Cover Sheet for Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-1, Air Warfare OPR: LeMay Center/DD 28 July 2011

AFDD numbering has changed to correspond with the joint doctrine publication numbering architecture (the AFDD titles remain unchanged until the doctrine is revised). Any AFDD citations within the documents will list the old AFDD numbers until the doctrine is revised. The changed numbers follow: OLD NEW TITLE AFDD 2-1 changed to AFDD 3-1 Air Warfare AFDD 2-1.1 changed to AFDD 3-01 Counterair Operations AFDD 2-1.2 changed to AFDD 3-70 Strategic Attack AFDD 2-1.3 changed to AFDD 3-03 Counterland Operations AFDD 2-1.4 changed to AFDD 3-04 Countersea Operations AFDD 2-1.6 changed to AFDD 3-50 Personnel Recovery Operations AFDD 2-1.7 changed to AFDD 3-52 Airspace Control AFDD 2-1.8 changed to AFDD 3-40 Counter-CBRN AFDD 2-1.9 changed to AFDD 3-60 Targeting AFDD 2-10 changed to AFDD 3-27 Homeland Operations AFDD 2-12 changed to AFDD 3-72 Nuclear Operations AFDD 2-2 changed to AFDD 3-14 Space Operations AFDD 2-2.1 changed to AFDD 3-14.1 Counterspace Operations AFDD 2-3 changed to AFDD 3-24 Irregular Warfare AFDD 2-3.1 changed to AFDD 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense AFDD 2-4 changed to AFDD 4-0 Combat Support AFDD 2-4.1 changed to AFDD 3-10 Force Protection AFDD 2-4.2 changed to AFDD 4-02 Health Services AFDD 2-4.4 changed to AFDD 4-11 Bases, Infrastructure, and Facilities [Rescinded] AFDD 2-4.5 changed to AFDD 1-04 Legal Support AFDD 2-5 changed to AFDD 3-13 Information Operations AFDD 2-5.1 changed to AFDD 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare AFDD 2-5.3 changed to AFDD 3-61 Public Affairs Operations AFDD 2-6 changed to AFDD 3-17 Air Mobility Operations AFDD 2-7 changed to AFDD 3-05 Special Operations AFDD 2-8 changed to AFDD 6-0 Command and Control AFDD 2-9 changed to AFDD 2-0 ISR Operations AFDD 2-9.1 changed to AFDD 3-59 Weather Operations

AIR WARFARE

Air Force Doctrine Document 3-1 22 January 2000

Incorporating Change 1, 28 July 2011

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations

BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 3-1 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 22 JANUARY 2000

INCORPORATING CHANGE 1, 28 JULY 2011

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This Interim change to Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1, changes the cover to AFDD 3-1, Air Warfare to reflect revised AFI 10-1301, Air Force Doctrine (9 August 2010). AFDD numbering has changed to correspond with the joint doctrine publication numbering architecture. AFDD titles and content remain unchanged until updated in the next full revision. A margin bar indicates newly revised material. OPR: LeMay Center/DD Certified by: LeMay Center/DD (Col Todd C. Westhauser) Pages: 116 Accessibility: Available on the e-publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading Releasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication Approved by: LeMay Center/CC, Maj Gen Thomas K. Andersen, USAF Commander, LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education

iFOREWORD

Since the Wright Brothers first flew at Kitty Hawk, the airplanehas continually evolved as an instrument of military and nationalpower. Today, the proper employment of aerospace power is essential forsuccess on and over the modern battlefield. In many instances it will be themilitary power of choice. Future advances in stealth, precision, andlethality will make aerospace power increasingly more effective at alllevels of warfare across the range of military operations. Airmen mustnot only understand the employment of aerospace power, but be ableto articulate the principles of air warfare.

Operation DESERT STORM (1991) validated the concept of a campaignin which aerospace power, applied simultaneously against strategic andoperational centers of gravity (COGs), rendered opposing military forcesvirtually ineffective. Aerospace power emerged as a dominant form ofmilitary might. It was decisive primarily because it achieved paralysis ofthe enemy at all levels of war with minimal casualties to friendly forces.Recent events in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) continue to re-validatethat air warfare, using aerospace power and a joint air operations plan(JAOP), will continue to be an essential and sometimes decisive tool infuture military operations. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, AirWarfare, provides a basis for understanding, planning, and executing airwarfare.

The US Air Force has adopted the term aerospace to describe themedium within which its forces operate and has applied the term to thosebroad and enduring concepts that apply across the entire medium. Theseparate terms air and space continue to be used when describing thosespecific tasks, missions, or platforms that apply strictly to the air or spaceenvironment.

MICHAEL E. RYANGeneral, USAFChief of Staff

22 January 2000

ii

iii

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... v

CHAPTER ONEAir Warfare Fundamentals ................................... 1Strategy ............................................................................................... 1The Joint Force Commanders (JFC) Campaign ................................ 1Air Operations and Aerospace Strategy .............................................. 2

Asymmetric Strategy ...................................................................... 3Functions, Effects, and Missions ........................................................ 5

Counterair ...................................................................................... 8Counterspace ................................................................................ 10Counterland ................................................................................. 10Countersea ................................................................................... 13Counterinformation ..................................................................... 13Strategic Attack............................................................................. 14Command and Control ................................................................. 14Airlift ............................................................................................ 17Air Refueling ................................................................................ 18Spacelift ........................................................................................ 18Special Operations Employment .................................................. 19Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) ................. 20Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) .............................................. 22Navigation and Positioning .......................................................... 23Weather Services .......................................................................... 23

Unity of Command ........................................................................... 24Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)....................... 24JFACC Designation ....................................................................... 25JFACC Responsibilities and Authority .......................................... 25

Joint Force Air Assets ....................................................................... 26Examples of Air Warfare ................................................................... 28

Guerilla Warfare ........................................................................... 28Forced Entry ................................................................................. 30Decisive Halt ................................................................................ 31Global Conflict ............................................................................. 32

CHAPTER TWOAir Warfare Planning ......................................... 35Overall Joint Planning ...................................................................... 35The Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) ............................................. 38Planning Joint Air Operations .......................................................... 39

JAOP Planning Process................................................................. 39

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iv

Phasing ......................................................................................... 41Measures of Success ..................................................................... 43JAOP Planning Factors ................................................................. 44

Tools for Joint Air Operations Planning ........................................... 46Strategic Appreciation .................................................................. 46Air Estimate of the Situation ........................................................ 46JAOP Format ................................................................................ 47

CHAPTER THREEExecuting Air Warfare ................................... 49Apportionment ................................................................................. 50Target Development ......................................................................... 51Allocation and Weaponeering........................................................... 51

Master Air Attack Plan ................................................................. 51Weaponeering ............................................................................... 53

Air Tasking Order (ATO) Development ............................................ 54Theater Air Control System.............................................................. 54

Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) ............................................ 55Other Centers and Liaison Elements ........................................... 56Ground Elements ......................................................................... 57Airborne Elements ....................................................................... 59

CHAPTER FOURTraining and Education for Air Warfare ....... 63Training Factors ................................................................................ 63Battle Management Training ............................................................ 63Aircrew Training ............................................................................... 64Exercises and Wargaming ................................................................. 65Education .......................................................................................... 67

Professional Continuing Education (PCE) ................................... 67Professional Military Education (PME) ........................................ 68Graduate Education ...................................................................... 68

Suggested Readings ............................................................................ 71

APPENDICES ....................................................................................... 73A. The Strategic Appreciation ......................................................... 73B. The Air Estimate of the Situation ................................................ 77C. Sample Joint Air Operations Plan Format .................................. 83D. Sample Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL) ............. 87E. Sample Master Air Attack Plan ................................................... 89F. Sample Air Tasking Order ........................................................... 91G. Additional Planning Tools ........................................................... 93

Glossary .............................................................................................. 101

vINTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) implements Air Force PolicyDirective (AFPD) 10-13, Air and Space Doctrine. AFDD 2-1 Air Warfareestablishes operational doctrine for air warfare. It provides initialguidance for conducting air operations as part of aerospace warfare.Specifically, this document contains beliefs and principles that guidethe organization, command and control, employment, and support of airforces conducting wartime operations. It examines relationships amongobjectives, forces, environments, and actions that enhance the ability ofair operations to contribute to achieving assigned objectives. It focuseson the sequencing of events and the application of forces and resources toensure aerospace power makes useful contributions to military andnational objectives. It examines the importance of command relation-ships, intelligence, space, logistics, and other factors to the planning andconduct of air warfare.

APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to all Air Force military and civilian personnel(includes Air Force Reserve Command [AFRC] and Air National Guard[ANG] units and members). The doctrine in this document is authorita-tive but not directive. Therefore, commanders need to consider not onlythe contents of this AFDD, but also the particular situation when accom-plishing the mission.

This document supports the fundamental concept of a single com-mander who is responsible for the planning and conduct of aerospacewarfare in a theater of operations. This single commander is codified injoint doctrine as the joint force air component commander (JFACC).

Air power has become predominant, both as a deterrent to war,andin the eventuality of waras the devastating force to destroyan enemys potential and totally undermine his will to wage war.

General Omar Bradley

vi

SCOPE

This document focuses on the operational and strategic maneu-ver aspects of air warfare in theater and global operations. Thisdocument does not specifically address military operations other thanwar (MOOTW), but the doctrinal guidance in this document can beapplied to MOOTW where appropriate. Furthermore, this document alsodoes not specifically address airlift, but many portions apply to airlift aspart of an overall air operation. Other doctrine documents providespecific guidance on MOOTW and airlift operations. Additional informa-tion on Air Warfare may be found in subordinate operational- andtactical-level doctrine.

1CHAPTER ONE

AIR WARFARE FUNDAMENTALS

STRATEGY

Strategy is a means to accomplish an end. Since overall theaterstrategy for employment of US forces is normally developed jointly, it isimperative that aerospace power be properly represented at the highest lev-els of strategy development. It is not prudent to wait for a theater strategy,emphasizing surface maneuver to be developed, and then create a support-ing air strategy. There are opportunities for a balanced, integrated strategyto be developed, and in some cases, an effective air-centric approach at thetheater level would be an optimum use of available forces. But withoutadequate air and space expertise at that level, planning has historicallydevolved to an emphasis on surface warfare operations and objectives andhow they can be supported by aerospace power. This does not imply thataerospace power is the answer in every case, but it does mandate that theater-levelplanning include examining aerospace power options from the beginning.

THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDERS (JFC) CAMPAIGN

The JFCs campaign is a series of major operations that arrangetactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategicand operational objectives. Wartime campaigns integrate air, land, sea,space and special operations, interagency and multinational operations inharmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attainnational and multinational objectives.

To conquer the command of the air means victory; to be beaten inthe air means defeat and acceptance of whatever terms the enemymay be pleased to impose.

Giulio Douhet

Strategy is the employment of battle to gain the end in war; itmust therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which mustbe in accordance with the object of the war; in other words, strategyforms the plan of the war.

Carl von Clausewitz

2Air operations involve the employment of air assets by them-selves or in concert with other assets or forces and are part of theoverall joint campaign. They can be used as the primary focus of theJFCs theater campaign plan, as in Operation ALLIED FORCE, or they cancomplement and reinforce the employment of other forces. No matterwhat type of air operation is used in the joint strategy, a joint air opera-tions plan (JAOP) is the essential aerospace ingredient in the JFCs over-all campaign plan. The JAOP links specific air and space objectives andtasks with overall military and political strategy. It also describes centersof gravity, phasing of operations, and resources required. It describeshow aerospace power is used to achieve the overall theater and strategicobjectives. It explains how other forces will support air and space opera-tions, taking advantage of the synergism between aerospace and otherforces. It also shows how air forces will complement and support otherforces to achieve joint objectives. Like the overall theater plan, the JAOPcarries through to the conclusion of the joint campaign and describes thedesired end state.

AIR OPERATIONS AND AEROSPACE STRATEGY

Every JAOP should include a desired outcome, target set, and amechanism for achieving the desired outcome. The task of the airstrategist is to translate a number of conflicting and competing targetingrequirements into a workable JFC air operations plan that supports theoverall joint campaign. This is done by first asking three fundamentalquestions: What is the goal? How much is it worth to achieve that goal?and What is it worth to the enemy to prevent friendly forces fromachieving it? These are vital questions, and Bismarcks famous dictum,Woe to the statesman whose reasons for entering a war are not as clear atthe end as at the beginning, is absolutely correct. Once these basic

3questions are addressed, the strategist devises a joint campaign plan toanswer them, with a joint force air operation as part of it. This involvestransforming broad goals into specific military objectives, identifying thetarget sets that need to be affected (not necessarily destroyed) to attainthose objectives, and then converting the whole into a coordinated opera-tions order (OPORD) that can be implemented by the military forces in-volved. It cannot be overemphasized that there must be a clear linkage be-tween the targets chosen and the objectives sought. If the overall objective isto force the enemy to halt an invasion of a neighboring country, thenhow, exactly, will striking the power gridor munitions factory, or ar-mored divisions, or intelligence headquarterscontribute towards achiev-ing that objective? In other words, just because a target is destroyed orneutralized does not mean objectives were achieved. The process of link-ing ends and means is a critical requirement for the air strategist. Theultimate results are often psychological in nature; war is after all a hu-man endeavor, and attempting to predict human reaction too preciselycan be difficult. Nevertheless, understanding the links between causeand either physical or psychological effect is a key part of air warfareplanning. Failure to properly analyze the mechanism that ties tacticalresults to strategic effects has historically been the shortcoming of both airpowertheorists and strategists.

Asymmetric Force Strategy

A number of developments in recent years have contributed tothe emergence of a new American way of war. US military forcesnow employ sophisticated military capabilities to achieve national ob-jectives and avoid costly force-on-force engagements that characterizedthe traditional strategies of attrition and annihilation that evolved fromnineteenth century warfare. Airpower is particularly relevant to this newway of war or, as it is commonly referred to, asymmetric force strategy.Asymmetric force strategy dictates applying US strengths against adver-sary vulnerabilities and enabling the US to directly attack an enemyscenters of gravity (COGs) without placing Americans or allies at riskunnecessarily. Five key components of asymmetric force strategy are:

The commanders conceptualization of the battlespace usesinformation to conceive a strategy for employment. It includes col-lecting and exploiting the information necessary to identify threats andopportunities regarding national interests and preparing the area ofconcern to initiate and conduct operations. This is a key step to

4perform before committing resources to an operation. A key part ofmaintaining consistency in this effort is intelligence preparation of thebattlespace (IPB).

Controlling the battlespace means exercising the degree of controlnecessary in all media (land, sea, and aerospace, in both their physicaland information domains) to employ, maneuver, and engage forces whiledenying the same capability to the adversary. To position forces andmaximize the effectiveness of maneuver for decisive effect, commandersshould have freedom of operation. Forces and lines of communicationshould be protected from a diverse set of threats to obtain that freedom ofaction and to ensure the ability of friendly forces to deploy, maneuver,and engage an opponent. Battlespace control includes a number ofactive measures such as ensuring aerospace and maritime superiority.Furthermore, information superiority and control of the use of the elec-tromagnetic spectrum also plays a critical role in battlespace control.The form of battlespace control most often practiced by aerospace forces is airsuperiority, which enables friendly forces to use the air medium for militarypurposes while denying the enemy effective use of the same.

Decisive maneuver is positioning forces to gain favorable advantagesover an adversary or event in anticipation of engagement or strike.Maneuver is inherent in aerospace power. Decisive maneuver requiresrapidly deployable, highly mobile joint forces that can outpace and out-maneuver opposing forces. These forces should be adept at sustainedand integrated operations from dispersed postures. During operations,forces are positioned so they might rapidly transition to precisionemployment, applying appropriate combinations of lethal and nonlethalattacks against the enemy. The speed, range, and flexibility of air andspace assets make them uniquely qualified to employ rapid maneuveragainst the enemy for maximum effect. Aerospace power alone possessesthe capability to bypass the bulk of enemy forces and maneuver directly totheir vital targets, whether the targets be critical-fielded forces or key strategiccenters.

Aerospace powers inherent ability to maneuver also lends itself tostrategic mobility. As the US Air Force adopts a more expeditionaryposture, with air expeditionary forces (AEFs) on alert for contingencydeployments, the ability to quickly deploy decisive combat power to troublespots will become more important. Forward deployable aerospace combatpower, along with continental US (CONUS)-based global power, is vital tothe protection of US national interests.

5 Precision employment is the direct application of force to degradean adversarys capability or will, or the employment of forces to affectan event. Airpower assets can effectively engage the adversary onland, in the air, or at sea throughout the depth of the battlespace andcan deny the enemy the use of space by attacking vital ground nodessuch as launch and communications facilities. Precision employmentincludes the application of force and supplies to achieve the desiredresult, along with the required information to make that employmenttruly precise.

Integrated sustainment is the ability to effectively deploy and main-tain forces. Integrated sustainment includes logistics, readiness, facili-ties, and modernization.

A key part of asymmetric force strategy as employed by aerospacepower is the concept of parallel attack. Parallel attack is defined as simul-taneous attack of varied target sets to shock, disrupt, or overwhelm anenemy, resulting in decisive effects. Parallel attack is possible at one ormultiple levels of war and achieves rapid effects that leave the enemylittle time to respond. Because of its speed, range, flexibility, and abilityto maneuver as required to locate and precisely attack targets whileneutralizing or avoiding threats, aerospace power is uniquely suited toconducting rapid, parallel attacks against the enemy. The three-dimen-sional maneuver capability of aerospace forces allows them to avoidnoncritical enemy forces or defenses much more easily than surface forces.As figure 1.1 depicts, air and space operations can support multiple simulta-neous missions, and can easily flow from one phase, objective, or effect to thenext as simply as changing targets for the next mission.

FUNCTIONS, EFFECTS, AND MISSIONS

Any discussion of the various aspects of air warfare requires a carefuldefinition of the terms involved. In this regard, it is easy to becomeconfused when comparing and contrasting the concepts of function, effect,and mission.

AFDD 1 defines functions as the broad, fundamental, andcontinuing activities of aerospace power. Examples include counterair,counterspace, countersea, counterland, strategic attack, counterinformation,etc. Functions are the means by which Services or components accom-plish the tasks assigned by the JFC.

6Mount DecisiveCounteroffensive

Build UpCombat Power;

Weaken theEnemy

Halt theInvading

Force

Traditional Ground-Centric View of Conflict

Modern View of Conflict

This is a Modern Culminating Point

MajorRegionalConflict

Halt the InvadingForce

Deploy and Sustain Forces

Gain/expandStrategicInitiative

Mount DecisiveCounteroffensive

Disable enemyregime

Punish/impose sanctions

Build up groundforces

These areBranches and

Sequels

Aggressors initiativeand options

Time

Time

Traditional Culminating Point

Deploy and Sustain Forces

!"!

7Effects are the operational- or strategic-level outcomes thatfunctions are intended to produce. For example, a joint force air com-ponent commander (JFACC) employs the function of counterair to achievethe effect of aerospace superiority, or employs the counterland functionto achieve the effect of battlefield isolation. The strategic attack functionis often aimed directly at producing the strategic effect of enemy defeat,with no intermediate level effects on enemy forces involved.

Any discussion of effect must include the concepts of direct and indirecteffects. Direct effects are those that result immediately from attackingthe target set or sets involved. For example, bombing enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and the associated command and control (C2)facilities may directly result in SAM and radar sites destroyed, but thecumulative indirect effect may be to achieve aerospace superiority acrossthe theater, which in turn allows other effects to be imposed on theenemy. Detailed analysis of interconnected indirect effects can easilybecome complex, and such effects are nearly impossible to predictexactly. General predictions, however, can be made that have success-fully guided aerospace strategy in conflicts from World War II toOperation ALLIED FORCE (1999).

Another point requiring clarification is the difference betweenstrategic attack and strategic effect. A strategic effect is the disruptionof the enemys strategy, ability, or will to wage war or carry out aggres-sive activity through destruction or disruption of their COGs or othervital target sets, including command elements, war production assets,fielded forces, and key supporting infrastructure. If an operation aimsdirectly at those key targets whose destruction or disruption can causestrategic effects, it is a strategic attack. Strategic effects can also indi-rectly result from the actions of aerospace or surface forces at the lowerlevels of war. An example of the latter would be destruction of the enemyarmy on the battlefield, which in turn impairs the enemy strategy to thepoint where it is forced to cease fighting. In this latter case, the resultsfrom the tactical level of war are eventually felt at the strategic level. Akey difference between aerospace power and surface warfare is that aerospaceforces can often strike directly at key target sets that have strategic results,without having to go through the process of drawn-out attrition at the tacticallevel of war. Analyzing the enemy for such critical targets is a fundamentalpart of aerospace warfare.

The term mission, as applied to the tactical level of war, describes thetask assigned to small units, flights or individual aircraft, missiles, or space-

8craft (This is different than the mission of the Air Force.). Therefore,these missions describe the immediate, tactical results (e.g., an enemyaircraft shot down or a bridge destroyed) and focus at the level of theoperator in the field and the specific tasks that must be performed. Theemphasis is more on affecting the enemy than on the platforms or weap-ons employed for the task. For example, destroying an enemy munitionsfactory is a strategic attack mission, while employing the same asset to cutan enemy supply route is an air interdiction mission. Unless there is athorough understanding of the aerospace functions, confusion can occurbased on the names of these functions since some of them also apply totactical missions, such as strategic attack and countersea. The followingsection briefly addresses US Air Force functions as listed in AFDD 1, andwhere applicable, further addresses the specific mission categories withineach.

Counterair

Counterair consists ofoperations to attain andmaintain a desired de-gree of air superiority bythe destruction or neu-tralization of enemyforces. Both offensiveand defensive actions areinvolved. The former in-volves aggressively neutral-izing enemy forces in-flightor the supporting infra-structure on the ground,while the latter describesreactively engaging en-emy aerospace forceswhich have alreadylaunched on an offensivemission. The speed, range,and three-dimensional van-tage point of air and spaceplatforms give them uniquecapabilities, as well as limita-tions, when compared toground or naval forces.

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9 Offensive counterair(OCA) m i s s i o n s u s eoffensive aerospace forcesto destroy, disrupt, or limitenemy air and missilethreats. OCA missionsproactively target enemyairborne forces, or thoseforces and supportinginfrastructure while on theground. Surface attackmissions represent the air-to-ground portion of OCAand disrupts or destroys selected targets including runwayscomplexes; hardened aircraft shelters; petroleum, oils, and lubricants(POL) and munitions storage facilities, and C2 facilities used by theenemy air force. The air-to-air portion of OCA is further broken downinto the missions of fighter sweep and escort. Fighter sweep employsair superiority fighters sweeping through a designated portion ofenemy airspace to sanitize any enemy air-to-air threat, while escortputs the air superiority fighters in a direct support role protecting lessair-to-air capable strike assets from enemy fighters. Modern multi-rolefighters often practice self-escort through the mixed carriage of long-range air-to-air missiles along with their standard air-to-groundweapons loads. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) is a pri-mary OCA mission designed to neutralize, destroy, or temporarilydegrade enemy surface based air defenses by destructive or disruptive means.

Defensive counterair (DCA) includes both active and passive mea-sures to protect friendly forces and vital interests from enemy air andmissile attacks. Active air defense missions use reactive air-to-air fight-ers or other assets placed on airborne or ground alert status to destroyattacking air and missile threats or to reduce their effectiveness againstfriendly forces and assets. Passive air defense includes all measures,other than active air defense, to minimize enemy effectiveness andincludes dispersion, camouflage, concealment, and hardened shelters.

Although some DCA missions are normally scheduled when enemy airattack is expected, air-to-ground OCA is typically the best way to employlimited assets against an air threat because it employs concentration ofeffects. DCA tends to disperse the counterair effort and many missions donot actually engage the enemy since attacking aircraft have the initiative.

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10

Counterspace

Counterspace is the function that attains and maintains spacesuperiority. The main objectives of counterspace operations are toallow friendly forces to exploit space capabilities, while negating theenemys ability to do the same. Air, space, land, sea, or special operationsforces can conduct them. Counterspace operations include both offen-sive and defensive components.

Offensive counterspace (OCS) missions destroy or neutralize anadversarys space capabilities through attacks on the various elementsof an adversarys space systems. Specific effects of OCS includedisruption, denial, degradation, deception, and destruction of enemyspace systems. OCS missions may include surface-to-surface or air-to-surface attack on launch facilities or space C2 nodes, jamming satelliteuplink and downlink frequencies, and could expand in the future tomore active attacks on vehicles in space.

Defensive counterspace (DCS) missions protect US space-relatedsystems and capabilities from enemy attack or interference. Theobjective of active DCS missions is to detect, track, identify, intercept,and neutralize or destroy enemy forces that threaten friendly spacecapability. Passive defenses protect and increase the survivability offriendly space forces and their products.

Counterland

Counterland involves those operations conducted to attain andmaintain a desired degree of superiority over surface operationsby the destruction or neutralization of enemy surface forces. Themain objectives of counterland are to dominate the surface environmentand prevent the opponent from doing the same. Counterland can eitherbe accomplished in direct or indirect support of large-scale ground opera-tions, or can be carried out with minimal or no friendly ground forces inthe area. When friendly ground forces are present, counterland tends tobe more effective at greater distances from the ground battle where fratri-cide is not an issue and the enemy may be more vulnerable. In the lattercase, counterland operations may represent the bulk of overall theaterstrategy. The ultimate expression of this doctrine is the decisive halt in whichthe enemy is both stopped short of reaching their objective, which may be to

11

engage friendly ground forces and/or take territory, and destroyed or disruptedto such a degree that continued fighting is no longer possible. Missions thatare used to perform counterland are air interdiction (AI) and close airsupport (CAS).

Air interdiction is a form of aerial maneuver that destroys, disrupts,diverts, or delays the enemys surface military potential before it canbe used effectively against friendly forces, or otherwise achieve itsobjectives. Typical targets for AI are lines of communication, supplycenters, command and control nodes, or fielded forces. Air interdictionplanners typically look for targets that leverage the available air assets bycreating significant disruptions of the enemy through attacks on relativelyfew targets. Direct attack of fielded forces, one vehicle or artillerybattery at a time, is possible but tends to be a less efficient use of aero-space power. Air interdiction is either performed as part of an overalltheater-wide interdiction effort, which typically aims to isolate all orpart of the battlefield from its source of support and reinforcement, oras a more local effort in response to the needs of ground combat. When-ever AI is flown in the vicinity of ground operations, the two achievethe greatest results when the efforts are integrated.

Close air support is the use of aerospace assets to directly supportthe ground force. CAS is flown against targets that are in close proximityto friendly forces; that proximity requires detailed integration betweenCAS missions andthe fire and move-ment of surfaceforces. In this con-text, forces in closeproximity areclose enough to en-gage one anotherwith organic weap-ons such as artil-lery. Enemy forcesthat are not withinthis range are moreproperly the tar-gets of AI ratherthan CAS. Longrange weapons thatdo not bring a pre-

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ponderance of fire to the battlefield, such as tactical ballistic missiles, arenot used to set the maximum distance of close proximity. While CAS isnot considered the most efficient mission for aerospace power, incritical ground combat situations it may be the most effective. Controlof close air support is performed by Air Force personnel attached tothe ground units being supported, working closely with their Armycounterparts. Tactical control of CAS always remains with the air compo-nent commander, not the ground commander.

In general terms, CAS should only be used when the surface forcecannot handle the enemy with organic firepower. This makes therequirement for CAS greater with light forces, such as airborne oramphibious units, and less for heavy units such as armored divisions.

Synergies at the Battle of Khafji

The Battle of Khafji was a critical event during the Gulf War and exemplifiedthe potential advantages of teaming information systems with interdiction as-sets. On January 29, 1991, two Iraqi heavy divisions began moving towardsallied forces near Al Khafji. Once detected by the joint surveillance, targetattack radar systems (JSTARS) sensors and mission crew, coalition command-ers quickly and decisively diverted airpower to counter the Iraqi offensive. Inthe three days and over 1,000 sorties that followed, the two Iraqi divisions wererendered ineffective. One Iraqi veteran described the coalition air attacks ascausing more damage in 30 minutes than in eight years of the Iran-Iraq War.

Coupled with the capabilities of its mission crew, the technology on boardJSTARS contributed in three critical ways. First, it located and tracked Iraqiarmor columns, immediately passing this information to airborne strike air-craft. Second, it gave commanders at the tactical air control center (TACC) asignificantly enhanced picture of the battlefield situation. Finally, it providedcritical insights about the Iraqis movements and intentions directly to coali-tion ground commanders throughout the Khafji operation.

Advanced information systems ensured that the coalition forces at the Battleof Khafji maintained a heightened sense of awareness throughout the opera-tion. Information technologies identified the enemys intent, combat units,and scheme of maneuver, thus enabling coalition commanders to divert assetsand decisively employ their airpower.

Airpower and the Iraqi Offensive at KahfjiAFSAA CD-ROM

13

Countersea

Countersea is a collateralfunction that extends theapplication of Air Forcepower into the maritimeenvironment. Specificcountersea missions includesurface warfare (antiship),undersea warfare (antisubma-rine), sea surveillance, andaerial minelaying. Otheraerospace power functionsand missions, such ascounterair and aerial refuel-ing, can support maritimeoperations in the joint envi-ronment. While these missionswill typically operate in supportof friendly naval forces, theymay be employed independentlywhen friendly naval forces arenot in the area.

Counterinformation

Counterinformation is the function that seeks to establish infor-mation superiority through control of the information realm. Likecounterair, counterinformation enables other functions and missions tooccur and can be broken down into offensive and defensive actions. Manycounterinformation actions directly achieve counterinformation objec-tives, while others are better seen as part of counterforce functions (as inthe case of employing anti-radiation missiles to achieve SEAD effects onthe enemy). Since the focus of air warfare planning is on achievingeffects on the enemy, the label placed on a given action is best determined bythe combination of function performed and effect achieved, rather than by thetype of weapon (information, electronic, or physical attack) used. A goodexample of this is the broad area called electronic warfare, whichperforms actions in many categories including air warfare and informa-tion operations.

One of the most successful sea-controlstrikes occurred off the east coast of NewGuinea in March 1943. In that battle, knownas the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, approxi-mately one hundred Allied planes, includingmodified B-25s carrying five-hundred-poundbombs, attacked and successfully destroyed anentire Japanese convoy. Flying at one hundredfeet above the ocean surface, American B-25sskipped their bombs across the water and intothe hulls of these ships. At the battles conclu-sion, 12 cargo ships and 4 Japanese destroyerswere sunk or severely damaged.

Dr. Donald D. ChipmanAIRPOWER: A New Way of

Warfare (Sea Control)Airpower Journal

Fall 1997

14

A key part of counterinformation is information attack. Infor-mation attack refers to those activities taken to manipulate or destroy anadversarys information or information system without necessarily changingvisibly the physical entity within which it resides. Although different fromthe conventional concepts of physical and electronic attack (EA), infor-mation attack can be an equally important part of air warfare.

In many cases, an attack on a specific target may have components oftwo or even all three forms of attack. Figure 1.2 illustrates this in moredetail and shows the connection among physical, information, and elec-tronic methods of attack and how they can interplay in the same action.Other cases may involve only one method at work.

Strategic Attack

Strategic attack isdefined as militaryaction carried outagainst an enemysCOGs or other vitaltarget sets, includingcommand elements,war-production assets,and key supporting in-frastructure. It affectsa level of destruction anddisintegration of theenemys military capac-ity to the point where theenemy no longer retainsthe ability or will to wagewar or carry out aggressive activity. The term strategic attack alsoapplies to the actual missions flown against strategic targets and is validwhen the primary value of those targets to the enemy exists at the strate-gic level of war. Whether a particular mission is labeled strategic should bebased primarily on the expected effects on the enemy and not on the type offorce used or the specific type of target attacked.

Command and Control

Command is the art of motivating and directing people and organiza-tions into action to accomplish missions. Control is inherent in

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command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute thecommanders intent. C2 includes both the process by which thecommander decides what action is to be taken and the system that

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A Use of electromagnetic jamming to deny key information to the enemy.

B Bombing an enemy C2 system represents both physical and information attack.

C Perhaps the oldest use of airpower, physical attack of enemy forces or industrial

production facilities represents pure physical attack.

D An example of all three would be the use of a high-speed anti-radiation missile(HARM) to target the acquisition radar of an enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) site

for the purpose of obtaining local air superiority through SEAD. The HARM guides

on the electronic emissions of the enemy radar, a form of electronic attack since it

uses the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. The actual detonation of the HARM war-

head on the radar is a method of physical attack. Once the radar is destroyed, the

SAM launch crew is denied the information required to acquire and track the friendly

strike package, which thus makes it through to the target.

16

directs and monitors the implementation of the decision. Specifi-cally, C2 includes the battlespace management process of planning,directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations. C2 involvesthe integration of systems, procedures, organizational structures, person-nel, equipment, facilities, information, and communications designed toenable a commander to exercise command and control across the rangeof military operations. Aerospace forces conduct command and control tomeet strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

Air Force units are employed in a joint force context by a joint forcecommander. C2 of those forces can be through a Service componentcommander or a functional component commander if more than oneServices air assets are involved. This officer, the JFACC, should be theService commander with the preponderance of air and space assets andthe capability to plan, task, and control joint air and space operations. Itis a basic principle of aerospace doctrine that C2 of air and space forces becentralized under one officeran airman.

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Airlift

Airlift is the transportation of personnel and materiel through theair and can be applied across the entire range of military operationsin support of national objectives. Airlift provides rapid and flexible force-mobility options that allow military forces to respond to and operate in awider variety of circumstances and time frames. A key function of the AirForce, airlift provides global reach for US military forces and the capabilityto quickly apply strategic global power to various crisis situations worldwideby delivering necessary forces. The power-projection capabilities that airliftsupplies are vital since it provides the flexibility to get expeditionary forcesto the point of a crisis with minimum delay. Accordingly, airlift is viewed asa foundation of US national security at the strategic level and as a crucialcapability for operational and tactical commanders within a theater. There-fore, airlift is not only a vital component of US defense policy but is critical tosupport overall national policy and objectives.

Air Force airlift operations are typically classified as intertheater orintratheater. Operational Support Airlift (OSA) comprises a third andspecial classification of airlift operations. These operations are defined bythe nature of the mission rather than the airframe used. Most aircraft arenot exclusively assigned to one operational classification. In fact, the major-ity of the airlift force is capable of accomplishing any classification of airlift.

Intertheater airlift provides the airbridge that links theaters tothe CONUS and to other theaters, as well as airlift within theCONUS. Due to the global ranges usually involved, intertheater airliftis normally comprised of the heavy, intercontinental airlift assets, butmay be augmented with shorter-range aircraft when required. Most ofthe forces responsible for executing intertheater airlift missions areunder the operational control (OPCON) of the Commander, Air Mobil-ity Command (AMC/CC).

Intratheater airlift provides the air movement of personnel andmateriel within a geographic CINCs AOR. Assets designated toprovide intratheater airlift are either assigned or attached to thatgeographic CINC. This classification of airlift is generally fulfilled byaircraft capable of operation under a wide range of tactical conditions,including small, austere, unimproved airfield operations. Intratheateroperations provide time-sensitive airlift to the commander, which maybe critically needed to fulfill theater objectives.

18

Operational support airlift is a special classification of operationsproviding for the timely movement of limited numbers of prioritypersonnel and cargo during wartime as well as peacetime. OSA opera-tions tend to be conducted by smaller-sized business type airframes.In most cases, these airframes are permanently assigned to a theatercomponent or major air command (MAJCOM). While OSA operationsare normally conducted in support of the assigned organizationsorganic requirements, OSA assets may be used to reduce extraordinaryworkload demands on the airlift system. United States TransportationCommand (USTRANSCOM) is responsible for the scheduling andexecution of OSA operations regarding CONUS based assets while theServices validate OSA requests.

Air Refueling

Air refueling is an integral part of US airpower across the rangeof military operations. Air refueling, along with airlift, fulfills the AirForce contribution to the joint mobility role. It significantly expands theemployment options available to a commander by increasing the range,endurance, payload, and flexibility of air forces. Therefore, aerial refuel-ing is an essential capability in the conduct of air operations worldwideand is especially important when overseas basing is limited or not avail-able. Air Force air refueling assets perform six basic missions: (1) SingleIntegrated Operation Plan (SIOP) support, (2) global attack support,(3) air bridge support, (4) deployment support, (5) theater support, and(6) special operations support.

Air refueling provides additional options for the air strategist. Ifforward locations are threatened, fighters and bombers may operate outof bases further to the rear for airbase security. The same option maywork for cases where forward bases are unavailable for political or otherreasons. A drawback to this option is increased mission duration, whichreduces the total number of sorties possible in a given period.

Spacelift

Spacelift projects power by delivering satellites, payloads, andmateriel into or through space. During a period of increased tensionor conflict, the spacelift objective is to launch or deploy new and replen-ishment space assets to achieve national security objectives. To satisfythis requirement, spacelift should be functional and flexible, capable ofmeeting the nations full range of launch requirements from placing space

19

systems in orbit. Equallyimportant, spacelift shouldbe timely and responsive tothe users needs. Air Forcespacelift operations areconducted to either deploy,sustain, or augment sat-ellite constellations sup-porting national securityobjectives.

Launch to deploydescr ibes launchesrequired to initiallyachieve a s a t e l l i t esystems designed op-erational capability. Inthis approach, space sys-tems are launched on apredetermined schedule.

Launch to sustaindescribes launches to re-place satellites that are predicted to fail or abruptly fail. They may bescheduled well in advance or may require unscheduled operations.

Launch to augment describes launches to increase operationalcapability in response to contingency requirements, crisis, or war.Unscheduled launches or payload adjustment on scheduled activitywill likely be required.

Special Operations Employment

Special operations employment is the use of special operations airpower,to conduct the following primary missions: unconventional warfare,direct action, special reconnaissance, combating terrorism, foreign inter-nal defense, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs, informationoperations, and counterproliferation. To execute special operations, AirForce special operations forces (AFSOF) are normally employed in smallformations capable of both independent and supporting operations,with the purpose of enabling timely and tailored responses across therange of military operations.

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AFSOF may accomplishtasks at the strategic,operational, or tacticallevels of war or other con-tingency operationsthrough the conduct oflow-visibility, covert, orclandestine military ac-tions. US Air Force specialoperations are usually con-ducted in enemy-controlledor politically sensitive terri-tories and may complementor support conventionaloperations. AFSOF may be part of a joint special operations forces (SOF)team that provides combatant commanders with a synergistic capabilityto accomplish specialized tasks.

Special operations differ from conventional operations inoperational techniques, mode of employment, degree of covert-ness, independence from friendly support, and dependence ondetailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Thosecircumstances are often dominated by high risk and political, environ-mental, and operational constraints. In addition, governments often viewthe use of SOF as a means to control escalation in situations in which theuse of conventional forces is unwarranted or undesirable. Accordingly,theater CINCs may choose to use special operations forces, workingeither independently or in support of conventional forces, to operate inrear areas to exploit enemy weaknesses or collect intelligence that wouldnot otherwise be available. However, it should be emphasized thatspecial operations forces can also operate as a strategic force indepen-dent of theater CINCs. Such employment should be carefully coordinatedto prevent conflict with other operations.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Intelligence provides clear, brief, relevant, and timely analysison foreign capabilities and intentions for planning and conduct-ing military operations. The overall objective of intelligence is to enablecommanders and combat forces to know the enemy. It helps commandersacross the range of military operations by collecting, analyzing, fusing,

21

tailoring, and disseminating intelligence to the right place at the righttime for key decision making. Intelligence provides indications ofenemy intentions and guides decisions on how, when, and where toengage enemy forces to achieve the commanders objectives. It assists incombat assessment through munitions-effects assessment and bomb-dam-age assessment.

Intelligence organizations integrate technical and quantitative assess-ments with analytical judgments based on detailed knowledge of theway the enemy thinks and operates. Intelligence personnel shouldmaintain an independent perspective. Commanders anticipate thateven the best intelligence may not provide a complete picture, espe-cially when the enemy is practicing deception or when the intelligenceis derived from a single source. Still, intelligence gives commandersthe best available estimate of enemy capabilities, COGs, and courses ofaction.

A useful tool for Air Force intelligence is intelligence preparation of thebattlespace (IPB). IPB is a four-step systematic process of analyzing thethreat and environment to help the commander better understand themany variables that can influence his mission and operations. TheIPB methodology is an effective analytical process that can be usedduring peacetime, crisis, or at the tactical, operational, and strategiclevels of war. While most of the individual actions that constitute IPBare nothing new to Air Force intelligence, establishing a consistentprocess will provide greater focus, thereby improving the overall effec-tiveness of aerospace power.

Specifically, IPB focuses on the relationship between the threat andenvironment, along with the effect of that interaction on both friendlyand enemy courses of action. IPB results in the production of adversarycourses of action, named areas of interest, and high-value targets, whichare inputs to the JFACC/COMAFFOR campaign planning, intelligencecollection, and targeting processes. When done properly, IPB facilitatesgetting inside the enemys decision-making cycle. IPB is viewed by theUS Air Force as a valuable methodology for focusing intelligence on thecommander and the commanders supporting C2 elements. Additionaladvantages include integrating analysis, collection management, andtargeting processes, as well as providing a standardized analytic approachfor training purposes. Air Force intelligence entities at all levels of com-mand should use IPB principles, focusing on environmental and threat

22

characteristics and activities that significantly influence air, space, andinformation operations. However, specific IPB products and proceduresare left to the discretion of local commanders.

Surveillance is the function of systematically observing air, space,surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual,aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Surveillance is acontinuing process, not oriented to a specific target. In response to therequirements of military forces, surveillance must be designed to providewarning of enemy initiatives and threats and to detect changes in enemyactivities. Airborne and space-based surveillance assets exploit elevationto detect enemy initiatives at long range. For example, its extremeelevation makes space-based missile-launch detection and tracking indis-pensable for defense against ballistic missile attack. Surveillance assetsare now essential to national and theater defense and to the security of allmilitary forces.

Reconnaissance complements surveillance in obtaining, by vi-sual observation or other detection methods, specific informationabout the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy;or in securing data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic,or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Reconnaissancegenerally has a time constraint associated with the tasking. Collectioncapabilities including airborne and space-based systems, both mannedand unmanned, and their associated support systems are tailored toprovide the flexibility, responsiveness, versatility, and mobility requiredby the strenuous demands of fluid, global taskings. Intelligence critical tothe prosecution of current combat operations is derived from reconnais-sance operations and is evaluated and transmitted in near real time tothose elements needing that information. Intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance must operate together, enabling commanders to preserve forces,achieve economies, and accomplish campaign objectives.

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

CSAR is an integral part of US combat operations and should beconsidered across the range of military operations. CSAR consists ofthose air operations conducted to recover distressed personnelduring wartime or contingency and is a key element in sustainingthe morale, cohesion, and fighting capability of friendly forces. Itpreserves critical combat resources and denies the enemy potential sourcesof intelligence. Although all US Air Force weapon systems have the

23

inherent capability to support CSAR operations, the US Air Force main-tains certain forces specifically dedicated for search, rescue, andrecovery operations.

Navigation and Positioning

The function of navigation and positioning is to provideaccurate location and time of reference in support of strategic,operational, and tactical operations. Navigation and positioning helpall military forces to precisely maneuver, synchronize actions, locate andattack targets, locate and recover downed aircrew, and other tasks requir-ing navigation and positioning accuracy. Navigation and positioning arekey elements of information superiority and global awareness. Some keyportions of navigation and positioning, such as the global positioningsystem (GPS) or ground-based navigation aides, may be exploited by theenemy. This should be taken into consideration when weighing thepotential benefits versus potential threats of employing various systems.

Weather Services

Weather services provided by the Air Force supply timely and accurateenvironmental information, including both space environment and atmospheric

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weather, to commanders for their objectives and plans at the strategic,operational, and tactical levels. They gather, analyze, and provide me-teorological data for mission planning and execution. Environmentalinformation is integral to the timing of operations, employmentplanning, and the conduct of air, ground, and space launch operations.Weather services also influence the selection of targets, routes, weapon sys-tems, and delivery tactics and are a key element of information superiority.

UNITY OF COMMAND

Aerospace power best serves the nations interests when tailoredto operate across the entire region or theater of battle. Doctrinesupports this concept by first adhering to the fundamental principle ofunity of command. One commander should have overall authority to

control all military operations within the theater. The JFC exploits thecapabilities of his various forces to accomplish theater and strategicobjectives. Similarly, aerospace power can be most effectively employedwhen led by a single airman, the JFACC, who is responsible for the plan-ning and conduct of air warfare in a given operation or conflict. In orderto benefit from unity of command, the JFACC follows principles that guidethe organization, command and control, employment, and support fortheater air forces.

Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)

The JFACC is the professional airman with the requisite experi-ence and expertise to integrate joint aerospace capabilities in meet-ing national and theater objectives. In that capacity, the JFACC sharesthe JFCs vision on how to meet those objectives and translates the JFCsconcept of operations into terms relevant to air and space missions. The

The very flexibility of air forces makes true cooperation essential.Air forces, at short notice, can be switched from one sort of target toanother and, within limits, from one type of operation to a quitedifferent type. There is, therefore, a constant temptation to use thempiecemeal to meet an immediate requirement, rather than to usethem on a long-term joint plan, and to utilize their flexibility in themethod of achieving a consistent aim which is an integral part ofour governments policy and our strategy to implement that policy.

J.C. SlessorAir Marshall, Royal Air Force

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JFACC develops and executes an air operation to achieve the national andtheater objectives for the JFC, as part of the overall theater campaign.Essentially, the JFACC is the single airman responsible for planning anddirecting joint aerospace operations to maximize overall combat power for theJFC.

JFACC Designation

Theater air commanders (JFACCs) devise ways to exploit thedifferent capabilities of the available air and space assets whilereducing their limitations; they also plan operations that helpmaximize the combat power of both the aerospace and surfaceefforts, and consequently conduct an effective theater aircampaign. Operation DESERT STORM provided a modern combatvalidation of the JFACC concept, reinforced during operations in Bosniaand Kosovo, that demonstrated the effectiveness of centralizing C2 ofaerospace power. Current joint doctrine acknowledges the lessons ofhistory by recommending that JFCs normally designate a JFACC toensure the proper application of the aerospace effort within a theaterof operations. Normally, the component commander with the pre-ponderance of air and space assets and the capability to plan, task, andcontrol joint aerospace operations is designated as the JFACC. Thisindividual should have comprehensive knowledge and understand-ing of aerospace power doctrine and be trained in the application ofaerospace power to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objec-tives. Under most circumstances the commander of Air Force forces isdesignated the JFACC, and as such will be the supported commander foraerospace operations that are within or affect the theater of operations.

JFACC Responsibilities and Authority

The essence of the JFACC concept is the unified development ofa concept of air operations supporting the joint campaign plan tomeet the JFCs objectives. JFCs define the JFACCs responsibilities andauthority based on these objectives. The individual designated as theJFACC uses established procedures with the joint force headquarters andthe other components to fulfill JFC-assigned tasks. These include plan-ning, coordinating, tasking, and directing the overall aerospace effort, andrecommending apportionment of aerospace power to the JFC. The JFACCis normally the area air defense commander (AADC) and the airspacecontrol authority (ACA). The JFC establishes the specific commandauthority for the JFACC to accomplish those responsibilities. The JFACC

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typically exercises OPCON over assigned and attached forces and tacticalcontrol (TACON) over other military capabilities and forces made avail-able for tasking. Certain aerospace forces, such as intertheater airlift andspace assets, may not come under the operational control of the JFACCbut will still support operations. Some air assets, such as the Army Tacti-cal Missile System (ATACMS), Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs),SOF aircraft, and Army/Marine attack helicopters, might remain underthe OPCON of the respective component commanders. Normally, theJFACC needs only TACON or an established supported/supportingrelationship to conduct operations with augmenting forces that remainassigned to other components. For example, the JFACC is normally desig-nated the supported commander for counterair operations. Whenaerospace operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed todirectly attack strategic COGs, JFCs will normally task the JFACC, as asupported commander, to conduct such operations. The JFACC will alsodesignate targets or objectives for other components in support of thejoint strategic attack effort. The JFACC is also the supported commanderfor joint air interdiction and will use JFC priorities to plan and executethe theaterwide interdiction effort. It is important to recognize that theJFACC retains a theaterwide focus, and joint doctrine specifies the use of smallerareas of operations (AOs) only for surface forces.

JOINT FORCE AIR ASSETS

The primary purpose for designating a JFACC is to provide unityof the aerospace effort for the benefit of the joint force as a whole.Component commanders make air and space capabilities/forces avail-able to the JFC for tasking to support the joint force as a whole based onthe JFCs mission. Normally, these capabilities/forces are provided bythe JFC to the JFACC for tasking.

The US Navy retains organic control of those assets required for fleetdefense and related naval missions. TLAM and fixed-wing sorties inexcess of those needed to satisfy maritime air operations requirementsare normally made available to the JFACC.

Army aviation assets are normally retained for employment asorganic forces. However, some Army helicopters can be employed forAI or SEAD, in which case they come under the purview of the JFACC.The same holds true for other systems (such as ATACMs) whenemployed for AI or SEAD, depending on tasking and target location.

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For Marine aviation assets, the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF)commander normally retains operational control of organic air assets.Because the US Marine Corps surface forces do not bring a large amountof heavy artillery to the battle, their need for CAS is greater than mostArmy units. As a result, CAS is considered an essential component ofMarine battlefield firepower. During joint operations, the MAGTF makessorties available to the JFC, for tasking through the JFACC for air defense,interdiction, and reconnaissance. In addition to those requirements, thosesorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements are provided tothe JFC for tasking through the JFACC for support of other joint forcecomponents or the joint force as a whole.

The joint force special operations component commander(JFSOCC), when established, exercises operational control over alltheater assigned joint special operations forces that have been made avail-able for tasking by the Services. The Joint Special Operations Air Com-ponent Commander (JSOACC) would then control all theater assignedspecial operations aviation assets. The JSOACC centralizes control ofspecial operations aviation much as the JFACC does for conventional

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airpower. Alternatively, Air Force special operations forces may beplaced under the OPCON or TACON of the COMAFFOR or JFACC.

EXAMPLES OF AIR WARFARE

Air power can be employed in as many different ways as there aredifferent kinds of warfare. Nevertheless, there are certain doctrinalconcepts, such as the tenets of airpower, that apply at least generally tomost cases. The following are examples of US Air Force doctrine on aero-space force employment in several different types of warfare. Not allfunctions are illustrated in every example; some, like ISR and C2, areassumed to be employed in all scenarios. The intent is to show how therole of some functions change as a campaign develops.

Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare is defined in joint doctrine as military and paramili-tary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular,predominantly indigenous forces. While sometimes limited enough toqualify as a military operations other than war (MOOTW), guerrilla war-fare can also be considered true warfare when the level of violence is highenough. This was the case for operations in South Vietnam during theVietnam War, to cite one example. Aerospace power can be usedeffectively in guerrilla warfare but will often be employed in either asupporting role or some other form of operation that differs from theconventional application of force against traditional targets. A guerrillaenemy is typically equipped with light weapons, often of relatively lowtechnology. Air superiority will not normally be challenged; enemy airdefense weapons often consist solely of light antiaircraft guns and shoul-der-launched SAMs. On the other hand, the enemy may enjoy support inthe local populace, and disrupting the enemys support base throughphysical means may prove difficult. Although the level of informationsophistication of the enemy may vary greatly from one region to another,it is becoming increasingly easy for small units in remote locations toaccess data worldwide.

As with all military operations, aerospace power success in guerrillawarfare requires a thorough understanding of the military and nationalobjectives and strategy. The character and scope of aerospace operationswill directly depend on the objectives they support. Under some circumstances,airlift may represent the bulk of the air components contribution to the

29

war effort, providing mobility and resupply to ground forces operating inremote areas. Special forces airpower may play a large role in guerrillawarfare, especially for counterinsurgency operations. IO such as PSYOPand ISR are uses of aerospace forces that may also play a critical role inguerrilla warfare.

Figure 1.3 illustrates one possible scenario, in which only a smallportion of the available air and space assets are required for air superior-ity, and a large percentage of that is directed against surface-to-air targets.ISR remains a vital part of the operation from beginning to end, as gainingintelligence on enemy movements can be very difficult under guerrillawarfare conditions. PSYOP is important and is used to win the local popu-lace over through keeping them informed of actual events as theytranspire. This use of IO to overcome adversary propaganda is a vital partof the campaign. Air mobility is also a key use of air assets, both insupport of actual combat operations and in resupply of remote groundforces that enable monitoring of the entire country. Counterland attacksare often made when enemy forces concentrate for conventional attacks,since they become vulnerable when massing for attack or operating inthe open as conventional ground combat formations. Except for theseoccasional counterland attacks, there is not a large need for conventionalforce application since lucrative targets for air attack do not exist.

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Forced Entry

Forced entry operations are typically short in duration but mayinvolve high levels of conventional combat. Friendly ground forces areinserted via various delivery methods to accomplish ground objectives,while aerospace power operates in various supported and supporting roles.The actual functions and missions performed vary with specific circum-stances; for example, aerospace power might play a greater role during anairborne force insertion than during an amphibious operation. OperationJUST CAUSE in Panama was an example of forced entry warfare thatrelied heavily on aerospace forces for both mobility and forceapplication. There may be a need to devote a large force to aerospacesuperiority, since forced entry operations are usually planned for shortduration and there may not be time for a protracted aerospace superior-ity campaign. Surface forces may be employed in very vulnerable modesof insertion, so enemy air and missile reaction must be reduced tominimum levels. Forced entry operations may take place at longdistances from friendly bases, so the judicious use of both air refuelingand naval aviation assets is important.

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Figure 1.4 illustrates the use of aerospace forces in a sample airborneforced entry operation. The key functions performed early on areaerospace superiority and air mobility, since the enemy threat must beeliminated and the friendly force must be delivered to the surface area ofoperations. Once in place, and once the enemy aerospace threat isneutralized, counterland operations ramp up to both destroy the enemyground force reserves and support the engaged friendly ground units. Somestrategic attack is also employed, mainly against enemy C2 centers thatwill have immediate effects on the battlefield. Due to the short durationof the operation, other strategic attacks that would have longer-delayedeffects are not employed.

Decisive Halt

A decisive halt operation is employed to stop an advancing enemyground force prior to reaching its objective, which typically is to seize andoccupy a certain amount of territory. Aerospace forces provide anunmatched global response capability to perform decisive halt, and oftenrepresent the only force application available on short notice to performexpeditionary tasks. When a decisive halt is performed during conven-tional warfare, the enemy will often have a robust air defense system andmay possess a significant offensive aerospace capability of their own. Thisrequires a large application of counterair force early on, which can rampdown to a maintenance level as the conflict progresses. As with forcedentry, the timespace of a decisive halt may be limited (the enemy mustbe stopped before they have time to reach their objectives). This willmandate the use of counterland in more of a direct attack mode than inlonger scenarios, and strategic attack should be restricted to those targetswhose payoff will be realized in the time allowed. There may not be anyneed for traditional CAS, as the bulk of friendly ground forces may notarrive in theater until after the halt has been accomplished.

Figure 1.5 shows one possible decisive halt scenario, which starts withlong-range strikes on counterair targets and some key strategic targets.Depending on availability of nearby airbases, in-place forces and aircraftcarriers, the bulk of the first few days attacks may come from global-reachmissions launched from bases outside the theater. This places a heavydemand on air refueling assets, which will also be heavily tasked tosupport the deployment of shorter range air assets and ground forces intothe theater. Counterland attacks, primarily air interdiction of the invad-ing enemy ground force, grow to become the bulk of missions flown untilthe halt is achieved. This illustration is similar to that for the forced entry

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example, with the exception that the air mobility effort to bring groundforces into theater may be smaller (or possibly not required). This isespecially true if the allied nation involved can provide a capable,on-scene ground combat force.

Global Conflict

The cold war era was an example of global conflict that was deterredfrom ever reaching its full destructive potential, with only occasionaloutbreaks of combat between the superpowers or their allies. Nuclearweapons, along with other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), havesuch devastating potential that deterrence, not combat, has fortunatelyremained their primary use. As the United States develops its strategy forthe post-cold war era, the global reach mission has become a province ofconventional forces. The US Air Force is becoming more expeditionaryin nature, with fewer forces permanently stationed at overseas locationsfrom which force may be directly applied against an enemy. The AEFprovides a task-oriented force that can be rapidly deployed to any part ofthe globe, to perform any of the lethal or nonlethal missions assigned tothe Air Force. Naval airpower can supplement the AEF, depending on theproximity of the theater to accessible sea approaches.

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Global power missions, such as B-52 and B-2 strikes from CONUS bases,provide an important source of aerospace power that does not depend oneither forward bases or sea access, although long-range missions result infar fewer sorties per day than in-theater forces can provide. This is some-what offset by the large number of weapons that can be carried by long-range bombers and a growing family of independently targetable precisionweapons that enable strikes against multiple targets during a single bombersortie. Shorter-range forces can also be employed on very long-rangemissions, provided proper air refueling support is available. An exampleof this was the Libyan raid of 1986 using multiple refuelings to supportfighter attacks at intercontinental ranges. All of the examples listed inthis section employ some degree of the Air Forces global reach capabil-ity; the amount they actually use depends on numerous factors that rangefrom geographic distance to political support from allied and neutralnations.

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CHAPTER TWO

AIR WARFARE PLANNING

Campaign plans provide practical guidance for the employment offorces at the operational level of war. In a major conflict, a campaignmay be one of a series of campaigns needed to support a strategy thataccomplishes national objectives. Campaigns tie military strategy andobjectives to the battlespace. Just as a conductor directs the timing, tempo,and phasing for an orchestra, so too the campaign plan directs theconduct of tactical operations to achieve strategic goals.

OVERALL JOINT PLANNING

Joint planning is normally conducted via the deliberate planningprocess, which produces operations plans (OPLANs) as the end product.OPLANs provide detailed guidance, including deployment and logisticalsupport, for areas of the world where possible conflict may occur at somefuture time. Crisis action planning, on the other hand, occurs in responseto an actual contingency and produces as its output an OPORD that is, ifneeded, executed by the National Command Authorities (NCA) to putmilitary forces into motion. Figure 2.1 compares the two planningprocedures.

Simply stated, an OPLAN serves as the key employment conceptof the theater of war and theater of operations. It is the basis for allother planning among the staff and various subordinate commands. Itprovides the joint commanders vision and intent through broad conceptsfor operations and sustainment for the duration of the situation. For largemultiphase conflicts, a campaign plan with supporting OPLANs might bedeveloped. Regardless of which type of process is used, the resulting planprovides strategic military objectives and operational direction. Adistinction is made for each phase of the conflict, and an end state foreach should be clearly defined. Reorganization of forces or resourcesmay be required at the end of a phase before another action is initiated.The plan organizes and tasks subordinate forces. It furthermore desig-nates command relationships, additional responsibilities, and objectives.

Air power can win battles, or it can win wars.

General William Momyer

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JAOP ensures synchronization and integration of aerospace, land, mari-time, information, and special operations efforts into a synergistic whole.

Planning such operations revolves around precise communicationof commanders intent and a shared, clear understanding of theappropriate operational concepts at each level of command. Oncethe overall strategy has been formulated for fighting the war, the theatercommander imparts it to his component commanders. They then devise agame plan for supporting the national strategy by integrating the assets undertheir command. It is from this point onward that strategic concepts aretranslated into operational missions. The JFCs strategic appreciation andarticulation of the strategic and operational objectives needed to accom-plish the mission form the basis for determining the component objectives.The capabilities of aerospace power, whether acting as the decisive force orin support of other components, must be included in strategic planning atthe highest level. If the JFC focuses solely on the classic post-buildup counterat-tack as the decisive phase of combat, he may miss an opportunity to drive theenemy out of the fight early on with aerospace power.

Campaign plans set long-term goals such as control of a geographicarea or the defeat of an enemy in the theater of operations. Accord-ingly, campaign plans normally provide both a general plan for theentire campaign and specific plans for the campaigns various phases.

The JFC should specify how to defeat the enemy. This plan alsoaims for the fastest possible solution at the lowest possible cost in livesand materiel. A protracted campaign rarely serves strategic purposeswell and usually increases friendly force exposure to losses.

Above all, the method selected should be effective and militarilyachievable. An effective campaign plan focuses on the enemysvulnerable COGsthose military, political, economic, or informationalpoints from which an adversary derives its freedom of action, physicalstrength, or will to fight. If such a COG is attacked (or merely threat-ened), the enemys position may become untenable.

In order for aerospace options to be properly planned, presented, thetheater commander should have a representative number of airmen in thekey positions on the joint staff. This is particularly important if the JFC isnot an airman. Especially during crisis action planning, the JFACC and theairmen on the CINCs joint staff should ensure that all possible aerospaceoptions are examined in the formulation of overall joint courses of action.

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THE JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN (JAOP)

Normally, the JFACC has the responsibility of developing the JAOPin support of the JFCs overall theater plan. The JFACC provides theJFC the means to exploit joint aerospace capabilities, and the JAOP is thevehicle through which the JFACC directs joint aerospace power. The JFACCplans and conducts operations in coordination with the other componentcommanders, creating a unified effort to accomplish theater military objectives.While the JFACC provides the central guidance for conduct of the theater aircampaign, the JFC sequences and resolves component requirements andpriorities. The JAOP provides the blueprint for air and space tasking, which willbe implemented through the daily air tasking order (ATO) process. The ATO istypically not developed until operations actually commence, but somecontingency plans include an on-the-shelf air tasking order for the firstfew days of a possible conflict.

CONCEPT OF JOINT AIR OPERATIONS DEVELOPMENT

JFC STRATEGIC APPRECIATION

JFACC/JFC STAFF ESTIMATE OF THESITUATION

JOINT AIR AND SPACEOPERATIONS PLAN

JFACCs DAILY GUIDANCE

JOINT FORCE MISSION

OBJECTIVES & COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE

JFACC/JFC STAFF RECOMMENDS COA FOR JFC / NCA APPROVAL

SUPPORTING PLANS (Air Defense Plan, Airspace Control Plan, etc.)

REFINE PLANS AND SUPPORTING ORDERS(JAOP, Joint ATO, Airspace Control Order, etc.)

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The JFACC uses the JFCs strategic and operational objectives todevelop an air estimate of the situation that results in the formula-tion of a course of action (COA). Once the air commanders COA isapproved by the JFC, it becomes the basic concept for joint airoperations, stating what is to be accomplished. The JAOP and supportingplans state how the air component commander will conduct aerospaceoperations. This is the heart of what is colloquially called the air campaign.

PLANNING JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

In developing the JAOP, the JFACC leverages combinations of forcesand actions to achieve the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time andwith minimal casualties. The JFACC arranges symmetric and asymmet-ric actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemyvulnerabilities; this also preserves freedom of action for future operations.Where possible, COGs are targeted to provide the greatest effect for the forceemployed.

JAOP Planning Process

Normally, there are five stages in the joint air operations plan-ning process, and each stage produces a desired product. Whilepresented in a sequential order, the steps are not all required to be com-pleted in the given order. Work on the various phases may be concurrentor sequential. At some point, however, the stages must be integrated andthe products of each phase must be checked and verified for consistency.

Operational Environment Research. The product of this phase isprimarily the intelligence preparation of the battlespace that presents anin-depth knowledge of the operational environment. This phase isfocused on gaining information about friendly and adversary capabili-ties and intentions, doctrine, and the environment in which the opera-tions will take place. The goal of this phase is to gain an understandingof the theater of operations, the adversary, and friendly forces avail-able to accomplish the JFCs objectives. Key factors such as threatsand airbase availability will affect the strategy development process.A larger enemy air threat requires more time and assets dedicated tothe achievement of air superiority, to the initial detriment of othermissions. Airfields further from the AOR may be used by long-rangeor tanker-assisted assets, but the increased mission duration willreduce the number of targets that can be attacked in a given period.

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Such airfields may be at lower risk to enemy air and missile attack,however, providing a tradeoff between efficiency and survivability.

Objective Determination. The products of this phase are clearlydefined and quantifiable objectives that will contribute to the accomplish-ment of the JFCs overall objectives.

The source of planning objectives is usually documented in theJFCs initial planning guidance and the operation or campaignplan.

Joint air objectives are derived from the JFCs objectives.

Aerospace power can impact all three levels of war and can per-form in