Afghanistan and South Africa A Letter to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M. P., Regarding Portions of His Midlothian Speeches

8/10/2019 Afghanistan and South Africa A Letter to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M. P., Regarding Portions of His Midlothi

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AFGHANISTANAND C^O J

SOUTH AFRICA.

A LETTER

TO THE

EIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.,

BEOABDING POBTIOKS Or HIB

MIDLOTHIAN SPEECHES.

BT THE

RIGHT HON. SIR BAETLEFRERE, Bart..Ill

G.C.B., G.C.S.I., .R.S., etc.

WITH A LETTER TO THE LATE SIE JOHN KAYE,AND OTHER PAPERS.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1881.


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LONDON :

PRINTED BY WrLLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,

STAMFORD 8TEEET AND CHARIIiO CROSS.

'^-\'S


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CONTENTS.

FAOB

Letteb TO THE Eight Hon. W. E, Gladstone, M.P 5

Note enclosed in Letter to Mb. Gladstone 7

Midlothian Speeches 7

Memorandum of 13th January, 1880 9

Real Views on Afghan Question 10

Zulu War 12

Duty of High Commissioner 16True Causes of War with Barbaric Neighbours 17

History of Letter to Sir John Kaye 19

Opinions then given confirmed by late experience . . . . 20

Sind Frontier Policy 21

Effects of Midlothian Speeches in Africa 24

Essentials for Future Peace in South Africa 25

British Sovereignty essential to Peace 26

Documents befebbed to in Preceding Note.

1. Sib Bartle Frere's Letter to Sir John Kate 27

Merv Causes of Eussian Advance 28

Crusading Element 29

Inutility f Neutral Zone 30

Opposite characters of Eussian and English Policy .. .. 31

Change needed in our own PoUcy 32

Change effected by Lord Mayo 33

Value of Occupation of Que tta 31

Necessity of Eailway connection with Bolan 35

Eeal Danger of Eussian Advance Herat 36

Character of Danger from Eussian Advance .37

Need of increased Naval Defence..

39

Turkey, Persia,Egypt 40

Impending Decay of Eastern Dynasties 41

Need of Army Eeform, Eedistribution, c 43

Viceroy should be absolved from details of Local Adminis-ration

-15


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4 Contents.

PAGB

II. Lord Lawbenoe's Memorandum on the Centhal Abian

Question 47

III.

Sir Bautle Fkeee's Noteon

Lord Lawrence's Memorandum

on the Central Asian Question 55

Eeply to Lord Lawrence's Objections 55

Native Opinion in In'dia 57

Suggestions for Central Asian Policy 58

Lord Mayo's Policy 59

Was it a fresh Departure ? 60

Native Newsagents at Cabul 61

Necessity for Englisb Agents 62

Our Commercial Interests 63

Duties of English Agents 64

Our Border Policy 65

Occupation of Quetta 66

Value of Quetta 67

Its commanding Positiont

68

Eecapitulation of Suggestions 69

IV.

Extracts from Memorandum by Sir Bartle Frere, dated

March 1876, Illustrative of the Sind Frontier System 73


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To THE Right Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.

Sir,

In the course of a political our in Scotland in 1879

you introduced my name in some of your many speeches as

one of the principal instigators f a foreign policy, hich youdenounced as wicked and aggressive, s depraving the morality,and ruining the finances, of England.

These speeches, I need hardly say, produced an immense

effect on publicopinion, both in England and in the distant

Colony where I was then on duty.It was impossible for me to make, at the time, any effectual

reply to what was so said. It was nearly a month before the

report of the speeches made in Midlothian could reach the

Colony another month before any answer could be received

in England, even by return of post. Large numbers of mycountrymen had consequently, n reliance on your testimony,condemned me, and all I had done or proposed to do, in South

Africa, before I could be heard in my own defence ; and I was

recalled from South Africa at a very critical period in the

fortunes of its Colonies.

To the personal results to myself I have no intention to

refer ; but I believe that the statements and opinions to whichthose speeches gave currency and authority, caused, and arestill causing, infinite mischief in South Africa. They have

retarded the prosperity and progress of the European Colonies

in that region, they have laid the foundation of wars ; and

raised very serious obstacles to the religious, oral, and politicaladvancement of the native

races.On

my return to England,I find the old calumnies and misrepresentations f fact and

opinion, to which those utterances gave currency, constantlyrecalled and used by your political ollowers to the prejudiceof the interests, and the ruin of the prosperity, of a regionwhich might otherwise become a southern home of men of

European races, discharging a great duty in civilizing and


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6 Letter to Mr. Gladstone.

raising n the scale of humanity the millions of natives of Africa,who for many ages past have never known what permanent peaceand civilization might mean. Such misrepresentations, hich

I would gladly believe were the result of want of knowledge ofactual facts, nd not a wilful distortion of them, affect necessarilynot only the past history but the future of those importantColonies.

I deem it,therefore, duty I owe to the people whose bestinterests are at stake, o show how unfounded are some, and howdistorted are all, the chargesbrought

againstme, on

yourauthority, f ever having advocated an unjust or aggressivepolicy towards our neighbours r an oppressive policy towardsour own subjects, nd no doubt you would yourself e the first

frankly o acknowledge this did you know the facts as I knowthem.

I hope in time to show that, both in Afghanistan nd Africa,the advice I gave, and the action I took, was the only adviceand the only action compatible with my duty to my countryand my Sovereign. I confine myself, owever, for the present,to endeavouring to show in the Note of which I take the libertyto enclose a copy, that my views and advice regarding he courseto be pursued both in Afghanistan nd South Africa have been

very gravelymisrepresented.I cannot hope that, whilst weighted with the cares of the

whole nation, you will have time to consider whether there

was ever any just ground for the attacks on any character 1

may have had for justice, umanity, r intelligent evotion to

publicduty ; but a time may come when you may have leisure

tothink

onthese

thingsand I

may at least have put it in thepower of those who come after us to judge whether I have been

justly ncluded amongst those who, in these latter days, have

brought ruin and disgrace n regions in which it has been myduty and my pride for forty-six ears to serve my country.

I have the honour to be. Sir,

Your obedient servant,

H. B. E. FRERE.AthencEum Club, July, 1881.


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Midlothian Speeches.

NOTE

Inclosed in Letter to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone.

In November and December of 1879, Mr. Gladstone, then ona political rogress through Scotland, named me in some of his

public addresses as one of the authors of what he denounced as

an unjust, nnecessary and aggressive ar in Afghanistanand

the charges thus vouched bj his high authority ere used forthe double purpose of implicating e in the alleged uilt f theAfghan war, and of thus destroying he weight of any argumentsI might use to defend my action in South Africa.

I was then engaged in very arduous public duties in the otherhemisphere. It was several weeks before I was even aware of,and several more before I could reply to, Mr. Gladstone's charges ;very few of the documents relating o the transactions to whichhe referred were then accessible to me, and the charges wereingrained n the belief, ot only of his supporters, but also of

many thousands of others my countrymen, before I could have achance of replying o them.

I nevertheless feltit my duty to take the earliest opportunityin my power to address Her ^Majesty's overnment on the subjectof Mr. Gladstone's strictures

;and on the 13th of

January, 880,1

forwarded officially o the then Secretary f State for the Colonies,for such use as he might see fit to make of them, a MemorandumI had drawn up after reading in the newspapers extracts fromspeeches r. Gladstone had delivered in Scotland.

Not having the reports of his speeches in full, t hand, Ispecially uoted from the ' Cape Mercantile Advertiser,'Colonial newspaper, of the 7th of January, 1880, the followingamong other extracts. After summarizing one of Mr. Gladstone'sMidlothian speeches, he ' Advertiser

' said :

That is rather strong language o use against olitical ppo-*'

nents, but there was more of it later on. The foreign policy of the Government was ' pestilentctivity no democrat, no ' agitator, ould thus degrade the principles f free govern- ' ment.' Forcing Shere Ali to receive a Resident at Cabul had sent him ' in sorrow to his grave.' (The Ameer died of

an internal disease, hich the doctor to the Russian Embassy could not cure or eradicate, j

* In Africa we had the record of


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8 Midlothian Speeches.

' 10,000 Zulus slain for no other offence han their attempt to ' defend their hearths and homes, their wives and their children.^ Afghanistan is ruined, and Shere Ali ' never gave us the ' slightest ause for mistrust of his intentions. There are two ' gentlemen of distinguished ames who supported n Indian ' policy of advance in Afghanistan. Who are they ? Sir ' Henry Rawlinson and Sir Bartle Frere those were the two*' ' great authorities. Sir Henry Rawlinson was, I believe, a ' distinguished fficer. He is a scientific man, a man of high ' character and great ability. Sir Bartle Frere, except that I * believe he is entirely civilian, eserves the ascription o ' him of all those

qualitiesn the

highest egree ;but neither

' the one nor the other gentleman has ever been in a position ' of responsibility neither one nor the other has ever imbibed ' from actual acquaintance ith British institutions the spirit ' by which British government ought to be regulated and*' ' controlled. That they are men of benevolence I do not ' doubt, but I am afraid they are gentlemen who are apt, ' in giving scope to their benevolent motives, to take into*' ' their own hands the choice of means in a manner those who '

are conversant with free government and with a responsible*' ' government never dream of. Sir Bartle Frere's mode of ' action at the Cape of Good Hope does not tend to accredit ' his advice in Afghanistan ow.'

*

I would observe in passing that opinions may differ as towhat is a position f responsibility. t is now many yearssince on Sir

HenryRawlinson were laid the

gravest responsi-ilitiesfor the safety f General Sir William Nott's army andfor the maintenance of our rule at Candahar. From that time

* I find the following in the authorized edition of Mr. Gladstone's PoliticalSpeeches in Scotland, Nov. and Dec. 1879, revised by the Author. London :Bidgway. 1879 :

P. 49. After denouncing the Annexation of the Transvaal and the Zulu War,

Mr. Gladstone said :

Sir Bartle Frere, who was the great authority or tbe pro- ceedings of the Government in Afghanistan, has announced in South Africa that it will be necessary for us to extend our dominions until we reach the Portuguese frontier to the north.

Ibid. We have assumed,jointly with France, the virtual Government of Egypt, and as we are to extend, says Sir Bartle Frere, ur southern dominions in Africa till we meet the southern frontier of the Portuguese, possibly ne of'* these days we may extend our northern dominions in Africa till we meet the northern frontier of the Portuguese.

Ibid. p. 205. After a vehement denunciation of the Afghan War, Mr. Glud-Btone said : There were two

gentlemen,men of

distinguished ames,who

' supported the Indian policy of advance into Afghanistan who were they ? Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Bartle Frere. These were the two great authorities. Sir Henry Rawlinson was, I believe, nd so on, almost verbatim as given in theextract in the Cape Mercantile Advertiser.


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Memorandum of ISth January, 1880. 9

to this his duties have always been among the most responsibleon which an Indian Diplomatist an be employed.

In my own case, after several years service in sole charge ofthe province f Sattara, was for some nine years in charge ofSind and of our frontier relations on that Border, including heyears of the Indian Mutiny. I should hardly have had thehonour of twice receiving he thanks of Parliament, had not myposition here been considered one of responsibility. heappointments have subsequently eld as Member of LordCanning's Council (1859 to 1862), as Governor of Bombay(1862 to 1867), nd as Member of the Indian Council (1867 to1877) were then generally egarded s positions f considerableresponsibility.

The English rule in India rests on publicopinion, 0n thegeneral conviction of the vast masses of the population hat theEnglish re not only far stronger, but more just, ore merciful,more careful of prescriptive ights than any other possiblecompetitors or rule.

It is hardly possible o have had much share, during a whole

lifetime, n maintaining n Empire resting n such convictions,without becoming sensitive to popular feeling to the in-rticulavoice of the people ruled, to their wants and wishes

expressed r unexpressed in a degree not always possible othose who are more accustomed to obey the varying but alwaysloudly expressed emands of party feeling n this country.

Hence I venture to claim, not merely for Sir Henry Rawlin-son and myself, ut for all Indian officialswho have efficientlyfilled such officesof responsibilitv, o lack of training o under-tand

the popular will and when such training s joined toordinary honestv, courage, and loyalty o national interests,cannot think there can be any incapacity o comprehend thespirit y which British Government ought to be regulated ndcontrolled either in England or in distant dependencies.

The following s the Memorandum which was enclosed in mydespatch f the 13th January, nd received by the Secretary fState on the 6th of February, 1880 :

Memoeandum enclosed in Cape of Good Hope Despatch,No. 9.

*' I annex an extract taken by a Cape newspaper from theLondon ' Times ' of the 6th December, reporting speech ofMr. Gladstone's at

Glasgow, attributingo me a

largehare of the

blame for the Afghan war, and denouncing the Zulu war asproving my incapacity o understand the principles f free andresponsible overnment.


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10 Ileal Views on Afghan Question.

To what extent I may be responsible or our dealing ithAfghanistan will not now discuss. I only ask Mr. Gladstone,before he attempts to fix on an absent man any share of the

responsibility or such a heinous crime as he considers theadvance into Afghanistan o be, that he will take the trouble toinquire what I have said upon the subject, nd when, and towhom?

He will then find that for close on a quarter of a century 1have persistently rged on the Government of India, and,through it, on the Government of England, presided ver fora great portion of that time by Mr. Gladstone himself, theonlypolicy which, as later events have shown, could have pre-ented

the necessity or any military dvance into Afghanistan. When Lord Canning was Viceroy of India, an opportunity

offered for restoring ore friendly elations with the Afghans,in consequence of messages brought from the Sirdar of Herat

by Sir Lewis (then Captain) Pelly, nd from other quarters,seekingfriendship nd alliance.

I was then senior member of Lord Canning's ouncil, and

pressed s strongly sI could

onthe

Viceroy,nd not for the

first time, that advantage should be taken of these and othersimilar expressions f Afghangood-will o restore more cordialrelations with the Afghan Government and Sirdars. We hadthen an opportunity f establishing urselves as allies of theAfghans, with common interests in all matters affecting heother great Asiatic Powers, and I urged our taking advantage ofthat opportunity, s the surest mode of avoiding misunderstand-ngs,

and consequent hostile positions, hich seemed to meotherwise inevitable.

This view, which I believe commended itself to Lord

Canning's wn judgment, was discussed with those who hadbeen in the Punjab for some years previous, nd who had beendirectlyesponsible or the conduct of our intercourse, uch as itwas, with the Afghans. It was, I believe, laid before HerMajesty's overnment in England, of which, Mr. Gladstonewas then, I think, a member.

The result was the expression o Lord Canning of a verystrong opinion that we should have as few relations as possible,whether friendly r otherwise, ith the Afghans ; that we shouldneither invite nor accept any overtures which might lead tocloser intercourse ; that we should have as little as possible odo with them, either as friends or foes ; that we should in fact,as far as we could,

ignoretheir existence.

The discussion of the question, n fact, ripened nd formu-

i.c. of the English Cabinet,


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Heal Views on Afghan Question. 11

lated that doctrine of cold apparent indifference to the Afghansand their interests which, with the too brief interval of Lord

Mayo's viceroyalty, as till lately been acted on by ourGovernment in its relations with the Afghans, and which Mr.

Gladstone, then and now, has, I believe, cordiallypproved. I have always, to the best of my power, in the interests of

peace, ventured to combat that doctrine, believing hat therewere no better guarantees for peace, than cordial and intimate

relations with one's near and weaker neighbours, mpressingon them the conviction that we were content with our own,

and had no wish to use our superior ower for any purpose

inimical to others. I have alwaysheld

thata

contrarycourse of isolation, urning ur backs on them and disregard-ng

their wishes, might for a time seem to avoid the entangle-entsof neighbourly dealing, but in the long run must

naturally nd inevitably lienate one's neighbours and, inAfghanistan, under existing circumstances, throw them onother neighbouring owers, whose interests might, and probablywould be the opposite f ours.

It seemed to me that the time must come when we should

be rudely awakened from our dream of fancied security, ndshould be driven to seek the friendship nd alliance of ourneighbours, obviously then only for selfish purposes of ourown. Success would then be hollow and precarious, ndfailure would probably involve war, hurriedly undertaken,certainly ostly, nd possiblymperfect n its results.

Whether I wasright

orwrong

in thesemy anticipationsleave to be judged from the history f the past three years,

during which I have had nothing to say to the conduct ofEastern affairs.

I would only beg Mr. Gladstone to remember that the ad- anceinto Afghanistan, hich I had recommended for so

many years in vain to his and to other Governments, tillit was too late to take my advice, was advance as a friend and

good neighbour, anxious to cultivate friendly elations andprevent war, conscious of superior ower and resources, butdesirous to use them as much in the interests of peace and for

the benefit of our neighbours s of ourselves. Hostile advances could then only become necessary in self-

defence, and after the repulsion f such friendly vertures. Mr. Gladstone will hardly join with men of the ' iron

and blood ' school indenouncing

such views as benevolent

dreams ; but, unless he does, I should like to know what thirdcourse he thinks was open to us? Does he still think that, ifwe had gone on shutting ur eyes and turning our backs


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12 Zulu War.

on the Afghans, we should have improved their feelingtowards us, or kept the Russians further from the Indus?

Mr. Gladstone's own colleagues, iceroys f India, and theSecretaries of State for India in Liberal Ministries, nd myown colleagues, heir councillors, ill bear me witness that Ihave never ceased to warn Her Majesty's overnment that theinevitable consequences of the policy of neglect nd turningthe cold shoulder towards Afghanistan must some day bepanic, and probably sudden war, when the English nationfelt that they had been deluded by promises of peace wherethere was no peace.

Thiswarning of mine, that war

must

inevitably ollow anAfghan policy which told the Afghans we did not care forthem, that we did not intend to be enemies, but did not wishto be intimate friends, that, in fact, we would have nothingto do with them, cannot, I submit, by any ingenuity, etortured into a suggestion of a hostile advance into Afghan-stan.

The certainty seemed to me as inevitable as the

sequence of night and day ; and I am no more responsible orthe Afghan war than the person who asserts that night and daymust follow each other is for the existence of light r darkness.

To me the policy of neglect, pproved by Mr. Gladstone'sGovernment, has always seemed the immediate and maincause of the present Afghan war.

How far Mr. Gladstone or his colleagues re responsible orthat policy ust be left to him and them to decide.

There are obvious reasonswhy

I cannot atpresent

follow

Mr. Gladstone throughout his denunciations of the Zulu war. I have no doubt that in the cloud of contradictory nd

incorrect statements which has been sent home on the subject,by those who ought to know better, Mr. Gladstone may findsome justification or what he states as facts ; but I would askhim, before he uses his facts as foundations for a chargeof blood-guiltiness gainst me, or any other absent man, totake the trouble to verify hem, and ponder these few, which Ibelieve to be unquestionable acts :

(1.) That the numbers and force of the Zulu army have beenproved by inexorable facts to have been greater, andtheir organization more perfect than my highestofficial estimate before Lord Chelmsford's firstadvance.

*' (2.) That in the judgment of all military uthorities, othbefore the war and since, it was

absolutelympossible

for Lord Chelmsford's force, acting on the defensive,within the Natal boundary, o prevent a Zulu impifrom entering Natal, and repeating he same indis-


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Zulu War..

13

criminate slaughter f all ages and sexes which theyboast of having effected in Natal, at Blaauw-Krantzand Weenen, in Dingaan's other massacres of fortj

years ago, and in the inroads into the Transvaal terri-ory

made by Umbellini, with Cetywayo's onnivance,within the last two years.

No competent judge, s far as I can learn, ow doubts Cety-ayo'spoicer to have inflicted even more atrocious damage on

Natal in the year justpassed, han he and his uncle had in-lictedbefore, by the hands of men many of whom are still

living and active members of the late Zulu army. These facts seem to me to prove that I did not over-estimate

the Zulu danger ; let me add a few words in answer to thecountercharge f rashness, in that I under-estimated it, andallowed Lord Chelmsford to attempt the task with an insuffi-ient

force. In answer to this, I will only ask Mr. Gladstone to ponder

one more unquestionable act. An unexpected isaster, ausedin Lord Chelmsford's absence by disregard f his orders, n-ailed

a delayof

fivemonths and

serious discouragement o us,and added enormously to the militaryrestige f the enemy. Nevertheless, s soon as he was enabled to resume the offen-ive,

Lord Chelmsford, moving on the same line as that he firstadopted, n eight marches from the scene of the former disaster,with a column of about 6000 Europeans, completely efeatedthe Zulu army and annihilated their military ystem.

Will any one, with this unquestionable act before him, say1 was rash in what I asked Lord Chelmsford to attempt inJanuary with about 6600 English soldiers, commanded byofficerslike Wood and Redvers Buller, Pearson and Glyn ?

But it is said by some people, Cety wayo did not intend touse his army for purposes of war ;' others say,

' The war

might have been postponed.' Few, probably, ow go so far as to maintain that Cetywayo

' kept up his army in the interests of peace.' He had formallyand repeatedly nnounced his desire to shed blood, and there wasno one within reach, beyond his own dominions, whose bloodhe could shed, save English subjects r their protected llies.

He had enrolled every able-bodied male in his kingdom intohis army, and trained that army into a most perfect achine of[ estruction.

Would Mr. Gladstone believe any civilized monarch on the

earth, if he said that such a universal enrolment andtraining

fthe whole male population as not intended to be used for anymilitary urpose ?^b If he would not believe such assertion made by an European


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14 Zulu War.

Emperor, how can he attach any weight to it when volunteered,not by, but for, barbarian Chief, whose own boast is that heacknowledges o superior, nd that unrestrained power to shedblood is a national necessity, ithout which the Zulus could notexist as a nation. One of the falsehoods, o incessantly epeatedthat Mr. Gladstone appears to have accepted t, and refers to itas a fact, s that Cetywayo committed no overt act of hostilityon us before we invaded his territory, hat we made war on him,not he on us.

This is not true, even if we restrict ourselves to Natal ;unless Mr. Gladstone accepts, as evidence of friendly ntent,and as sufficientsatisfaction for two successive armed violations

of British territory y armed bands, Cetywayo's refusal of ourdemands in the case of the two murdered refugees.

But it is yet more untrue as regards British territory n theTransvaal. Two successive impis are recorded as havinginvaded British Transvaal territory, eyond the Pongolo, n theneighbourhood f Luneberg, etween Sir TheophilusShepstone'sconference and Lord Chelmsford's firstadvance.* In the course

of these inroads, every man, woman, and child who was notmurdered (and, in two cases, burned alive in their huts), ascarried off into slavery n Zululand. That these inroads weremade into British territory though the British subjects erenatives and not Englishmen), rom Zululand, by Chiefs underCetywayo's orders, before Lord Chelmsford's first advance, areall, I believe, indubitable facts, clearly tated in official BlueBooks, nowhere, as far as I know, contradicted, nd, I believe,

beyond all doubt true. But unless it can be shown that suchacts never occurred, I would ask who was the aggressor ? who

actually ommenced the war by committing acts which, if nosatisfaction be given for them, are^ acts of war ?

' I have alwaysmaintained it was not we who made war on Cetywayo, ut hewho made war on us ; and that Lord Chelmsford's firstadvance

was preceded y acts of the Zulus, which, unless atoned for, ereunquestionable cts of hostility nd virtual declarations of war.

But it is said, with somewhat more show of reason, that' though war was inevitable, t might have been postponed.'1 would ask, till when ?

There is a period of the year when the Tugela is in flood,and the invasion of Natal is so dangerous hat the most deter-ined

' impis hesitate to attempt it. This was the time chosen to make our demands on Cety-ayo

forreparation

or thepast

andsecurity

or the future.

There is another time of the year when the Tugela is every-

* i.e. durini' the vear 1878.


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Zulu War. 15

where fordable, and it is impossible or an army many timesthe size of Lord Chelmsford's force to prevent an invasion of

Natal. Would it have been justifiable o postpone the demandstill that season arrived ?

It seems to me that, after all, he main and only importantquestion is, were the demands at all justifiable? nd I willconsider only the first, ecause it is, as Cetywayo himself now

says, the only one which was ever seriously onsidered byhim or his council.

** Ought Sir Henry Bulwer, in August, o have demanded thesurrender for trial of two young men charged with having, ntwo

separateoccasions, aken large bodies of armed men into

Natal, and with having forcibly aken away two refugees romBritish territory nto Zululand, and there murdered them ?

Ought he, after an interval of months, to have repeatedthat demand ? Ought he to have declined the blood-moneyoffered, t 25Z. per head, for the murdered refugees? OughtI, after this, and after five months had passed without theoffenders being given up, to have considered the refusal as a

declaration of hostility nd entrusted the enforcement of thedemand to the General and his army ?

Unless all these questions an be answered in the negative,it is difficult to see how the war could have been postponed,and unless they are answered in the negative, what othercourse was open ? Can it be said that no such demand

should have been made, nor, when made, that it should nothave been enforced ?

Should the Zulus have been virtually old that thej- might,when they pleased, epeat the outrage ? and if they might enterBritish territory nd take away two human beings o kill them,why not any greater number?

Why not give Cetywayo tacitly ree leave to * wash his

young men's spears' in the blood of as many of our subjects s

he thought necessary or convenient ? After the way he has publich^ nd repeatedly eld me up

to the condemnation of all just and humane Englishmen formy conduct in this matter, I think I am entitled to ask Mr.Gladstone jo state, distinctly, hat he would have had me orSir Henry Bulwer do under the circumstances ?

He is reported o have said that I have never ' been in aposition f responsibility, ever imbibed, from actual acquaint-nce

with British institutions, he spirit y which English

government oughtto be

regulatednd controlled.'

I regret that the forty-five ears of my public service havebeen, for the most part, in lands less favourable for studying heinstitutions of our native country than those Mr. Gladstone has


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16 Duty of High Commissioner.

inhabited ; but I can assure him that absence has not deadened

my English instincts, or I trust put me out of sympathy withthe general feeling f my countrymen.

I still believe that, by a right older than Magna Charta,every British subject, nd every stranger in a British subject'shome, be it hut or palace, n whatever part of the world, isentitled to live as securely s in England, with the assurancethat every Englishman, be he Governor, soldier, r taxpayer,will do his best, in his own calling, o prevent an armedforeign orce carrying uch subject ut of the realm, and there

murdering him or her. Such, and no more, was what I endeavoured to secure for

the inhabitants, lack as well as white, f these British colonies. I still believe that there is no law which would permit me

to accept 25/., or any other sum, as composition or theabduction, with a view to murder, of any one on British soil.I believe that my countrymen would have justly isowned me,as unworthy the name of Englishman, ad they believed thatI advised the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal to accept that, r

any other sum, as a bribe to blind the eyes of my countrymento what had been done, or on any grounds to palliate he

outrage. If in these beliefs I mistook the * spirit y which English

government ought to be regulated and controlled,' would

respectfully, ut very earnestly, eg Mr. Gladstone, f his fuller

knowledge, o tell me what he thinks we ought to have done ? I cannot but believe that, when the Queen's Government

gave me a commission charging e ' to take all such measures,* and to do all such matters and things s can and may lawfully' and discreetly e done by you for preventing he recurrence of'

any irruption nto our said possessions f the tribes inhabiting* the territories aforesaid, nd for maintaining ur said posses-* sions in peace and safety, nd for promoting, s far as may be' possible, he good order, civilization, nd moral and religious' instruction of the tribes aforesaid, nd, with that view, for* placing hem under some settled form of government,' he wordsmeant what, in the ordinary eaning of the Englishlanguage,they seem to convey, and that it was my duty to act , jcordingly.If Mr. Gladstone's ' actual acquaintance ith BriSsh institu-ions,'

leads him to think differently, ill he say what elsecould have been done, under the circumstances, han to call onthe British General to use the force at his disposal, o the

best of his skill,o

protectthe lives and

propertyof British

subjects I have spoken hitherto only of the immediate causes of the

Zulu war ; but if we look for causes as far back as Mr. Glad-


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Historyof Letter to Sir John Kaye. 19

On my return to England last autumn I had better oppor-unitiesthan when in South Africa of consulting he records of

what I had actually aid or written on the subject f our relationswith Afghanistan, uring my service in India and in the Indian

Council. I found that there was a great mass of despatcheswritten whilst I was for nine years, from 1850 to 1859, Com-issioner

in Sind, in charge of our political elations withBeloochistan and much of southern Afghanistan, ncluding hechief trade routes to Candahar and Herat. But the more im-ortant

opinions had then given were fairly pitomized n aletter subsequently ritten on the subject o the late Sir JohnKaye, when I was a member of the Indian Council in 1874and 1875, and he was Secretary n the Political Department.Sir John Kaye was a personal riend of mine, in many of his

political iews I very cordially oncurred, and, to the best of myrecollection the cause of my writing o him was a conversationwe had on the grave aspect of Afghan affairs in June 1874. Heasked me to put in writing what I had orally tated to him. Idid as he requested, nd expressed y opinions n a letter to himdated the 12th of June, 1874, which he deemed of sufficient

importance o have printed or the perusal f the Secretary fState and Political Committee and other Alembers of the Indian

Council.

The subject eing of great importance, copy of this letterwas shown, either by the Secretary f State or by some friendin Council, I know not which, to the late Lord Lawrence, whose

opinions ere known not to agree with those I held on the

subject.This elicited from him a

Memorandum,dated the 4th

of November, 1874, to which I wrote a reply n the 11th ofJanuary, 875.

These papers belonged to a very large class of opinions ivenand recorded by Members of the Indian Council, for the use andinformation of the Secretary f State for India and his Council.They were not regarded as strictly fficial papers, but wereabsolutely t the disposal f the Secretary f State.

I was in South Africa when, without any previous referenceto me, my letter to Sir John Kaye, of the 12th of June, 1874,was published in the London 'Times' of the 17th of October,1878, and it was followed, at intervals of a few days, by ihelate Lord Lawrence's Memorandum of the 4th of November,1874, and my rejoinder f the 11th of January, 1875, whichappeared in the 'Times

' of 14th November, 1878.I see nothing in the opinions expressed n the papers I then

wrote to withdraw or alter. Portions of the papers were omittedin the * Times' reprint. hese are now supplied n the papersprinted t the end of this Note.

C 2^


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20 Opinions hen given confirmedy late Experience.

I will not epitomise y letter to Sir John Kaye, nor LordLawrence's Memorandum in reply, or my answer pointingout in what he had misunderstood my views. I have no wish

to reopen the question, ut simply to put on record what werethe opinions reallyexpressed at that time and have alwaysmaintained, and I would ask that what I wrote may be read and

fairly judged by any one who cares to know whether 1 everadvocated a war of aggression n the Afghans, r in any other

way said, r wrote, or did anything to justify he imputations fadvocating uch a war whether, on the contrary, it is not truethat in 1874 I advocated, s I had always done, the only policywhich could have honourably and safelyprevented uch a war ?

Looking at what I then wrote by the light of subsequentevents, it seems to me that I was not far wrong in my anticipa-ions

of what must happen, if the cold, unneighbourly, nd dis-rustful

course, which we had then been for some time followingin Asia, were persevered n. Whether I was right in my judg-ent

of the causes which had alienated the Afghan powers whether those causes admitted of being removed whether at

the time 1 wrotein

1874 a changeof

tone revertingo that

frank, just, nd neighbourly reatment which had been adoptedby Lord Mayo, would have mended matters ; these and manyother questions ay be matters of speculation nd opinion.But I may safely challenge any one to produce a word fromwhat I wrote, then or at any other time, which justifies r.Gladstone's charge that I instigated he advance into Afghan-stan,

which took place four years after I wrote.

Of the specific easures which I did recommend in 1874, it isobservable that the most important have been since carried outor adopted by the present Government. Thus Quetta in Beloo-chistan is now occupied by our troops, as an advanced post ofour Western Indian frontier. This was one main point on the

necessity f which I always insisted, nd which, when I wrote,might have been carried out without firing shot. The meansof communication between Quetta and the Indus have been

improved by railway and made roads, and I am sure that if

any one in the Government of India now feels any regretconnected with these lines of communication, it is regret that

such suggestions ere not earlier and more completely arriedout. What agents we are now maintaining to let us knowwhat goes on in Afghanistan, cannot tell ; but I conclude wehave some, and I doubt whether they could have instructionsless calculated to

provokewar than those I recommended

enjoining n them in 1874, viz. entire abstinence from

meddling with the internal Government of the country ; a policyof watchful vigilance, f sincere desire to support the ruler of


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Sind Frontier Polio/. 21

the country, actively nd efficiently, s long as he maintainedfriendly elations with us in all matters of foreign policy. I

may note that I also counselled abstinence from any attempt to

enforce union of the Afghan states under a single ruler-advice which we may yet find was not altogether ll-judged rsuperfluous.

As regards these agents, if there is now any difficulty nmaintaining them in positions here they can observe and

accurately eport what goes on in Afghanistan, such difficultyhas certainly ot arisen from following ny advice of mine.

I referred then, and I can refer now, to officers still living ho

can prove that they did, habitually, ong ago,and under

myorders, what I recommended should be still done ; and that

they were able to gain the good-will and confidence of all withwhom thev came in contact Afghans included and to live asfriends among them, not by bullying, intriguing, hreatening,or provoking to war, but by frank,honest, straightforward nd

friendly earing, uch as befits Englishgentlemen ; and by im-ressingon all with whom they came in contact that if, at any

time, war should be forced on us, it would be ill for those whoprovoked it for that the English soldiers were men-at-arms whowould accept no defeat. Sir William Merewether, unfortunatelyfor the public service, as since gone from among us ; but SirHenry Green and his brother, Colonel Malcolm Green, SirLewis Pelly, nd Sir Frederick Goldsmid and many others ofthe Sind Frontier School are still alive, and can testify hat I

suggestedin 1874

nothingmore than what

they had, habituallyand safely, nd as a matter of course, done during many yearsas frontier officials whilst representing he English Governmentin the countries beyond our Western Indian frontier.

VV hat were the circumstances under which the said frontier

officials acted, and what the principles hich they professedand carried out, were described by me in a memorandum whichI drew up, for the information of the Viceroy, n the 22nd of

March, 1876. I endeavoured in that paper to give an idea olthe Sind system of frontier policv and action, s I bad knownit during the nine years (1850 to 1859), I was in political hargeol all the Lower Indus frontier from Kussmore and the districts

north of the Bolan Pass to the sea, including ur relations withthe Beloochis and the Southern Afghans about Candahar. I nowreler to what I then wrote with the greater confidence, ecauseit is obviously ree from any possible reference to events whichhave since happened.*

* Vide infra, p. 73.


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22 Sind Frontier Policy.

Sincl had been annexed to British India in 1843, and for

some years after the frontier was much disturbed by incursionsof the Belooch tribes. Life and property were insecure for aconsiderable distance within British territory, nd as late as1847 many thousand head of cattle were swept off by a raid ofBeloochees, who plundered up to the immediate neighbourhoodof Shikarpoor. Till this time there had been much division of

authority n the frontier. In 1847, General John Jacob was

placed in command, and gradually introduced a system whichwas acted on, with little variation, s long as I remained in Sind.General Jacob died in 1858, but his firm, consistent, ust, nd

humane system was well maintainedfor

many yearsafterwards

by his successors whom I have already named, and who can bereferred to on the subject.

[The relations between the Khan of Khelat and the Britishofficers in Sind had been generally riendly,hough the Beloo-hees

had no great reason to love us. In 1839 Sir J. Wiltshire,

returning from Cabul, stormed Khelat, and the Ruler, MehrabKhan, was slain in his citadel. A rival was set up by us asKhan, in place of his son, a child, Nusseer Khan, who fledwestwards, but, having been brought back by his step-mother,Mehrab Khan's widow, a woman of great energy and ability,the interloper as deposed, Nusseer Khan was elected ruler,and we found it convenient to acquiesce n the succession. Hebehaved well after the British conquest of Sind from the

Belooch Amirs, and in 1855 a treaty was concluded with him,

bywhich he became a subordinate

allyof the British Govern-ent,

and a small subsidy was allowed him, to aid him in

restoring rder to his distracted country.]During the nine years I remained in Sind as Commissioner

up to 1859, the system introduced by General Jacob worked

admirably. The peace and protection ecured to our own sub-ectswithin the Sind border were extended up to the Candahar

frontier. The wild Belooch tribes shared in the quiet and

prosperity hich British subjectseverywhere enjoyed, nd ourofficers were welcome guests wherever they went in the Khan ofKhelat's dominions, and were on friendly erms with the AfghanSirdars of Candahar.

The credit of the Sind frontier policy is mainly due to thelate General John Jacob and to Sir Charles Napier, who, seeingJacob's capacity for such duty, placed him in charge of thatborder. I claim no share in its success, beyond heartily up-orting

it, when, as Commissioner in Sind, I became responsiblefor the whole political nd civil administration of Sind, andfor the peace of that border. But I do claim to be a competent


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Sind Frontier Policy. 23

witness to the merits of the system, and to be entitled to beheard when I testify hat, by following t, not only did we pre-erve

peace and good-will ith our neighbours, ut that we andall English officers there employed were respected nd trusted,by those beyond the English border, as long as that policy asfollowed.

I have always, consistently, or a quarter of a century past,advocated that we should occupy Quetta in the territory f ourally the Khan of Khelat, who had agreed bv Treaty to allowus to do so, and that we should improve our communications,via the Bolan Pass and Quetta, between the Indus andCandahar, rather than attempt to force an entrance into theCabul Valley, ia JuUalabad and the Khyber.

It seems to me that all the dear-bought xperience f the pastwar is in favour of this view ; that the operations f GeneralsRoberts and Stewart have shown that the position recommendedwas one more easy to take up and defend diplomatically, swell as in a military ense than either remaining inactivewithin the old frontier or advancing from Peshawar on Cabul ;

that it would give us precisely he influence we desired tohave in Afghanistan, ithout risk of war ; that it was, in fact,the best position or ensuring permanent peace.

Whether the late Afghan war was just r unjust, ecessary orunnecessary ; whether it was a consequence of previous neglectand of contemptuous indifference to our relations with the

Afghans, or whether there were other causes, are questionsinto which I am not now called to enter. All I have now to

say is that there was no warrant for classing e, whether forblame or praise, mong the authors or instigators f that war,when I was so far off as to be incapable f advising n the sub-ect,

and when all I had ever spoken or written regard-ngAfghanistan, or the previoustwenty-five ears, was in

the interest of peace and good neighbourhood owards theAfghans.*

It is too late now to repair he personal injustice one bythe Midlothian speeches o Indian officials, he work of whoselife, owever obscure and unnoticed by English politicians, asalways had for its aim to promote peace and the peaceful m-rovement

of the people of India and their neighbours, hilstupholding the honour of England. But it is not yet too late toarrest some of the evil results, lsewhere, of such misrepre-entations.

* As regards the late evacuation of the positions e bad taken up in Afghan-stan,I have always held the strongest opinion, that whatever might be the

merits of the question of original advance, ur precipitate bandonment of thepositions e held was as unwise as it was unjust.


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24 Effects f Midlothian Speeches n Africa.

The storm of Midlothian invective was directed not onlyagainst the Afghan policy f the late Government, but againstall they had done and allowed in South Africa, and I, as oneof their officials, as to be discreditably onnected with their

Afghan policy, n order to diminish any weight which mightotherwise attach to my opinions s an actor in South Africa.The desired effect was produced. I was discredited andrecalled, nd all that I did and recommended, was, as far as

possible, ndone and disallowed.I may note in passing that, though I belong to an old Tory

family, I have myself been specially mployed as much byLiberal as by Conservative Administrations, nd, like my com-anions

in the Indian services, ave been trained to take, as myexamples in public life, hose who placed the honour and wel-are

of England above all other considerations, nd to serve ourSovereign and country apart from all questions f party politics,as Englishmen above and before all things, hether we wereTories, Radicals, r Whigs, It was therefore a new experienceto me to find myself looked upon as a party tool.

So far, the revolution in South African policy, hich Mr.Gladstone in his Midlothian speeches expressed is desire toeffect, as been effected. It is possible hat hereafter, hen theheat of party prejudice as somewhat abated, a time may cometo weigh facts and opinions in other balances than those of

party, and show that Mr. Gladstone was not more accurate or

just in describing hat I did or advised to be done in SouthAfrica, than he was with regard to Afghanistan.

Meantime, as the revolution of all that was done under theprevious overnment is not yet so complete n Africa as it isin Afghanistan, would only ask all who are concerned in thewelfare of our colonies in South Africa, to consider two mainfeatures of all I have ever recommended regarding ur treatmentof our fellow-subjects nd neighbours n South Africa, s wellas in Afghanistan.

First, s regards the natives, n all our dealings ith them,I have ever recommended that we should protect and rulethem in South Africa as we do in India. The best method of

such protection s quite another question n which I will notenter now. I would only state my conviction that time willshow that protection, ithout sovereignuthority, s impossiblethat the withdrawal of sovereignty eans the withdrawal of

protection and that both sovereignty nd protection ay be

effectuallyxercised

throughthe Colonial

Government,and

byMinisters responsible o a freely lected Colonial Parliament,provided t is under the direct and unquestionable overeigntyof the Crown of England.


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26 British Sovereignty ssential to Peace.

English gentlemen who knew the Boers thoroughly, and under-tood

what was needed to give them a good and liberal form of

government.The materials so collected were at the disposal of Her

Majesty's Government, when I was superseded as regarded all

authority in the Transvaal in June, 1879. I drew the specialattention of the late Sir George Colley to the subject when he

came out in 1880, and placed copies of the materials I hadcollected at his disposal. In a letter which I received from

him, dated Mount Prospect,February 7th, 1881, only a few

days before his lamented death, he asked me whether I re-embered

sending him an outline of a form of government

approved by educated Dutch politicians? and added, I think with some modifications it might not be inapplicable to the Transvaal. I may be sanguine, but I still hope that this revolt will be followed by something of a reaction against its leaders and instigators, and that a favourable

opportunity may offer for giving the Boers asomewhat

more

liberal constitution, and one which would satisfy he demands of the majority.

We shall possibly be told that efforts are now being madein the same direction by Sir George Colley's successor, aided

by the advice of some of the same persons who helped me to

put together the outlines of the constitution to which he refers

in his letter to me.

But I see little chance of success, if the grand essentials of

sovereign rule, and protection for all law-abiding subjects, rewithdrawn. The result it seems to me must be much the same

as if Ireland were now handed over to the Land League, by wayof giving her self-government. What may ultimately be evolved

out of a ferment of diverse nationalities in South Africa I do

not pretend to forecast ; but if the sovereign rule of the British

Crown be withdrawn, I see little hope for the safety of life,property, or liberty in the Transvaal or beyond its borders, savefrom the strong arm

of men fighting each for his own hand ;and still less hope for peace and a cessation of war for many

years to come.

H. B. E. FRERE.

July 1881.


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27

DOCUMEJTTS REFERRED TO IN PRECEDINa

NOTE.

I. Sir Bartle Fbere's Letteb to Sib John Katb.

24, Chapel Street, Belgrave Square,My dear KaYE, 12th June, 1874.

Many thanks for the papers regarding the Central Asianquestion. I have not seen Eawlinson's nor Burne's papers, and inwhat you sent me I find nothing new as regards the facts of the case,

nothing, mean, beyond what the newspapers tell us, and what hasbeen, in fact, oreseen for the last quarter of a century ; for we findthe whole clearly predicted a Sir John McNeil's pamphlet, whichreached its third edition during the Crimean war, and in what

manyothers have published since, besides what many more of us haveu-ritten officially, nd not published. The one new feature is thatofficial politicians n India seem now at last seriously alarmed,and there is much risk that, like all men when they at last perceivedanger they have long been unable to recognize, hey may rush in the

wrong direction.

However, the policy of masterly inactivity eems at lastabandoned by most of its former advocates. They no longer closetheir eyes, and turn their backs on obvious dangers which are rapidlyapproaching. All agree that the time is come when somethingmust be done, but what is that '' something to be ? The Eussiansthreaten Merv, and are steadily dvancing along their whole frontierline. Our advisers all say, we, too, must advance; one of themadds, we must saturate Tui-keetan with British influence and Britishgoods ;

and all seem to agree that we must make any move onwards

by Kussia a casus belli.As for Turkestan, it is quiteright to open any trade routes

we can in that direction, nd if we can induce the people there andin Thibet to trade with India more extensively, o much the better.It is an object well worth all the trouble and expense of suchMissions as Forsyth's o attain. I would only urge that we shouldlook at such questions occasionally rom a Chinese point of view,consider how our Mission affects onr relations with China, and takegood care that our alliance with the Amir of Turkestan does not in-uriousl

affect our position t Pekin. As a barrier agaiust Russianadvance, a Turkestan alliance seems to me of little value. Of course,it is well at all times to be on the alert, o have oui- attention directedin that direction, nd to have constant, late, and accurate information


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28 Merv Causes of Russian Advance.

of all that goes on in that quarter. The day may come when it maybe very important to us to have a good name and good friends inTurkestan, whence a few active officers might in time of need make auseful flank impression on any force threatening ndia from the

north-west. But Turkestan is not an easy route for invading India,and not likely o be used against us unless it should be so entirelyneglected s, like any unguarded postern, to invite the approach ofthe invader.

As for Merv, I do not in the least underrate the importance o us ofits occupation by Russia. But our threat to make such occupation fa troublesome refuge for frontier robbers and man-stealers a casusbelli would be worse than simply ineffectual. It would not stop theRussian advance

in the least. It would merely, if the Russians re-ardedour threat at all, postpone that one step till, s in the case of

the abrogation f the obnoxious clauses regarding the Black Sea inthe Treaty of Paris, the step, in itself a necessary one, and useful tocivilization and good order, irrespective f Russian interests, ouldbe taken at a moment when we could not go to war with any chance

of fighting o good purpose.A little consideration will show that this must be the case. What

is it that impels Russia to advance ? We arepretty

well agreed thatthe impulse is the same as that which impelled ourselves fromCalcutta to Peshawur. We were a strong, united, aggressive, ndgrowing Power, in contact with States so disunited and demoralizedthat their power was paralyzed, nd had no inherent vigour andcapacity or resistance, till less for growth. Hence they invariablygave way and crumbled before us, and when there was any inherent

vigour left in them to resist, heyalways gave us some good cause forquarrel, nd were soon worsted in fair fight. We never stopped in

conquering India for considerations of home policy, r in obedienceto any orders from London. Some of otir greatest acquisitions eremade, in our own generation, y men who came out sincerely eter-ined

to avoid extension of boundary, but the course of conquest wasnever stayed till we got to the barriers of the mountain regionswhich surround India on the land side. All this was in spite of themost constant and positive rders from home, and the most sincerewish on the part of men at the head of affairsin India to obey those

orders.It is the same with Russia, with this difference, hat instead of

public opinion at home being, as was the case in England, stronglyand sincerely ronounced against urther extension of territory, hereare in Russia, as I need not tell you, two opposite oliticalarties.Neither of them objects, n any moral ground, to extensions of terri- ory

; but one of them, including the Emperor himscK and some ofthe best and most able financiers and enlightened politicians, s

strongly opposed to further extension in Asia, on grounds of expe-iency.The great mercantile party of protectionists, any of theRussianized Germans, who arc more Russian than the Russians, mostof the military and the ultra-national politicians, n the other hand,


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Crusading Element. 29

are enthusiastic supporters of further schemes of conquest, and this

party is by far the more popular and powerful.If we, with our strong political iscipline, ith the earnest desire

of Viceroys to obey orders, and with a still more earnest desire on

the part of the nation at large to avoid conquest, if we, so favourablysituated for abstention from aggressive warfare, found circumstancestoo strong for us, and were unwillingly orced on from the sea to the

Himalayas, what chance has the Eussian Government, or that partyin it which dreads further conquest, of resisting he pressure of thesame kind, but much greater in degree, hich forces them to break upand annex the savage hordes intervening etween them and India?I need not to you repeat how the annexation comes about ; how thecivilized

power,theirs

aswell as

ours,is forced to

putits best men in

contact with the uncivilized neighbour how, if the frontier com-anderis ambitious, his uncivilized neighboursgive him constant

and apparently ustifiable ause for hostilities, hich in the end mustalways lead to the victorious advance of the stronger and morecivilized power ; how, if the frontier commander is conscientious orunambitious, the uncivilized neighbourgravitates o the stronger powerby a process less violent than in the former case, but even morecertain ; how, when

anysemi-civilized Humpty Dumpty

gets his

fall, all the king's horses and all the king's en

are utterly nableto set him up again ; how there is life and power of recovery after themost damaging defeat and disaster in the most misrmanaged branch ofthe civilized power, and how there is nothing but death and decay inthe uncivilized ; how the one power is insensibly nd by internalvigour urged to grow and aggress, while the other has no inherentforce of resistance, nless he gives \ip his antiquated rms and in-iscipli

and takes to himself the powerful weapons and militaryarray of civilized nations, hich are of no avail, in fact, which cannotlong exist, unless he abandons also his barbarous habits and policy offinance and internal administration, in a word, unless he enters theranks of civilized nations. All these things you know and Lave seen,and therefore I need not argue to you that, while Russia is a civilized,living, nd growing Power, the wishes even of the all-powerful zarand his ablest councillors are of little avail in stopping her career ofgrowth and conquest among the least civilized races of Asia.

But the Russians have one source of impulse which moves themmore powerfully han it does us, though we, too, feel something of it.I mean the religious crusading element ; this, as you know, isstudiously discouraged nd generally distrusted by our politicians,and though there is a strong missionaryimpulse in many classes ofthe community,sufficiently trong to ensure respectful reatment fromthose who do not share it among the governing class, t is by no meansa fashionable and hardly a popular political mpulse. But it is quite

otherwise in Russia, where whatever of real loyalty exists isinsepariibly ound up with religion, and whatever is religions sactively propagandist, nd hostile to non-Christian powers. To amodern religious ussian the prospect of a war with a Mahomedan or


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30 Inutility f Neutral Zone.

an idolatrous Prince has the same aspect and excites the same feelingsas a crusade did among religiousnglishmen in the middle ages, Ionly mention this because I think it is one of the forces impellingRussia onwards of which we take less account as a political orce than

it deserves. It is in many ways a great source of strength o her.So is the declared policy of the Eussian Government to spare nopains to put down slavery wherever her influence extends, such slavery,1 mean, as that prevalent mong the Turcomans and throughoutCentral Asia. Contrast our feelings, r the feelings f intelligentAmericans, when they heard that the slave markets in Khiva andBokhara were abolished, ith what you and I felt when we ineffectuallyground our teeth as we read of what poor Stoddart and Conolly were

sufferingand

we mayhave some faint idea of the national

credit,he

sense of duty performed, nd the impulse to do more, which patrioticRussians feel when they consider what they are doing in Asia. Thework may not be very perfect, ut their feelingregarding it reckonsfor much in weighing political orces, s compared with the half-earted

shilly-shallying f our ordinary dealings ith such questions,when we get beyond the bounds of India and the four corners of anAct of Parliament.

The result of all this is, that Russia will go on, whether her Go-ernmentwish it or not, till something stops her; and what will

stop her ? Nothing that I can see, except an impassable barrier,such as we found in the mountain chain of the Himalayas, or apolitical arrier, uch as finding erself on a frontier which she cannot

pass without fighting n equallypowerful nation on the other side,and where that powerful nation is civilized like herself, nd able andwilling to give her honest hearing and reasonable redress with regardto all frontier discussions, nd to requireequaljustice rom her.

A neutral zone, consisting f the territory f uncivilized powersis worse than useless as a barrier, simply because the uncivilized

power is, by the nature of things, ure to act in a way which would

give an aggressive nd growing power on its border an irresistiblecause for advance ; or, if the civilized power is sufiiciently trong anddetermined to abstain from aggression, he weak and imcivilized powermust gravitate owards the stronger body, and become in time a partof it, without formal annexation or aggression.

For similar reasons, it will not be a sufficient check on the Russianadvance to find themselves on the frontier of an uncivilized power,under our influence or protection, nless we are prepared to usethat influence to direct the uncivilized power in all its relations with

its neighbours. We must be prepared not only to support theprotected tate when right, ut to force it to make satisfaction when

wrong ; otherwise we shall not close the opening for interference bythe other civilized power on the opposite side, because we can offer no

effectual guarantee that our uncivilized neighbour shall not repeat theprovocation, nd therefore we can have no valid objection o offer toRussia, on the opposite border, exacting fficient guarantees for herown security.


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Opposite haracters of Russian and English Policy. 31

This forms tbe great diflficulty f any alliance with or protectorateof Affghanistan. An alliance is illusory, s we are now finding ut to

our cost, unless our ally be a ruler of exceptional isdom, experience,and foresight ike Dost Mahomed. As for a protectorate, t is an

essential element in any system of protection hat the protected tateshould be willing to be guidedby the advice of its protector in allmatters of foreign policy. But it is hopeless o attempt anything ofthe kind in Affghanistan, nless the protectorate were preceded bya thorough conquest, such as should clearlysubject the Ruler of

Affghanistan o be guidedby the advice of the British Government.What, then, is the barrier which I would propose to raise to Russia's

advance towards India ?

Let us, before answeringthis

question,onsider the essential

dif-erenceof British and Russian policy, sing the word less in the

sense of a design for political ction, which may be changed fromtime to time, than as the result of national instincts and tendencies,and the expression of national interests, hich are less variable.Used in this sense, Russian policy in Asia is, as we all see, positive,active, and aggressive. Whatever may be the professions r thewishes of Russian statesmen, the exigencies f her frontier positionrender it impossible or Russia to stand still until she meets somephysical r political bstacle, hich certainly oes not at this momentexist between her frontier and ours. The question, hen the twofrontiers will be conterminous,s, as far as Russia is concerned, simplyone of more or less time.

Our policy, n the other hand, is purely defensive and stationary,and it seems to me that,by the nature of our position, t must socontinue, unless we are inclined to enter the lists as rivals to Russia,and to embark on indefinite schemes of further Asiatic conquest.The nation is clearly ot prepared, or likely to be prepared, forthis if it has due warning, has its eyes open to the consequences,and is aware that if once more on the move we may find it not easy to

stop, nor to choose our own limit to om* conquest.But our policy itherto has been not only stationary, nd nominally,

though I think very imperfectly, efensive. It has been also purelynegative. We are ready enough to say what we \vill not do, but allefforts by any of the other Asiatic Powers concerned have hitherto

failed to elicit from the Government, either here or in India, anydeclaration of what it will do, under any given or conceivable com-ination

of circumstances.

This peculiarity n our policy ill at once explain to any one whoknows Orientals, or, in fact, to any one who knows mankind ingeneral, he inherent weakness of our policy s compared with thatof the Russians. We find it so every day in Europe : negatives onot satisfy elgium or Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey, Sweden, or

any other Power that can possibly need a good word or a friendlyact from us. How then can theysatisfy man like the Ameer, theShah, or any other Oriental, who understands, nd may trust, posi-ive

promise, but who can neither understand nor trust a simple


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32 Change needed in our own Policy.

assertion that, when the time comes and the event happens we will think about it, and who cannot estimate, s an European diplomatistcan, what, from a variety f motives, e may do, in the event of aweak European Power being threatened by a strong one ?

What then ought we now to do? Stand still, and do nothing?Clearly this can only precipitate vents. Orientals generally is-nderstand

our present inaction. They suspect some deep design, omesecret understanding with Russia. If it is once understood that

nothing will move us tillthe Russians appear on our frontier, e shall

certainly asten that event by a great many years.But a defensive policy is not necessarily nactive, or merely

stationary, tillless is it necessarily eak. On the contrary, truedefensive

policyfor India seems to me to

require,ow more than

ever, much active exertion in many directions. Our great danger,greater than anything we can fear from foreign designs of aggression,seems to be on our own side the border, in the Indian belief that weare indifferent to, or afraid of, or connive at the Russian conquests, inour English insouciance, nd distaste for the subject, hich is certainto end in a sudden rude awakening to the dangers of our position,and a risk of passionate, ll-considered, iolent action, hich is moredangerous to peace in democratic communities than the most ambitiousdesigns of despotic utocrats.

What then ought to be the character of our action ? As for makingan advance upon Merv by Russia a casus belli, do not think theproposal will stand examination ; the place is nothing to us, exceptas a step towards Herat and Cabul, and it is not a necessary step toeither ; to prohibit the Russians from taking it might, in the eventof their regarding our prohibition, orce them to turn it, and thus

delay for some short time the extermination of hordes of robbers andman-stealers, hose intervention between us and Russia must everbe a fruitful source of misunderstanding. But the Russians will not,or, m(jre correctlypeaking,they cannot, stop for any mere threatsor promises of ours.

Nothing, I believe, will be effectiial to arrest their progress towardsIndia till we have British Officers stationed on the Indian side of a

well-defined frontier, xercising n effectivecontrol over the politics fthe semi-civilized races on our side of such a border, and in constant

frank diplomatic ommunication with Russian officers on the other side.But how is this to be effected without annexation, r protectorate

almost equivalent o annexation, nd supported by force ? We must carry much further, and make more generally nderstood,

the liberal, rank, and independent policyinaugurated y Lord Mayo.Much ingenuity nd eloquence were expended, hen Lord Mayo wentout to India, to prove that, n his dealings ith the Ameer of Affghan-istan, here was no departure rom our previouspolicy but the fact

is that Lord Mayo endeavoured, and with much success, to reverse the masterlyinactivitypolicy of the previous 0 years, and to revertto that system of dealing ith our powerful frontier neighbours, hichwhen Sir George Clerk was at Umballa, and other men of like spirit


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34 Value of Occupation f Quetta,

But nothiug can make up for the loss of such a noble school offrontier officers as John Jacob founded, and which the Governmentof India so persistently iscouraged, nd ultimately abolished. Youwill find it every day more difficult to form men such as your Punjab

frontier has furnished, and of which you have some stillleft. Butif you intend to keep India, you must manage to train up men inthe spirit f your Malcolms, Elphinstones, nd Metcalfes of times past,and of Sir George Clerk in later days ; men who by their characterand the confidence the Natives have in them, can hold their ownwithout the immediate presence of battalions and big guns.

The active measures which seem to me essential for our presentpurpose are, first, o place an advanced post of our frontier army in theKhan of Khelat's

territoryt

Quetta, sufficiently trongto

preventthe place being carried till reinforcements can arrive from the Indus,between which and Quetta the communication should be improved,as far and as fast as practicable, o the foot of the Bolan and through-ut

that pass. This would establish above the passes, and in the

territory f a power bound by treaty to act in subordinate co-opera-ionwith us, an advanced post in an excellent position or watching

Southern Affghanistan, nd acting, f necessary, on the flank of any-hingwhich might threaten India from the Khyber Pass and Cabul.

These measures require no diplomacy, nor consultation with anyother power, except the Khan of Khelat, and we have treaties and

engagements with him which give us all the power we can require.A detachment from Jacobabad has frequentlyassed the summer in

Quetta, and nothing ore is necessary than to strengthen nd provisionsuch a post, and make it capable of permanent occupation.

But I am not at all sure that you may not now find covert

opposition n quarters where you would have found ready acquies-encein such a scheme a few years ago. I heard last week from an

old Indian friend that he lately et, on board a steamer in the BlackSea, two Russian Officers of rank, who began talking to him aboutAffghan politics, nd one of tliem told my friend that he had livedfor six months at Khelat. I never saw any mention of such a visitor

in any of our frontier reports. But I have often thought that the

perverse conduct of the Khan lately, etokened an idea that he could

rely on other support than that of the Government of India.

The railway for 150 miles, from the Indus to the Bolan, would runover a level plain very similar to that which, in Northern Bengal, arailway has just been made at the rate of a mile a day. Thence toQuetta the road may be easily nd cheaply improved by keeping partiesof pioneers at work on it, remembering that nothing more than apracticable oad for artillery s needed.

Secondly, ell-selected English agents should be placed at Herat,Cabul, and Candahar. I still retain my own predilections or Mili-ary

Officers for such service, ut they should be picked men, withgood training in the scientific branches of their profession, ardy,active, good linguists, nd, above all, en of good temper and dis-osition

calculated to secure the confidence of the Chiefs they have


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and necessity f Railway connection xtith Bolan. 35

to deal with. Their policy must be strictly aid out for them ; itmust be one of entire abstinence from all meddling with the internal

government of the country, of watchful vigilance s regards allthat goes on, and actuated by a sincere desire to support the Enler

of the country, actively nd eflSciently, s long as he maintainedfriendly elations with us, and dealt frankly nd in a friendly piritwith the English Government regarding all matters of foreigapolicy.

This need not be a costlyproceeding, f we are careful to avoidthe mistake of subsidizing he Prince, so as to make him rely moreupon our treasury than on his own thrift and good management.

But what if the Ameer should object to follow our advice ? If thematter did not affect his foreign relations he might be left to followhis own inclinations ; but if it affected such a question s his relationswith other powers than ourselves, I would give him clearly o under-tand

that he must not count on our support unless he followed ouradvice. I would not break with him save in the last extremity, ndafter all .hope of continuingfriendly elations had disappearedbut I would clear for action, nd give him unequivocally o under-tand

that we held ourselves free to act as might seem best for ourown interests, hich were to give foreign owers no good ground forinterference with him or us.

If, as we are told, the Ameer already evinces dislike and distrusttowards om* Government, we cannot too soon come to a clear under-tanding

with him as to whether he means peace and effectualallianco

or the reverse. If peace, then I would let no small obstacle hinder

Dur placing British OfiScer, ot necessarily n the capital, ut in aposition o judge for himself, and to report to us all that goes on atCabul. If, on the conti-ary, he Ameer objects o such a course, and

wishes to keep us at arms length, I would let him clearly ee weregarded his objection s proof of unfriendliness, nd were preparedto act accordingly.

With regard to the present state of affairs at Herat, I would imme-iatelydepute from the Persian side an intelligent nd scientific

Military fficer, ith three or four good assistants, cc[uainted ithall arms of the service, and if the Euler of Herat could bo inducedto receive them, I would establish them there permanently. This,no doubt, in the present state of affairs, ould give umbrage to theAmeer of Cabul, but I would let him clearly nderstand that wecould not sit by while he quarrelled ith the ablest and most popularof his relations,nd, possibly, uccessors ; that we must recognizethe actual state of affairs in Affghanistan, nd would not coun-enance

a repetition,y him, of the process by which his fatherwasted his own lifeand the resources of his kingdom, in establishinghis direct rule over Herat.

In the event of his persisting, would inform him that we shouldwithdraw all countenance from him, and reserve to ourselves fullliberty o treat as we might think proper with the Ruler of Herat.On the other hand, I would offer our good oflSces to both parties o

D 2


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36 Real Danger of Russian Advance Herat.

effecteach a formal reconciliation as should save the Ameer's nominal

sovereignty,djourning ll further questions to the indefinite periodof the next vacancy of the throne. Nothing, of course, but extremepressure will induce the Ameer to acquiesce in this course, but the

pressure ought, I tWnk, to be applied.I need not say I would lose no time in completing the railway

communication on an uniform gauge, from Kurrachee, via Mooltanand Lahore, to Peshawur, with a branch from Sukkar, to the BolanPass.

In considering his Central Asian question it never seems to methat, either those that are for active measures on our North- Westfrontier, r their opponents the advocates of masterly activity,

fairlyappreciatethe real character of the

danger tobe

guardedagainst, r the respective inds of strength f the parties concerned.What is our danger in India from Eussian advance ? People talk

of a Eussian invasion of India. If this means an expedition, ike theexpeditions o Khiva and Bokhara, formally prepared by the EussianGovernment with Eussian forces, and marching from the Eussianfrontier to attack us, the danger is jjerhaps remote one. No Eussianstatesman in his senses would, as matters now stand, dream ofattempting ucli a thing for a long time to come ; the Eussians haveneither the money, the men, nor the organization ecessary for suchan undertaking, hile they have an active enemy of great power atsea, able to worry them in the Baltic and the Black Seas, and onland all along their line from the Caucasus to the Indus. I thinkI could name a round dozen of our Officers any one of whom wouldundertake to stop, and could stop, such an expedition, r at any ratecut it off from its Eussian base, without moving a single British regi-ent,

if he had the command of a few hundred thousand pounds, afew good subordinate officers, nd three months warning. So far Iquite agree with the

masterly inactivity advocates, nd I have nodoubt whatever of the entire sincerity f all Eussian statesmen andsoldiers of judgment when they disclaim any idea of such an invasionof India for their own generation.

But the danger I apprehend is not of this kind ; it is twofold.First, there is the danger which Dost Mahomed well described to

Burnes, as like that apprehended when you see a stranger lookingover your garden wall ; he may be on his own side of the fence,and he may make no seeming attempt to come over ; but you knowhe is there for no good, and you do your best to dislodge him, anddo not rest till you have done so.

If we suppose Affghanistannly so far Eussianized that Eussiantravellers freely ove about the country, that Eussian Officers andmen, not necessarily n the pay of the Eussian Government, butdeserters possibly r vagabonds from Eussia, drill the Ameer's troops,

cast his cannon, coin his rupees, and physic him and his subjects,what would be the effect in India ? Can any man in his senses, whoknows anything of India, doubt that the effect now, and for manyyears to come, must be to disquiet very one in India, except that


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Character of Danger from Russian Advance. 37

great majority f the cultivators who will go on cultivating ithout

talking politics ill the crack of doom? Every Englishman, fromthe Governor-General downwards, will bo disquieted they will feelthat a great foreign Power has almost as much to say to the pro-eedings

of all the troublesome classes as the Viceroy and his EnglishofBcials. Every Prince and Chief will see in the Eussians a possiblealternative claimant for empire in India, all the disaffected, anger-us,

and criminal classes will be on the qui vive, ready to etir at amoment's notice-, nd all the millions who still have some martial

spirit eft will furbish their swords and believe that another era of

fighting nd fair contest for martial renown and plunder, s at hand.All these elements may be stirred into strife any moment by a Russian

proclamation ssued at Cabul, or even bya false

reportof

one,for it

is not necessary that the report should be true, to set some of theserestless elements in motion.

Now this danger, to be reasonably apprehended from a EussianMinister established at Cabul and Eussian subjects uietly ermeatingAffghanistan, s a danger which is never many weeks removed fromthe present time. I have no doubt that the good feeling f the existingGovernment in Eussia would prevent their taking any steps towardsit if we seriously emonstrated with them at the present moment ;but we must recollect that the more material part of such a step

may be taken at any moment by a daring Eussian frontier commanderwho chooses to run the risk of formal disavowal and recall ; and that,once taken, the step would be, or might be said by the Eussians tobe, irrevocable. If the Ameer chooses to invite a Eussian Officer of

rank, if he promises and affords friendly rotection o all Eussianvisitors, n what form at the present moment could we put our com-l^l