 .1 .8 .7 Extendable-Aid Device 70
5.1.8.8 Emergency Provisions 70
5. 1.8.9 Emergency Brake Provisions . . . . . . 70
5. 1.9 Jettisoning/Dumping 70
5. 1. 10 Remote Deployment/Operation 71
5. 1. 11 Holding 72
5. 1. 12 Packaging/Containment/Marking 73
5. 1. 13 Materials Selection 75
5. 2 Locational Features . . 76
5. 2. 1 Exterior Placement 76
5. 2. 2 Interior Considerations 77
5 . 2 . 3 Circumferential/Longitudinal Placement 78
5. 2. 4 Proximity Considerations 78
5. 2. 5 Accessibility Considerations 79
5. 2. 6 Jettisoning/Dumping Considerations 80
5. 3 Operational Techniques 81
5.3. 1 Setup/Deploy/Ope rate 81
5.3. 1. 1 Protective Garments /Devices 81
5 . 3 . 1 . 2 Remote Deployment 82
5 . 3 . 1 . 3 Remote Operation 82
5. 3 .1 .4 Special Work Areas 82
5 . 3 . 1 . 5 Restricted Operations . . . 83
5 .3 .1 .6 Special Precautions 84
5. 3. 1. 6. 1 EVA Operations . 84
5 . 3 . 1 . 6 . 2 EVA-Device Operations . . 84
5.3 .1 .6 .3 Egress Operations 85
5 .3 .1 .6 .4 Contingency Plans/Procedures 85
13
CONTENTS (Continued)
6.
8.
5.3.2 Deactivating/Securing
5.3.3 Jettisoning /Dumping
5.3 .4 Caution and Warning Systems
5.3.5 Monitoring and Control
REMEDIAL MEASURE ASSESSMENT
6. 1
6.2
Potentially Unresolved Hazardous Situations . . . .
Remedial Measure Statements
6. 2. 1 Fire Suppression
6. 2. 2 Emergency EC/LS
6. 2. 3 Medical Aid
6. 2. 4 Decontamination
6. 2. 5 Structure Repair
6. 2. 6 Removal Tools
6 .2 .7 Access Equipment
6. 2. 8 Crew Transfer Equipment (Space Rescue)
6, 2. 9 Crew Aid and Retrieval
6. 2. 10 Ground Facility Aid
EXPERIMENT INTERACTION SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS . . .
7. 1
7. 2
7.3
7 .4
Experiment-to -Experiment Interactions
Experiment -to -Module Interactions
Experiment -to -Orbiter Interactions
Interaction Summary
SUMMARY
8. 1
8.2
8.3
Interaction Considerations
Accommodation Mode Considerations
Hazards and Emergency Situations
85
86
87
89
91
91
93
94
94
96
97
98
98
99
99
99
100
101
101
102
103
104
107
107
108
109
14
CONTENTS (Continued)
8.4 Preventive Measures . .' 110
8. 5 Remedial Measures Ill
9 . REFERENCES . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
10. SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS . ... 115
i 15
Volume II - Part 2
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 17
2. PRIMARY PARAMETERS AFFECTING EXPERIMENTSAFETY 19
3. EXPERIMENT INTERACTION SAFETYCONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4. EXPERIMENT SAFETY GUIDELINES 37
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 121
6. REFERENCES 123
7. SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 125
16
FIGURES
2-1
2-2
2-3
2-3. a
.b
. c
.d
2-4
2-5
2-6
3-1
3-2
3-3
3-4
3-5
3-6
3-7
4-1
4-2
6-1
Selected Representative Satellite Payloads
Shuttle-Based Experiment Operations !. . . '. .
Several Operating Modes for Space Shuttle Orbiter -Sortie Operations
Man-Conducted Experiment Operations UsingSeparate Experiment and Support Modules . . . . . . . . . . .
Man-Conducted Experiment Operations UsingSingle Module for Experiment and Support
Free-Flying, Unmanned, Man-ServicedExperiment Operation
Attached Automated Experiment Operation
SOAR/Shuttle Mission Classes
Shuttle -Based Accommodation Modes
Selected Generic Experiment Categories
Equipment/Support Requirements -Astronomy Modules; Attached MSM Mode
Potential Hazard Sources - Astronomy Module;Attached MSM Mode
Hazard Sources Related to Equipment and Contents
Hazard Sources Related to Operations
Orbiter Hazards
Summary of Orbiter Emergency Situations
Hazards/Interactions (On-Orbit Phase); AstronomyModules, Attached MSM Mode
Preventive Measure Assessment - Lasers
Summary of General Preventive Measures
Remedial Measure Assessment -Overboard Vent Malfunctions
28
29
31
31
31
31
31
33
35
37
43
44
45
46
49
50
52
56
58
92
17
TABLES
2-1 FPE Requirements Summary . . . . . ; 117
2-2 Crew Skills 119
2-3 Fluid Management Experiment Requirements Summary ... 120
2-4 EVA Experiment Requirements Summary 123
2-5 FPE-Subgroup Analysis - Space Physics Example 124
2-6 FPE-Sub-FPE Relationships . . . 125
2-7 Candidate Blue Book RAM Payloads, Eight Free-FlyingResearch and Applications Modules 126
2-8 Candidate Payload Subgroups 127
3-1 Experiment/SupportRequirements - Astronomy Modules,
Attached MSM Mode 128
3-2 - Physics Modules,Attached MSM Mode 130
3-3 - Earth Survey Modules,Attached MSM Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3-4 - Comm/Nav Modules,Attached MSM Mode . . 133
3-5 - Materials and Manu-facturing Modules,Attached MSM Mode 134
3-6 - Contamination Module,Attached MSM Mode 135
3-7 - Equipment TechnologyModules, AttachedMSM Mode 136
3-8 - Life Sciences Modules,Attached MSM Mode 138
18
TABLES (Continued)
3-9 Experiment/SupportRequirements - Astronomy Modules,
Detached RAM Mode 139
3-10 - Cosmic Ray Physics Modules,Detached RAM Mode 141
3-11 - Fluid Management Modules,Detached RAM Mode 142
3-12 - Life Sciences Modules,Detached RAM Mode 143
3-13 - Satellite Payloads,Detached RAM Mode . ... 144
3-14 - Astronomy Modules,Attached Pallet Mode 145
3-15 - Physics Modules,Attached Pallet Mode . . . 146
3-16 - Earth Survey Modules,Attached Pallet Mode 147
3-17 - Comm/Nav Modules,Attached Pallet Mode 148
3-18 - Biological Module,Attached Pallet Mode 149
3-19 - Contamination Modules,Attached Pallet Mode . 150
3-20 - Equipment Technology Modules,Attached Pallet Mode 151
3-21 Hazards/Interactions(On-Orbit Phase) - Astronomy Modules,
Attached MSM Mode 152
3-22 - Physics Modules,Attached MSM Mode 154
19
TABLES (Continued)
3-23 Hazard/Interactions(On-Orbit Phase) - Earth Survey Modules,
Attached MSM Mode 159
3-24 - Comm/Nav Modules,Attached MSM Mode 160
3-25 - Materials and ManufacturingModules, Attached MSMMode 161
3-26 - Contamination Modules,Attached MSM Mode . . 162
3-27 - Equipment TechnologyModules, Attached MSMMode 163
3-28 - Life Sciences Modules,Attached MSM Mode 166
3-29 Hazards/InteractionsSummary - Attached MSM Mode, On-Orbit
Phase 168
3-30 . - Detached RAM Mode, On-OrbitPhase . 176
3-31 - Attached Pallet Mode, On-OrbitPhase 181
3-32 Summary of Hazard Source, Causation, and Interaction ^Results - Equipment/Contents - Related HazardSources 186
3-33 Summary of Hazard Source, Causation, and InteractionResults - Operations - Related Hazard Sources . 194
3-34 Summary of Hazard/Emergency Groups and TheirRelated Experimental Sources 197
20
TABLES (Continued)
3-35 Emergency Situation Applicability - Pre-Launch Phase. ... 199
3-36 - Ascent Phase . . 200
3-37 - On-Orbit Phase 201
3-38 - Return Phase 202
3-39 - Post-Flight Phase . . . . 203
5-1 In-Space Experiments; Hazard/Emergency Analysis andSafety Criteria Summary Sheets 204
5- l .H- l High-Temperature Sources 2045-1.H-2 Overboard Vents 2055-1, H-3 Lasers 2065-1.H-4 Spark Chambers ., 2075-1.H-5 Superconducting Magnet 2085-1, H-6 Scientific Airlocks 2095-1, H-7 Subsatellites 2105- l ,H-8 Rotating Equipment 2115-1,H-9 Telescopes 2125-1.H-10 Booms/Platforms/Antennas 2135- l .H- l l Balloons 2145- l ,H-12 Negative Pressure Source 2155-1.H-13 Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU) 2165-1.H-14 Maneuverable Work Platform (MWP) 2175- l ,H-15 Teleoperated Spacecraft 2185-1.H-16 Solid Propellants 2195-1.H-17 Radiation Sources 2205-l ,H-18 Cameras and Equipment 2215-1.H-19 Batteries 2225-1.H-20 Electrically Powered Experiment Equipment. . . 2235-1.H-21 Biologicals/Animals/Insects/Plants 2245-1.H-22 Non-Cryogenic Fluids 2255-1.H-23 Non-Cryogenic Gases 2275- l ,H-24 Cryogenics 2285-1.H-25 Emulsions 2295- l ,H-26 Specific Contamination Source . . . 2305-1.H-27 EVA Operations 2315- l ,H-28 Maintenance and Repair Operations 2325-1.H-29 Egress Operations 2335-1.H-30 Erection/Retraction Operations 2345-1.H-31 Docking/Undocking Operations 235
6-1 Summary of Hazard/Emergency Groups and TheirAssociated Potential Remedial Aid Requirements 236
21
1. INTRODUCTION
1. 1 BACKGROUND
A major NASA objective is to utilize manned space flight capability for the
benefit of our nation and mankind. To further this objective, a number of
experiment programs have been defined. These experiments are described
in the "Reference Earth Orbital Research and Applications Investigations"
(Blue Book), Ref. 1. This broad-based experiment program definition
encompasses the disciplines of astronomy, physics, earth observations,
communications/navigation, materials science and manufacturing, technol-
ogy, and the life sciences.
Present plans place complete dependence on the Space Shuttle for transport-
ing such scientific and application payloads into space and returning them
(where appropriate) from earth orbit. Additionally, the Orbiter element of
the Shuttle is required to deploy and retrieve payloads in some instances; in
other cases the Orbiter functions as a primary base of operations for an
attached experiment payload. In all cases the nature of the experiment pay-
loads and their potential for introducing or precipitating hazards which
endanger the safety of experimenters and/or the Orbiter and its crew are
of obvious interest. Therefore, this study was undertaken to investigate
the safety aspects of in-space experiments performed in connection with
the Space Shuttle.
1. 2 STUDY OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the study were:
a. Analyze the potential emergency situations created by carryingexperiment equipment aboard a Space Shuttle.
b. Identify safety guidelines and requirements for eliminating orreducing hazards to the Space Shuttle and its crew which maybe introduced by the experiment equipment and its operations.
23
1. 3 STUDY SCOPE
The safety analysis considered all mission phases from the launch pad
through to deployment, free flight (where applicable), experiment operations,
retrieval, and final disposition. Also considered were the interactions of the
experiment equipment and experiment operations with Experiment Modules
(Pallet, MSM, RAM, Sortie Module, etc. ) and the Space Shuttle, other pay-
loads within the Qrbiter cargo bay, and associated satellites.
24
2. EXPERIMENT AND HARDWARE DEFINITION
2. 1 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
A brief review of the literature indicated that a comprehensive identification
of basic candidate experiments and experiment equipment being considered as
payloads for the Space Shuttle was contained in the Blue Book, Ref. 1. Supple-
mentary experiment and hardware data, more specifically related to Space
Shuttle applicability (and extending to automated satellite payload compatibility),
was treated extensively in the SOAR study, Ref. 2. These two reference
sources, then, were utilized to provide baseline definitions of experiment
equipment and support requirements for the present safety analysis.
2.1.1 Blue Book Definitions
The 15 January 1971 edition of "Reference Earth Orbital Research and
Applications Investigations" (Blue Book) provides the latest definition of
experiment requirements data for continuing NASA Space Station, Space
Shuttle, and Research Application Module (RAM) definition activities.
The Blue Book describes experiment requirements for seven scientific
disciplines and functional program elements (FPEs) within each discipline,
where appropriate. An FPE is a grouping of experiments, experiment
classes, or research activities characterized by being mutually supportive
of a particular discipline of research or investigation or by imposing similar
and related demands on the support systems.
Tables 2-1 through 2-4 (from Ref. 1) summarize the Blue Book experiment
requirements. Table 2-1 summarizes the requirements for each FPE except
for Fluid Management and EVA, which cannot be summarized at the FPE level
due to either the complex and diverse nature of the facility requirements or
the uniqueness of each experiment set-up or operation. Summary data for
these two FPEs are presented in Table 2-3 (for Fluid Management) and
Table 2-4 (for EVA). Table 2-2 lists required crew skills and their code
numbers as used in Table 2-1.
25
Specific experiment equipment, support equipment, and materials used in the
conduct of the experiments are delineated in Section 3.
2 . 1 . 2 SOAR Study Definitions
Task 1 of the SOAR study (Ref. 2) had three basic elements: to assimilate
Shuttle payload data, to assess payload compatibility with Space Shuttle mis-
sion capabilities, and to select a representative payload set for detailed re-
quirements and accommodation analyses.
Candidate orbital experiment definition in terms of functional program ele-
ments (FPEs) is related to a facility or laboratory approach to orbital re-
search. In order to provide smaller packages affording greater flexibility
for short-duration Shuttle application missions, the 25 FPEs in the Blue Book
•were divided into 56 sub-FPEs, or payload elements. An example of how one
of the FPE concepts, the Space Physics Research Laboratory, was expanded
into five payload elements is shown in Table 2-5 (from Ref. 2). The resulting
56 payload elements and their relationships to the 25 FPEs in the Blue Book
are shown in Table 2-6 (from Ref. 2). These 56 payload elements plus two
indivisible FPEs (A-l and A-6) comprised the payload data base for Shuttle
orbital research in the SOAR study.
The second major class of Shuttle applications considered in the SOAR study
was the delivery, service, and retrieval of automated spacecraft. This in-
cluded operations with two types of spacecraft: operations related to free-
flying research and applications modules (RAMs) and conventional automated
orbital satellites and interplanetary spacecraft. Eight free-flying RAMs were
identified from the Blue Book (Table 2-7 from Ref. 2) and, as such, generally
include a pressurized or pressurizable compartment within •which crewmen
service the spacecraft at prescribed intervals, whereas conventional automated
spacecraft do not offer this facility.
The NASA Payload Fleet Analysis repoVt (Ref. 3) tabulates the characteristics
of 73 automated spacecraft potentially ready for flight in the 1977 to 1990 time
26
period. Of this number, four automated spacecraft (see Figure 2-1 from
Ref. 2) were chosen for the SOAR representative payload set to characterize
critical mission, design, and interface requirements on the Shuttle system;
they were also considered representative of the requirements envelope of the
full candidate spacecraft payload set.
Details concerning experiment equipment, support equipment, and materials
used in the conduct of the experiments or associated with the accommodation
of the automated spacecraft are delineated in Section 3.
2.2 ORBITER ACCOMMODATION MODES
2. 2. 1 Blue Book
As outlined in the Blue Book, experiment modules containing laboratory
facilities will operate either attached to a Space Station, attached to a Shuttle
(Shuttle-sortie mode), or will be free-flying, depending on experiment require
ments such as pointing, stabilization, g-level, etc. In this regard, the follow-
ing material is abstracted from the Blue Book (Ref . 1).
"A possible mode for accommodating experiment programsprior to or in lieu of the operational availability of a spacestation exists with the concept of using the Earth-to-OrbitSpace Shuttle as a short term orbital base for conductingexperiments. This concept evolves around the use of theShuttle and minimum additional support equipment to carryaloft research equipment and, where appropriate, scientistsand technicians, to conduct experiments during relativelyshort stay times in low earth orbit. In cases where man isnot directly required for experiment operation, such as mostastronomy observations, the concept includes leaving theequipment in orbit to accomplish the program with periodicservicing by subsequent Shuttle flights.
"The primary operating modes envisioned for Shuttle-sortieoperations, depicted in Figure 2-2, are as follows:
a. Modes where man is directly involved in the conduct ofthe experiment program. In these cases the research equip-ment is carried aloft in the Shuttle along with the necessarysupport equipment such as crew quarters, life support, anddata management provisions. In the attached modes the ex-periments are conducted during the Shuttle stay time on orbitof perhaps 5 to 30 days. The experiments would be conducted
27
o
<ztno
OZ
soo
oUJ
UJ$OItt<tUl
CO0
<4-4
O
£
<fttlaO
-£nJP.
(D£rf
<D
%<n<a
<n<U
fl)
Oa>,— t0)
bO
28
wQO
O
H
OQW
CQ
H
HHPEV5
CO
• iM
15
a,OJnO
at .
S «)O ITH
4-> 13
S uS '>
Xw
c.2"S.2*'S•«-<•4-)5jrt
OH
OO!-<
5ca
QW
O<:HH<
o
W
DE
TA
CH
E
n! • >»3 d o
3
£ < JB c
n io- c S iU
o0 Cd 5 tn
O.cuQ
0,
<u ."S o ™S •£ ~ £
"^ /^v ^^ 0JH w <L> 4->
W -a >
U
-s .s -° .SI -s »C a >'
a, a, 3X 0) <U Z>
H Q ttJ. w
0)
COao
a>a<O-i->rta>
H
(UCOnjffl
icu
(M
00
(U
bfl
'C
oKw
g"W
QWEU
HH
U>* •
J3
C •*-*.S O
<D T)Cn C
W U
29
either extended from the Shuttle payload bay, as shown, orpossibly from -within the bay. The assembly is returned toearth after completion of the 5 - to 30-day experiment program.
In the detached mode, the experiment equipment and crew areplaced in orbit by the Shuttle and retrieved after 30 to 45 daysby another Shuttle.
Two potential configurations for accommodating the crew andsupport equipment are shown in Figure 2-3. In Figure 2-3a,a separate support module is attached to the experiment module.In Figure 2-3b, the crew and support equipment are containedwithin the experiment module. Studies currently being conductedby NASA are evaluating these methods of implementation.
b. Modes where man is required only for periodic logistics,maintenance, update, or retrieval of the experiment and is notdirectly involved in conducting the experiment program. Inthese cases the experiment equipment is carried aloft by theShuttle, normally without an experiment crew, for unmannedautomated experiment operations. Two basic operating modesare considered likely:
1. The experiment equipment is placed in orbit from aShuttle to commence experiment operations; the Shuttle returnsto earth and periodically visits the experiment equipment onsubsequent flights for logistics and servicing. This mode ispictured in Figure 2-3c, which shows the servicing operation•with an astronomy module.
2. The experiment equipment is self-contained andautomated and needs only delivery to the proper orbit toaccomplish the experiment program while remaining attachedto the Shuttle, after -which it is returned to the ground. Thisconcept is depicted in Figure 2-3d. All normal servicing ofexperiment equipment would be accomplished on the groundto avoid the EVA required in the unpressurizable payload bay.
"It is likely that variations of the above basic modes will bedeveloped to meet the needs of particular experiment programs.The concept includes consideration for operations or orbitalaltitudes and inclinations other than that of the Space Stationorbit, which may be particularly beneficial to the experimentprogram, or where payload weights dictate use of a lowerenergy orbit.
"Those experiment operations 'which can be conducted in theShuttle-sortie mode will be affected by the characteristics andcapabilities of the Space Shuttle system, particularly those ofthe Shuttle Orbiter. A few'examples of these characteristicswhich must be considered are listed below. In many of these
30
a
1£ =llU. 'C
* 1w XLL LU
\,\
IIHlilt
l|!lIlll
III1 1III
HI'I1II
S •£"- c<o .£
lic .sS.1a. •;
<^<S
h
j 0)
P1•^lii 1. UJ
\ .•^ \. w
•\ /-> — 1_
\1
I
M<04->• iH,DMO
to<Do(tJCH
en .
•T3 m0 tt)
n) £m <«® Inft <U
O 0,
> n0) o
w co
31
cases, limitations of the Orbiter capabilities can be overcomeor supplemented by support equipment carried as payload, asdepicted earlier.
a. Shuttle pilots will have limited, if any, time to conduct orparticipate in experiment operations. Any significant degreeof man participation will necessitate carrying an experimentcrew as payload.
b. Shuttle systems will have limited, if any, capability to providepower, data, crew EC/LS or other support to experiment opera-tions, necessitating that these items also be provided by systemscarried as part of the payload. . . . . . .
c. Nominal stay time on orbit is 5 days. However, it is likelythat it will be possible to extend this to 30 days by carrying aspayload all the required expendables and supplies.
d. The Orbiter pointing accuracy and stability will fall shortof the requirements of some experiments, and must be providedby the support equipment carried as payload. "
2 . 2 . 2 SOAR Study
The general emphasis of the SOAR study was on early time frame Space
Shuttle missions that'were relatively austere compared to initial Shuttle
mission concepts. This led to the definition of two general mission classes
comprised of three basic system design options (presented in Figure 2-4 from
Ref. 2). The first mission class is entitled, "Sortie", and encompasses the
conduct of man-supported orbital research with the Space Shuttle Orbiter,
The design options consist of either a pallet upon which experiment equipment
is mounted, or a mission support module (MSM) within which research is con-
ducted in a pressurized environment by man. In the event that the control of
pallet-mounted equipment from within the Orbiter is undesirable or impractical
because of operational or physical considerations, an MSM can be used as
shown in the figure. Similarly, if the physical or crew limitations of an early
capability MSM are excessive for accomplishing certain advanced research, an
MSM extension module is feasible and so indicated. This could be a dedicated
experiment module, operating attached to the Orbiter/MSM. Alternatively,
the MSM extension module might be a nondedicated reconfigurable module in
which multiple or large experiment payloads could be operated or additional
crewmen could be accommodated.
32
FE
AT
UR
II9:2 £DO £0<-> O^0 2:QUJ Duj I- co coHZ> 5Z D < £D O - J Sr\ *; &-°?LO_,< U J Q <
>-^;, zSti2< ? < £a. co O
DE
SIG
N O
PT
ION
S
PR
ES
SU
RIZ
ED
MS
MIN
TE
RN
AL
EX
PE
RIM
EN
TS
MS
M E
XT
EN
SIO
N
MO
DU
LE
GR
OW
TH
V
ER
SIO
N
1U
O
ocs
ooc
-u 5 LU< < H CO0- CCZ >
< u. co O
CQ11}COtonJ•—iUao•t-iCO
'CO
(1)
I
Oen
(U
UJ U.
t- <
§**0UJ. o
33
The second Shuttle mission class relates to the delivery, service, and
retrieval of free-flying RAMs and conventional automated spacecraft. The
payload may include an attached propulsive stage for orbital transfer after
Shuttle delivery to low earth orbit. The design option associated -with this
mission class allows for including an MSM with the spacecraft payload, if it
is required for status displays, deployment, and retrieval controls, or service
kits.
2 . 2 . 3 Present Study Assumptions _
For purposes of the present safety analysis, three basic or generic modes of
Experiment Module accommodation by the Orbiter were selected to encompass
the various options suggested in the Blue Book and the SOAR study. These
three modes and their Blue Book and SOAR counterparts are summarized in
Figure 2-5.
The first, or Pallet, mode is restricted to the case where all active experi-
ment equipment is mounted in or on an Experiment Module which remains
attached to the Orbiter and has no provisions for pressurization or volume to
permit man's participation for operation or on-orbit servicing. Therefore,
in this mode the experiment crew as well as associated displays and control
equipment must be installed in the Orbiter.
The second, or attached MSM, mode encompasses all cases where a pres-
surized mission support module, which remains attached to the Orbiter, is
included to permit man's direct participation in experiment operations. The
actual Experiment Equipment may be partially or totally contained within or
attached to the Experiment Module proper. In this mode, then, the Experi-
ment Module is required to furnish life support functions for the experiment
crew during the period(s) they are within the Module.
The third, or detached RAM, mode encompasses all cases where the Experi-
ment Module is detached from the Orbiter to accomplish its function. This
mode, then, includes both free-flying RAMs per se (manned or unmanned),
and automated spacecraft.
34
ooffl
CO3
i— iCQ
tf !»3 1303CO CO
fc i»Qf3
-u^+J CHU (U •CO CO
OT0H
h C 0>
^1.2J -cT^
en
ts A
uto
ma
n,
Se
rvic
ed
Att
ach
ed t
ole
rvic
ing
S O 10 »•H C __
.iH +J .2 'O
»H Cti d C
(U h S 3a, a) c oX (X CO MW O t f O
o
55 mCO i— (
S 2CX -(->'3 cn^
w u
'OT3 q;<U 4J
3 § "i-t S ?»
1^1J, OJ.2"S^Qi— i +•>r-J 3 -0
^ ^5 CPH CO rt
O
CUi— <e-l
01 W
<r1 (TJsjc
• H •«
JH CJ
3 .2 0" M <u £ -e./ CX 3« -rl A«£ W** *J oco nj **
B^-S'C o-g& S SX -H *-"w Q <:o
"3 c -o•3 O COtn .H +->CO co C•y c 3
^ *^ CO O
"x SS H J.
' 0 i ( ^1 ^> (—{
•sS ^ ^.•gs s sss .S s « SB
CO tH '"j £VCO CO "^ ™ *^ .HID O< < i TD I«H 3
O O 0
CO
2 'CO
uJj
m'° **
CJ ^ ^H
^ • • S ^ 'Sc?^ > £ &***>H C -H C *O <|) .
, -pj O JH C (0 +J
g.*« 5 . y »* &« ^ >>:'co ." ^ 01 W &b
a tl t! "c . S •co rt 3 co fi '5, ong ft -^ g 2 r1 c.S .j OT .H '43 h -r!HOC h r t ' ."CO J C CO h CO >(X 2 O (X co co f.Ixj ." n x (X H 3
W Q k W O h (0
o o .
coJ---I
0
•w •«->
rt to • O .(J ^ o*" ^ 'ao **< co )CX C 'o?
CO 00 3 t*_ c o rtTJ -^ S-( i-Hco >> ,< ext; r1 ., wcd (i, co .HC i 7J QO co •*->
3 ^ i^5 C<J k «—
O O
Srt
JGu(d
'aJQ
35
2. 3 GENERIC EXPERIMENT CATEGORIES
The large number of potentially applicable experiment payload elements
(56 sub-FPEs, two indivisible FPEs, eight free-flying RAMs, and 73 auto-
mated spacecraft), plus their diverse requirements with regard to design,
subsystems, destination, handling, installation, and deployment (see Tables
2-1 through 2-4), were reduced to generic experiment categories of interest
from a safety point of view, in order to facilitate the initial analysis efforts.
The SOAR study included a comprehensive assessment, extending to the
detailed sub-FPE level, of payload compatibility with Orbiter mission capa-
bilities. Table 2-8 (from Ref. 2) presents a summary of the subgroups
recommended in the SOAR study as candidates for accommodation in a limited
MSM, an MSM extension module, a Pallet, or a RAM.
With this baseline definition of subgroup accommodation compatibility, the
various subgroups were combined into generic Experiment Modules according
to scientific discipline (FPE type) and associated applicable generic mode of
accommodation (Pallet, attached MSM, or detached RAM, as denoted in
section 2 .2 .3 and Figure 2-5). The resulting group of selected generic ex-
periment categories is shown in Figure 2-6.
By this'technique, Experiment Modules of each scientific discipline are
identifed as to potentially meaningful configurational modes (i. e. , Pallet,
MSM, RAM) and as to the spectrum of FPE subgroups which may be incor-
porated within each configurational or accommodation mode.
It should be noted that the SOAR study did not specifically treat the life
science experiments related to vertebrates (LS-2), plants (LS-3), cells and
tissues (LS-4), invertebrates (LS-5), life support and protective systems ,
(LS-6), and manned system integration (LS-7) due to the short mission
duration considered in the SOAR study. For purposes of completeness, they
have been incorporated in the present study, in both the MSM and RAM
accommodation categories.
36
rt
00
in
ro
U
U
CO If)
Offl
CO
-O
w6.Oro
« W
<P
O
w"QOCQ"
PP
o
ofn"
w"Q"uCQ"
Po
du
le
U)o•1-1(0>.
wH
od
u
>*o>
rH
3
CO
£rH
n)H
U
bOC
ua)
Cni
13C
TH Q)
•*-" "O«J O
PQ
<D
"3T3O
nat
ion
rt-t->flOU
CO
in
ffl
ro
ifi
<u•3
oI—to
o(UH•4->C
(D
p
H
in
xh
CJ
CO
CO
cu-3t)o2(fi(Uoc0)
• Ho
CO
(iCO<u
•rH4->
$
S"01
s-ss °fx, >•»
PH ft
^C f^
o «W tot _ -j }
(U
"u X
co
W
o
co QTl rHC O
Kt **-•
"C '
S T3
^ gW v o
g. 03 ,* <D
O rQ
0 - ^ 3c coco
. fc. O CC ni
f e 1 ^ Wft (UCL
^ *^w"(U rg 0)
<° 2 <U
Pi CO rC
*
CO
<1>rH
OCuO
"rtU
0)
rH
0)
W
U••HrH
C(UOTJ
CO
sOI
(M
0)rH
bo
37
2. 4 ORBITER/EXPERIMENT MODULE INTERFACES
The principal interfaces between the Experiment Module and the Orbiter
include not only the physical means for mounting and manipulating the Module
but also the provisions for and extent of utilities or other support services
provided to the Module by the Orbiter. The following assumptions were made
in this study for the purpose of the safety analysis.
2. 4. 1 Module Mounting
It was assumed that the mounting provisions included in the Orbiter cargo
bay would:
a. be adequate to provide secure holding and protection againstexcessive shock, vibration, and.thermal loads from the Orbiterto the Module during all mission phases from ground installationto removal after flight
b. afford a clear egress path from the Orbiter crew compartmentto the Module via a hatch and tunnel between the crew compart-ment and the Orbiter cargo bay
2. 4. 2 Module Manipulation
It -was assumed that manipulator mechanisms would be provided in the Orbiter
cargo bay (in conjunction with mounting provisions) to accomplish any neces-
sary erections and retractions of the Module. In the case of MSM or RAM
configurations, the access tunnel connection between the Orbiter crew com-
partment and the Module would remain operative throughout the erection/
retraction process.
2 .4 .3 Module Utilities /Support
2 .4 .3 .1 Electrical Power
It was assumed that an active electrical power interface existed between the
Orbiter and Module. On this basis the Orbiter could furnish all or only a
small part of the electrical power required by the Module.
38
2 . 4 . 3 . 2 Life Support/Crew Systems
It was assumed that the Orbiter provided all necessary crew systems and life
support for the experiment crew except when the crew was in an MSM or RAM
Module. During these periods the Module (MSM or RAM) was assumed to
provide any necessary crew systems and life support.
2 . 4 . 3 . 3 Thermal Control
It was assumed that thermal control of the Module and its subsystems would
be accomplished with an Orbiter/Module shared fluid-radiator loop.
2 . 4 . 3 . 4 Guidance, Navigation, and Control
It was assumed that Shuttle GN&C system and thrusters would provide at least
coarse control for all Modules while attached to the Orbiter. Where the
Orbiter pointing accuracy and stability are inadequate for the nature of a
given experiment, the Module would contain the necessary sensors and control
features to accomplish the fine pointing.
Detached RAM Modules would contain integral GN&C systems appropriate for
their mission purposes.
2 . 4 . 3 . 5 Controls and Displays
It was assumed that all controls and displays necessary for the conduct of a
given Experiment would be contained within the Module, except in the case of
a Pallet configuration where such controls would necessarily be located within
the Orbiter crew compartment proper.
In all cases it was assumed that any controls and displays associated with
caution and warning systems would be duplicated in the Orbiter crew com-
partment to the extent necessary to provide for preventive or remedial actions
on the part of the Orbiter or its crew.
2 . 4 . 3 . 6 Data Management
It was assumed that all experiment data management systems would be con-
tained within the Module, except in the case of a Pallet configuration where
39
some parts of the system might necessarily be located in the Orbiter for
access by the experiment crew. Data would be transmitted to the ground for
processing by either the Module or the Orbiter, as required by the nature
of the Experiment carried.
2 . 4 . 3 . 7 Checkout System
All checkout systems, whether associated with subsystems aboard the Module
or with automated satellites, would be located within the Module. Any fault -
detection signals would be appropriately displayed in the Orbiter crew
compartment.
2 .4 .3 .8 Voice Communication
It was assumed that voice communication links would be provided:
a. between the Orbiter control station and each mannedhabitable compartment of the Module
b. between manned habitable compartments of the Module
40
3. HAZARD ANALYSIS
3. 1 GENERAL
A hazard analysis was performed to identify and assess the emergency-causing
potential of the various Experiments and their associated equipment; this
included hazardous interactions arising from interfaces with the Orbiter as well
as interfaces between Experiment Equipment and other payloads likely to be
simultaneously carried.
This analysis activity was keyed to:
a. identifying potential sources of basic hazards, in terms ofExperiment Equipment characteristics or operations attendantto operation of the equipment or performing the Experiment
b. identifying those causative events/factors/conditions whichcould arise from or combine with a basic hazard source toproduce a hazardous result
c. delineating potentially hazardous results arising from theoccurrence of the forcing function (causative event/factor/condition)
d. summarizing the spectrum of potential emergency situationswhich could arise from implementing experiment programsin concert with the Space Shuttle Orbiter
3.2 EXPERIMENT MODULES
3.2 .1 Hazard Source Identification
Each of the generic Experiment Modules selected in section 2.3 (see
Figure 2-6) was examined in detail as to the basic types of Experiment Equip-
ment likely to be employed, possible support requirements in terms of both
additional equipment and operational needs, expected operating power levels,
and nominal GSE and facility utility requirements for installation purposes.
The primary source for this level of definition was the sub-FPE descriptive
material contained in the SOAR study (Ref. 4).
41
Figure 3-1 illustrates the type of information provided by this examination
effort, in this example, for the Astronomy Module configured in the Attached
MSM mode. Similar information for each of the 20 generic experiment cate-
gory modules selected for examination (from Figure 2-6) are contained in
Tables 3-1 through 3-20.
Each generic module class was then examined to determine what particular
equipment (experiment or support), related materials, or operations associ-
ated with it might be a hazard source because of inherent characteristics.
Figure 3-2 illustrates typical results, again for the Astronomy Module con-
figured in the Attached MSM mode. Similar information for all 20 generic
Experiment Module categories are contained in Tables 3-21 through 3-31.
Finally, all resulting hazard sources from all generic Experiment Modules
were consolidated to facilitate the hazards analysis by means of a single
source listing. Figure 3-3 delineates the 26 resulting hazard sources associ-
ated with equipment or related contents, and Figure 3-4 delineates the eight
hazard source areas associated with operations related to Or biter /Experiment
missions.
3 . 2 . 2 Hazard Analysis
With the foregoing definition of hazard source areas (Figures 3-3 and 3-4),
each source area, or combination thereof (where pertinent), was analyzed to
determine plausible causations leading to potentially hazardous situations.
In some cases the causation was attributed to a "condition" resulting naturally
from the inherent characteristics of Experiment Equipment, associated mate-
rials, or necessary operating conditions. For example, in this category
would be "abnormal combustion" (or combustion instability) as a causative
condition leading to fire or explosive propellant mixtures from an experiment
combustor.
42
>• OP !£._i t
«>k ^-u.
Vt **
^C ^~S
§QC
P
(PO
SSIB
LE)
P
OPE
R.
£oQ.Q_
CO
1
. *O£
-
e***
z
§Ri— »
SETU
P/DE
PLO
Y
_
?
(SPA
CE V
ACU
l
1
BA
SIC
EQU
IPM
ENT
LU
LUO.
a
A-3C
: PH
OTO
HE
LIO
GRA
PH
ce
^1UJ
cT
o*i
.. i"S2 §™~* JL "
gSaT1
R or^
g0
i §R S a•-H CM m
Q tyt
OPE
RATE
NO E
VA
PLAN
NEI
ASTR
ONO
MER
/AS
TRO
PHYS
ICI!
o_
oS S S-^ ^ _^ = , ,0 0 !£
> > 0 =
°- °- iij ot/1 LO Cj 2
A-3D
: X-
RAY
PH
OTO
HELI
OG
RAPH
A-3E
: XU
V SP
ECTR
OM
ETER
(PAS
SIVE
AT
LAU
NC
H;
SENS
ITIV
E TO
ALL
CONT
AMIN
ANTS
)
|
oQ£H-
§i
1
^^
1
1i—*
O
^o<^
5- ^Cct
1 I2-cT JjjJiiigH o- °°oS 5 < Q <s>
M ^sC Q- 0 |> u.<>0 O 'Z.S.—
oce SO ce«/> CO <
mS3^= ° in "-$8f^ iSS^-=: = O oLl_ U_ (/>
A-4
A:
NAR
RO
W-F
IELD
UV
TELE
SCOP
E(C
AMER
AS F
ILM
TRA
NSPO
RT.
SPEC
TRO
-G
RAP
HS;
AS
S'Y
MO
UNTE
D O
N G
IMB
AL
RIN
GS)
8
g,-
~8, — i
s"=•i
af\
i— »
t—Lrt
AIR
LOC
K)
ASTR
ONO
MER
/AS
TRO
PHYS
ICI
o:Otn
FILM
VAU
LTFI
LM P
ROCE
S:OP
TICS
LAB.
A-4B
: W
IDE-
FIEL
D U
VTE
LESC
OPE
(O
N AT
M-T
YPE
PLAT
FORM
WIT
H IN
STRU
MEN
TS A
S IN
A-4
A)
^5
CM
8
RETR
IEVE
/REP
L/FI
LM
_ ^^
it
(SPA
CE V
ACU
l
A-4C
.- SM
ALL
UV S
UR
VEY
TELE
SCO
PE(IN
STRU
MEN
TS A
S AB
OVE
)(P
ASSI
VE A
T LA
UNCH
: SE
NSI
TIVE
TO C
ON
TAM
INAN
TS)
o50>-g
1
S
K o s i>- « s i 2O on z S <
gu, i 2 1 15o^ o o o<_>
|i 1 ^ 1 ££LU Q. _1 O 3: I HIC/> O «C Z t/l CU O_
CO
s T=; o 1/1O — cj
|!M;?•»/) 1/1 >-S; < ««!2 o oo
X-R
AY
TELE
SCO
PES
(GR
AZIN
G
INCI
DENC
ES
VEN
ETIA
N BL
IND
), SP
ECTR
OM
ETER
/PO
LAR
IMET
ER A
SS
Y,
X-R
AY
COUN
TER
ARR
AY.
DETE
CTOR
AR
RAY
, G
AMM
A-R
AYSP
ECTR
OM
ETER
, SP
ARK-
CH
AMBE
R(A
CTI
VE C
RYO
GEN
ICS
IN -
5B;
- 5A
PASS
IVE
AT L
AUNC
H; S
LIG
HT
TOM
ODE
RATE
SE
NS
ITIV
ITY
TO C
ON
TAM
IN-
ANTS
)
oceLUni. -z... o.
CO C~
?" "*<c
'N..Z
0 ^" "o> »8 ce i™ zin o _i _i
^^
1
NO E
VA
SETU
P/ D
EPLO
YO
PERA
TE
£o3o<>82 z«-z«l£ _J _!
IR T
ELES
COPE
(O
PTIC
AL),
INTE
R-FE
ROM
ETER
, IR
DET
ECTO
R AR
RAY
,A
UX
ILIA
RY
OPT
ICAL
TEL
ESCO
PE(IM
AG
ING
), EL
EVAT
OR
/RET
RAC
TOR
MEC
HAN
ISM
, G
IMBA
LS.
PRES
-
?!uZ O
~l/>
*
(/)
ASTR
ONO
MER
/AS
TRO
PHYS
ICI
ASTR
ONA
UT
SUR
IZED
SER
VIC
E H
OU
SIN
G,
CHIL
LDO
WN
S CO
OLI
NG
EQUI
PMEN
T:
2 LI
Q.
NEO
N TA
NKS
VALV
ES,
VENT
S, R
EGUL
ATO
RS
2 IN
SULA
TED
RECE
IV IN
G T
ANKS
(FOR
GAS
EOU
S NE
ON
COLL
ECTI
ON;
VENT
ED T
O S
PACE
OR
REL
IQU
IFIE
D)
CO0)
o
Hfo«o
. £H4->CO
<:CO
3CD
J-l»l~l
S0*CD
tn "°O *H
(AC
TIVE
CR
YOG
ENIC
S; S
ENSI
TIVE
TOC
ON
lAM
INA
Nrs
, PA
RTI
CU
LAR
LY.
WH
ILE
COO
LED
TO C
RYO
TEM
PS)
e 3
-1.
Equip
ment /S
up
pA
tta
ch
ed M
SM
h
3bO
^
43
mcO
*t~i
^Jn)
OJa0•oCO
•4->
mr-H
CO
cd
4)+J
2 ®to i— iCO 73a, aO «J^.ss>^
•§*(X Uco 3
S£a, "y f
(UCO
•
4-»Q>
M
CO•4->e
str
um
e
ct-H
t>»0
I— 1acuP
00c•|H
•ydCO>
«o1
t-H•HO
pqCOnJU
a1— 1• H
fcCOCO<uoo
tL ®I-H i-l~^ T3
<o au a)
t*«o-^ 3
CO O>HCO
• r-l
»-l 14->CO
rt
0)-(->
^ 22-M rHco nJo<o
£^^S^a<o M
«3^^3 1+J
COCO
c3
CO
tJMrd
oH4-»
U
<D(_,
• H
P>N
t— 1I— I
rtd**CO-H
>
1
CO4-*a)MCOa,O>,o
f— 4
(X
CO
Pa,3^*COCO
<U
HID
COto
•uCCO
a•rH30<W
CO
8a<i>,
r— 1
ectr
ica
l
rM
W
(0
uo
1— 1to
• iH
<
Lentific
^JCO
wa
rs
CO
P
yo
ge
nic
toU
C<oS'04•H
a1
WTJwc«i
me
ras ;
rtU
«
le s
co
pe
COH
09M(1)
Ui
nJO.W
44
CO
ela
ted
rt
Co
nte
nts
[nse
cts/
Pla
ni
CO
icals
/An
imal
00o,-HO
• —Iffl tt
gn
ics
COT3
ryo
gen
ic F
lui
MOo>>hU
iaoZ,
CO<u
ryo
gen
ic G
as
Uieo2
ion
s
CO
6w
n S
ou
rce
ofrH
ic C
on
tam
inal
VHOCO&i
CO
fi(U-utiOU
«Ja.s-3o*W
nJi— i0)
COa>u
.ela
ted
«
A.
Eq
uip
men
t-
CO<o0t->1-t
Hig
h-
Tem
pera
ture
So
\O
verb
oard
Ven
tsL
ase
rsS
par
k-
Ch
am
bers
CO+ju
Su
per
con
du
ctin
g M
agn
Sci
enti
fic
Air
lock
sS
ub
- S
ate
llit
es
co03CgV
Ro
tati
ng E
qu
ipm
ent
Tele
sco
pes
Bo
om
s/ P
latf
orm
s/A
nt
cuuM
Bal
loo
ns
Neg
ativ
e P
ressu
re S
oi
< *~*
~ £• r< >HC 0
!-. <t-l(-J 4->
00^
Ast
ron
au
t M
an
eu
ve
rin
Ma
ne
uv
era
ble
Wo
rk P
**H OJ
Te
leo
pe
rato
r S
pac
ecr?
So
lid P
rop
ell
an
t D
evic
Rad
iati
on S
ou
rces
"c
Ca
me
ras
and E
qu
ipm
e
qu
ipm
e:
W
Batt
eri
es
Ele
ctr
icall
y-
Po
were
d
aJ
GO• r-l
45
V
-3
W
w(0a)
W
o W) S3•rj d O« '£ ""to <j
o
rt-o
o «>• H C4J •*-*
o »M<u u
o
rt <5r-4 >
tJ o
tf
o oW Q O O
to
I13a,Oo-u
T30)
O O O O O O O
imen
tati
on
1-1(U
2tup
Eq
uip
men
t
w
**
0)
• r-*
$
Oi— i
Q
Inte
rnal
ly
0
nti
fic
Air
lock
s
ID
Th
rou
gh
Sci
<
0
lig
n/
Cal
ibra
te
<
Shu
tdow
n
**-•*.
per
ate
/Mo
nit
or
0
/Pro
ce
ss
(Fil
m]
At
etr
iev
e/R
ep
lac
(
«
Mo
vem
ents
extr
ou
s C
on
tro
]
Q
t>0c
I•»
G•fHr-H
cm
To
uch
ing
, H
o
Cle
anu
p
•*COm
*ocuCO
oftCO
p :ore
Sam
ple
s
w
(Urtto<uo
OCO
n)tslnJ
EC
ttO• l-ih
W
46
In other cases the causation was attributed to a "factor," not related to the
particular Experiment Equipment characteristics, whose presence or occur-
rence combined with the equipment characteristics to produce a hazardous
condition. For example, in this category would be "mere proximity" of crew
or sensitive equipment to permeating-field devices (e.g., RF^fields, mag-
netic fields).
In still other cases the causation was attributed to an "event" whose occur-
rence was necessary, in addition to Experiment Equipment characteristics,
to produce a hazardous condition. Typical of this category would be eye
damage caused by inadvertently "looking" at the sun or at reflected sunlight
through an optical telescope, or burns resulting from "touching" of "handling"
hot surfaces.
Emphasis was placed on "causation" determination (as outlined above) not only
to assess meaningful hazardous results (and their requirements for effective
remedial actions), but also to provide the framework for later preventive
measure assessments of means for eliminating or reducing the hazards intro-
duced by the Experiment Equipment and its operation (as reported in Section 4).
The results of the hazard analysis performed in this manner are summarized
in Tables 3-32 and 3-33. Table 3-32 is a summary of hazard source, causa-
tion, and interaction results for the equipment/contents-related hazard
sources of Figure 3-3. Table 3-33 is a similar summary for the operations-
related hazard sources of Figure 3-4.
In a previous study (Ref. 5) relating to hazards associated with manned space-
craft in general, it was determined that 12 hazard/emergency groups were
sufficiently generic to meaningfully encompass all space-related hazards/
emergencies. For purposes of comparison, correlation, and insight, the
experiment-related hazard sources identified in the present study (Tables 3-32
and 3-33) were tested against this 12-group generic classification for com-
pliance and/or for the identification of new hazards. The resultant groupings
47
are shown in Table 3-34. As can be seen, the 12-group generic hazard/
emergency classes were sufficient to encompass all of the specific experi-
ment hazard sources identified in the present study; i.e., the utilization of
such Experiment Equipment or operations do not in and of themselves pose
hazards or emergencies that are different from those previously determined.
The tabulations of Table 3-34 do serve, however, to illustrate and emphasize
the extremely broad range of specific hazard sources (equipment and/or their
related operations and interfaces) which potentially exist for Space Shuttle
missions associated with in-space experiments of the types described in the
Blue Book (Ref. 1).
3.3 ORBITER
3.3.1 Hazards and Emergency Situations
Hazards and emergency situations onboard spacecraft of the general config-
uration of the Orbiter were previously examined in Ref. 5. The results of
Ref. 5 pertaining to Orbiter hazards and general emergency situations (result-
ing from the occurrence of a hazard) were adopted in the present study after
a brief confirmatory review. Figures 3-5 and 3-6 summarize the resultant
hazards and emergency situations.
3 .3 .2 Effects of Experiment Modules
The effect of incorporating Experiment Modules as Orbiter payloads is to
increase the number of potential sources of hazards because of the wide
spectrum of Experiment Equipment they contain, the involvement of man in
many experiment operations, and the many interfaces between Experiment
Equipment, the Experiment Modules, and the Orbiter. Although the basic
potential hazards which might be encountered are not increased, the source
listing is very extensive (see Table 3-34).
Another significant effect is that an MSM or RAM Experiment Module repre-
sents a separate compartment or spacecraft (with respect to the Orbiter),
which poses additional problems and/or requirements with regard to egress
48
IMP
LO
SIO
NL
OS
ION
/
&XW
1SIO
N/ O
VE
RP
RE
SS
UR
EO
MP
RE
S
UWQ
JEC
TS
) -
ffl
(IN
TE
RN
AL
/EX
TE
RN
AL
O
LIS
ION
S
JOU
TIO
N (
TO
XIC
/NO
N-T
OX
IC)
TA
MIN
A
2OO
(NO
N- C
OL
LIS
ION
- O
RIE
NT
ED
]
w
L/
ST
RU
CT
UR
AL
FA
ILU
RE
: HA
NIC
A
UW5
INT
ER
NA
L/
EX
TE
RN
AL
)IA
TIO
N (
Q<rf
rtsin)
ffi
mi
CO
f-i
bfi• r4
fc
O O O O O O O
49
o Ill/Injured Crew (Physical, Chemical, Disease, Mental)
o Metabolic Deprivation
o Stranded /Entrapped Crew
/ During EVA Operations
/ In Vehicle
o Inability to Communicate
o Out-Of-Control Spacecraft
/ Tumbling in Safe Orbit
/ Decaying Orbit
/ Unsafe Trajectory
o Debris in Vicinity
o Radiation in Vicinity
o Non-Habitable Environment in Spacecraft
/ Lack of Environmental Control (Temp., HumidityExtremes)
/ Contamination (Experiments, Animals, Bacteria,Insects)
/ Radiation (Internal)
o Abandonment (Grew in EVA After Bailout)
o Inability to Reenter
Figure 3-6. Summary of Orbiter Emergency Situations
50
(escape) and remedial aid (rescue) if emergencies should occur within the
Module which require Orbiter-generated assistance. A typical example of
the potential interactions between hazard sources, an MSM or RAM module,
and the Orbiter is indicated in Figure 3-7 for an Astronomy Module configured
in the attached MSM mode. (Similar illustrations for other Experiment Mod-
ules and modes are given in Tables 3-21 to 3-31.) As can be noted, the gen-
eral effects on the Module and/or Orbiter, in terms of condition (emergency
situation) or requirement (remedial need) fall into well recognized categories.
It is evident from the figure that many Experiments contain inherent hazard
sources (and their potential hazardous interactions) which can result in an
emergency.
3.4 SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
Tables 3-35 through 3-39 summarize the potential emergency situations
which may exist for the Orbiter and Experiment Module (Pallet, attached
MSM, detached RAM) during the pre-launch, ascent, on-orbit, return, and
post-flight phases of a mission. These tables serve to highlight the nature
of potential emergencies associated with the Orbiter or Module and the
mission phases during which they could occur.
As can be noted, contamination of an Experiment Module or the Orbiter can
occur during any mission phase.
Illness or injury are of concern aboard the Orbiter during all mission phases,
and the Orbiter can become non-habitable at any time due to loss of EC/LS
supply, temperature or humidity control, etc. The same applies to an MSM
or RAM, but only during the on-orbit phase while crewmen are within.
Crew entrapment (in an airlock or module) is of importance during the on-orbit
phase where egress activities are planned. It is also of concern during the
return and post-flight phases, if a crew member has been entrapped.
EVA stranding, by its very nature, is limited to the on-orbit phase.
51
otru
UJ
1S
8
o
«•*••
1£z
i03
POTE
NT!
ALR
ESU
lOF
OCC
URRE
NIH
AZAR
D S
OUR
CE
<
§oa.
OPE
RATI
ONS
1
—g2:
"jj
oJo =:
g^ u — >
< <E uj
|| || | |
> oo S ce oo v
is is si<— « CJ •-* CN
.
0."~ UJ
E Si
3 i iS t^ 5
uj < S: ooSo => <
*• s uT z•-* ^4 cs
Z
CO
:*T
o "•S Eo
1 IUJ 00
-• !
11.
SET
UP/D
EPLO
Y/O
PERA
TE
a.
TOUC
H,
HAND
LE
b.
OTH
ERS
1
, oj
^ °1 —< uj 5;O o UJ
ss>H- ijj ^_
h3 s _J_i O -JLU a. <
<-
at£ Of
J ^= oq03 ^
liilipil!T* o& t <UJ O U. UJ UJzoo ^ SO <Z ni oo
r—i evi
ID0
fe §2uj LU ce? b^5o- < o-ff t^UJ 5^
t- =F!2i . 0SS z la
-csl
UJ LU <fZ OO Z OO UJ
£ O uj o -^1 Q_ Zj «-
0 0 oog
0
11 1 1UJ S Q Q
la 1 1— • cJ m
i
13 i? 00 3
o 0.*
< S_i cy<o0
X
UJ
SUBS
EQU
,4
o
0 2 oJ ' ^ Q _l
<o- zz SQ.to'S1 — UJ LUUJ =3 i_ | — LU;UJ
— ee. oo xz — ci;H-<<" SS ^5<^-xg gg ||a:g.S
o J£ . . z o§ J3 s
- cJ
UJ
t- t-fr-t- z $5 oz z z z g ZSI z
iiiis gs i§o§§| 12 >§o o o o > S oe
Q ° Q § 0 3 °Qsocceo;;:: ujoo ^±jujujuj^ oooo rr.5 iff 5- 2S iOO — — co OQ. —
-'
/ii
enz
3X.
S
oi.
zij
oo
ooi
cJ m W >i<
UJ
j .
3oc
-; cJ
1. V
ENTI
NG O
F CR
YOG
ENIC
BOIL
-OFF
GAS
ES
o->•y
>
o
-•
s0LU
1
CH
EMIC
AL I
NJU
RY
-f
1. R
ETRI
EVE/
REPL
ACE/
00
OO
ceUJ55o
S
PRO
CESS
ING
CH
EMPR
OCE
SS F
ILM
t_
UJ
1— -^
2
fc LU
1 la0. 00 Z3— 00 0^ Ul o
2 gfi%. sg^ »/» uo
esJ cK ^
9 .OO Q.
UJ f. O
5 CO UJ
i ? i0 o "2UJ „ ^ OO
5 ^5 £z zto g;f <f UJ — i_ ag 5
t; o uj LUo £O flj J3 U.
rJ m
oo-
1 1
CH
EMIC
AL S
PILL
S I
DRY
CHEM
ICAL
S)
FIRE
(FLA
MM
ABLE
F
cJ <•<
1
il2 ore jj
UJOO
UJce
PRO
VIDE
,4
...
UJ
PRO
VID
EREL
EAS
-J
1
o<_J
ENTM
EDIC
A
200oo
oo
cJ
£
o
IMM
EDIA
TE M
ED 1
cJ
fz |
OPER
ATOR
IN
ADVE
FEN
TRAP
PED
BY I
NSIN
LOC
KED
PO
SIT
K
EYE
DAM
AGE
(TO
VI
«
1.
SETU
P/DE
PLO
Y/O
PERA
TE
00
of8COUJ
eUJ
CSJ'
a.
ALIG
N &
CAL
IBR
ATE
b.
VISU
ALLY
DIR
ECTE
DTO
WAR
DS S
UN
oAJ
INCA
PACI
TA
0.' Q
O _lUJ <<
Z °2 «y 5
/J 00 ^ UJ
5 g § 25 ^ s 5
— i£ O. Z Z3ui s r3 o o-§£ *" — 00
5- UJ ul =i 00
f-H
ID
cJ cr< ^
'Q- _— o8 <
0 UJ _j
IS 1 532E £ S<s £ s1— UJ 9s UJ— oz Q- t—CO £ 0- <
^E ^ Si S UJ 5:
IS i2 sis u. —
-•
SUJ
cvj rn
%
ARG
ON/
MET
HANE
Bl
FROM
SP
ARK-
CHAA
a.
CO
NTA
MIN
ATIO
b.
FIRE
-•
1.
SPAR
K-CH
AMBE
R
ceCO
§o
ce^CCuoo
ul
OPE
RATI
ON
COH)
-3
>,aoo
CO
a>COnJ
oiao.
COfi <uO 13
CO
(UviSac
52
Inability to reenter the earth's atmosphere is restricted to the Orbiter and
the on-orbit phase.
Metabolic deprivation and inability to communicate can occur at any time
for crew members in the Orbiter, whereas crew members in the MSM or
RAM would be affected only during the on-orbit phase.
Out-of-control (tumbling, unsafe trajectory) would be a condition of concern
to the Orbiter during ascent, on-orbit, and return phases, and to the RAM
during the on-orbit phase.
Abandonment (by means of EVA) is limited to the Orbiter and RAM during
the on-orbit phase.
Debris in the vicinity and radiation in the vicinity are associated primarily
with the on-orbit phase of operation.
53
4. PREVENTIVE MEASURE ASSESSMENT
4. 1 HAZARD ELIMINATION/AVOIDANCE
As delineated in Section 3, a very broad spectrum of potential hazard sources
is introduced when conducting in-space experiment programs in concert with
the Space Shuttle. In order to identify possible means for eliminating hazard
sources and avoiding their occurrence, a series of preventive measure assess-
ments were performed. These assessments were based on the inherent hazard
source lists (Figure 3-3 and 3-4) and were keyed to the causative events/
factors/conditions as described in Tables 3-32 and 3-33.
The approach followed in the assessment was to graphically display and relate
a basic hazard source and its attendant causations (events, factors, conditions)
to a subjective analysis, and the assessment of meaningful measures which
could potentially:
a. prevent a hazardous condition from occurring
b. avoid undertaking a particular potentially hazards event or act
c. separate non-experiment-related factors from association withthe experiment process
Three broad basic areas were selected to provide the framework and focus for
the investigative analysis:
a. Design features
b. Locational features
c. Operational techniques
Measures in these areas, whose implementation could either eliminate or
avoid a hazard, or alleviate the results of its occurrence, were then identified.
The above techniques are illustrated in Figure 4-1 for the case of laser
equipment and related operations. In the case illustrated it can be seen
55
"S0)
COCO0)COCO
<4)(43CO(00)
2Q)>
C
0)
£
cV
nm
(D0>
13
rtN
S
h >-0.0
0) C0 O
§1I/I C
o
«"T-N S
•Or"• M fe
O "*••.> •"< goU
** 2j
.53S CO
33 «UU
3O
"2riNrt
d) C
*a fi
3^rt "cO a
Ha
za
rd
o•-*CO0)
..4
g-so o-'** "c2^S Ma/ m
c?^
•
ao
'%O
3
e01(0
Q
u •0)
3
3CO4)aj
gi
•ocoU
Vu^130J5
- I ' Is"(8 00 ^ "* "rt
•o oo o "5S cC — * b l C O
* " Jt a "S 200 00_ ID C ^
*• c ^ *• y «S S -s co '« ac J; .5 c M, °« ? O 4) c mOT ? a to .5 .™
«« fM
CL 00 ^
o 'g.~ .2 g 2 oo ug _ ^ ° 5 i n - M o 1 -
•° * S'3'iT S " S" u -g
i| ill ': IHIL ' . ..( ^ { t f - i . O ^ H j j • J c ^ ' D C - ' t i
— • (M (*•>
rt4> ^ * O T2** c c c *j ™*-* flj
llnil i!i< !i lUi« J S §"2-2> g S § 2 § 2 g S r t S" -«
. 5 a o M ; 3 ' « w S ^ " S j t 5 O a ^ o S r t ^»^ N t»"i ^* in \o
«)oo „ • .
£ 2rt (jQ 3
C y^ C ^S c.2 o
. H -H 4J '_Q
.s^g-o'S Sfa „ U K OS in
, x 1X » ' « u J
*5 C 5) O O J?
ou S S -S -2^g o K 5 " °
5 j a > . . ' 3 3 ( 0 ' < c j > < J " , T 3
2 o » S " SJ ^; _ • > ; _ • j:£ o,W~-.^.^. w C L i W Z Z Z Z t n
•"*
g . r I1 3 I | 1 s M r <= .2 wg . S S ^ £ o « 1 g 5 s S f ' - g ' . 2 ' o > ' -
M * ^ ( U ' t t S J O t j ' t i t n O O U O C h " C l ) c l ) r N
S - a S ^ g - a - S O S B K O P W a S B i a
to
0)[0
0)to0)COen
(1)
COnJ
n)CO
n)O
^0)
bo
56
that six measures were identified in the design features area, three measures
in the locational features area, and two measures with regard to operational
techniques.
For the total hazard source spectrum so analyzed, a total of 23 general mea-
sures pertaining to design features, six measures related to locational fea-
tures, and 10 measures related to operational techniques were identified.
Figure 4-2 summarizes these 39 measures, or potential means which should
be considered for eliminating or avoiding experiment-related hazards.
The formulation of methods of implementing or using such preventive mea-
sures is presented in Section 5 in terms of statements which express the
measure and relate it to the pertinent or example experiment equipments
and/or operations to which each preventive measure could apply.
57
Ogv a
S 2&< rt
"* w -S6 c .y
NA
L F
EA
TU
RE
S
g
UO
eri
or
Pla
cem
en
tri
or
Co
nsi
dera
tio
ns
cum
f e r e
nti
al /
Lo
ng
itu
di
xim
ity
C
on
sid
era
tio
ns
ess
ibil
ity
Co
nsi
dera
tio
iso
nin
g/D
um
pin
g C
on
s:
-M 0) £, O 0 £
w £ u cu < »-j
n4)u
VQ~ ^ n o .m d r1*" H w-*j -»J m n m C
ON
AL
TE
CH
NIQ
UE
S
1— 1H<!WOHO
ip/ D
eplo
y /O
pe
rate
Pro
tecti
ve
Carm
en
Rem
ote
Dep
loy
men
Rem
ote
Op
era
tio
nH
oo
ded
Wo
rk A
rea
iR
est
ric
ted
Op
era
tii
Sp
ecia
l P
recau
tio
n!
tio
n a
nd
Wa
rnin
g S
yst
eli
tori
ng
an
d C
on
tro
lcti
vati
ng
/Se
cu
rin
gis
on
ing
/Du
mp
ing
*• id o 2 *•co US Q ^
0)
2 >>
m«0
rt O•5 0)
sh
«*H(Una,•o
«*>rt
LJ e-H W
0 ? "
n o 20) (J 0
' S s SO c a60 •-}
• •!-! TO«J W fiv a) Oh -
CO0)
con>d>
C)• H•4-1rt0)
o
CD CM
'EA
TU
RE
S
to2
wWQ
boC
•iH
C bo*> 2> .2 .Sg .2 MS -3£ bo c T3 -^C h £ C .JJ4> 3 nj O ^> P ^ w U w
nCO CDC o0 -^
•4-> 4)
£ Q
^ ^
arc
e S
tren
gil
-Safe
Co
no
tecti
ve
SaJ
O nS J-iW f c A
CO
Inte
rlo
co
mat
ic
4->
<J
ctu
atio
n
<j
itio
nal
r-HO
mVu
•r-t
CDQ0)
Co
ve
rsS
top
sG
uard
sD
isch
ar
aso
rbin
g M
ear
Dev
ice
«d '
:ner
gy
^b
le-A
idL
ase
r E
Ex
ten
da
LS
Pro
vis
ion
s
— .UW
CJa
Em
erg
ee P
rov
isio
ns
rX|rt
mCJ
a
Em
erg
e
pera
tio
n
0
amp
ing
ym
en
t/tt
iso
nin
g/D
\m
ote
D
eplo
aj "•->ri
bo
(4
cCD
nta
inrm
ecti
on
O r-<
bO M
S ^.S n?'^
O nJ 5KOi *
a>
ri toa)
0 ) 4 , 0TJ 'o a)O — W
CO
« S S3 5.2** !Z! >.P. n <U
CD
(UO
58
5. PREVENTIVE MEASURE STATEMENTS
The following preventive measure statements are summary expressions which
serve to highlight and emphasize areas deserving further consideration in
order to enhance in-space experiment safety. More specifically, the state- •
ments are directed to future NASA space programs involving the use of the
Space Shuttle to transport and facilitate in-space scientific Experiments;.
These preventive measure statements are the result of, and were initially
identified in, the series of preventive measure assessments described pre-
viously in Section 4. For convenience of presentation and utilization, the
statements are grouped in the general areas of (1) design features, (2) loca-
tional features, and (3) operational procedures, which were the selected areas
of investigation in the preventive measure assessment activity. Within each
of these general areas, the statements are further categorized according to
distinctive sub-levels whose title or heading is suggestive of the key or prin-
cipal safety-related criteria contained in the statement.
Where appropriate, the statement (or accompanying example of equipment/*
experiment/condition exemplifying the statement's intent) contains a reference
to the particular Hazard/Emergency Analysis and Safety Criteria Summary
Sheet of Table 5-1. This table contains, for each hazard source area of
Figures 3-3 and 3-4, a summarization of pertinent causation factors, poten-
tially hazardous results, and the spectrum of preventive measures applicable
to the hazard source area.
It is emphasized that the statements in a given area, e. g. , in the design fea-
tures area, in many cases are not singular solutions, but require corollary
or complementary considerations in the locational features and operational
technique areas. For example, if an item were to be designed for jettisoning
Reference by "H" number, e.g., "H-l" refers to Table 5-1, H-l.
59
its location could be important to facilitate jettisoning, and the conditions
under which the jettisoning operation should be implemented should be defined.
Therefore, for completeness of thought and purpose, in cases where a safety-
related issue has reasonable implications in more than just the design area
it may also be separately stated as a safety consideration in the locational
and operational technique areas, as appropriate.
It is also emphasized that the statements in some cases are addressed to only
one of several possible approaches to enhancing safety in a given potentially
hazardous situation. In still other cases some! statements may be conflicting
(with respect to each other or Experiment requirements) under certain condi-
tions. Trade-off analyses would have to be performed to determine the most
satisfactory, solution in each instance. These trade-off analyses were beyond
the scope of the present study.
Further, the preventive measures are not presented in order of absolute value
as safety measures. Generally accepted safety practice indicates, however,
that the order of preference that should be followed in applying them is:
a. Design features to eliminate the hazard
b. Design features to control the hazard
c. Use of protective safety devices
d. Use of warning devices
e. Implementation of operational procedures
The level of detail in the preventive measure assessment, in many cases,
was sufficient to overlap to a certain degree with generalized spacecraft
safety criteria, even though the present analysis was restricted to identifying
experiment-related safety criteria. Typical overlap areas included:
a. Electrical systems (cable insulation, connectors, grounding,power distribution paths, redundancy, shielding, routing, etc.)
b. Airlocks (mechanical design, materials, sealing provisions,etc. )
c. Vent systems (valves, regulators, location, pressure-relief, etc.)
60
d. Pressurized containers storing gases or liquids (valves,regulators, pressure-relief, vents, etc.)
e. Batteries (electrolyte containment, venting, etc.)
f. Solid propellants (safing, arming, etc.)
g. Minimum number of egress ports in a manned habitablecompartment
h. EVA
Safety practice areas in the above categories are referred to in the general
sense only in the following statements, which are supplementary to generally
accepted safety criteria for manned space flight equipment and operational
procedures.
Specific attention is directed to other recent studies conducted for NASA which
resulted in safety criteria which may be directly applicable to experiment
and/or accommodating vehicle safety considerations and which should be con-
sidered by experiment designers, mission planners, etc. These include:
a. The Prevention of Electrical Breakdown in Spacecraft .,(Ref. 6)
b. Safety in Earth Orbit Study (Ref. 7 ,8,9,10)
c. Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety (Ref. 11)
d. Space Station Safety Study (Ref. 12)
e. Space Station Study, Experiment Safety (Ref. 13)
Four other documents, even though not specifically safety-oriented, should
also be of value:
a. Space Shuttle Baseline Accommodation for Payloads (Ref. 14)
b. Shuttle Orbiter/Payloads Monitor and Control Interface(Ref. 15)
c. Assessment and Control of Spacecraft ElectromagneticInterference (Ref. 16)
d. Shuttle Orbiter Applications and Requirements, Phase II(SOAR) (Ref. 17)
Sections 5. 1, 5. 2,and 5. 3 present the preventive measure statements developed
for the areas of design features, locational features, and operational techniques,
61
respectively. These sections relate the complete statement including the
purpose or rationale for the statement (where not self-evident), any qualifying
conditions, and representative illustrations of equipment/experiments/condi-
tions which serve to illustrate or exemplify the intent of the statement. The
formulation of selected measures into summary Safety Guidelines is presented
in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 of Volume II, Part 2.
5. 1 DESIGN FEATURES
The general area of design features encompasses the Experiment Module,
scientific and support equipment (generally referred to as Experiment Equip-
'ment), and any ancillary contents or materials required in the conduct of the
experiments. The preventive measure statements refer to particular design
features or provisions which should be given consideration during the configu-
ration selection and design process.
5. 1. 1 Venting
5. 1. 1. 1 Provide overboard vent systems, including pressure-regulationand pressure-relief subsystems.
Applicable to components or experiment hardware elementswhose contents are susceptible to pressure buildup, fire,explosions, or the accumulation of toxic or noxious substanceswhose inadvertent release into a compartment would resultin contamination of atmosphere or surfaces. Such components/elements would include:
a. Batteries (H-19)*
b. Fuel cells
c. Cryogenic dewars (H-24)
d. Pressurized or volatile liquid containers(including propellants)(H-22)
e. High-pressure gas bottles (H-23)
f. High-temperature sources (gas jets, combustors,furnaces, e tc . ) (H-l)
g. Holding and rearing cages (for animals, insects,plants) (H-21)
*See Table 5-1, H-19.
62
h. Special work areas
i. Biological containers (H-21)
5. 1. 1. 2 Configure overboard vent systems to:
a. Avoid common exit sources or immediately adjacentexterior locations to preclude the mixing of potentiallycombustible or reactive substances, or to avoidcross-contamination.
b. Prevent vent efflux from entering Orbiter cargo bay.
c. Prevent efflux in the vicinity of contamination-sensitive sensors (e. g. , telescopes, camera lenses,etc. ) aboard either the Orbiter or Experiment Module.
5. 1. 1. 3 Incorporate means for controlled venting which also permits aquick pressure relief of the vent system in case an emergencyshould arise during a no-venting period.
To permit controlled venting during potentially criticaloperational periods (e .g . , EVA, docking, accurate-pointing hold periods, etc.).
5 .1 .2 Purging
5. 1. 2. 1 Provide a purge system capability, including associated ventsystem requirements (see 5.1.1).
Applicable to Experiment Module compartment areas andequipment subject to spills or leaks of fluids, gases, orwaste products. Typical examples include:
a. Film-processing areas (H-18)
b. Areas containing cryogenic dewars, non-cryogenic fluids or gases, or transfer lines oroutlets from such sources (H-22, H-23, H-24)
c. High-temperature devices (gas jets, combustors,furnaces, etc .)(H-l)
d. Special work areas for handling animals, insects,plants, serums, isotopes, embalming fluids,other chemicals, etc. (H-21)
5. 1. 2. 2 Provide the capability to purge all tanks or containers holdingnon-inert liquids or gases.
For purging at the completion of experiment activitiesor prior to return to earth. (H-22, H-23)
63
5.1.3 Safing
5. 1. 3. 1 Utilize safing mechanisms, devices.
To prevent inadvertent actuation of equipment whoseactuation could result in an uncontrolled hazardous situa-tion. Such could include:
a. Solid propellant-containing units (pyrotechnics,solid rocket motors, e tc . ) (H-l6)
b. Biological and radiobiological containers (H-21)
c. Radiation sources (reactor or isotope)(H-17)
d. Balloon-inflating devices (H- l l )
5.1.4 Conditioning
5. 1.4. 1 Consider providing an independent (separate from ExperimentModule compartment EC/LS) environmental conditioning system.
Applicable to the holding and rearing cages housinganimals, insects, plants. The cage pressure levelshould in all cases be lower than cabin pressure toprevent cage content efflux into the cabin atmosphere.(H-21)
5. 1. 5 Shielding
5. 1. 5. 1 Incorporate mechanical shielding around rotating equipment.
To provide for containment of rotating members in theevent of breakup due to overspeed. Illustrative equip-ment includes:
a. Biological centrifuges (H-8)
b. Human centrifuge (H-8)
c. Rotating litter chair (H-8)
5. 1. 5. 2 Utilize radiation shields for the crew and sensitive equipment.
To protect crew and equipment from excessive exposureto radiation fields. Example areas include:
a. X-ray machines (H-17)
b. Radioisotopes (H-17)
c. Radioisotope Thermal Generators(RTGs)(H-17)
64
d. Nuclear reactor power sources
e. Lasers (H-3)
5. 1. 5. 3 Incorporate shielding in all solid propellant-containing devicesand/or areas housing such devices.
To prevent inadvertent activation through exposure toexcessive RF or magnetic fields. Example devices include:
a. Pyrotechnics (H-16)
b. Solid rocket motors/stages (H-16)
c. Spin-up rockets (H-16)
5. 1. 5. 4 Provide pressure compartments with an airlock and decontamina-tion equipment for the conduct of experiments with radioactivematerials. (H-21)
5.1.6 Source Strength
5. 1. 6. 1 Where possible, select the inherent source strength of equipmentwith permeating fields, whose loss of control could result in ahazardous situation.to be compatible with crew/equipment.
The source strength maximum value to be tolerable toman and to sensitive equipment in either the ExperimentModule or the Orbiter. Illustrative examples include:
a. RF-generators (H-17)
b. Superconducting magnet (H-5)
c. Laser beams (H-3)
d. Negative pressure source for the Lower BodyNegative Pressure Chamber (H-12)
e. Radiation sources (X-rays, isotopes, RTGs)(H-17)
5.1.7 Fail-Safe Configurations
5. 1.7. 1 Design mechanical systems with fail-safe features to prevent theoccurrence of hazardous failure modes.
Example areas include:
a. Means to preclude failure of deployment mechanismsto fully retract
65
1. Scientific airlocks (H-6)
2. Booms/platforms/antennas (H-10)
3. Erection/retraction mechanism (H-30)
b. Means for assuring that if a propulsion system failureoccurs it is in the non-thrusting mode
1. Experiment Module Attitude Control System (ACS)
2. Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU)(H-13)
3. Maneuverable Work Platform (MWP)(H-14)
c. Means to prevent failure of docking system mechanismsto release from attached or locked-up mode (H-31)
d. Means to ensure a non-hazardous mode of failure whichoccurs prior to a potential catastrophic break-up ofrotating components due to overspeed (H-8)
5. 1.7.2 Configure fluid, gas, and electrical components of experimentequipment to fail-safe. (H-22, H-23, H-24, H-20)
5. 1.7.3 Provide fluid line connectors having connect/disconnect featureswhich ensure fast operation, cleanliness of the connection, andpositive locking.
5.1.8 Protective Safety Devices
5.1.8.1 Interlocks
5.1.8.1.1 Automatic
Incorporate automatic interlocks of mechanical, electrical, orelectromechanical nature.
To provide automatic shutdown and/or to prevent operationunder unsafe conditions. Representative areas of applica-tion include:
a. Overboard vent systems - - to prevent operation ofexperimental equipment requiring an operative ventin the event of vent system malfunction (H-2)
b. Field generators - - to provide automatic shutdown inthe event field strength intensity exceeds the designrange
1. X-ray equipment (H-17)
2. Lasers (H-3)
3. RF-generators (H-17)
4. Superconducting magnet (H-5)
66
c. Negative pressure source -- to provide automaticmeans for a controlled shutdown of the Lower BodyNegative Pressure Chamber experiment in the eventthe vacuum decreases below the permissible level(H-12)
d. Optical telescope covers -- to provide remotelyoperated lens covers so that they can be covered duringnon-use periods (H-9)
e. Rotating equipment - - to provide for automatic shutdownin the event rotational speeds exceed design values
1. Biological centrifuges (H-8)
2. Human centrifuges (H-8)
3. Rotating litter chair (H-8)
f. Gas bottle and battery recharging systems - - to preventmaintenance and/or servicing operations until positiveengagement is ensured between the recharging systemand the component/sub system to be serviced (H-28)
5.1.8.1.2 Manual Actuation
Incorporate interlocks requiring manual actuation.
To require a knowledgeable volitional act by a crew memberto activate, actuate, open, remove, or release inherentlyhazardous experimental equipment, contents, or devices.Representative areas of application include:
a. To prevent inadvertent activation or actuation of:
1. Electrically-powered equipment (H-20)
2. Simultaneous opening of inner and outer scientificairlock hatch doors (H-6)
3. Laser beams (H-3)
4. Balloon-inflating devices (H-l l)
5. Negative pressure sources (H-12)
6. Rotating equipment (H-8)
7. Solid propellant-containing devices (H-16)
b. To open or remove protective covers or closuresfor:
1. Photochemicals (H-18)
2. Emulsions (H-25)
67
3. Containerized fluids (H-22)
4. Radioisotopes (H-21, H-17)
5. Cage doors (H-21)
6. The Active Cleaning Device (H-26)
c. To prevent the inadvertent release of externallyattached systems:
1. Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU)(H-13)
2. Maneuverable Work Platform (MWP)(H-14)
3. Teleoperator spacecraft (H-15)
5.1.8.2 Covers
Provide protective covers.
To prevent inadvertent contact with potentially hazardous sur-faces, contents, and elements. Applicable equipment areasinclude:
a. Optical telescopes (direct viewing)-- to prevent eyedamage from direct or reflected sunlight. (The"cover" may actually be a fast-acting filter. )(H-9)
b. Batteries and fuel cells - - to prevent electricalshock (H-19)
c. Emulsion sheets - - to prevent chemical injury (H-25)
d. High-temperature surfaces, e .g . , furnaces -- toprevent burns and inadvertent release of liquid metals,glasses, etc. during melting and casting operations(H-l)
e. The Active Cleaning Device - - to prevent exposure tocontaminants inside the device (H-26)
f. Biological containers - - to prevent release of contents(H-21)
g. Scientific centrifuges - - to prevent release of contents(H-8)
h. Rotating portions of ergometer - - t o prevent physicalinjury (H-8)
i. Devices with high-voltage potential - - t o preventelectrical shock (H-20)
68
5.1.8.3 Stops
Provide protective stops or interlocks to confine or limit direc-tional movement or adjustment.
Applies to experiment equipment whose inherent naturerequires directional control for safe operation. Applicableequipment includes:
a. Laser beams (H-3)
5. 1. 8. 4 Guards
Provide protective guards.
To prevent access to experiment equipment which could posephysical proximity hazards when in operation. Typicalequipment includes:
a. Laser beams (H-3)
b. High-temperature devices (gas jets, combustors,furnaces, e tc . ) (H-l)
c. Rotating equipment (human centrifuge, rotatinglitter chair, etc. )(H-8)
5.1.8.5 Discharge Devices
Incorporate discharge devices.
To de-energize high-voltage electrical systems or compo-nents when the system is shut down. Applicable areas in-clude:
a. All electrically-powered equipment within theExperiment Module having high-voltage compo-nents (H-20)
b. Subsatellites incorporating high-voltage compo-nents and which require handling, maintenance,or sensor replacement (H-7)
To establish equipotential between the Orbiter and retrievedsatellites /Experiment Modules (H-31)
5.1.8.6 Laser Energy Absorbing Means
Interpose a material suitable for absorbing laser beam energybetween the laser beam target and the Experiment Moduleprimary structure.
Such means would prevent Module structural damage in theevent of target failure. (H-3)
69
5.1.8.7 Extendable-Aid Device
Provide extendable-aid devices (e .g . , "lassos", telescopingrods with end-hooks, etc.).
To render immediate retrieval assistance to personnel inEVA and preclude EVA stranding. (H-27)
5.1.8.8 Emergency Provisions
Provide special emergency equipment.
Whenever an Orbiter flight carries Experiment Equipmentaboard which could cause a hazard for which the normallycarried emergency equipment is hot suitable, appropriateemergency equipment should be provided (e. g. , appropriatefire extinguishers, decontaminants, protective gear, anti-dotes, etc. ).
5.1.8.9 Emergency Brake Provisions
Provide a back-up locking device for rotatable equipment.
Applicable to rotatable equipment which would pose ahazard to the crew members or adjacent equipment uponfailure of the primary locking or latching mechanism.Example areas include:
a. Rotatable telescopes (H-9)
b. Rotating litter chair (H-8)
5.1.9 Jetti s oning / Dumping
Consider configuring for ease of jettisoning.
Applicable to experiment equipment with inherentlyhazardous contents or characteristics whose uncontrolledoperation or malperformance could jeopardize an Experi-ment Module and/or the Orbiter or the return to Earth.Applicable equipment which may have to be considered forjettisoning/dumping include:
a. Objects within scientific airlock - - in the event ofhang-up or other need to dispose of object (H-6)
b. Spark-chamber -- in the event of malfunction involv-ing argon and methane gas bleed (H-4)
c. Booms/platforms/antennas - - in event of failure tofully retract (H-10)
d. Sub satellites •-- in event of certain component or sub-system malfunction (H-7)
70
e. Cryogenic dewars - - in the event of tankage leakor rupture (H-24)
f. Emulsion plates and containers - - in the event ofretracting mechanism failure (H-25)
g. High-pressure gas bottles (H-23)
h. Containerized fluids (H-22)
i. Propellant tanks (H-22)
j. High-temperature devices (e. g. , gas jets, com-bustors, furnaces)(H-l)
k. Radiation sources (radioisotopes, etc.)(H-17)
1. Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU)(H-13)
m. Maneuverable Work Platform (MWP)(H-14)
n. Teleoperator spacecraft (H-15)
o. Automated satellite pay loads (including propulsivestages)
p. Any spacecraft or other object docked or partiallydocked to the Experiment Module (H-31)
q. The entire Experiment Module (Pallet, MSM, or. RAM)(H-31)
r. The liquid and gaseous contents of storage tanks,bottles (H-22, H-23)
5.1.10 Remote Deployment/Operation
5. 1. 10. 1 Configure for remote deployment/retrieval and remote operationalcontrol.
Applies to experiment equipment with inherently hazardouscontents or characteristics. Typical areas and equipmentinclude:
a. Remote deployment of:
1. Subsatellites - - t o reduce handling operations andto avoid having to pass through an airlock (H-7)
2. Contamination sample plates, holding racks, and theActive Cleaning Device (H-26)
3. Teleoperator spacecraft (H-15)
b. Remote operational control of:
1. High-pressure gas sources (H-23)
2. High-temperature sources (gas jets, combustors,furnaces, etc.)(H-l)
71
3. Feeding and cleaning provisions in holding andrearing cages (to avoid opening cage doors) (H-21)
4. Gas bottle and battery recharging systems associ-ated with satellite maintenance (H-28)
5. Docking control system (including guidance andnavigation, propulsion, etc.) of any spacecraftattempting to dock with the Experiment Moduleor Orbiter (H-31)
5.1.10.2 Design and configure experiment equipment for minimum EVAoperations.
5.1.11 Holding
5. 1. 11. 1 Provide means for positive holding and securing of transportablecontainers.
Applies to such containers (chemicals, nutrients, etc.)when not in actual use by crew members. (H-22)
5.1.11.2 Provide protuberances or grips for physical transport.
Applicable to equipment with contents posing chemical injuryupon surface contact. Typical items include:
a. Contamination sample plates and holding racks (H-26)
b. Emulsion sheets and holders (H-25)
5.1.11.3 Provide attach and holding means external to habitablecompartment.
Applies to equipment whose primary function is accomplishedexterior to the Experiment Module. Typical items include:
a. Scientific subsatellites (H-7)
b. Contamination sample plates and racks (H-26)
c. Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU) (H-13)
d. Maneuverable Work Platform (MWP) (H-14)
e. Teleoperator spacecraft (H-15)
72
5.1.12 Packaging/Containment/Marking
5. 1. 12. 1 Provide holding and rearing cages with means, preferablyautomatic, for feeding of caged inhabitants and removal anddisposal of liquid and solid waste products.
Such provisions should be externally or remotely operable(see 5. 1. 10. b. 3) and be capable of performing on orbit aswell as on the launch pad. (H-21)
5. 1. 12.2 Provide containers or other provisions for preserving and/orstoring dead animals, insects, plant specimens, etc.
Candidate techniques include (but are not limited to)embalming, freezing, etc. (H-21)
5. 1. 12.3 Configure EVA suits and PLSS units, including voice communi-cation, for "plug-in" of an emergency PLSS package. (H-27)
5. 1. 12.4 Provide an Experiment Module and/or Orbiter with exteriorconnections (preferably near EVA airlock) for "plug-in" ofEC/LS umbilicals and voice communication. (H-27)
5.1.12.5 Configure in modular or self-contained units.
Applicable to hazardous experiment equipment composedof separable components and whose nature indicates thepotential desirability of either remote storage/deploymentor the need for jettisoning. Typical equipment includes:
a. Gas bottle and battery recharging systems (H-28)
b. Cryogenic dewars (where dewar is an inherent partof the system, as in the supercooled magnet, orwhere the dewar is used for periodic replacement)(H-24)
c. Systems containing principally quantities of reactivefluids (cryogenic or non-cryogenic); operation in theunmanned detached (free flying) module mode would bepreferable for these systems (H-22, H-24)
d. Nuclear and plastic emulsion sheet devices, includingremote storage and deployment mechanisms (H-25)
e. Gaseous release devices and their associated ICNand NH3 canisters (H-22)
f. The leak-detection experiment and its associatedGHe container (H-23)
73
g. The spark-chamber device and its associated argonand methane tankage (H-22, H-4)
h. High-temperature devices such as gas jets, combustors,furnaces, and the fire-sensing and suppression device(H- l )
i. A self-contained cleaning unit (cleaning materials,waste disposal provisions, e tc . ) for EVA cleaningoperations (H-26)
5.1.12.6 Provide end closures, spouts, or caps with no-spill, positivesealing characteristics.
Applicable to equipment intended for use as fluid holders,fluid receivers, oir fluid transfer devices. Typical itemsinclude:
a. Batteries (H- l9)
b. Fuel cells
c. Photochemical storage containers (H-18)
d. Liquid nutrient containers (H-22)
e. Biological storage containers (H-21)
f. lostope fluid containers (H-21)
g. Miscellaneous liquid chemical containers (H-22)
5. 1. 12.7 Provide the Active Cleaning Device with covers or end closures.
To prevent exposure of the crew to contaminants withinthe device. (H-26)
5. 1. 12.8 Provide an indication of high-voltage equipment operation on themaster experiment monitoring panel.
To warn the crew of the high-voltage hazard source. (H-20)
5. 1. 12.9 Prominently and permanently mark all containers having remov-able end closures which contain inherently hazardous materials.
To identify the specific nature of the contents together withwarning and handling notes including antidotes, where appro-priate (e.g., toxic fluids, serums, etc.). (H-22, H-21)
5. 1. 12. 10 Configure and package equipment for retention of integrity andcontainment of contents.
Applicable to all Experiment Module subsystems (e.g., cages,containers, devices) during the load and temperature environ-ments of all mission phases, including all intact aborts.
74
5. 1. 12. 11 Provide means to ensure that failure of any subsystem within anExperiment Module will result in containment within the subsys-tem or Module and not propagate to the Orbiter.
5. 1. 12. 1Z Packaging of experiment equipment and materials should reflectconsideration of the number and types of discrete hazard sourcescontained within the limited volume of a Module, and their poten-tial interactions and synergistic effects.
5. 1. 12. 13 Design experiment and support equipment to withstand rapid APchanges without causing a hazardous condition (e.g., containerdeformation under reduced pressure conditions may result inwire-touching and shorts, broken connections, etc.). ,
5. 1. 12. 14 Design experiment equipment fluid piping and connectors withready accessibility in an Experiment Module.
5. 1. 12. 15 No equipment whose malfunction could obstruct free passageshould be located, internally or externally, near crew accessand egress passageways through airlocks, tunnels, or dockingports (e.g., pressure bottles, batteries, etc.).
5.1.13 Materials Selection
5. 1. 13. 1 Avoid the use of magnetic tools when experiments having mag-netic field sources (e.g., supercooled magnet) are incorporatedin the Experiment Module. (H-5)
5. 1. 13.2 Utilize non-combustible materials except where the inherentnature of the experiment requires a combustible material; inthat case employ special precautionary measures.
5. 1. 13.3 Avoid the use of mercury in experiment equipment.
If mercury is indispensable, accidentally escaped mercuryshould be prevented from entering habitable compartments(e.g., by locating it outside such compartments, double con-tainment, etc.), because spilled mercury cannot be removedcompletely and will permanently poison the compartmentatmosphere.
75
5.2 LQCATIONAL FEATURES
The choice of experiment equipment location involves both relative placement
(exterior, interior, circumferential, longitudinal, etc.) and the effect of
placement on potential operational needs (ease of jettisoning, proximity,
accessibility, etc.). The preventive measure statements refer to preferred
particular placement or location features or provisions which should be given
consideration during the configuration selection and design process. It should
be recognized that special safety features, such as double containment, could
in certain cases void one of these particular statements.
5.2.1 Exterior Placement
Consideration should be given to locating inherently hazardousequipment exterior to habitable Module compartments.
Applicable to experiment equipment whose inherent nature,associated contents, or operational modes indicate that amalfunction could precipitate an uncontrollable hazard.Examples of such equipment and conditions include:
a. Spark-chamber - - to prevent argon or methane gasleakage from contaminating Experiment Moduleatmosphere (H-4)
b. Laser apparatus, with laser beam pointed away fromthe Experiment Module primary habitable structure,the Orbiter, and any other systems (H-3)
c. Balloons and their inflating devices ( H - l l )
d. Subsatellites (H-7)
e. Cryogenic dewars and fluid transfer lines (H-24)
f. Emulsion sheet devices (H-25)
g. Containers holding reactive or toxic fluids, gases(H-22, H-23)
h. Gaseous release devices (H-23)
i. Gas jets, combustors, furnaces, etc. (H-1)
j. High-pressure containers (H-23)
k. Devices for EVA operation (Astronaut ManeuveringUnit, Maneuverable Work Platform, teleoperatorspacecraft) (H-13, H-14, H-15)
76
1. Leak-detection experiment module (H-23)
m. Fire-sensing and suppression experiment module(H-l )
n. Radioisotope thermal generators (RTGs) (H-17)
o. Contamination sample plates and racks (H-26)
p. Battery and gas bottle recharging equipment (H-28)
q. Any EVA sensor cleaning units, accessible to EVAairlock (H-26)
5.2 .2 Interior Considerations
5 .2 .2 .1 Position rotatable telescopes (when within Experiment Module)to facilitate egress activities.
So that if the telescope latching mechanism fails in anyposition there will still be sufficient room for a crewmember to reach normal Module egress ports. (H-9)
5 .2 .2 .2 Position laser apparatus (if within Experiment Module) so as toprevent laser operation outside a shielded area. (H-3)
5 .2 .2 .3 Position rotatable equipment such that a clear egress path existswhen the equipment is in any orientation. (H-8)
5 .2 .2 .4 Locate interior equipment with escapable contents in specialwork areas with spill containment, waste disposal, purge, con-tamination control, and vent provisions. Such areas mayrequire separate environmental control.
Examples of equipment types include:
a. Batteries (H-19)
b. Fluid canisters (H-22)
c. Gaseous canisters (H-23)
d. Gas jets, combustors, furnaces (H- l )
e. Radioisotope fluid containers (H-17)
f. Biological containers (H-21)
g. Animal cage and cage rack assemblies (H-21)
h. Contaminated products or devices (H-26)
77
5.2.3 Circumferential/Longitudinal Placement
5. 2.3. 1 Orient circumferentially located scientific airlocks in such aposition in the Experiment Module that a jammed-open doorwill not interfere with cargo bay door closure. (H-2)
5.2.3.2 Locate the terminus of overboard vents such that vent effluxwill not enter the Orbiter cargo bay. (H-2)
5.2.4 Proximity Considerations
5.2.4. 1 Locate devices with permeating fields away from field-sensitiveequipment (including solid propellant ignitors) and habitable com-partments unless properly shielded.
Example equipment includes:
a. RF-generators (H-17)
b. Superconducting magnet (H-5)
c. Radiation sources (H-17)
5.2.4.2 Locate exterior equipment away from EVA hatches.
To avoid potential EVA hazard sources (e.g., shock,impact, tether entanglement, etc.). Example areas include:
a. Booms/platforms/antennas (H-10)
b. Radiation sources (H-17)
c. High-voltage equipment (H-20)
d. RF-generators (H-17)
5.2.4.3 Located exterior equipment away from docking ports.
To avoid potential docking hazard sources. Examplesinclude:
a. Booms/platforms/antennas (H-10)
5.2.4.4 Keep balloons and balloon-inflating device/apparatus separatefrom one another until time for inflation. (H-11-)
5 .2 .4 .5 Locate batteries away from potentially combustible materialsor systems that could be damaged by escaping battery fluids.This applies also to Experiment Module compartments whichmay have such materials within them at any time during themission. (H-19)
78
i 5 .2 .4 .6 Locate reactive fluid tanks non-adjacently and in differentj compartment areas. (H-22)iiI 5 .2.4.7 Locate the terminus of vents to avoid adjacent locations where
potentially reactive vent effluxes could combine. (H-2)
! 5.2.4.8 Locate equipment with hot surfaces away from other equipment, in the same Module. (H- l )I
I 5 .2 .5 Accessibility ConsiderationsI ; ~| 5.2.5. 1 Place high-voltage components of high-voltage equipment in not-.j normally-accessible zones, requiring knowledgeable, volitional| acts to reach or touch them. (H-20)
j 5 .2 .5 .2 Locate film, photochemicals, and film vaults away from potentialignition source areas and remote from open habitable areas.(H-18)
5.2.5.3 Position the laser apparatus (if within the Module) such that it isaway from normal crew passage routes, requiring a volitionalaccess movement to reach it. (H-3)
5.2.5.4 Store balloon-inflation device in a remote area to help ensureagainst activation until balloon use reaches near-deploymentstage. ( H - l l )
5 .2 .5 .5 Locate externally mounted devices for EVA operations (e.g.,Astronaut Maneuvering Unit, Maneuverable Work Platform,teleoperator spacecraft) so as to permit unimpeded egressfrom EVA hatch and to provide convenient access for theiruse by astronauts in EVA. (H-13, H-14, H- l5)
5.2 .5 .6 Locate external EC/LS umbilicals and communication plug-inunit near EVA hatch. (H-27)
5.2.5.7 Locate EVA tether attach points and fixtures so as to minimizepossibility of tether entanglement. (H-27)
5.2.5.8 Locate Experiment Modules (Pallet, MSM, RAM) and experimentequipment so as not to interfere with any egress from or ingressto airlock hatches or the Orbiter tunnel (neither in the installednor in the extended position).
5 .2 .5 .9 Locate experiment equipment attached externally to Experiment' Modules so as not to interfere with any egress from or ingress
to airlock hatches or the Orbiter tunnel (neither in the installednor in the extended position).
79
5.2. 5. 10 Locate all docking ports so as to ensure visual observation of the: docking operations . (H-31)
5.2.5.11 Locate equipment requiring periodic maintenance (e.g., animalcages) so as to facilitate access on the ground and on orbit. (H-28)
5.2. 5. 12 Locate equipment within the Experiment Module so as to allow anIVA-suited man to pass by regardless of the position of movableexterior equipment parts. (H-29)
5 .2 .6 Jettisoning/Dumping Considerations
5 .2 .6 . 1 Consideration should be given to locating inherently hazardousequipment for ease of jettisoning/dumping.
Applicable to experiment equipment with inherently hazardouscontents or characteristics whose uncontrolled initiation, oper-ation, or malperformance could jeopardize Experiment Mod-ule and/or Orbiter integrity. Applicable equipment systemareas include:
a. Spark-chamber (H-4)
b. Cryogenic dewars (H-24)
c. Subsatellites (H-7)
d. High-pressure gas bottles (H-23)
e. Containerized fluids (H-22)
f. Propellant tanks and/or contents (H-22)
g. High-temperature devices (e.g., gas jets, combustors,furnaces) (H-1)
h. Radiation sources (radioisotopes require special analy-sis of the potential radiological consequences) (H-17)
i. EVA use devices (Astronaut Maneuvering Unit, Maneu-verable Work Platform, teleoperator spacecraft)(H-13, H-14, H-15)
5 .2 .6 .2 Consider provisions for dumping hazardous fluids (when carriedin large quantities) which make jettisoning of their containerunattractive.
5 .2 .6 .3 If emergency dumping of fluids is determined to be a requirement,provisions should be made so that dumping can be done during anyphase of the mission, including the phase of aerodynamic flight ofthe Orbiter and on the ground.
80
5.3 OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES
The general area of operational techniques encompasses both actual operational
steps (setup, deployment, experiment/equipment operation, jettisoning, check-
out, purging, deactivating, securing, etc.) and associated caution, warning, and
monitoring system elements (sensors, visual and aural alarms, etc.) which may
be necessary for safe and timely implementation of the actual operational steps.
The preventive measure statements refer to particular operations and opera-
tional requirements which should be considered during the configuration selec-
tion and design process.
5.3.1 Setup/Deploy/Ope rate
5.3.1.1 Protective Garments/Devices
5.3 .1 .1 .1 Wear radiation dose-accumulation badges.
To guard against excessive accumulation from both experimentequipment and natural sources. (H-17)
5.3 .1 .1 .2 Wear suitable protective garments, including gloves, face masks,etc.
Applicable when handling or involved with equipment orcontents which could cause injury or illness by merecontact or inhalation. Applicable areas include:
a. Film, film packs, film-processing operations (H-18)
b. Toxic or reactive fluid container handling (H-22)
c. Furnace-related operations (melting, casting, etc.)(H- l )
d. Animals, insects, plants (H-21)
e. Exposed contamination sample plates (H-26)
f. Sensor cleaning operations (H-26)
g. Biologicals and biological containers (H-21)
h. Isotopes, serums, etc. (H-21)
i. Embalming of cadavers
81
5.3.1.2 Remote Deployment
5.3. 1.2. 1 Deploy emulsion sheets with remote, deployment mechanisms.(H-25)
5.3.1.3 Remote Operation
5.3.1.3.1 Control remotely the initiation, activation, or operation ofexperiment equipment exhibiting characteristics for potentialexplosion, fire, or contamination due to equipment malfunctionand/or contents.
Illustrative experiment areas include:
a. Reactive fluid experiments (H-22)
b. Gas bottle and battery recharging operations (H-28)
c. Leakage-detection experiment (H-23)
d. Spark-chamber experiments (H-4)
e. Gas jet, combustor, and furnace experiments (H- l )
f. Feeding and cage-cleaning operations (H-21)
5 .3 .1 .3 .2 Utilize an Experiment Module of the detached, free-flying RAMtype, remotely deployed at a safe distance from the Orbiter, forthe incorporation and conduct of experiments whose inherentnature implies risks of explosion, fire, or collision.
The safe distance should be established by considerationof pressure wave and shrapnel phenomena associated withthe explosion characteristics of the specific experimenttype. Applicable experiment types include:
a. Combustion experiments (H-l)
b. Propellant storage and transfer experiments(H-22, H-24)
c. Furnace-related experiments (casting, melting,etc.) (H- l )
d. Maneuverable Work Platform-controlled and teleoperatorspacecraft-controlled docking experiments (H-14, H-15)
5.3.1.4 Special Work Areas
Perform experiment operations in special work areas with pro-visions for spill containment, purge, venting, contamination
82
j control, and waste disposal. Such areas (e.g., glove.boxes,j double containment, etc.) may also require separate environ-i mental control.
| Applicable when the nature of experiment equipment orI materials involved indicate the possibility of surface or
atmospheric contamination through the release of toxicor noxious substances. Examples of operations include:
j a. Processing film (H-18)
b. Performing biological experimentation (H-21)
c. Performing uncaged animal, insect, and planti handling operations (H-21)
I d. Performing contamination experiments or sensorcleaning (H-26)
e. Handling toxic fluid substances, isotopes, serums,| etc. (H-21)
5.3.1.5 Restricted Operationsj ____i
5.3.1.5.1 Suspend all experiment operations involved with controlledradiation sources, RF-generators, supercooled magnets, androtating equipment during EVA operations and ExperimentModule erection, retraction, docking, and undocking operations.(H-27, H-30, H-31)
5.3. 1.5.2 Do not transport experiments with strong RF or magnetic fieldsources on the same Orbiter flight with payloads having solidpropellant propulsive stages unless appropriate precautionarymeasures are incorporated. (H-5, H-17)
5.3.1.5.3 Control the timing of experiments with magnetic or RF-fieldsto avoid adversely affecting sensitive Shuttle subsystems.
Some Shuttle subsystems (e.g., guidance and navigationsensors) may be adversely affected by the normal opera-tion of experiment magnetic or RF-fields. Coordinatedsequencing of active periods might be used to preventadverse interactions . (H-5, H-17)
5.3. 1. 5.4 Perform experiments with chemicals posing toxic gas or vaporcontamination hazards in pressure compartments with a separateenvironmental control system. (H-23)
83
5.3.1.6 Special Precautions
5.3.1.6.1 EVA Operations
5.3 .1 .6 .1 .1 Conduct particularly hazardous EVA experiment operations byat least two EVA men, one of them performing the work and theother being a Safety man who is standing by for instant action inclose proximity to the first one.
The sole function of the Safety man is to observe the workerand assist him in case he gets into an emergency situation.Depending on the circumstances, one Safety man might lookafter two EVA workers. (H-27)
5.3. 1.6. 1.2 For normal EVA experiment operations provide at least twoEVA men who work together as a team (buddy system).
Such men should perform work in relatively close proximityto each other in order to provide aid and assistance to eachother. (H-27)
5.3.1.6.1.3 Provide an additional crewman, suited and ready to go intoEVA, in the event of an emergency involving any of the menalready in EVA.
This man should be in visual contact with the men in EVA(either direct viewing or TV monitoring). (H-27)
5.3.1.6.1.4 Avoid experiment EVA: (H-27)
a. When high-voltage, RF-field, or magnetic fields arepresent
b. During Experiment Module erection, retraction, docking,or undocking operations
c. Near attitude control nozzle jets
5 .3 .1 .6 .2 EVA-Device Operations
5.3. 1.6.2. 1 Conduct AMU and MWP operations in a tethered mode unlessdictated otherwise by the experiment requirements. (H-13,H-14)
5.3. 1 .6 .2 .2 Remotely monitor Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU) andManeuverable Work Platform (MWP) propulsion subsystems anddeactivate them if pressures or temperatures exceed normalrange values or other evidence of malfunction is indicated.(H-13, H-14)
84
5.3.1.6.3 Egress Operations
5.3. 1.6.3. 1 Provide a second or Safety crewman to stand by during airlockoperations for purposes of rendering aid and assistance ifnecessary. (H-29)
5.3.1.6.3.2 Provide pressure suits (including PLSS units) in the ExperimentModule for crew members in the event EVA egress from theModule should be required to reenter the Orbiter (via theOrbiter EVA airlock). (H-29)
5.3. 1.6.3.3 Wait until the Experiment Module is fully erected and secured,and interface circuits have been checked out, before initiatingentry into the Module. (H-29, H-30)
5.3.1.6.3.4 Have all personnel leave the Experiment Module (and enter theOrbiter) prior to initiating retraction of the Module. (H-29,H-30)
5.3.1.6.4 Contingency Plans and Proceduresi
5.3. 1.6.4. 1 Prepare contingency plans (including shutdown and backoutprocedures) for every Orbiter flight.
5.3.1.6.4.2 Appoint a single crew member responsible for implementingsafety and contingency plans.
5.3.1.6.4.3 Prepare loading/unloading time schedules for equipmentrequiring servicing from the ground or Orbiter.
5.3.1.6.4.4 Establish startup and shutdown procedures for all experimentequipment; such sequences should minimize effects on otherequipment and should have no adverse effect on Orbiter operat-ing systems.
5.3.1.6.4.5 Establish order-of-connection procedures for all fluidconnections. (H-22, H-23)
5.3.1.6.4.6 Experiment equipment containing nuclear materials shall con-form with established nuclear safety requirements. (H-17)
5.3.2 Deactivating/Securing
5.3.2.1 Nuetralize (discharge) all high-voltage components after groundcheckout and/or operation. (H-20)
5 .3 .2 .2 Purge Orbiter cargo bay in the event of inadvertent hazardousefflux release into the bay by Experiment Module overboardvents. (H-2)
85
5.3.2 .3 Purge, inert, and safe all returnable tanks /containers holdingnon-inert substances after the experiment is completed or priorto reentry. (H-22, H-23)
5.3.2.4 Secure all containers in their respective storage areas after use.(H-22, H-23)
5 .3 .2 .5 Safe all solid propellant-containing systems prior to ground instal-lation and prior to recovering them into the Orbiter cargo bay inorbit. (H-16)
5 .3 .2 .6 Maintain in a passive or deactivated status experiment equipmentcapable of causing a hazardous situation upon their mere activation.
Illustrative devices include:
a. Balloons and inflating devices ( H - l l )
b. Reactive-fluid experimental equipment (H-22)
c. Combustion-related equipment (H- l )
d. Propulsion units (e.g., Astronaut Maneuvering Unit,Maneuverable Work Platform) (H-13, H-14)
e. The negative pressure source for the Lower BodyNegative Pressure Chamber (H-l2)
5.3.3 Jettisoning/Dumping
5.3.3.1 Consider jettisoning or dumping experiment equipment whosestatus or condition poses an uncontrollable hazard affecting thesafety of crewmen in the Experiment Module and/or the safetyand integrity of the Orbiter and crew.
Applicable equipment system areas include:
a. Leaking containers (photochemicals, isotopes,serums, etc.) (H-18, H-21)
b. Containers which exceed normal range values intemperature or pressure (H-22, H-23)
c. Spark-chamber with leaking gases (argon, methane)(H-4)
d. Booms/platforms/antennas (if their presence precludesany necessary docking, retraction, or Orbiter cargobay door closure operations) (H-10)
86
e. Scientific airlock outer hatch door (if jammedopen and not closeable) (H-6)
f. Cryogenic or reactive fluid tanks (if their pressureor temperature exceeds normal range values)(H-22, H-24)
g. High-temperature devices (gas jets, combustors,furnaces)--if their temperature or pressure limitsare exceeded (H- l )
h. EVA-use devices (Astronaut Manevering Unit, Maneu-verable Work Platform, teleoperator spacecraft)--iftheir propulsion systems indicate malfunctions (H-13,H-14, H-15)
i. Automated satellite and propulsive stages (if propulsivemalfunctions are indicated)
j. The entire Experiment Module (Pallet, MSM, RAM)--iffull and secure retraction cannot be accomplished, or inthe event of any uncontrollable hazardous condition in theModule proper.
5.3.4 Caution and Warning Systems
5.3.4. 1 Incorporate Caution and Warning signals to alert the crew tohazardous and potentially hazardous conditions.
Such systems (where appropriate) should include the capa-bility to record sensor measurement trends and comparethese with predetermined trend predictions in order to pro-vide a timely warning of imminent hazardous conditions.Their display (visual and/or aural) and their location (onOrbiter flight deck or lower deck, or in an ExperimentModule) depends on the particular hazard condition andseverity. Applicable equipment and operational areasinclude:
a. RF-field generation (H-17)
b. Magnetic field generation (H-5)
c. Excessive leakage rates through airlock doors (H-6)
d. Status of overboard vent system components (pressureregulators, pressure-relief, etc.) including positivewarning of vent malfunctions (H-2)
e. Status of Experiment Module atmosphere with regardto pressure, temperature, humidity, and contaminantlevels; positive warning with respect to incidence of
87
fire or contamination (toxic, non-toxic, smoke,chemical vapors, pollen, insects, radioactive ele-ments, biologicals, etc.)
f. Positive warning if laser beam direction is out-of-limits (H-3)
g. Extension or retrieval of booms/platforms/antennasand positive warning if active elements thereon areoperational during docking, EVA, or Orbiter cargobay door closure operations (H-10)
h. Temperature and/or pressure level measurements,with positive warning if design range values areexceeded, for such items as:
1. Batteries (H-19)
2. Gas bottles (H-23)
3.. Cryogenic dewars (H-24)
4. Non-cryogenic fluid containers (H-22)
5. Gas jets, combustors, furnaces (H- l )
6. Biological containers (H-21)
7. Lower Body Negative Pressure Chamber (H-12)
8. EVA-devices (Astronaut Maneuvering Unit, Maneu-verable Work Platform, teleoperator spacecraft), gasbottles, batteries, and propellant tanks (H-13,H-14, H-15)
9. Gas bottles and battery recharging apparatus (H-28)
i. Radiation levels of X-ray machines, isotopes, radio-isotope thermal generators (RTGs), etc., with positivewarning if design range values are exceeded (H-17)
j. Speed of rotating equipment, with positive warning ifdesign range values are exceeded (H-8)
k. Status of solid propellant safe-and-arm circuits (H-16)
1. Status of PLSS conditions, with positive warning ifconditions deviate from design range values (H-27)
m. Status of airlock EC/LS, pressure levels, and door posi-tions, including positive warning if design range valuesare exceeded (H-27, H-29)
n. Velocity and alignment of a docking spacecraft relativeto the Experiment Module or Orbiter docking port,including positive warning of any deviation from designrange values (H-31)
88
o. Position of erection/retraction system, with statusas to fully erected, fully retracted (H-30)
5.3.5 Monitoring and Control
5.3.5.1 Monitor and control, on a continuous or scheduled basis (asappropriate), operations/devices requiring immediate or con-current measures to prevent or counteract hazardous situations.
Illustrative areas include:
a. Gas bottle and battery recharging operations (H-28)
b. Reactive fluid container pressure and temperaturewhile aboard the Orbiter or in the immediate vicinity(H-22, H-24)
c. The condition and operability of cage feeding andcleaning devices (H-21)
d. Radiation levels of active radiation devices in orattached to the Experiment Module (H-17)
e. Human centrifuge operations (H-8)
f. EVA equipment operations (Astronaut Manevering Unit,Maneuverable Work Platform, teleoperator spacecraft)(H-13, H-14, H-15)
g. EVA operations (H-27)
h. PLSS conditions during EVA operations (H-27)
i. Airlock and crew conditions during airlock egressoperations (H-29)
j. Docking sensors and control systems during dockingoperations (H-31)
k. Erection/retraction control system and status sensorsthroughout erection/retraction operations (H-30)
1. The total radiation level environment to which the Orbiterand Experiment Module have been subjected due to bothnatural radiation spectrums and experimental equipmentoperation. Utilization of dose-accumulation badges bythe individual crew members would facilitate the moni-toring of their individual exposures. (H-17)
89
6. REMEDIAL MEASURE ASSESSMENT
6. 1 POTENTIALLY UNRESOLVED HAZARDOUS SITUATIONS
Regardless of the care and attention given to spacecraft design and redundancy
features, and despite the incorporation of meaningful preventive measures,
hazardous situations can and will occur in space operations. This prospect is
as applicable to in-space experiment programs as to any other space activity.
In order to identify possible means for remedying the situation after the occur-
rence of a hazard, a series of remedial measure assessments was performed.
These assessments were based on the inherent hazard source lists (Figures
3-3 and 3-4) and were keyed to the potentially hazardous results as described
in Tables 3-32 and 3-33.
The approach followed in the assessment was to graphically display and relate
a basic hazard source and its attendant hazardous results to a subjective
analysis and assessment of meaningful measures which could potentially:
a. prevent further propagation of a hazard
b. neutralize the effects of a hazardous occurrence
c. provide needed:
1. physical aid
2. medical aid
3. metabolic sustenance
d. provide for transfer to a haven of safety, if required
The analysis was focused on identifying both remedial equipment and its
associated operational or functional requirements in the above areas.
The assessment technique is illustrated in Figure 6-1 for the case of over-
board vent malfunctions and related experiment operations. In the case
illustrated, four equipment-related measures and three operations-related
measures were identified.
For the total hazard source spectrum so analyzed, a total of 11 basic
remedial need areas were identified. Table 6-1 summarizes these 11
91
"eV •
00VCO(0
^flj
30)rtfljS
"rtT3o;eoi
d4>
CO0}<u0}<n
<
"SrtNrt
£•
VucVh .fe
3uu0
<n3O
73(1)0)
SV
rt
o
^
0
1"o0}
(S
(D
SCO3O
73
rtSrta
V>
rtCO3rt
CJ
•o»4rtN
&unrtn
cort
aO
«:V
Sa
• H3cr
^>u •
I
'ScQ
Oll
O4JU«
cV
to
V
Sourc
~a d> V4) °-
'C « O% .S c
** 3 '£^ rt
" -< : ' •£ « « ' ' «*° rt c > - > >'3 « 1 * 2 S . '^ co o *" . rt« >• 0 41 (U Uh j: v v £ 5
U P. Q w • w w
' • . ' ~r~" * ~*~t *^^^*^ *^r'*^r** - . r O m ^POcn •— ro m »H(\jro
i a .' 3 ' 3 . 5 - ' . . . . . . . . .
'« ' 1C J "0 C. ffl C
'S u -2 .2» a. 25* y » 'c at 4> «5- c C j, .3 « "a S o 0- . o« g> 3 c -o -o -o
•U 4) £ g " ™ . "
.* C ^ 4) JJ ^ ' J
- N n * -M^M. Nm* « N <v, ^
1
S- « .- -a §^ *H » (H ' 4-5
^ u y - J ^ o ) c
3 4) h QJ rt 'ofl 3 4) 00 i«00 CL 00 60 w » ti C^ss» ss^- « - « g . |&g. « S g J g 3 a « .S S ,; 5-2.O J _ _ Q J J ^ . ^ J i 4 ) "CL^j i y "
•^*5tD "Sc ' 1 " 1 ^ '5C ' t i ' * J flj'^ _Q j^c a--- rt Q, c a • w> ^ c c on £ •** rt rtrt 3 jjJ -C 3 ^rt _0*ii rt 3 'c ^S rt .^ g
* TT1 ^
rt rt rt • -S • S S -e Q QCL Q, Q, O « - ~Qjj o o ., ^ :>, b.c "ti e •*-* c1*-1 V v c •r' »* „
• r t r ^ C C > ^ ' ^ 1 ^
7?> 73 > 73" > : £ 2 ^ S.O " "
^OJ ^OJ ^OJ "* ' ^ !5 60 5 '** - -
^H*^ ""^'i ^^'^* CQ O v r t O - X ^ j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ r f
< I P P . U w w Q W w w
2 • « • ' " cort " S ' " « ~
M« si : (S I ~ i . s i i ^ « -' f • 'C O 3 * O C ( y ^ b O ^ " ^ 0 0 ^ ) C
•£ o o S a .S s S o" 5 o»S o . i JouoDwo jo :OJ ' ' Qj CQ
< • qq • U
0}CO
• rH4->Uc
n)O
(U
O
c0)
01CO0)COCO
(1)
S
ocS
92
categories and indicates their applicability with regard to the 12 hazard/
emergency groups presented in section 3.2.2.
The formulation of methods of implementing such remedial measures is
presented in section 6.2 in terms of statements which delineate potential
equipment and operational requirements and relate them to pertinent or
example hazardous situations to which each remedial measure may apply.
6.2 REMEDIAL MEASURE STATEMENTS
The following remedial measure statements are summary expressions which
emphasize areas deserving further consideration in order to enhance in-space
experiment safety. Specifically, they refer to particular features or provisions
of remedial measures which should be given consideration during the configura-
tion selection and design process associated with scientific experiments in
connection with the Space Shuttle Orbiter.
These remedial measures were initially identified in the series of remedial
measure assessments described in section 6. 1. For convenience of presenta-
tion the remedial measure statements are grouped according to the basic
remedial need areas of Table 6-1.
Where appropriate, the remedial measure statement (or accompanying example
of equipment/experiment/condition exemplifying the statement intent) contains
a reference to the particular Hazard/Emergency Analysis and Safety Criteria
Summary Sheet of Table 5-1, which contains the basic hazard/emergency
assessment used to form the basis of the remedial need.
It is emphasized that the remedial measures, as stated, in many cases are not
singular remedies, but require corollary or complementary activities. For
example, if a crew member were injured and required medical aid, there may
also be the requirement for emergency access equipment to reach the injured
party and the need for crew aid and retrieval personnel and equipment to effect
his transfer to another compartment or spacecraft module. The formulation of
selected remedial measures into summary Safety Guidelines is presented in
Table 4-3 of Volume II, Part 2.
93
6 .2 .1 Fire Suppression
In addition to normal fire-suppression provisions, consideration .should be given to providing fire-suppression devices (e.g. , "fireextinguishers") and/or systems (e .g . , controlled chamber decom-pression techniques, inert gas purge systems, etc. ) suitable forthose unique combustibles introduced by the nature of the experi-ment and for which the normal equipment would not be suitable.
Selection of fire suppression device/system type, configuration,and operational characteristics should be compatible with thefeatures and characteristics of the particular spacecraft inwhich it is installed and reflect consideration of its use bycrew members in the spacecraft or its use by remote controland activation from the Orbiter (in the case of Pallet, MSM,or RAM Experiment Modules). The fire-suppression character-istics of selected devices/systems should reflect the range ofpotential on-board ignition sources and flammable contents.sources which include:
a. Electrically-powered equipment (H-20)
b. Closed vent explosions (H-2)
c. Spark-chamber gas leakage (H-4)
d. Film processing chemicals (H-18)
e. Lasers (H-3)
f. Batteries (H-19)
g. Gas bottle explosions (H-23)
h. Cryogenic dewar ruptures (H-24)
i. Non-cryogenic dewar ruptures (H-22)
j. Non-cryogenic gas escape (H-23)
k. Solid propellants (H-16)
1. Gas jets, combustors, furnaces (H- l )
m.. Liquid metals, glasses ( H - l )
6 .2 .2 Emergency EC/LS
Provide short term life support within EM's (e.g. , face maskbreathing devices, portable self-contained "plug-in" EC/LS units,interior and exterior umbilical connections, etc. ) which is config-ured and located to provide ready access and limited term breath-ing atmosphere.
Selection of emergency EC/LS device/system type, configura-tion, and operational characteristics should be compatible withthe features and characteristics of the particular spacecraft
94
in which it is installed and/or reflect consideration of itsuse by crew members in the spacecraft or its use in aspecific activity (e .g. EVA). The environmental and lifesupport characteristics of selected devices/systems shouldreflect the range of potential situations and conditions whichmay require their use. Such conditions include:
a. Experiment Module atmosphere composition, temper-ature, humidity, and pressure extremes due to:
1. Basic EC/LS system malfunction
2. Fire, smoke
3. Contamination
a. Toxic gases (H-23)
b. Film processing chemicals (H-18)
c. Cryogenic gases (H-24)
d. Non-cryogenic gases (H-23)
e. Bacteria (H-21)
f . Radiation (H-17)
g. Pollen (H-21)
h. Waste products (H-21)
i . Miscellaneous chemicals (H-21)
4. Decompression/overpressure
a. Laser beam damage to structure (H-3)
b. Open/leaking scientific airlock doors (H-6)
c . Rotating equipment damage to structure (H-8)
d . Uncontrolled vacuum source for the LowerBody Negative Pressure Chamber (LBNPC)(H-12)
e . Balloon inflation in Module (H- l l )
f . Overboard vent malfunction (H-2)
g. Collisions (H-7)
b. Depleted or depleting EC/LS supply due to:
1. Inability to return from EVA (H-27)
2. Stranding in RAM
3. Entrapment in airlock (H-29)
4. Entrapment in MSM (H-29)
95
6.2 .3 Medical Aid
Provide medical supplies, equipment, and personnel trained inperforming physician's duties for potential injury/illnessconditions caused by experiments.
Supplies/equipment selection and location should reflectconsideration of the nature of the injury to be'treated,where the injury can occur, and the rapidity with whichthe illness/injury should be treated. Examples of potentialinjuries/illnesses to be considered include:
a. High-voltage shock (H-20)
b. Electrical burns (H-20)
c. RE-field exposure injury (H-17)
d. Magnetic field exposure injury (H-5)
e. Metabolic deprivation
f. Explosion injuries
g. Toxic gas inhalation (H-23)
h. Chemical injury, burns (H-l)
i. Eye damage (from looking at sun) (H-9)
j. Laser injuries (burns, radiation) (H-3)
k. Cryogenic fluid contact (H-24)
1. Emulsion contact or vapor inhalation (H-25)
m. Combustor or furnace burns (H-l )
n. Radiation injuries (field exposure, isotope contact)(H-17)
o. Animal, insect bites (H-21)
p. Biological disease (H-21)
q. Bacterial exposure (H-21)
r. Excessive negative pressure exposure (H-12)
s. Rotating equipment impact injury (H-8)
t. EVA injury (H-27)
1. Impact
2. Negative pressure
3 . Metabolic deprivation
96
u. Excessive physical stress
1. Human centrifuge (H-8)
2. Litter chair (H-8)
3. Ergometer (H-8)
6.2 .4 Decontamination
Provide equipment, supplies, and personnel trained in relatedoperational techniques for the purpose of decontaminatingspacecraft surfaces and atmosphere.
Such equipment/supplies selection and location should reflectconsideration of the nature of the contaminant source, wherethe contamination can occur, and the rapidity with whichthe contaminant should be removed. Examples of potentialcontaminant sources to be considered include:
a. Atmospheric contamination
1. Toxic gases (H-23)
2. Volatile processing chemicals (H-18)
3. Plant pollens (H-21)
4. Airborne bacteria (H-21) .
5. Airborne waste products (H-21)
6. Cryogenic gases (H-24)
7 • .Non-cryogenic gases (H-23)
8- Insects (H-21)
9- Emulsion vapors (H-25)
10. Ionizing radiation (H-17)
11 . Powders
b. Surface contamination
1. Liquid and solid waste products (H-21)
2. Processing chemicals
(a) Liquids
(b) Solids (powders, granules, etc.)
3- Biological cultures, serums (H-21)
4- Battery electrolyte (H-19)
5. Cryogenic fluids (H-24)
97
6. Non-cryogenic fluids (H-22)
(a) Toxic
(b) Non-toxic
7. Emulsions (H-25)
8. Specific contaminant sources (H-26)
9. Isotope solutions (H-17)
6 .2 .5 Structure Repair
Provide materials, equipment, and personnel trained in relatedoperational techniques for the purpose of enabling emergencyrepair of damage to the primary pressure-containing shell of thespacecraft.
Such repair would be limited to patching or reinforcing shellsurface areas which had suffered minor or non-catastrophicopenings and whose repair was essential to permit continuedhabitability until affected crew members could exit to a safehaven. Examples of typical sources of such structural damageinclude:
a. Micrometeoroid penetration
b. Minor explosions
c. Impact holes, cracks
1. Rotating equipment (H-8)
2. Exterior collisions (H-7)
d. Laser beam holes (H-3)
e. Uncontrolled negative pressure source (H-12)
6 .2 .6 Removal Tools
Provide tools, other equipment, and personnel trained in relatedoperational techniques for the purpose of removing spacecraftequipment and/or appendages whose status or condition is suchas to pose an immediate hazardous condition or to prevent theability of the Orbiter to return to earth.
Examples of equipment or appendages which pose thispotential requirement include:
a. Protuberances preventing closure of Orbitercargo bay doors
1. Scientific airlock outer doors (H-6)
2. Extending instruments , deployment mechanisms
98
3 Booms /platforms /antennas (H-10)
4. Unretractable Pallet, MSM, RAM
b. Malfunctions resulting in crew entrapment
1. Telescope latching mechanisms (H-9)
2 . Airlock doors
c. Malfunction resulting in inability to undock an attachedvehicle .
1. Docking mechanisms
2. Astronaut Maneuvering Unit, ManeuveringWork Platform, and teleoperator spacecraftattach mechanisms (H-13, H-14, H-15)
6.2.7 Access Equipment
Provide emergency access equipment (cutting tools, knockout orblow-out panels, etc. ) for the purpose of enabling access to andthe egress of crew members entrapped within airlocks or space-craft compartments. (H-29)
6 .2 .8 Crew Transfer Equipment (Space Rescue)
Provide equipment to enable transfer to the Orbiter of crewmembers stranded in EVA or in a vehicle unable to close-rendezvous and/or dock with the Orbiter (or attached MSM).(See also Volume II, Part 3, and Ref. 5 for detailed information. )
Such equipment selection should consider the potential needfor transporting crewmen who are immobile and who requirea pressurized atmosphere for survival. Typical situationswhich pose the requirement for such transfer equipment include:
a. Astronaut stranded in EVA (H-27)
b. Stranded Maneuvering Work Platform (H-14)
c. Stranded RAM
6.2 .9 Crew Aid and Retrieval
Provide personnel trained in the requisite operational techniquesfor immediate aid and assistance to injured, entrapped, orstranded crew members in the same or adjacent compartmentsor in EVA operations.
Such personnel should be fully cognizant of all associatedequipment and operational characteristics. Trainingemphasis should concentrate on speed of response to anemergency situation and techniques for retrieval of
99
disabled crew members who cannot participate in arescue operation.
6.2.10 Ground Facility Aid
Provide aid at the launch and return facilities which is sufficientlybroad to encompass the following emergency aid areas:
a. Fire suppression
b. Emergency life support
c. Medical aid
d. Decontamination
e. Access tools, equipment
f. Crew aid and retrieval
g. Purging
h. Cooling (e .g . , isotope systems)
Sections 6.2.1, 6 .2 .2 , 6 .2 .3 , 6. 2.4, 6. 2 .7 , and 6. 2. 9 denotetypical emergency conditions and sources which may form thebasis for the remedial aid required in each area above.
100
7. EXPERIMENT INTERACTION SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
Performing experiments in connection with the Space Shuttle Orbiter could
result in emergency situations of well-recognized categories. The presence of
Experiment Equipment and its operations does not cause hazards that are sig-
nificantly different from previously known space hazards. It does, however,
introduce an extremely broad range of specific hazard sources which are
additive to the hazards inherent in space operations.
The number of discrete hazards that can occur due to equipment or operation
of any experiment class (FPE) is related to.the nature of the Experiment.
Materials Science and Manufacturing Experiment Modules, for example, have
more equipment of a hazardous nature than Earth Survey Experiment Modules.
This class-to-class differentiation loses significance, however, when multiple
experiment categories are integrated into any one Experiment Module. The
definition of hazards with their resultant potential emergency situations have
to be based on the equipment that will actually be used. The synergistic
effects and the interactions between Experiment, Module, and Orbiter equip-
ment and instrumentation must be considered in order to reach a complete
definition of potential hazards and emergency situations attributable to a
specific Experiment.
The discussions in Section 3 regarding parameters affecting experiment safety
were necessarily directed to first-order effects because the Experiments and
their interfaces are not completely defined at present. Equally important
from a safety standpoint are the hazards arising from less well defined poten-
tial interactions due to the integration of the diverse Experiment Equipment.
This section discusses interactions involving an Experiment and its operational
equipment that could have an impact on the safety of the crew and the Orbiter.
7. 1 EXPERIMENT-TO-EXPERIMENT INTERACTIONS
Within a given scientific discipline, such as Astronomy, the number and
characteristics of hazard sources varies as a function of the accommodation
101
mode (Pallet, MSM, or RAM). The number and types of scientific equipment
which can be carried and operated depend on the available volume, weight
limitation, and capacity for pressurization, thermal control, contamination
control, etc. For multiple-experiment missions, there is also the variation
in scientific and supporting equipment required for the different Experiments.
The hazards associated with the Experiments and their equipment, as shown
in Tables 3-32 and 3-33, lead to a formidable list of potential emergencies.
The less demanding Experiments (in terms of both experiment and support
equipment) produce fewer hazards, while more complex or multiple-
experiment combinations produce a greater number of potential hazards.
In addition to the hazard sources that exist for any discrete scientific Experi-
ment Equipment, interference with other scientific or operational equipment
can endanger safety. For example, field-coupling effects (magnetic, RF,
nuclear, etc. ), -which could produce synergistic interactions, and thus could
activate or deactivate sensors, detectors, or control loops of other Experi-
ment Equipment, could result in:
a. Hazardous component/subsystem malperformance
b. Erroneous sequencing of hazardous equipment operation
c. Requirement for manual experiment operator control (to avoidhazardous occurrence) at a time when an operator is not availablefor such control
d. Overloading of electrical power system
e. Inadvertent start-up and/or shut-down of multiple ExperimentEquipment
7.2 EXPERIMENT-TO-MODULE INTERACTIONS
Emergency situations could also be produced by interactions which are
related to equipment configuration and placement within the Experiment
Module (Pallet, MSM, RAM, etc. ) in which the equipment is carried and
operated. Therefore, consideration must be given to:
a. The density of packaging of Experiment Equipment within aModule
102
b. The environment within the Module (i. e., pressurized orunpressurized)
c. Placement relative to Module (i. e. , whether "inside" Moduleor attached "externally")
d. Degree of reliance on sensors, detectors, control loops, etc.,which are experiment-specific equipment, or which are centralequipment provided by the Module or the Orbiter
e. Effects of special remedial means included in the Module (e. g. ,special fire detection and suppression equipment)
f. Start-up and shut-down procedures
The conduct of scientific experiments in ground laboratories devoted to a
variety of experiments generally allows separation of the different Experiment
Equipment, provision for protective enclosures or walls between equipment
and operators, and isolation of caution and warning detectors as well as con-
trol loops from the primary power source and experiment control systems
and stations.
The comparatively small volume available for Experiment Equipment within
a Module aboard the Space Shuttle Orbiter suggests centralization of auxiliary
equipment, such as central power conditioning and control units, data process-
ing units, caution and warning detectors and alarm systems, etc. , in order
to maximize the number of experiment packages and equipment for any
Module and mission. Such an approach is justifiable because it minimizes
costs and maximizes the scope of experiment activity that can be undertaken
during any one space mission. It could, however, lead to a safety problem
because of interactions. Wall-to-wall experiment and control equipment,
with its potential for hazardous interactions and synergistic effects, suggests
that a careful and systematic systems integration approach for Modules
housing Experiment Equipment should be followed.
7.3 EXPERIMENT-TO-ORBITER INTERACTIONS
The hazard-causing potential of Experiment Equipment can also provide inter-
actions with the Orbiter operational equipment and cause direct hazards due
to potential synergistic effects on diverse equipment within a Module or the
Orbiter.
103
All of the subsystems essential for the safety and well-being of the Orbiter
and its crew can be detrimentally affected by Experiment Equipment either
directly or indirectly, regardless of the location of the equipment. For
example, the electrical power system could be overloaded or rendered in-
operable; communications with other spacecraft and the ground could be
interrupted or cut; the Orbiter guidance and navigation system could be
rendered inaccurate or ineffective, etc.
During experiment operations the orientation of the Experiment Module and
Experiment Equipment with respect to the Orbiter is of importance. For
example, the efflux from overboard vents could contaminate the cargo bay
and/or sensitive Orbiter elements (lenses, sensors, etc. ).
7.4 INTERACTION SUMMARY
The experiment program foresees a large variety of Experiments aboard the
Space Shuttle on any one flight. The multitude of interactions between the
Experiment Equipment, and its operations, Accommodation Modules, experi-
menters, and Shuttle Orbiter operational equipment and crew creates many
potential hazards. Malfunctioning Experiment Equipment presents discrete
hazard sources; the potential hazards created by them could propagate to
other Experiment Equipment and supporting equipment and to operational
equipment of the Accommodating Module and the Orbiter.
Implementation of effective preventive or remedial measures to eliminate or
reduce to an acceptable level the safety risk of such experiment-related
hazards requires an integrated system approach. Such an approach demands
the preparation and coordination of failure mode and effect analyses and
safety plans which reflect the interfaces between the Experiment Equipment
and other systems on board every individual Orbiter flight. Such plans
must identify and consider all potential hazards introduced by the mutual
interactions of:
a. All Experiment Equipment and its operation
104
b. All supporting equipment (central controls, displays, detectors,etc.) installed in the Accommodating Module (e.g., Pallet, MSM,RAM, etc. ) and its operation
c. Subsystems and Experiment support equipment of the Orbiter(e. g. , cargo bay doors, deployment and retrieval mechanisms,electrical power system, venting system, EC/LS, communica-tions system, etc. )
d. Operations required for performing particular Experiments(e .g . , setup, deployment, retrieval, disposal, EVA, mainte-nance and repair, etc. )
The above effort must be carried out at three system levels, all of which
must consider the Experiment Equipment operation. The first of these levels
is the Experiment Equipment design level which must include considerations
of operational safety. The second level is the integration of the Experiment
Equipment carried and operated within the Accommodation Module. The
third level is the integration of the Accommodation Module with the Space
Shuttle Orbiter. The second and third levels must consider the stowed and
deployed modes of the Accommodation Module and must consider the full
spectrum of potential hazards created by the Experiments carried aboard the
Orbiter and operated within it or nearby. These hazards should include
considerations of synergistic effects.
Included in all the above system levels, but particularly on the second and
third levels, are considerations such as the choice of the central or multiple
use of the control, conditioning, and detection systems (e .g . , fire, leak, and
contamination detection, etc. ). This choice must be based on safe operation
under the diverse conditions arising during simultaneous operation of several
Experiments and operational Orbiter equipment (either planned or accidentally).
If there is the possibility that under certain combined operations a spurious
signal could result in a false caution or warning alarm, such particular opera-
tional modes should be excluded, or flagged for special considerations, such
as selected operating time schedules.
105
Other considerations include damage control, safety trade-offs, jettisoning
or dumping of hazardous equipment or materials, contingency plans, etc.
The contingency plans, which must be established for every Space Shuttle
Orbiter/Experiment Payload configuration, must include the planned emer-
gency shutdown of equipment, consideration of the periods during which
several (planned) Experiments will be in progress, emergency backout pro-
cedures, etc.
106
8. SUMMARY
Manned missions being considered for the future include the implementation
of a wide variety of scientific and application payloads. Current definitions
of a broad-based experiment program are portrayed and summarized in the
Blue Book. Specific spacecraft designs which incorporate and implement
some types of experiments are currently in progress. It is expected that
additional experimental spacecraft designs will evolve in concert with experi-
ment program implementation planning.
A basic element for such experiment missions is the Space Shuttle, used not
only for transportation to and recovery from low earth orbit, but also for
payload deployment and retrieval and as a primary base of operations for
an attached experiment payload. The identification of potential emergency
situations created by carrying such Experiment Equipment aboard the Space
Shuttle and the indentification of Safety Guidelines for eliminating or reducing
hazards introduced by the Experiment Equipment and its operation was the
subject of this study.
This section provides a summary overview of some of the significant results
presented in detail throughout the report.
8. 1 INTERACTION CONSIDERATIONS
The wide spectrum of potential Experiment Equipment, operations, and modes
of accommodation inherent in a broad-based Space Shuttle experiment program
results in a large number of potentially hazardous interactions between
Experiment Equipment, experimenters, Accommodating Modules, and the
Orbiter. Experiment Equipment and its attendant operational requirements
represent discrete hazard sources which can propagate to other equipment
(experimental or supportive) within the Accommodating Module or to the
Orbiter proper, depending upon the nature of the hazardous occurrence.
107
Implementation of effective preventive or remedial measures to eliminate
or reduce to an acceptable level the safety risk of such experiment-related
hazards requires an integrated system approach for every individual
Orbiter flight. Such an integration effort must be carried out at three
system levels:
1. The Experiment Equipment design level which must includeconsiderations of integration and operational safety
2. The integration of the Experiment Equipment carried andoperated within the Accommodation Module
3. The integration of the Accommodation Module with the SpaceShuttle Orbiter
The second and third levels must consider the stowed and deployed modes of
the Accommodation Module and must consider the full spectrum of potential
hazards created by the Experiments carried aboard the Orbiter and operated
within it or nearby, including their synergistic effects.
Other considerations include damage control, safety trade-offs, jettisoning or
dumping of hazardous equipment or materials, contingency plans, etc. The
contingency plans, which must be established for every Space Shuttle Orbiter/
Experiment Payload configuration, must include the planned emergency shut-
down of equipment, consideration of the periods during which several (planned)
Experiments will be in progress, emergency backout procedures, etc.
8.2 ACCOMMODATION MODE CONSIDERATIONS
Nine basic or generic Experiment Module categories were examined for Experi-
ment Equipment, contents, and related operational requirements. The specific
equipment and operational requirements of these generic Experiment Module
categories are influenced by the mode of accommodation of the module by the .
Orbiter. Accommodation modes examined included:
a. attached MSM mode
b. detached RAM mode
c. attached Pallet mode
108
In some instances all accommodation modes are applicable to a single generic
experiment category; the required Orbiter support functions, however, vary
with the accommodation mode. Thus, one accommodation mode approach is
not necessarily a competitive alternate to the other modes. Instead, selection
would be made on the basis of whether the entire capability represented by the
specific accommodation mode is desired and whether two or more experi-
ment categories are to be simultaneously carried by the Orbiter.
During non-operational periods (i.e., Experiment Equipment and support
equipment in quiescent state during transport to and from orbit), the mode
of accommodation would not appear to be a significant variable with regard
to hazardous occurrences in that all Experiment Modules are'located within
the Orbiter Cargo bay.
During on-orbit operational periods (i.e., when actual experimentation is
taking place), the attached modes of accommodation (Pallet, MSM) would
appear to represent a significantly higher hazard source level than the
detached RAM mode (for the same Experiment Equipment contents). This
is due solely to their attachment to and dependence on (in some cases) the
Orbiter.
8.3 HAZARDS AND EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
The use of the Space Shuttle Orbiter for in-space experiment programs could
result in the occurrence of emergency situations requiring remedial aid of
well-recognized categories. The presence of Experiment Equipment and its
attendant operations do not, in and of themselves, pose basic hazards that
are significantly different from previously determined space hazards. They
do, however, constitute an extremely broad range of specific hazard sources
which are additive to the inherent hazard sources existing in space operations
in general.
The number of discrete hazard sources for a single Experiment class (FPE)
is related to the nature of the Experiment. Materials Science and Manufactur-
ing Experiment Modules, for example, have more hazardous equipment and
109
contents than Earth Survey Experiment Modules. This class-to-class differ-
entiation loses primary significance, however, when multiple experiment
categories are considered for integration in a single Experiment Module.
The definition of hazard sources and resultant potential emergency situations
for such cases have to be based on the specific Experiment Equipment that
will actually be used. Again, the synergistic effects of adjacent operational
equipment and the interfaces between equipment, the Accommodating Module,
and the Orbiter must be included for a complete definition of hazards and
emergency situations attributable to a specific Experiment Module and Orbiter
mission.
8.4 PREVENTIVE MEASURES
An extensive listing of preventive measures was identified which, if method-
ically applied, could result in the elimination of the hazard sources or the
avoidance of their occurrence. These measures treated the Experiment Mod-
ule, scientific and support equipment, and any ancillary contents or materials
required on the conduct of the experiments. The measures identified design
features, provisions, locational features, and operational techniques which
should be given consideration and traded-off during the configuration selec-
tion and design process.
•
The formulation of these measures into summary Safety Guideline statements
serving to emphasize these areas deserving of further consideration as pre-
ventive measures is presented in detail in Volume II, Part 2.
It is emphasized that these measures are not complete solutions, in and of
themselves, for the prevention of hazardous occurrences. Rather, they are
both general and specific items which should be fully addressed, treated, and
traded-off during the origination and coordination phases of the development
of failure analyses and safety plans attendant to the system integration of
in-space experiments with the Space Shuttle.
110
Effective consideration of all viable preventive measures is especially
important if the trend develops to configure Experiment Modules with the
maximum possible number of experiment and supportive equipments per
given Module volume. Not only are the number of discrete hazard sources
per Module increased in this case, but the possibility of interactive or
synergistic reactions may also be increased.
8.5 REMEDIAL MEASURES
Ten basic remedial measures were identified which could result in remedying
an emergency situation after the occurrence of a hazard. These measures
were selected on the basis of the potential to:
a. prevent further propagation of a hazard
b. neutralize the effects of a hazardous occurrence
c. provide needed:
(1) physical aid
(2) medical aid
(3) metabolic sustenance
d. provide for transfer to a haven of safety, if required
The identified remedial measures encompassed both remedial equipment and
their associated operational or functional requirements in the areas listed in
Table 6-1.
I l l
9. REFERENCES
1. Preliminary Edition of Reference Earth Orbital Research andApplications Investigations (Blue Book), NASA NHB 7150.0,Vol. I through VIII, January 15, 1971.
2. Shuttle Orbital Applications and Requirements (SOAR) Final Report -Technical, Vol. I, Candidate Payload Identification, McDonnellDouglas Astronautics Company, MDC G2355, July 1971, NASAContract NAS8-26790.
3. NASA Payload Data for Integrated Operations/Payloads/FleetAnalysis, Aerospace Corporation Report No. ATR-7 1(723 1 )-7,April 30, 1971, NASA Contract NASW 2129.
4. Shuttle Orbital Applications and Requirements (SOAR) Final Report -Technical, Vol. I, Appendix B, Experiment Requirements Summary,McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, MDC G2355, July 1971,
. NASA Contract NAS 8-26790.
5. Space Rescue Operations, Volume II: Technical Discussion,Aerospace Corporation Report No. ATR-7 1 (7212-05)-1, 12 May 1971,NASA Contract No. NASW-2078.
6. The Prevention of Electrical Breakdown in Spacecraft, NASA SP-208,1969.
7. Safety in Earth Orbit Study, Vol. I, Technical Summary, Section 1.0,Hazardous Payloads, NAR Report SD-72-SA-0094-1 (MSC-04477),July 12, 1972, NASA Contract NAS 9-12004.
8. Safety in Earth Orbit Study, Vol. II, Analysis of Hazardous Payloads,NAR Report SD-72-SA-0094-2 (MSC-04477), July 12, 1972, NASAContract NAS 9-12004.
9. Safety in Earth Orbit Study, Vol. IV, Space Shuttle Orbiter, SafetyRequirements and Guidelines, NAR Report SD72-SA-0094-4(MSC-04477), July 12, 1972, NASA Contract NAS9- 12004.
10. Safety in Earth Orbit Study, Vol. V, Space Shuttle Payloads, SafetyRequirements and Guidelines, NAR Report SD72-SA-0094-5(MSC-04477), July 12, 1972, NASA Contract NAS9-12004.
113
11. Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety, Vol. V, NuclearSystem Safety Guidelines, Part 2, Space Shuttle/Nuclear PayloadsSafety, General Electric Report No. 72 SD4201-5-2, January 1972,NASA Contract NAS 8-26282.
12. Space Station Safety Study, Vol, I, Crew Safety Guidelines, BoeingReport No. DZ-113070-5 (MSC-00189), January 1970, NASAContract NAS 9-9046.
13. Space Station Study, Preliminary Systems Design Data, Vol. Ill,Book 4, Supporting Analysis, Section 4, Experiment Safety, McDonnellDouglas Astronautics Company, MDC G0634, July 1970, NASA Con-tract NAS 8-25140.
14. Space Shuttle Baseline Accommodations for Payloads, NASA MSC-06900, 27 June 1972.
15. Shuttle Orbiter/Payloads Monitor and Control Interface, NARReport SD 72-SA-004, 1 May 1972, NASA Contract NAS 9-12068.
16. Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Electromagnetic Interference,NASA SP-8092, June 1972.
17. Shuttle Orbiter Applications and Requirements, Phase II (SOAR),MDC Report, Spring 1973, NASA Contract NAS 8-28583.
114
10. SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AMU Astronaut Maneuvering Unit
E Experiment
EC/LS Environmental control and life support system
EE Experiment Equipment
EM Experiment Module; a spacecraft element containing or housingprincipal experimental equipments and experimenters (wheninvolved). Can be a Pallet, an MSM, or a RAM in configuration.
FPE Functional program element; a grouping of experiment classes,or research activities within a particular discipline of research.
LBNPC Lower Body Negative Pressure Chamber; a medical researchequipment.
MSM A mission-support-module within which research is conductedin a pressurized environment by man.
MWP Maneuverable Work Platform
Pallet A structure upon which experimental equipment is mounted.
RAM Research Application Module containing experimental equipment.
RTG Radioisotope thermal generator
SOAR Shuttle Orbital Applications and Requirements; a study conductedby McDonnell Douglas for NASA.
Sortie A mission class encompassing the conduct of orbital researchwith the Shuttle system.
sub-FPE Payload elements within an FPE grouping
115
(M>-MO
0)
rt
Mn!
3CO
CO.uC0)a<uM
• M0cr0)
rtWOHh
(M
(1)
5n)H
t/.
<5
< '£•t ^ - . y? - ^~ ? i ?
Ul
O u.c
t-1
^C
UJa
.
5c
s
c3^
^
HO
IST
ING
S < 5fei?
h-5H<O
y.
o
a
•f
„rf -3
a: n
£
5
5C
^O
(JJIO
13A
O
SS
VIt
^
^£
CO
Ul
u.
4 '-
* f S
- •? ^ "^'-; *• a - "
£ i £ ^ £•= U "2 ,
co
- 3
Si E'. C
_
E
1 «='• 4~ c- t« — A
•s'E 0'
O °
" - 6
-
u
-•a E
o S
i 8
•zJa
to
11
1!oo C
"
>.•>
•/>0
R S
o o
3s
X
g
g S :: c
7: ^ c ^5 8 5 s
,
C
J «='° o b
6
1 •='
!-P•o S
" 1*
2 c• i1 U
_
S 'io ^n 0
Desired:
5-
10"6
rad
Accepta
ble
5 •
ID"5
rad
lifsf
£ — S =g 8 g 5
^
in
CD
o
0o
o M.
3 =
Ste
llar
c.
£ 3
II
_
E
5 c •
ss ?
i • 5J «=' ;.'SS 5a-g
E
S t•= '
* "2 «i S
U
£ *5 Sn ^
o ^T
Desired:
5 "
10"7
rad
Accepta
ble
:
1.2
- ID
"5 r
a
1 s § s
1 1! I
i
o
oo
o
-8
0 o
1
c
- g
II1 8
_
EJ c
o S b
E
^ c
1§S?
f Ii; 5•3 S
c l - . n l- 0 H iii H
— 0 • 3 c •. - T o 7* fn "^ J T J> fl 0 « 3
C
C
u«
°
i"2 8^
> oo H w"
11
!l
o
m
10o
—
- s
ilu
•4 C
I 51i .*"•
-3 Ei .,
Ill_
E
o S b
"ijl c
»» f c'_
;;
- v
f >
- W
o 5
tyn
\0
o
11
\ *N v
•rO
-
?o
^_
s5
0 o
S ">n w
Hig
h E
nerg
>'
Ste
llar
S ^
|^l
r. >" 4
1 c ^
S « ?— ^ »**• C £
_
C ,'-
J2 c' ""-- o **
6
J •='
Igg
.
'£
-•3 E
>- H
0 S
.'•> 3
i'-™
1
ei
If
ti
11
2
m
oo
^~
^s
i!
0;
A1VONOU1SV
< S
^£ '.- " ^ rt
jj 'v J - ? 2
c 7. c •» ^ "
ll 13 31-r «, «
c
E c
^§ c
0
A
E E
0 •=' 1-
:§£
g~ :
>J 0
o S
_8 m
rad {0
.5*
si
" 1
"o
2
—to
0
"*
l_
n i
» §
i S
Space P
hysic
s
Researc
h L
ab
c
E a
Ji
2A
E 6
rl^
c
E .S
JULs;o 2-
0 1
1
^s
= §
* ,~*
n
o
no
f
* o
•3^ o
s 5.
Pla
sma
I
% c
i\_
i =S K 1.
EJ c
His
X.
1to •
sill
sillno ,
a
p*
*~
r-o
o
2 !2
| f
a^S
-> E
M r)
Is
<V.
e i•" c
r 1 4'
•s.
18O
O
do —
8 §
*«*H
-r
jn-
—43
oO)
o
g f°. Cl
Physic
s i
Chem
istr
y
SDISAIId
c
s 3II
0
%
rl
•^ c u
r II
CE .0
0 S
0
«
d
si
j;
UO 0>
-1 W (S»
>n
•*
S a
o o
Ea
rth O
bser-
vations
Fa
cility
SUO
niuva
•s.
•s.
eil"** C* <T)
^ £• o*A C A
^
•o -
E "
- S
^t
o
0.1
75
mra
d
s'.a-
^1
o
0
:-^M
« -^
0
M
10 C
o
S 2
CO
M/N
AV
Researc
h Lab
AVN
WOO
^•T-* ^F -i
i' Z
1.1
«
''
S.
2
V.
! .s 1 i5 2 i ^2-
1 s i aI - 2 Sg 3 E S •
"s- -
CD ^H CM
w M n
,-. « ^ CM
0
m
3 1° 3 2E "•' S *~*
Islls'g S " §
liii
Ma
teri
als
Scie
nce
Researc
h l.a
b
SW/SW
117
(MM-4O
(U
rtaCO
CO-uC(U
a
(U
wa,
(U.—iJ3nJ
4!-
-J **
r* 's
;/
x.OH
X.
U.
c
<
iN
M5•<H
Q
W
°
W
O
±'
o
p
Su
k.CC
RE
Ql'
IKK
MC
ST
S
s.
—
i
u
—s
t
te
ai
0
(.X.
HV,
o
X.
E
a.
•
3in
^
"«
E
u
U)0.u.
Exp
eri
me
nt
peculia
r
2*~* '~ -c""' n 3<ff 3
J1!0 C
ssA C
X.
*7
- -
u» O
" —
= s
2 E
^j0 0 >
' H
o'
„ •o
25
o S
IIS i§ ?.| 8J •%
t*>
03
U
w
Flu
idM
anag
e m
e
AC
.i
u
aH
U
>J
KnoNioa
u
£JI
%
2
X.
«
O
c
"Se
•*
o
oo ^
^-
o
« n
oc
(M
-• f
o o
0 »
O —
Ad
van
ced
Sys
tem
s T
I
Nu
pa
rt-n
t S
t'
ma
nru
-verin^;
during
iku
km
gand
un
iV>
ckin
£.
'f.
x.
X.
-c'S'
m S-
o
«
« "^ >1= ? H
".
0
«o
n 2
_ gI ">
\
Te
teo
pcra
t
No m
am
-uve
rin^
.during
exp
eri
me
nts
2
<
«
< '
X.
c
M °
o m to Cco ^ n <^
? 2.
So
•r" wn «
s
3!
_ m •w t-g g
Mod le
a I
Re
sea
rch
Isola
tion f
rum
no
ise
,vib
rati
on
, 4
pu
ssih
tvE
MU
ES
I. A
cc
ele
r-atio
n <
|0'3
K. "
2
X.
X.
f.X.
- „ -§
2 2 § £
si
O)o«
^ «-)
s^
« ~•) s
II
Ve
rte
bra
teR
ese
arc
h
Isola
tion
fro
m n
uis
e,
vib
ratio
n, i p
ussib
ly
EM
I !
ES
I.
Ac
ce
ler-
atio
n ^
lO"5
if.
-
5
X.
X.
< • •X.
'c
o "3 o Cu> ^ to n
to —
i-o
2'".
!S
sl
il
Pla
nt
Rese
arc
h
S30
Isola
tion
fro
m n
ois
e,
vib
ratio
n,!
po
ssib
ly
EM
I 1 E
SI.
A
cc
ele
r-a
tio
n <
in-5
K.
X.
X.
*
<
X.
. §
O S -r "2
^ o
n
o
CJ
w.
n-o
*»" «
§ia
Mlc
roblo
loR
ese
arc
h
4310S 3dr
Isola
tion f
tvm
no
ise
,vib
ratio
n.!
pu
ssib
lyE
MI
L E
SI.
A
cce
ler-
»tin
n''ltr3
K.
x!
c5 i
5 2 ™"
III
x.
X.
c
3§
so
2".
s
- 1
il
Invertt b
ra
Rese
arc
h
I
x.
X.
X.
x!
0
«> "' 0 U
s 2s £
2 ^.
on
".
~-«
g
n
si
oS gS c
£a
Co
ntr
olle
d i
llu
min
a-
tio
n &
no
ise l
eve
ls.
Secl
usi
on f
rum
vis
ua
lt
au
dito
ry d
istr
ac-
tio
ns.
x!
i
x
X.
« ~ =
~, " ?1 i.
2 22 1
S §2 a
••
n
-' M
-n
n —
II
s
118
Table 2-2. Crew Skills (Ref. 1)
1. Biological Technician
2. Microbiological Technician
3. Biochemist
4. Physiologist
5. Astronomer/Astrophysicist
G. Physicist
7. Nuclear Physicist
8. Photo Technician/Cartographer
9. Thermodynamicist
10. Electronic Engineer
11. Mechanical Engineer
12. Electromechanical Technician
13. Medical Doctor
14. Optical Technician.
15. Optical Scientist
16. Meteorologist
17. Microwave Specialist
18. Oceanographer
19. Physical Geologist
20. Photo Geologist
21. Behavioral ScientistI
22. Chemical Technician
23. Metallurgist
24. Material Scientist
25. Physical Chemist
26. Agronomist
27. Geographer
119
'•--.
"<
t- •/,X. p-
2 -ui u:
X —
j
KO
SM
E.V
TH
U:M
ENTS
•* 5u 2
3
•n
O
VIt-X.
II2X
W
5u1*
ui
s-JO"*
Pyi X
* £
ui
5
c:
E
1r.
C
i
i'
HV,W"£
EX
PE
R:
i u *£
3 "3 7 • •
5 *• 7 % Z'("^ C •? | 1 £
g „? Z g 1 S, ..
** 3 * w JZ **ft i IT c
— o .- 2 ° rt *"o S 3 S ' * «
L..A
'/" C» 91* O*
P. M M W
T « -r *«J> i 1 iW O O O
u
11o^ A «H 5 2
** §ej c
'111-
W (** *"r*
o
*
•a S .| g ||
«>d> ^
'H "y tO
tO *"
"s
1-T
-«
S o o m imo M n In
a G o |®
3 S S 2 *?!CM — J ^-
1S '*"
* s 2 S i" ^* C H 35 >S
2 | 7 • •; == H 7 Sc '*:
2f. »T:|5
,0 •» er r>
f t O t ^ o^ « M e-
& U M U
!77 7*£ O O O
Us"t "t~ l* c7"£5 S B*• **s. Oo.-^ o
"3 *" w
1 -^1 1 1 i
•S JB "*UJ P
^rt O
£ t- *a SO N v inx a.•n
~x ^-
d x
x "O) X
•r
.n
—
tt ~ c S e 5 eIS
r^ r— f-« o m oo ojjo01 ~ " " ~ Is
||5 g 41 £ *^ W? >,
N E
2-3 ^ i
S 3 "n "
I .; S 1
1 S";i 3 ci " 3 Zv.~
o S -3 2
1
O O O
?• 7 '?O O O
kl« ' / . § _i 1 0< iK i F **u 5 C.SH
w
0
llo -^.
p
C
1-r
"3 oc •«
ISISX ft.
01dx
d *X W
0> x
d 2.
I^-S in o o . o o |m
o o o> o u tn« e (2 e £ e. |j;
— Cfl -f to oO O «NO oo 10 oo o ^ --^ M -*• 0
"§• S S "S * OT*
:.l lifl. 3 U H- C m
f4 (/J *
to" 3» O £ —
-1= 1 =c "jj1 — Jf
iillic c
i 1 E— O toN r-
fyyS 'o 'otn •-« «
"3o
"o
10u
— r— i. "
jj|;'JK Si Jj "w t- h
0
w "
•a ^ SoC _ in 41"c C4 Jj (O *
0 -H* « " C''
m
"X W
to ci
v ">
JS
t-
-c-i
t ^ m w t o o j o o i o o i w
3 d " S S S - S 2 | 2cf
d f- .£*
® § Ja* S " § w J2
N X *
It "' o yi
a "3 7 « ^*" ® - u^ "^ u ? 2
ilfil*
O 0 O
0*0*0*
§"«*«"*i o o
151jj 2 ^ "3
i ? £ 3 .O ^ / bfi
•3 *• ~.- o 2
11 i
ill*" il i "•UJ {-
oa
"3 *•c «21 S "^ °
Cl
d
"" «
d x
r l!'1
-£> >
d £i
a
Sd
§11o Oi 1
" 1 ss£ si* '& ^*H « y -o
"J ilM U
120
OO
I-HO
0)rt>^fH
a
wCO
4->C(!)a0)
^• H
&
OJrt•1-1ccu
^1(UaX
W-U
C0)
(!)bOrtaa!
T3• H
i—I
h
roi
fM
J3n)H
*' C
|5x -ui H
uJ1
Q
U
enl~X
w *^:* £g r;
?>
UIa.Oj
£b)
£o>
H
tn O
*I
i/-.H-
^*•"
i
>fa:
i
L
w
£
I
2
•2(A
UITU
ID
5i*
<£
6
"soE
I
S
H
ER
JME
N
s>u
... .>l •-
• T3 ^ .
3 "3 2k. £<cp H- S ®
y ** n, fct s: sf£ *•! ^* c
5 o t 63 S « ~c » « c
" °. °. °. °.
p. M M M M
* - > ' ' ' o
^ 2 2 2 o
7o £ «-. O >
K" T "fc 7 aP — p
,M f., C,
£ 6 7;•v. o
o. y. u
*a t;i «l•S s 2
MtII SiUJ P
s>.
"3 !* ^
1 « sX " A "
«o So"
«O X
r! **•X "*
ci £
o"oeo*—
S
| |8§8f 8I8|
cs a> — w — v ^" ^ o>
a *
£ ^ ^ > w „*• § a 5*V3 t "i ? > jjn" H H
n
• 1 i"— "? 3»• »-_c H 2 o5 . « »
| S? &.£ *5i "O C
IIHI,
o o o o o* ft J> i/> O<* M A ?• O
V
O. M M M
llskl
— o >
If -— 0 T)o — o
l-r e0. 0
•jj u •;
1 s 1•g E |
IPw P
•ai sis& - &
". -X "^CM O
M X
M o
ri G.
o
§8
|l|lllg2g||
5 s S S s S 2 =s |E*• (0
»p « a ." s
""• ? 1 1 .1 a**3 5 1 > « ?:-i0^» HN«
n
B ^ 2a "a s
1 H 7 t0 • • %
g ^1 O
S "a *
2211
iO Ifi O O
<D r» y ri
g. « « «
«7 T *?u o o o
(O -• « •*
Hi"t «•- b -0E v £s r Es4 1(x y. o
"3 i2>•p i S• 5 ^ 1e « •? '83 PiS « 5C H
E
•a ~5 Oi o * 80 ^ 41 -I
X CU
x S"v> x
W CMx -^
M c.
o"
s3
-— , — • -v •» ^
« — i u? »r in oo - <c tnN <-4 (O
M
I|:BfijJ™ J ' S l ^ s l j a s:• i H * M H -
n
P -o
« "*3 i>*u £ - .c H -^ •*o pi
t « u ^
S 5 "S 2^ S U * £
. i:-Ma
J3
O *» «- t-
(M* O O O
§•„-„- cS 0 0 0
4*
A
a
o
•a ^i s«. S41 — .
||
w
goo
"""'
•a -2£ oe o JC oc o « o
!**.*-
t-
o ^.X "*to ci
o x
X **
o x
o £!•
o
oo
o
l|s||o» i£> o in
«) IMj 0>
9a.
» s s*• » §• IZ-IH"
U -o
*J "3 «Tu ^ S M
| o- 1 7
« ^ u ?*i « "2 O
" o c" n•I o 5 1 2u ct • a *
«. w w c*
^ M bfl
Fs"^ I•21bo
•Q
bgO
•3 ^•a "°
"'*s § l
i|s|.lu
o
CD
. «H
•3 £C
1 s -a §to t- o 2
"X *r
eo0 .
to x
O ^i
a .o>
0.
S o m im.0 tl <^
— ti 1"
rt -• -tJ onCM m «j -f .
M
C Irt
•° S uO w> 6 ^
J2 W * * a_ .
121
*— -.CO
"oro
•*H
"-H0>
HH^""
^>
rrt5
g
|
C/3
CO4->
ca)a(U!H
•H
CT1
0)Of-uC
1
<u
x*W•uC<Da0)6JOcdcn)SrQ
•g—1 .fa
•
ro1
CM
0)
5rt
i '7! — p
-
^-
i*— v;/. H— ?
i -^ «Hi P
_ •
^
*- £u <:>* —
o s£ ^
2 I
V,
"T
2;S
5V)
«J
2ic:
UJ
O
u
l*J
p:
O"*
H
? 1X j£
-
*
£
c
,
~k-,^
£
„
^
H
5(XXUl
' £ «
^ ~ 0 '^ £ ^i§H 7 f'5 .' ^3 —
E - 3 co 2 ^ £
^2 .
O «O W W
^* o e o
a « M wi to *o 2*• i i xeft 2 2 0
41 ' ' '
j£. • ' '"T ••c
i
o **
a f. - •8 ' S ' . . •£ ^> •
" O
O
M
i 8 -a S '?."£'•-~ z' >
<& *o £t
Cl
*"— ' .. . •
£» ' ' •o
O. iO ' f>j O
Oi -*• O «->rt c-i (0
•a . - " ' . •^ '.2•S E - '° £ u •0 S, * 1 1 ' •
-:m! ' '" -
122
CO
CO•4-1
cCU
cr0)
c
I0)
H
W
CM
0)
TH
ER
MA
LC
ON
TR
OL
r £iv y.
ee
CP
MM
fMC
AT
loN
O -y, —5 fc
DA
TA
RE
QU
IRE
ME
NT
S
EX
PE
RIM
EN
TT
IME
L
IMIT
S
IRO
NM
tNT
UR
EM
INT
5£
K —
«3.W
Dd
Ulc,O ~•i ~> Ey,u
jri
»E
]CM
T
kj
(ll>
)
II ; HiX ai
v x c 5
1 I 2' 1 ° "
5 E>N k
» *
.1 S ^
• 5 ' . ? s ! 5f 3 £ A <
, | j fliS°« 5° Is < s 1 < s
*; 3:•" <!;
a • 2
? 1
i 3?x tt 5W " L.X ' X X
*\ "5 = 3= -y « ri — OT
5 E - i " « * -~
^ ''• ". £ ^ ?• r £ 22 ••' C. o. 2 -• C. o* 7.
v ^- c
tf J rf
III liljl!Ill s* hi
• O P ! " *** ** X O
£ §
s 12i pjS 2 ~
s S S 3
si 1 ,; |g ;. I i531 . 3 ^ 5
!§!!^ OQ 3 00
! = £»
•
123
Table 2-5. FPE-Subgroup Analysis, Space PhysicsExample (Ref. 2)
Experiment
P-l Space Physics ResearchLaboratory (Space Station)
P-1A Atmospheric and Magneto' Science
P-1B Cometary Physics
P-1C Meteoroid Science
P-1D Thick Material MeteoroidPenetration*
P-1E Small AstronomyTelescopes
*Divided because of weight distribution
Weightkg (Ib)
1,373.0 (3,024)
292.4 (644)
105.6 (232.5)
40,1 (88.5)
865. 0 (1, 909)
96.0 (210)
Volumem3 (ft3)
4.47 (159.7)
1. 16 (41. 3)
0. 58 (20. 6)
0.81 (28 .9)
1.47 (48. 5)
0. 51 (18. 0)
124
Table 2-6. FPE-Sub-FPE Relationships (Ref. 2)
A»t runo 'ny
A-1 X-Ray Stellar Astronomy
A-2 Advanced Stellar Astronomy
A-2A In te rmed ia te Stellar Telescope
A-3 Advanced Solar Astronomy
A-3A 1. 5m Photohcliograph/0. 25m XUVSp«:cl rohcl iograph/0. 5m X*RayTelescope
A-3B Solar Coronagraph
A-3C ITiotoheliograph
A-3D X-Ray Spcctrohcliograph
A-3E UV Long Wave Spectrometer
A-4 Intormorliate Size UV Telescopes
A-4A 0. 5m Narrow Field UV Telescope*
A-4D 0. 3m Wide Field UV Telescope!
A-4C Small UV Survey Telescopes
A-5 High Knorgy Astronomy
A-5A Lower Energy Experiment
A-5B Higher Energy Experiment
A-6 IR ToloBCOpe
C O M / N A V
C/N-1 Communicat ions/Navigat ions Facility
C/N-1A C O M / N A V Subgroup A
C/N-113 COM/NAV Subgroup 1»
Malcr ia la Science and M a n u f a c t u r i n g
MS-1
MS-1IA 5-Day Group, Biological
MS- 110 5-Day Group, Levitntion
MS-1IC 5-Day Group, Furnace
MS-1 ID 5-Day Group, Small and Low Temp
MS-1IIA 30-Day Group
MS-HID 30-Day Group
MS- 1IIC 30- Day Group
MS-HIIA Space Station Group
MS-HUB Space Station Group
MS-1IIIC Space Station Group
MS-11I1D Space Station Group
MS- HUE Space Station Group
Space Physics Research Lab
• 1A Atmospheric and Magneto Science
• IB Cometary Physics
• 1C Mctcoroicl Science
• ID Thick Material Mcteoroid Penetration
• IE Small Astronomy Telescopes
Plasma Physics and EnvironmentalPerturbation Lab •
P-2A Wake Measurements from Stationand Dooms
P-2B Wake Measurements from Subsatellites
P-2C Plasma Resonances
P-2D Wave Particle Interactions
P-2E Electron and Ion Beam Interaction
P-3 Cosmic Ray Physics Lab
P-3A Lab Without Total Absorption Device
P-3B Lab W i t h Total Absorption Device
P-3C Plas t ic /Nuclear Emulsions
P-4 Physics and Chemistry Lab
P-4A Airlock and Boom Experiments
P-4B Flame Chemistry and Laser Experiments
P-4C Test Chamber Experiments
Earth Survey
ES-1 Earth Observation Facility
ES-1A Meteorological and Atmospheric Science
ES-1B Land Use Mapping
ES-1C Air and Water Pollution
CS-1D Resource Recognition
ES-1E Natural Disasters
ES-1F Ocean Resources
ES-1G Minimum Payload
Technology
T-1 Contamination Measurements
T-1A Contamination Package 1
T-1B Contamination Package 2
T-2 Fluid Management
T-2A Long Term Cryogenic Storage
T-2B Short Term Cryogenic Storage
T-2C Slosh Propcllant
T-2D Non-Cryogenic Storage 1
T-2E Non-Cryogenic Storage 2
T-3 EVA
T-3A Astronaut Maneuver Unit
T-3B Manned Work Platform
T-4 Advanced Spacecraft Systems Test
T-4A Long Duration Systems Tests
T-4B Medium Duration Tests
T-4C Short Duration Tests
T-5 Teleoperations
T-5A Initial Flight
T-5B Functional Manipulation
T-5C Ground Control
iLife Science
LS-ST/A Minimal Medical Research Facility(Station)
LS-ST/B Minimal Life Science Facility (Station)
LS-ST/C Interim Life Science Facility (Station)
LS-ST/D Dedicated Life Science Facility(Station)
LS-SH/A 5-Day Ufa Science Facility (Shuttle)
LS-SH/B 30-D»y Ufa Science Facility (Shuttle)
125
Table 2-7. Candidate Blue Book RAM Payloads, Eight Free-FlyingResearch and Applications Modules (Ref. Z)
Astronomy A-l
A-Z
A-3
X-Ray Stellar Astronomy
Advanced Stellar Astronomy
Advanced Solar Astronomy
A-4 Intermediate Size UV Telescopes
A-5
A-6
High Energy Stellar Astronomy
Infrared Astronomy
Physics P-3 Cosmic Ray Physics Laboratory
Technology T-2 Fluid Management
126
(M
ena3Ofnbo
JD3
COTDrtO
i-H
><n)
PH
4-1
niT3
CrdU
00
(M
0)
l_O *-.> 0 3
— .- C
c u i
*
c.-<" .C %
Q
CO
2
p3
.— *
J3^>
ror-1r*6
•
~
•< Oi
co S2 .3
c-o >0
<-• ro""* r"
.rt O
1-1 Ti<'
Gr-
3, — tO
ro
in
*— *
U)C0
rfl
0Q,O
OJ
. . c5
1 1 4 1 1 1 1 I
0
UH"
W
d C.
W. U
U O U - CQ CQ" < W U
m" ^ H ffl. < - ^" a. ^ °! m" 'O < <" < U < -H • • 7 < - < CQ" CQ <r
ro ^C •— i rg ro r}< i ^ ' ^^ <, i i n r o r o . nI 1 1 ' i ' C O - - - i 2 ' r O C O i ' ' ' -
ror- r J
'o -0CQ . . •
^ ^ ** 1*1
' W; .3 < . <
C PH 7 ^ T - • -^ co n" to< W J
ro
J • « ffl
~ w (J < <<- ^ - '- ^o ^ U cq < ' 7
~ i ' I 1 ~^ CO
< < < a, u S
W 0 uM <•*
. U U Q -::-"CQ
CQ CQ (j CQ . .. . i — t . -X- -"-
i i i W i i w i i i i< . PH PH 0 , P - . 2 E - l E - « H H
o.
b*
W
a"W .
uU U . CQ U
« •» CQ •» *C Q C Q C Q . < C Q C Q C Q <
u. < < ^ < x u x « ^ < < < 7ro rt- ^^> 7 "j> <^> 7 ^ ^ 7 °? *? w
"S-i"niPH
ID
rtt,rtaOJto
127
>^a§o
PH
I<*">
ctiH
wo
(O
rt
~ID
0)J*•*
oft
"oj"sm
|
OCLD.3
Basic
"
'
I
£•£.3 '533^ s
14)00rtV
5
enCO
cd
&O
cV
a."3crW
Eq
uip
men
t
1
!i,
3
-* O (j
H •*cn "
gllj
o -o or- u-> a-
: •£••>-? J3g M 0
88 *C N * CO""""' -"- *-••..00 o o
CO. I"- if> rOrH ^H (SJ
O
rtM0)QJ T30 tt) ^
">-. c "~" *o rt £ "o
P-H >— 1 4) -r-l(X (X g CO
1 w 2gJ3 *J *3aJ o m „co - z < ; r f
bibc'00
? ? ? g3 3 3 . •"3 3 3 0u u u .;;rt rt rt C
U iy (U £ gU U U U "Jrt rt rt u Cip. a a — 0
A -
3 C
-. P
ho
Vo
heU
og
rap
h
A-3
D:
X-r
ay p
ho
toh
eli
og
rap
h
A-3
E:
XU
V s
pectr
om
ete
r
(Passiv
e at
lau
nch
; sen
sit
ive
to a
ll co
nta
min
an
ts)
H
S
C/3
<
wO S
O- c0 o1 03<i<;
OO00
1oo<M
O \f\ lTtO (M -^fO CO O
(M
O (TlO 04fO CO cJ
~i - O O•*# tM pj .
V *% '~~rt (j uOJ ** -H (U
a *o L ^ o0 U < -- ^ rt
">. § * o ^ 2 "3*_o rt ^ ^ J o «O- CL, oj Tj C to -^
•S <-° g 0^- y."i ^- '^ o §• .23 w g » i £ i s
0 ) O i o W ^ Q > j 2w Z-Z. a < r t a l a
tT^ ^ &1
0°^ 0° 0° " ft o r i i j m r t m r t c
u ^ . ^ t n ^ c o ^ i 3
' s o r t 0 ' s o r t * 3 O r t r t
> 0-"» S > O.'« > Q-'ui >
~ ^ '& 2 ^ — "-^ ^ JS '^ d
^ ™ -« ° S S ^*
sis"! i|! il •«!
V
1-1 n.. Vug .- O
Jii<f w
HT ><; s
u'du00o
U
cr-m
rO
,fUr-J^D
^
rtL,
UCL TJ *J*0 « V C „
">. rt c '3 2_0 ^ jfl g U
o> "rt , | J ^
^ -^ > ° !S *0) r^ O JH >C m
to < 2 w fU rt
s1 -oT2 ^- (j
rt ? m S
4J | C O
1- 3SSJ2. GO
X-r
ay t
ele
sco
pes
(gra
zin
gin
cid
en
ce an
d V
en
eti
an b
lin
d),
sp
e c
tr o
mete
r /p
ola
r ir
riete
rassy
. X
-ra
y co
un
ter
arr
ay
,1
dete
cto
r arr
ay
, g
am
ma
ra
ysp
ec
tro
me
ter,
sp
ark
- ch
am
ber
(acti
ve cry
og
en
ics
in-5
B;
-5A
passiv
e at
lau
nch
; sli
gh
t to
mo
de
rate
sen
sit
ivit
y t
oco
nta
min
an
ts)
00LIVc0)
sCQ C
OJ" ^
(-1
1 (0
••
^"2 .. .-o >^« «?0 h i ii/j ^ i_j K-i
oorO
O
ro
0>
rtL,
(Uao
"•>o
w "§•2 w
]ort
<uurt a) <i>o- 2 XJG. 3 3
IR te
lesc
op
e (
op
tic
al)
,in
terf
ero
me
ter
,IR
d
ete
cto
r a
rra
y,
au
xil
iary
op
tical
tele
sco
pe
(im
ag
ing
),e
lev
ato
r/re
tra
cto
r m
ech
an
ism
, :
gim
bals
, p
ressu
riz
ed
se
rvic
e
EO
OL,
<
hrtuc
*~* o•& o1 p< .E
128
^xsoo
J-> * — •to (M
^oroin
1 * jj
0) 0)
<U - —"r"t
c^ ^-" *=J/•s rrtO >/•*
' r«
-1.
Ex
peri
men
tM
od
ule
s,
Att
acl
CO
<u1 — 1
rtEH
^ O^ Q)
W -JJ £ '
<a
V>
t_,
>
£
*«r3inoO-
O0.a3
t/3
1
«DO
V>
10C0
nl
S.0
c£p."atrW
I
Basi
cE
qu
ipm
ent
c0)g'C4)a£
~-^ CO
ill •0 0*0 .
°> BO M<^ rt n)
00
a « «^r1 2^i -SS? '" 2 S « g - s 3 g -rrt <tf ..•'—< C O *5 - j « t o a ) g . " w« 3 C ( i l j S ' * j * j
:- . H s S - - s f l & '1 1|2S| l|ss ihi l? rsiu « u . f f l c o g a " 'CTIii -?nni ?3§5 .21 - « - ° 2 « « 8 *g 3 CM >rjSla h o "^
E » S2 s
gocoh
<!•o
CUhCD
"^8
129
IDU
• t-iCO
CO4->
(U
<u
cr
-~- 13
^^OJ U6 n»
ro
ytoO
1o
•5E4)
»S
V
a
oss
ible
]
a,
oCL
3
'JCO
(fl21
a
X «*-* 4}
u r^i«( •£*i ^3
Vn)4)tx
4)
(4
5
(0CO
h4)CLO
C
eaUU
Eq
uip
men
t
!
k
3
g
r^
fO
r- o o r-oo O ^O ro-H 0 ^
-H ^» ^
<j^ o — * m.0 sD •*
' i ^ ^4> ^^_ . J
tn « .-^ JJJ > n)
^-Is^'- &<3- ^" s »« ^
jji?ii!ilfl0 c_ WW Qj
g" u -|g "' |
5 « „ B S ™ c
•sJJ^jL| | |.^ r t ^ ' i ' u r t ^ ^ C ^ . ^t: 1: ""e^iS c u^ u^ u
^l£lE§"y~!a
Ph
oto
metr
ic
clu
ste
r,
scan
nin
gsp
ec
tro
me
ters
, im
ag
e is
oco
nT
V,
mass
sp
ec
tro
me
ters
,ele
ctr
ic f
ield
pro
bes,
en
er-
get
ic p
art
icle
se
nso
rs
(alu
m,
foil
),
ga
seo
us
rele
ase d
ev
ice
(IC
N,
he
ate
r,
batt
ery
pack
),m
ete
oro
id se
nso
rs
(pa
ne
ls,
du
st a
na
lyz
ers
)
(Pass
ive
at
lau
nch
; m
inim
ize
co
nta
min
an
ts)
j*o
• J j . ( 0 4 )
S o -" c £4) 'a m 5 6tf C >*•£ §
00 at w o
Itlllli!u O - n ' C o ^ g a
(X *
2 «uwCL,
£
-^
- -. M *J
£ 0 «>O **"" .QO ^ 3in 2 a
OO O O t/> O
•tf ro \o m in
o to in oCO O "H ^1ro ro xO ro co
^H O ^^
j:- 5 « h
s -5 • £ *"O 0. £ m rj 004) 0 n) «J £ 'CH ""*>. W *" " " u 5
UU " IS 2^ ~
S|! 1 Illtl- .O QJ CL ™ 4> ™ y ,13 u
z w o 2 Q i o f t S
- i -g 'rt •*-> i M
JS^ -S « ^do•2~?o E h " r l s » J < e
'Ti o<i ^^ ^ P ^~. g +^ ^a S E £P § —~S .S .2 '« ° i*>;P ^ S t o 4 ) r t ' a > h J i l L l i n j S
ISlslSS"SS^I5
Bo
om
-mo
un
ted se
nso
rs (m
ag
-n
eti
c an
d e
lectr
ic f
ield
s,
ion
an
d e
lec
tric
de
nsi
ty),
gim
bal
pla
tfo
rms,
, o
scil
losc
op
e, s
ub
-sa
tell
ite
(co
ld g
as
pro
pu
lsio
n,
| b
att
eri
es,
p
art
icle
an
d f
ield
| se
nso
rs),
in
flata
ble
E
CH
O!
ball
oo
ns,
b
oo
m-m
ou
nte
d t
ran
s-
mit
ters
an
d a
cc
ele
rato
rs (u
p t
o1
10 k
W),
re
ch
arg
ea
ble
b
att
er-
ies,
in
ve
rte
rs,
pu
lsers
,m
oto
r -d
riv
eti
ste
m,
larg
ean
ten
nas
01 m 1) >-c c S 71 — "S"« JJ <i> u ." rt 5c c.ti1" § ^ i - ^ 3 -
» 2 u ^ C O " " 1 Sit) '" 'j^ 3 c 3 ^ > ° 7 J ' 0 ^ S ' ^
i||i|s|||] Hlff c j< i - J Q U sS'S'S" M <"*] * J ( M P J W W j - r t
M « i l i t r t C * j n )
0- 5l n U S
4>
OC
. < rt
s 1f >*0 0
S o.1.5 1l< U ~-
"u "S 5*4) >N *iU a w
I ^"u1 STo r^ h4J . o« ^^s«:g(o (- „) O
1 ° ~s5JS2 3o 3^- 34) C ^U^ GO r tS n ii- >
Pla
stic
an
d n
ucle
ar
em
ul-
sio
ns
COu» S^ 8& s.1^1K o u •"i, — o) ^~." 2 » "3 SE S « g -Sg - S B - S s"J6 &^ ^ U
ol J,
m
vDfvj
i4)
M J
00 0r- — i o<M in o*
"*
O 0 Orjf o m
— •**
V(A
•• .? &ES| -a.^ x 4> ,0
" 6 0 " • ?^ t. d --O Q p,
"&^> ^o g.w ig
m ' i >-
g {--I | ,| a'g Jig '» | E 2 .£• 3 "° ""— ~- > ••^r |- s~s ES||||^ c J2 S — ^,^ 3 £ 6 ii 5 a c o ~ o ' M S ' ' 1 + j . 2 ' ^ • w
I s - a - s a s i l E l l a ^
"Su
itcase
p
ay
load
s" fo
r p
lug
-in
; sc
att
eri
ng c
ha
mb
er
(gas
jet,
N
2,
O2
>
He
), i
on
izati
on
ch
am
be
r,
mass
sp
ec
tro
me
ter,
de
tec
tors
, o
scil
losc
op
e,
pla
t-in
g
sou
rce
, h
ea
ters
, co
mb
us
tio
n c
ha
mb
er,
o
xid
izer
an
dfu
el ta
nk
s,
cam
era
(f
ilm
),in
ert
gas
sup
ply
, h
eat
ex
ch
an
ge
rs,
tra
nsd
uc
ers
,ele
ctr
on
ics
. in
sula
tio
n,
the
r -
mal
shie
ldin
g, e
tc.
O.
£ ° . m •2 E ^* *c x *
J iJ <y 4> >H
,<D £ *^ ** P •"
T3 S ^ C L ^ ^ -13 ~'-
." 2 "p § S ™ & " 2 ? ^
^ ^ ^ c i u 3 S t o 0 r t ^^ •**• ^r <r -g_ _j ^ Q
<i ' ' ' H 1
130
COu
CO °
C M
S *E <u0) rd
IH CO
K o
S «i.5 ±j
ro(U
•a
W
» - • •
? ' » C o>• >•« a
'
ti>0._ J
E ^° " „',!
'S E B w45 S .„ gO. 4
o 2 J » i1-to .S d « ;3 ., 3
X "" g.
S'S u(0 — <
autt
E? -2
c >•" S
131
a)W
•8-g• rJ O
Q) 2
a ;>,W >. si
on
0)
« - • •o^"
fc.D
Op
Eq
u
•" E
iiW
or- M r- -H
-^ oo in
a
->.
w w o o 2 A u « : o x o
uVa.
" « S S 'S "S. So 2 g a 3 " > 2 - a"> a i f l > f t « _ j i r t a oc 4-» g oOJ^- ' 5,rt
H^lHife !
co£
-s£•
W O
132
T)
a) ^•§S
^50) &K^4J (1)
h ,£o u& oJ
*ZW ^
C OT
«3.fn -O0) 5(X^lX >
W 32
T^S00 g
a, oJDn)H
U
W '£ '£
S s st* s
.2651.
U
.2 c e
s 51i|il111!
~° -Bills!!>!
,
A j3 3 2 B"j i .5 «; a j« »•
to . r*
6* I
~HM «s.s
- 4) U -TOco ^ to ^ ^ Xnt A B rt m .trC rt W -^ . t3
« P -5S
P S
U W W
XW
133
T3ari<n
i—i(tf•r-i!n(U 0)^ "°
S|
!§C T3" 0)z*t3 °3 rt3 -uQ1 -u<u <;* .-u tD
*H (UO r-(CX 3d,T33 O^sc 5P«.S.§3S S^^w s
n)
-?2<*•>
(Ui-H
JDrtH
_ V
W 2-3
833[•« D
trM
° ° '3s^c>o o o— o o *;2-1
O O OO ro O
O -H CO fJ
E J3 5
5
Sis. o
l •
£ - u"^ 2 r u^ rt « o <uw E S 3 "3
c a. -•a o 3 c^ u c *
CC<1J
5.
<B>°"
§8 .
.5 .S^ '^a a& Sw E
>* c £ "o .2 « o
U . . «
g S g - g - . s•S -3 « 8 g-5t O ' - I C a J -
» x . h S " - B - «
t o l w "
>- e^ !< «a a Xu
134
wasft "?U rt 11
oǤ*!o a>~
g o .
* «C o 8
ES 1
H I1 Jiff<T o > « B-5
K H ~\ \— —- • g - 8 . 1 ] . .JH X o- S ir (Tj 3 f, a," 1 o .ij w^ y s i ua;y g -2 §.3 3a* 1 ••'HC/j •* 'S I •-« -* -9
Cfl 1 O* 1 T! S4 J f l ) ^ 1 S ^ ^ ' g o nfl i— < 1 j -H ** *• h ^0) ^» co S 8-5.SJG TJ -:
Tab
le 3
-6.
Ex
peri
rC
on
tam
inati
on
Mo
^
Basi
cE
qu
ipm
ent
c
IMQJQ.X
W
Ph
oto
ele
ctr
ic p
ola
rim
ete
r,q
uart
z cry
stal
con
tam
inan
tg
aug
e,P
ort
ab
le
spectr
ore
flecto
mete
ran
d e
xp
osu
re r
ack
,
a *.2 *i *^e 6 o o
§ a u>»g irPiPi
ss^ 77
5«JHVao
***• "
J? P<__^— — - —
aV
o
» ^
O< (N]« z^_^— ^^— —
u2•g<
o.p.
^ •
•
Mas
s sp
ectr
om
ete
r,C
onta
min
ant
mea
sure
men
tcam
era
,O
pti
cal
pro
pert
ies
module
(dri
ve
shaf
t,
ph
oto
tub
e,
gau
ge,
tab
le),
_
Act
ive
cle
an
ing d
ev
ice
(wit
hu
mb
ilic
al)
,C
on
tam
inat
ion c
on
tro
l p
anel
(ele
ctr
om
ag
neti
c an
d e
lectr
o-
stati
c p
rote
ctiv
e d
ev
ices,
g
as
sup
ply
lin
e,
gas
cu
shio
n p
ro-
tecti
ve
dev
ice,
con
tam
inan
tg
aug
e,
mass
sp
ectr
om
ete
r)
• B « •
IfU£.5 1 « o•^ *j M S tO
a) i ^ C ij -f"S o >P^ >" »^O e
o -2 -2 v °J5 S |(S §••« .5 »
' -
)
JI-
(Pass
ive a
t la
un
ch
; k
ept
inse
aled
co
nta
iners
, in
clu
din
gsa
mp
les)
135
boo
04)H
en
>-i <nO _rjcu-g
ri CD« T^•H SJ-l T3<U OOH^
X *W
CO
(U
w a s
Bas
iE
qu
ipm
o
o tn
?£o oo o . .
O X u
.
<§>!& 2*i b o rt -i• r* ai Q t. 3W U-o oo ffl
sW n C a^
i|oE ^X
.s >-<-
« « if if i-i2 " S . - * - * J
— " P 0 0 - - ^ ^p. '-S £ .5 S JS ^ 5
-
a aa nj
<- .s
»| g 5
"5 SW o t
o.g
"""SC 5
slw
. s u- «
136
boO
, — rOc
(U *—>
I?I-H ^
1 5co CO
-<-> • — •
0) 0)d T3?i OCD VHI-i !
ti -CD CO
S3• rH 3
t-t rr-j
fi °w
t-I
0)^H
O
n)
U.3
-Isl«:s
U
ve-
Setu
p
O iM esj ^- h O a)
.23oO
O a fl.0
M -5 S 5, cS.B c a gS'2 3 g 5a)^ <j lij u
137
I2 0)C T30) O
co
X
fl0)
ooi
2-5w '-SS'sS
w
rt
^"
*4>
£t.
SO
"jj"
3IA
Oa
oaa3tn
rf&
a'Ed)u
1
coa.2p.o
cVs<v3o-
W
Basi
cE
qu
ipm
en
tE
xp
eri
me
nt
b | 0)
o"j!" 5 eZ* o - «
B •? •? | 3** V O w -rt
u) •? £ 0 00
oo ..I- g"^ °* f-o « 60 C -H* s «~ > a
M X
u"» s, Ovo g w c
"^ « y § *U
= 1111
U
«J
V ja u-2 \ • g"° 1 g'Sa I 5 o" y _ .s
"- / "^ u »<< 3 1 ^ m> « 1 3'ZW to ^ S J
S! (Uw J;
J< « IO •-» w
-2 ** a"3 ~ £< - t^ -T^ Q«w Si w
ou i „ i » i o
•1 a 8.1X1 ' .-'11 5
^ s ^ o g a ^ o ^ M ^3 a ^ T T s (i'^^ai^ , 5^
1 it2
5 3,-i0 -« *J 'S
RJ *- 0 £.
h > •-• Jrs =• » - a >.(8 ™ • ^ "* O, h
° C P W *"S <L) ^ S T3 ?j QO < c a o•-• — i. n» dJ u
Bio
med
ical
me
asu
rem
en
tu
nit
, lo
wer
bo
dy
ne
ga
tiv
ep
ressu
re c
ha
mb
er,
e
rgo
-m
ete
r (b
icy
cle
),
rota
tin
gli
tte
r ch
air
£taj
ca
l R
ese
arc
h
-3
r~,
a
oacH -Rt ? *J
w o m
^ -S gt) «j *S "o *"00 C nj fljC C M^s -o -aQ *^ O OT
X m ^ ^ o
to "
Pri
mate
ho
ldin
g u
nit
,sm
al
ma
mm
al
ho
ldin
g u
nit
, an
i-m
als
(4
p
rim
ate
s,
25
6 ra
ta
nd
/or
mic
e,
ma
rmo
ts,
e
.«u
eb
rate
Rese
ar
tity
V nl
rj'
a
t*V
<dS
TJO
•2c .rt uE S
bOC
0
bfi
OJ
00C m .
c •(T) ..->
E §
U
t R
ese
arc
h
Fa
ctt
n->
a
<AOaU)
a
Cell
s an
d t
issu
e h
old
ing
un
it (
incu
bato
rs
for
EC
S,
inst.
,
op
era
tio
ns)
, w
ide
va
rie
ty o
f o
rga
nis
ms
(sin
gle
-ce
lle
d
org
an
ism
san
d t
issu
es
in
cu
ltu
re)
V
H -3•D rG
C 0rt >H„ RJW (U
^3 cn0) O
UcdTf
a
2oex
(fld
Ho
ldin
g a
nd r
ea
rin
g u
nit
s,
va
rie
ty o
f in
ve
rte
bra
tes
•teb
rate
arc
h
Lab
.
g sm
a
>w
)0
"rt
>W
Te
st
un
it,
gas
an
aly
sis,
mic
rob
iolo
gy an
aly
sis,
bio
med
ical
an
aly
sis,
ma
inte
na
nc
e,
test
h
ard
-w
are
(e
. g
. ,
CC
>2 co
llec-
tio
n u
nit
, z
ero
-g
sho
we
r,e
tc.)
.
^ *
o wa >3 u
W ai
vO
J
C0)s
Hu
ma
n r
ese
arc
h
ce
ntr
ifu
gn
ob
ilit
y u
nit
(p
ort
ab
le m
et
bo
lic
an
aly
ze
r,
imp
ac
t fo
rd
ete
cto
r,
po
rtab
le a
ccele
ro
me
ters
),
beh
av
iora
lm
ea
sure
me
nts
u
nit
-Sy
stem
;ra
tio
n
S u(d 1-1
r-
a
138
^Socohto fv?< ^i
I °
C (U(U (U
gt(
II^si:so <J&s3 -ow
4-1
(U
<uunJ
«"Sw -S -^o " 5
CD
rt
--~
V
<o1-1
V
oIX
"aT3
CO
1Rft3to
rtV
V
!?2•u
^
ao
rt<uaO
cV
a'3crU
Bas
icE
qu
ipm
ent
C
ILIo>a
W
0)u
• 'S£ £ M
Ififi
-00in
ao•*
V
rtVi4) ^
^ . C W - m
O rt >"> ** O
§• u a£ gt) O O 0 'Sto 2 H :< *
C
- 2O ••*
'S >
>° S>• $n ,aU S2
X-r
ay t
eles
cop
es, p
ro-
po
rtio
nal
co
un
ters
,sc
inti
llat
ion
cou
nte
rs,
flat
cry
stal
sp
ectr
og
rap
h,
X-r
ay d
etec
tors
, (p
assi
ve
at l
aun
ch e
xce
pt
for
acti
ve
cry
og
enic
s)
rt? 6W 0
zl1 CO
I
t '
.. ^ ii ° _£ «2 .S • 13 »« .
S o S. S S 2
o
7m
"~*
iS
^i,m •
'-'
g• b3 -sii -
— ' O rt jt - ^ o2'a'aD c '«s5<-s ||2>5" SSa; 3 rt ^3 H
O » 2 U < rt
"3 >." ' _ri o c
g S 3rS O pQ ^*
j^ O Jfl ™
ft co a;Sc o y
fe -£ rt! ^ D, ft
Tel
esco
pe
(rem
ote
ly c
on
-tr
oll
ed),
ali
gn
men
t an
dca
lib
rati
on
equ
ipm
ent,
imag
ing
mic
rosc
op
e,el
ectr
on
ic i
mag
ing
tub
e,fi
lm-p
late
ho
lder
, sp
ectr
o-
ph
oto
met
er,
spec
tro
met
ers
po
lari
met
er (
pas
siv
e at
lau
nch
ex
cep
t fo
r h
eate
rs)
s'|*** oCO Co
<!CM
0)00
3.L" ft<=> 0o (ii
?£
or-o
^M "§ft *5O m
— VO 4) O
r- rt m
• 4)
rtt-, mV U
o » - *•"""* ^ "» " O
!>> - C • "^- .2.O rt Jj o co
"f & 2 g" "j.
cS ' Z 3S <
ciC
'So
C C
§ 'uu .;.5 §^u i So u ~
& a§
Ph
oto
heli
og
rap
h,
X-r
ay
tele
sco
pe
, X
UV
sp
ec
tro
-h
eli
og
rap
h,
X-r
ay
ph
oto
-h
eli
og
rap
h,
XU
V s
pe
ctr
o-
me
ter,
so
lar
co
ron
og
rap
hs
(Pass
ive a
t la
un
ch
; sen
si-
tiv
e to
co
nta
min
an
ts)
S S,O 0
CO C0
TJ (0
1
Ooo
V .
in*
. -'
mr^in
mmin
.^ O4) ^a -o 'O 4) <C O «
O flj O ^ M y
•o < -° "o 2" QX
£ iK'S ^S
M *« h M —o ,0 ° ° "P"co i. ID m ™co .3 co w 2
£0 .0 . . ^ u j i i l o^ i "3 O r t . ~ 3 O r t 3 O r t P
E £ £ » £ £ 5 £ S S *^ S ft'G ^ ^ ft " S ft rS-tn PH O to t* h O h fc O —
CO
O (X ** » •••*
J - a j c r t r t - S n c T ' r tn '^ ** *irs|| if|i.i!| ?§ •
CO
<u. a.S Sio v
• Vi* H
I
tu
^°a> -D-, coX cuw-3
T3• O
TSro0)
i—(J3n!H
1.39
W 3 S
SS3U< D
oo(H
0>c
<u
E ^•-Q
X a)
'O• o
CO
a)i—)riH
"iss.«'g.
u
2>•
2 »« g
~ 'P,rt .u <
~CM
- ju a
c » 4->5 >N 3°^3 rtc p^ C
3 o< 2
o w
•o 'c
ay t
ele
sco
pes
den
ce a
nd
Ven
bli
nd
),
spectr
om
ete
r a
ssy
, X
arr
ay
, d
ete
cto
,g
amm
a ra
y s
pe
ctr
om
ete
r,sp
ark
-ch
am
be
r (a
cti
ve
cry
og
enic
s in
-5
B;
-5A
pass
ive
at l
aun
ch;
slig
ht
to m
od
era
tese
nsi
tiv
ity
to c
on
tam
inan
ts)
o -
" 'g
> S
cu rt
•a
140
S S 3 -J p.0
c.3
rW >>
Basi
uip
m
ttj<ut— i
JDnJH
P «C o
> 4)
w i j
« 'S
si• 2 1c u'
S
o~ *Is! iZ § J 5 S^i U 3 00
all s
S B
o « "'> CO '5
o"2 »g 2 S --IS^ 2 HO n2 <»~•9 O 01< K
33!H°b2
U 4)
S.'-1
™ x .*j h •u rt .•s,?
ou
np
la
tiv
e(L
Hco
nd
um
ete
rb
ay
s (
be
rs),
em
uls
E
£•£
'MT3 «« T>
Is2 oo
141
T "i TJ
§1G^
*<
cr
oOn
CO
0)
c eB
asi
Eq
uip
m
c
Ia
W
H rt•— t4
IS35
^ >
•o KSO
-
.0-
5 a » 7.>• 5P • <o <nC h o £ o) i, o,
£-2 C 2 £ » g C -
rt'" .-E'
tlfl Q* U. Ji S - ^
§ ^*? rt h ™ * ^ f•J UdJ W T 3 2 . r t Q ) . S "
= 8
" < » « " U Q W.. rM cj co (M ro
142
(U O
ES
c S(U ,—<C 3.5 ^C O
«>
S £•w 3 'o
31".
*Jrt
|4)
LIft>
*«XI
1aa«
rt.0)
a>
i*V
<
c0•aaMVP.
0
0U
• £aIW
Bas
icE
quip
men
t
ca;
0}a
W
n
o^-fsf
h -J .2 •- rt4> , > N Urt £ 8 M
OO .,r- £
"o rt 6o c •-
-1 aa)
4> Cm jj o•-£) Q C
^S-a s-3-ii^ Q S
n)ft) •a -^-cO Li u
•^ o «O u 4)a -§ gm ^H 4)
> u "1 O. -rf W
W 'w 2 S
<J to
g 5Jri 0)o ^ ^
•3 ^ £2 a^ "^a '3w 2. w
Vis
ual
rec
ord
s an
d m
icro
sco
py
un
it,
dat
a m
anag
emen
t u
nit
,ex
p.
sup
po
rt u
nit
(p
ow
er, g
as,
flui
d,
vac
uu
m d
istr
ibu
tio
n),
pre
p,
pre
serv
. ,
and
retr
iev
alu
nit
, b
ioch
emic
al/
bio
ph
ysi
cal
anal
ysi
s,
M&
R a
nd
fab
rica
-ti
on u
nit
, an
cill
ary
sto
rag
e,b
iore
sear
ch c
entr
ifu
ge,
ra
dio
-bi
olog
y un
it,
airl
ock
EV
A u
nit
* oto ^.- G *-•
01 £ rt C
S l^|S s f 'B-^ (0
^* > S ^H
* 2 i -2 | sJ? u ex js to 22 c _ £ £•2 *> =! -5 T3 C^ O < S c o•-1 ii o rf rt o
Bio
med
ical
mea
sure
men
t u
nit
,lo
wer
bod
y n
egat
ive
pre
ssu
rech
amb
er,
erg
om
eter
(b
icy
cle)
,ro
tati
ng
litt
er
chai
r
&j
uLIrt4)CO4>
Pi"rtu-S4)
2
3
u
O,nft)
ojao
M)C^ to" w™ c *J
» o "Vi .^ rtT) rt ^C -0 'rt O u
g j - g•^ C ,-,2 8 -o P.K Sl^
Pri
mat
e ho
ldin
g u
nit
, sm
all
mam
mal
hol
ding
un
it,
anim
als
(4 p
rim
ates
, 2
56
rats
an
d/o
rm
ice,
m
arm
ots
, etc
. )
uLtrt4)ft)rtoR!
_£
Li %
> U
C-J rt
a'1"
uoaCO
maLIa,
TJ «
1 1-C 4J
^ ^
Pla
nt
ho
ldin
g an
d g
row
ing
un
it,
pla
nts
urtfc
uLI
4)
OM
C
3
rtto
nQ •
Ce
lls
an
d ti
ssu
e h
old
ing u
nit
(in
cu
ba
tors
fo
r E
CS
, in
st.
,o
pe
rati
on
s),
w
ide v
ari
ety
of
org
an
ism
s an
d ti
ssu
es
incu
ltu
re
4)3CO
in
i3ra ^
O o
2
"rtn0aCO
'O
(0rt
CO
"2 SDO Lid J3.-. v
a LI
1!uLl
CO
47
a:4)
rt
4)
!*•3
00
XIrt
Ocn
143
<uc <uC T3(U of-l *H
•3s
f-l rQo J5cu S
0)
.
£ M.b T3^ nJ0) O
Im
n)H
<u
.?.2
(0
IS0)
04LI<u
£
^
3enenaLI
a,3
X,a
£
Wn)V
CO
R)
(XO
Eq
uip
men
t
Bas
icE
qu
ipm
ent
+j0
'Ca.xu
i
AC
S (
N2
H4,
GN
2p
ress
uri
za
tio
n);
batt
eri
es,
p
yro
s;
Tu
g p
rop
, st
age
(LO
£,
LH
2,
GN
2,
rock
et
eng
ine)
So
lid
-sta
te d
ete
cto
rs1
Sci
nti
llat
or
cry
sta
lsP
ho
tom
ult
ipli
er
tub
es
w *£^*" U C* O
i c o riO o £
« *« Jr n _ < 0
~
AC
S (
N2H
4. G
N2..
pre
ssu
riz
ati
on
);b
att
eri
es,
p
yro
s;
Del
ta S
tag
e (U
DM
H,
N2
H4
, G
He,
rock
et
eng
ine)
Sp
ectr
om
ete
rIR
ra
dio
mete
rM
icro
wav
e ra
dio
met
e:S
ide
-lo
ok
ing
rad
ar
cortLI
_ to
5 O "wS2x x§ S3W C.IO
rg
(U
AC
S
(N^
H4,
GN
2
pre
ssu
riz
ati
on
);b
att
erie
s,
py
ro
s;
RT
Gs
Ce
nta
ur
sta
ge
<L
O2
, L
H2
, G
He
,i
H2O
2,
roc
ke
t en
gin
i T
E-3
64
-4 m
oto
r
O R)CL L,CL 1
UV
ph
oto
met
erIR
ra
dio
mete
rM
agn
eto
met
erG
eig
er-
tub
e te
lesc
op
eU
V
spectr
om
ete
rT
ele
vis
ion
, d
ete
cto
rs{R
F, p
lasm
a w
ave,
tra
]ra
dia
tio
n,
part
icle
, X
3• — .LI'a
LI<vacoam
"oTc
O g ^ 2 «- '13 Oi QJ 5 ^•^rt ^ boK ^
LtV
s-1Q) ^ Q W) C
S M" rt > M•S « ^ Jj^ ^ *-' C hIj J^ tj ®3 CL, _^ n) rt
i/>
OE
2
m51iBo0
*
144
C (U
S'S£2•rJ -U
3 O
I««p,h-0s^CX^.ex "3 n)
CO ±!
^r<c .0) to
.§•3£•§! °w >,. £
Tf O-< d' o
ro h4-1
(U 0)s<riH
3 !t
CO
rt
u
S^SQ
*ft73'»»aaft
w
Bas
ic
i
I
^ or <u
' 5'< u
rt4)cu
00rt0)
cort4)ftO
cVgft
1w
Eq
uip
men
t
J
kiuX
q
£ «*rt O QO« to to 3" • O i f i .
HC'-Z
O
I—"
—c M
S'So oCO C-
— i — i
orthQ, *C
-2. § ffl
,2 2 s:sft ft C to
•8 «. °£'1 « a f
0) O w mto Z .< id
00c'5o
1 13O "« 'S« 2?« ^S« Sg
A-3
C:
Ph
oto
hel
iog
rap
h
(Pas
siv
e at
lau
nch
; se
nsi
-ti
ve
to a
ll c
on
tam
inan
ts)
rto
™ g^ o
L.
en^
<
>oo00
oor-J
o in -^O M OM m eg
o in0 (M
-— -^ (M-H 0 -^
•xf rJ O-H -H (M
V U
rt 0.2.aJ -vf .Sft -a ' rt
^ g< 0 «
J2 JS «2 ** « "•a < -^ "u o js~a >2 * . o &3 0 o 8 ^ isc£ Z . ! < rt
t, w L, u, —0 .2 o ° G
ii y J3 . ^ O j i ^ U . O * u
3 0 j f l . W 3 0 J S 3 O j 2 >
> f t » 5 > f t u ) S f t "^ 4 )
E C u C C C ° CCU °
e- S 4>0 o i c 7;
rtft3 ^ ^ - ^ LI -M to-—
iS 6 **" 22 '^ s.£ ^S' rt g _>**J "3 H •£ ^3 C 2
•• — _ § « £ •• o r t "* - - 0 0 - jo
< < < t-5
ma>
** y
C D
->- V
£1
u'cV
-00oMo
t
*12
^(M
'
rtLl
S.« •» "'•"* t3 *"• '3 to
1.1 t - -si
"a"c M •§ 'So 4
2.? „ a >•£4) -H O j- *«W < Z « &* rt
-^ «
s *3 *""'u O o
ff itg,^ " >.ft nj rt IT
52. o • O o .
M 1 • -g ^» » 8 « c -c
X-r
ay
tele
sco
pe
s (g
razi
ng
inci
den
ce a
nd
Ven
etia
nbl
ind)
, sp
ec
tro
me
ter/
po
lar
imet
er a
ss'y
, X
-ra
y co
unt
arr
ay
, d
etec
tor
arr
ay
, g
ara
y s
pe
ctr
om
ete
r,
spark
-ch
amb
er (
acti
ve
cry
og
enic
in -
5B
; -5
A p
assi
ve
at l
ausl
igh
t to
mo
der
ate
sen
siti
ito
co
nta
min
ants
)
00LIg
w
• ? l_ LI
in<
<
£>. B
i" "m J
oo
o . •(M
0)
rtaJQ,O ^"* 01>. - ."° S.SO. g « •"
< -n 2 x rt> ~~ S o- cw §• ° £ £z w <; rt «i
?3u
s0)urt v vQ, *7 "T1
a 3S .
C u to
£" : -S '£ £ "c o > 5^a g» S L, 25,2 S 5 rt ft•^ 'S»^ M 6°'° « c "3
"^ ^ .§ " rt- tt JS £ *j o ft .- £ P^
1oco^JCO
<T3VLIrt
•aI-H
•£
<
145
CO4->a0) <UC T3C O
1H
COCJ
£nJH
w ^ SC/5 *u 3O rt -^
a)
rt
0)
J
uga.
a(0
a
Ms.a5
•IS"n)£
VQO
u
cortLtVa0
£'
8OH
'3cru
Bas
icE
qu
ipm
ent
CD
't-tVftx
W
[^- .
to
r-. o o r-m i o o co^^ ' O ^
o o o* aoo o — * m
^
il ^ >>fl) •* O
cu ^ §"X
h i . CD" a>
<! f.2 11|wf ^. .-I1 g - g o .*S .|gg-t;-S.S
B" § 7 7 -" ' 'S
l l»2 ~Z~z ^
-Ifiikff '§||S-|S33 «
S I s S l e ^ H . .«
Ph
oto
met
ric
clu
ste
r,
scan
nin
gsp
ectr
om
ete
rs,
imag
e is
oco
nT
V,
mass
sp
ectr
om
eter
s,el
ectr
ic f
ield
pro
bes
, en
erg
etic
par
ticl
e se
nso
rs (
alu
m,
foil
),g
aseo
us
rele
ase
dev
ice
(IC
N,
he
ate
r,
batt
ery
pac
k),
mef
erA
idse
nso
rs (
pan
els,
d
ust
an
aly
ze
rs)
(Pas
siv
e at
lau
nch
; m
inim
ize
con
tam
inan
ts)
* no °fH jy
! | Isr •<y s >. » ow -o •,-; c« ti a. o
l^gf l l l
»2l||s|l8.3 .. "°. ..""^ i 7T 7a,
ooin
CO
COro
d)
2•oS. » -ss1-2 1 - S-lC >• C to o) _ , t^rt O u IH jj a) ^^U g. c 3 S -2 .g „'
>-| &ll sJlo|' |I1 Iff
Z en Q -S « Q . C C
Id1 S^ '-f l ' ^ ' d < ^ j f l O ^ n T
C ** 3 "^ '°r^''n
§ ""* rt ft "5 o "U •> *j ^ rt n OC P w - C - r t H t i ^ - o
Bo
om
-mo
un
ted
sen
sors
(mag
net
ic a
nd
ele
ctr
ic f
ield
s,io
n an
d e
lectr
ic d
en
sity
),g
imb
al p
latf
orm
s,
osc
illo
-sc
op
e,
infl
atab
le
EC
HO
bal
loo
ns,
b
oo
m -m
ou
nte
dtr
an
smit
ters
an
d a
ccele
r-a
tors
(up
to
10 k
W),
rec
ha
rge
rs o
r b
att
eri
es,
inv
ert
ers
, p
uls
ers
, m
oto
r -
dri
ven
ste
m,
larg
e an
ten
nas
£•3 S
. c o-S S .^ a; -^ od p ^•C'0T C TJ +* <D
» " S 3 -S g g a » S
S" S 3 ^o^g c co C . rt
6 _rt 0 • "Z 3 » "u
•2 # "" « » S -^ 'S O ,y £
i i£2£
<ugz
V
• rt•g «« a*i oj: >-u oc~ o.£ « »O .-I T3u U —-*J -rf n,U CO ^11) >. 3
— j: «Wo. w
(U ..
o - O£ 2 ^
£ n1 N
U) "*^<J "^
» S S o
11^ Iu 3 _ 3
^ G T S' *5 <u rt ?•
Pla
stic
an
d n
ucl
ear
em
uls
ion
s
CO
.S KCA rt>. ws 1->• c e5 ^-2 •
1 11?W ^3 ft « "So rt m^ ju a•? " «i j.
sO
or-
Qr-
O1
«rt TJ
•o Jj "5- ;JU x0) • ' "* ft W U *•*
S S ^ -^ G '? "»l « 5 -.I|S
C 0 *O -^ rt O o>» »- g --1 U u f i u
! • § < ! • H s g«.« > u ys x x SOQn W CO C L i D n t ^ U
s • - >• *"a3 .2" -- u' > * 2 o
sfp.fi |||| |.|, *iii-^gHit i2^^1
^ f l j d o ' r t f t u * j S c D j D ffl«S ^- ft iJ
• Vi
.0 w .
-1 s °U " U
•^ DO to .2 u -^ M
(O — < bo o ft °> |1,
' ft
li °
|'l J.j 'O CO X
5 c ^ t"0•O ^ ro 4) rt C
Sf| E1|. 5 2 S g . o g
$*l f S
Tf ' ft"*
i H
146
£• 4>w a s8 "3
h.3
• 3 - -
S §£ sO 0s m lO
in •* - lA " r
•«"
W5<
cr n) &3 •O.0 SQooSpEooK ' o S
* *U V
d w(U (U
Slj
IIw ^
• h^O 3
" « 6 § -g •£ *: <«O M -H 'i3 3 » 5 'S
•g-w
•§
Co» 2,a. IIJS S W fl) -rt6 rt *•* ^.U ? _, a> TJ
Ex
p
W b,
147
M4->
0) T)
S OM
<u ^>H . ,
0)Pi
c -
>n)
00 g
<U O^—1 r ^^3 U
rtH
U.D
Op
i(4 H
« 1
Xw
5 , f fT3 4) £-d o
C "- O
.2 j=«3 -3
S H
H M rt oB S « Sr! — Q- e
aHi.- 2
. -~J .^ BJ O *J Io,g.B«S w ^ o i " oB ' S > 3 "g ^ B. ^• " j h t ( * j ^ ^ d o (o
II 3! Ill *t
ii
IIfc. (a 2 -rt 2S ° h B a*S3 «i u « o-p
§
!§
8 ft ft g0 , 1 rl E .
( _ > W W .S
148
8 S3
Ito
C(U 0)
OJI•f-l3 4->
Sf"<U r-l
a-g6 6 ° S Bsills,
• . « u <o «
m G O,C 4) 3i-t u »
rt
oo
CO O
n)H
it«•§.w
axW
« •- 5 • o > 2"3 * S"° c •S''3 «u - J m c o < u - 3 - ^•6 S g rt »| g I?
5.3 •'-' ~ W M c5"o fi ^"^ S ^ rt h
*"(« - w ° d ^ S ( - * J C( O C ( U - r t O C ^ S 4 ) C
^ S - s a g H gJ ^ ^ N ti *"•s. "•ss » So u rs _ g n; c S
1 > « C P 3 n > ° , i : « > ' cI (X 0> il'^i to +j (XT3 .«
a S S . 3 ," o ^ •* .'
< Si- a« X
i W
149
1
<U O
ss• •*-*
"r* '""'
cr nJ4) ^
•*-* fli^ ,3
Q< nJ— » *
O) <!4-> •»
C co<u <uS i— i
^'£ "Q
CLS
W o• 1-14->
•—I -i-l
^ 1oj -yi— i C^3 0M r *\T O ( 1
H
j
w =8 su
S
V
SM
ft
O
V
2
(0CD
&
a§•
CO
y<o(4a
ia
" iiac>fc
~ Sa• r4
3D
rtV
0)
R)
>
<
c0
•i3n)
V(XO
1a
CTU
cu
o.3S
•
1J1,<!
c 0 ' ..5 <S 3 >o§ o"S*• ° -Q (M
t»* (X O O^ X h 00 (MO 9. V M ~+
O Oo o
0
(£in o
. . : ro r1 "
«rt .
| | . ' .>• -C^>
bo . (jo "o, ~~~. v t>
•'S. "3* -S '^ ^ '5 o a
> f 1 « § f iglW Q H U ^ w a"«^
- 6 ?
5.-I i5 gU" £^-33 SIs M 'S ^ O r!a> <u OJ 5 rt C
0 X }"! 3 rn *Vr'4W 4) fl) 00 v • Z 1^4
« _ . 00
"'e » « „ I 1 - .S-5 2 ^ 0 ) ^ 5 ? f l l < U 6 0 - t -»3
61 f § Is 5 rJaSl, Is'C S -S . h- 13 . c s -g ^ B o _>.c „ •£ .. •"
ll | «2 * ' -J^ glu^ls 1
I! j|t|Ji^flM!t l|:lisli-lli^ slll^jls ss ( 2 s ^P« CT 00 p, rt C u u O-vU)<iJ 3 U v4)"d 0013 C ^- o> ro -
• i J „3 j; «, c S
>. . J3 8 »§ -N/ts°:i|!|ii ;|1||||6 6 » i .. g - S s S ' "
(3 » .... 'a ; o 2 S y. «- 2 S g; 3 o 1««2l 1 ftt*>J3O.^.^^
H
150
0)
aa•i-i3cr
W <u« • §
^C 4J
0) (1)
£3<u flJ2 ft
.1-13 T3cr <u0 ,£« sJ-> JJh tJo <!fta •3 w
W r 2j
*im Oss
•I-C .
« M
x<-r i °W C
^3. o
o «ro Hi
roV
t—iJ3ft)H
4
MS0 5
|i
R)
15
V.U
s
(2
*«
090)O
3?MO
1W
U09rt
tt
+ct
!
>
t
;:e1 •£4^>
cOV
ft
VDOri
*•
1
aoartu
o"
cV
a
iw
ment
a"3O*U
j
X<3
u
/•C^J: P^
" rf ° "rt '^ 5 >* 0) co w g ..-1 oco CU ,5 < t-t ^
O O u ' "t! « "oo o c ,2 .cen o **5 o X u -
o or- o
0 0
ss(U
rt
£~ a. °
S '8 1 1J> oS O- O- Cij - d "y w c, 00.5 M TJ 0
<: S,a& s 1 «^| Jj u rt -g 5 _uW O •§ M « CO W
2 0S . "N-
ii I-L '_o - S ' < S. e.i M g t, w 3 '5 •
w £ 5 cS,« o £ > cci3s
»• i - , s M
« w Tf01 u *U « (j ^
' '^ )S -^ * ^ a i c " - r t "°
l|°|J,||"|ri|i jl«!-fll itifill- *§ ^ ^ ** -° C ' S ^ p ^ S S . « ri «>
Iliiilltllilll I
2 ><<i>w <«m ' ''
H
T3
«*H
U
a0)
ococ
'Sm
oo
u
u | -„ _ 0 u
*» s 'r -s^h-• « y — S -„ *•SB 1 - $ S™^§.° S 3 H. ^ g "2
<z •- a 1 §• lis-s>3 « ^i 0 X JS • »w-o S pi a; « w ^ J S
»J. E3 » g
«"§ !"" S S "j^ ro g .—i C O flj
5.S-S5.S E!I? -a H, ,S '
2» s'j'g E § 3 " rf « ? « 2 * •»
C o o j 5 a ; a ) * j r t ^ . ^ ^ r t ^ ^ j a ) 2 { ' 1 . S 4 )
• 2 3 « - s £ £ | S S 2 ^ - S : 5 2 " i a . 2 J S c | i :
|i.f||l»-f^|!:-isj!flliR i!!rB!a'!f§! lir O ^ a ' 5 ' 4 J o J 2 . r t £ - f X ^ i - t ! . > > - f l t » f i S r G ( o S
S 2 S„ ^s-! J§Jtn ..< +j rtX 2 a htn y u 3
05 C "^ ^
• " J2 in• 13 <U
<H < (QO
^ f i " i
H
"rt0)
._ h
°T4 »0 JJ J=m X o
o o oo o omm m
o o oo o o
o o o^2 ^2 ^>
00 <D
C 'C ^ 4) ,;
•o S £.& g-u
I|i«? I|fe° t; S js ^ ° w
gi|.fl fill
w
c" c *; ro5II i^slm f ^ O -^ W 001 In "-i M rv«, y-- m rt -c 2 ;j ^
111 --^t-u«i^ 5 £ o S ^
o * g o^ « c h
tn c S 0.000 a c ~.§^. o rtZ 5H - -° oMC 2-0 -o 2
*s^- i"v - S Ji 0 rt- Si o «
S j s s ^ e : . .-asg 1 - .2~ c 33 -t; s
c S> ""§ 5 «lln^S.S t
'c —rt O
C '§J~' 0
s??|lo -d a "3 *^W w W a O4)
^ <c ii oin in m
in ' ' '
H
151
CO(U
TJO
O
ro
O
nj0)
0) O
ri -4-1
^!<CO
rt
ffi
CMI
CO
0)
nJH
<§
3
Orb
ite
r(C
on
d./
Re
q't)
Module
(Co
nd
./R
eq
't;
j_»•3 oj
s ^«-s
Pote
ntial
of
Occu
r
u
U}
•ordNcd
DC
3'c0)
O0.
CO
ort0ft0
dccft3crW
Pro
vid
e m
edic
al
aid
(su
bse
qu
en
t)
Re
mo
ve i
ncapaci-
tate
d e
xp
eri
me
nte
r—1 CM
•o'3
cd
Pro
vid
e m
edic
(im
media
te)
-
COd3
Jt?CJ
s-tou'£4_)
U
0)
3-
Fire
su
pp
ressio
nequip
.
Je
ttis
on m
odule
— 1 C\J
c.2
Fire
su
pp
ress:
equip
.
Non-h
abitable
module
-i IM°
CQV
CO
0
t-H
«<3*•» oQJ .-HO* 13O C
•"-- rt>* X
^o
tt J3 ^CJ U fli*O 3 r1
--. o -Sft H 0
0) •CO rt JD
r-H*
<u 'uTd) P,
o ^(X ^' rtX— '
'rt c^ c-ij cuaj 3
^H crW Ci]
<
£ c a "sft S>-° "S 0)0 > i 0 >
S £ °01 H *" _0W °*EX c! retOj rt
"d o o M ""3 0 , . T; o>: •" £ £ *«> h' 3 S ^ a£ •" o ° E5 3 -S O rdZ o u is id t/>
-H rM
cCD co
0 rd 00
§• |5|1 - HI-o IBS-H (M
£ CV <n
°a, L •Cg " f l "c ojo o o o o.9 f 5 S °
O O 0 o ™ '• o o o o °
h t. a, "^ "^ „ "° £*<U .JJ CO 0) OJ CO -gj2
3 3 0 c d o o r t
o 013 5 £T! m2
~-t CN] ro - in
CO
COJE3fH
COc
"a. •<u i<P 0)
-,'
JCJoh
<CJ
^3*j
CD•H
C/J
«•
' 2" | JJ _«
ft g 3 3
" 'C o 2•S a S £0 X C C> <D O O
g-o .2 .2
111 -1
~-t ro m
<Q 0)13 4) ^
m C Si ? w
HI - H O)fl)<u y <J C M <U"i)
35, g | g 3 S,
' S i j ' ^ ^ - ' g ' r d i "•f 3 '3 0 0 IT .2- -f 3 -g
^ O C T ' . ^ ^ ^ O ^ 1
•-H fj rn ^
c-§
] oj 24-1 ^ dd 3 oj0 S >
•o " ™ S0) O. 5 Tssl Sug S J3 . .
-
CJ
'da)Moh S
O bfi
.S o
> J3
-.'
CO
d0)
6
"5 I•o £0 0.
c "O &i3 3
S1 iCO (O
-§3 =8CO rt U
^ ro
t-^
ri ^U ^H
£ "S ft S
5 i s s-?T3 E Ji .5J S) 0
JJ j° 3 o u -£E _ c -og 3 ° 2
HH n) O C rd .a
- ^H CM
Ii
.2,'" 3 ^
.S S S" »< „o co 1_) « in
s|s s . -g« 1 1 « '§•!-•
D ^HCJ T3rt C^ nJS-E -15
-j2 ^ £
'C S ^ oV oOJ h •
-<'
aj£ex"3(T1
13
S
canJ
0)
EcdU
P
152
10(U, — i3
T)O
g
O
-1-1CO
<n' S-l
^-~ O0)CO Nrt -t-.
nU
to
COT3rH
nJ
CM
OO
0)
a0
£u
Orb
iter
on
d./
Re
q't
)O
^^"cr
3--
|-g* O
0
Po
ten
tial
Res
ult
of
Occ
urr
ence
<L>0h3O
W•ocr)NrtI
"SCooQ,
Op
era
tio
ns
CI)
a.'3CT
W
e
e su
pp
ress
io]
ip.
:iso
n m
od
ule
h 3 n;" cr tuPH cj •-!
ro' :
Cotnto
a.a3tn •
h 3E Sf
CO
Fir
e
(fla
mm
able
film
)
CO
eSa3crU•oertj
V. ^
Jl
Q
•3u<U TJ
i i^ «U 3
•o - cr> S£ -§3ft r/) cS
r* CVJ
130
tn ^nj CU
« m
« ' .2
I h^-* ro
1 '
Op
erat
or
tnad
ver
teen
trap
ped
by
inst
nm
ent
in l
ock
edp
osi
tio
n
Ey
e d
amag
e (t
ov
iew
er)
-H' rq
V 13
? 4J
I * C
"*• "S " 1"0 C 4J >* (0
|ll Ho- < 3 > s4) .
W id XI
-H'
tno,0uID0)
E-i
W
00 ^
. fc Id.i 2 C °u 0 ^0 41 ?a c « "3 S« .5 ? -ocu . ^ o
• s & I i f -IB X 3 03> 1) M . O cr
g -o „ .2- -2 gJs g g- t; -§2
—1 C-J CO Tf
rtC uO "-1
ro .2 T3Hi tn en o)
^H <U W CX> M <U C
rt t>0 M n." 4) ,-, (X -w_Q — - ro O< rt
^ £ (H « • *°
•^ £ »- t>4 o £ rt
— i <M" on
« S•S-2 e-•° £ o
i 1 1fi-i g
~S •» o .50 g 0 U<
<! i rt jo
-'
hc;
J3
|gi '^3
rt Sa a
CO O
~H*
M0)
JDs . •(U
U1
1ti
V
• Q
J3cd
to
cu
tn
-
See
V
ents
, ab
ov
e -
Un
con
tain
ed c
ryo
-g
enic
flu
ids,
g
ase
s
-•
u *C 1-7 •iu 2 uo — w"*" (D »^ (U CO-^u tn jrf c
MH rt nj rt)O W) 0) -u
2>s 1 8a?-* ^2-SC •-< I -2 «^ 'o 3 'S. g> J3— . W —
-I M'
too'cto00o
u
o
0] 0)O 3^J c cr ,^ o -1 vo> .2 c -^C *J -J3 3»- re u TJ4j C <n O ' -r- ••-' AJ CS £ rt
6
3 C D m ecr " . to o1 O.S- a 51 1 Q 1 S •%
~ N co' *
0>
"f« C §•u o tn -g
1 ''S ' • 3 £ u
s is- ill i^ T 3 J J = J O 0 " ^3 '3 Q a T z E v ! Q
^H f\] CO -^
Q,C '3o cr« »
E S ^2 p, oo . .
O ca .n
-
« totn <ufc uO ft)tn •"C g
to M
•"• C cO C o
r? ° 2. 5^0C - IUid • 3
U tu QJ.
-H*
totuot4
1Coft).S'o
(§1I
153
cnO
fi
nJ -H
°
O CO• rJ >«H
U ^(Ti T3
co(U
rtH
aO
<uW-l>-M
W
•5O
rbite
r(C
on
d.
/Re
"crto to
o «
o
u
Pote
ntial
Re
su
]o
f O
ccu
rre
nce
i S
ourc
e
aS)
Sa'£Etoo0.
to. co4-101
toa0
'Bto
a,'3
W
—
5 .: «£ u Eco d co
i S-|0 '" O.3 « Xcr > co
Mlin o) 05 .2
-H- N
'rtu
T3VE
'SO
-'
i/
Ele
ctr
ica
l shod
burn
s
-
E2 °'; "35 "V
Fire
suppre
equip
.
Je
ttis
on
mo
— t IM
EO
'to 0
to .D** So. 23 d to
"•£ 11S 2. § ofc. « Z S
^ |M
Sh
ort
s,
fire
s
-'
0 ' '
dti COCO t— iQ. T3O B-^ flj
O
"3. J3 2CO 0 J
— o "50. H O3
4-1CO . «
to o! a_"
•0 —.CO CDh CO
P Pj
0 ^i d
•""* 4^a coi a.u -^to 3— crW U
«
E^ >- J»co C U 3
m h~- £ Sco O*Q. ^S x^ • ofl O O to
? •§ « a • Ss s l s * I5 3 - 0 . olZ O 0 TJ d t/1
— . IM
ECO CO
- " I0) (4 td)
ft .-a « —M « -"00) rt 4) °
1 1 1 '?•
rH IM
c E») S§• g. n" •" 4J 4J °
g "« "E "B S0 0 0 0 Q ,
S S J | oSi * H m
1 1 S S 8 'T3 ^3 T3 T3 ° &0
S £" h H i u ! c - -3 5^ S S.3 o"1
- M' - »' '•"'
CO
(i(U
£pJH
4-)
to
J3
Q QJ
"
_^jo
H
<!j
U
"S.2w
OQ
CO
i «
rt u ^
S-g •§u '^ o•s g. £ '4) X E> CO O
p-o -2c to ±j41 d «K 4J •">
- ~10 CO13 0 co•3 ™ 00
co - S) rt
CO CO O U "B" (rt•S I- 'S 'S d. -o-2 oo S S S01 QJ CO CU C *jSi 60 00 3 E'S 1 T3 O O J5 'CO
d_ to » >• ^ — £
-H IM ro
E r;
5 d g>: « 5A h cC! 3 0)
'O ^ 2 O<D tX 5 'ffl h 3 £O <0 CU ^r^ > 3 c;U O H e-3
^H <N)
"rt h
U E .i S^ 0 „ 0 C
» 'S *3 HeC M 1) rt E« £ ° y '£c o. B .S »o g; a3 3 E co Xcr a . o > «CO Q. CO O _,en to .S" 53 c ^^3^1 h 3 tS C «3 -^* "^ tr co d
W d IH co *~J K 4-1
-' -^ « *
"dE L»
S _ -2 =5u co E £ JJ
•S ^ <* E-D on c ">01 CO C H rtt.Si 3 Q. 4-1.0 1 T3 J3 D. dd co « -^ 3 ^•f "3 -S £" a. «c -0 3 ^ < " • - < £
Si £ 'jf-si! £1•-H ro ro f
hCO
gd "0
J, 2 . d '|E 3 00 en
53 S CO &
* " * § g l !co h 3 r " j*o co a fjU o 2 d j5 5
~
CJ•~J 1 ' .C w
S) 3
P £ ^? "* O **"*
y • ys.f'o .5^-2
li HIIM'
CO4^ -E
>
U
154
tnU
fi
I In
cu
cOuua
"
Orb
ite
rond.
/Re
q'
(j
"XT
Module
(Co
nd
./R
eq
'
Pote
ntial
Re
su
llo
f O
ccu
rre
nce
CUU
3O(fl•a
dsd
d4-1
cV
oft
inCo
d^uo,O
4j
c<u£a3cr
t .d *"u £ c
" • =3 S o „y> ?/ -(n "3E '£ s -gS « S. Em a, (x3 3 3 Ccr ' m . o<a c a m
in rt V .£r £JD rg 0) tn 3 -u3 --J rJ i'4 cr a)
W rt O w <u >-j
*H CO . rO -^
1—1 3 *-*rt T3 fl)U O X G-a E ^ 2
<U 5 CO
E « ^ 2 So rt ? <° rt ^rt -s g Si a
• r-1 C M ^ 3
S 5 u tT-E £.0.P 12 o . . •- g.M rt U rt .Q t <u
.
1^ GO 4)
.3^ tn Hi! rt
u ° ^ u « *** -^
^ O < u _ c c r i l ) h ^O < i o U C i - o ^ IM
-
~^~ D<U »-iU tJrt C'Q. rt
0) S ^
• " J2"0) u> M 3
.s S °h U ^
« 0. d"
rf
cCJ
£a3crU•o2
uld
(U
£dU
D
"d
•5 ° v<u 'S -gC ® rfl
- £ ' °
i 1 ccr S . o" a 2
J3 _j h 3 «j3 •** ',** cr 4)
— < rg r^i
'rt So j«{ u c
«) d "0' '£C • - » = • «c X( ^ 0)41 g ^ d a> J> i.
2 '•" S ' ^ 3 °-
g 8..21 z £ " a) .2-S
T3 O 3 h 3-i-< c cr * ; cr
t— i d I-H 4) d w aj
— . rg . r*i
3 1^(0 "o t!o- .2,x p t;0 ^ S-JT o,c c E 2> .S0 d O. ™ h^ E E 3 E> ffi U^ "^
ll
-'
10 -y
1 i'rt h
-° 8,CJ) KC 0)
ly MU 4)rt w
H J
^ (M
rt•nrtih ^rn !nW ™ m
^ rt rt10
3 d .0
ui
•« s~'" rt
1 J3
3 J
1 «C en
o u
g -3 " SS rJ c: o,° a> rt o2. *-i U TJ
-H (M
,_4
ft
T) "C ^ "^ 'nc QJ ™ o 13 T:0 C *J OnW .5 ° u u-^5 ^ ^ ai *O
- N
0
n «
Part
ial
exte
nsio
i
Bo
om
s /p
latf
orm
wo
n't re
tra
ct
Hang -up
*—t rvj (v-j
in -.J rt
U ^M m
^ E^ 'D
« 3 > 1, £> g °5 1^* (j ^•^ 4J n _j
a !3 d' in 'S
— J (M
WJ rt
O ^n**. W cu
H T3 'O ""
a) 3 > ? rt> rt o £ s2 c
nh X u•c £ ^ « 1
« S . £^CC rt rt i-i rt
N .
u' ^ 4J O -j
> 1 I < . ™' :.'t] u d > ^
u r r i ^* uS c h S 3 r« S g .s c •" £< U O ' S - ^ r Q . S ^ ^ j
13 ^ «>C «J 'rt ^ ""*
nj 3 fli
CO rt .0 i— i O rt ^3
-
(0 "g jj-^ rt 3 C
l! E|_§ d -"3 • '•
bO~in ^ ^S £ ' > r-t .
11 S ^•" "rt ^ -2*W 'ft U S
-H fSj
^^CO
g
t!_d
ft <"~^ rt
co Cc cZ s0 Cm <
cC
. •-
(0 <J13
T3O
ooi
ro
(U
155
enu•^eni>»
I In, — . w-i0) Oen ^
O cU
«••§
S -43 UC rt
toT3
eO^ju£<*-!W
—
Orb
ite
r(C
on
d./
Re
q't
,
crto v3«TJ^0 „'2 T3
CoU
^"3 gS £« £"d 3
S O•k*
(5"°
uo^
oen•odN
C4>
O0.
CO
aodh4>0,O
c
£a'3crW
•r* nj - ^
W *° ^
•"i o ^3 -*-» LIn) r — d **H> C 5 X <5 4,* *£ 2 ".,-• h tO 10 -£ <u --3 ~ h .g
— < (M
^. <y
* ~ 0C L< O
. « .S -H
'-4 4J 3 ^ **1 i I ? - -s2; •-- P ^ aj Mc -^ ^ n
^ 3 i h 0) to i•3 "2 c '; !r, 3 c £e o 0 > M c o °
— i (\J ro Tr
« en "OC . S 0)O tH M t,
tS O O Od O. " 7 1 °
!-;?! rsssC ' S U > ^ 0 3 § .
h £ 'd
> .S 5 « 5 Sd • _iS d" xi
-
6"c ud t]00-c bo w
'S- C C.3 " o
Q ^ 5
«'
to
O
dn
d
|1aoXId
n"£
j2uo
^•rj
"
Scie
ntific
V<u
co
1
ii
a300cdx:
uo;«<
-
-Po
we
red
>.
"du
u41
04)
CO
.i?0O
du
o4)
W
-
£
"od JSto 3 •«XI -0 °3 o u
00 C 5 ^^5 |3 "*H ?j
|| Is IQ S 2 S d
^ (M
«
2
34)
to
3CO
K
du•a4> to
£ S
• ! 5|1 g -c S•2 x> TJ •" a.n) 3 ii ^ Xr t/> nj Pi a)
— i (M
C ^a> nt
C >PJ
(X T3 to' <U ^ (0
W ^j tti 00
ti _Q ' — * T3
h H!1-1 d ^ C ^
' CM'
"" p*-3 o
(o S. d" t o Ch -^° S £.0 >, s- dtO ^H h u
O 3 C• ti '^ O
S S o i-< °^ h 0
X) t^ W d XI
CM ro
co
Fire
su
pp
ress
equip
.
m
up
pre
ssio
r
to .«.&>< 3i-1 crU4 4>
CO
C fc.O h „
J £"£(XX . .
W d xi
-
(I)
OJ3
dj
j -oo(a
aJ0
4J
O .
a^-
(Nl
z-a" a
y 4) 2f «) 3 4)•S S -S £ " E
d xi d u h 0 °-C J .1 'fl Iu ™ o a.i c a
XI O
a
c
>53a
T3Cd
ffi4)
in
co
*j_>dh5J 00§• .s
— < ood J;£ 5h UO 0)2 «
r-. M
toa)'£4)
CQ
"
CM
ro
(X)H
156
COu
0) O
«f-i
9'
£|
cOu
s3
5aarcaj_cp.
So
urc
e
•D
d
d
."3'c01
o
•" ~
v 4).•§«•° ~~r
0"coO
*
Module
•nd
./R
eq
1
UO
cu
rre
nce
50
rations
41o.O
^oES*'3erW
f\
f
1E-
c
!*
L4
U
^
C00a)E .
•0 taj «o •<o
S 3<a • *-(X ca3 (X
W O r
^
(0
.r^C
DOO
U
H)
r>o
•ii _
i
u ^
« -H
\ ' iD
JPJ j.** IH
) K
\) <
D U
u
of
cry
og
en
Venting
(M
jji
HJ
T
0L>
Dti
H
-
n
)
D
2
—3? J.J «
CO -oj w -rrto ^ (j
GO CJ -S
'o '£..£.0 w • •
BCO
_, (D
rt h
^ S ° ° C OJOJ -2 'S rt ® ^
is •- £ S"2 1s E a -s s, E3 a 3 ID x c
I U IS- 1- .2•° "0 «3 .-3 S" "
^^ rj t^i ^r m
•o'ia
"* O' .2 W
"° -~ * J 2 h
' "0 5 3 ^ o 01
i* E o .21 « .2* ^ ]§ '3
H H ^ - P t t j k < u 2 ; c M
^^ CM CO f
h SO o
S 0
?i i - 8 B ilC«*-i . '"Illo wn j0 ) O £ * - O Q . r i O C
« M m 'g1 -S X C 3 '^ X §
•5 ^J s M u E cg 1> § . . .CQ . .0
i — t h * * < n ] ^ u O o n l j D O
*-« (vj ro
(i
^ ( D C
S S S -2 |S. 2 -2 3 « 2 -^ S C J .*
E . 8 ' S H5 r5 ,? W) *> "2
6 *"* So,o . • v x •O rt ^ N o rt J3
•-» (NJ
toT)"3
Eu'S0)MO
^
O1co
«
— t m
0 c .^ »^o o u c o
S S S-E »
| s. 1-1 13 ?• 0> X Ctr 55 . > t> o™ °- ° -o 2•° -o .£ '= „ S 2in '13 t< ti K 2 HJ
u -< . M m •»•
o^ 13d .^
* "3 1 .E -2 « v «
•^ C -S ^ nj do
£ -2. S 1 "g. g o |r t i _ ( ^ . [ ^ a > 2 c p(A
3 ~-l (M POW
Utn
o4) Kn u0) CO g
•2 Si " 2
.2 <jf - 1" -| g« 'c c M
•g 41 "1 .>-< > H rt jj o
T — ' rg
„ M "C c
^ S s '3> ^ '-j j,
"" S rt a; 'w 3 ^
"3 '3 S JJ<n E ti A o. a
~ N
m410)
Ou
VWos>.hUa0Z
*
mu•-1 C'S .2£ 13„ c
S 13 rto- y .4) 5 QjtO O .r.
•^ Tl ^3
U5 '3 Q 41
-H (VJ
'O
'rt
u .^J• FJ 4J
» C6 1' 2t o g.
•2> u 3
i-t O 41
^H ro
2 eS -2S SU .M
"x | •
3 C
-H ro
to
u• i— i QO
S- 3 S C°2 c to ja ^X j| S|
£ A 1 5toOO M.
-«
03cOen.3
w
2
S UC! a)
«
CM
CO
CDi— iXInJH
157
COu
I sr— MH
CU OCOcd ^
cO
CJO
3
V<La:
*f*c<
' 1
So
urc
e
TDf-4
rtNrt
2c01
ft
Orb
iter
(Co
nd
./R
eq
't.)
.jjn*
S 03 «
•O —O •
2 TJCoo
t|y
3uQ
•s
COCO•aa0
O
u
O
• gjf.
'3£
~-i ajR] , JjW c tF- jj
'•o 2 y c «
I : 11* s. -si I4) Q. B.3 3 11 X C
• cr i . > » °i> Q. o « ^co u .Sr c •» •-3 2 •- §• S | S
CO d ft o) 05 -2 >->
^H CM CO ^
•o*
rt (3«l .2 01o 5 o M
^3 co -i 41
1| | IjL' *O 3 "S fli <U
If .sfll'l5 — fe 11 2 E ^
^H CM co
do
h o.2, S • g.M U( U
—t CM CO
AJc11sh h
(X m to
5 .s, 5CO co E" cd o' S o uJ3ft cj XI
*~*
01»43
cti
a sE U
J~ Ij
i Pi.^ aX<
£
. cart , »•u iS
Subsequent
me
di
aid
Re
mo
ve in
capac'
tate
d 'e
xp
eri
me
nt
-H CM
•O
'd
du•oa aC -uc cd
' ^
I!-o
J) h
bo •-•0) SE 9o rt
" >- ^J c
S •? S s1? " o -SU .2i _! C "^^H d M 11
~H CM
•a
ooCJ
*+4
O
co
Is« MO, «0 E
^H
01CJ
3Oto•o•aECJ
dMct)s
6
^H *"a) , J^u * <u
'•5 o '5 £ «o . d 41 Hc " 'O. c 3C d d .5 73
I E -S g. 1 .3 rt 11 X Ccr " . > ti o
• S o o- g -o .2•S-o S'3 ^S s3 •.•* O* (rt W
CO rtJ Q fl) CC j_, t—)
~ IM* CO* ^ •
-a"«
nJ o to" 'S OJ W'o rt --; «u C • •" *^S T - I r t D O
£ .S^~
' ^ "2 o
t H i " ? = -3•^ u '3 S "o o*
-1 CM CO '
CO'
cdc
t 13 C
" U
-I CM' .
4)
IDn)
2)0 g.S 2 1M 0 -5O 3 hO.TJ 4)01 O .Q,
>pj M XQ a a
r-*
(0
'rt(j
f" CD ' -Ci) *j .
X O
,5t T?^ ^ ' .
Q tx •
ft
-tj UC rt
I—I •!->
^ •*-*
^<JT3
N ^(Tj r-J
CMI
cui — rJD(X)H
158
(1)en
o
.w
CO ,£(M -^
. A S.w
e0u
S
.— .
h'o1
|oO
. .j
41 0)
"3 «o •2 "c
0U
• „"3 ®S «* E"cti 3
"c u
£oO **"*
auh3Q
CO
•ortN(11EIs
'c
oA
0)CO
rt
S.0
c
Q.
3CTW
o .1. S C•° ii Ji .2 «1 || : I3 (U X 3 Ccr > a) S5 . os g-o „«• s•2 *o S « .- '§« 5w '3 EC 5 fe « ^
i— t ro co ^*
fljrt C•- •• o4) en HI co
E co ,_» cu- -0 <D J3 hh ••-• h rt bo.;: «j a « <u ^
1 ^H IT* -D JTrt 3 _ (U ju JJ
£ E E f z E S.
^H CM m
C^3
X)
Jd« COX 0)to .u
u ^OJ O
3 to
sm*> ^ _O. T3 S° c a
•2 ra "
^ u ^ c
o. H O 1= 'S" '3 Q<
co a J3 2. h
^H M
4} CO
Sio "
i,—
"a c
•gl£ a
si.w w
"'
1 .
.
f\J1
Ta
ble
11
c
E. o.
3crW•DCn)(A
(4
01
Eu(i)
an
COJ
a'3crw•ocaCO(9
Cam
e
• C Q
fH
J
ro • •
n)H
U)
u3otoco
1'a
o(.J)0)4)to
<+•!
O
Oflc'c(flH)
u
2o1c
.0
^H
0)u3
cortc1rt'cou
U
(0
OCOC
CO
*— «.
u
'u
D-CO
159
CDCOnJ
CDCo
TO
U iJrt <!in0)
-l-> COC <u
CO T3TJ Op 5nJ "
2 >iS 3
' oCO
CDU
cO-"41
W
4-1
h O°£ 414J OS
n ""**h *n Tu co
O
, .
CT
!«T3 .
^1U
Po
ten
tial
Res
ult
of O
cc
urr
en
ce
So
urc
e
•ortNrtI
~ae4>
00,
tnC0jjn))HVa0
cojPaDCTU
ro(M
m —
(M(M
1m
rg
Ta
ble
s 2
c4)
£ •
:ctr
ical
ly-P
ow
ered
Eq
u
V
3<U
cn1
(
T) — *V cnh CU<U D->* £•as' rti^— *
^ct
rica
llu
ipm
ent
•-* crCd W
<
rgrg
rO
ro
cncn
JS-J3rtH
W
— S
ee S
cien
tifi
c A
irlo
ck
cn_YuO(H
tent
ific
/
ot/j
cq
mfM1
rO
rorg
cn
(M1
CO .
(0
(U
J3mH.c
Ca
me
ras
and
Eq
uip
me
CUQJ
W
men
t
a'3O"1
Wtjc
me
ras
a
rtU
6
"ac41
crt<nUl
rg 3fM t->
i •*-><^ 4)
*3
nas
, T
ab!
c ex
pan
da
-c .^fll ^H" 0C JD
<i rt• i* •
- rt
See
Bo
om
s,
Pla
tfo
rms
ere
cti
on
of
PE
TA
--
p
4)
OZ
CD
El<o
rt
om
s,
PL
ten
nas
0 'Ca <
Q
(M(VJ
1CO
41
3rtH
La
sers
,
V41in
IH41
rt
T>
rt M0 g
J? 'M
5S<"
sers
3W
TJU
•0 '5 41<D ™ CO ^H
E S-j ^^ u H oc £ c 641 — u C3 41 £ Ccr > .3 o41 O h u)to C 41 VI.£ .rt Q. *j3 2 « X «l
W rt tt 0) 1-7,
— i IN) m
-
1 • 5J) S f 2i • -s a, . g -sg -- « ' 5-0 .-H.— -o ' » ;T•n rt 41 41 •", rttg "f 3=5 3 r t «3 £ e'S'tr "5 i-iJl Us llo:•-< (Ni m
Co
llis
ion
a.
Str
uc
t, d
am
ag
e
Imp
erfe
ct
do
ck
--h
ang
-up
a.
Wo
n't
sep
arat
e
-H CM
rtt-i
5 ^ ">•^ > "S* s st»n -- FC u 5
III~H"
4)u.i-jr-l
0)
rtCO
-O3
W
fc-
mrg
icn
rgi
cnw<y
J3 •rtH
(0(Uuf-t§c° . '
11 •rtco .OVu '
cn
i
in4>0
3O . . .
10
co . • 'rt.SirIsre (j
c «;6a 'o"
160
to, — ((ti
OJ-l-i
^ cu
9l
CO COC cuo
CO
dJC cti
in TJCM aI (ti
m
O*jV
?£ ST** OS
•°""to "
co(J.
O"
'O ^-
Siou
3 „(0 gW 4)
«) 3
3*§°( 2 °
ou
rce
CO
•oaaX
"is°^cS'oP,
Op
erat
ion
s
C
£D,
'3crU
imaW3Oh
.c
Tab
les
3-
irn
aces)
.""^ ^u ^
£^.Cu 00
w 913 I
h ,2?
s X
OD.
snjO
U
W
<u<u
d) enh 0)flj CU& ^*o **
• *nl>**-*
3 S11•-t CT
W W
<
CM
1m
rt
U)
"c0)
^<D0)
(0
Ven
tin
g of
fu
rnac
ec
ha
mb
ers
, et
c.
.1-1
to"c>
CQ
fMM
I
JaH
•a3.0
"S.00oHo
zVo
Op
en s
tora
ge
offl
uid
s u
sed
inex
per
imen
ts
.1—1
m'H*3[TJ
U
C0)DOO
UicoZ
U
r(X
r«
jai>
rtH
34JOJ
O.a
0)
2
f-
1)X
H
iu
L>D5
^M
C m 41 ti —C 4-, 0 C MT3 C n) -rj OC 4) C £ -r;rt g >H 41 „
^P.~°S 4) (4
t
£n»nta,o,
aE4)
in
Q
o0J41
CO
<U
rtH
H
a,a,
2a)X
£H
inu
DD5
s Srt JJ . J
rtc "^ ^ ft" £ - 2 ^
2 OJ (t) ^ U ' 'O
B
(
I.•0)
Iti11H
sW
! , 'Nrrt
BO3O
•S
! *Y ^! m
09 4!ft) -Q
-H nj
Hen
i 1 •V r-4
g h0. u
U £ .U oo
o'S ^*•* f^<l) |
* g£ 11 '^X 0)
u£u0)
3u ;
W
00 1c (J ' fQ
Bio
log
ical
p
roc
ess
i
a.
Ele
ctro
ph
ore
tise
par
atio
n
b .
Ly
op
hil
izat
ion
(str
on
g af
fin
ity
coll
oid
to
liqu
ii
9~*
00^Hd' 0)
1u00
o£
h
.CO
CJp
•uoCU
„ m*^rt co
• "^J0) n)
<5H
Q
BO•ac
& 53 B'? o5 u_' rj
4)
= 5d) C i— tc fc rt *5 • rt.§ a -0 S s£ « 13 * | S"S1. g-g S • S4> 4) T .5 • 0 "ouU a f.- E-. •£ »h P ?, n -2 M
o 5 ^i S1 ^ mW S U S n) « ^
.rt f\J m TT
todu
4) ™
>- O
Q Pi
d
161
O a)— ,£w y§5
~^ otn ve
' aro O
cO
0)
3
•3'. ~crM 01o o;
». -o°§
U
cr^ 03•O •
2 o(J
tial
Re
sult
cu
rren
ce
o; O
' k ° •
So
urc
e
•ortf
ffir-H
1
O
e.2rth§.O
c
Eq
uip
me
m(Mi
j=0030h
£
IM
M
CO01
JDrtH.
Q,3 •CPH•o
Ily
-Po
were
rtu
o0>
W01
en
•a —01 CO
01 a,
S. n
Ele
ctr
icall
y-!
Eq
uip
men
t (a
l
4
on
003O
£
tM1
m
.Ort
CO
U
5
us4-1
'o
sW
1
CO
U,2
Sci
enti
fic
Air
CQ
^
m
003O
•"i-H
roi
to
A
H
ii
i'5cr
•oertCOI*
mer
;
rt<_>
Sco
e01
gex'3cr
W
Cam
era
s an
d
U
4,' M
1ft
"§
n}
OJj
COV
&ntH
09rt
/An
ten
n,
/'P
latf
orm
s
COgoo
0101en
i
CO
£(HO
Bo
om
s,
Pla
tf
Q
oJ3a
u
u<u
^-« .
c0)
c;
01
c
1
5
i3CO
Dep
loy
ing
sate
llit
e
-1
Su
bsa
tell
ites
W
.
SN
3
r\j
CO
t oi^i
1
M
0)>Q
H
01Q)
. rt3°rt
|
0)CO0)
aS.0oao
1
c
IfaVs-
Op
enin
g e
-•
CO0}COrtOu'SV00o
Oico
h
U
'S0) 'ttf)0t^.hU
o
0)to
s^
'O
*-H
^1 mrA rt
co
nta
iner!
wit
h N
2 g
ro •m
c*T"(NJ
1
CO . 'VftaH„ID01 ' .U
3O •ind '' ..2rte
£1oO0)
y
0 h JO .201 > rQ C> 01 O C *£ *a rt rt ^J0 00 to ^ urt 5 jj - M
II 111^-* ro ro
01u3o
en.
.2
rt tj'S 01 •
o
162
C0)
W -I -"<u^~ <u
• .•rJ O
•£2
0) ,
c «
o! 1
• O
INI -C' U
m <uo;H
^H
J3
cO*j4)!SU
«K So ^w tf
'rt '*"'
O aoU
Mo
du
le(C
on
d./
Re
a't
]
3 8* CiV **
h"rt 3• H U
Soo'oA
ou
rce
tnTlt*aaX
' 2'c41OA
Op
era
tio
ns
ccuga'3crU
-H
I
iC<)
ed E
qu
ipm
ent,
T
ab
le
1
o0
^j^H
i rt
•^1 h
u• (U
'nw0)
iwi
T3 ^*v mL* 0)
O *"*
iS
Ele
ctr
icall
Eq
uip
men
t
<:
rlo
ck
s,
Tab
le 3
-21
-
u
:c01
'uina)V
tn
CO
u0
1*4
Scie
nti
fic
f
M
,_4 •
equ
ipm
ent,
T
ab
le 3
-2
"SrtCO
£0)e-CDU
cu. 4)'tn
1
^c41
0.
'3crW•oc
Ca
me
ras
a
U
MINJ
s/A
nte
nn
as,
T
able
3
-atf
orm
•n:W •
' CO ;
' . S ,1 O '0 '
4)i 4)|co
'
1
JHo*
<nEo
(4
Bo
om
s,
PI
An
ten
na
s
Q
i
rgi
rtH
CD
<Ucnnj
cuo
1
Ran
gin
g ra
dar
.
Lasers
W
.
<MCM
PO
rS[ortH
to0)
rten
• u
bo -»J C gC 7j fl) t
* s- - "E •I CJ ^ 4)
[14 tn n] ^ u *^ 2
. . .--< CN] m
CO
£rtCOJ33
tn
fci
|lev]
; mi 0)
1 ^)
!H1 *
•M
: a)OH
•1
I 0
:ctr
ical
V
tUIC
; nj
'i CO
i *»
'S• CD
rt; CD
to<D
1
Ba
tte
rie
s
0
'MI t M
ICO
V
3H
i :
Ion
-Cry
og
en
ic F
luid
s,
*• iIUIU
w0«
N2H
4 i
n M
WP
pro
pu
lsio
n
.
CO•o'^sO
'30)onofeOiCo2
E1 1
CM
*VCO
4>
2(0H
Ion
-Cry
og
en
ic
Gase
s,
i °(U
Icn
D
a < c
<o e -^ CMI 'o CM Z.OS O Oco ij co co OCO *J CO COa) ID o> o> tnh T3 fc h
A * .'A A o'
X .2 cu I X H
• • •--i rM m
CO
en
0u'3ono
Uico
^
_
0 J, jj' 0 C 0.
£ Q« C 3"i .5 ""
C S <1) P4) 6.3 IU X C0- > 4) O4) O enCD £ ! > * •
tn '13. K 5 in
^H CNJ CO
'O
1.
Inju
ry--
me
d.
ai'
2.
No
n-h
ab
itab
lem
od
ule
(e
gre
ssre
q'd
)
bo
£nJ
'O'rt
fnj-j -
5 3'rt* -i*>5 W
, ,~H (V4
Jj"
a obO Ct
'-S 2 .rt ^**H nl tjo•3 a»|
.2 § |3 «aM -S rl ° *"2 X A "° M
S.S S=o E 2 ^. .
^H rj
DCC•^o
o cra w_;
rtrt0
•o
I'c4>3 .crCO
•S3.tn rt_'
c
1.
Inju
ry -
-med
aid
2.
Fir
e su
pp
ress
io
5 £*d* '**£ E^
. .^ N
bDg
'to£ S
Op
era
te f
ire
san
d
sup
pre
ssit
mo
du
le
,
CO3
rtM
Q,O,
a
4)H
£«'
163
c<D
6.2^3 <+*
cr oW N
I0)
0)rt
eO4Jocu
»**s
ia
- C
(
Ca
a
<uCJ
(aoto13
1~i• njNn)
"fti
C<uo
(X
h CT0 0
i «
XI —U •0-g
oU
^
Module
(Co
nd
. /R
eq
1
! g0 w
3 s, d)
•1 h. 3; uu;o .'•s
cae
pe
ratio
O
d0)
o.'aa-U
h1 0 «— u Co e o „rt « m ~*a c ? 3« .5 " -ou £ J> o•5 S 0,3 £» * §• JJ o> o g E o
l-s «- 3= 5 -ft §• 2« 5 h 5 ™
rj ro TJ«
Non-h
abita
ble
module
(e
gre
ss
req
'd)
<"i
CO
3nj
^
1<fX
s?- .H ^1 o
ici.
«
ft u
*• • S > „' Ji3 1 S E-a| | ~ g -H S"S
• 1 l 2 d < » = - S « 3 f « 3 « | ^ « «
!• "8 §| l| S SS 3 |g |: I 1 15 •§ S ! aS 8. S2 | a2 •;•§. 2 * rt
0 ) O ^ H ^ t n O O J a i ^ m ^ X t t ) • •"£ " ' - i r t W r t a » ! r t 2 « r t « S > ^ •" m
« * • « . 2 . . .' . g gK U r i t f o } W r t n J J 3 0 T 3 V l t / 5
^^ cj m ^< in vo r-
&. a
^ •£ > . •3 ** rt o rt o _a J 2 J S S i - 2S x T l m M ^ » ^ ^S - - S 0 r t ' o nt <S 5
': -§^ Hi I- ! 1 '|5 8 s Is IIs SS Us s^ l s t|s * *•g -- * =3 « S ° £ 1 £ 3s li 2 I 4! « «5 .1 • J • S -880 5 U r t K r t W o J r t J 3 o T 3 W W
^H ro m ^ m %o r*.
*+* y "**-" rt •o ™ • u« « «" <D »
—< (H ft) •— ' . • . .
4 " .£ > "" u ""~- a> ^ - h3 0 ° « ' S S J Srt a » » 2 28 * K," " "S o » •O T O ^ . ^ ^ , 0 S o
- B • " 2 5 « »• • S "ft< n h r t . ? P r t X ^ X< J < O < n O U 5 ) W
^H rj rn -^ m \o r-
hTO 0) TO _3C -i C S.2 t: -a 2 ^2
S g- i 2 • . . -8a i S 8. £o • J o • o .
•° " -i "0 C ' c cU 0 4) . E ECC ^n ^ C •*•* "^ "l-
CM OO '*/ jj jj *j j_»^ t. rt B >, >, >,
JS "1 ? JS C C C. 5 u • «! 2 < < <!
.-H oo ro TT m o i
CO
TO m
O c 4>h E h3 h . . O,
is! i- 1 Jls l!c - a ^ S o S.^« " 4S.1 2 c 1 21 2 S uTi
p ^ O a O < h f t 3 £ « W O>2 --H -CM ro ^ in so r-
4 - .
0) CU> >0 0J5 J3rt rt
m in0) U
tn to
— t f\J
0) 0) • • -> >O Oja a
rt rt >
in in .tu 01V 01
to en
~4 CM
CJ
.§ "
**"* (U»H
.2 =
TO (T0 ™
•s. s •M W
-H CXJ
Vkl3
'2 »4S E
• •§ ?.rt CH <
— « PO
V
'oXIV
s° •re j)
O 'fc•" 4)<n u
<M rto n .
2< -' CM"
S
0)4-1 •»
C toI— I 0)~~~ i— iw 3
T3 TJh O
I!
§fMi
CD
H
rtH
164
0)
acr o
c co
°^en T30 «jO -^.^ uf , U -j->rt iJJH <!OJjj •*C to
t— I 0)"~^ r-1(fi 3
T3 T3JH OnJ 5N ^
£ ^i-C &oo
.—I• o
u<U
rtH
crS %
o-goU
O
3 »
S B« 8'rt 3
So
aO
a1
W
o.0rt
S uS >Q H
H -< CM CO
Ca!
1o
(vj2O
c o m< U cq
165
0) r— I
3 ^ro Ojff «>
to COc 5O "5"-1 PT-I-L-> ^U (1)rt XIH Ucu rt
rt -d31(M ,51 c^ CD
^ oJ3 ^ntH
cO
W -
crh V« «
!S •h T3
o §u
* f
Module
(Co
nd
. /R
eq
•3 t)co 00 S« £-. hrt 3
18u O
I °
uCJh3O
•ontS]
E
3cuo0.
pera
tions
O
«3V
13crU
CNJ. ro1 u
!?:H
! Ca
(X'3cr
T3
h0)
o(2ij *
i U
OO
'Wl1
;U)
-a — .0) «
0) CU
o "*•*
2~o gId "£3 O«
flj 3•— i cruw
.«•
'5 5• 0 g
*U rt A vo Ou ca .—C •« h t! 3
- sl .!L °§• «- I E °S t S o .2- "jj £ Q, 0 £ JJ3 » X « cr cu
co 05 cu Q cu •">
-H CM M V
oi, C 0 m
3 '^ ^ h•s, _, a oo-•2 •- is-2"In" rt g _«) rt _o5 • S "3 "f "3 -0g 13 £ "0 c -0 -Q.
3 £ U g 1 E £•
-' N' "
,,•0 ' "o „
nf " c" ci)o 0) •£ X*j h C O*
1 » > i* « 0 K £
" " h 0 n)U) V, 2 ^ Q)O aj a _J> oo*— * > 3 ~y (du o S 5 3
~
c00 O
.S <" ! E «> cu
|H ||||
'•g h o U
^ rt rt rt
^
(0
C(U
CQ
mhV
.r4 C
d a)• ^*2 *^ o jy
E 4> V* 9a rt 13
** * S 0^ C "g C
1 1 ll 1-H CM ro XT
i ei O 01
CO S CU ""01 rt -^ «CU C ^3 ^
-i '3 IS g a t> ^
111! 11! :-H CM CO
U-a
•3^^^ oT3 -rt
3 s5 g§ i •0 CCi 0D 0
i "2 "nt '3 a£ ^ oo g0 00 .S ?
S '£ "» " 1^ e cu c 3C ^ B a "C, C
I 1 I 1 I 10 - 0 0
8.1 . ' 8. • ' - 8.W 5 nj CO at J3 W
M <o
CO
•o3
0
boO
U1
Coz
U
CD
*o ~ynl ' o. £ c
• 0 - ^ 0 J »
£ 8. S -i„ X C O
S ^ 'i o' e3 ? nl « Ccr J " g 02 t § o. -2•5 » Si. sCO « Q u 1-,
- CM' « „•
i Ci o m01 a cj mto aj ^ fl)
L ih 11-^ '3 5 g ta j)
^H CM ro
•
-
«
'o ci .2
§£D 2
-'
^ u
? I A* s £ %O CU rt "~J L,
O Z ™ «*C Jj " c ™
2 « ° E .5 SS c .2 3 c 2
"11 ^a 2 m .O £ « nt jj
-H' cvj
COOJU
- 3O
CO
_0
13
•ontK
Q
CO
CU
3 *0) <0
. £T3 •«-" Ma, ^ ^1£ S. 5.., « o"S <u c
3 s Ccr £ oft) ..-< W
1 « 1IO PH '-i"
-H (M ft
T3
(d tn
•o 3 S£ - 1 « -
.3. ol'tr
.5 IIS '
~t CM
c0
rt 00o *
— • a)ft> 'JT* !
o - '"3
tilD A e/J
S
^. g 'S> S 5 *
llljllll(-•
8. . . . .O «J X) 0 T)
B
^
00c"
o
^ c
^ S"•I* Q<2 30 cr« W
W
166
!-< (DO Vi O
c 5o ^^T5CJ 0)nj ,£h U
tn(U
ooI
on
to(uuC<u
n)H
aOu
:§w
:ential
Re
su
lt
oA
Vu*H3O
W
•artNrdE
2ca;joft
tr»* uS «S •h T3
°§U
*J"cr
.-H P£
•0 •
2 oU
Occu
rre
nce
***o
rations
Va0
g
O
Ea'3crU
(0
u2 col 11
• 6 C!"2 'C § 5£ a> '£ 3
a rt -a4J X 0 O
i- I II I '« •- § o. .2J> " ° '3 s3 » » 0- <U
cn K Q « >TI
—i (M m ^
C
"i" 1 III C "fJ •*-* d)C B "* --.•1 «> S -9 «ij C ro 0)& § S. - fSso '
tilll!?
i: « S - -3 t) O rt Hi
'? a .g X" m c E S"j w -T* a> u3 S £ S a•- n m U fflto j^b» a
A (d* O <a" jj
-I [VI
•"* 13. 2 o 2« » „ .2 BIm - o g O I O M i « oE S » " S ' S " . S h ^ J
« ^ s S 5 E " ^ S ^ ^ S § ". O 3 ( f l O D i J W . H - w J j ^ n J ' 0 - ^ .' h n f l ) W ^ 3 ' i ^ ' ^ w ® * * ^ " r t *
O ^ J ^ J P . u " S l l £ * J ' r t y7 ^ . i ^ S S l S ^ r t ^.2 . c. m £ a .G a v m
f l r t J D < r t j 3 o ' £ f t U U ^ D . 2
-H M < r > ' f U 1 v O [ - C O
CO
n)g'c *2
* A
GO i-0 0rj a;0 01td£
fcl
B ' 4>
to3 aA v. S•o .-
6 |a «
IICO h
•° t!LO OS
-H CM*
2"ia
" CO
« '.S Sg J3 h
m ao
1 J3 ' ^
°* rt >~
111!£33u
> o'«
I isO ^ 0) •
£.„ §•£Co C CU° ° iD co Q i.
-H (\J
00fljc
T3
.. ° 0) h
"•* O t-l JM '
& .
O n)
^1
«h3wCO(D
£
(U>.£ <u*-> u™ h .
^ 0^ w
o
167
V(0
OI
c-C ^c ""c A3 co
co —
•2 I
a 2
E
cr-oo
iCO
OJI—IJD
c0
u
sflc
a
ct
r
:
'0
^
Po
ten
tia
l
.
,
i'•
3
LI
3
Re
su
lt
cV
4)
3
U
Co
•oo
CJ
c
EJ.'3o*u
co
oo
co
rt
ndO
ui
Co
nte
m
4)
a.y
U
O 41
« 4 1 - 0
•0 « * 0
'« o-c u ^- a-i « c
3 -S £ i o;g „ .£• '£ •-
s£*rtwC4Joa,
eo0)
41h *J
« 36 £S «•- S.S .5 2. Sifc, t, « tl
OJ
SI 1u E g
•O C fll
3 fj C
. S E 1
MC
3JJ
o S •
-LJ 4J
JJ O
S W
rt ^
•{ *J Q.
U s•*" _e 0)O — (j
"a - cOJ -^ ^ rt
1 1 1 1in ni J3 IS
N
. 'S-3- «
WO. oT
II s 1 "fl C (n _«j Q _ m
£.| : S j i | S S | g
a S « J £ I £ ^ H X W K £ ;
<
i? 34) T3h Ou E
1 i4) ua -i
4>
C
Vt.
"crtU
a.cr .
c50 ui
•O w
1 ff
«a>
s 1Ox ."
s) n]
"c: cti oU 2
^
C "DO.
"S | IIS g>§•• s Sd«-^« aS; >• -> c " s S| g. 5^^ |S ° 6 » * §"u " S 3 ™ i;§1 § S l g SQ o q .Su-Si
.-d
E
£ " "c
">.'s_o o
4> SQ m
_l
w
u
u
c41
to
ffl
g - " 1"5 . 5 ! 1 '
3 .S S ^ °
1 1 i ^ i 1 1^ " 3 t~ 3 " ".- *j cr — ' o" " v•* Q 4> u, u a ^
u
^n)
cSoIX
a3a-4)^ Co .2rt «
'3 2 • I* «« g 4, .9- ».S 4) -- g, eoU< Q tn o W
•a rt a. •- « ° ^
^ E P u " c d"c" n) jj ni "2 "* -^1 E < o = S i-H 0 .- _0
^ V "
> " 3 =
• Is s, .si ?"§• I |"s «
O I W ^ M £ ^ O - " 4 j G r f r t > * J
O a - J x — ' U.5 -- -- U ^ - , ~ - , - ^ - ^ —
u c . ' a
2 F w x° *•*
o- '? •? « S... g, E . c
E£ » = S 'o £ » « 'D^_
° « 5. ^ » J cw ^ j; « ^ c _n
-.' M m »'
- E^ S. i • 3«
C j) U1 <J _, C
> .i S . .- 1 1•0 C ' « S J 01 S "S » « > ^ - c « S "
|!l Jill 111O — ro ffi -r
(J
168
IDrt
fi
C ooO m~— O
!H
1
•oi3roNnJ
DC
rtH
0u£W
d
cHo0,
£
i.
13O
o3
•o
2
rt ..
Pote
nti
Re
su
lt
C
j
I ;
c
c
£V
'3C"V
cc
co.5•o
ou
me
nt
Vt.3o-4)
C
onditio
U
:3
*,
I,
)
i)
:V
:0J
:1)
|3tr0
1 ' £•o o
i 11•D 3 £
1 E?*
4)M
13cuo0,
1 1i s
2 1 £5* 2 w 3 p
s g s M.t S S, i g.U, Q U b. v
c . „ * 0 *• 2 3
s 1 1 1 !sllli3 C rt C J,•^ o 0 -S
J3 o -- z: fa
•D ^
JU _Q
t « -°C rC £4(
5" S SIs 1*s g. « s•s?-|l sS,E 6s E< i -- ~-
1.
Op
era
tio
n o
f sp
ark-
cham
ber
in a
str
on
om
y
experim
ents
t*
i5uJ£
1Q
ra «> -o^ c ^ Jj o* p c c £- 5 « « *» ^s § 1 « E «^ o S- -" a *•o S'p i -5 a" U O1 41 . (T ijS Q w ffi (K « ^
4)M
***
1V
oCX
c2
1
"2 11 g* 2 P ra pS gl 2 I™ U 3 ^ 3.- u cr no . trfa Q « UI fa v
1 llS .• s S i
•0 1 1 5 1 d
rtCh.fi —c 3 w c S•p o o ."£ U - - Z fc.
5 ?E3 1O — •"i E - jj
tfl J!|-E.M - Ip C Q. C
""* n ^3
. E « E' t^ 0 « S
O D. O t.
"5 J!JS -S£•£ *i= -=y^ -0" ••a: i 1Sg H 0£&.-, -,
Sat
V— u **C 9 * 3«S a a S 55 [ | E 6 E Jg -5 E E E •£ C<" cr . .U U] _ N ^ V
bi
s° 2u ^.
S 3i -5^ i
4)
rtJU
0)h -O
4J "3"^
E Ia, b<
« S,5 * ™10 " rta. ^ ^« • ti S ida -AU £ —
S a
SIM3 i s a2» si- * « c
j° o'i.
1.
Co
nd
uct
of
astr
on
om
y
! e
xp
eri
me
nts
i /
Se
tup
/de
plo
y
/ A
lign
/ca
lib
ra
te
/ V
isual poin
ting
1 sy w Jw O. .f *jjs o 2 u" • . .H — <M M
fa
J! .. tn3 I"3
"o *• M *°
£ " u «
2 ' ll S- ig 35 j| S
_w
J -1-H7T 2 °50" = E
"2 rt eS'M u »«^ J; « x "Du u V. > Uo c o i «c *> o „ «> • £ * * 'rt >• 0 *JS 25 u £
a • . w•3 ^tr »H 7^<u y O
£ > 2f > 1> (4O 4> -D
« 'C "> B
Co ce; a fa
c
E
cuX '
cfltu
o •*- ° u
Is ^ S 1, ^n id "^ J3 M "
Si w 1 Si - -3
• 'M is l - ^s" * ^ . 0 0 * t J ^ X C C l l l ur t S c - a o t l o . - ^ . ^— O r t C f c . « 2 j : —>• jf * SB J O H ^ < B . I d
O . o ^ ~ - w ^ - . U - - —
"S « S - _E g 3 S <4> gg C 2 g H S C5» E g, M J.S^C Q — m ( X x c
°-J f §•£ - " *C^ < « E ° u .op > — o c:-'0
ll"O!PSS » 2 a « SJSul loSg >5l
^_ c
E Ji MM ^ 4)o •- J.•3 u 0
- s «0. « « • .S
^S a §•c c v ao 2 M ao c0< - rw
o
169
0}COn)
ooO
c a>C <uC A>i C/53 ^^
O• >-)
-JJ
CJ
(L) >«rH
C S
"2b(ONrt
ro
,0rt)
H
o£
srt
dV
°(X
t
1
C
V
O
jj3•DO
Pote
ntial
u>3303
1
C
iU
£
do
V
'3« .
as
do
*GdoU
d
i"'3crB;
eo
*odoU
»
Op
era
tio
n
U
d
,5 3» -o•0 « 0a a E
S _ S i g^ « -iT
2 oe E I 5
£
rt
d
o(X
c
0
n
S
•s &'rt to 3- 2 " ex.
£ u* £ S*
0)
jj .2 "3£ 2 10 !o
•O rt C
.S c £
.5 2 h
£
111S rt d e£ « rt a.
Is I Jr 1s s
C U cI'lII «U u U
£•£ S^ 3 rtH w -3
»M'
13rt
• S Su *4 "^.3 J -M
I
• » » 3v -dt. TJ 00 "3 E
| | . |
c * «K 2 a £
.a
3 § £ —w "° *i *i-fsf S o "
° £ 03
" S 1^2 S S E
a.'3V
•a d'rt w |
• £ 2-- oo 2
- b, W w
d
s " 8.« _o oM j ^i b *.
•D £ 2 ^. °u u 2 _ua -a rt 3 Jj
• 1 i g i. °U 5 Z D -.
•D
1 ^ | 0rt j ° rt SiC a> ™ C oC h ^ d ^
«^ » W S •»^3 n* J t| .. h
S-g 2 o S" *-o E H U -0-2 od d ^^ c 'S *^
do
rt "«ta-°
||
-'
s.f_,a Oo •"•
n -.'
-
.
•
'0
C
J
__
"
J.
"
C
«S
SV
I-w -
^
_ ci g .2 JS
* 3 3 J J S
• O h O - D C ? O
a u E -3 •£ o. E.V ^ Q,
a > § a 2 = gU
. S S " O n ".L i
5 £ 3 S 8 f s f - =i C o " o j . - S § - S^ K > - > f C Q v t f b v ' - )
0 g c ^
u"0^ «
•3^~« f2 -Sa.2" ^2 S S S | ?! IS U ^j 2 t< u E tx
jjU e
" I Ia «c S
•o -o E ' g;a . 's | . ; 2 .
Ci iU b Q u U I ^ v
w» S > o S 1
n • • s i - ' i i .3d 3 d d "
•£> O -Z* O 0 —
4) • (o00 4J •
d rt *<J C 4) - 0 "0.
: 1 j< • a | • t I« ^ i i i « " I: 2 ^ a « u *J -5
1 O C ^H 3 -H X
00 i
a ET u ~ZoZ ^^ £ = 5 S J- |4« E
- £ E M . c « ^ S S S ^^s c .S-S « " w l « u S d ' a
N ro*
tis 3I f - ' •
= „ a-> Ql O
s - ? - S "S 2 HW
• W r<
•g 3 §o a «^: w rtJ^ 4) .2
1 | £• Ih t- 3 d
U O d" M_« ^J ^
d.2rtH« COa c
° »• '
jj |0 V
Z K
-1 ro
» -o ?1 3 I'5 z oaffl - INJ
*
170
(Uwni
OI ^~.c ooO ^— o
p «C 0)
g|o o
rt73(Hrt
rt <IE
(N]iro
JDrtH
dOu4>
H
.3dV
1
t.
SO
ju3
O
2
"3 -.
1".PC&
Sourc
e
-oaaI"rtcu
dV
4)h
ITCK
CO
1oo
14)
O*41K
Conditio
n
3aue.
<odo
(0M41
<?
2V
C
<3cV
I3
U
4>
S 3
41 .-"3 * o
1 11
4)
1•0 1
•32 »n 0 «
E Q U
, g £ s> •- 4) ,O
|| f|
3 d < d•z» o o,5 o ^ z
s9 S„«. s
•S g g,2 . .is -S s SI s U s•S 8 o 1 ^4) (X £• jo <d
•2 > 'SL ""*O O ""» W *--
— u
s 1
•3 S « 'B 30 2' 00 M
U Z V c •-
&& 3 isDa « o
tn o — > A
~ (M*
n
U 41 4>
o 3 3O -i <M'
J
d
I l l s-o d t. o Js
« » *"
^ g a -2 a » P
1 11 s. Ill
511 P— rt 2cd **
C u'rt» DO0 *J C&H w3
co
i•o 1 &'S *2 M« o .j ° .5-.5 S g. Si g.b, O i U b. £
d „ .S> o -S p
S 1 a 1" .g 2 E
. -o E a c£ 2 •?3 C C f*•p o o ."£ U Z U,
s Ih 3 50 *~ .0
•C « E4) T3 O
'"I d ! •£ Bcv, .2 S 3 -2£ ° x g .5 g S
> rt -p .- x « £ •- x• D t J ^ b i M c u U , Wg U 0 c
.
c ' i» „ » ° > !S
•S t S '; 3 i . £e j c 1
| Jg«r||| II || !|| |||||
rg ^ n- ^ ^>
a B
S 1 = 2-S G c u
•- a. °" -i *o • •• £ S | 2 * S
g " a 11 »* * ^ r O " r * ' - ^ t ' . E t D
i| a z z~o u ll So J3
s
0 1
•o i • • :
"3 'c 0. «
- - 1 S ••i g a " a. §^ "3 £= £
S Q f E? 0
51| II* 2s
73 34)
d u ^
§. "3
1 - 11 o
•D E a'32 « g
! s -J .« »|E II e? E 1
C « *3
S 3 SI
o 1 •- E
T3 £ "d d
£ u 1 £
'4)
-5, | t• s 2 f 1 £
'| •S u 5 E** t?
*; ^
i § i . 9 1 1"a 2 - '5, xT52 S o ™ » S
Is-ll^l?"•« - 2 (5*1 C
2 j -
Ilill -." Isl• . .
-* <N] M
m4)
3u"c4)
^ 2) "
; o~ z~ i < 2o ^Z -. <M n -r in «
0Z £
171
COnJ
Ooo
rt£
<u0)
w
Ha; ^HC S
rt <!
iro
rtH
dO„
V
S
c
• ofl.
u•
:
c
.
'c
^
0i3D}3
dg
:jsu
,
1>
l-l)
j1
'
t.1
t
uir
em
en
t 1
«
(4
3oO
—V
E14
'3*>
1rtdoU
i
D
1
L
a
i5j=»Lia
a I c O ui Z i*.2 0 .2 0 h 0 £o » rt « S » Ei S S S £ S .So•8 S. §• S. g. S. v.2J J . ; £ p ; j 2 g * J
• J 5 * ^ < : - ^ H ~ - w ' § '^" 1/1 >o r—
u —= £
£8U a
il.z
e_o
2 1"3 "grj AS s •
II!
-C
•£
3•o E•3 3"S o **•** u "3
ti Q 4)
cS 2
° S
I I3 C
2f 6
co
1'g
»r 33 d
••71 oJS O
3
^ •" M anrt c c d .* « •- .5r J3 ^H Bo C u "O e
•± *r* 3 c 0E It o n - "« S. H* »O Xo S ~-
Em
uls
ion
s
1.
Pla
sti
c
2.
Nu
cle
ar
O
»! 3 33 S [ I Ss I s • 1 •§5 "t- tt £" •£ 3
* « i 3. s £2 a h ? £, o
Is
- « °.2 "c *• "^a a S=> i gM _
O'«
S•« §:'3 s s .• £ "•-E W E v
V
4 JS =£ 2 |
V A —
•p o .SS Z bt
c0
ir J• S t. u
2 a i< = o x xU h <U u
- §' i ^1 1 1 . nX ,C ^j v d rt
?, ^ « u, > £ 6£ ^ s ^ < -.• • .
« CM (^
d01 I _ ' l 1
0 a> " 3 u U Q . u
P ' S ' ^ J 3 2 "S 'sE rt « E £ « *-o•* £ rt o a . « c 2
0,"
a.x
t*
•ocrtU)
1.
Hi -
Te
mp
era
ture
Ma
teri
als
1.
Liq
uid
m
eta
ls
2.
Liq
uid
g
lasses
3.
Va
po
riz
ed s
ub
-st
an
ces
d
§ " ' j s "r 9 3a «*c
•o c »- od £ E
- 3 . o" o * -22 sg. s2 Q c a ^
c ,,•-
• g•o E' 5 2 , 0" o d. y
. E nt u
C u* -S 3£ « 2" S S
•0 P rt£ 2 -f3 d d
. •? o o£ U Z
c•o .2d 1
»< o 'c
§ 1 2u £ C3 2 0
•g
i J. . «|
l l j i j i i°-c *JJ O c PS • •
J — —
U •£ «
-S S 2{^ g O
05 — rJ
03
172
(UU]rt
JDf-i
OI . _ .CooOm~— o
(U
(uClJ
CV]
ro
<U
cOu
U
cV
1
|»4
O
3
Os
Po
ten
tia
'
c
e
Require:
co
1ou
=jE4)
3o-V
e
Conditi
o:
0
30UC
S
-2«
s.o
ipm
en
t/C
on
ten
1
*•0 h
'"3 u
3 s=5 £.S o2 a
'rt a)
IEt"4 W
U
I |
i 13 C
S z
DO(4
ES g«3 = E^ a> rt a.g G G *3 .o o 3 cro."* X tdX tjjw 3 • .
•oJj>
U
e0 .
Is0 1
«
! Iu. §„Is Ifoo 5 w E
2$ -
w
Co JSS S aS t> T3
*" °
iUju u S. u V.S a ? K "
c
*J-id
1'5 2 »^ g.& s-.S •!.§. £aPM D u W
c «> o -Sh sy C .^
| 1 !3 £ d-0 O O
£ U Z
h . CO 0 0
:- " 1 2 •:• . s : 1 1 5
?. S S 6 m£ 0
-^ u ^ -~
mw
C
" I '
- M &
3 S*
•*• » . 5•2 "S S irt j= a) <<t », rt
' 5 > 2 | ^ u - o 3 | « 2 j j J'g Jg ^ " « i
.2 * ^~ ^^ *" *"* "*f f l£ -. N ^ ^ . ^ ^ r - w a -
H
•
'
(.
'
•
'
[>
^
<i•
•
b
i
ii
',«
SS l
iolo
gic
al P
roc«
CQ -
D
tji
>
>XIi
)
i
Id
!u
i.3
r .3i
>t•}
11|
>|
:
i
' £i pi *j^
;&!s
i: d
se
pa
ratio
n
. Lyophiliz
atio
N
•2 -a** 4) -O
- - 5 ca g £
JlilS^ » 0- « ft)2 o c « >->
eo .
cdc•o £'3 I • SS §.? S= Sg. S,U, Q I CJ
c vfe 0 -^IIIh 3 '•f- o o>S u z
"eJS c^ o
•D -
Jr 115
a
E « i
^ 1 :„ S .sU M U
' i S J!£S 1 3~ (M c"->
*« 2 ' >. u^ O U h 41
3 " £ *° •*ia £ » o "° 5
i . •«! s^ I «"2
Q£ _' rj n V „'
>-
173
COrt,£PH
.0t-t
ooO
5 <uc i
U
n!CO
0)
rtNrt
(M
OO
D
ou
<**Srt
cu
1
•ao
3
U
ia
'I
«
O
4)
3
O
S
a
= "3
f j
_
. c
1
(.
• I
ao
V_»,3a1
()(X
1rtd
U
a
I3O*
K
1oU
iI
ii.)
I)
3
^i1
L
3TJ
- ' ! 1'rt ° E
3 | |
1 il
•a'rt n*. *a «,.S S,
jlj
E JS0 S•a rtt> 'Xh 1
_3 C
. E33U
S §7•a '-* <°« S rtS uE h 4>
a c
d » E S0 £ 0 ^
Jlsl. •&a °M *•<E rt
4)O (O4) 4)U h
U C
» E
3!
'; ||||* S 3 g §.1
Z w -^
5=
o3 1
T J C h
ilj•— o ^* r•D R •- ij
4! « §• «2 Q i a
c
'i
1*s ^
• * 1 . s• tt 0 2* W
.5 s g. a.U, Q i U
* 1 I
" a -" S 3*° E rt
h rt i3 c C
C 'O
W jj
1 15 o E
1 : -31 «a-0 -- .—
MiC V hO « 4)
rt "o x
.S 00
E .S Srt c j:S 35o o.S
t
.S- S" ™
E 'E -o crt m ** C 2d 4) Ji "* — •O U O 01 U
"| is *S s1| II ll 1tn rt ^ rJ tX
X
t)3
a
S3 « » > 3 ; > 3t) t) u *O ^ t) "O
Is 1 I ' 1 2 S a 1 1 S' • 8 1 « » 1 1 '» | « 1
"=t!S E "
37s
' HiO nJ C
P< -D 3
aC
j j S S ~° 5 p.""" £ S ** " ^« "D 4) aj ^- 4) ^ "W> 4) '3 > > ' ° > "d S 'ri «4»*O 4 ) 1 ) 4 ) 4 ) ° W
V j, ._ u 4) 4) ' « .« « •" 00
-d o.^ 3 « 4>* i 3 3o " 5 "•o 5 & "S T*
•-* ^ 1 =5l £^ 1 I
^ | S | l .| B 1 . 1
| f i . i| ill ill !i I
• I-,
d' rt
M
O
: S,
' s |rt «" - • i3 "
IE ill |||i l!?1"3 1*1. ( 5 | ^ £ l ^ m § S .rt ^3 **S C L - i M M i - m % o r -
>.
174
5°w
0)incxi
,£!fn
oC 00
O .H
~~^ o
^00nj ~^"^S 0)
co
3-8•SI
<l) ^H
^
(T)
ffi
rtE-i
> Iu *
& a <-~. -~. u
&o
- — U PJ (NJ
<il! ° °!N
if
« E
M Z « «S 0= T
175
TtO
(UX!urt4->
0)
Q
0)COni
OI
n) -ud a)S <^
COCOdo
1073t-iRjNcd
E
oCO
Iro
rtH
cO3
ac
00.
jff
t!d
1
w
O
2
Re
su
lt.
c
'.
it
E
.?"aua:
co
'OC
(3
su
V
"aa-4>cs
g
Conditi
"
ii>
i
i
'•)
i.3r
c0 „
2 ^- 1
3 2 1 §
^ sf 1s h ST "
u1 £ i
rt
.e££
* E 2« 3 S. « . § . t n >fc, h ST U
V
M «5 E 3•d c rt
is 1. £ UH 2
C
3
o S
U *"
Eii
1 - 11 1 i~^ 3 rC U
Q. O — g
tfl id" JJ 2
N
T3 , —
u a.
!| .-• ^~ « = ' 2« <= » 5 S «
S ' l ' i i < ' J S 5 3 - i "S u ' o ^ a H H I W u i S j h
•*
C)
« 1"o
1 cco
« 1
1 U
t;uV
"c
U
0.
3
'? iC
o S2 **
1 £
c
1 18. 1X JD |u nJ
C Crt o0 Z
s -_o e* -o "D.
"S 1 |1|?o&S =^P? = -°- = cI s. s's^iS 0 C u ft C0, ,fl g >. „ 3™ £ £ 3 ^ i1 1 Ills
'c
E
C .
>, uO O
11Q in
-'
«uo
u
SW
cq
c0 0 «
S « J 3d u V T3
•o S £ " °'d 'c a u E•s s = > §u C • « • « 2
' S | ' ? • ? £ • -» « §. .i g. . S
«s Q v Ui c) CC •")
i i ".i: :
"rt
i£IX
• I 1rt n
• e l l•- d 3 m
*; o &. O. S
•i S'l S'g. 5,U, Q u U, u U)
S
o 2 S S 3 "•J ^ rt
J - J i i f i 1C* *& £ (0 "O ** "?
C B < S £ £ C- o i o« U — -^ -. U. z
O U .. "D
U uj CC C
L> S « C
c a £ »
1 « ^ ^ u id
• S ? ' ? 0 • g H h y | . < ^ 0 ' ( Q S M
to
1 ^Sin u C
E£ s ' ;o e r,-c .5 " n -r-o ^ p S
•II 3^1« (M
(ft
J. C
? s ^ i^0 C Tl> ._ . « 0
1 S.S .S"E0 . °_ M 2 ^ °
•° ^ t: *o S uJ; u o s t- n
6 —' rJ -
u
176
ort
-4->0)
P
I
0)nJ
O
toCO
•H4->U
(-1ni
oro
iro
<L>,—irQ
n5H
CO
u
W
Id
c
ofa
(•
:
c
^3o
S<:a
^•3s£ »1*tu
«. ,!3 C31
3L,
dC
SuD t
L i
eq
uir
em
en
t«
cO
15
sV£VId
'3trVK '
Conditio
n
i
L>
iiLic1
c
1 1
3 ' I i« 2 . i•- u ^ 2'S " ' 5 sS K S ? "
1 ' is"d
'a41
1
1 1i s
•o 1 &' S 2 . 3" e » " ow 0 41 u .2*
S S M .£ D
£ Q u £ S"
d S « "9 .2 S S ^
' 5 ! 1 1 it S 11 -s5 c < i s•? o o --5 O — Z fc.
1
s! i.? g
S E -3 .5 ° x 5 •CT £ « 3 o a.
ISf §S -Sa. J 0« u.< J O -^ —
>%
• s
IfO.Z.OT a)
«« rt
= -££3 * 1S B'X^ C u
*5&O u v
5J3
6
8.W
Q
c
1 . ! iS ™ -O
* 0
"rt 'c Q. E
- 1 - 3 .8^ § .5- •« .S- 3U u 3 >- 3 S
S Q S" fa ? ^
1 1 I s"rt
co
1
§ . I•rt; <*
S !•o I a« 2 « 3s § e- s : ?5 S 'a & S g.t Q u w t, ;
> 0 JS I* -rj JJ *D
5 S .; s S I1 1 i * 1 -s*, 2 - 3 ' 4,3 c < w c ?;
•z» o o .-.S U -^ -- Z fa
c-3 1*• o £O .f SH
!1 1S " 3 1| j? a E
E S E ?
6 D. 0 S
0 **
1 1?•? «s -^ ^
~»t! £ x> ™ u 4,
.2 S g •£S 0 H °» Sa a -~. •--
* x -1°3 O *"
S ! •"d 0 0-S 3
" S. °-S ;« E E | E J
| c £ £ Co EO E -' rj' m .-
U*
3t>fc -D
d
I 3« u
K S
1 1
S14
—h 2
•o "*
o ?h .;.0. b,
* »B s «' " S8. " -3• ! ti- 5 uw ^^
T3
^ 10 C
s i£ a5 g'd c
w
^ •§. s §Ills^ES « »" 3 c
S I 1i4 n a, ^J '«^ g l s ^s l l & Sd S. « < >62 - - -.
• S„ ! 2 S
fa*
§ I .3 * S- "3•o S x S •?o 1 "a E- 2 ? S1 gB ° S- x " 2- .=« "3 S S'S s5 Q f « C? ^
V
1 1 ' J S
"3c
oOH
1 1S S
3 1 *S 2 « ss o.». s :.?t. « 3 ( I S 3
fa Q S* UJ fa «"
c „ 4J> 0 — 3
•rt ^ -D
S .5 §1 | crt •?"S e £-^o o .!:U 2 fa
=3 §a in a i q
o ** c•° - - rtw O M 13- i 3 c
«) JJ .5 uu G S - — .
c0
ttM« bO
o1 S
l!O 4)2 K
-* M
S Ti 5'i o S5 2 6(4
«Q - .M
q
177
(1)T3O
UnJ
•4->
(!)Q
(Uen
cotofiO
0)
COT3t-iniMnJ
ffi
OCO
ICO
0)
ctiH
cO
o
£
rt
cV
o
4>U
:oV
•D
t(0
X~f
1t.
1
.n
O
«
rt
if
£K
c
1
(_
&
rem
en
t
3erv
so
Ia
B4>
E4)h
"3o-
<£
co
•oe8
ij
1
i.
1
33
Bi.3TJ
S 3V Tl
2 1 ** °A E
3 | o
~ u 4)
1 ' 1
£
.§•u E'a S m" 0 ' S
.£? 4) 00[i, Q U
c y o* 3 £ |
- £ i t 3U *• W •-
•o 1 2 -3« o E x*• £J y . '3 B < B
« U - 2
j,2 « '
2 2 3 .
- ° 1 s 5" S 3 -S "s s « 1 «* S g. - •§S S - , 5 5 SJ2 « u ~ •-• .
"~" ~"~
I 's
1 1rt u *
II ! »!S 2 ^ = op, 3 *J c ""
W 0 ~- > J
<aU
'c4> 4> 4>M T 7
a3 3»,O -' rJ
I
i I a'S S * 3s
" D C h « O n'S c ° a E »" £ 4. a ^ *•3 ? - £ 2 . o -g^ 0.9- 'C C..B- -2 g
U "TBO JJ •
E £ii i i •" £
2 ** "c ti "3o i cP. . «3
§ I' m
B S
•0 1 &
•3 | . . f« o .2* « u .9*E D ? u1 E ?
£ O .2 3
s i l l•si 1 -s3 C • i «•;r o o .i:£ 0 2 U,
o
E '3 c
B 2 'n ^ c 2. fl ° !>. J .2 o a g
111 " - " J l l - ™
S 1 -S C .S5S M *° •>
1 E 1 3 | 1„ c U «, Z > h
-M *-*•o ^3 § S •c^ c u
" » on * •?.' S B 3 " T o» 5 J c o.
*• n i ^ C mV-5 ° E 3- ^c •- &, W 2 a ?o « . . .2: £n — • co m •*
«
1 ,1 1"2 c *« JJ tt
"5 'c ° o. *_ c 4) fl. **
ilillfl2 Q ? B E ? 0
w —
c c« S «i i i -o £
3 5 1I "23 | =P. w -H.
g I« w
g «.•o i &"52 » 3s §5- s ;«•.s S 1 5, .i 'g.In a Su In f
E „ JS> O ^i 3
£ 1 2 1» | S |tH 2 1 ..3 c c !;•p o o .-£ O 2 b
4)
S S D00 => ,2
£ s i 5 £;| -c w 'S £
1-1 > "^ " **"
^ — 1 *•C £ 'C «fl.O v (i— , A
52 w - 5 c£ 't 00 « ° .2
Ibl ill034>
(0
'c
1 sh ° S
c 2" S < So . .
->
co
•o i« 1
1 i&2 If
1 1
c0'£
c
•o' E•- rt
s Is** « 3
tn Q c
Ca °
5 l• 13 C
« o
d0
c
£ 23 C
'S 8
S 1Q. n)X X41 .«r t C O
X Is
. 1 H «
* o rt
S 3 33 B, Z .E . .U — N
K
178
PC;T3(UXon!•»->0)pI
COnJ
Oi
cH
coCOaoOrt
(Uj->i—i
CO
Nrt
oCO
rO
(U,—iXIa!H
<U
cO
Sa
c
1
u1t
3
C
.
C
<a
••j
Po
ten
0j
iJ53
1
1
j
U
u
I
>
sc
^ja
K
C
'<t.
(l
Re
qu
ire
me
nt
1
co
1J
d
£u
*3tr€
K
co
•g
J
iji
S.1
aii
•|
i
ti.
irJ
c3 j}S U 13
*• O• • 1 " E
8 S • 5 S=3 !~ £ 3« » §. » 55 Q i K ^
1 1 1
eo
iTJ 1'rt 2 «
• 1-* 5.£ 0) fr 00U, Q u U
c «
s 1-1u d . .^•a § <as i -f3 0 d•-» o o5 0 2
e•o .2a «o c 5£5 6gs 1h !D £ 0
j:
<>• >. 1K a w ^H. S j, a^
S >< 1 ijS || | |«
S g.| 5 i •? Sjj o E « • •3 ^ -«-
« C nu •£ wh * O.3 " O
* E g
•2 8 1 o"S f 0 H^ x a; «a -,' • N m
J
1 » -,3 11J j j j :S l?l 1
1 1 1
CO
ac
•0 1
• S i :S °5 «
E 5l 51
/
C .,
S -2 I£ 1 2•S 1 1£ 2 •?a c c= • 6 1
»• . c.2, a ° - -£ « a S 2
Hill>. n c o ng ^ ^
ax«u
d«
0)
u
^
~'
•*• « . 2J2 -a S i c-« ' c « m • v. .2 <oE ' r t - £ £ w h « «
!c "o E '£..-, * ^ h P ( 3
"« ft 'Sir s S S)jj " r t ^ * 1 - « „ m.- . 7 * 2u-^ js j ; « .^ i s £ * « ° c v10 ^ w * 0 0
£.5 -. N r < 1 - T i n ^ 3 r - « ) C T -
s
1 '.I2 _d h o
•ilili3 «sl « S
i i i
- ao
i•o 1•3- 2 . .
£ III
jj O JS
£ 1 |
i 1 13 C C
c c^ O
11
3 dS"a
a.u
«c
n
u
^
-"
*« ** ^ u
I «J5 | 1 -S
JjlJIlislsQ 0, -.' N n V u,'
*
179
0)T3o
0)X!u
30)Q
<utnn)
di
X!
O
dS^ o
£ ..
ooCO
o• tH4->O
Q)•4->
fi
rttg
8.o
OCO
iCO
cd3!
180
0)TOO
0)r-H^H
rtOH
Ort
(UU]
nj
O
CO
COPIO
,CO
toT3
VH«1Ncdffi
rOi
CO
cdH
cO
4>
w"(3
so0,
i*
C
.c
c
rt24*
1
)
tD
3
44c1cj!
3k3
5i
3
41K
c
t
1
C
]uirem
"
ao
•3coO
•g
§S3D*
K.
C0
.«c
a
iiiL
a
:3
^
i.jcrj
4)
1 1
1 i, 1 1
*
"rt
cu
S
Q.
3
aac
4»
£
£
2
. 1
id
s. • .0 k&la 0VQ a
-
1 'S.* >•" a
^ C M ^ 0 ^
- ss i S " 1 S z Et J « . S " - J ; S c j £ 2 .
S a. u « ^ C U H ( - X « W
<
co
,1 I• & a
*5 ? • ; : * *
S E 1 S
"
C4)
1'
C•.2
m
4)
13
U
E
^5 '
. IC
t.
E .
s s"2 PL. *
?!• "1 S •• 's,
1 S.J Ius! "a
a
1,. "*
O '£h 4)
Is_'
1
o
u "
IH *« *
6 -*
ai
e13
— rt
5 if"S 3 S«5 r* cr v
»
nj
c4>
1
co<a
0)
g.D.3
».e-^ 3
Ji3
•oO
c
41
z
4) v
.S-o-o ES^rt w
«•£
"c * u
II !,LIo. •" X
Op
era
tio
n o
fch
am
be
r in
ast
ron
om
y e
-H'
^
1
U
ta
o"
a
co'O ' J
. 2 1 3" 6 «•* 2 0-- o O- *•a J; ;- « -i;« ;, s »* *-«S Q « £ "
^
j
I* 2S*
1 <a au _
1.2 3|| |
a.3O"
co
4>
CXa.a
«
£
c JUO 3• *o
1 s 16 -5 c
1 ^ sO -^ tM
' ?
SJJA
1 1p iu v
5 c
V
o
JJ ^i C O
s. i;!a> S 2 _iilll^
h ^£ "SS »
t) U " ID ^
S- £ £» 5c °- , ." >
S'^ S S £*s S5 trUW - M ^ ^>
Q
GO
d4)ao4)
o
M
1
41
OC
•oV
c
.5= I„ 0 4,K '•" a
1 i. "^•o J o
J.2 O1™
E|
1(9 <n
"o S
u §
I's0 S
_'
: -o" °
| fc-s if^ — . rg ro
W
181
0)
os4-»(D
t—i•—t
P!T)
0)COrteO
f
tio
CO
o
UnJ
(U•»->S
i—i
CO
ffi
ro
cOu4)
15
4>
I
So
urc
e
t-
na"K
c4
1
h
hiO
*
a
0.
Re
sult
|
c
'
'({.'
<•
C
uir
em
i
cr4)
co
•acoU
1£4)
'ga1
K
C.2H'"c
O
ij
i
i
ii1
>)
>i.ir
5 . i J•3 *• u *aa. y u '50 S u -S « | 8
« * ** Jf>-> as 0, S
0 >- «
7. -° ° !
"° 1 '0, o
.0 *- c -^ " rt «
c« «
s 211
c
P. .,.
s.X
~cXU
°= §Is < S £ 5c E 5 '•£ S? •2 » a c S S ^ ^ - J« i 7 ^ £ >• - S § 'K
S l j i s i !_o « 6 «_ tq g^ «
£| *|1 »| tW "a O t) o U ^ t d
IM* ^
^ e
1 1 1(0 41 4.
E. S i^- ri ' 3C C jj uS £ w .«o e
tJ
co: s
s s i"rt 3 o
•D « •- '5
1 E S" S
«
*«
13c-
I '
co'«
o.Q.S .4) ***
E ?
JW
S.c4>1.
fo
u 4)s r1 1S S - ss i i -> 2 o" •-•O _™ y [^
Tra
ck
ing
(b
all
oo
ns,
Su
bsa
tell
ite
s, e
tc.)
«
id•on)k.
u
J> ^
d
<aaco
V
i.o °" O
• 3 "^* cC "^ "y *
!li* S S
Ina
dv
ert
en
t in
fla
tio
nin
P
/L
ba
y
/ O
ute
r d
oo
r o
pen
^plo
yin
g an
d in
flati
ng
llo
on
s
aJS
all
oo
ns
, E
CH
O t
yp
e
02 -,
a
o
Ico
£
x w
" S o3 J u"a o4> C^ •** c4J «t
o ^ uc ^ m^ c *.Is 85 t. TJ
cd
J
cD.3boc
a
De
plo
yin
g
sub
-sa
tell
ite
_'
u O
rt w
ibsa
tell
ite
s
, E
xp
eri
me
nt
Tele
op
era
to
U) — « (M
-
Ico
5
5S o
T34)
2Jrt Q, u
J! •« S0 Jj "
>. c c5 « «^ h O
Co
llis
ion
I
/ S
tru
ctu
ral
dam
ag
e
Imp
erf
ec
t d
ock
/ H
ang
-up
/ W
on
't
sep
ara
te
I
1
c
oD
<M'
I
rt ^ g
4) 3 *jS-- o1 4)
f* W •-)
VI.c;rt
c4)
1
Co(0CO0)
aam <at. '3E ?
^O ^
c "5rl O.E 5
1 .?O Cn
Fir
es,
sho
rts
Ele
ctr
oly
te sp
ills
/ C
on
tam
ina
tio
n
Ex
plo
sio
n
/ F
ire
Main
ten
an
ce
'
/ B
att
ery
re
ch
arg
-in
g
/ G
as
bo
ttle
re
-ch
arg
ing (
Hi-
pre
ssu
re N
2)
m
182
(U
os•4-1(U
r—Ii—I
ni
a>
oat
O
SO
CO
O•H
O
rta)-»->C
nJ
ro
eOu
!3
"3
cV
0IX
C
41
3
£•o
flj
NrtI
d
C41
1
«
3o
«j
£
i : "3
J«
ec
rt
CO
2
*j
me
nt/
Co
i
c'"
5
uirem
ent
|
o-«
DC
Co
iS
M
Et.
'SO1
«
Co*J
i(3
§ I '| S £
3 I s. &- « §• ='J » '5 j! '= S2 Q S* fa £" ^
ti
^1aj
0.
a0.
'3
c _0 £
1 «.s »•E S1 £o .2O h
J5 c"2 - o
8] 0- "4.. ro fl
s , .s•S *• 6
" 3 5
" .2 °£ S ~-
cod
g. !?
« <•M U
1 K
« -o 2•C u .S| z 6a _' M'
^
CO
• 3•0 « "rt'S a a
3 ' « °=0 JJ-21 -S
S r* o* 4>h V *-»
4)
^
U
£"
c0
«4)
a30) •
«.?h 3£ ?
U
• a.C
«UH
M u
5 «"c o. w
rt =J Si1 - * -L £ ^ 5 Se 3 g •» if
? S G . 2 ^-o £ g. . •£^O 41 ^ " •-*
U o -- W --
uc4)
O
•« nO «>00 M
" —
>!-*
u*cV 4» 41
I 3 5U - M
*'
1 - .2| i« C v
« *"
1 u . £ 12 D S* i»< S" O
4> "
n) £
£ «S£ *° M
•3 ' " 2 2
"i 1-3« 3 3o »; SQ, w —
c0
s41
a •3
^ '3
fa f
c2 *>
1 1£ =rt« £o .2U h
o*-• aj1
-2 c
^^ .2 ''S4) O 01 C
tu , 5 -SU a — ?• - O. L
> a v .* x ™•a « c b« u c5s u °£ t< «2 •<• -*• u
ii 2 ** v
•1 " | "S 2^«>. S * 5 g.- z « * 5.c p, »-< 2 ^ f36 ii -~. 2 cc
-
u
"c4100O
*T ***o . g x1 c2 h; 2 2
Z G ™ (Ni (*i
4
co
| | s-
? *• a « ^
1 Z 1 5 0
S,"<? ** •
S! 's ^ ^-. « 25 S «» =5£ wi
a3
fa c
«3
g.C
41
^
V
-5, s g
• S 2 f 5S c U fa
^ > H ~~ -,
J a
si 1 . - . i s i 8? g i= 2 _ 5 s ? s : t : « : « c .
•3 I 7 •" S Ji S S>S " R"0
* ^ 3 l " w ' S T l ? * 0 ^ O . f t - t «
^ 4 l r M ^ ^ h d X v X ^ X t q V
£ O .S W^ J ^ < I » H ~ . M § '
- ~ m' ,' ^ ^
B1>
rtOuc
1 « 2 -IT o j:
t o'z-i IIO
2
183
(UT)O
OH
Tl(U
ort
COid
OIjj
o
10
oCJ
(d
•1-1ti
KH
(0
rttqrt
CO
CO,—i,0rtH
dO
•2
rt
dV
1
So
urc
e
•a«
a
a
1
|<
5o
«
13
rt .,
Pote
nti
Re
su
l
aCi
i>•
;
i'_!
1
'
•
:
j
u
§.V
o
'Od
.3
ment
u
o*
K
Cotu
•S• c
ou.
•
'
•
u
r
-Slv*o E a *
sillo c c *; >a « 3 * ,_o u o S• S M£1 rt rt» £ n cC o O Oo S a ud 3 v
j jp°rt
_
Co
1£rtsoO
co
11oU
rt ct* uu £
M SO >{0 S
-•
HIi - =U -.' M" •
Z '
c
1 S S•° s 2 s* a o. g
3 S . o -o
S « -a ^ §
S In o (^ O
V —M 'rt
S -S
3 S-4c tj *i£ • 3o iQ, vi _
co
aaas >
£•3el
^U
rta.c
«
E
CO'5jD
h ^
— XUt w
1c2 |
a- o fc
x c in
U M " 4>
^ ^ i b£ -. 5 s *-. rvj
C0
I ll
H I. <3 E5 1.»j a
O*
a•U'5
'S
Itiuc
1•ocrt
«ea,
S•D1)
V3
£
o
y
JU
S«
£ '
• g g
* E
rt a
S S
M
c
iolo
gic
al
Pro
ce
ss
Ele
ctr
op
ho
reti
cse
pa
ratio
n
, Lyophiliz
ation
cq - ^
D,"
B
•0 1« §« S0 C J
i "1"
S o ?
C
* .20 *{
*" C
T3 £
E 23 C
33.
• co
1'in)COU
co
jj • c '
S B !1 2 .2-2 « o*c CU UoU ^ •-.
2 « £c .Sd u *,O « V•- art ^ xc «
'I 2 urt c j:
i r°u u.S-H fVJ
2
E 1 ^ 1rt « C rtC W £ a ~-tO U u w u
<•> 3 > ? ?• S"5 W o * ^ C
W"£ " CM* ro
a
8? s 1t- (J ' "O
A i- o "1ffi t 2 tt K
ado
aa>aoV
rt
0
>S
'su
T3
"d
0
E - 1 S -"J Q ^ O 1 3 * . S
> " S * « C ' g h ^ i
13 *O 41 -S, •" ^ d O rt 'M•S S "o " 5 > * t J " ^ y u C l " H
rtmfflw<&,5 fl"i~c^-S), J 5 ^ ^ ^ u o S u ^ J
dO w
1 ia *
1 I2 0
— ^_
• s i - § -S S - 2 . - - ;,-
o- | E | S » | S J « |0"'
c^ O ' a O < C 0. 35 oa Ua
^ C U ^ 4 ( s J r o ^ " < X « O r -
(£
184
T)O
S-(->CD
T)mx!o
COn)
fi
Orto
3c/1
COao
• |HJ->O(tih<u
•»->s
niNnJffi
n)H
cO
•Su"(3c
.£oa.
•
(•
;
c
».
XIuo
S
I
a21)
£
ij
i
3L,
9a:1
3a
X
m
ratio
r
S.o
'eu
sm
en
t/C
on
t
•-cU
c
ire
me
3D"OK
CO .
'ScoU
4>£V
racrK
co
'iou
£ 2 •«'S 2 -« S
(Q Ot O41 _ *•
t « § no«.S <J » - 3
i 3 5 « X2 2 * IS
£ac3
U XI
if" ETT«"£.2 c c
= "SS g S£ ^ 2
0,%2co
0>
3h
0)
C !?
* £fil
Co
V ^^ . oC C w
„-!^5 ^** o« w u
•ow CN 0g U_
^E • -g o
S3So,
K
»--o 2U <s
1 s .0 |
a a S
co
5 . 1!w ^ *>.5 £• -3 S J!•° .3, •- i Si 2 •- 1- 1 „™ a 5 < o, 3 ow --. -. W — ^ ^-
<>u-
JI • ioo*; on " o,C < fl ui S
Us 3 f a l lo S£ 0 Mg M «* - c u W O x » O c Qn m M<sd -: N „ *
w
u
1 11 1 "•O *S. 4
2 1 1
41
rttoC3
U XI
i S- 'E »•
U " S
IH£ - 3 2 -
u3
^
.2 4)c Sf5 c
£l
c0
B 8
.2 »
1 1X O
W Q
co
3ULg •2 1SB-'
Eu ^t s » «i i i 1 s i §1 ! '1 I 1 > * 1 1 « 3^ 2 Q H J < O a 0 3
H -' rj fo 1- in * r~'
H
185
CO
COcu
nj
a co<u
- oc ^o s*3 ocd W
uCUO
N
OS
•»->
i—i0)
I
S «3 HC/3 (X
CMCOI
oo
cu
iff
014J
"301cu
<n
O731*Ctfsn)Xi-Hni '
• |H4-*
CU4->O(X
go
•r-t
Causative
Facto
r/C
ondit
4->
CU
W
cuu
Ba
sic
Ha
za
rd S
our
01cu01R)00
(J• ft
o4->
01C LIo J;w J2
- n) o, cug C 01 o
1/1 || >•
• §*•* 0 -j?w C o \\ £
X!01 ooi
3 f l g ! 2
2°1'S
• s s f r SJls's•? o x> *?I-" u Ou £ •«> oO ") -u CUD
C 01 qT3 E 3 -3S o - S - gS c S 3,i< J3 O OO <J U H
co01encuIHa
eft 01 CL«c u ^ 3u O 01
-te
mp
era
ture
sour
pp
ara
tus
Ga
sje
ts,
com
bust
Fu
rna
ce
sF
ire
sensin
g a
nd
module
• § , < • • •X \
'-
01cIH3
J3
en
3O
• — (_<
"2 rt™ oO .H
•55 gp>, CU£. XftU
"
COcut-t3
73couotla00c3 01•a ^C nini cuX ^>* ~jj CO»— 1 1— 1
2--rrt ak CO
COCU rn01 uCO (J
J5 c
ate
ria
ls
Liq
uid
me
tals
, g]
Va
po
rize
d su
bsta
2 . .
^
CJ r t CO"" 4J C
. - "> CU to .01 . 3C ' « oi- •*>
J* to «>"S. * « CU
I 5s" s-"•H D- 1—* «j tn( / )•—< ^, -W
- en S 0 Id 3C! W (D -H £X 4J 0O 4) m 0) — ' f—| f_(
""S S 3> J2 2" ^ rf S .2C ^^ nt ^H TJ ^ >r^ ^
g o -q e rs i | «
•«H O "~1
h U \\\ \ £ >.\\
•
cu cu
33 °Q. a, § x ^ '
C 3 3 -IJ ,2 "* 'w h ^ rt S x
> - cu o u ^
I si ;> =*i 01 L, • 3 jj "-"™ co 3 j^ o °.,, cu **H ni *4H nj 4_>¥ M . (H CU CU C
o &^ S *j h ^C O C 'i [ "^
^i O 3 ^ 00 ni ^^O ^ , Q C C j-irt
•0 C g M g "x %.-°cu n) O n) C -JJ > 0» H U U g 2 - « M
u \\\ o > A S
tnCO QJ0> ao
S g > Sco C .S ^
n) 3 rt g
« cu . ^ -H'g T) 01 -j 'Jjcu o
h C T3> .H O n) o
T3 H M 00 £
13 »5 .S 6
S Otjf f i rt
o \\\(VJ
j '3TC ^ 3 co F^ S
« c 2 -^i«c ^16 "o "n oT cf--13 C a "C ^ .2!u C rrt 34-» O I ,Q *~*W 'g^ — '
^«o "3.2^3 IjJ O *4J
S a« » .2C O . >~73
<J S "^ J3 rtni .H O 01 u, JTr^ 01 o in 3 w CM
." <d <u o •;?U< CQ Q »4 £ \^^^
• grtcu
cu01n!
cu g 2
3 '3 3 cuS s-i *X
014-1
CU
'C ^
tlcu cu
01 01 01
^ J J01 •— 1 »-im
ro
186
ICO
COcu
rt f^h +J0) 0)
S su
IsCO Tj3 n
^ i(J 'OJH d)rj 4J
w ^5
»H InJ In) ^
E Sc <"§ S
roro
(Ui — i,n(T)
H
(0
^
Po
ten
tial
Ha
za
rdo
us
Re
s
0•r-l4->
'OC
55l^S2 «.3 *0 4->
V>W
cu<JH3O
COT3HcdSIcdX0
tord«
encuen • — •
» E
xp
losi
on
» F
ire
> C
on
tam
ina
tio
n
/ A
tmo
sp
he
re (
tox
ic g
a
» In
jury
/ P
hy
sical
(bu
rns,
e
tc.
/ C
he
mic
al
Co >•*no alH J3
** 0^ 0°0 H
T3 "JCU °
_2 co cu H
-° M 'S "
sa| '-sD <U " O
n] •*-* >— < HHcu «J
U)MCU.0gcd
01
Hnia
CO
^
•o cc «J Is° c S4J H COu cd (X
> In
jury
/ P
hy
sical
i B
asi
c su
bsy
ste
m
ma
lfu
n>
Ina
dv
ert
en
t a
ctu
ati
on
of
de
vic
es
(e
.g.
, so
lid
p
roig
nit
ers
)
•£•00C
"
CO
•iM 1 — 1' — ' CU •*-*^ VH 4J QJ«J „ . ,-.4j cu I>* r«w > « ^
•S « g "3 12 S X r?,^
^2 ^
cuC00rt
g00co3
T)
0OHCUex3
CO
in
cug 00 "O ! ^<L> H u 0l - c ( 3 g o•" u c -1X P H
» M
od
ule
de
co
mp
ressio
n (e
t L
oss
of
mo
du
le E
C/L
S»
Inab
ilit
y t
o clo
se O
rbit
er
bay d
oo
rs
/ O
ute
r a
irlo
ck d
oo
r ja
;o
pen
/ P
rotu
be
ran
ce
fro
m a
i
u3.71'3c
.""*-
0 3"
"° 00 Uoo C rtc^ f3 t)rt h
«J C 0^ CD 4-.
a <2 '3O £ h
engCO r^
'r^ <U
rt >••S-3.en <u JJ*
o CO 4-. »
I— 1 (^ 4-»
.*" CU C
• rl O tX •"'c O cu "Jc u O O I Io
CO \\\
*
G-=fc^
i S
ee
"Scie
nti
fic
Air
loc
ks'
^
ccu|
_o"acu
T3
Q
_oH
<i
COCU
4->«rtr-t
V
n). CO
3CO
."-'
i C
oll
isio
n
^
cu,
3an)ocuUCcdC<u4JC'3gHO00c!SuoQ
4!00H<fl4-1
4->
imen
HCUaXH
^
» S
ee
"B
att
eri
es"
(#1
9)
t E
xp
losi
on
» F
ire
» C
on
tam
inati
on
» -I
nju
ry
00
.Oj ^
M|
Je «U ^
« 25 • ' •a *s •§ -S-cu iJ co
C rt rt
'32 \\
oen
T— 1
cdO 0) H
J2 « o —
s- Is'Sra : i 0, H
. C O ' [ J O OC J[\ cu cu
^o , N2 7^ o> O <u jj ** u <d
cd cq o
0 Q
187
CO
CO<a
ool oo
llI—I >C
•02.rt OT
. O
o ^
10
t—*3-COtu«
[P
ote
nti
al
Ha
za
rdo
us
co• H
Ca
usa
tiv
et/
Facto
r/C
on
di
OJ
W
tuu
o
73nrtNrt£o
• l-l01rt«
Co 'j•£ co C _r* <1> ^
1 i w ° «i2 <U X <u J W 00rt 00 4) oo "^ S 5E c c g <-> w-nc 5 ~ g W • c £C ™ a) O ^4) 'U C -rl <U (_> <U
•*-> 4 _ > o ^ c o
1 1 [ 1 1 Is! - tlrt m o -p o
O
rt
? CU 4JH j » ^
. I l|
" ^8I So
S -1 1 i 1^ !0 (U 7) ^
•S S SB; ^> "" '
S o • • S0 >J \ O
j_,-.Hrt
*i uSOJ ^c tu.s- £ a^ K-S3 M *J V *''""'CT ^^ C C oJ 00
4J 1) Kl O
4-> *• * "O
BJ \ ^\
oo
• T
rap
ped c
rew
ma
n•
In
jury
/ E
ye
dam
ag
e
o• r-4
••'SM "0o ' "1 '
T~l *~^ 1Jrt t— iD tl <*H
^5 .rt 1)O +? h
•S . 00 c
3 C "'.7! 'o rt ^__
| Ifl•i-> ^ en O g
. •
U
(U
«10tu •-;
& §o ^<n a,
^ OQj
H ^^
^
o00
rto^CU
4_»
• In
ab
ilit
y t
o c
lose
Orb
:b
ay d
oo
rs
oin
to r
etr
ac
t;
part
ial
ex
ten
:2 ? -3 M
.7! Crt rtt,x
•a<a>-,<aS
• S
ee
"E
lectr
icall
y- P
o'
Eq
uip
me
nt"
(#
20
)
oT3cuurt4-i ' .
rt toto T3
C " " '
* -C _clCU CO 00: BO
r ° ^ • • •<u
u> m
rt .CC(U
C ' r?<I M 5 r*5
^ S c > .01 p, ° W -
o « « iu•" ^3 (U <J E
r1 -a *2 H o&. c 5 w»1 « " C CU rt
C w rt .
1 w 2 . • .o
CQ ^^ ^
o
u03
o rt
co-uf!CD
s «n 8
CO CU
(NJ
ro
(U
188
to<u
tf
Ucti ^*
5 "S"r< <U
S W
0), O
fl rH
O S
U N
(1) HH
w 5TJ frj
3 iS »ffi "S
<~ 5o arTU
6 Sd eto a,
I
(1)
CO
"301
KCO30
T3rH
n!Nrt£I-H
Cti
•iH
•M
ccu40
oOH
C040
•rH
Ccu 0
•rH^\
Ca
usa
tn
t/F
acto
r,
cu
W
cuu
30
W
-orH
tdNriEoCOn)«
Cn)
•J 2
o U
OH M
ni corH O
H r-H
« »
T)CU
cu ^
8 3SO m 3
•£ •"-> m
rH O g
c a c•rH CU to <U
£ | <^
T) rH • •
' r— 1 ^
000rH
U
rH
CU40
IDHOCOof—t0
0•"-> CO
^0••* o• H T3
« £C niM rO
* .
T)I CU
,g
•g
'•r-l
^O: o
cu40
irlo
ck,
ou
i
rt cu
rS 0
^
CO
. Co
"rtW
~
"cu"CO(8O ^
C ^S -?£ CDX Q
O g•rH rH
CO g
10 (J
11g >>
O rH
0 3
(U •->
QrS
» *
CU
OtjoCO
g33
rolle
d v
ac
Coo
. cp
CUCU >O -H
3 S)O jj ^W C cu
2 >-c2 o-S -"-SCU krH CU CU
• & * sO 3
CU rH 01
> CO•rH H (1J
1,-ss.cuE \
(XI
T)G T^T
"cu" "i pj
_>- O —^— 0 " -
« H^ *Srt o - Jj
S JH m rdw c ^3 .« O
^ - .2 rH CU .rH
'"I: / -1 40 Oj 40 r;
- * x m " t! Seg - ." W S '? ,5 SoO .rH. CO VH 'g C P O
• _ 2 r 2 r T £ C O d j H ^ ^ O ^
"o x -^ o £ o •£ fi .*"* ^ >S
• •• ••• c/5 =
pH -
cu•rH
6 |0 0,v r-. C
r-H ° ,3
"5 13 rt O
g 8 S'So J. ga40 O CU 1)
• b | ^w£ O 2 c/>
pl*J ^^^ r« p -
•rH
P
00
G
2? ">3 " CU S
C ^ 3 ^ SfO Q 3 -rH
^ U to ,C CU
| . _§< r-1 O Mrt
0 p~ rt^ 2 w • • • •CO *~J
«; -S \CO
40UnjOH
g to
. 15 u1 1 ;| S
r "H, 3 P< CO
0 X ••? OU W r-H ^ r-H
• • • •
(U
•rH
6 |0 tj
CU ^
lip . -"2 ,v ig-C O M 'O
oj o "3 "^
g>2 S « •4^ rH „)
S rt .3j« a -2n co C
^ rH g
« y^ ^ i"
Is: s.llll|^ -^ <-—s.
2 -£ , ^~^~ - JJOd '
i-H -— '
189
CO
CO0)
d ®•S ^
. oC ^o =J
| "2<d «jU N
<tf
(U "U TJ
n) I
ffi "SHH^0 C
>- °Cort —5 a6 2s 6co a
•iH
S; o1
^ WCO
cu
014J
g '
<Derf •
Po
ten
tial
Haz
ard
ou
s
c0
V*'S
"*3112 °rt rt
U ( X 4*" ^
.*-*
a)>
W
4) .0Vi30
COTl
^_J
msiniE
Bas
ici
i --• <->C tn tu•5 i £ w
% ^J - r 0^•
Fir
e•
Co
nta
min
ati
on
/ C
hem
ical
(ele
ctr
op
rop
ell
an
ts)
See
als
o "B
att
eri
es"
(#
1C
ryo
gen
ic F
luid
s" (
#2
3)
Cry
og
en
ic G
ase
s" (
#2
4);
Pla
tfo
rms/
An
ten
na
s"
(#P
ow
ere
d E
qu
ip.
# (#
20
)
IT*o"j""".~
oto O^ tu — -
1 S3I Soc cq Wou
1 — 1
_
c^ SII I ._ Q p^
~?s'3° ..-1 iS"
•
Co
llis
ion
• E
xp
losi
on
•
Fir
e
See
als
o
"B
att
eri
es"
(#
1C
ryo
ge
nic
Ga
se
s"
(#2
4)
Pla
tfo
rms/
An
ten
na
s" (
#"E
lectr
icall
y-
Po
we
red
:(#
20
)<U4->
J3 »— *
0 > ob •" h> '-^Oh ?! °4 _ i O r 1
IH :>100 § 3"™ g
^ s° V ° S co .S "2 vj ^ gc" 4^ OW Sh ° d >N
m ° •• -S>U !"j
4! cu
" 6 2m 5 cU 4_> ^, ^
rt 3 M isa d m S
IH T>" 2 ,2 2 »
2 c 5 c ^ 01 c J? '£
(U
in
•
Ex
plo
sio
n•
Fir
e•
Inju
ry
D00ni
« 2 „
•^ 4.^" ^^
g- S C "a! '^ «K W P . 2 S C.O
>r< rt f rrt 3
*J "c "a'i! « 2 co~1 rt <u o1 KQ< • • •rt
CO ^\\
Mflju »
.rt W> o0) -*->Q 2 .2
C <U
-i i-i or~i i" ii V^
n o 13 'OH l-i 3 .5
!2 i CO CO"o
vD
00C rt.2 S
_ tl rt"5" c ^.2 § c4J ^1 O
• Il
lness
(r
ad
iati
on
)•
Co
nta
min
atio
n
(ra
dia
/ S
urf
ac
e/
Atm
osp
he
re
• B
asi
c su
bsy
ste
m m
a
/ E
qu
ipm
en
t ra
dia
ti
o<u_
to (j
^ • t>'aM c -c "
s 5 1?^So ^ i 2™ <u 7 v "O ^ u u 3
S"s « s s s.fll tD Q -^ — ' III^!;, m ii o o ™a, o co to U> X. 3
.O W-d \\^
01 CU(U C tnO -r« (Uh ^ a1 If ,mrt ^* O tO *•*
-2 rt •" o ^rt i rt t~* rt^ x « « j«^-^r-
190
CO+J
-3COcu
0) CU
3 1S™
0)
Oco-a
n! co
6 «=t gto a,•i-H
rO
tt)
to .
"3totu
to
o
msiniE
Po
ten
tia
l
Co
•i-tT)
0cu U
Ca
usa
tiv
/Fa
cto
r/
en•4->C0)
w
CUo
3. O
in
Ha
za
rd
u•fH
COn)W
g £.2 «>£ £n) tuo.C 0 to
•£ rt O>J "S £, OJ 3 4->
£ 3 d W<.* -p ofa.Su \\
tuoJ-l
3OCO
C0
•4-1
S.2C0
o - a sco cu
>~ . 0£ ra °g.S a* £ g0 ^ , 5^ ,C -Hp fj [T)
toctfu
c
c ££ X
e °&,.rH ^H3 0a* cow ST3 SoC 30ni nj tc
> f1-
2 S^^cu ."^ £ £g fa h fartU ^ . ^
oo~"
COC
3^3
„ IUJ g >n•g .2 £
/H 2 ,— , ft tu ex
'» "^ .^ S "S g
" "a, 3 ^ c ^ <
t:tU>
tu>4->
CO "i .
•3 <u
st0) -rt
IsCO Jn "pj-> j-> HlH O COO <U _O
Lc S O
COcu
•rH
rt«
o
"
0
0c
1 «C 00
1 1CO T3
_Q D^ m 3 -rt
(J C CO l"IH
r* 3 U faCU *~" 7Z r(*\ "* nsJ; 3 w w to «
>- .'« -o2a> tu .rt
H c 2
5^ siO fe co ^
w > C^ OJ O-4-j 1 FH )HJH J2 X [L CliO 00 00^ -1-1 -rH
"c-g g ' "
t, Q-, «i
OJ "~* ^-. 3 0)
OM - « 2dn ^ .2* o ^
^,5 ra ra 'S rt 5^~* (^ ^"* 'tO ^ r^ ^ C
n C t i u r t o - ^ m
C co C * j < l > C'£••-< J1,-, i n O O n i . )^ > J ] > 3 > 3 X O l H 4 i .
o p. M ( X H f a O , < H W
.o(NJ
! CO
1
« 5fvg /O ni wCO . CU
• i-l T3
tu ^2C .. - n co co u
l-Li1!!*.C co u -jj ™ ^ 'So c
•p! O n) g *3 - o cuS £•£ S « g -ssrt I! 3 43 j™ -rt ." O
O -
^ •"2 CC . : ^S
"tJ OO
8 '3 m IB
<« "" w S° §• tJ S -| ..SS S c "1 rt « •qj _| t Q . j At
1) ••' ''M QJ f g|jQ \
So «£ | <C« g<ro (u .H
CO-4_> 01U QJ CD0) T3 0) "u) -H t, a; . .£ » 5 "
f— » to <_)
g CO *§ ** O C • U
< ^ 2 " - "o ^" - 13 g to a, a, T3
^ C CO •+•* (H
L i i|i ii'iiO ni
•t-t - — ' ^-^CQ |li -V^v. >O>>%>^ U
O
gtM i
191
CO
CO(U
« cu
5
rt mcu
- o
U Nd
CD ^H
U r^J
% CU3 4JO rd
C^ """cuT) pj
S is »ffi fl•" 5O d
s «3 S
CO ft
ro(U
CO4-»-
mcu«CO
O
nisiniEi — in)
.1H4->Ccu4JOa
Cau
sati
ve
Ev
en
t/ F
acto
r / C
on
dit
ion
cuu3O
C/DT3
nltQ .ri
' ffio
'ton)cq
CUCOcdcuCO
"O
^ " "S 'rt rt
^* .M ,£ .H ^ •*->
5 PQU PQ w W••—»c
.
edin
g o
pera
tio
ns
dio
iso
top
e ex
peri
men
ts
CU nik «
Ocu•
to+j
to «C fl
.rH tO
4_> O 10
C T3 S^ ° s •-~ rt O,'S
^ C **"* rOC cu JJ n!
•fi 43 ,™ cuC O ^ Q0o ^
i — iPJ
toT3
3X-C
CU
^• H4JUn)cu^ cu
0 £*3 .C
- n) cu a,g C u to•2 'c 42 2<n . n 7J Po ^ RI 3 +*'a, w 3 c w *<<x .S -r> oW h ,5 U - ...
nk o
ve
rpre
ssu
re,
rup
ture
Ven
t m
alf
un
cti
on
, etc
.
ills
, le
ak
s
Lin
e b
rea
ks,
etc
.
ni (^H — . W \
tno'c1) GJ CJ f\J (\J
^0 tx K ol£ d t—3 1—3 t-3
u -.- — .^
fM00
to toT) • O•H _ u to
Ci " ' BO
tu cu - u^10 ^ - r H
j . 'y to (-.O Jl Cti 4-*^ ..-I $ *~ ' CU r^
~- ^ t« C JIto ^-, -^ _O cu ^, ^ic U ' " " 1 n i f j + j 4 3 n i n jC ™ u .;; ni a cu u -r"
C r ~ t O . ^ l f ^ n j H t O O ' ^ "
•I - U § -2 | c -2 c! "5O ^ X ^ d - r ^ n J j j ^ X n J' c L S d C U U C P ^ < w U C PK.S*^' 0
W NjC -^^^ ( ) -^-^ ^ -^
rt <y
l|*O TD to c
•0 « S °C en tn 4> *H
ni n) to T3 "j tu ra-^J. C 3 cu1 3 3
§ S S S «l 1+1 _ 0 h 3 OU ~ h 4J »* Om 3 cp (u c
» ^ 0 £ *J ^" (u w d) O
1^ g | 3 1 1 £cc "-" c coi-iU 0rt O n) C*-^*_*
4-»
CO u
4J CUC to
_rt Cra "a!
T3 p^ to ^H
'3 O 73 2 J2
[n &,^ -rf *J 3
u eu 60 rt -o E'c x c w o cuM o g •£ a oo * ^H cu /nr^. ^ j? ""* 4-* tj
fit *Z, °^K c •" ^ to^ f ^ I l C o o S ^ ^ ' ^' ^ ^ ^ w f e ^ » 2o
CO(M
CO4)tort00
cu^
O ,'ni
-4)In cu
~^ C hO CU
a - ftO (3 »
•fH C 205 . C H
_O ^rt *» ' ."p. J! 3 'S "*•x .2 ••? oW fa M O ~~.
o? 1 '
nk r
up
ture
Ov
erp
ress
ure
(in
ad
eq
uate
malf
un
cti
on
ing v
en
t sy
stei
ak
s
Lin
e b
reak
s,
etc
.
lease
to o
r v
enti
ng t
o m
od
:eri
or
n) eu v a
.
to. cu
tonjOu'a ' 'eu fl.M JJ
2. c S^ ° 5 '
'^ oo ro <u ^ w.H O X " ^ ^
O
•*'CM
192
05
w<u
oo
35
RO
«(1)o
niaU«3O
llcp
O f l
fll ~-
S ^S 23 Sw a.
CD•4-1
"3CO
01
oTD
Pote
ntial
Ha
za
r
ao• l-tTDa
„, o£u•i-i ->•M Li
Ca
usa
.t/F
acto
:
q<U>
W
<U
0in•on)SIrtffiu
•H01
nim
d0
CO
"3ggoIH
^* iti
Inju
ry
(ch
em
ica
lC
onta
min
ation
/ S
urf
ace
/ A
tmo
sp
he
reo
utg
assin
g)
• •
00
.Ho
"3.
60 .
«^5 fH ^0
•""* .H £*
"§ rt 'h
ffi S OT
to u ^g -^ s.2 CO -H
(0 (t ^
2 n ^rjc
W -.—
inCNJ
f— 1 +•>rt fi<J r< <U
ll . !!U .2 IH 0) CT
TS "S aw(Tj 3
•r-l 0
,5.0 ^
O •
do
• H
rtC
1ni 01(H <U
° +* —io -i-i T;U > Jj 'o '•" ocu £ &•0 « M 00 6J>-<c d .S d d "°g « .d S 'g <u" CH ^ "^ (ti "^fn .H S C3 oO h O nJ .— i ™^ j£ H X O ?
(X cu ^•^^-~-.
(U0
O a;
O <u 01
"*rt O2 &0 n) 5f>•2 _« n .Sg d TD 5rt rt d ™
a ^ r t 7 jO 0 01 "
> 'Q. O_" .rt p 01
0 < CO W<ua
v£3CN]
193
ICO
o• r-l
4->
O
f-t0}
^-<
tJ f>
-CO
fl —
to
O
" sjj toO ffi
-G nJ5 ^S S.r-j &,
roI
CO
CO4J
COCU
Oj
CO30
T>l-int
Po
ten
tial
Haz;
C0
• TH4-1
TJc<u o> u•H/? (SO k
40
<u>W
Basi
c H
azard
So
urc
eCOa3
XI
ctT4> CUCO +J .-
4) ^to . e
•H CO 5
3 - > P
1 r -«.| J J ^ - S f l EW rj n) 0 M. 4-. x! cd (j o h_, C ™. o .,H o rd eg a u ." .S M*•• *"** *^ T< . g((j i— i j^ (j to >r4 bo
1 - U'7 i°° 's -2 § s °-2 "S0 > - j 3 ^ X . 2 ' r t rt 3 « X . 2 " r t g-•o.j 'S o< -« o CQ o; -s w « ; o c q c r ; S*x .S •? § 2
(ij [n ,5 ^ — ^^-^ 0 — -•»• — H
COto cu to C4)' O C °
--~ 0 ^ O 4J
•** ' In 3 4^ O 0 aH • nj S C ""rt 'O
L j C Q U ™ O U) LJ £3 «rH i-H
O •, to " ^* o vj **•* JH•. "^ t o o J c C ^ t* oJ
'U (u QJ C QJ CJ KA • QJ T? ^ ff. (U
^ S C O 1 ^ ^ 0 a S * 2 ' ^ S < i > - 2 V " M ^ M
S < U W ^ ^ t i f l S m ^ E ^ 1 ^ ' S ^ ^(J { t i ^ O f d « - * u ' Q j Q^ f^ (ij _i
2 B o . J fcu "2 g-g JJ «2« • •<u o o o ^ cr^
CO01 (A
•iH *^
•H o " g • a« 2 o S g< 5 2 n
H o SC 0 W * g ^J
* - « -S ^ o 11 sg -s S5|. S i.||| fill- ! j|ff |!
" t [ to> f X ^ H t D ^ H Q ) r t O•rn c/}Q •• O < { & H ^ Q . • • • ^ in
CO
rt ^ ^.^^ ^^PP -~ ^.^^ -, ~^^
-
Wr^
fc** LV
rt *•^ fi _r*
Frt ** ! C tn
la x ^ |
. c ""* X •— (S S< a wo ^ >t-J co W — ^^
? ra
4) c; nC « &<2 S
C ,2 M JJ ^ S
g-« g £ T* ^ S c.(U ,, [Q W) DO _• jy yij
Sill ££ 1 2 1a pq H w --.-. & &, o
.o
r\
A
Acti
vit
ies
Inst
all
or
rem
ov
e ex
teri
(eq
uip
men
t,
sam
ple
sO
pera
te A
MU
Op
era
te M
WP
Ere
ct
an
ten
nas,
b
oo
ms,
p>w ~- ^"~-"~"
CM
fll
•-H 8 S•-J ni w XI
« S.s g S-S.2 'S 6- | o rico . >, <u C g ^o >^ xl xl rt £ 3a£3 <^u -g <w
.. . .
. co'rto
h CD 4) ni -ah a -te c 4, 454> n) J M.2
<u ^ h co ** ii 'g tj " g > bQ .. n* O. i
5 s Sa '{J.-S-S)(Xw > W f f i K
CO<u
• H4_1
inte
nan
ce
and
Rep
air
Act
i
Re
ch
arg
e b
att
eri
es
Re
ch
arg
e g
as
bo
ttle
sR
ep
lace
co
mp
on
en
tsC
lean
se
nso
rs
Co
2 -------
CO
194
(O(a
ao•1-1•MO ^
n) oCO t-id Sn) OU W
T)
3o
mO
oslI
C "JS ^c <ud ^
co O
rororo0)
,—1
•3H
CO
1— <•
tomrt
Po
ten
tial
Ha
za
rdo
us
Cau
sati
ve
Ev
en
t/ F
acto
r /
Co
nd
itio
n
4>U
3c8•ort
n)ffiu
>HCO0)«
-
V V*
» T
rap
ped
cre
wm
an
/ In
Orb
iter
air
locl
/ In
mo
du
le
air
locl
/ In
mo
du
le
• S
tran
ded i
n E
VA
bit
er
air
lock
m
alf
un
cti
on
•du
le a
irlo
ck
malf
un
cti
on
L4 V
. 02
4) t-t• i— i 4)
2 -4->
o?n o <3l-c M t>cu cu yC- C ^
(0 "> V Oa _ »n
*cj Jii 3 3•H -i T3 T3"5 •£ ° °< o 6 6co *;•£•£™ 'x 'x 'xJJ H W W00
W -»-^~-.
^
o00
rtuh
A)4-1•l-l43
i In
ab
ilit
y t
o c
lose
Or
bay
do
ors
ich
an
ism
m
alf
un
cti
on
Part
ial
ex
ten
sio
n o
nly
Wil
l n
ot
full
y re
tra
ct
otu
bera
nces
on m
od
ule
Wil
l n
ot
retr
ac
t
<y ti2, ---£-.
"aT-3T3
M-l
ao
n)
(U
-^ sO 4^ "
• rH .^
U -inCU "^
W <
in
to ..1-1
» V
eh
icle
st
ran
ded
/ R
AM
/ A
uto
mate
d sa
tell
/ E
tc.
ich
an
ism
malf
un
cti
on
Do
ckin
g
att
em
pt
• D
oes
no
t att
ach
S ^.
COcu
•|H4^
.rt4JU
<
00
1u0
"2c
^00c'juo .a
-
oDO
n)o
m"H "
•° 5O <u v -7!
<U -0 ti W> ^
S ' a -8- S S 1"o ' ° S 7, ni c
•Jj ™ jj T3 T3 .
^ •>. ' S . J l s ' c S ^ ^ 3 O < !a rt X ." -g» O eu £
rH >- • c^ 'co
_ o -rj .
s" ^-slrt R) ^ g 2S ° 'o S P-
rt « ri •* Jj o
C C u C co O "Q•r! co h o cu f-i 7r-" (U • «r-l ' t) Q. j.
1 Si 3 «^oC 0t) • 0 -^^-.
^ •
195
o-iH+->ortit-l0)
fV)
O 03'+.> <u(D Oen i-,3 3nJ OU w
T3CD HO ™
S 3O ffi
W T Jt) 0)M t{
O CD
5-2co -t->
C5
CO
ion
•s
as4-1I— 1
CO<u
to
OTJ
niN
ffii— in)
• 1-14->
<U4-»Oa
co4-1
TJc(U O>uri^S o
Caui
Event/ F
act
QJoIH
OU3
T3
n)SIni
ffiUMn)«
C ^£ ni n) '&>
c g .irasO .5 C <U O
•H r< »H 4-> .1-1to fi <U o T3O ^* nJ *c - nj n)"ft. u 3 ^ O CQ rtX .* -r> 0
W k £ 0 ~-~--^
d • ,_,•r* Q)4-1 _iO -C
§ 0 M <uI-H 4^ • .H rjrt <J to -S ^2 § c « o
r-i H | *^ Pi
^ 5 S c a1"
1 §| s8 i>ils«||i" O M i>\ *^ ^ ^g- O H « g £ «h "§ to
• • •
13O
2"oco
•(-*
^_tt— (
JSCO
an
'D
§o
a
r-
r-H
C! ^
° ^^ H^ ^H f—H «HiJ ni n) GO
g g .a -a 5w £ <u tJ 'SO , rt X ol nJU £ a c UPQrtx '? °
5o ^-H <n•*-» (-1O ^
§ § g>r*M «r^ K __J
S 3 C S?" i— \ 1-t ^H *^ £
^ w «* "S . *i ^.o a* 6 § go1 § 2 c t; «C .1-1 P^ £ VH " ^
h "2 toQ ---^ wW — -^
• o •
*"rt
T3O
2^H
O
It>Og(U
PHT)
§O
O
00
196
<u+->nJ-i(U
(U
HT)fin)too.
O
«l SH-l <U
ro
•8
a.3O
O
• Uc«00IH
- v
W
•ofa
n)Kt
X
no
I
D
£?
0 o
li •
11 •c ifM *O o
H
IO X
— ri -O cO ^ -
u .c""'
.o u
'* 5• s sO 01
a-
Oin
aEc0
'in
O.
U
U
£
w
00
to
<U
' 1
Q
XM
•
aantO
•o
£
•c
Ea'a
00cnjO»
*
V00
£aEm
CQ
ft)
ft)
a
-o
V
CQnt
in t
ele
sco
pe)
Cu
ts
•
rJX
f\)
£J
w
003
»4
4)
_^_
~
U O
•g ^•9, M.- c
V 0)
mb
ust
ors
0Q
tn
1o
B
*rt
a
£
•
CMO
0)
"
cmc
O Xao.
c. O
• a.Dcr
CJ
O05
o
oV
erp
ress
ui
wars
00
I-p
c
<•
^
U
E
tS^'
Q
1c
c3
jy
03
Co
a
cua
-uc
00£
i|;- s
n- B 13
2 0 4) S o Jl« 3 u T3 « « . 2
l_ n «l ;• (B t" cp ^ ' 3 3 ° E
3CQ ^ ^-^. ^ ^
• •
ca • e^ 0 ^
« ? « « S E2 < x I a s
"w
S 23— 2
1 5 S a '^ iwt H < 2 K
Eio .5'
o 5 > 5 .2
! J? ^ 1"
'h '^ M O £ -*
(3 w nt -JJ 4) o -2
o «o g 5 5^
SO .
—r1 N oj
; ^ i o« . • .
'^ tJ S j 9. o v n)
(04)
M ^S 3
- **
2 1 1ai •* d2 " „ 6 .2
1 | « -s |J tt J °* m
o
Ele
ctr
ica
l S
ho
ck
RF
-Fie
ld E
xp
osu
r
• •*
DO
||
tL O
•
T)4) m
E 3.2 «IJS
NaH
4.M
eth
an
e
D)V
5 Ec v5. 6a p
PL <nV
T3' US oo ^w 0<
T3
"«
Ji•
n)
*-* o
B ^JU ,
n V
G -"r
z- _"u g
T)<11
1
!,iiCJ Id
ss
n
Rad
iati
on F
ield
Ex
po
sure
/ L
ase
rs/
X-R
ay M
achi
ne/
Rad
iois
otop
es/
RT
Gs
•
9
N M oi 2 •C •£ <L> C ^
1 s - s^s• •
*t ^ — 'C 'i* u
"3 ^6a > *S. "So
s| 11"o "* s .2"w DJ
* *
toV
(rt
O
-o3
^^ P«J P>J
U. E O
| ^Sl
ojnos pai«I3
c
E • s "3 I .. S tJ « 1 -2M 3 ' ' ( d t . S Ma x. to .n . i. w ." G ,
^ « J g - o - " "w g>| u | o " fo S-^ 0|
'^ "22 'S *" 'Z S c 5 " " S S i ?v "oo o _. ?, « - - ^ ? , f f l >o 2.«o S •; g s u j w j j w(8 C O O C X Xn S -^^ j H u u -^-~.~. w -—
. . . . . .
so" -o e
* a ~, 2 «0.0 S J B u >• 3 o5 ** *O ^ * ' f r l t " " — "* ^K
J- .s J" o »•§' ?s | ^ | ^gl Sp^ i; ^^ . CQtl C Q C Q tJ ---.---. 05 O W
. >
U333
cort
S.0 „ .2
v oo ft) S
S •£ •= SJ3 00 4) "M
I §' I | 1 S . •
a
dio
log
ical
nt
*
197
h'|H
0)
HT)
CO CJ
O
•Ug
t\]
a f )n
-^ o•rt CO
trj «ffi 2i. . C
sa
ro
ro
niH
ma30
O
0cM)
I
t-,a• nffi
coa
13 °^ *-^ ^
• ^l3
«
OS
C
3
«<K>
o"
*s"* t*S<*ac
E
tn c
>-2to '
• s sW 3
0*.— ntM 5rt •*
03
Pe
rso
nn
el
Erro
rs
—rtC
d a>2 Krt W•o •-;rt 2
. « £u^
in
'rtU,
.nic
al/
Str
uctu
ra
in.C
w
jy t,
« ? ' o E ' S = ' p 2*" 0 — * ' ' ? * ' £ . ^m O ^ - ^ S o C f i
" d ' ^ - ^ ^ s i S ' E ^ u «c rt ." (X « o c Q 2 ^ ° "-• "^
'ill )l li 1 Hi 1 H f H. c u ( x * o - - - - - - . ^ ^ , [ d - ^ . ^ t / 5 - ^ ^
nCO*3
2 «
* 1 1 &< H 5 2
5
•S J!
^ * u * 2 - 2 ' n ' f l * ^ o u c u " '- ' C U u > , w p x • = x o j a . ya u ^ . u ^ H Q £ o u ° ' w ° c
^ S f l j ^ O w ^ < H w < Q " 3 Q o * Q £« ^, U • U 2 t-> oH . ~ ~ ~ - ~ ^ m . 1 ^
• * * * * *
gft 5 *c ° '3
j^ ^, rt ^ fto c w v
-8 •§ "E l ' • "= - ' 5 S K
S p ^ 2 S . » S £ ^ M § " §| | i- u 1| S || 1 ? S | = £ I g | |
CoaT3 w
^ c c -E ^ S oS S a sW *5 4J .,1
CQ •£ o -0
S « .2 3 «
rt « rt H kJ X tt 05 0! '
u> tn
I 1'£ -^ 0) 4)
•g ^ u » < 1 c
" u c . . c ~ ~ " E 2• S l g S « ? £ " < „ . 5- g S. « 5 'S s < " g ? « •£^ 1 1 i1 "i . 2 '. •. | 's1 S | ^ s • j-o « > - W ^ c S i 0 0 < l J a > ? r ^ f l ) 2 - c Q i ! * i - - f f l. ^ t D O a f l ^ ' i ; Q i " C X r ; ^ C I . « - O . . - . I ~ I ^ - 5 C . ^
^ o " o . ™ c a 2 " > ° " ~ w D " a ' ^ " ( j ' M ' ^ o ' ° 2 c
S p O r t U i x ^ S c S - J ^ ^ O J i ' S C - S o S ^ " o
W — • — • 05 - - . • • — . H ••-. • - - . ' • - - CQ 2 ~ - ~ H ^ - - " ~ - - ^ " ~ ~ - — .W5
• • * . • • • • •
••»•»* P.*.»«
C • (oV U
E . • S -ou i C
^ U> | B » 0^ f t d m < - o « - ^
§ s 1 I ! 1 II a« a G I I J l| ,st n o h ^ . ^ U c ^ ^ t or t CLO * * • - M
| - | F ^ C «0 | S ;' < ? •§> - .2:5. 3 « S < « gi '85
oo > o ^ u ^ o• ^ - . U U O ' O K t K
• • • • ' ' •
00>- ' c« " 1, •?
<a £ u oo .S S E 'M B 0 I _s s • s- «i0 S S ?1S 2 a ^ 3jI -f 1 -s -21 'o -S 2 g .S3
o ^^ 0 - 0 ^
• •
198
.acj
(Umn)
<U• rH
&
O
rS rN rN rS
ofl
tio
n)oOJ
X
coX
u• Hf — IaOH
PiO
0)rrHi—I
oJOH
x <UCOn)
CO
uPi
0)
a
CO
0)«-H,0at
PIo
t>PIoU~P!O
•HCO
<uM
5
2,Sd>«i** d
oS
. a -s §0 . 0 -^
uPI
_rt
0)
od
ule
du
rin
gN
o cre
w
• • • • •
199
CUCOrt
&•MaoCO
^£
•4->• 1-1i—<• iH43rtU
-Hi — 1PU/•N
P-t
C0
•1-1
"rt
•iHCO
oV
£f
s
co
CO
<U1— 143rt
flO
rtuo
isu
0)4->•H43JH
0
i-H
^ ,^N
C<
i— i
CO
•M
I— 1rt
PH
ao• ft4->•1-1T3
O
:uation/ C
1~•l->co
X XX X X X X
.'
X
X .
x - •
1
1 t-< •: O
2 ^: a sh O <J
• • 1 ^ 1 2 i »5 S | • S g « ^ -S ^
> 32 g 5 ^ < 5 1 1 1 2 ^' I'p ^ i 3 _ o 0 ^ ^ + ^ . ^ , H ^ o - f l o
iS 1 w 1 1 ° w .3 S1 S 2 i ^ « 1T3 r tm-^'g f-o C d7 3 O f i6 ^ •*• -^( U . t i O ^ C ( U r - H 'H - o +J O^J H c r jM 4 3 • 2 n 5 S l H 7 3 f H ^ < J r O H - ' ^ O.2, j2 w S £ (X 'rt -S 0) ^ ^ ^ ^ £ W ^
:Cr* flt-l^O ^ j » _ 4 rt 'Q 2 43 j l j t"1 nj 43 *S '>' ^ O C ! + j ^ J J 5 ^ 4 3 < D r t .
. . . . . . . • •
CO
rt
CX
fl(UCJCOrtW>C
•HHn
T3
n m
odule
•1-1
1»H
O
O£
200
0)CO
O
o•t
>^
(X
rto
(Uoo0)
£
r-co
<ur-H
XI
(ti
H
a0
• H
rdo
•a•rHO
•1-1
0
• H
t-t
0
srf.
w i
i— ii— i(X)ft
g~£i
Sit
uat
ion
/ C
ond
V b<" •*•rS rS rS
X X X
X X X
X
MoCD*12nt0)
a<p co
> Il
l/in
jure
d cre
w
> N
on
-hab
itab
le
/ L
oss
of
EC
/LS
, t
hu
mid
ity
ex
trem
e
/ C
on
tam
inat
ion
w w
X
X X X
X X
X X X
X
(1) §"5 S c
> E
ntr
ap
men
t of
cre
w
/ In
air
lock
or
mo
d
» S
tran
ded
in
EV
A
> O
r bit
er
un
able
to
re<
> M
etab
oli
c d
ep
riv
ati
o
X
X
X
-MrtCJ
> In
abil
ity
to
com
mu
ni
X
X
^ou
'«?M*J
> O
ut -o
f -c
on
tro
l
/ T
um
bli
ng
, u
nsa
fe
X
X
X
"Ha
» A
ban
do
nm
en
t (c
rew
i
X
» D
eb
ris
in v
icin
ity
X
> R
ad
iati
on
in v
icin
ity
201
a• HU
>
<aCOcd
?SFHO
(U
ao••-It!oo
x
o X
PHPH
co• |H4->n) ni x
ucubfl
cu6
COCO
Ico0)
nJH
Sit
uati
on
/ C
on
dit
ion
cu1-1
(U CO• ^ c o
d
a.„ -oS O
5 J
O <!0 $"-» 1
S
°nl,o<j
>>4->
43<uP
n)
COrtPH
ficu
od
ule
d
uri
ng
No
cre
w i
n
202
CO
bfi
enOft
rtu
•s•HU
0)
HO
X X X X
aoriu X
wX
o•£rd
0)I—Ii-Hn)
X
rt
UPI(U
0)
fiW
ro
CO
0)i-HXI(Ti
H
on
/ C
on
dit
ion
S
2
- s B2
1:1 s
.
S i"
itt)
W
!
2-
fi r
«
£
2
rth
Ba>M
§a3<u
i-H
dT>O
No
cre
w i
n
203
Table 5-1, H-l. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
| No. H-l
HAZARD SOURCE Hi -Temperature Sources
A number of high temperature sources are present in the form of gas jets, combuatora, xfurnaces, fire sensing and suppression module and resultant liquid metals and glassed inmanufacturing experiments. (See also H-2. H-20, H-22, H-23, and H -24 for related hazard xsources.)Experiment Groupa: P-4;MS-l ;T-4 |
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbiter
Combustor or jet burn-through, uncontrolled combustion, and inadvertent release of hot or toxic gases and liquids
HAZARDOUS RESULT | HAZARD /EMERGENCY GROUPS
Uncontrolled combustion can result in explosions. Fire- *•?)"**• e*Plo9ion'
Spillage of liquid metals, glasses, vaporized substances can also result in tire,injury, and contamination of surfaces and atmosphere.
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
subsystems.
2. Provide capability to purge high-temperature devices.
4. Provide guards to prevent access to operational high-temperature equipment.
5. Configure for ease of jettisoning.
6. -- Configure for remote deployment and remote operational control.
7. Configure high -temperature equipment in integral or self-contained units.
B. Locational Features
1. Locate high-temperature sources exterior to habitable Module compartments.
2. If interior to the Module, locate high-temperature devices in special areas with spill
3. Orient the spark -chamber, gas jets, combustors, etc. so that an inadvertent bleed orefflux will not be directed toward the Orbiter or cargo bay.
4. Locate equipment with hot surfaces away from other equipment in the same Module.
5. Locate high -temperature equipment to facilitate jettisoning.
C. Operational Techniques
» 1. Wear protective garments, gloves, face masks', etc. when performing furnace -relatedoperations.
2. Perform combustion and furnace related experiments in a free-flying Experiment Module,deployed at a safe distance from the Orbiter.
3. Remotely control high-temperature experiments.
4. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate if high -temperature devices exceed designpressure or temperature limits.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.1.1
5.1.2.1
5.1.8.2
5.1.8.4
5.1.9
5.1.10
5.1.12.5
5.2.1
5.2.2.5
5.2.3.3
5.2.4.8
5.2.6.1
5.3.1.1.2
5.3.1.2.1
5.3.1.3
5.3.4.1
205
Table 5-1, H-2. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
[NO. H-Z
HAZARD SOURCE Overboard Vents ' X
holding and rear infi accommodations necessitate venting various chambers overboard to providepressure or environmental control during the experiment(s). (See also H-l, H-21, and H-24 for Yrelated hazard sources.)
.Experiment .Groups: A-l. -5, -6; P-3, -4; T-2; MS-1; LS-2. -3, -4. -5 | X
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbiter
Closed or inoperative vents, cargo bay venting, and common vent sink locations are potential causative factors.
HAZARDOUS RESULT | HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Cryogenic tank overpressure/rupture releases cryo fluids, gases. Fire, explosion, injury,
Cage overpressure and rupture can release animals, insects, plants, pollen,
A common vent sink location can result in fire or explosion if the vent effluxes are reactive.
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A.- Design Features
1 C nf b d
a. avoid, common exit sources or adjacent exterior locations
b. prevent vent efflux from entering Orbiter cargo bay
c. prevent efflux. in vicinity of Orbiter or Module sensors
2. Incorporate accumulators to permit controlled venting during critical operational periods.
3. Incorporate automatic interlocks which prevent operation of equipment requiring an
B. Locational Features
1. Locate the terminals .of overboard vents such that vent efflux will not enter the Orbitercargo bay. * '
2. Locate the terminus of overboard vents to avoid adjacent locations where reactive venteffluxes could combine.
C. Operational Techniques
1 . Purge the Orbiter cargo bay in the event of inadvertent efflux release into the bay by
2. Employ caution and warning 'signals to indicate status of vent system components and givepositive warning of component malfunctions.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.1.2
5.1.1.3
5.1.8.1.1
5.2.3.2
5.2.4.7
5.3.2.2
5.3.4.1
207
Table 5-1, H-3. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
( N O . H-3
HAZARD SOURCE Lasers X
X
Experiment Groups: P-2, -4; C/N-1; T-3 |
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbiter
Inadvertent exposure of crew, equipment, or structure to the laser beam is the principal causative event.
HAZARDOUS RESULT | HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Such beam exposure can potentially result in fire, injury, equipment damage, Fire, injury, loss of EC/LS,
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Provide radiation shields to protect crew and sensitive equipment from laser radiation.
2. Select source strength compatible with crew and nearby equipment.
3. Incorporate automatic interlocks to shut down laser if field intensity exceeds designrange values.
5. Provide stops to limit the directional movement of the laser beam.
6. Provide guards to prevent access to laser equipment when it is in operation.
7. Interpose a material means (for absorbing laser beam energy) between the laser beam
1. Locate laser equipment exterior to habitable Module compartments.
2. Position laser apparatus (if within the Module) such that:
b. apparatus is away from normal crew passage routes
C. Operational Techniques
1. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate status of laser beam pointing direction
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1:5.2
5.1.6.1
5.1.8.1.1
5.1.8.1.2
5.1.8.3
5.1.8.4
5.1.8.6
5.2.1
5 .2 .Z .Z
5.3.4.1
209
Table 5-1, H-4. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
HAZARD SOURCE [ Spark-Chamber
Device for measuring galactic and extragalactic radiation sources inhi-energy astronomyexperiments. Utilizes Argon and Methane gases. (See also H-2. H-20, and H -23 for related
I No. H-4
Experiment Groups: A-5
Pallet
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION
Leakage or bleed of argon or methane gases with the Module or Orbiter cargo bay are causative factors.
HAZARDOUS RESULT
Leaks and spills can result in toxic gases, fire, or explosion in the ExperimentModule or in the Orbiter cargo bay.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPSFire, explosion, injury,contamination
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
A. Design Feature^
1. Configure spark-chamber for ease of jettisoning.
2. Configure the spark-chamber and its associated argon and methane tankage in integral orself-contained units to facilitate remote storage and jettisoning.
B. LocatiQnal Features
1. Locate the spark-chamber exterior to habitable Module compartments.
2. Locate spark-chambers to facilitate jettisoning.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Jettison spark-chambers with leaking gases or other malfunctions.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.9
5.1.12.5
5.2.1
5.2.6.1
211
Table 5-1, H-5. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
No. H-5
HAZARD SOURCE Superconducting Magnet
Cryogenic ally cooled superconducting magnets (in dewars) are indicated for certain Physicsexperiments. (See also H -24 for related hazard sources.)
Experiment Groups: P3. P4
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION ;
The superconducting magnet provides an extremely high magnetic field strength in relation to its physicalsize and power input. This field strength, its location, and its possible instabilities are conditions which couldprecipitate hazardous results.
HAZARDOUS RESULT |
Excessive magnetic field strength or a location too close to habitablecompartmentsof equipment permeated by the field.
could lead to crew injury or malfunction
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Basic subsystem malfunction,injury
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
A. Design Features
1. Select a field source strength compatible with the crew and nearby sensitive equipment.
2. Incorporate automatic interlocks to shut down magnet if field intensity exceeds designrange values.
3. Avoid the use of magnetic tools, etc. , when experiments having magnetic fields areincorporated in the Module.
B. Locational Features
1. Locate magnetic field devices away from field-sensitive equipment and habitablecompartments.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Do not transport magnetic-field devices on same flight with solid propellantpropulsive stages.
2. Control the timing of experiments with magnetic fields to avoid adversely.affectingsensitive Shuttle .subsystems,
3. Employ caution and warning, signals to indicate activation of magnetic-field devices.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
S.3.1.5.2
5.3.1.5.3
5.3.4.1
213
Table 5-1, H-6. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
No. H-6
HAZARD SOURCE Scientific Airlocks
Several experiment categories require scientific airlocks for the deployment of instruments, jj
Experiment Groups: A-4; p-1; -2, -4; C/N-1; T-l. -4 |
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbiter
Leaking doors or seals, inadvertent opening of inner and outer doors at same time, failure of outer door to close,instrument "hang -up" in airlock, deployment mechanism malfunction.
HAZARDOUS RESULT | HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Leaking doors or inadvertent simultaneous opening of both doors can lead to Loss of EC/LS, injury,
P/L bay doors [upon retraction of the Module) and place the Orbiter in the position ofbeing unable to reenter the earth's atmosphere.
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
2. Incorporate manual interlocks to prevent simultaneous opening of inner and outerhatch doors.
3. Configure airlocks and deployment mechanisms for ease of jettisoning objects whichhang -up in airlock.
B. Locational Features
1. Orient scientific airlocks such that a jammed open outer door will not prevent Orbitercargo bay door closure.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Jettison outer hatch doors if not closeable.
2. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate excessive leakage rates through airlockdoors.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.7.1
5.1.8.1.2
5:1.9
5.2.3.1
5.3.3..1
5.3. 4.1
215
Table 5-1, H-7. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
Ho. H-7
HAZARD SOURCE Subsatellites . X
target source or for data relay. (See also H-6, H-19, H-20, and H-Z3 for related hazardsources.) - x
Experiment Groups: P-l, -2; C/N-1; T-l |
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbit er
Active or passive subsatellites can "hang -up" in airlocks.Gas bottle overpressure is a hazardous condition in a subsatellite with active propulsion.Battery shorts, electrolyte spills, and overpressure are causative conditions in subsatellites with active
on -board power.
HAZARDOUS RESULT | HAZARD /EMERGENCY GROUPS
Gas bottle overpressure can result in explosion, f i re , and injury. SSimfffii'iirfibiiuy' toBattery shorts can result in fire, electric shock, burns. reenter
surfaces and atmosphere.
and subsequent inability to reenter earth's atmosphere.
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Incorporate discharge devices to de-energize subsatellites incorporating high-voltagecomponents which require handling, maintenance, or sensor replacement.
2. Configure sub satellite a for ease of jettisoning from the Module.
3. Configure subsatellites for remote deployment (to avoid deployment through airlocks).
4. Provide means for attaching and holding subsatellites exterior to the Module.
B. Locational Features
1. Locate subsatellites exterior to habitable Module compartments.
2. Locate subsatellites to facilitate jettisoning.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5l l . 8. 5
5.1.9 .
5.1.10
5.1.11.3
5.2.1
5.2.6.1
217
Table 5-1, H-8. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
HAZARD SOURCE Rotating Equipment
A number of rotating equipments are proposed for Life Sciences experiments (scientificcentrifuges, manned centrifuges, ergometer. rotating litter chair).
Experiment Groups: LS-1
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION
Loss of rotational control (overspeed) and overexertton are the principal causative factors.
HAZARDOUS RESULT |
Overspeed of centrifuges can result in impact injury to crew, spread ofbioresearch centrifuge contents (contamination), and structural damage tothe Module shell (decompression in extreme). '
Overexertion in the ergometer could result in fainting or other human injury.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPSInjury, contamination.decompression
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
•A. Design _Fe atures
1. Incorporate mechanical shielding for containment of failed rotating members.
2. Incorporate means to cause principal drive number to fail if excessive speeds or loadsare reached.
3. Incorporate automatic interlocks to shut down rotating equipment if speeds exceed designrange values.
4. Incorporate manual interlocks to prevent inadvertent actuation of rotating equipment.
5. Provide protective covers to prevent release of centrifuge contents.
6. Provide guards to prevent access to operational rotating equipment.
7. Provide emergency means for braking and holding rotatable equipment.
B. Locations! Features
1. Position rotating equipments such that a clear egress path exists when the equipment isrotating.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate if speed of rotating equipment exceedsdesign range values.
2, Continuously monitor and control human centrifuge operations.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.5.1
5.1.7.1
5.1.8.1.1
5.1.8.1.2
5.1.8.2
5.1.8.4
5.1.8.9
5.2.2.4
5.3.4.1
5.3.5.1
219
Table 5-1, H-9. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
HAZARD SOURCE
A wide variety of telescopes -- optical, IR, UV, X-ray -- are utilized in the astronomyexperiments. (See also H-6, H-18, H-20, and H-24 for related hazard sources.)
Experiment Groups: A-l , -2, -3, -4, -5, -6
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Telescopes are normally passive in and of themselves.Malfunction of holding and rotating mechanisms and visual pointing operations are potential causative factors
leading to hazardous results.
HAZARDOUS RESULT |
Failure of the latching mechanism in the locked position could result increw member entrapment.
Looking directly at the sun or reflected sunlight during visual pointingoperations could result in eye damage.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Injury, entrapment
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
A. Design Features
1. Incorporate means to ensure that the telescope latching mechanism releases from thelocked position.
• 2. Incorporate automatic interlocks to prevent use of direct-viewing telescope if orientedtoward sun or reflected sunlight.
3. Provide protective covers for direct-viewing telescopes to prevent eye damage fromdirect or reflected sunlight ("cover" may be in fact a fast-acting filter).
4. Provide emergency means for braking and holding rotatable telescopes.
B. Locational Features
1. Position rotatable telescopes so that a crew member can reach normal Module egressports with telescope locked in any position.
C. Ojae r a tio na 1 T e ch niques^
1. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate if optical telescopes are pointed at sunor receiving reflected sunlight.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.2.2.1
221
Table 5-1, H-10. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
N« H-10
HAZARD SOURCE | Booms/Platforms/Antennas x
Extendable booms/platforms/antennas are contemplated for a number of experiments to deploy X
credible parabolic expandable truss antenna (PETA) IB also planned. (See also H-20 and H-27 xfor related hazard sources.)Experiment Groups: P-l, -2, -4; T-l, -3. -4, -5; C/N-1 |
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbiter
Latch failures or expanding mechanism failures which prevent retraction of the boom/platforms/antennas
HAZARDOUS RESULT | HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
If the boom/platform/antenna extended length is sufficient to preclude closing the Inability to reenterOrbiter P/L bay doors (after Module is retracted) the Orbiter will be unable to
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
2. Configure for ease of jettisoning in the event of failure to fully erect or to fully retract.
B. Locational Features
1. Locate booms/platforms/antennas away from EVA hatches.
. 2. Locate booms/platforms/antennas away from docking ports,
C. Operational Techniques
1. Jettison booms/platforms/antennas if not retractable and their presence prevents cargobay door closure.
positive warning if elements thereon are active.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.7.1
5.1.9
5.2.4.2
5.2.4.3
5.3.3.1
5.3.4.1
223
Table 5-1, H - l l . In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
H-ll
HAZARD SOURCE
Inflatable ballons {of ECHO type) are called for in wake measurement experiments in PlasmaPhysics FPE. (See also H-6 for related hazard sources.)
Experiment Groups: P-2
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
The balloon material and the possibility of inadvertent inflation are principal causative factors leading topotential hazardous results.
HAZARDOUS RESULT |
Balloons made from combustible materials are a source of fire.Inadvertent balloon inflation within a Module can cover EC/LS ports, the
crewman's body, or prevent crewman freedom of movement.Inadvertent inflation in an airlock could result in an outer hatch door being jammed
open, preventing Orbiter P/L bay door closure upon retraction of the Module.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPSFire, injury, loss of EC/LS,entrapment, inability tor center
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Utilize safing mechanisms/devices for inflating means.
2. Incorporate manual interlocks to prevent inadvertent balloon inflation.
B. Locationa! Features
1. Locate balloons and their inflating devices exterior to habitable Module compartments.
2. Keep balloons and inflating devices separate from one another until time for inflation.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.2.1
5.2.4.4
225
Table 5-1, H-12. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
HAZARD SOURCE] Negative Pressure
I No
Source
A negative pressure, source is required for the Lower Body Negative Pressure Chamber(LBNPC) used for human biomedical research experiments.
Experiment Groups: LS-1
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION
An uncontrolled \ i source is the principal causative factor.
HAZARDOUS RESULT
An uncontrolled vacuum source could result in physical injury to the humanresearch subject.
In the extreme, an uncontrolled vacuum source could lead to cabindecompression.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Injury, decompression
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
A. Design Features
1. Select a low pressure source no lower than required by LBNPC experiment requirements(avoid an uncontrolled vacuum source).
2. .Incorporate automatic interlocks to provide a controlled shutdown of the LBNPC ifthe permissible lower range pressure value is exceeded.
3. Incorporate manual interlocks to prevent inadvertent activation of the LBNPC
C. Operational Technique
1. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate if the LBNPC lower pressure design limitis exceeded.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
227
Table 5-1, H-13. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
No. H-13
HAZARD SOURCE Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU) (Backpack)
A backpack AMU is utilized in Technology experiments. {See also H-19. H-23. H-27 forrelated hazard sources.)
Experiment Groups: T -3
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION
Subsystem malfunction is the principal causative factor (aside from EVA operations attendant to utilizingthe AMU).
HAZARDOUS RESULT
Oxygen bottle overpressure and explosion can result in fire and injury.Battery overpressure and explosion or electrolyte leakage can result in injury,
fire, explosion, and contamination.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Injury, fire, explosion,contamination
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
A. . Design Features
1. Incorporate means to ensure that any propulsion failure occurs in the non-thrusting mode.
2. Incorporate manual interlocks to prevent inadvertent release of the AMU from the Module.
• 3. Configure the AMU for ease of jettisoning from the Module.
4. Provide means for attaching and holding the AMU to the exterior of the Module.
B. Locational Features •
1. Locate the AMU exterior to habitable Module compartments.
2. Locate AMU so as to permit unimpeded egress from EVA hatch and to provide convenientaccess for use by astronaut in EVA.
3. Locate the AMU to facilitate jettisoning.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Conduct AMU operations in the tethered mode, to the maximum extent possible.
2. Monitor AMU propulsion subsystems and deactivate if malfunction is indicated.
3. Jettison the AMU from the Module if a propulsion system malfunction is indicated.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.7.1
5.1.8.1.2
5.1.9
5.1.11.3
5.2.1
5.2.5.5
5.3.1.6.2.1
5.3.1 .6 .2 .2
5.3.3.1
229
Table 5-1, H-14. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
HAZARD SOURCE Manned Work Platform (MWP)
A maneuverable open MWP is utilized in certain Technology experiments. (See also H-10,H-19, H-20, H-2Z. and H-23 for related hazard sources.)
Experiment Groups: T-3
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Subsystem malfunctions and incorrect docking conditions (excessive velocity, incorrect heading, e tc . ) are theprincipal causative factors (aside from EVA operations attendant to utilizing the MWp).
HAZARDOUS RESULT |
Gas bottle overpressure can result in fire, explosion, injury.Battery overpressure can result in fire, explosion, injury, contamination.Incorrect docking can result in a collision, with decompression an extreme
result.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Fire, explosion, injury,contamination, collision,decompression _.
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Incorporate means to ensure that any propulsion failure occurs in the non-thrusting mode.
2. Incorporate manual interlocks to prevent inadvertent release of the MWP from the Module.
3. Configure the MWP for ease of jettisoning from the Module.
4. Provide means for attaching and holding the MWP to the exterior of the Module.
B. Locational Features
1. Liocate the MWP exterior to habitable Module compartments.
2. Locate MWP so as to permit unimpeded egress from EVA hatch and to provide convenientaccess for use by astronaut in EVA.
3. Locate the MWP to facilitate jettisoning.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Perform MWP-controlled docking experiments with a free-flying Experiment Module,deployed at a safe distance from the Orbiter.
2. Conduct MWP operations in the tethered mode, to the maximum extent possible.
3. Monitor MWP propulsion subsystems and deactivate if malfunction is indicated.
4. Jettison the MWP from the Module if a propulsion system malfunction is indicated.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.1.1
5.1.8.1.2
5.1.9
5.1.11.3
S . Z . I
5.2.5.5
5.3.1.2.1
5.3.1.6.2.1
5.3.1.6.2.2
5.3.3.1
231
Table 5-1, H-15. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
HAZARD SOURCE I Teleoperator S/C (Unmanned)
An unmanned remotely-controlled spacecraft for cargo manipulation and docking maneuvers isutilized in one Technology experiment. (See also H-10. H-19,'H-20, and H-23 for relatedhazard sources.)
Experiment Groups: T-5
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Subsystem malfunction and incorrect docking conditions (excessive velocity, incorrect heading, etc.) are theprincipal causative factors.
HAZARDOUS RESULT~[
Gas bottle overpressure can result in fire, explosion, injury.Battery overpressure can result in fire, explosion, injury, contamination.Incorrect docking can result in a collision, with decompression an extreme
result.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Fire, explosion, injury,contamination, collision,decompression
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Incorporate manual interlocks to prevent inadvertent release of the tele opera tor S/Cfrom the Module.
2. Configure the teleoperator S/C for ease of Jettisoning from the Module.
3. Configure the teleoperator S/C for remote deployment from the Module.
4. Provide means for attaching and holding the AMU to the exterior of the Module.
B. Locational Features
1. Locate the teleoperator S/C exterior to habitable Module compartments.
2. Locate the teleoperator S/C so as to permit unimpeded egress from EVA hatch and toprovide convenient access for EVA checkout.
3. Locate the teleoperator S/C to facilitate jettisoning.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Perform teleoperator-controlled docking experiments with a free-flying ExperimentModule, deployed at a safe distance from the Or biter.
2. Jettison the teleoperator S/C from the Module if a-propulsion system malfunction ia. indicated.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.8.1.2
5.1.9
5.1.10
5.1.11.3
5.2.;
5.2.5.5
233
Table 5-1, H-16. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
No. H-16
HAZARD SOURCE Solid P rope Hants
A variety of solid propellants are required (pyrotechnics, solid rocket motors, spin-up rockets,etc.) for planned automated satellites and related propulsive stages.
Experiment Groups: Automated Satellites b Propulsive Stages
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbiter
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
The principal causative factor is inadvertent ignitor activation, whether by overt act, squib failure, RF-field.or magnetic field inducement.
HAZARDOUS RESULT |
Rocket explosion or normal operation while attached to or in the vicinity ofthe Orbiter can result in fire, injury, or explosion.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Fire, injury, explosion
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Utilize safing mechanism/devices.
2. Incorporate shielding to protect against inadvertent activation by exposure to permeatingfields.
3. Incorporate manual interlocks to prevent inadvertent activation of devices containingsolid propellants.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Safe all systems containing solid propellanta prior to ground installation.
2. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate changes in status of safe-and-armcircuits.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.3.1
5.1.5.3
5.3.Z.5
5.3.4.1
235
Table 5-1, H-17. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
HAZARD SOURCE Radiation Sources
Sources of on-board radiation include X-ray machines, radioisotopea. RTG, lasers, andRF-emitters in various physics, Comm/Nav. and Life Sciences experiments, (See also H-3and H -20 for related hazard sources.)
Experiment Groups: P-2, -4; C/N-1; LS-1. -2. -3, -4, -5
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
An uncontrolled radiation source and isotope spillage are the principal causative factors.
HAZARDOUS RESULT | HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Uncontrolled radiation from X-ray, RTG, laser, or RF sources can cause humaninjury and result in the malfunction of sensitive equipment within the rangeof the radiation field.
Contact with isotope spills can result in human injury and surface and atmosphericcontamination.
Injury, contamination,basic subsystem malfunction
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design^ Features
1. Utilize safing mechanisms/devices for reactor or isotope devices.
2. Provide radiation shielding to protect crew and sensitive equipment.
3. Select a source strength compatible with the crew and nearby sensitive equipment.
4. Incorporate automatic interlocks to shut down generators if field intensity exceedsdesign range values.
5. Incorporate manual interlocks to prevent inadvertent activation of radiation sources.
6. Configure devices for ease of jettisoning from the Modules in the event of uncontrolledradiation.
B, Locational Features
1. Locate radiation sources exterior to habitable Module compartments..
ocate radioisotope fluid containers in special areas with spill containment, waste disposal.purge, and vent provisions.
2. Locatpurge
3. Locatte permeating field devices away from field -sensitive equipment and habitablecompartments .
4. Locate externally-mounted field generators away .from EVA hatches.
5. Locate radiation sources to facilitate jettisoning.
C. Operational Techniques
1 . Wear radiation dose -accumulation badges to guard against excessive radiation accumulation.
2. Do not transport permeative -field experiments on same flight with solid-propellantpropulsion stages.
3. Control the timing of experiments with magnetic or RF fields to avoid adversely affectingsensitive Shuttle subsystems.
4. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate commencement of radiation sourceactivation, and positive warning if design range values are exceeded.
5. Continuously monitor and control the radiation levels of active radiation devices in orattached to the Experiment Module.
6. Monitor and control the total radiation level envirExperiment have been s u b t o both atuexperimental equipment).
on to r an contro te tota r a a t o n eve envronment to which the Orbiter andExperiment have been subjected (due to both natural radiation spectrums and
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.3.1
5.1.5.2
•5.1.6.1
5.1.8.1. 1
5.1.8.1.2
5.1.9
5.2.1
5.2.2.5
5.2.4.2
5.2.6.1
5.3.1.1.1
5.3.1.5.2
5.3.1.5.3
5.3.4.1
5.3.5.1
5.3.5.1
237
Table 5-1, H-18. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
1 No H-18
HAZARD SOURCE | Cameras and Equipment
Various experiments rely on photography to record forms of data andprocessing of the film to facilitate the experimental evaluation. (Seerelated hazard sources.)
X
require in-space X
X
Experiment Groups: A-2, -4;P-1. -2. -4;ES-1;T-1, -2 ;C/N-1 |
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Combustible materials, chemical spills, and film processing operatic
HAZARDOUS RESULT J
Fire can result from the ignition of film and photochemicals.
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbiter
ns are principal causative factors.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Fire, injury, contamination.
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
1. Provide capability to purge film -processing areas.
photochemical containers.
3. Provide photochemical containers with end closures, spouts,positive sealing characteristics.
B. Locational Features
or caps with no -spill,
1. Locate film, photochemicals, and film vaults away from potential ignition source areasand remote from open habitable areas.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Wear protective garments, gloves, masks, etc. during film handling or processingoperations.
3. Jettison leaking photochemical containers.
ReferenceParagraph,
5. I . Z . I
5.1.8.1.2
5.1.12.6
5.2.5.2
5.3.1.1.2
5.3.1.4
5.3.3.1
239
Table 5-1, H-19- In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
No. ' H-19
HAZARD SOURCE | Batteries
Batteries are required in certain experiments to power sensor a and equipment. (See alsoH-2 and H.-20.J
Experiment Groups: P-l, -Z; T-3. -5
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Battery shorts, electrolyte spills, and inadequate venting (overpressure) are principal causative factors.
HAZARDOUS RESULT |
Shorts tvear combustible mate-rials cause fire.Electrolyte spills can result in chemical injury and contamination of spacecraft
surfaces and atmosphere.If overpressured, the battery can explode, resulting in fire, injury, and contamination.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Fire, injury, explosion,contamination
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Provide overboard vent systems, including pressure-regulation and pressure-reliefsubsystems.
2. Provide protective covers to prevent inadvertent electric shock.
3. Provide batteries with closures having no-spill, positive sealing characteristics.
B. Locations I Feature^
1. Within the Module locate batteries in special areas with spill containment, waste disposal,purge, and vent provisions.
2. Locate batteries av/ay from potentially combustible materials or systems that could bedamaged by escaping battery fluids.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Utilize caution and warning signals to indicate if battery temperature or pressure levelsexceed design range values.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.8.2
5,1.12.6
5.2.2.5
5.2.4.5
241
Table 5-1, H-20. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
N«_ H-20
HAZARD SOURCE 1 Electrically -Powered Experimental Equipment X
All experiments require some form of electrically -powered apparatus. Examples include: X
, p ' t ' t h' t l d ' l t P r - acre era orn.
Experiment Groups: All |
CAUSATIVE EVENT /FACTOR/CONDITION |
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbit er
Many devices employ high voltage; others provide an RF-field. With power off, capacitative devices can dischargeinadvertently. With power on, the high voltage and RF sources are active, and shorts can result. Mere presencein the RF-field and touching or handling of equipment can also precipitate hazardous results.
HAZARDOUS RESULT j HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
. . . , Fire, injury, basic subsystemShorts and hi -voltage discharge can precipitate fires. alfunction
malfunction of nearby sensitive equipment.
shock and burns. v
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Configure electrical interface lines to fail-safe.
2. Incorporate manual interlocks to prevent inadvertent activation.
4. Incorporate discharge devices to de-energize high-voltage equipment.
5. Prominently and permanently mark all equipment having high-voltage components to
B. Vocational Features
1. Locate high -voltage equipment away from EVA hatches.
2. Place high-voltage components in zones not normally accessible, so that knowledgeableacts are required to reach or touch them.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Neutralize (discharge) all high-voltage components after ground checkout and/oroperation.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.7.2
5.1.8.1.2
5.1.8.2
5.1.8.5
5.1.12.8
5.2.4.2
5.2.5.1
5.3.2.1
243
Table 5-1, H-21. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
HAZARD SOURCE Biologicals/Animals/Insects/Plants
A wide spectrum of cells and tissues, organisms and cultures, animals (primates, rats, mice,marmots, etc.), insects, and plants are required to support the Life Sciences experiments.(See also H-2, H-17, and H-22 for related hazard sources)
Experiment Groups: LS-2, -3, -4, -5 Orbit er
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
The potentially toxic nature of certain biologicals, the animals and insects themselves, plant pollens, and chemicaltreatments, as well as the products associated with feeding requirements and waste (excreta, vomit, etc.) are theprincipal causative factors. The diverse handling requirements add another causative event potential. Malfunctionof holding and rearing accommodations is yet another causative condition.
HAZARDOUS RESULT
Animal and insect bites can cause injury. The release of insects, pollens,serums, etc. can contaminate the atmosphere. The discharge of wasteproducts into the atmosphere is also a contamination result. Mere contact withtoxic biologicals or waste products can result in human injury/illness.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Injury, contamination
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Provide overboard vent systems, including pressure-regulation and pressure-reliefsubsystems.
2. Provide capability to purge any work areas for handling animals, insects, etc.
3. Utilize safing'mechanisms/devices for biological and radiobiological containers used inlife sciences experiments.
4. Provide thermal conditioning for biological containers (e. g. , incubation control).
5. Provide independent environmental conditioning system for holding and rearing cages.
6. Provide compartment with airlock and decontamination equipment for conduct of experi-ments with radioactive materials.
7. Incorporate interlocks to prevent inadvertent opening of cage doors or isotope containers.
8. Provide protective covers for biological containers to prevent release of contents.
9. Configure cage feeding and cleaning provisions for remote operational control.
10. Provide the cages with integral provisions for automatic feeding and cleaning.
11. Provide containers or other provisions for preserving/storing dead animals, insects,plant specimens, etc.
12. Provide biological and isotope storage containers with closures having no-spill, positive-sealing characteristics.
13. Prominently and permanently mark all containers to identify nature of contents together' with warning and handling notes (including antidotes, where appropriate).
B. Locational Features
1. Locate cage and cage rack assemblies and biological containers in special areas with spillcontainment, waste disposal, purge, and vent provisions.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Wear protective garments, gloves, masks, etc, when handling animals, biologicals,isotopes, serums, etc.
2. Control cage feeding and cleaning operations remotely.
3. Perform biological experiments and handling of animals, insects, toxic fluids, serums,etc. in special work areas.
4. Jettison leaking containers (serums, etc.).
5. Employ caution and warning signals to notify if biological containers exceed design rangepressure or temperature.
6. Monitor and control the condition and ope r ability of cage feeding and cleaning devices.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5. 1.2. 1
5. 1.3. 1
5. 1.4. 1
5. 1.4.2
5.1.5.4
5.1.8. l.Z
5.1.8.2
5.1.10
5. 1.12. 1
5.1. 12.2
5. 1. 12.6
5.3. 1.3
5.3. 1.4
5.3.3.1
5.3.4. 1
245
Table 5-1, H-22. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria (1 of 2)
No. H-22
HAZARD SOURCE Non-Cryogenic Fluids
A wide variety of toxic and reactive fluids are required in the conduct of certain Physics,Materials and Manufacturing, Technology, and Life Sciences experiments.
Experiment Groups; P-i. -4;MS-1;T-Z. -3. -4, -5; LS-2. -3, -4. -5 |
X Pallet
CAUSATIVE EVKNT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Cannister overpressure or rupture, and inadvertent leaks or spills during handling operations are principalcausative factors. Uncontrolled combustion and combustor rupture is another factor.
HAZARDOUS RESULT |
Cannister rupture, combustor rupture, or the inadvertent release of reactive ortoxic fluids or gases can lead to injury, f ire, explosion, and contamination ofsurfaces'and atmosphere.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Fire, injury, explosion,contamination
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Provide overboard vent systems, including pressure-regulation and pressure-reliefsubsystems.
2. Provide capability to purge areas containing fluid tanks, transfer lines, or outlets.
3. Provide capability to purge tanks or containers holding non-inert liquids.
4. Provide thermal conditioning for fluids affected by temperature extremes.
5. Configure fluid interface lines to fail-safe.
6. Configure propellant tanks and containerized fluids for ease of jettisoning from theModule, and for ease of jettisoning contents.
7. Provide means for positively holding and securing transportable containers when notin actual use.
8. Configure systems containing principally quantities of reactive fluids in integral orself-contained units to facilitate remote storage/deployment and jettisoning.
9. Configure gaseous release devices and associated ICN and NH3 cannisters in integralor self-contained units.
10. Configure the spark-chamber and its associated argon and methane tankage is integralor self-contained units.
11. Provide liquid containers with caps or closures having no-spill, positive-sealingcharacteristics.
12. Prominently and permanently mark all containers to identify nature of contents,together with warning and handling notes (including antidotes, where appropriate).
B. Lggatjonal Features
1. Locate containers holding reactive or toxic fluids exterior to habitable Modulecompartments.
Z. Store cannisters requiring thermal conditioning in an area where their temperaturelimits will not be exceeded.
3. Locate fluid cannisters in special areas with spill containment, waste disposal, purge,and vent provisions.
4. Locate reactive fluid tanks non-adjacently and in different compartment areas.
5. Locate containerized fluids and propellant tanks to facilitate jettisoning.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Wear protective garments, gloves, masks, etc. when handling toxic or reactive fluidcontainers.
2. Perform propellant storage and transfer experiments in a free-f lying ExperimentModule, deployed at a safe distance from the Orbiter.
3. Central reactive fluid experiments remotely.
(more)
ReferenceParagraph,
Section 5
5.1.1.1
5.1.2.1
5.1.2.2
5.1.4.1
5.1 .7 .2
5.1.9
5.1.11.1
5.1.12.5
5.1.12.5
5.1.12.5
5.1.12.6
5.1.12.9
5.2.1
5.2.2.3
5.2.2.5
5.2.4.6
5.2.6.1
5.3.1.12
5.3.1.2.1
5.3.1.3
247
Table 5-1, H-22. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria (2 of 2)
No. H-22 fconti
HAZARD SOURCE
Experiment Groups:
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
HAZARDOUS RESULT | HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
PREVENTIVE MEASURES | '
C. Operational Techniques (continued)
4. Establish order-of-connection procedures for all fluid connections.
5. Purge, inert, and safe all returnable tanks/containers,
6. Secure all containers in respective storage areas after use.
7. Jettison containers which exceed design range values in temperature or pressure.
8. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate if container design'pressure ortemperature limits are exceeded.
9. Monitor and control reactive fluid container pressure and temperature while aboardthe Orbiter or in its immediate vicinity.
ReferenceParagraph,
Section 5
5.3.1.6.4.6
5.3.2.3
5.3.2.4
5.3.3.1
5.3.4.1
5.3.5.1
249
Table 5-1, H-23. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
1 No. H-Z31
HAZARD SOURCE | Non-Cryogenic Gases x
and Technology experiments. . x
Experiment Groups: A-5, -6; P-2, -4;T-1, -2, -3. -4, -5
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbiter
Tank overpressure or rupture and inadvertent leaks of inert, toxic, and reactive gases are principal causativefactors.
HAZARDOUS RESULT | HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Tank rupture or the inadvertent release of inert, toxic, and reactive gases can Injury, fire, explosion,
PREVENTIVE MEASURES ]
A. Design Features
1. Provide overboard vent systems, including pressure -regulation and pressure-reliefsubsystems.
3. Provide capability to purge non-inert gas bottles.
5. Configure high -pressure gas bottles for ease of jettisoning from the Module, and for
6. Configure high-pressure gas bottles for remote operational control.
B. Locational Features
1. Locate containers holding reactive or toxic gases, high -pressure containers, gaseousrelease devices, and the leak detection experiment Module exterior to habitable Modulecompartments. ,
2. Locate gaseous cannisters in special areas with purge and vent provisions.
3. Locate high-pressure gas bottles to facilitate jettisoning.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Control the leakage detection experiment (GHe) remotely.
2. Perform experiments with toxic gas or vapor contamination chemicals in pressure
•
4. Purge, inert, and safe all returnable tanke/containers.
6. Jettison containers which exceed temperature or pressure design values.
7. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate if gas bottle design pressure or temperaturelimits are exceeded.
ReferenceParagraph,
Section 5
5.1.1.1
5.1.2.1
5.1.2.2
5.1.7.2
5.1.9
5.1.10
5.2.1
5.2.2.5
5.2.6.1
5.3.1.3
5.3.1.5.4
5.3.1.6.4.6
5.3.2.3
5.3.2.4
5.3.3.1
5.3.4.1
Table 5-1, H-24. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
1 No. H-24
HAZARD SOURCE | Cryogenics x
Inert cryogenics (LHe, LNe, LNj) are required in Astronomy and Physics experiments to cool x
FPE. (See. also H-2, H-5, and H-20 for related hazard sources. ) ** %
Experiment Groups: A- l , -5. -6; P-3, -4; T -2
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Tank overpressure (closed vents, etc.). line breaks, spills, etc. are principal causative factors.
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbiter
HAZARDOUS RESULT | HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Inert tank overpressure and resultant rupture, and line breaks or spills can Fire, injury, explosion,result in physical injury or Module contamination because of the release of contamination
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Provide overboard vent systems, including pressure -regulation and pressure-reliefsubsystems.
P i p g 8 y
4. Configure cryogenic dewars for ease of jettisoning from the Module.
in integral or self-contained unite to facilitate remote storage/deployment or• jettisoning.
1. Locate cryogenic dewars and fluid transfer lines exterior to habitable Module compartments.
2. Locate cryogenic dewars to facilitate jettisoning.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Perform propellant storage and transfer experiments in a free -flying ExperimentModule, deployed at a safe distance from the Orbiter.
2. Jettison dewars which exceed design range pressures.
3. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate if dewar design pressure levels areexceeded.
4. Monitor and control reactive. fluid container pressure and temperature while aboard theOrbiter or in its immediate vicinity.
ReferenceParagraph,
Section 5
5.1.1.1
5.1.2.1
5.1.7.2
5.1.9
5.1.12.5
5.2.1
5.2.6.1
5.3.1.2.1
5.3.3.1
5.3.4.1
5.3.5.1
253
Table 5-1, H-25. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
No. H-Z5
HAZARD SOURCE Emuls
Plastic and nuclear emulsion sheets are required in the Cosmic Ray Physics experiment.These sheets are deployed to extend from the Module with an extendable mechanism.(See also H-6 for related hazard sources.)
Experiment Groups: P-3
X Pallet
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Latch failures or extending mechanism failures which prevent retraction of the extending mechanism arecausative factors. Touching and/or handling of emulsion sheets are also possible causative events.
HAZARDOUS RESULT HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
If the mechanism extended length is sufficient to prevent closing the OrbiterP/L bay doors (after module retraction) the Orbiter may be unable to reenterthe earth's atmosphere. " .
Depending upon the exact emulsion constituents, mere touching could result in human injury ormodule surface contamination.
?njujv.' contamination.inability to reenter
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Incorporate manual interlocks to prevent inadvertent removal of emulsion sheetprotective covers or closures.
2. Provide protective covers for emulsion sheet devices.
3. Configure emulsion plates and containers for ease of jettisoning in the event ofretraction system failure.
4. Provide grips for physical transport of emulsion sheets and holders (to avoidsurface contact).
5. Configure nuclear and plastic emulsion sheet devices and their deployment mechanismsin integral or self-contained units to facilitate remote deployment and jettisoning.
B. Locational Features
1. Locate emulsion sheet devices exterior to habitable Module compartments.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Deploy emulsion sheets with.remote deployment mechanisms.
ReferenceParagraph,
Section 5
5.1.8.2
5.1.9
255
Table 5-1, H-26. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
No.- H-26
HAZARD SOURCE 1 Specific Contamination Source x
An active cleaning device (ADC), samples and racks, and sensor cleaning operations are required X
(See also H-6, H-10, and H-27 for related hazard sources.) - x
Experiment Groups: T-l |
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbiter
HAZARDOUS RESULT HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
. aft fnation of the surface and atmosphere.
Th d ' f h ' h k' 1 '
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Incorporate manual interlocks to prevent inadvertent removal of the ACD end coversor closures.
2. Provide protective covers for the ACD to prevent exposure to contaminants within the ACD.
3. Configure the sample plates, holding racks, and the ACD for remote deployment.
4. Provide grips for physical transport of sample plates and racks (to avoid surfacecontact injury).
5. Provide means for attaching sample plates and racks externally to Module.
or self-contained units to facilitate remote storage and jettisoning.
7. Provide the ACD with end closures to retain contaminants within the device.
B. Locational Features
1. Locate sample plates and racks exterior to habitable Module compartments.
2. Locate any EVA sensor cleaning units exterior to habitable Module compartmentsaccessible to the EVA airlocks.
3. Locate contam nated products or devices in special areas with waste disposal, purge,
C. Operational Techniques
1. Wear protective garments, gloves, masks, etc. during sensor cleaning operationsor when handling exposed sample plates.
tion
ReferenceParagraph,
Section 5
5.1.8.1.2
5.1.8.2
5.1.10
5.1.11.2
5.1.11.3
5.1.12.5
5.1.12.7
5.2.1
5.2.1
5.2.2.5
5.3.1.1.2
5.3.1.4
257
Table 5-1, H-27. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
No. H-28
HAZARD SOURCE Maintenance and Repair Operations
Battery recharging, gas bottle recharging, component replacement, dewar replacement, andsensor cleaning are specific activities required in experimental operations. (See also H-5, H-6,H-7, H-19, H-20. H-23, H-24, H-26 for corollary Or related hazard sources.)
Experiment Groups; P-Z, -3; ES-l; C /N- l ; T- l , -3, -4. -5
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
High-voltage exposure, shorts, electrolyte spills, contaminated sensor surfaces, and tank or dewar overpressureand leaks are principal causative factors.
HAZARDOUS RESULT |
Hazardous results include fire, injury {including electrical shock and burns),chemical injury, contamination, explosion, and release of cryogenic fluids andgases.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Fire, injury, explosioncontamination
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Deaigr. Fe atures
1. Incorporate automatic interlocks in recharging systems to prevent operation untilpositive engagement is ensured between recharging system and component/subsystemto be serviced.
2. Configure gas bottle and battery recharging systems associated with satellite maintenancefor remote operational control.
3. Configure gas bottle and battery recharging systems in integral or self-contained units
B. Locational Features
1. Locate gas bottle and battery recharging equipment exterior to habitable Modulecompartments.
2. Locate equipment requiring periodic maintenance {e.g. , animal cages) so as tofacilitate access on the ground and in orbit.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Remotely control gas bottle and battery recharging operations.
2. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate if recharging system pressure ortemperature design levels are exceeded.
3. Continuously monitor and control the gas bottle and battery recharging operations.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.8.1.1
5.1.10
5.1.12.5
5.3.1.3
5.3.4.1
5.3.5.1
259
Table 5-1, H-28. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
HAZARD SOURCE EVA Operations
EVA operations are required in performing a number of functions: installing/removing externalequipment, packages, samples; erecting antennas, booms; operating AMU; operating MWP.
Experiment Groups: P-l, -3; C/N-1; T-l, -3. -4; LS-6
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
PLSS depletion, suit puncture , broken tethers, tether entanglement, collisions, exposure to high-voltage.high-RF, magnetic fields, mere falling off, and propulsion "runaway" are principal causative factors.
HAZARDOUS RESULT
The causative factors can result in loss of EC/LS, stranding in EVA,physical injuries, and electric shock and burn injury.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Injury, loss of EC/LS,stranded in EVA
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
A. Design Features
1. Provide extendable-aid devices to permit EVA retrieval assistance.
2. Provide emergency EC/LS umbilicals exterior to Module for use by EVA astronaut.
3. Configure EVA suits and/or PLSS units for simple plug-in of an emergency PLSSpackage and a voice communication unit.
4. Provide the Module and/or Orbiter with exterior connections (near EVA airlock) forsimple plug-in of EC/LS umbilicals and a voice communications unit.
B. Locational Features
1. . Locate external EC/LS umbilicals and communication plug-in unit near the EVA hatch.
2. Locate EVA tether attach points and fixtures so as to minimize possibility of tetherentanglement.
C. Operational Technique^
1. Suspend permeating field experiments and rotating equipment operations duringEVA operations.
2. Conduct hazardous EVA experiment operations with at least two EVA men (one working,one standing-by as a safety man).
3. Conduct normal EVA experiment operations with at least two EVA men (buddy system).
4. Provide an additional suited crewman ready to go into EVA, in the event of an emergencyinvolving men already in EVA.
5. Avoid experiment EVA:
a. when high-voltage RF-field, or magnetic fields are present .
b. during Experiment Module erection, retraction, docking, or undocking operations
c. near attitude control nozzle jets
6. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate if PLSS conditions deviate from designrange values.
7. Continuously monitor EVA operations and PLSS conditions during EVA operations.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.2.5.6
5.2.5.7
5.3.1.6.1.1
5.3.1.6.1.2
5.3.1.6.1.3
5.3.1.6.1.4
5.3.4.1
5.3.5.1
261
Table 5-1, H-29. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
No. H-29
HAZARD SOURCE Egress Operations X
w 11 as ' d EVA ' ' "v"
X
Experiment Groups: All | x
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION J
Pallet
MSM
RAM
Orbiter
HAZARDOUS RESULT | HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
M 1 ' 1 d f I h h) If 1 ' 1 fc/h h £ '1result in internal entrapment or EVA stranding. In combination with EC/LS EC/LS, stranded in EVA
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
C .
compartment.
B. Locational Features
1. Locate Experiment Modules and/or other cargo In the cargo bay to avoid blocking or
2. Locate equipment/devices attached externally to the Experiment Module in such a
3. Locate equipment within the Experiment Module BO as to prevent the wedging -in of
C. Operational Techniques
1. Provide a second or safety crewman to stand by during airlock operations.
2. Provide pressure suits (including PLSS units) in Experiment Module to enable EVAegress from Module to Orbiter airlock.
3. Do not attempt entry into the Experiment Module until it is fully erected and secured.
4. Have all personnel leave the Experiment Module and enter the Orbiter prior to initiatingretraction of the Module.
5. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate status of airlock EC/LS, pressure levels,and door positions.
6. Monitor airlock and crew conditions continuously during airlock egress operations.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.8.8
5.2.5.8
5.2 .5 .9
5.2.5.12
5 3 1.6.3.1
5 3 1.6.3.3
5 3 1.6.3.3
5.3.4.1
5.3.5.1
263
Table 5-1, H-30. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
f
HAZARD SOURCE Erection/Retraction Operations
All Experiment Modules pose the potential requirement for erection (to perform experiments,undock, etc.) and retraction back into the cargo bay for return to earth.
Experiment Groups: Al 1
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION |
The principal causative factors are (1) mechanism malfunction during the erection or retraction process, and(2.) protuberances on the Experiment Module.
HAZARDOUS RESULT |
If the mechanism malfunction (either at partial or full extension) prevents retrac-tion, the Orbiter P/L bay doors cannot be closed and the Orbiter cannotreenter. Similarly, protuberances may prevent P/L bay door closing.
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPS
Inability to reenter
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Fgatures
1. Incorporate means to ensure that erection/retraction mechanisms retract from theextended positions.
c. Operational Techniques
1. Suspend permeating field experiments and rotating equipment operations duringerection/retraction operations.
2. Do not erect or retract the Experiment Module until all crew members are in the Orbiter.
3.- Employ caution and warning signals to indicate position and status of erection/retractionsystem.
4. Continuously monitor and control the erection/retraction system status and operations.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.3.1.6.3.35.3.1.6.3.4
5.3.4.1
5.3.5.1
265
m
Table 5-1, H-31. In-Space Experiments - Hazard/EmergencyAnalysis and Safety Criteria
HAZARD SOURCE Docking/Undocking Operations
Free-flying RAMa, automated satellites and manned work platforms (MWPs) pose hazard sourceswith regard to requirements for docking/uridocking with the Orbiter.
Experiment Groups: A- l , -Z, -3. -4. -5. -6: P-3; T-Z, -3; LS; HEAP; EOS; P/S; C/N II |
CAUSATIVE EVENT/FACTOR/CONDITION
The principal causative factors are (1) docking mechanism malfunctions, and (2) collisions betweendocking vehicles.
HAZARDOUS RESULT
Inability of a Module to release from the Orbiter, plus the inability to retract theModule, could result in Orbiter inability to rcenter. Inability to effectively dock
HAZARD/EMERGENCY GROUPSFire, injury, explosion,contamination, inability to reenter.
could lead to a RAM stranded in space or MWP stranded in EVA, Vehicle col-lisions could precipitate a wide spectrum of hazardous results {fire, explosion, injury,contamination, etc.)
stranded (in space or EVA)
PREVENTIVE MEASURES |
A. Design Features
1. Incorporate means to ensure that docking mechanisms release from the locked-up mode.
2. Incorporate discharge devices to establish equipotential between the Orbiter and retrievedsatellites.
3. Configure any spacecraft and the Experiment Module for ease of jettisoning from theModule and/or Orbiter.
4. Configure docking control systems of any spacecraft attempting to dock with the Moduleor Orbiter for remote operational control.
B. Locatignal Features
1. Locate the docking ports of Experiment Modules and the Orbiter so as to facilitatevisual observations of the docking operations.
C. Operational Techniques
1. Suspend permeating field experiments and rotating equipment operations duringdocking/undocking operations.
2. Employ caution and warning signals to indicate if the velocity and/or alignment of a'docking spacecraft relative to the Module or Orbiter deviates from design range values. •
3. Continuously monitor and control docking sensor and control systems during dockingoperations.
ReferenceParagraph,Section 5
5.1.7.1
5.1.8.5
5.1.9
5.1. 10
5.3. 1.5. 1
5.3.4.1
5.3.5.1
267
ni£
•M
OOH
T)
UOenen
H
1»rt c
H0 2
°U>^ Q>
w
rtffi
J-lnjS3
co
rtH
o 2
B!
c « .
X 3 <u *• w
o oa'H.
I 1 !•5 .S -
269
