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AFCEA Nova 2010Future of the AFNET
Art “Wally” Wachdorf24 AF/CA
1
21 Oct 2010
Endstate
• Fully integrated air, space, and cyberspace operations in support of the Joint warfighter
• A secure cyberspace domain• A secure cyberspace domain that enables effective Defensive Counter-Cyber operationsoperations
• Cyberspace superiority that enables "Freedom of Action" in support of the Joint Fight
2
Two Pronged Approach
Architecture Enables Operations
Secure cyberspace architecture
Robust Dynamic Defensivearchitecture
based on operational
strategy
Defensive Operations in support of the
mission
3
Operational Requirements Drive Architecture
Unclassified Mission Assurance vs. Network Assurance
Mission Assurance Network Assurance• Operational focus (A3) • Service provider focus (A6)• Assure mission • Assure the network• Focuses on operational need
• Focuses on service availability
P i iti d f b d Att t t d f d ti• Prioritize defense basedon critical asset lists
• Attempts to defend entire network
• Proactive based on • Reactive based on• Proactive based on intelligence preparation
• Reactive based on observed enemy activity
• Fight through the attack • Disconnect if attacked
4Unclassified
Fight through the attack Disconnect if attacked
Changing Direction
Rapid Tech Inserts Enterprise or Msn
specific
Operational Inputs UONs – adjust legacy
ff t
specific Virtual technology Random network On-Network tech
efforts Joint Orders OPORDs Mission Orders TTPs
Strategy Based Network“Mission Assurance”
Ongoing Legacy EffortsOngoing Legacy Efforts ADX Migration Gateway Consolidation 2nd Gen Wireless 624 OC SA
5
624 OC SA TTS (Remedy) AFNet Increment 2 Improved Legacy Network
Unclassified Case for a Strategy Based Architecture
• Defense of the AF Network is essential to success of all Air Force operationsall Air Force operations
• Operational imperatives must drive all future technical and systems decisionstechnical and systems decisions
• Overall strategy drives all operational planning and serves as the foundationserves as the foundation
• The operational warfighter must be able to configure the battlespace to support his operational scheme p pp pand defensive strategies
6Unclassified
Unclassified
Assumptions
• The AFNet will remain a contested domain• The threat will continue to evolve and they will• The threat will continue to evolve and they will
continue to leverage the newest technologies. • Intent behind threat activity is difficult or impossibleIntent behind threat activity is difficult or impossible
to ascertain • Nation and non-nation state actors will use cyber
operations to support a larger strategy • The AFNet is a vastly complicated, heterogeneous
t i th t t b b l t l denterprise that cannot be absolutely secured • The AFNet will continue to have dependencies and
interconnections with DoD industry and other
7Unclassified
interconnections with DoD, industry, and other organizations
Unclassified
Operational Strategies
• Layered defenseO• Secure Enclaves
• Trust Management
Operational Imperatives Mission Assurance Operate Through an
• Trusted systems
• Stealth
p gAttack
Defend Priority Targets (Defended Asset List)Stealth
• Simplicity Resilience – “Last
Known Good” Positive Command and
• Cyber Maneuver Control
8Unclassified
New Paradigm -- Strategy Drives the Architecture
Acquisition Process
• Increasingly dynamic environment• Streamline acquisition processes
• Rapid capability deliveryOps&
Innovation • Meet warfighter needsInnovation
CurrentCurrent Rapid
(UON/JUON)
Foundational
9
Unclassified
QUESTIONS?10Unclassified
QUESTIONS?