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Fifth Symposium on “U.S.-China Relations in a Global Context”

Cosponsored by: George Washington University China Policy Program, and

China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)

June 1-3, 2011, Beijing, China

Africa: U.S. Interests/Policy and Potential Collaboration/Competition with China

David H. Shinn, Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, GW

Long-term Themes in United States Policy towards Africa

There are four long-term themes in U.S. policy towards Africa that have been consistent for most of the period since the end of World War II.

First, when compared to other major regions of the world Sub-Saharan Africa has had the lowest foreign policy priority for each administration. Although North Africa is part of Africa, for U.S. policy purposes it is treated as part of the Middle East.

Second, U.S. policy towards Africa does not change significantly from one administration to another. It makes little difference if the administration changes from Republican control to Democratic control or vice versa.

Third, from the end of the Second World War until the end of the Cold War, the containment of communism dominated U.S. policy in Africa. Although there were other concerns, none was as dominant or consistent as the effort to minimize communist influence in Africa. This policy ended as the Cold War concluded.

Fourth, the United States has consistently been the first country to provide the most emergency assistance, especially food aid, to African countries in times of need.

Current U.S. Interests in Africa

Based on a hard-headed calculus as to what constitutes a U.S. interest, the United States has only five interests in Africa.

First, the United States obtains about 20 percent of its imported oil from Africa and wants to maintain or expand its access to African energy.

Second, it seeks political support from as many as possible of Africa’s fifty-three countries, which constitute more than one-quarter of the members of the United Nations.

Third, it wants to maintain access for U.S. military aircraft to overfly/land in African countries and for U.S. Navy ships to refuel and resupply in African ports.

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Fourth, it seeks African support in the global fight against terrorism, drug smuggling, money laundering and international crime so that these problems do not spread to the United States.

Fifth, it wants to increase exports to Africa.

Some analysts would include as U.S. interests in Africa the expansion of democracy, improvement of human rights, economic development of African countries, support for free markets, etc. In my view, these are more appropriately described as goals or objectives of U.S. policy. They are not “hard” interests.

Current U.S. Policy towards Africa

After more than two years in office, the Obama administration has articulated its policy towards Africa. In its broadest outline, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, explained earlier this year that there are five essential components to the policy.

First, strengthening democracies, good governance and human rights; Second, promoting sustainable economic growth; Third, mitigating and resolving conflicts; Fourth, improving public health, especially HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; and Fifth, working with Africa as partners on global issues, concerns and challenges such as

climate change, narco-trafficking, proliferation of small arms, global terrorism, etc.

Carson made the point that President Obama has refused to see African leaders who do not have democratic credentials. His support for economic development is evidenced by renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)-related initiatives, support for extension of AGOA beyond 2012 and continuation of the Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge Corporation. The Obama administration remains committed to the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)-related initiatives and announced a new Global Health Initiative that promotes the strengthening of health systems, improves maternal child health, addresses neglected tropical diseases and fosters research and development. The administration supports agriculture in Africa through the new Feed the Future initiative. Support for conflict mitigation is evidenced by the administration’s strong engagement in implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan and collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States for regional resolution of disputes. The administration has also increased assistance for countering global climate change.

While the policy of the Obama administration towards Africa is not significantly different than that of the Bush administration, there has been some reordering of priorities. The Obama administration attaches more importance to both the rhetoric and reality of long-standing U.S. policy to encourage democratization and human rights in Africa. Financial resources for this purpose remain, however, modest and there are occasional compromises on principle when African countries with questionable records on these issues also export critical resources such as

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oil or they support U.S. regional and international polices. The Obama administration has refocused the U.S. approach towards counterterrorism in Africa and shown less enthusiasm, for example, for actions that result in military attacks. While it continues strong support for the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, it has begun a new initiative to improve African agriculture and food security. There is a question, however, whether the tight budget environment facing the U.S. government will allow sufficient funds to make significant progress in the improvement of agriculture. There has been increased rhetorical support for dealing with climate change and improving the environment in Africa, although it is not clear that significant financial resources will be made available to support these objectives. Finally, the Obama administration has expanded somewhat high level personal contact with African counterparts.

Areas for U.S.-China Collaboration in Africa

The following areas for U.S.-China collaboration try to take into account American and Chinese interests while, at the same time, provide benefits to Africa.

Development Assistance Cooperation:

The United States and China have particular strengths in the health sector that can collaboratively improve the situation in Africa. China and the United States give a high priority to antimalarial programs. China is constructing thirty malaria treatment centers and providing antimalarial drugs such as artemisinin. China built a factory in Tanzania for the production of artemisinin. It is a highly effective medicine for preventing malaria when used in combination with other drugs and as part of a holistic program that includes insecticide-treated bed nets. USAID supports such a holistic program. In addition, the President’s Malaria Initiative has a goal of reducing mortality by half in target countries. Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete during a visit to Washington in 2008 lavished praise on the multidonor anti-malarial program in his country. When asked if China is part of the multidonor coordination, Kikwete replied in the negative but said he would welcome participation by China in the collective effort. A cooperative program for countering malaria is not likely to lead to political conditionality on the U.S. side and might also include involvement by organizations like the Clinton Foundation and Gates Foundation.

Neglected tropical diseases, particularly hookworm infection and schistosomiasis that each afflict 200 million Africans, are another area for U.S.-China collaboration. USAID and the Gates Foundation are working to reduce both diseases in Africa, and China has experience in combating them. China is also among the largest producers of praziquantel, the principal drug for treating schistosomiasis. Merck is another major producer. Although praziquantel costs only eight cents a pill, it is still too expensive for many African countries. At a minimum, a multidonor program that includes China and the United States should step up efforts to counter neglected tropical diseases such as hookworm and schistosomiasis.

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Other areas in the health sector for possible collaboration include improvement of nutrition and pandemic preparedness. China and the United States have experience in these areas that could prove valuable to African countries.

The other principal area for potential collaboration is agriculture. Some 60 percent of the African labor force works in agriculture and is still not able to grow enough food to feed its people. By contrast, 2 percent of the U.S. labor force produces enough food to feed the U.S. population, sell large quantities on world markets and supply food aid to many African countries. China feeds 20 percent of the world’s population on only about 8 percent of the world’s arable land and grows about 95 percent of what it consumes. The United States and China have significant experience in aiding African agriculture. While the focus over the years in helping African countries has been different, this is an obvious area for combining the strengths of China and the United States.

Improving African Trade, Business and the Environment:

The United States and China should work to build greater export capacity in Africa, which African leaders have identified as a priority. The United States and China have the experience and institutions to help African states improve their competitiveness in global markets, especially for products other than raw materials. The United States has been doing this with some success through the African Growth and Opportunity Act. China has a similar but more modest program for admitting certain products into China duty free from Africa’s poorest countries. China also has a loan fund that encourages Chinese businesses to establish manufacturing operations in Africa. The United States and China can provide personnel and technical assistance to increase African export capacity.

At the policy level, China, the United States and other major trading nations should be more supportive of African goals in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Doha Round began in 2001 as an initiative to ensure that developing countries are better integrated into the multilateral trading system. Results have been disappointing so far as the 153 WTO member countries try to finish negotiations this year.

As part of a broader dialogue on global energy, the United States and China can include developing oil derivatives and renewable energy, encouraging efficient energy consumption, developing energy technology and increasing the safety, efficiency and environmental protection of oil extraction in Africa.

A dialogue between China and the United States that includes Africa has already begun in the area of corporate social responsibility. This is a topic that seems to be of growing concern in China; it is not surprising the Chinese are willing to expand the dialogue to Africa. While still at an early stage, it is an area where the United States has a great deal of experience and may be able to help improve Chinese business interaction in Africa.

The United States and China have demonstrated their concern over the negative impact of climate change and environmental degradation. China is increasingly receptive to taking steps to end environmentally damaging practices. Growing recognition that climate

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change will have some of its most negative impacts on Africa could open the door for constructive cooperation by both countries and other donors with the Africans.

Security Cooperation:

China assigns about 1,600 soldiers, mostly engineering, transportation and medical personnel, to the six UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. The United States provides the single largest amount of funding for UN and African Union peacekeeping operations. The United States welcomes Chinese involvement in African peacekeeping and has even collaborated with China in the building of barracks for peacekeepers in Liberia. This is an area where the interests of both countries are often similar; there could be additional peacekeeping cooperation.

The United States and China should work together to help African coastal states reduce piracy, smuggling, illegal fishing, drug trafficking and threats to offshore oil facilities. Chinese and American shipping interests have been attacked by Somali pirates. There has already been significant cooperation in the anti-piracy operation off Somalia. Although Chinese frigates operate independently of the three established naval task forces in the region, the United States has spoken favorably about the Chinese contribution to the anti-piracy effort. The U.S. Coast Guard has been particularly successful in cooperating with its Chinese counterpart organizations. China has provided patrol boats and training to several countries in West Africa. The time may be appropriate to extend the U.S. Coast Guard’s interaction with its Chinese counterparts to include discussion of possible cooperation along the African coastline.

The United States should encourage U.S.-China discussions that include the Africans and Europeans on drug trafficking that passes through Africa. This has become a growing problem for several African countries as heroin moves from South Asia across Africa to North America and Europe. Cocaine originating in Latin America reaches West Africa before going to Europe. It brings with it international crime syndicates and increasing cases of money laundering. A number of African drug smugglers have been arrested in China. Eventually, this will become a greater threat to China.

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) based in Stuttgart has expressed a willingness to engage its Chinese counterparts in dialogue and even to consider joint projects in connection with UN peacekeeping operations and maritime security. While this is a sensitive topic that must include Africans in the discussion, it has the potential to improve stability where it is threatened in Africa to the advantage of all three parties.

Challenges Hindering U.S.-China Cooperation in Africa

Information sharing is a significant problem. While there can always be improvement on the American side, this has traditionally been a greater problem on the Chinese side. Even details about China’s foreign assistance, a seemingly innocuous topic, are treated as a state secret. It will be difficult to cooperate in virtually any area until China is more

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willing to share information. For example, the United States has encouraged China to subscribe to the principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which aims to strengthen governance by improving transparency and accountability in the extractive sector. China has made clear that it has no interest in supporting EITI.

The United States often imposes conditions concerning good governance, human rights and economic policy reform on its foreign assistance. This practice is anathema to China and will almost certainly eliminate the possibility of collaboration on development assistance projects in countries such as Zimbabwe and Sudan with a probable exception for the new government in South Sudan. On the other hand, there are a number of African countries where U.S. conditionality does not come into play and others where unconditional U.S. assistance is possible for certain kinds of projects. This is not an insurmountable obstacle, but one that must be dealt with delicately.

Whenever possible in its assistance programs, the United States works through nongovernmental and civil society organizations. China interacts almost exclusively with African governments or ruling political parties. There will be occasions where these two operating principles come into conflict. Again, however, there are many cases where American aid passes exclusively through African governments, and the Chinese are slowly becoming more comfortable working with nongovernmental organizations.

The United States is almost always an active member of donor coordination groups in African capitals. These informal groups have traditionally included all western donor nations, although they are open to non-western countries. China has not shown any interest in joining these groups just as it has avoided participation in the OECD, another western dominated organization. While it is perhaps understandable that China prefers to confine its international donor coordination to UN and African organizations, where there is less western control, it is less clear why China eschews participation in donor coordination groups in African capitals. These are essentially information sharing sessions to improve donor coordination and sort out problems with host governments.

China’s policy on selling small arms and light weapons to African countries is opaque and does not always result in strict procedures to ensure that these arms are not transferred to undesirable third parties. Chinese weapons and those from other countries including the United States have appeared, for example, in conflict zones such as Darfur and the eastern Congo. Nevertheless, most western countries that supply arms make a greater effort to keep these weapons out of the hands of undesirable third parties.