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Denis Kolchinsky
Project Chief Engineer
AES-2006 – new design with
VVER reactor and INPRO
methodology
State Atomic Energy Corporation ROSATOM
Branch of Joint Stock Company «East-European leading scientific research and design
institute for energy technology»
Saint-Petersburg R&D Institute “Atomenergoproject” (SPbAEP)
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
Was found in 1929;
Localized in Saint-Petersburg, Russia;
Has designs of power plants at 19 countries among them Finland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, China, Vietnam, Cuba etc;
Participation in designing of 117 Power Plants, including 18 NPP;
More than 1400 employees;
01.07.2013 had been consolidated with Joint Stock Company «East-European leading scientific research and design institute for energy technology» .
Saint-Petersburg R&D Institute Atomenergoproject” («SPbAEP») – the General Designer of AES-2006
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
What AES-2006 and MIR.1200 are?
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
AES-2006 – is an abbreviated name of an evolutionary NPP of VVER-1200 design which was developed on the basis of standard Russian design VVER-1000.
Currently this design is being under construction on several sites.
The reference plant design for AES-2006 is AES-91 design, two units of which type was put into operation in China in 2007.
MIR.1200 (Modernized International Reactor) is based on the design of AES-2006 with taking into account requirements of Bid Specification for Temelin-3,4
VVER Designs Evolution
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
Existing NPP
for comparison
INS design for
comparison
Main Principles and Approaches for Designing of AES-2006
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
Maximum using of well-proven solutions and technologies
Minimizing costs and timeframes by using of experience which was got during construction and putting into operation of reference NPP (design AES-91 in China in 2007)
Ensuring of required safety level (also for DEC) by:
optimal safety systems configuration based on active (generally for BDA) and passive (generally for BDBA) elements;
diversity and redundancy of safety functions;
BDBA management;
reduction of human factor influence.
Improvements of AES-2006 in comparison with V-320
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
Increased thermal power to 3200 MW;
Increased unit electrical output to 1197 MW (Tcw=25oC);
Increased power unit efficiency coefficient to 37 % (gross);
Improved steam parameters at the exit from the steam generator to 7.0 MPa;
Improvement of safety characteristics (FCD<10-6).
Main Technical and Economical Parameters (for one Unit AES-2006)
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
# Parameter
1 Installed nominal output per one power unit, Mwe 1197
2 Service life, years 60
3 Power plant efficiency, % (gross) 37. 0
4 Power plant efficiency, % (net) 34.5
5 House load consumption, % 7.0
6 Availability factor, % 92.0
7 Number of operating personnel (person/MW) 0.42
8 Fuel campaign duration (i.e. fuel life in the core) (years) 4
9 Design basis maximum fuel burn-up (average per fuel assembly)
(MWd/kgU)
60
10 Period of refueling, months 12 (18)
1 – Essential Cooling Water pump
2 – Heat exchangers of Intermediate
cooling circuit for important
consumers
3 – Intermediate circuit pump
4 – Exchanger of the spent fuel pool
5 – Low-pressure pump of the
emergency injection system
6 – High-pressure pump of the
emergency injection system
7 – Emergency feed water pump
8 – Storage tanks with high
concentration boric acid
9 – Emergency boration system pump
10 – Storage tanks with boric acid
solution
11 – Emergency boration system
pump
12 – Storage tank of chemical
reagents
13 – Chemical reagents supply pump
14 – Containment Spray system pump
15 – Filter
16 – Deaerator of the volume and
chemical control system
17 – Pump of the volume and
chemical control system
18 – Ventilation stack
19 – Controlled leaks pump
20 – Controlled leaks tank
21 – External containment
22 – Steam generator
23 – Special water treatment plant
24 – After-cooler
25 – Spent fuel pool
26 – Bubbler tank
27 – Regeneration heat exchanger of
the volume and chemical control
system
28 – Reactor
29 – Reactor coolant pump
30 – Molten Core Catcher
31 – Emergency Core Cooling System
Sump and RWST
32 – Alkalis emergency reserve tank
33 – MSIV, safety and relief valves
unit
34 – Containment
35 – Pressurizer
36 – Hydroaccumulators
37 – Passive cooling system tank
38 – Condenser of the containment
passive cooling system
39 – Spray systems collector
40 – Passive hydrogen recombinator
41 – High-pressure heaters
42 – Electric-driven auxiliary feed
water pump
43 – Deaerator
44 – Electric-driven feed water pump
45 – Condenser
46 – Low-pressure heaters
47 – Condensate pumps of the first
stage
48 – Unit demineralised plant
49 – Main condensate treatment
50 – Superheater
51 – Circulation water pumps
(cooling apparatuses)
52 – Service water pump
53 – Machine hall consumers
54 – Standby step down transformer
55 – Generator
56 – Low-pressure part of the turbine
57 – Intermediate-pressure part of the
turbine
58 – High-pressure part of the turbine
59 – Boost pump
60 – Condensate pumps for Unit
demiralisation plant
61 – Emergency feed water pump
62 – Demineralized water storage
tank
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
Principal Diagram
Plant Layout
Concentration of all building of Nuclear Island around the Reactor Building;
Minimization of radioactive influence on the staff;
Physical division of the buildings which contains safety components into safety trains by the fire protected walls;
Reduction the lengths of communications between buildings: pipes, cabling etc;
Turbine building arrangement excludes the possibility of reactor building damage by the missiles from turbine;
Capabilities of access control to Nuclear Island buildings;
Optimized systems layout for better workflow and reduction of capital and operating costs.
The area of the Site (for two units), including cooling towers and other hydro-technical constructions, is 90 hectare.
Reactor Building
Turbine Building
Safety Building
Control Building Steam Cell
Auxiliary Building Fuel Storage Building
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
Main Equipment
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
321
291
The main safety measures in
comparison with V-320
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
ЯППУ С РУ В-491СОСТОЯНИЕ ТОПЛИВА
ГАЗОНЕПЛОТНЫЕ ТВЭЛЫ-0.2%
ДЕФЕКТНЫЕ ТВЭЛЫ-0.02%
ТЕПЛОНОСИТЕЛЬ ПЕРВОГО КОНТУРА
АКТИВНОСТЬ,Бк/кг:
ПРОДУКТЫ ДЕЛЕНИЯ (ИРГ-64%,ИОДЫ- -14%)-2.0Е8
ПРОДУКТЫ КОРРОЗИИ -1.0Е4ТРИТИЙ -7.4Е6
ПРОТЕЧКАнеорганизованная
0.1 Т/ЧАС
АКТИВНОСТЬ ВОЗДУХА, Бк/м3ПРОДУКТЫ ДЕЛЕНИЯ -2.0Е6
(ИРГ- 94%,ИОДЫ- < 0.1%)
ПРОТЕЧКА ГЦН
4.8 Т/ЧАС
ПРОБООТБОРорганиз. протечки
0.45 Т/ЧАС
ВЫВОДТЕПЛОНОСИТЕЛЯ
1060 Т/ГОД
ПРОТЕЧКА ВОВТОРОЙ КОНТУР
1 КГ/ЧАС
КОНТУРОЧИСТКИ KBE
КОНТУР ОЧИСТКИ
КВА10ВВ001
КОНТУР КВВ
В ПЕРВЫЙ КОНТУР
КОНТУРKBF,KPF,KPK,JNK
КОНТУР ОЧИСТКИKPL-3
4.4Е3
ВТОРОЙ КОНТУР
АКТИВНОСТЬ ПАРА, Бк/кг:
ПРОДУКТЫ ДЕЛЕНИЯ
(ИРГ-87%,ИОДЫ-12%) -3.3Е1ПРОДУКТЫ КОРРОЗИИ -4.0Е-4ТРИТИЙ -1.3Е2
ПРОТЕЧКА
неорганизованная
100 Т/Ч
АКТИВНОСТЬ ВОЗДУХА,Бк/м3НИЖЕ ДОАнас
ВЫБРОС(ГБк/год)
2.6Е-1(ИРГ-87%)
ТРИТИЙ 1.2Е0
ЖИДКИЕ СРЕДЫ
ВОЗДУХ
ТЕХНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ СДУВКИ
ГРАНИЦА ЗКД
БАККТА10ВВ001
КОНТУР ОЧИСТКИ
КВА10ВВ001
ПРОТЕЧКАнеорганизованная
30 КГ/ЧАС
АКТИВНОСТЬ ВОЗДУХА,Бк/м3ПРОДУКТЫ ДЕЛЕНИЯ - 8.6Е2
(ИРГ-90%,ИОДЫ- - 0.2%)
КОНТУР ОЧИСТКИ
KLD-20
КОНТУР ОЧИСТКИKLD-10
КОНТУР ОЧИСТКИKLЕ-30
КОНТУР ОЧИСТКИ
KPL-2
ОСТАНОВ БЛОКА
РА
БО
ТА
НА
МО
ЩН
ОС
ТИ
7.0Е21.4Е2
ТРИТИЙ-5.0Е14.0Е4
ТРИТИЙ-3.9Е3
4.6Е4(ИРГ-99%,ИОДЫ<0.1%
АЭРОЗОЛИ<0.1%)
ТРИТИЙ-3.9Е3
ГЕ
РМ
ЕТ
ИЧ
НЫ
Й Б
ОК
С О
СН
ОВ
НО
ГО
ОБ
ОР
УД
ОВ
АН
ИЯ
1Е
10
М3
/ГО
Д
ЗД
АН
ИЕ
ТУ
РБ
ИН
Ы
ВЫБРОС(ГБк/год)ВЫБРОС(ГБк/год)ВЫБРОС(ГБк/год)ВЫБРОС(ГБк/год)
ВЫБРОС(ГБк/год)
1.2
Е9
м3
/го
д
РК
ПАР НА ТУРБИНУ
6468.5 Т/Ч
ВО ВТОРОЙ КОНТУР
ОСТАНОВБЛОКА
ГЕ
РМ
ЕТ
ИЧ
НЫ
Й Б
ОК
С О
СН
ОВ
НО
ГО
ОБ
ОР
УД
ОВ
АН
ИЯ
БО
КС
Ы
ВС
ПО
МО
ГА
ТЕ
ЛЬ
НО
ГО
О
БО
РУ
ДО
ВА
НИ
Я
КОНТУР ОЧИСТКИKLA13
РК
РК РКРК РК
Redundancy and
physical separation
Low volume of radioactive
emission
External impacts
protection
Defense in
Depth and
Diversity
I&C for safety functions
Safety systems for
BDA and measures
for BDBA
management 4 versus
3 trains
Diversity
of all SF Core Catch.,
PHRS…
D-Cont,
Aircraft Crash,
DBE=0,25g
Independence
DiD levels
Diversity, CCF
Designs Features Comparison
V-320 AES-91 MIR-1200/AES-2006
3 safety trains 4 safety trains 4 safety trains
Single containment Double containment Double containment
- Engineering measures for
BDBA management (H2-
recombiners, core catcher,
etc.)
Engineering measures for
BDBA management (H2-
recombiners, core catcher,
etc.)
- Enhanced seismic stability Enhanced seismic stability
- - C-PHRS and PHRS-SG
(BDBA)
- - Independence from outer
power supply – 72 hours
- - Emergency Storage Water
Tank inside the Containment
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
1
2
3
4
5
67
Main features of the Design
Optimal combination of passive and active
heat removal systems (HRS) Conventional active HRS
Newest additional Passive HRS
via Steam Generators
from the Containment
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
Measures for severe accident
management
Main features of the Design
Hydrogen Removal System
Core Catcher
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
Design Basis Conditions (DBC) and Design Extension Conditions (DEC)
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
For each category of design conditions the acceptance criteria are stated and made
safety analyzes to justify them.
CCF,
EEI*
Severe
Accidents
*) CCF – some of Common Cause
Failure events
EEI – some of Extremely External
Impacts
In the deterministic safety analysis, as per the level of possible negative consequences and an occurrence probability, the list of Design Conditions is divided into the several categories
For previous designs there was
only three categories:
- Normal operation;
- Anticipated transients;
- Accidents.
Radiation Safety for Population at Accidents
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
DBA:
Dose incurred by population will not exceed the operational dose limit established for normal NPP operation;
Radius of emergency protection area doesn’t exceed 0.8 km around reactor (i.e. limited by Site boundary).
Severe accidents:
Evacuation of people closely living near the NPP are not required;
Radius of area where protection measures for population are planned doesn’t exceed 3 km.
Safety Plant Assurance from the Fukushima Point of View
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
The “stress test” analyze was fulfilled for Leningrad NPP-2. Full list of
external impacts (including: flooding, tsunami, tornado, etc) was
considered.
Within the framework of “Stress tests” an expert engineering evaluation of
seismic strength of inner containment was performed to determine threshold
seismic impact value.
There was made analyze of following initiating events:
loss of all electrical power supply sources, including station black out;
loss of the ultimate heat sink;
combination of both.
Seismicity Resistance Analyze
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
The evaluation is performed by means of the following methods:
Direct strength analysis of containment as per linear and spectra theory of seismic stability at step-by-step increasing of acceleration level;
Evaluation based on design experience and seismic fragility test of this type of construction is performed as per recommendations of EPRI-NP-6041.
Conclusion:
Taking the minimum value of acceleration from obtained by these two methods, threshold value of maximum acceleration on the ground level is 0,51 g.
Current stage of the Designs
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
8 units of AES-2006:
Leningrad NPP – 2 Units under construction, 2 – in the process for construction permit;
Baltic NPP - 1 Unit under construction, 1Unit has Site Decision Permit;
Belorussia NPP – 2 Units under construction;
2 units of AES-91 under construction in China;
2 units of MIR.1200 in bid process for Temelin 3 and 4 in Czech Republic;
1 unit of AES-2006 is being considered for construction in Finland (Feasibility Study);
other possible bid competitions and contracts.
Assessment Methodology
for Innovative Nuclear Energy Systems (general comments and notes)
Recently the final report of an INPRO assessment of the
planned nuclear energy system (AES-2006), performed by
Belarusian experts in 2009-2011, was published by IAEA.
This publication is a clear evidence that it is necessary for
designers and/or technology holders make support or assist
of potential future NPP owners in this activity. Because
whether assessor doesn’t have actual design information, he
can take it from not-reliable sources, than, based on it, made
not correct evaluation and could disserve to the vendor (or
technology holder).
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
The Positives Effects from Cooperation
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
The cooperation of technology holder and potential NPP owners in
INPRO assessment may have following positive effects for each
party:
Popularization of certain design;
Additional self estimation of designer;
Independence estimation implemented by owner’s and IAEA’s
experts;
To contribute more opening of nuclear technology for public;
Increasing of owners competence level and knowledge of the
design and nuclear technology as a whole;
Stimulation of healthy competition among technology holders.
Criteria for the Assessment
For consideration at the Forum there were chosen following
criteria:
2-nd presentation (Mr. Michael Bykov):
CR 1.1.1 Robustness;
CR 1.2.1 Inherent characteristics;
CR 1.2.3 Inertia;
3-rd presentation (Mr. Michael Bykov):
CR 1.2.2 Grace period;
CR 1.3.2 Grace period;
CR 1.3.3 Safety features;
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
4-th presentation (Mr. Michael Bykov):
CR 1.3.4 Barriers;
CR 1.3.5 Controlled state;
CR 1.3.6 Subcriticality
5-th presentation (Mr. Denis Kolchinsky):
CR 1.4.1 Major release into containment
CR 1.4.2 Process
CR 1.4.3 Accident management;
6-th presentation (Mr. Denis Kolchinsky):
CR 1.6.1 Independent of defense in depth.
Criteria for the Assessment
(continuation)
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna
Thank you for the attention!
19-22 November, 2013 INPRO Forum, IAEA, Vienna