2008

African Security Review

EditorDeane-Peter Baker

Editorial BoardFestus Aboagye

Hiruy Amanuel

Annie Chikwanha

Jakkie Cilliers

Anton du Plessis

Peter Edupo

Peter Gastrow

Charles Goredema

Paul-Simon Handy

Guy Lamb

Len le Roux

Prince Mashele

Kenneth Mpyisi

Augusta Muchai

Naison Ngoma

Hennie van Vuuren

Institute for Security Studies

vol 17 no 3

African Security Review

September 2008

Abstracts v

FeaturesThe climate security divide:Bridging human and national security in Africa 2Denise Garcia

From the West to the rest:Climate change as a challenge to human security in Africa 18Dan Kuwali

Climate change:A new threat to stability in West Africa?Evidence from Ghana and Burkina Faso 39Oli Brown and Alec Crawford

Environmental change and human security in Lesotho:The role of the Lesotho Highlands Water Projectin environmental degradation 58Oscar Gakuo Mwangi

Africa WatchPersonnel fatalities in United Nations missions,by year, up to 30 June 2008 72Henri Boshoff

Senegal’s democracy:Has Wade lost his edge? 75David Zounmenou

CONTENTS

EssaysDeveloping national security strategiesin the African context 82Colonel (Rtd) James D Noteboom

Oil pipeline sabotage in Nigeria:Dimensions, actors and implications for national security 99Freedom C Onuoha

CommentariesUnderstanding Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood 118Laurence Caromba and Hussein Solomon

The impacts of environmental degradationon refugee–host relationships 125Leah Berry

Book ReviewThe ethics of climate change:Right and wrong in a warming world 134James Garvey

ABSTRACTS

Abstracts

Features

The climate security divide:Bridging human and national security in AfricaDenise Garcia

National security is traditionally considered to have two dimensions: national defence

against external aggressors and internal security against domestic enemies. States

therefore pursue weapons and alliances to attain security with military procurement

being an integral part of the pursuit of national security. Climate change has modifi ed

this state of affairs because it poses unique challenges to the regional security of Africa,

and to general security on a global scale: it is a non-temporal threat, with no clearly

defi ned parameters, and cannot be tackled by military means. In addition, it threatens

not only the security of a state but the security of communities or entire portions of a

state’s population. It is therefore a risk to both national and human security. The advent

of nuclear weapons has dramatically changed international relations in the 20th century

and modifi ed security relations amongst nations. Now climate change processes are

vi African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Abstracts vii

redefi ning security in the 21st century. The security implications for Africa are the most

dramatic and urgent.

This paper explores the climate divide produced by climate change processes,

particularly with regard to consequences of and effects on national and human security.

To complement this analysis, two areas of security are examined, the fi rst being the

relationship between climate change and confl ict and the second the security stressors

in Africa that compound climate change and imperil security. In conclusion, the climate

change scenario in Africa is linked to the pursuit of energy, conservation of forests and

resolution of confl icts. The author also situates the African challenges in the multilateral

processes of climate change.

From the West to the rest: Climate change as a challenge to human security in AfricaDan Kuwali

To date, most of the work on climate change has focused on mitigation and adaptation

strategies to address its causes and consequences to the environment. Some commentators

have expanded the debate by arguing for the promotion of sustainable development and

poverty reduction. However, there is need to also focus on the human dimension in the

climate change discourse. Therefore, this discussion seeks to contribute a more nuanced

understanding of the problem through a victim (human security) oriented approach to

combat climate change.

The central argument is that there must be a deliberate reframing of the climate change

debate in terms of human security, which is anchored in human rights doctrine.

The shared human rights framework entitles and empowers developing countries to

safeguard their rights when they are endangered. Investment in emission reduction is a

bargain compared to the long-term costs of inaction. It is essential to act now to prevent

catastrophic impacts, rather than adopt a business as usual approach and face terrible

consequences later. Africa should take the lead, as populations in developing countries

on the African continent will bear the brunt of climate change impact.

Climate change: A new threat to stability in West Africa? Evidence from Ghana and Burkina FasoOli Brown and Alec Crawford

Traditionally seen as an environmental and an energy issue, climate change is now being

recast as a threat to international peace and security. Africa, though the least responsible

for greenhouse gas emissions, is seen as the continent most likely to suffer its worst

consequences – a function of the continent’s reliance on climate-dependent sectors (such

as rain-fed agriculture) and its history of resource, ethnic and political confl ict.

The security implications of climate change have become the subject of unprecedented

international attention, and in 2007 climate change was the focus of both a Security

Council debate and the Nobel Peace Prize. There have been some attempts to construct

scenarios of the ways in which warming temperatures might undermine security on a

global scale. But the security impacts of climate change at the level of countries have

been lost in the political rhetoric.

This paper is an effort to address this research gap. Drawing on fi eld visits and consultations

with local experts, the authors explore the extent to which climate change could undermine

stability in two different West African countries, namely Ghana and Burkina Faso.

Environmental change and human security in Lesotho: The role of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in environmental degradationOscar Gakuo Mwangi

This paper examines the impact of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project on environmental

change and on environmental and human security in Lesotho. The central argument is

that the construction of the project has contributed to environmental degradation, and

particularly the depletion of renewable resources in terms of both quantity and quality.

The environmental scarcity brought about by the project’s construction is, fi rst, human-

induced and second, supply-induced in that it is caused by resource degradation and

depletion. This has had an adverse impact on environmental and human security in the

country. Part of the problem is that environmental issues associated with the project

have not been politicised by the elite and have accordingly not yet become a concern at a

high political level. However, the project itself is indeed the subject of politics at a high

level, because of its hydro-political implications. In the conclusion potential solutions to

the challenges of environmental problems associated with the project and the country as

a whole are put forward.

Africa Watch

Senegal’s democracy: Has Wade lost his edge?David Zounmenou

The recent ‘national dialogue’ initiated by opposition parties and civil society organisations

in Senegal in an attempt to frame solutions to the country’s latent political crisis highlights

the fragility of the democratic experiments in Africa. Since gaining its independence from

France in 1960, Senegal has been a model for political stability in West Africa. For almost

two decades Léopold Senghor, Senegal’s fi rst president, governed a relatively democratic

system before stepping down willingly in 1981. His party, the Socialist Party, remained

in power until the election of Abdoulaye Wade in 2000. While the 2000 elections

viii African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies

ushered in a new political dispensation in Senegal, recent growing political dissension

and socio-economic problems cast serious concerns over Wade’s political legacy and

the state of democracy in Senegal. Low-intensity but protracted armed confl ict in the

Casamance and recurrent social protests tend to cloud the ambitions of Wade’s Coalition

for Change, mainly because his international actions often receive a mixed welcome, if

not outright contempt.

Essays

Developing national security strategies in the African contextColonel (Rtd) James D Noteboom

It is important that African nations, free of colonial and cold war infl uences, now develop

their own national security strategies to deal with threats to or opportunities to advance

their national interests. This is particularly important because of the many and evolving

challenges they face from globalisation, climate change, internal strife, disease and non-

state actors, including drug cartels and terrorists. National security strategies can be

developed using an analytical model that considers national values, national interests, the

strategic vision of its leaders, and the use of national powers to achieve these objectives.

The model deviates from traditional national security analysis in that it does not focus

primarily on the use of military power to achieve strategic objectives, but rather on a

balanced and coordinated use of all elements of national power, including its diplomatic,

political, economic, military, information and socio/psychological powers to advance the

security of the nation.

Oil pipeline sabotage in Nigeria:Dimensions, actors and implications for national securityFreedom C Onuoha

If situated within the Cold War era conceptualisation of national security, oil pipeline

sabotage does not seem to fi t in properly. However, when viewed from a new paradigm

of national security, recent manifestations of oil pipeline sabotage and its implications

hold out serous threats for national security in Nigeria. This paper examines the three

main dimensions of oil pipeline sabotage in Nigeria, namely oil bunkering, pipeline

vandalisation/fuel scooping, and oil terrorism, as well as the actors and objectives behind

them. The author argues that if the federal government does not make concerted efforts

to contain the rising incidence of oil pipeline sabotage in the country, the capacity

of government to discharge its primary responsibility, that is to provide security and

development, will be largely compromised. The paper therefore advocates the adoption

of stringent measures aimed at enhancing surveillance of the pipelines, the tackling of

corruption and the entrenchment of good governance in the country.

The climate security divide:Bridging human and national security in Africa

Denise Garcia

From the West to the rest:Climate change as a challenge to human security in Africa

Dan Kuwali

Climate change:A new threat to stability in West Africa? Evidence from Ghana and Burkina Faso

Oli Brown and Alec Crawford

Environmental change and human security in Lesotho:The role of the Lesotho Highlands Water

Project in environmental degradationOscar Gakuo Mwangi

FEATURES

African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 3

particularly severe. Climate change has already started to disrupt state capacity to generate

wealth, to decrease the gross national product (GDP) and to affect human, and ultimately

national, security and will continue to do so to an ever-increasing extent.

The African continent is characterised by a diverse range of climates: the wet tropical,

dry tropical (many countries fall in this category), and alternating wet and dry climates,

with the latter being the most common. Several factors make Africa more vulnerable

to climate change processes: among these are volatile trade regimes, poor or lack of

governance, widespread poverty, recurrent droughts, inequitable land distribution, and

high dependence on rain-fed agriculture. This is exacerbated by an absence of sustained

investment coupled with high population growth rates. The resulting pressures on the

environment and prevalent poverty that hinders its adaptation capabilities make Africa

the continent most susceptible to even small changes in climate (IPCC 2007).

Although Africa is responsible for only about 3,8 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions,

there are three factors that make it one of the continents which is the most vulnerable to

climate change. Because of its position on the globe, Africa already has a warm climate and

is exposed to inconsistency in rainfall, prevalence of poor soils, and fl ood plains. Second,

most economies are dependent on sectors that are susceptible to climate variations; and

third and perhaps most importantly, the lack of good governance, widespread poverty,

poor economic and social infrastructure, confl icts, and limited human, institutional and

fi nancial capacities mean that as a continent, it is least able to cope with the effects of

climate change (IPCC 2007).

African states are largely dependent on economic sectors that are particularly susceptible

to climate change, such as agriculture, fi sheries, forestry and tourism. There are fi ve

areas in particular that represent security risks for Africa and can potentially undermine

human and national security, namely its ecosystems, water supply, agriculture and food

industries, coastal systems and public health (IPCC 2007). Disruptions of the natural

patterns of any of these areas, but particularly the fi rst three, may generate and intensify

confl ict. Climate change threatens sustainable development in Africa (ECOSOC 2008)

and with regard to the fi ve risk areas many, if not most, of the countries that would be

most severely affected are in Africa, and of these a large number are in sub-Saharan

Africa. The biggest concern with regard to each of the risk factors is that disruptions of

the already fragile systems and sectors would have devastating consequences for national

security and the wealth generation capability of the countries concerned, which would

in turn threaten livelihoods and severely affect human security.

Ecosystems: ■ Forests and aquifers are threatened by population growth and overuse of

such resources. As a result, loss of biodiversity is noticeable as is depletion of land

cover due to desertifi cation which is encroaching on previously fertile lands. A rise

in temperature of more than 1 °C would cause signifi cant changes in forest cover;

The climate security divide:Bridging human and national security in AfricaDenise Garcia*

The climate divide

Global climate change caused by the inexorable build-up of greenhouse gases in the

earth’s atmosphere is already disrupting ecosystems and causing about 150 000 additional

deaths per year (Kovats & Haines 2005). Unless climate change is reversed, the public

health burdens of climate change are likely to almost double by 2020 (ibid). Average global

warming of 2 °C threatens millions of people with an increased risk of hunger, malaria,

fl ooding and water shortages (Greenpeace 2007). In Africa these problems are likely to be

* Denise Garcia is an assistant professor in the Political Science Department at Northeastern University and a research associate at the International Security Program at Harvard University. She participated in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Cairo in June 2007 and in the fi rst UN high-level meeting on climate change, under the auspices of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in New York in September 2007.

4 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 5

diseases and lead to greater susceptibility to disease because of a poorer nutritional

status. Vector-borne diseases such as yellow and dengue fever could be a leading cause

of increases in the mortality rate which will have sweeping economic consequences,

too. Most African countries do not have the capacity to tackle such health challenges

and will be unable to attain health security without comprehensive multilateral

cooperation and support. Management of pollution, sanitation, waste disposal and

water supplies – all of which have a bearing on public health – as well as the provision

of adequate infrastructure in urban areas could become more diffi cult and costly if

the climate changes dramatically (ECOSOC 2008).

These infl uences combined would have a number of implications from a security point of

view. Security has traditionally been viewed in terms of threats to the state territory and

the population by a clearly defi ned enemy, which could be dealt with by having strong

armed forces. Climate change effects have redefi ned this traditional understanding

of security. The literature in international relations has been keeping pace with these

changes since the end of the Cold War, by widening the scope of security. However,

most states still prepare for traditional wars that are quite unlikely to occur: wars of

annexation of territory and defensive postures. If sea levels do rise, however, huge

portions of territories will be lost with grave accompanying losses in the GDP of those

states. Territories in this century will not be lost by wars, but by forces of nature. States

have only quite recently started to realise this and it will probably take many years before

military postures are adapted in the quest for security.

Bridging national and human security

From the above it should be clear that climate change in the 21st century will link aspects

that were previously seen as separate issues, namely national and human security. Climate

change is the overarching peril to the security of nations, making all the other threats

more likely, or exacerbating them. It will also come to constitute, in the coming years, a

threat to people, especially those living in the states most likely to be seriously affected.

After the end of the Cold War, the concept of security broadened and deepened beyond

its traditional focus on states and military defence. It grew to encompass a range of

potential threats from economic and environmental issues to illicit arms traffi cking

and energy security. ‘Deepening security’ also includes the human aspect, namely the

security of communities and individuals. Therefore security can no longer be defi ned

exclusively in terms of the ability of the state to defend its territory and its principal

values against military threats. The end of the post-Cold War era, too, brought

sweeping changes, including the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, many

devastating intrastate confl icts (in Rwanda and Bosnia, for example) and the rise of

China as a world power. Most importantly, these changes extended to the emergence

species distribution, composition, and migration patterns; and biodiversity in general

with loss of plant and animal species that are unable to adapt to warmer conditions.

Particularly the regions around the Sahara desert and in eastern and southern Africa,

already under threat from land degradation and desertifi cation, are vulnerable. In

confl ict regions such as the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the

exploitation of minerals and other natural wealth contributes to pressures on the

environment (IPCC 2007).

Water: ■ A third of the world’s population lives in the 19 countries currently classifi ed as

water-stressed. If the rainfall in the Sahel and southern Africa decreases and pollution

of the water basins continues, it will aggravate the situation. For example, the melting

of the glacier on Mount Kilimanjaro, where an estimated 82 per cent of the ice cap

that it had in 1912 has melted, means that Kilimanjaro’s glacier could disappear in the

next 15 years (ECOSOC 2008). It goes without saying that this would have a negative

effect on Tanzania’s economy, particularly on its production of coffee and bananas, as

well as tourism, and severely reduce the capacity of the country to generate wealth.

Agriculture and food industries: ■ Agriculture represents 20 to 30 per cent of the GDP in

sub-Saharan Africa and 55 per cent of the total value of African exports. Between

60 and 90 per cent of the total labour force are employed in the agricultural sectors

of countries in sub-Saharan Africa (ECOSOC 2008). However, African farming

is dependent upon seasonal rainfall patterns, which means that droughts or fl oods

could affect the availability of food. The result of such food insecurity is likely to be

confl ict, both within individual countries and between different countries in Africa.

Coastal systems: ■ Countries on the west coast of Africa that will be affected by rising sea

levels include Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon and Angola.

Most of these countries have major and rapidly expanding coastal cities and this zone

is usually pummelled by storms that increase the risk of erosion and inundation. The

eastern coast of Africa will also be affected, but to a lesser extent. The area with the

highest risk of inundation is a considerable portion of the northern Nile Delta, which

will have substantial implications for agricultural and urban areas as well as a devastating

effect on the Egyptian economy. Adaptation is possible but it would come at a great

cost for each country’s GDP (ECOSOC 2008). In countries that rely on agriculture in

coastal zones, such as Kenya (mangoes, cashew nuts, and coconuts), Benin (coconuts

and palm oil), Guinea (rice) and Nigeria, where coastal agricultural land accounts for

about 75 per cent of total, rising sea levels will impact negatively on food supplies,

putting at risk the lives of signifi cant parts of their populations (ECOSOC 2008:4).

Public health: ■ Higher temperatures, changes in natural seasonality and a loss of

biodiversity because of climate change impinging upon delicate ecosystems and

upsetting the natural balance will increase the risk of the occurrence of vector-borne

6 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 7

forthcoming), for example reducing reliance on highly polluting forms of energy such as

coal and oil by fi nding alternative sources of energy.

In the world today, defence should focus less on military threats, to be countered by

expenditure on military hardware, and more on the threats posed by climate changes

which will place populations at risk and could threaten the very survival of the states and

their people. The 2007 UNDP Human Development Report summarised the risks that

threatened human survival if no action was taken, as follows: an additional 600 million

people at risk of malnutrition because of the collapse of agricultural systems, especially

in sub-Saharan Africa; an additional 1,8 billion people at risk from water scarcity by

2080; up to 333 million people living in coastal regions could be displaced by tropical

storms and fl ooding; and hundreds of millions of people could be at increased risk from

diseases such as malaria. In Africa between 75 and 250 million people could be exposed

to increased water stress due to climate change and yields from rain-fed agriculture

could be reduced by up to 50 per cent by 2020 (UNDP 2007).

Climate security and confl ict

To truly understand the crisis in Darfur – and it has been profoundly

misunderstood – you need to look back to the mid-1980s, before the

violence between African and Arab began to simmer. Alex de Waal, now

a program director at the Social Science Research Council, was there at

that time, as a doctoral candidate doing anthropological fi eldwork. Earlier

this year, he told me a story that, he says, keeps coming back to him. De

Waal was travelling through the dry scrub of Darfur, studying indigenous

reactions to the drought that gripped the region. In a herders’ camp near

the desert’s border, he met with a bedridden and nearly blind Arab sheikh

named Hilal Abdalla, who said he was noticing things he had never seen

before: Sand blew into fertile land, and the rare rain washed away alluvial

soil. Farmers who had once hosted his tribe and his camels were now

blocking their migration; the land could no longer support both herder and

farmer. Many tribesmen had lost their stock and scratched at millet farming

on marginal plots. The God-given order was broken, the sheikh said, and

he feared the future. ‘The way the world was set up since time immemorial

was being disturbed,’ recalled de Waal. ‘And it was bewildering, depressing.

And the consequences were terrible’ (Faris 2007).

A recent long-term study undertaken by the United Nations Environment Programme

revealed strong links between climate change processes and the crisis in Darfur.

Environmental competition creates a volatile situation as a result of competition for

resources such as oil, gas reserves, water from the Nile River and timber, as well as

of entirely new categories of security challenges and threats, such as environmental

degradation (climate change), resource scarcities, transnational criminal activities and

human migrations, resulting in a profound transformation in the security landscape (for

analysis and criticism of the concept of human security, see Thomas & Wilkin 1999;

Paris 2001:87–102).

The costs of Hurricane Katrina in the United States – a major natural disaster in one of

the most powerful countries in the world – is a telling example of the fi nancial havoc

climate-related catastrophes can wreak. Insurance industry experts are refi ning their

estimates and agree losses will far exceed US$100 billion, making Katrina the United

States’ costliest natural disaster. Furthermore, more than 500 000 jobs were lost as a result

of hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Wolk 2005). Because of Katrina and other climate-related

disasters, states may be forced to realise that expenditure on costly military hardware,

vessels, combat helicopters, tanks and armoury will not provide their populations with

the security they have been promised.

Five years after September 2001, the US made provision for a total of US$432 billion in

annual and supplemental appropriations under the heading ‘global war on terror’. This

increase in US military spending has played a substantial part in budget defi cits and

government debt. Similarly, the overall past and future costs until year 2016 to the US

of the war in Iraq have been estimated at US$2 267 billion. This sum could have been

employed to alleviate the threats and risks associated with climate change processes and

challenges of adaptation to ongoing phenomena and mitigation of risks not only to the

US itself, but also for transfer technology and capacity to Africa, the continent likely to

be the worst hit.

Military expenditure worldwide in 2006 was estimated at US$1 204 billion, a 3,5 per

cent increase in real terms since 2005 and a 37 per cent increase over the ten-year period

since 1997. Average spending per capita increased from US$173 in 2005 to US$184

in 2006. The ratio of military spending to social spending was found to be highest in

those countries with the lowest per capita incomes (Stålenheim et al 2007). Based on a

percentage of GDP spent on defence, some African countries surpassed even the US,

with Eritrea having the third highest percentage worldwide at 9,2 per cent, followed

by Burundi which is 12th on the list with 6,4 per cent, Zimbabwe (15th with 5,9

per cent), Botswana (23rd with 4 per cent) and Ethiopia (26th with 3,9 per cent). In

comparison, the US is 28th on the list and spends 3,8 per cent of its GDP on defence

(The Economist 2007).

The current defence expenditure could actually jeopardise security, for it diverts

money to useless items that used to be part of statecraft and security but serve little

purpose now. Improving security should entail spending based on a combination and

multilayered strategy to achieve sustainable development or ‘sustainable security’ (Garcia

8 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 9

This is substantiated by confl icts not only in Darfur, but also in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia,

Angola, Nigeria, Cameroon, Western Sahara and Rwanda, where the confl icts can at least in

part be ascribed to environmental causes. Confl icts are often triggered by loss or diffi culty

to sustain traditional livelihoods (Military Advisory Board 2007; Charlery de la Masseliere

1996; Persival & Dixon 1996), upholding the argument that climate change will increase

the chances of confl ict because it will intensify resource wars (Klare 2007:355–361). A

study entitled Africa’s missing billions represents the fi rst-ever estimate on the overall cost of

confl ict on GDPs across the continent, and according to Oxfam International, IANSA and

Saferworld (2006) amounted to approximately US$300 billion between 1990 and 2005.

Confl icts weaken the African economy by 15 per cent per annum, which translates to an

average of US$18 billion lost annually as a result of confl ict.

Links between human and national security can be amplifi ed by three sets of dynamics.

First, more than 30 per cent of the world’s refugees and internally displaced people live in

Africa. The food shortages that already affect 25 African countries and 200 million people

will exacerbate the situation. Second, the rise of sea levels may cause large movements

of people because 25 per cent of the African population live within 100 kilometers of

the coast and six of Africa’s ten largest cities are on the coast. The two cyclones that hit

Mozambique in 2000, which displaced 500 000 people with 950 000 people becoming

dependent on humanitarian assistance, illustrate the vulnerability of coastal populations.

Third, health challenges associated with climate change will become a major burden for

several countries, because of epidemics, especially of malaria and dengue fever, while

cholera may occur in areas that are fl ooded (Military Advisory Board 2007:23).

In a study by Hendrix and Glaser (2007:695–715) the relationship between climate

change processes and the onset of confl ict was examined from two perspectives. The

authors fi rst estimated the impact of both long-term climate trends and short-term

climatic variance (operationalised as change in annual rainfall) on civil confl ict onset

in sub-Saharan Africa. They found that more temperate climates and fertile areas are

associated with a decreased likelihood of confl ict and conversely that a decrease in rainfall

is associated with an increased likelihood of confl ict during the next year. Second, they

focused on strategies for avoiding confl ict for the period 1980–2059 and concluded that

the objective should be to break dependence of subsistence agriculturalists on rainfall as

a source of crop water, as this resource is not predicted to increase in the future.

Security stressors

The challenge for Africa is to reduce the convergence of multiple stressors such as the

impact of widespread health pandemics like HIV/Aids and poor governance, as well as

confl ict and the excessive availability and proliferation of arms (Fields 2005:A534–A537).

As a result of the convergence of the stressors like these, climate change has an even

land use. These are substantive causal elements in the initiation and persistence of the

confl ict in Sudan. The study points to ‘a very strong link between land degradation,

desertifi cation and confl ict in Darfur. Northern Darfur – where exponential population

growth and related environmental stress have created the conditions for confl icts to be

triggered and sustained by political, tribal or ethnic differences – can be considered a

tragic example of the social breakdown that can result from ecological collapse. Long-

term peace in the region will not be possible unless these underlying and closely linked

environmental and livelihood issues are resolved’ (UNEP 2007).

The encroaching and expanding Sahara results in a diminishing operational territory

for farmers and rangers. An estimated 50 to 200 kilometres southward advance of the

boundary between semi-desert and desert has occurred since 1930s and this is likely

to continue, with a concomitant decrease in food production capabilities. Furthermore,

a decline in precipitation due to regional climate change acted as a stressor on pastoral

societies in Darfur and Kordofan, too, which contributed to confl ict (UNEP 2007).

There is general consensus that the confl ict in Darfur is partly associated with constrained

and disturbed natural migration patterns of herders (ECOSOC 2008).

There are several river basins – the Congo, Zambezi, Okavango, Volta, Niger and Nile –

that are shared by a number of countries (Pumphrey 2008). The water equation in these

regions is complicated by numerous inter- and intrastate confl icts, lack of cooperative

regimes for water sharing, or antiquated international laws, as in the case of the Nile in

terms of which Egypt receives the bulk of the resources.

The effects of climate change could lead to migration, which could in turn result in

confl ict in the competition for scarce resources such as water and land. Since the 1970s,

35 million people have been affected by drought. Lake Chad has lost over 50 per cent

of its water between 1973 and 2002. Several rivers only run intermittently and are dry

during the summer months. Even major rivers such as the Nile, Niger and Zambezi have

declining water levels, and the river fl ow in the Nile region will decrease by 75 per cent by

2100, which will have a devastating effect on irrigation practices. By 2020, between 75 and

250 million people in Africa would be exposed to increased water stress and by 2050 the

area of sub-Saharan Africa area which is water-stressed will have increased by 29 per cent.

Climate change will work as a threat multiplier (Military Advisory Board 2007:7).

From a human security point of view, it is likely to aggravate already precarious living

conditions in Africa. From a national security point of view, an inability to pursue

wealth will lead to instability and ultimately failed states, which will in turn be breeding

grounds for confl icts over resources and large population movements. Climate change

has displaced two pillars of traditional security thinking, the fi rst being that protection

against conventional military threats is the primary obligation and the second that these

threats will involve one single enemy or entity (Military Advisory Board 2007).

10 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 11

Africa being notorious for the proliferation and availability of arms. The general attitude

is that if you have weapons, you will have more power over scarce resources and will be

better able to maintain a livelihood (Boot 2008). However, the presence of arms weakens

fragile post-confl ict situations, jeopardises peace, and in general increases the security

threats to communities. There is a blurred line between confl ict and crime in most

confl ict situations in Africa. Arms are easy to access and widespread violations occur of

UN Security Council embargoes in the Great Lakes region and southern Africa. This

was particularly prevalent in the 1990s but still continues at present. Enforcement poses

many challenges due to lack of capacity and porous borders (Lamb 2007). Child soldiers

is a prime security problem which disrupts the normal fabric of societies (Gislesen 2007),

while armed groups also contribute to the indistinct line between confl ict and crime

(Small Arms Survey 2006). Both these groups pose major problems for disarmament,

demobilisation and reintegration.

Africa itself has very little capacity to produce arms, so the problem is mainly in-country

and in-region circulation of arms (Garcia 2006). This problem should be dealt with by

strengthening legal controls on arms exports to Africa and between the countries on the

continent, reducing arms brokering and traffi cking, and building capacity to address the

availability and misuse of weapons within Africa (Small Arms Survey 2005).

The role of the weapons trade has often been ignored in the study of confl ict, particularly

in Africa. Arms transfers may serve as to predict where confl ict is likely to break out.

Therefore multilateral and individual state restraints on suppliers and recipients are

essential to break the causal link between arms and confl ict in sub-Saharan Africa

(Craft & Smaldone 2002:693–710). This would benefi t human security throughout the

region.

In Africa, arms as a security stressor affect two main areas, namely peace and security,

and governance. Obviously, the most direct impact of the spread of small arms is that it

has a negative effect on the curtailment of confl ict in the pursuit of peace and security.

Small arms have been used in all African confl icts outlined above. Furthermore the

use of arms by dissenting groups can derail and upset the establishment of legitimate

governance in post-election situations where fragile democracies are being established. In

the process it disrupts the provision of a secure environment where sustainable economic

activities can fl ourish. Some countries in Africa have a wealth of natural resources, but

the confl ict sometimes fuelled by their exploitation is deleterious to governance. Groups

manipulating the extraction of resources have an interest in prolonging confl icts that

enable unlawful appropriation of resources. Under normal circumstances of good

governance this would be not be possible. Therefore, reducing the availability and ease

of access to arms throughout Africa as well as channelling the vast natural resources to

the benefi t of good governance are key requirements if Africa is to be ready to adapt to

and mitigate climate change.

bigger security impact in the region, because it is more diffi cult to put in place strategies

for adaptation and it is costly to pay for mitigation. If a state is already weakened by such

other factors, it will in all likelihood have less capacity to cope with the consequences of

a climate-related disaster. In the previous section, I dealt with the relationship between

confl ict and climate change. In this part I will briefl y examine the HIV/Aids pandemic,

poor governance and the availability of arms as key security stressors contributing to

increased volatility of the security scenario in Africa when combined with climate

change.

In 2006, almost two thirds of all persons infected with HIV, totalling 24,7 million, lived

in sub-Saharan Africa. An estimated 2,8 million adults and children became infected

with HIV in 2006, more than in all other regions of the world combined. The 2,1 million

Aids deaths in sub-Saharan Africa represent 72 per cent of global Aids deaths. Southern

Africa is the focal point of the global HIV epidemic, with 32 per cent of people with

HIV living in this sub-region and 34 per cent of Aids deaths globally occurring there

(UNAIDS/WHO AIDS 2006).

The full exploration of the security implications and wider impacts of HIV/Aids will

probably take many years. Only after several decades did the international community

start to take comprehensive action and recognise the wider implications (Garrett

2005:51–64). Even in 2000, while millions were dying, ‘action’ by the Security Council

was limited to discussing the matter. When the pandemic started to take its toll in the

countries in sub-Saharan Africa, few acknowledged that there was a link between HIV/

Aids and national security. In addition, the distinction between national and international

health problems is blurred in an increasingly globalised world.

A number of authors have started to examine the link between HIV/Aids pandemic in

sub-Saharan Africa and insecurity and how the securitisation of this issue took place

in the context of the human security situation in the sub-region (O’Manique 2005),

while others have investigated the spread of HIV/Aids and the impact this has had and

is still having on military and peacekeeping operations as well as on social stability (Ban

2003). From his examination of the HIV/Aids pandemic in South Africa, Hudson (2005)

contends that making a distinction between human and national security is invalid

because the pandemic affects such large portions of society.

As far back as 2003 observers such as Brundtland (2003) asserted that public health issues

are an underlying determinant of development, security and international stability. In

the light of the devastating effect of HIV/Aids in Africa, the perils of neglecting public

health are evident in the weakened fabric of societies.

Clearly, few countries in the sub-Saharan region of the continent fare well on the

provision of security. The lack of security also extends to the issue of small arms, with

12 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 13

countries and is particularly relevant to Africa, as the continent has very few clean

development mechanism projects.

Disentangling the energy section of the equation from security will be important for

Africa and crucial for the world. The key goal of the International Conference on

Renewable Energy in Africa, which was held from 16 to 18 April 2008 with the theme,

‘making renewable energy markets work for Africa: policies, industries and fi nance for

scaling up’, was to assess the potential of renewable energy in addressing Africa’s energy

challenges. There was an agreement to raise renewable energy investments to US$10

billion between 2009 and 2014 in collaboration with international development partners,

non-government organisations and the private sector (IISD 2008).

Multilateral processes and Africa

The structure of the international climate change regime is based on UNFCCC, which

was adopted in 1992, and the Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC, which was negotiated in 1997.

There is no specifi c mention of Africa in the latter, but in article 4(e), ‘Commitments’,

UNFCCC requires that states ‘cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of

climate change; develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone

management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation

of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertifi cation, as well as fl oods’.

In article 4(4) the developed member states are also mandated to assist the developing

member states that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in

meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.

The UNFCCC political negotiating coalitions are based on the common interest or

cultural, economic or geographic affi nities of their members, and vary considerably in

their degree of cohesion, objectives and modes of operation. There are three coalitions,

namely Group of 77 and China, AOSIS, and the Africa Group (Yamin & Depledge

2004:33–39). AOSIS is the strongest and most progressive coalition and advocates

the largest cuts in emissions. Pursuing a sustainable development path can reduce

vulnerability to climate change by enhancing adaptive capacity and increasing resilience

in Africa. At present, however, few plans for promoting sustainability have explicitly

included these two aspects (ECOSOC 2008).

In article 4(1), UNFCCC commits countries to prepare for and facilitate adequate

adaptation to climate change. Furthermore, in terms of article 4(8) states are required

to take actions to fund, insure and transfer technology, to meet the specifi c needs

and concerns of developing states. In addition, member states must take full account

of the specifi c needs and special situations of the least developed countries in their

actions with regard to funding and transfer of technology (article 4.9). Ultimately issues

The security equation in Africa:In search of ‘sustainable security’1

There are four components to the security equation in Africa: breaking the reliance

on non-renewable sources such as coal and oil which are used to the detriment of the

environment; the pursuit of multi-layered sustainable energy based upon renewable

sources of energy, together with conservation of forests; increased measures of

governance to ensure community development and eradicate poverty; and resolution of

confl icts by means of a strong commitment to ridding Africa of the scourge of weapons

proliferation.

Unless something is done, and done quickly, the present situation will turn into climate

chaos. Although Africa contributes less than 4 per cent to greenhouse gas emissions

and most climate change processes are being generated by the developed world, Africa

will be the fi rst to suffer serious consequences. At the same time it has little capacity to

mitigate the effects or adapt to them. Therefore the position of the ‘Africa group’ within

the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations should

mirror its priorities of development to attain millennium goals and eradicate poverty.

There is a need for a regional preparatory process to strengthen Africa’s negotiating

position regarding post-2012 issues during the Kyoto Protocol review. Africa could ally

with the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to attain a strong position on emissions

reductions coupled with the transfer of technology and capacity to developing nations. In

view of these goals the Economic Commission for Africa has created an African Climate

Policy Centre to manage knowledge and consolidate efforts in the quest for sustainable

development on the continent (ECOSOC 2008).

According to the infl uential Stern Review (2007), climate change processes contribute

to squandering of wealth and national fi nances, increased illness and death rates and

declining agricultural income sources in developing countries. The impact will spill over

national borders, leading to confl ict and thus exacerbating the situation. Climate-related

disasters have sparked violent confl ict in the past and confl ict is a serious risk in areas

such as West Africa and the Nile basin (Stern 2007).

In Bali, countries agreed upon a framework to allow the comprehensive implementation

of UNFCCC through long-term cooperative action, from the present and beyond

2012, to develop policy approaches and positive incentives to reduce emissions from

deforestation and forest degradation and enhance conservation and sustainable

management of forests and forest carbon stocks in developing countries. One decision

was to double the limit in size of small-scale afforestation/deforestation project activities

to 16 kilotonnes of CO2 per year. This move will expand the number and geographical

reach of the Kyoto clean development mechanism. The clean development mechanism

makes provision for trading off carbon emissions with sustainable projects in developing

14 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 15

for Africa is to reduce the convergence of multiple stressors such as the impact of

widespread health pandemics like HIV/Aids, poor governance, confl ict and the excessive

availability and proliferation of arms. It is the convergence of all such stressors which

exacerbates the security impact of climate change on the continent, mainly because

it is more diffi cult to put in place strategies for adaptation under such circumstances.

Furthermore, money that could have been used to mitigate its effects, have to be spent

on those other stressors. If a state is already weakened by corruption, bad governance

and other problems, a climate-related disaster is likely to have a more severe effect and

capacity to cope is limited, ultimately diminishing human security.

Security was traditionally defi ned in terms of threats to national territory and to the

population from a clearly defi ned enemy. Such threats could be tackled by strong armed

forces and military capacity. Even in the face of the very real dangers posed by climate

change, most states are still preparing for traditional wars – based on annexation and

defence of territory – that are quite unlikely to occur. However, higher sea levels are

more likely to be the cause of loss of territories, a fact that states have only quite recently

started to realise.

Climate change should be redefi ning traditionally understood security because it poses

unique challenges to the regional security in Africa, and to global security in general: it

is a non-temporal threat, with no clearly defi ned parameters, and cannot be tackled by

military means. It is a risk to national and human security, for it is also disrupting the

capacity of states to generate wealth and will decrease their GDPs. Territories in this

century will not be lost by wars, but by the forces of nature. It will probably take many

years for an adaptation of postures, from a military quest for security to one that seeks to

address environmental insecurity.

In Africa and in the world in general, the current forms of defence spending actually

increase the security risk of states. Government spending on defence items that used

to form part of statecraft and security now serve little purpose. In the present world,

military threats and expenditure on military hardware have little relevance to defence

and security. The real challenge that states today have to address is one of populations

at peril not from military menace but from climate change, and these are threats to the

very survival of the state and of its people.

Climate change will act as a threat multiplier: From a human security point of view,

it will aggravate uncertain living conditions in Africa. And from a national security

standpoint, a breakdown in the ability to pursue wealth on a massive scale may lead to

instability and ultimately failed states, and this will become the breeding grounds for

confl icts over resources, large population movements and resulting pressures.

Note

1 The arguments in this section are based on Garcia (forthcoming).

pertinent to Africa, such as fi nancial resources, vulnerability and adaptation assessments,

adaptation planning and implementation; risk management and risk reduction; regional

collaboration; capacity building, education, training and public awareness; and data

collection, systematic observation and monitoring, are still being negotiated in the

context of the UNFCCC (2007).

The UNFCCC held a Conference of the Parties in Bali in December 2007. One of the

decisions taken at the Bali conference that is of special concern to Africa was to create an

adaptation fund in terms of article 4(4) of UNFCCC. This will be the principal instrument

for assisting developing countries with adaptation to climate change (Subsidiary Body

for Implementation 2007). A key question for African countries, particularly in the sub-

Saharan region, concerns the reduction of deforestation. In this regard, countries will

during the next two years decide on action to reduce emissions from deforestation and

forest degradation in developing countries; address the drivers of deforestation, with a

view to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and thus enhancing

forest carbon sinks as a result of sustainable management of forests; and create positive

incentives on issues relating to reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest

degradation in developing countries. The role of conservation, sustainable management

of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries will also

come under the spotlight (ECOSOC 2008).

The executive secretary of UNFCCC stressed (De Boer 2008):

… the Bali Action Plan calls for the road to Copenhagen to be an open

process – open to the private sector, international organizations and civil

society. This offers opportunities for the business community, along

with international fi nancial institutions, to contribute. With private

investments constituting 86 per cent of investment and fi nancial fl ows

related to climate change, businesses are key to the solution. Furthermore,

multilateral organizations can spur green, low carbon growth in developing

countries by mainstreaming climate change into the development agenda.

Here, UN organizations such as the World Bank and UNDP are called

upon to provide input. Other UN agencies will for example need to say

what is required in areas of disaster risk assessment and disaster strategy

management.

Conclusions

Africa emits about 3,8 per cent of global greenhouse gases, but is the most vulnerable to

climate change effects. In the 21st century climate change correlates with national and

human security, areas previously thought to have no link with the climate. The challenge

16 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 17

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Stern, N 2007. Stern Review: the economics of climate change. Executive summary.

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African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 19

environmental problem and an economic challenge, its human security implications and

the concomitant human rights violations have not received the requisite consideration. Yet

climate change threatens food security, public health, property and the livelihoods and lives

of individuals worldwide (Aminzadeh 2007:231). The adverse effects of climate change run

against the grain of the concept of human security which posits that people ought to be

secure in their daily lives. Human security means, fi rst, safety from such chronic threats as

hunger, disease and repression; and second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful

disruptions in the patterns of daily life (UNDP Report 1994:23; Kerr 2007:92).

European institutions have adopted several instruments contributing to the fi ght against

global warming, but Africa has not yet developed an environmental policy exclusively

aimed at the reduction of GHG emissions. Climate change is real, rising, imminent

and has been recognised as a universal threat to the very future of Planet Earth. In its

1996 advisory opinion on the use of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice

(ICJ:1996, para 29) recognised ‘that the environment is under daily threat and … that

the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life

and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn. The existence of

the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and

control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is

now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.’ In the Social

and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) case (2001), the African Commission

appealed to the Nigerian government ‘to ensure protection of the environment, health

and livelihood’ of a group whose rights had been violated. Similarly, national courts have

explicitly accepted that climate change was occurring and that human activities were the

probable cause of the problem (Environmental Defence Society Case 2000).

After publication of the 2007 UNIPCC report, there is little doubt about what is

occurring and what is needed now is a decisive legal answer to drive political will to

effectively combat climate change. Experts have been pledging that ‘carbon capture and

sequestration’ – a technology that involves the storage of GHG in aquifers and disused oil

and gas wells instead of releasing it into the atmosphere – would be widely commercially

available by 2020. Yet, the cost of waiting may exacerbate a looming planetary catastrophe.

If levels of GHG and global temperatures continue to rise in line with current trends,

there could be a 2–3 ˚C temperature increase within the next 50 years. A rise in global

temperature of 2 ˚C is likely to result in a 10 per cent decline in crop yield in Africa – a

continent that is already struggling to produce enough food to sustain its population.

A further temperature increase could lead to a decline in fi sheries and freshwater supplies,

the loss of forests and wetlands, and more severe weather. The reason is that climate

change causes an increase in the severity and frequency of extreme events and weather

disasters, including storms, tropical cyclones and droughts. Climate change also causes

warming of oceans, rivers and lakes and poses a threat to fi sh stocks already under pressure

From the West to the rest: Climate change as a challenge to human security in AfricaDan Kuwali*

Introduction

Carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHG) produced by the burning

of fossil fuels and forests and other anthropogenic activities are accumulating in the

atmosphere and causing average global temperatures to rise – a phenomenon termed

‘global warming’. The resultant climate change raises complex legal and technical questions

related to the environment, and to science, economics, rights and development.

The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (UN IPCC 2007) has

detailed devastating effects of global warming. Although climate change is embraced as an

* Dan Kuwali is the deputy director of legal services of the Malawi Defence Force. He was a Marie Curie research fellow at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies and a guest researcher at the Nordic African Institute. He attained a Human Rights Award (honourable mention) at the Washington College of Law, American University, in 2008.

20 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 21

the problem. The UNFCCC called on nations ‘to protect the climate system … on the

basis of equity and in accordance with the common but differentiated responsibilities

and respective capabilities’. It sets a series of general objectives aimed at the stabilisation

of GHG through cooperation between developed and developing countries. The

UNFCCC sets a non-binding target for industrialised countries to reduce their GHG

emissions below their 1990 levels by 2000 – a target which has not been achieved to date.

Countries that cannot achieve this goal were given the option to buy emission credits or

invest in conservation. However, developing countries have no immediate restrictions

under the UNFCCC. As such, anecdotally, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol attempted to turn

this voluntary commitment into a binding one. However, some large GHG-emitting

states such China and India were not included in any numerical limitation in the Kyoto

Protocol because they were not among the main contributors to the emission of GHG

during the pre-treaty industrialisation period. Nevertheless, although they do not have

any commitment to reduce according to the Kyoto target, developing countries do share

the common responsibility that all countries have for reducing GHG emissions.

By way of illustration, the implication is that although China and the US together

produce about 40 per cent of the world’s total GHG emissions, neither has agreed to

binding reductions. This has driven some opponents of the UNFCCC to argue that the

split between Annex I (developed) countries in the North and non-Annex I (developing)

countries in the South is unfair and that both developing countries and developed

countries in the North need to reduce their emissions. It is also apparent that the costs of

complying with the UNFCCC requirements may have implications for the economies

of states.

On the one hand, developing countries have interpreted the ‘common but differentiated’

terminology of the UNFCCC very precisely to mean that industrialised countries

would need to take the lead by cutting their GHG emission and funding environmental

programmes in the South to boost green development paths. For this reason, despite

the strenuous efforts of developed countries to separate climate and development issues,

development concerns are invariably controversial issues in environmental negotiations.

On the other hand, developed countries have been more selective in their interpretation.

Developed countries have made signifi cant efforts to compartmentalise the climate

change problem, and they perceive developmental issues such as trade, aid, investment,

debt and intellectual property rights to be secondary concerns. Thus there is an inclination

amongst developing countries to see the position of developed countries as one akin to

environmental imperialism, with developed countries using the environmental agenda

to pull the development ladder up behind them (Reed 2007:4).

For the foregoing reason, the global environmental negotiations have been characterised

by high levels of ‘preference heterogeneity and deep discord’. Even when the North and

the South countries can agree on general fairness principles the ‘preference heterogeneity

from overfi shing, pollution and habitat loss (UNIPCC 2007). Such a decline could have

a devastating impact on human populations, particularly in the developing countries that

rely on fi sh as a main source of food. Higher temperatures may also lead to decreased

crop yields and in livestock and wildlife. Such environmental problems will most severely

impact on the vulnerable communities who mostly live in developing countries.

Most of the work on climate change has to date focused on mitigation and adaptation

strategies to address its causes and consequences to the environment. The UNIPCC

report attests to this view in that it focused on describing the problem rather that

advocating the solutions. Some commentators have expanded the debate by arguing

for the promotion of sustainable development and poverty reduction (Huq & Toulmin

2006). However, there is need to also focus on the human dimension in the climate

change discourse. Therefore, this discussion seeks to contribute a more nuanced

understanding of the problem through a victim (human security) oriented approach to

combat climate change.

The central argument is that there must be a deliberate reframing of the climate change

debate in terms of human security, which is anchored in human rights doctrine. The

shared human rights framework entitles and empowers developing countries to safeguard

their rights when they are endangered. Investment in emission reduction is a bargain

compared with the long-term costs of inaction. It is essential to act now to prevent

catastrophic impacts, rather than adopt a business as usual approach and face terrible

consequences later. The global energy system is out of alignment with the ecological

systems that sustain the earth. Realignment demands a fundamental shift in regulation,

market incentives and international cooperation and respect for human rights within

a human security framework. Considering that the climate change crisis divides the

world both in terms of culpability and vulnerability, any sustainable solution to climate

change must take into account its human impact and the needs of all communities in

all countries in a holistic manner. Although most GHG emanate from the West, the

essential point is that Africa should take the lead, as populations in developing countries

on the African continent will bear the brunt of climate change impact.

The issue of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’

Environmental imperialism? ‘Climate politics’ in the North and the South

Global warming – or climate change – has been identifi ed as one of the crises facing

the international community in the 21st century. The UN Framework Convention on

Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1994 as the basis for a global response to

22 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 23

In contrast, developing countries in the southern hemisphere have suggested that their

per capita GHG emissions remain very low relative to their developed counterparts in the

North. Their argument is that because it is the industrialised countries that have benefi ted

from past emissions of GHG, they have to be responsible for reducing their emissions

while they allow developing countries to focus on economic development. The rationale

is that since developing countries have relatively weaker economies and often widespread

poverty, they ought to be allowed to raise the living standards of their citizens without

being constrained by costly measures to reduce GHG emissions. The economic constraints

imply that developing countries have a lower adaptation capacity to climate change than

industrialised countries. This suggests the need for compensation, in the form of new

and additional aid. While most developing countries have agreed to negotiate treaties that

require richer nations to reduce emissions, they remain opposed to mandatory action

themselves. China and India, in particular, insist that established industrial powers must

act fi rst, given that their developed economies have apparently contributed to the present

build-up of GHG. This developed/developing countries divide shows that rich and poor

countries have diametrically opposed perceptions of ‘climate justice’ (Reed 2007:2).

The sense of injustice is compounded by the view that some developed countries appear

to undermine environmental treaties by failing to cut emissions, resisting limits on their

conspicuous consumption, failing to transfer promised technology and environmental

assistance and seemingly disdain the issue of development. This is clearly manifested

in relations between the US and China, for example, with both countries using each

other’s behaviour as an excuse for the stalemate. Although there has been declining

levels of generalised political trust between the North and the South, it is evident that a

political settlement without the full participation of developing countries is meaningless.

It is conceivable, therefore, to suggest that developing countries will never meaningfully

participate in global climate agreements that ignore their development needs. It also

explains why developing countries have repeatedly shown their ‘willingness to resort to

zero-sum, retaliatory tactics’ as a bargaining chip in international climate negotiations

(Reed 2007:3).

In an international system which is still state dominated and horizontally constructed there

must be legitimate reasons for the hierarchy between bodies set up by states. Hierarchies

are antithetical to the Westphalian paradigm of equal sovereign states that recognise no

superior. Even in the post-1945 era of the growth of international organisations, there

must be a presumption against hierarchies (Camilleri & Falk 1992). It is clear that both

developed and developing countries are responsible for GHG emissions. It is also true

that if the post-Kyoto framework is to mean anything, it must include the US, China and

India, who are the world’s fi rst, second and fi fth biggest GHG emitters.

The fact is that the geographical scope of climate change is global, including the Arctic

region, ocean currents, weather systems, tropical islands and land masses (UNIPCC

generated by global inequality aggravates disagreements about how to make those

principles operational’ (Reed 2007:3). The international community is far from reaching

consensus on the post-Kyoto Protocol climate regime to be followed after expiry of the

Kyoto agreement in 2012. Hence, a ‘gaping chasm’ divides North and South on the

crucial question as to who should reduce GHG emissions. The question that follows

is, when and by how much? A related question is who should pay for adaptation to

the impacts of climate change and how much should they pay? It is often argued that

developed countries are responsible for the current accumulated stock of CO2 in the

atmosphere. It has been predicted that increases in future emissions will primarily take

place in the developing world based on economic growth and demographic change

(Reed 2007:1,2). If this assessment is accepted, then it can be deduced that all of

humanity is responsible for the reduction of GHG emissions. It therefore follows that

if one state reduces its GHG emissions and other states do not, the GHG problem will

not be solved. This is true for both developing and developed states, and small as well

as big GHG emitters.

Imbalance of power: The antagonism of ‘climate justice’ in sharing the burdens of climate change

One of the marked characteristics of global climate negotiations has been the lack of

consensus between the global North and the global South. From the perspective of the

United States, the guiding principle is that the US must lead the world in the production

of fewer GHG emissions in a way that does not undermine economic growth or

prevent nations from delivering greater prosperity for the people (Bush 2007). Until

recently, when the European Union clearly diverged from the US position, developed

countries generally sought global restrictions on GHG emission reductions with fl exible

mechanisms for their implementation. The contention is that since GHG originate

all over the world, all countries need to be part of the emissions reduction efforts.

Developed countries often argue that a climate agreement that excludes developing

countries is unfair and meaningless since the emissions of non-Annex I countries will

increase exponentially over the next few decades. Some states have also suggested that if

they continue to bear the weight of sustaining global economic growth and international

fi nancial stability, it would be both unfair and unrealistic to expect them to make sharp

and immediate reductions in their carbon emissions (Reed 2007:3).

One of the problems with economic theory, however, is that in its ‘single-minded focus

on maximizing aggregate social welfare, it quite self-consciously ignores the distribution

of wealth and power in society’ (Sen 1999:349–351). Entitlement theories of justice, both

in their libertarian and Marxist context, hold that individuals are entitled to what they

have produced and in the context of climate change, ‘grandfathering’1 embodies this

principle. It also exemplifi es the justice principle of proportional equality that nations are

unequal and therefore should be treated unequally (Reed 2007:5).

24 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 25

target roughly equivalent to one tonne of CO2 per capita. Developing countries

obviously stand to gain from this approach because their present levels of income and

industrialisation put them well below the one metric tonne threshold. As it is diffi cult

to imagine any rapid convergence between nations at opposing ends of the emissions

spectrum, the per capita approach holds that low-emission countries would be able to

trade their unused allowances for funding or technical assistance through the Kyoto

Protocol’s clean development mechanism and other emissions trading mechanisms

(Reed 2007:7).

The climate change phenomenon also presents a division both in terms of culpability

and vulnerability. In this context, devastating effects will be felt primarily by the world’s

most vulnerable communities, such as drought-prone parts of Africa, fl ood-prone parts

of Asia and hurricane-prone parts on the Caribbean and Pacifi c oceans. Developing

countries of the global South are at the mercy of big players in the climate game since

GHG emissions that adversely affect them usually come from far away. Developing states,

in Africa for example, have generally contributed little to the concentration of GHG in

the atmosphere, yet they are directly affected by climate change. The signatory countries

to the UNFCCC agreed to take action to prevent dangerous climate change, yet it has

failed to protect many of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable communities.

Paradoxically, the poor and vulnerable countries and communities are most at risk from

adverse impacts, yet they are the least responsible for causing the problem. Indeed, the

haves of the world are responsible for the vast majority of the GHG that have already

accumulated, and yet it is the have-nots who are likely to bear the brunt of its effects

(UNIPCC 2007; Sinden 2007). The US, for example, with less than 5 per cent of the

world’s population, is responsible for more than 28 per cent of GHG. Many of the areas

most vulnerable to sea level rise and to debilitating drought are in the developing world

(UNIPCC Report 2007:7:16). Furthermore, throughout the world the poor are generally

less likely to have the resources to cope with calamity when it strikes. The same is true

of the vast majority of the people in the coastal areas of the African continent. Stern

(2006) aptly highlights both the moral obligation and the pragmatic need for the rich

countries, which are most responsible for creating the problem, to assist poorer and more

vulnerable nations in order to help them adapt to the inevitable impacts they may face.

Those most responsible for climate change have caused the loss of life and livelihoods of

poor and vulnerable communities. ‘Once this damage has been infl icted, adaptation is

much less of an option. Rather, issues of liability and associated compensation will need

to be considered’ (Huq & Toulmin 2006).

Many developing countries are small and poor, so they have little ability to adapt to climate

change, either physically or fi nancially. Small-scale farmers in Africa and Asia, those

who do not have access to safe drinking water, sanitation, healthcare or social security

or slum dwellers living in informal settlements located in hazardous zones, will suffer

2007). While the effects of climate change are widespread, they are not equally distributed

among countries. The Arctic region and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) bear the

brunt of the adverse repercussions of climate change. The Arctic region is warming twice

as fast as any other region, resulting in melting permafrost and thinning ice (Aminzadeh

2007:243–244).

Climate change may also impact on developing countries by causing an increase in the

spread of infectious diseases, an increase in surface temperature, a change in the acidity

of oceans, changes in rainfall patterns, fl ash fl oods and landslides, drought and changes

in the intensity of tropical cyclones (Aminzadeh 2007:244–245). The implication is

that the world’s poorest places will suffer setbacks unless rich countries promptly begin

to curb emissions linked to global warming while also helping poorer ones to access

less polluting energy sources than coal and oil. The poorer countries would also need

assistance to adapt to climate changes. In this connection, Sachs (2007) notes that equity

within a generation has at least two dimensions. First, it implies the fair distribution of

burdens and benefi ts of fossil fuel use among nations. Second, it implies the universal

protection of human dignity by securing the fundamental rights of every human

person to water, food, housing and health. This is in line with the theory that ensuring

human security requires a seven-pronged approach, addressing economic, food, health,

environment, personal, community and political security (Kerr 2007:92). In the non-

binding ‘Washington declaration’ key states agreed in principle to a global cap-and-

trade system that would apply to both developed and developing countries, which they

hoped would be in place by 2009.2 Global warming, as the name suggests, is a global

issue demanding much greater involvement than regional initiatives alone. The way that

people in the developed world lead their lives can and will have signifi cant effects on the

rest of the world. Stopping climate change is an enormous task which requires concerted

effort from governments and organisations throughout the world.

Is the world listening? The question of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions

In a nutshell, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol agreed that the largest share of historical

and current global emissions of GHG has originated in developed countries; that per

capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low; and that the share of

global emissions originating in developing countries will grow in line with their social

and development needs. The historical responsibility principle which has often been

espoused by developing countries holds that the polluter pays. It may be argued that a

country’s reduction of GHG should depend on its relative contribution to the global

rise in temperature. Per capita is premised on egalitarian principles and holds that every

human has equal rights to the global atmosphere and therefore allocations of how much

each can pollute should be done on a per capita basis. This approach places developed

countries at a distinct disadvantage, because they already far exceed the stabilisation

26 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 27

What is to be done? Taking human security seriously

The existing international climate regime is insuffi cient to deal with the scale of the

envisaged problem. In addition, treaty negotiations have stalled, and there are numerous

reasons for pessimism about international cooperation in the face of global warming.

Therefore practitioners concerned about global climate change have been searching

for other approaches (Posner 2007:1). The protection of human rights is at the very

heart of human security. As climate change will inevitably affect human security, the

protection of human rights should be a key consideration in efforts to address the impact

of climate change. International human rights law imposes several obligations on states

that are relevant to addressing human vulnerabilities to climate change. These include

the obligation to provide better housing, located away from hazardous zones; improved

access to sanitation, safe drinking water and healthcare; access to adequate food;

effective participation in planning and decisionmaking; accountability; as well as access

to information and justice. Therefore, there is merit in integrating the human security

dimension into strategic thinking about mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change

for optimal investment of resources in the long run.

Universal human rights norms and standards – which are anchored in common

humanity, needs and aspirations – should provide impartial guidance for managing

and protecting diversity. The very foundation of freedom, justice and peace rests on the

recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all humans

as expressed in the universal declaration of human rights. The declaration emphasises

that all people are entitled to exercise their fundamental freedoms and human rights,

without discrimination, and without any limitations other than those accepted under

international law. From a normative perspective the concept of human security serves to

highlight the importance of good global norms. Human security is not only a motivation

but serves as an umbrella norm for various treaties and conventions which aim to protect

vulnerable people from persecuting actors, notably states (Kerr 2007:93).

Reframing climate change negotiations in the context of human security

The route pursued by the international community, namely diplomacy and treaty

governance, has been largely ineffective in addressing the mitigation of, and adaptation

to, climate change. This is to a large extent due to the general reluctance of states to

relinquish sovereignty in order to address global environmental problems. Current

international environmental law does not adequately safeguard human security from

the threats associated with climate change. Furthermore, states have largely focused on

the environmental and economic implications of climate change rather than its human

security implications. Hence there is a need to reframe the climate change debate in

earliest and disproportionately the consequences of climate change. Wealth, technology

and infrastructure facilitate adaptation and the ability to cope with the adverse effects of

climate change. The poor generally tend to have much lower coping capacities yet they are

more exposed to disasters, drought, desertifi cation and slow economic decline. From this

argument it is clear that the rich countries, who also happen to be the largest historical

emitters, should take aggressive action to facilitate the reduction of GHG emissions and

mitigate the effects of climate change, including that beyond their borders.

The question is whether the developed countries are willing to transfer money and new

technologies to developing states to protect them from rising seas as outlined in the Bali

Action Plan. The intensity of CO2 makes clear the need for voluntary changes in energy

effi ciency to drive GHG emission reductions. The focus is on how economic growth

will be maintained while minimising the impact on the climate. In this case, the goal is

to provide for strong economic growth with as little GHG emissions as possible. This

approach could be seen as an offshoot of Betham’s ‘utilitarian theory’ of justice, which

holds that mutually advantageous and cost-effective solutions are also just solutions.

The corollary is that ineffi cient solutions are also unjust. From this perspective, the fair

solution to climate change involves stabilising the climate as cost-effectively as possible

while maximising economic growth. The assumption is that since developing countries

provide the most cost-effective opportunities for reducing GHG emissions, efforts to

stabilise the climate should focus predominantly on providing developing countries with

‘green development paths’ (Reed 2007:6).

To this end, Reed has advanced a ‘moral compromise’ or ‘negotiated justice’ settlement

involving an optimal mix of principles that may assist rich and poor countries in

overcoming barriers to cooperation. While others have developed hybrid models,3 simply

asserting that a ‘negotiated justice’ settlement should prevail, avoids the more central

question of whether and to what extent an agreement must favour rich or poor nations.

Reed (2007:8, 9) is of the opinion that ‘negotiating a shared world view will require the

North to consider forming equitable constructive, long-term partnerships with southern

nations and helping them to tailor country-specifi c and sector-specifi c development

strategies and climate policies to local conditions, culture, institutions, knowledge and

technologies’. Developed nations may also need to promote policies that explicitly signal

concern for the structural obstacles facing developing countries. In terms of Reed’s thesis,

developing this shared world view will necessitate a movement away from particularistic

understandings of justice representative of vested interests, to a shared understanding

of justice that transforms the relationship between North and South and in turn the

relationship with the natural world. In the same vein, poverty eradication, prevention of

extremism and good governance are crucial to the equitable and harmonious conduct of

both international relations and domestic policies. This exposes the dynamics and the

confrontation between economic and developmental concerns within the framework of

environmental protection and human security.

28 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 29

a given state’s failure to curb GHG emissions in terms of human security, they are seen

to advocate for the protection of the environment and challenge the disparity in power

and resources between vulnerable populations and perpetrators (Sinden 2007:4, 7). In

Hungary vs Slovakia, the ICJ (1997, para 13) stated that the protection of the environment

is a vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous

human rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself. In Hatton and Others vs

United Kingdom (2001:21) the European Court of Human Rights stated that the requisite

standard in the European human rights system was that states are required to minimise,

as far as possible, the interference with these rights, by trying to fi nd alternative solutions

and by generally seeking to achieve their aims in the least onerous way with regard to

human rights. In order to do that a proper and complete investigation and study with the

aim of fi nding the best possible solution which will, in reality, strike the right balance,

should precede the relevant project.

Climate perturbations most clearly surpass the jurisdiction of a single state; they are in

fact a striking example for the transnational character of threats in a highly interdependent

world. Under such circumstances, the human rights obligations of states and non-state

actors cannot simply stop at territorial borders; rather, they reach geographically to other

countries as well. As such, it can be argued that human rights that are susceptible to

the effects of climate change call for extra-territorial responsibility. Countries with

high emissions must therefore recognise their extraterritorial obligations towards the

protection of human rights.

If this assessment is acceptable, it is possible to argue that when human rights are

threatened by climate change, the principle of extraterritorial obligations becomes even

more relevant. The point is that just as climate effects reach to the ends of the earth, the

geographical scope of responsibility has to be global as well. Sachs (2007:9) succinctly

posits that:

[T]his responsibility is in the fi rst place a negative one; it implies avoiding

harmful action rather than intervening to provide conditions for enjoyment of

human rights … climate responsibility is fi rst of all a matter of self-limitation

on part of high-emitting States and social groups, ‘not a matter of benevolent

imperialism bent on improving the world’. It is, incidentally, the liberal core

of human rights law to emphasize negative obligations, ie, to call on power-

holders to refrain from actions that infringe upon people’s integrity.

The victims of global warming are dispersed throughout the world. However, most are

concentrated in poor countries in low-lying islands and coastal regions, where rising

sea levels result in more frequent fl oods, erosion and the destruction of property. Two

other groups of victims are fi rst farmers whose land can no longer support traditional

crops because of climatic changes, people who become vulnerable to diseases, and

terms of human security. Another reason for pursuing a human security approach is that

environmental governance on climate change, primarily the UNFCCC and the Kyoto

Protocol, do not provide remedies for injured parties (Aminzadeh 2007:245, 259–260).

The question is when is an environmental problem severe enough to become a human

security issue? With regard to human rights, Osofsky (2005a:91) suggests an approach

based on US environmental law to evaluate whether an environmental harm constitutes

a human rights violation by assessing the geographic scope, duration and severity of the

environmental damage. It appears that if these criteria are used, climate change will have

signifi cant social and human security implications (Aminzadeh 2007:242).

A human security approach to climate change would integrate the theoretical and

advocacy approaches of international environmental law and human rights law as well

as development discourses. This approach could result in a renewed sense of urgency in

the stagnant political debate over climate change and jumpstart international diplomacy

towards solutions, such as the debates relating to the post-Kyoto Protocol regime. The

approach seems to make sense from a legal standpoint because both international human

rights law and international environmental law limit the traditional independence

and autonomy of state sovereignty. However, there is a concern that a human security

approach could lead to an anthropocentric perspective of environmental problems, instead

of looking at the totality of impacts to species and the environment (Taylor 1998).

Thinking of climate change as a human security issue may facilitate the perception that

it is not just a matter of aggregate costs and benefi ts but of winners and losers – of the

powerful few preventing the political system from acting to protect the powerless many

(Sinden 2007:14). According to article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR) each state party shall respect and ‘ensure to all individuals

within its territory’ the various rights contained therein whereas article 2(2) obligates

states to undertake the necessary steps, including the adoption of legislative and other

measures, to give effect to the rights in the ICCPR. It is an accepted human rights

principle that the duty to ensure respect for rights generates both negative and positive

obligations for states. The political paralysis with regard to ‘climate justice’ is due to the

gross imbalance of power between those who stand to gain and those who stand to lose

from climate change regulation. Given that the human rights tradition is fundamentally

rooted in concerns about power imbalance, framing claims in connection with climate

change in human security terms may effect a shift in the debate, so that it spotlights the

problem of political failure rather than market failure (Sinden 2007:12).

Instead of arguing over how best to measure in dollar terms the costs and benefi ts of

climate change regulation, the focus should be on how to arrest the adverse impact of

climate change on the victims. By protecting vulnerable populations susceptible to the

adverse effects of climate change, such action will also serve to preserve the delicate

environment of the planet. When the vulnerable populations formulate a challenge on

30 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 31

Litigation over the effects of climate change may take various forms, and may be based on

international human rights law. Plaintiffs argue that major emitters of GHG have violated

rights to life and health by contributing to environmental injuries and health problems

associated with global warming. However, law suits involving climate change raise complex

issues about causation and redress because any single polluter is likely to produce relatively

insignifi cant proportions of the GHG and thus any judicial remedy is likely to have a small

impact on solving the global problem. It is also diffi cult to connect actors and claims to fora

for litigation because climate change occurs in the atmosphere without respect to national

boundaries. Despite these obstacles, there are laws that can force governments and other

parties to reduce their GHG emissions, and litigation is an increasingly prevalent means of

holding parties responsible for climate change (Mank 2005:1; Osofsky 2005a:1789, 1802).

Hence the importance of environmental organisations and states using domestic legal

action. Although climate change litigants have brought cases for different reasons, most

emphasise responsibilities and obligations rather than rights. Climate change litigation has

been a step in the right direction, but it has largely failed to emphasise the human rights

and social consequences of climate change (Aminzadeh 2007:233–234).

Victims of environmental harm can benefi t from a human rights-based approach

to environmental litigation because international human rights law provides a basis

for intervention when harm occurs solely within the borders of another state while

international environmental law generally does not. A reformulation of existing human

rights in the environmental context would garner more effective environmental

protection because it would take advantage of existing international and regional

monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, which are better developed in the human

rights terrain than in the environmental fi eld. Although it is unlikely that international

fora will issue injunctive relief to restrict GHG emissions, they can issue injunctions for

monetary relief, which will help to underwrite the cost of weather damage stemming

from climate change or to establish special funds to build coastal defences, protect

freshwater supplies and develop new forms of agriculture (Aminzadeh 2007:260).

Apart from domestic and regional structures, an applicant could also utilise UN

mechanisms, the particular choice obviously depending on the nature of the claim and

desired remedy. There are several other possibilities for adjudicating human rights claims

relating to climate change. States may bring claims against other states in the ICJ, subject

to jurisdictional requirements. Individuals could also bring claims against states in the

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), or the Inter-American Commission on

Human Rights (IACHR). Indigenous and other displaced peoples could bring complaints

to the World Bank Inspection Panel. It is for this reason the African states are urged to

sign the declaration, in terms of article 34(6) of the Protocol, that would establish the

African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Protocol which would provide

individuals and non-government organisations with a platform for human rights claims

based on climate change damage.

people who rely on glaciers and oceans, lakes and rivers for their water (Posner 2007).

Climate change therefore should be addressed in a way that is fair and just, cognisant

of the needs and risks faced by the vulnerable groups, and adhering to the principles

of non-discrimination and equality. If this analysis is sound, it is easy to conclude that

any sustainable solution to climate change must take into account its human security

impact and the needs of all communities in all countries (particularly poor countries) in

a holistic manner. Given that climate change is a universal problem, it is incumbent upon

every state to curb the anthropogenic effects of climate change that invariably result

in human rights violations. After all, humanity is indivisible. Human rights are higher

values that are not derived from the fact that an individual is a national of a certain state,

but are based upon attributes of his humanity.

Human security is concerned with the protection of people from life-threatening

dangers, regardless of whether the threats are rooted in anthropogenic activities or

natural events, whether they lie within or outside states and whether they are direct or

unstructured. Human security is ‘human centred’ in that its principal focus is on people

both as individuals and communal groups. It is ‘security oriented’ in that the focus is on

‘freedom from fear, danger and threat’ (Thakur & Newman 2004:347). A human security

perspective shifts the focus to people and to the effects of climate change on their lives.

Along with human security, human rights also introduce an accountability framework

that is an essential element of the promotion and protection of human rights as such, by

holding governments, the primary duty bearers, accountable for reducing the vulnerability

of their citizens to global warming and assisting them in adapting to the consequences.

‘Green litigation’ − combating climate change through human rights claims

The voluntary standards may not be enough to regulate a growing problem because they

may not provide for accountability – corporations and states may act unchecked, with no

penalties attaching to possible unethical decisions or actions. International environmental

law claims are more likely to succeed if they can be reconceptualised in terms of robust

international human rights claims (Posner 2007:3–7). Most states subscribe to human

rights treaties, and many of the obligations embodied in these treaties have become norms

of customary international law. Posner is of the view that, since certain treaties and norms

of customary international law imply that states are liable for emitting pollution which

adversely affect people living in other states as a corollary, it can be argued that if these

rules do in fact prohibit such pollution, they apply to GHG as well. Human rights treaties

potentially give individuals claims against states – both the state of which the individual

is a citizen and any relevant foreign state. In theory, individuals or groups could bring

human rights claims against their own state and foreign states in certain international

tribunals, and prevail if they can show that failure to regulate GHG emissions has resulted

in a violation of their human rights (Goldberg & Wagner 2004:191; Posner 2007:3, 4).

32 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 33

fl ooding was caused, in a legal sense, by GHG emissions of a particular corporation.

However, such litigation cannot address a global problem given that most GHG

emissions take place in foreign countries, and most of the victims may be in foreign

countries. Litigation against foreign states based on international law is likely to fare

poorly in domestic courts because of foreign sovereign immunity and other doctrines

that limit the liability of foreign states and individuals, plus the weakness of international

environmental treaties and customary law. The weakness of the law also makes litigation

before international tribunals largely pointless, except perhaps as a way of attracting

attention; further, international tribunals have no power to coerce states to comply with

their judgments.

Corporations can be held liable – especially if they have acted in complicity with states.

Thus, if GHG-related human rights litigation is to succeed, it will need to target

corporations – domestic, foreign and multinational – and the prospect of litigation and

damages will also have to deter corporations from offering their services to foreign states

and offi cials (Posner 2007:8). However, the question that arises is whether emissions of

GHG by a state or corporation violate international law. International legal restrictions on

pollution are weak or nonexistent, or apply in limited domains. For instance, article 24 of

the Banjul Charter provides the ‘right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to

development’, but there is also no international human right to be free of global warming

or pollution per se. An international human rights claim directed at GHG-emitting states

or corporations would have to be based on an argument that the polluters, by emitting

GHG, violated victims’ rights to life or health, or discriminated against them.

However, there are signifi cant legal hurdles to a human rights-based approach to climate

change litigation. The litigants have to prove that climate change has violated their

human rights. Just as a violation of the right to food, health or shelter can often not be

traced back to the action of a clearly identifi able duty bearer, climate effects, too, cannot

be attributed to a specifi c culprit identifi ed by name and address. Determining how to

use existing legal categories, who the responsible actors are, and who the victims are that

deserve remedies, is a diffi cult process. These legal hurdles may hurt a human rights-

based litigation strategy, fuelling criticisms about the insuffi ciency of scientifi c data and

undermining the effi cacy of climate change advocacy.

Nevertheless, the complexity in pinpointing culprits does not nullify the entitlements

of rights. A strictly legal conception, which maintains that there are no rights unless

they are justiciable, can hardly hold in the light of the universality principle of human

rights protection, the globalisation of security and amorphous anthropogenic causes

of global warming. States are the primary duty bearers in human rights law. In this

sense, the evidentiary standard for the right to life or health would require individuals or

communities to establish that their rights were violated by the state’s failure to restrict the

activities of the GHG emitter. In the Yanomanis case the Inter-American Commission

Therefore, one way of ensuring that a climate change case is brought in a competent

forum, is to use human rights litigation. For example, a litigant could bring a case in

a domestic court, as in the Nigerian Gbemre case (2005), where the communities in

the Niger Delta were granted an injunction in a Nigerian court against Shell and the

Nigerian National Petroleum Company by claiming that the climate change impacts of

the wasteful practice of ‘gas fl aring’ constituted a human rights violation. International

human rights courts provide alternative forums, with the African Court for example

providing a conducive forum, pursuant to article 3(1) of ACHPR, since actions may be

brought before the court on the basis of any instrument, such as environmental treaties,

which have been ratifi ed by states party to it.

The Inuit people of the Arctic have fi led a petition with the IACHR, claiming that

the acts and omissions of the US with respect to climate change violated their human

rights, particularly the right to life, residence and movement, inviolability of the home

and preservation of health and of well-being (Inuit Petition 2005). Despite the IACHR’s

refusal to review the petition on procedural grounds, the fi ling of the petition could

establish a legal basis for holding countries liable for profi ting from inadequate GHG

regulation (Aminzadeh 2007:241). In the Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria,

the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held that Nigeria had violated

several human rights espoused in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the

Banjul Charter), including article 16(2) which obliges states parties to ‘take the necessary

measures to protect the health of their people’. The commission found that Shell’s

operations contaminated the water, soil and air, causing both short-term and long-term

health problems for the Ogoni people. Because Nigeria was a party to the Banjul Charter

and had failed to restrain Shell’s behaviour and protect their citizens, the commission

found that they had violated the charter. Likewise, in the Hatton case, the ECHR held

that the UK failed to adequately regulate the airport noise and protect them against

arbitrary interference with their right to privacy and family life. As such, actions taken

to respond to climate change can themselves have signifi cant justice as well as human

rights implications because their benefi ts and costs are frequently distributed in ways that

consolidate or exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and inequalities (Reed 2007:1).

By and large, emitting pollution that harms third parties is a standard tort, which

means that plaintiffs should have no trouble persuading courts that GHG emitters are

potentially tortfeasors. However, complex questions about the scope of liability will have

to be addressed. To pursue a tort case, the plaintiff needs to prove that one’s life, health,

or property was damaged or destroyed by fl ooding, disease, or some other hazardous

phenomenon connected to global warming by the defendant. International law generally

creates obligations for states, not for corporations or individuals. Yet states are usually

protected by sovereign immunity, so that they cannot be sued in domestic courts.

However, domestic tort litigation in terms of the environment poses evidentiary hurdles

relating to causation – for example, a victim of fl ooding would have to show that the

34 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 35

emissions and provide the requisite fi nancial resources and transfer of technology to

developing countries.

Although Suckling (2007) suggests that the polar bear should be the icon for climate change,

Aminzadeh proposes that human beings are the icon for climate change, which should

provide a powerful impetus for solving the problem (Aminzadeh 2007:234). It seems that

a human security approach, rooted in human rights doctrine, to reduce GHG emissions

may act as a catalyst for an effective response to combat climate change. This entails that

the suffering resulting from climate change in the developing world be addressed and that

developing countries be helped to advance in ways that will be less harmful to the planet

in the future. Combating climate change involves complex economic and political realities.

Still, human security may be a utility concept for development of a policy framework

to combat climate change. As such, states and non-state actors need to do everything in

their power to stabilise GHG emissions, by making use of stringent national policies and

effective market mechanisms. When human rights and political or economic expediency

require different courses of action, human rights considerations should automatically be

accorded precedence. In this sense, a human security approach to climate change would

integrate the theoretical and advocacy approaches on the cross-disciplinary triangular

relationship between environmental law, human rights and development. Such an approach

which would require that climate change negotiations be reframed in the context of

human security, have the potential to break the political stalemate over climate change, and

jumpstart international diplomacy towards solutions for the post-Kyoto Protocol regime.

Climate change claims by vulnerable populations and victims of GHG emissions

may contribute to environmental protection and so avoid a planetary catastrophe

(Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria 2005). According to article 2

of the UN FCCC, the goal of climate change advocacy is to encourage states to scale back

their GHG emissions to a point where GHG concentrations in the atmosphere stabilise

and then decrease to a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the

climate. As long as states fail to pursue much-needed policies on climate change and set

adequate standards for emissions reductions, victims and environmental groups should

continue to use domestic laws and even international human rights law to gain protection

for human rights and the environment. The motivation of the international human rights

approach is that international litigation against states might pressure governments to adopt

more environmentally friendly policies, whereas domestic litigation against multinational

corporations might pressure them to reduce their GHG emissions. Litigation can generate

press attention, mobilise public interest groups, galvanise ordinary citizens and, ultimately,

gain compensation for victims (Posner 2007:7). Meritorious cases could thus break new

ground in international law relating to the protection of the environment.

The fi ght to save the earth, perhaps using CO2 trading programmes and increased sharing

of CO2

reduction technologies should be a priority. CO2

is quickly becoming a global

decided in favour of the petitioners that the Brazilian government violated the petitioner’s

right to life, liberty and personal security by failing to take environmental measures to

prevent environmental damage. When a state fails to take reasonable measures to prevent

environmental damage, and the result of such non-action is climate change, the victims

may seek redress for human violations (Aminzadeh 2007:251; Van de Venis 2006).

According to Aminzadeh (2007:264) reframing the climate change in human rights terms

is nonetheless valuable in its own right. That litigation can be effective for changing

policy cannot be denied, although it cannot be concluded with certainty that litigation

may lead to better policy (Posner 2007:17). Progress with global warming depends on

litigation succeeding against corporations around the world. International litigation,

since it would target foreign as well as domestic corporations, and thus apply a consistent

liability standard around the world, holds out more hope on this score. A positive decision

on the petition will establish the responsibility of major GHG-emitting states for the

human rights violations resulting from climate change. The responsibility creates an

international obligation to take action to prevent such violations. Thus, it seems sensible

that policymakers may need to adopt a human security approach to climate change that

is rooted in the international human rights framework.

Conclusion: Broadening the AU’s human security agenda – a proposal for an AU victim-oriented climate policy

The environment is one of the seven sectors identifi ed in the early defi nition of human

security by the UNDP (1994) together with economic, food, health, personal, community

and political security (Barnett 2007:197). During the Cold War scientists used to warn of

a ‘nuclear winter’ – the consequences of nuclear war in which smoke and debris would

block the very sunlight from the atmosphere. According to Pachauri (2007:2), now there

is a danger of creating a permanent ‘carbon summer’ in which global warming pollution

traps the heat that is normally radiated back out of the atmosphere, on earth. This explains

why the UN (2007) urged member states to take ‘decisive action on a global scale’,

towards a ‘comprehensive agreement’ that ‘tackles climate change on all fronts, including

adaptation, mitigation, clean technologies, deforestation and resource mobilization’.

Although it has been more than a decade since the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, the GHG

emissions of most industrialised countries are still rising and their per capita emissions

remain unacceptably high. It is often argued that industrialised countries must show

more leadership on the issue of climate change. Similarly, developing countries, and

especially large states, need to be brought on board if the climate change regime is to be

truly effective. However, the extent to which developing countries would be taken on

board depends on whether industrialised countries fulfi l commitments to cut domestic

36 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 37

3 See the ‘preference score’ developed by the Pew Centre for Global Climate Change and the ‘triptych’

proposal advanced by the University of Utrecht.

References

Aminzadeh, S C 2007. A moral imperative: the human rights implications of climate change. Hasting

International and Comparative Law Review, 30(2)231–265.

Arbour, L 2008. Address by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the occasion of the Madrid

Alliance of Civilizations Forum, 16 January 2008. Press release.

Barnett, J 2007. Environmental security. In A Colins, Contemporary security studies. Oxford: Oxford University

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Bush, G W 2007. Statement of 28 November 2007. Quoted in The International Herald Tribune, 3 December.

Camilleri, J and Falk, J 1992. The end of sovereignty? The politics of a shrinking and fragmenting world.

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Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria 2005. The Shell report: continuing abuses in Nigeria

– ten years after Ken Saro Wiwa. Enfi eld: Science Publishers.

Goldberg, D M and Wagner, M 2004. Petitioning for adverse impacts of global warming in the inter-

American human rights system. In V I Grover (ed), Climate change fi ve years after Kyoto. Enfi eld, NH:

Science Publishers.

Huq, S and Toulmin, C 2006. Climate change: from science and economics to human rights. Open

Democracy, 7 November. Available at www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-climate_change_debate/

climate_ justice_4073.jsp [accessed 5 August 2008].

Kerr, P 2007. Human security. In A Colins, Contemporary security studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mank, B C 2005. Standing and global warming: is injury to all injury to none? Environmental Law, 35(1):1–84.

Massai, L 2007. European climate policy dossier. The Hague: TMC Asser Institute, 10 September.

Osofsky, H M 2005a. Learning from environmental justice: a new model for international environmental

rights. Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 24(1)71–150.

Osofsky, H M 2005b. The geography of climate change litigation: implications for transnational regulatory

governance. Washington University Law Review, 83:1789.

Reed, C 2007. Towards a post Kyoto climate treaty for climate justice. MPA Briefi ng Paper, Church House,

November.

Pachauri, R 2007. Chairman of the International Climate Panel in his 2007 Nobel Peace Prize Lecture,

Oslo, December 2007. International Herald Tribune, 11 December.

Posner, E A 2007. Climate change and international human rights litigation: a critical appraisal. Chicago: John M

Olin Law & Economic Working Paper No 329 (2nd series).

Sachs, W 2007. Climate change and human rights; world economy and development in brief. Special report

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abstract=984266 [accessed 1 May 2007].

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independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm [accessed 5

August 2008].

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at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/media-archive/PolarBearOpEdKieran1-4-07.pdf [accessed 5

August 2008].

Taylor, P 1998. From environmental to ecological human rights: a new dynamic in international law.

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University Press.

UN Development Programme 2004. UNDP development report. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

commodity, and perhaps the next oil in terms of commodities or perhaps CO2 needs

to be the DNA for businesses, an important issue just like health and safety. However,

it should be understood that cutting GHG emissions will be costly – and while playing

down those costs may seem like smart politics today, it may be inaccurate in the longer

term. The IPCC estimates that action to avoid the most dangerous effects of climate

change would reduce the world’s annual gross domestic product by 3 per cent by 2030.

Although this is not an intolerable burden, it is still painful. However, it needs to be done

if one considers that the health of the global climate is to the public good. It will entail

sacrifi ce on a national scale, as well as transformation in the way that states produce and

use energy. Less-developed countries cannot be expected to control their emissions unless

developed countries take the lead, perhaps with new technologies such as solar panels,

hydrogen-fuelled cars and others as yet imagined. In an interdependent and globalised

world everyone is a stakeholder in human security. Starting with individuals (who may

also be victims, investors or policymakers) and proceeding to non-state actors as well as

states, everyone has the duty to combat climate change within their sphere of infl uence.

With regard to the African continent, there is a need for the integration of the environmental

protection concerns into the manifold policies of African states in general and the AU in

particular. The rationale is to develop a more coordinated AU policy on energy-related issues,

although the actual implementation may be left to the competence of the member states.

When the UN Charter was adopted soon after World War II, in 1945, it was imperative

for the peoples of the UN to commit themselves to save succeeding generations from the

scourge of war. Given that today climate change is a universal threat to the very future of

the planet, it is imperative that the members of the UN offer future generations a chance

to live by saving their planet as well. Therefore the AU needs to develop an environmental

policy in terms articles 9(1)(a) and 13(1)(b) and (e) of the AU Act. Such a policy may be akin

to the European climate policy whose basic goals are the promotion of energy effi ciency,

promotion of renewable sources, research and attention to the cost-effi ciency relationship

as to the sectors affected by regulations and cooperation with the industrial sector, non-

governmental organisations and other stakeholders (Massai 2007:11). Given that the bulk

of AU member states are developing countries that may be the most adversely affected by

climate change, the AU needs to lead the way to combat climate change to provide guidance

for the continent. If African states build the momentum to combat climate change, it will

send a signal that the global community will not be able to ignore.

Notes

1 ‘Grandfathering’ is the act of instituting an exception clause that allows a previously existing rule or

regime to continue to apply to some existing situations, while a new rule or regime will apply to all

relevant future situations.

2 The agreement was reached on 16 February 2007 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK,

US, Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa.

38 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features

Climate change:A new threat to stability in West Africa? Evidence from Ghana and Burkina Faso1

Oli Brown and Alec Crawford*

Introduction:Climate change as the ‘new’ security threat

Recent scientifi c evidence has ... given us a picture of the physical impacts

on our world that we can expect as our climate changes. And those impacts

go far beyond the environmental. Their consequences reach to the very

heart of the security agenda.

– Margaret Beckett, UK Foreign Secretary

UN Security Council debate in New York, 17 April 2007

Over the past decades the way we talk about climate change has shifted dramatically. When

scientists began to uncover worrying evidence of human-induced climate change in the

* Oli Brown is the programme manager and Alec Crawford a project offi cer at the IISD in Geneva.

UN 2007. Secretary-General challenges world community to tackle climate change head-on; how it

addresses threat ‘will defi ne us, our era and, ultimately, our global legacy’. GA 10607, July 31.

UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007. Climate change 2007: the physical science basis,

summary for policymakers. Available at www.aaas.org/news/press_room/climate_change/media/4th_

spm2feb07.pdf [accessed 5 August 2008].

Van de Venis, J 2006. Sustainable development and the development of the human right to a healthy and

clean environment. A background legal paper presented at the International Association of Lawyers

(UIA) 50th congress, Salvador, Brazil, 31 October – 4 November.

CasesGbemre vs Shell Petroleum Development Co. Nigeria Ltd, ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, the Nigerian National

Petroleum Corporation and the Federal Government of Nigeria, Suit No FHC/CS/B/153/2005, Order

(14 November 2005).

Environmental Defence Society vs Auckland Regional Council and Contact Energy Limited 2000 NZRMA 492 (Env’t

Ct. Auckland)

Hatton and Others vs United Kingdom, Eur. Ct.H.R. 17 (2001)

Hungary vs Slovakia, ICJ (1997) (September 25) (Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeamantry).

Inuit petition to the inter-American commission on human rights seeking relief from violations resulting

from global warming caused by acts and omissions of the United States. Available at www.ciel.org/

Publications/ICC_Petition_7Dec05.pdf [accessed 7 December 2005].

International Court of Justice. 1996. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (advisory opinion) ICJ 8 July

1996 General List No 95.

Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria, communication No 155/96(2001).

Yanomanis case, Case 7615 (Brazil), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 12/85, OEA/ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev.

1(1985).

40 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 41

Natural disasters and a changing landscape could contribute to destabilising and ■

unregulated population movements (so-called ‘climate refugees’). This would bring

previously separate groups in competition for the same dwindling resources

Receding sea and land ice could enable access to previously inaccessible resources ■

such as oil and gas supplies in the Arctic and transit routes like the Northwest Passage,

triggering dispute over their ownership and control

Salinisation, rising sea levels and mega droughts could make entire areas uninhabitable. ■

In the case of some small island states this presents perhaps the ultimate security

threat, jeopardising the very existence of small low-lying countries

Climate change may already be playing a role in existing confl icts. A June 2007 report

by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) suggested that the confl ict

in Darfur had in part been driven by climate change and environmental degradation

(UNEP 2007). Over the past 40 years rainfall in the region has decreased by 30 per cent

and the Sahara has advanced by more than a mile every year. The report argues that the

resulting tension between farmers and herders over disappearing pasture and declining

waterholes partly explains the Darfur confl ict (UNEP 2007). The UNEP report warned

of a succession of new wars across Africa unless more is done to contain the damage of

climate change, concluding that Darfur holds grim lessons for other countries at risk.

A second reason for the ‘securitisation’ of the climate change debate is more political;

it is part of a clear move by some campaigners to invest the climate negotiations with a

greater sense of urgency, to raise climate change to the realm of high politics and to create

the political space for serious concessions on greenhouse gas emissions. Advocates hope

it will help unite countries towards strong action on future mitigation and adaptation.

As Jon Barnett pointed out in 2001: ‘[S]ecurity communicates a certain gravitas that is

arguably necessary in climate change policy. In that climate change is a security problem

for certain groups, identifying it as such suggests that it is an issue that warrants a policy

response commensurate in effort if not in kind with war.’

In this approach, Africa is often portrayed as the ‘canary in the mine’ of climate security,

the fi rst continent to feel fully the effects of climate change on political and economic

stability. As the IPCC notes in its Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC 2007a:13): ‘Africa

is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability, a

situation aggravated by the interaction of “multiple stresses”, occurring at various levels,

and low adaptive capacity.’ Cases such as Darfur are being held up as cautionary tales for

the potential impact of climate change everywhere.

The scientifi c basis for climate change is becoming increasingly well established. There

is considerable evidence of the physical impacts of climate change in terms of raised

1970s and 1980s, the emerging problem of ‘global warming’ was seen by policymakers,

when not ignored altogether, as an environmental issue of peripheral concern. By the

1990s, as climate modelling grew more sophisticated, it became clear that reducing

greenhouse gas emissions would have a dramatic impact on the way we produce power

and transport ourselves. Given that doing so would necessitate drastic changes in our use

of fossil fuels, climate change became an economic and energy policy issue.

More recently, analysts and campaigners have begun to view climate change as a major

threat to international security. They argue that climate change, by redrawing the maps

of water availability, food security, disease prevalence, coastal boundaries and population

distribution, could exacerbate existing tensions and trigger new confl icts. Africa, though the

least responsible for per capita greenhouse gas emissions, is seen as the continent most likely

to suffer its worst consequences – a function of the continent’s reliance on climate-dependent

sectors (such as rain-fed agriculture) and its history of resource, ethnic and political confl ict.

The security threat posed by climate change has become the subject of unprecedented

international attention. In 2007 it was the focus of a dedicated UN Security Council

debate in April and the grounds for the Nobel Peace Prize shared between Al Gore and

the scientists of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Furthermore,

the climate debate has taken on the language of a military threat assessment. At an African

Union debate in early 2007 President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda called greenhouse gas

emissions an ‘act of aggression’ by the developed world against the developing world. In

April 2007 a group of retired US generals released a widely circulated report arguing that

climate change will act as a ‘threat multiplier’ that will make existing concerns such as

water scarcity and food insecurity more intractable (NPR 2007). At the April 2007 Security

Council debate the Namibian representative, Kaire Mbuende, called greenhouse gas

emissions tantamount to ‘low intensity biological or chemical warfare’ (UNSCDPI 2007).

In short, the security implications of climate change have caught the political imagination,

generating a perceptible shift in the way decision-makers discuss the subject. There

are perhaps two reasons for this. The fi rst is self-evident: it is becoming increasingly

clear that future climate change threatens to undermine development and to exacerbate

existing drivers of confl ict. Analysts have outlined fi ve main dimensions that link climate

change and confl ict (Dupont & Pearman 2006).

Volatile weather patterns, coupled with changes in rainfall and temperature, have the ■

capacity to reshape the productive landscape of entire regions and exacerbate food,

water and energy scarcities

More frequent and intense natural disasters coupled with a greater burden of diseases ■

such as malaria could stretch the coping capacity of developing countries. This could,

in turn, tip poor countries into fragile states and fragile states into failed states

42 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 43

Both countries have worked hard to identify sectors and regions that might be vulnerable

to climate change. In 2000 Ghana produced its fi rst national communication on climate

change, which identifi ed several key vulnerable sectors. In 2007 Burkina Faso produced

its fi rst National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), which detailed the current

and future climate vulnerabilities facing the country. (The report was written in 2006 and

endorsed by the president in November 2007 and is currently awaiting wider distribution.)

Our objective for this project was not to repeat the excellent work already done or going on

in either country. Rather, it was to determine whether and at what point these vulnerabilities

are no longer a matter of development concern but have become a security issue.

We did not set out to either prove or disprove the link between climate change and violent

confl ict: our aim was to understand better the infl uence of climate change on the political and

economic stability of Ghana and Burkina Faso, and through that to add some nuance to the

wider debate on climate change as a security threat. To do so, we arranged scenario planning

workshops in both countries, supplemented by individual meetings and consultations. We

invited a wide range of local experts to each meeting, including agronomists, hydrologists,

development specialists and security analysts. The purpose of each workshop was to facilitate

a process by which local experts could identify specifi c vulnerabilities and ‘hot spots’ and to

understand how domestic adaptation policies can be used to deal with anticipated problems

(such as water allocation and disaster risk management).

We presented three scenarios (a best case, medium case and worst case), each of which

described a different climate path for West Africa by 2100. These scenarios were

drawn from the emissions scenarios of the IPCC and were expanded using additional

information from the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report and the Stern Review. The

scenarios are highly speculative, but all fall within the meteorological bounds described

by the IPCC. Each describes a future climate scenario, the likelihood of which

depends on the complex interplay of factors such as total greenhouse gas emissions, the

meteorological evolution of climate change, global population growth, energy use and

international cooperation on mitigation and adaptation.

The projected impact of climate change on societies is, of course, one step more uncertain

than the projected climate change itself, being a projection based on a projection. In

addition, for West Africa as elsewhere, ‘the discourse is further complicated by the near

impossibility of disaggregating climatic from anthropogenic infl uences, as a whole range

of variables other than climatic ones (for example demographic, political, economic,

technical) are infl uencing land-use change throughout the Region’ (CIFOR 2005:12).

Nevertheless, to have any meaningful discussion on the social impact of climate change

one has to defi ne a starting point, albeit with sizeable built-in assumptions.

Our scenarios stretched from a conservative ‘best case’ to a conservative ‘worst case’ scenario.

The best case scenario is based on the B1 ‘storyline’ of the Special Report on Emission

sea levels, altered precipitation patterns and more frequent and fi erce storms. However,

there is comparatively little research on the empirical links between climate change and

confl ict.

There have been some attempts (CSIS 2007) to construct scenarios of the security

implications of climate change at a global level, but few if any have focused on the

country-level security impacts of climate change. Our research was an attempt to address

this research gap, to test the links that have been hypothesised and to determine the

extent to which they refl ect a realistic future for different countries as the impacts of

climate change gather pace.

Testing the links: The research methodology

The purpose of this research was to investigate the links between climate change and

security in the case of two countries in West Africa: Ghana and Burkina Faso. Three

questions drove the research:

What do we know about the way that climate change is going to interact with existing ■

tensions and create new ones?

Do we know enough to use climate change projections to predict future confl ict? ■

To what extent will adaptation to climate change ward off instability and confl ict? ■

There were three reasons for choosing Ghana and Burkina Faso as the subjects of our

research.

Ghana and Burkina Faso provide a study in contrast in the West African region. ■

Anglophone, coastal Ghana is one of West Africa’s wealthier countries, relatively speaking,

whereas francophone, land-locked Burkina Faso is one of the world’s poorest

Despite their differences Ghana and Burkina Faso share many development challenges: ■

a reliance on rain-fed agriculture; vulnerability to drought; and some unpredictable

neighbours. They also have to contend with signifi cant cross-border issues, principally

the allocation of the waters of the Volta River Basin, growing economic integration

and cross-border migration. But in a region that has witnessed half a dozen civil wars

over the last 15 years both countries are notable for their relative stability

They are both programme countries for Danida (the overseas development arm of ■

the Danish foreign ministry), which is currently considering how best to support

adaptation to the impact of climate change in the region

44 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 45

we asked participants to discuss the implications of each scenario across six different

sectors: agriculture and food security; productive systems and exports; water; natural

disasters and risk management; migration; and health. We asked the group to identify the

negative consequences and positive opportunities for political and economic stability in

each country with regard to each scenario. Scenario planning, by its very nature, becomes

less precise the longer it is projected into the future. Consequently, the discussions were

limited to impacts on economic and political stability between the present day and 2050.

We then followed up specifi c themes and issues in a series of individual meetings and

consultations in each country. This information was combined with the available literature

to come to seven broad fi ndings on the future impact of climate change on political and

economic stability in both countries. These fi ndings are the subject of the next section.

Main fi ndings

Key point 1: Ghana and Burkina Faso already face considerable development challenges from existing economic, population and environmental stresses

Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in the world, occupying the second-lowest

position on the 2007 Human Development Index (176 of 177). Ghana, by contrast, is

categorised as a country of ‘medium human development’ by the UNDP (position 135).

The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is higher in Ghana (US$485 in 2005) than

Burkina Faso (US$391), but foreign aid still constitutes more than a tenth of GDP in

both countries: In 2005 it was amounted to 10,4 per cent of Ghanaian and 12,8 per cent

of Burkinabe GDP (UNDP 2007).

The two countries share many development challenges. They have rapidly growing

populations: Ghana’s population is 22,5 million and rising at a rate of 1,9 per cent a year,

whereas that of Burkina Faso is 13,9 million and rising even faster (at 2,8 per cent). Their

urban populations are growing at a tremendous pace (4,2 per cent in Ghana and 4,8

per cent in Burkina Faso), stretching the capacity of government to provide basic urban

services (UNDP 2007).

Ghana and Burkina Faso are both vulnerable to changes in temperature and rainfall.

Both rely on rain-fed agriculture for their food security and for their agricultural exports

(particularly cocoa in Ghana and cotton in Burkina Faso). Consequently drought is the

top natural disaster risk in both countries (EM-DAT 2008a, b). Fifty-fi ve per cent of

the Ghanaian labour force works in agriculture which, in 2006, accounted for 35,8 per

cent of GDP. Land degradation and deforestation are serious problems in both countries

(MECV & SP/CONEDD 2006).

Scenarios (SRES), which describes a world whose population peaks mid-century at around

nine billion and declines thereafter to seven billion. States move rapidly towards service and

information economies, and there is a reduction in the material intensity of economic growth

and an introduction of clean and resource-effi cient technologies (Houghton et al 2001).

Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 would stabilise at around 600 ppm by the end of the

century, leading to a global temperature rise of about 1,8 ˚C and a sea level rise of 18 cm to 38

cm over the next 100 years. The temperature rise would lead to a 20 to 30 per cent decrease

in water availability in some vulnerable regions of the world. Crop yields would decline

across tropical regions and would fall by 5 to 10 per cent in Africa. Further diverging from

the SRES scenario, which does not factor in the impact of international action, this scenario

imagines that there is widespread international support for climate change adaptation.

Our medium case scenario uses the SRES A1B storyline as its starting point. A1B

envisages the same population curve as B1 and predicts a world of rapid economic growth

with the swift uptake of new and more effi cient technologies. By contrast to our best

case scenario, the world’s energy is sourced from a balanced mix of fossil-intensive and

non-fossil energy sources (Houghton et al 2001). By 2100, atmospheric concentrations

of CO2 grow to 850 ppm, three times pre-industrial levels. As a result, temperatures

increase over the same period by approximately 2,4 ˚C (within a range of 1,7 ˚C to

4,4 ˚C). Sea levels rise between 21 cm and 48 cm and the resultant coastal fl ooding

would affect between 11 and 170 million additional people every year. Precipitation in

sub-tropical areas would fall by up to 20 per cent. Internationally, some effort and funds

are invested in adaptation, but not a great deal.

Our worst case scenario is built around the A1F1 storyline. This SRES scenario differs

from the A1B scenario in that it forecasts a continued dependence on fossil fuels for the

world’s energy needs – a ‘business as usual’ scenario. Following this trend, atmospheric

concentrations of CO2 would be 1 550 ppm by 2100, fi ve times higher than pre-industrial

levels and four times higher than current levels. This concentration would result in

a global temperature increase of 4 ˚C (with a likely range of 2,4 ˚C to 6,4 ˚C) and a

corresponding sea level rise of between 29 cm and 59 cm. According to the Stern Review,

a warming of 4 ˚C would result in a 30 to 50 per cent decrease in water availability

in southern Africa and a decrease of 15 to 35 per cent in agricultural yields across the

continent (Stern 2006). With high climate sensitivity, the number of people exposed

to fl ooding per year could be as high as 160 million by 2050 and 420 million by 2100.

Under this fi nal scenario no serious support is given to climate change adaptation.

The terms ‘security’ and ‘confl ict’ are loaded and general concepts, open to misinterpretation.

Consequently we made a conscious decision to frame our discussions in terms of the

impact of climate change on economic and political stability, rather than outright violent

confl ict. This provided more scope for debate, enabling discussion across the spectrum of

the possible impact of climate change. Using these three scenarios as a basis for discussion,

46 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 47

An estimated 500 000 people died across the Sahel (CIFOR 2005:10) and as many as one

million left Burkina Faso during the droughts, most of them settling in the urban areas of

other West African countries, principally Côte d’Ivoire (Niamir-Fuller & Mann 2007:4).

Annual rainfall has since partly recovered and has contributed to the recent ‘greening’

of the Sahel: vegetation cover across the region increased signifi cantly in the 1994–2003

period when compared to the 1982–1993 period (Anyamba & Tucker 2005). Within

Burkina Faso, an increase in ‘greenness’ has been seen on the central plateau; however,

more has occurred than can be explained by the increase in rainfall alone. Land

use change is believed to be responsible in part for the reversal of the trend towards

desertifi cation; in some parts of the country a return to traditional water and soil

conservation strategies (such as contour bunding and Zäi cultivation) has helped farmers

reclaim some soil fertility and improve their crop yields. Whether the greening of the

Sahel represents a return to normal rainfall levels or a more encompassing trend towards

wetter conditions in the face of anthropogenic climate change remains to be seen.

Key point 3: Future climate change is likely to make many current development challenges more complex and urgent

There is broad agreement that temperatures in West Africa will rise. But there is little

consensus among the regional climate models on what will happen to rainfall in the

region. Since 2001 an increasing amount of research has pointed to an increased rainfall

in the Sahel being more likely than initially considered. The key factors seem to be that

increased temperature and CO2 concentrations could cause a northward shift of the West

African monsoon, which would increase vegetative production, in turn setting up a positive

feedback loop between increased vegetative cover and precipitation (though this additional

precipitation would be at least partially offset by a faster rate of evapo-transpiration) (CIFOR

2005:21). The rising rainfall of the 1990s seems to support these models.

Both Ghana and Burkina Faso have put considerable effort into assessing the possible

impact of climate change. In 2000 Ghana produced its fi rst (and only) national

communication on the subject, identifying three main aspects that might be affected:

Water: ■ Simulations using projected climate change scenarios suggested reduction in

fl ows of between 15 and 20 per cent and 30 and 40 per cent for the year 2020 and

2050 respectively in all river basins

Agricultural crops: ■ Projections indicated that the average maximum temperature for

the Sudanian savannah zone is expected to increase by 3 ˚C by 2100, with a 2,5 ˚C

increase in all other agro-climatic zones. They estimated that yields of maize would

decrease by 6,9 per cent by 2020 but that the yield of millet, a more drought-tolerant

crop, would not be affected

Both countries have been affected by episodes of violent confl ict domestically and

in neighbouring countries. According to the UN Offi ce for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) the civil war and anti-foreigner policies in Côte

d’Ivoire have led to the return of at least 365 000 Burkinabes since 1998. Others argue

this estimate might be too low. According to the former UN Resident Coordinator in

Burkina Faso, George Charpentier, over one million have been forced to return since

1998, placing considerable stress on employment opportunities, livelihoods and public

services (Kress 2006). Northern Ghana, meanwhile, saw episodic large-scale ethnic

violence between 1980 and 2002, culminating in the 1994–1995 confl ict that cost several

thousand lives and displaced many thousands more (Jönsson 2007:2).

Key point 2: Climate change is not new to West Africa

A changing climate has been a feature of life in West Africa for thousands of years. Just

10 000 years ago the Sahara was a landscape of lakes, savannah and open woodland.

After a period of generally drier conditions, the monsoon collapsed across much of what

is now the Sahara. Pastoral cattle herding emerged in the region as an adaptive response

to the more unpredictable climate.

West Africa in general and the Sahelian region in particular are still characterised by

some of the most variable climates on the planet, and this variability increases as one

moves north through the sub-humid and semi-arid zones (CIFOR 2005:7). Ghanaians

and Burkinabes have not been passive recipients of climate change in the past and have

developed many ingenious ways of adapting to their climate. Some analysts suggest

that the inherent adaptability of the Sahelian peoples is one of their greatest assets.

Nevertheless, this adaptability has been severely tested in the last few decades.

Climate variability seems to have become particularly pronounced in the 20th century.

There was a period of unusually high rainfall from the 1930s to the 1950s. At the same

time, many African nations were in a transition period to independence (Ghana attained

independence in 1957 and Burkina Faso in 1960). Nick Brooks (2006) suggests that, ‘the

coincidence of this period of political and economic transitions, when considerations of

environmental variability and sustainability were minimal, with increased rainfall, resulted

in the northward expansion of agriculture in the Sahel into historically marginal areas,

with profound implications for the vulnerability of agriculturalists and pastoralists alike’.

The high rainfall period was followed by an extended drought which lasted for much

of the latter half of the 20th century. Over a 30-year period, from the 1960s to 1990s,

temperatures rose by around 1 ˚C (EPA 2000:5). Mean annual rainfall and runoff

dropped by as much as 30 per cent with devastating effects on local populations and

livelihoods, resulting in what Hulme (2001:19) refers to as the ‘most dramatic example

of multi-decadal climate variability that has been quantitatively and directly measured’.

48 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 49

to continue apace. Forestry biomass is predicted to decrease from 200 million cubic

metres in 1999 to little more than 110 million cubic metres by 2050 (MECV & SP/

CONEDD 2007)

It is important to note that not all the assessments predict universally negative impacts.

Burkina Faso’s 2001 national communication to the United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change (UNFCCC) suggests that both cotton production and the forestry

sector would benefi t if climate change led to higher levels of rainfall (in contrast to their 2007

NAPA, which projects decreases in forestry biomass). However, the national communication

was produced six years before the NAPA (CIFOR 2005:27). A 2002 study undertaken by

the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis predicts that the potential for cereal

production could increase in Ghana, but decrease in Burkina Faso (Fischer et al 2002).

According to some analyses, the carbon fertilisation effect could lead to a potential increase

of vegetative cover and one 2003 study estimated that the potential increase could be as much

as 10 per cent of the Saharan land area per decade (Claussen et al 2003).

Box 1 National communications and NAPA in West Africa

All parties to UNFCCC are required to prepare a national communications document in which they

report on the steps they have taken or plan to undertake to implement the NAPA Convention. On 8

January 2007 Sierra Leone submitted its fi rst national communication, leaving Liberia as the only nation

in West Africa yet to complete the exercise.

NAPAs, also prepared under the UNFCCC, are designed to allow least developed countries (LDCs) to

‘identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and immediate needs with regard to adaptation

to climate change’. By identifying existing coping strategies through the NAPA process, LDCs can

prioritise those grassroots activities which require further support and enhancement, and areas where

more investment must be made in adaptive capacity. Instead of focusing on future vulnerabilities

through forecasting and scenarios, NAPAs focus on the needs of today, where ‘further delay could

increase vulnerability or lead to increased costs at a later stage’. Once identifi ed, priority projects are

presented to the Global Environment Facility for funding.

Most West African nations have prepared or are preparing their NAPAs. Reports have been submitted

by Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal; Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, the Gambia,

Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo are in the process of fi nalising theirs (UNFCCC 2007).

Key point 4: There are links between climate change and security in the region

There is some anecdotal evidence that climate change in West Africa might already be

associated with confl ict. According to Anthony Nyong and his colleagues (2006:235)

there is a correlation between reports of confl ict and periods of drought in northern

Nigeria. They also noticed that communities in northern Nigeria had successfully

evolved traditional systems to manage new types of confl ict, including those that result

from climate-related events. Nick Brooks (2006) suggests that drought helped to trigger

confl ict in some Sahelian areas. An example of such a confl ict is the Tuareg rebellion in

Coastal zones: ■ With a quarter of the population living below the 30 metre level, an

estimated sea level rise of 1 metre by 2100 could inundate 1 120 square kilometres

of land and put 132 000 people at risk. The cost of protecting all densely populated

shorelines at risk with seawalls was estimated at US$1,14 billion, while protecting

only the ‘important areas’ would reduce the cost to US$590 million (EPA 2000)

In 2007, using historical data from the end of 20th century, the Ghanaian Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) projected a steady rise in temperature and reduction in rainfall

over the next decades. ‘Historical data across the country from the year 1960 to 2000

show a progressive and discernible rise in temperature and a concomitant decrease in

rainfall in all agro-ecological zones in the country.’ Based on these data, they estimate an

average temperature rise of 0,6 ˚C, 2,0 ˚C and 3,9 ˚C; a rainfall decrease of 2,8 per cent,

10,9 per cent and 18,6 per cent; and a rise in the sea level of 5,8, 16,5 and 34,5 centimetres

by 2020, 2050 and 2080 respectively (EPA 2007:7–8). The EPA listed ten areas vulnerable

to climate change: water resources, agriculture and food security, biodiversity, human

health, coastal zones, land management, national revenue, hydropower production,

tourism, and women and the poor (EPA 2007:6–8).

The 2007 National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) for Burkina Faso

identifi ed four sectors as particularly vulnerable to climate change: water, agriculture,

stockbreeding and forestry/fi sheries. These four sectors form the basis of the Burkinabe

economy and are vulnerable to four aspects of climate change: decline and variability in

rainfall, heavy rainfall/fl ooding, rising temperatures and increased wind speeds.

Water: ■ A projected increase in the frequency of heavy rains and fl ooding is expected

to lead to widespread erosion and siltation along each of Burkina Fasa’s four basin

slopes. When combined with projected decreases in overall rainfall, the NAPA

authors anticipate this will result in reduced run-offs by 2050, ranging from 29,9 per

cent for the Nakanbé basin to 73 per cent for the Mouhoun basin

Agriculture: ■ The NAPA for Burkina Faso predicts that average annual rainfall will drop

by 3,4 per cent by 2025 and 7,3 per cent by 2050. For an economy heavily dependent

on rain-fed agriculture, such a drop will have signifi cant implications for crops and

planting cycles across the country, and there have already been declines in cotton,

maize and yams production in the south as a result of drought

Stockbreeding: ■ An expected rise in temperature of 1,7 ˚C by the middle of the

century will combine with decreased rainfall to reduce the drinking points open to

stockbreeders. Floods are expected to compound these threats by killing livestock

Forestry/ fi sheries: ■ Increased erosion and siltation are expected to damage land and water

ecosystems, while land clearing, in part a reaction to rainfall pressures, is expected

50 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 51

have the six riparian countries of the Volta come together to create a mechanism

to govern the management of the basin (see Box 2). The fl oods that displaced an

estimated 285 000 people in Ghana in September 2007 are an example of why such

mechanisms might become more important in future; despite two weeks’ warning,

the opening of the fl oodgates of the Burkinabe Bagré Dam to release excess water

led to widespread fl ooding in northern Ghana and a certain amount of bad feeling

(though the consequences of a ruptured dam would have been far more serious)

Instability on borders: ■ A further concern that was expressed, albeit vaguely, was the

ramifi cations of confl ict elsewhere caused by climate change impact and what that

might mean in terms of fl ows of refugees, potentially hostile neighbours and regional

economic disruption

Economic stability and the structure of the economy: ■ Some analysts predict that by 2080

Ghana’s climate may be unsuitable for the cultivation of cocoa (EPA 2007). This has

led to concerns that the impact of climate change will fundamentally alter Ghana’s

economy, with unforeseen consequences for economic stability

Box 2 The Volta Basin Authority

The Volta Basin Authority (VBA) was established in 2007 to coordinate water management policies for

the six riparian countries of the Volta River Basin (Ghana, Burkina Faso, Togo, Mali, Benin and Côte

d’Ivoire). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), believing that there might

be future confl icts in the region over the sharing of water resources, initiated the formation of the

VBA (Ghanaweb 2007). For years, the 400 000 square kilometre Volta Basin had been one of the few

transboundary basins in Africa which had no formal agreement in place for cross-border cooperation

and management.

Ghana and Burkina Faso together use 85 per cent of the basin’s water.

The VBA is administered by a Ghanaian deputy out of offi ces in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, with

input from the other four riparian countries. In addition to integrating the Volta water management

policies across the six states, the VBA will establish an observation post to monitor trends in the basin,

enhancing its ability to act as an early warning system should water issues arise.

The VBA, having been established only recently, is not yet fully operational. However, should it

grow into an effective institution with an appropriate level of infl uence over Volta water management

decisions, it will have implications for water consumption for the basin’s 20 million inhabitants, for

agricultural decisions, for ecosystem conservation and for hydropower generation (Boakye 2006).

Burkina Faso

Local experts in Burkina Faso suggested four main areas of concern:

Water availability: ■ Water is a contentious resource. Siltation, erosion and variable

and declining rainfall are expected to reduce water availability and quality. Our

interviewees stressed that, given this threat and a growing population, a careful

Mali 1990. Although the confl ict is primarily regarded as an attempt by various Tuareg

groups in Niger and Mali to secure an autonomous Tuareg state, it began amid famine

and widespread political repression.

However, there is little research that has managed to construct an empirical link between

climate change and confl ict in West Africa (or anywhere else for that matter). That is

not to say that such a link might not appear in future, but the drivers of confl ict and

instability are complex. Simple models of causation are inappropriate. Barnett and

Adger (2007:644) argue ‘[it] is necessary to be cautious about the links between climate

change and confl ict. Much of the analogous literature on environmental confl icts is

more theoretically than empirically driven and motivated by Northern theoretical and

strategic interests rather than informed by solid empirical research.’

Key point 5: Climate change could exacerbate existing, latent tensions in Ghana and Burkina Faso

Ghana

Our research (workshop, literature and subsequent interviews) in Ghana identifi ed fi ve

challenges and concerns:

Managing the north–south divide: ■ Ghana is characterised by a pronounced social divide.

Poverty is concentrated in the rural north, which is not as well serviced as the south across

the full range of government services. Historically the rural north has suffered the most

variable climate and demand for water is rapidly rising with population growth. Ghana’s

national communication estimated that demand for irrigation water in the dry northern

savannah could increase twelve-fold by 2050 as a result of climate change and population

growth. How the government manages development in the north in the context of an

increasingly changeable climate will be an acute challenge in the coming years

The division of water between ■ energy in the south and agriculture in the north: The north–

south divide is played out in the sphere of resource allocation between the different

regions. One critical issue is the trade-off between water for agriculture in the north

and water for the production of hydro-energy in the south. Just before the fl oods of

August and September 2007, the level of water in the Akosombo Dam had fallen to

critically low levels, leading to an energy crisis across the country (Addax 2007)

The management of regional water sources: ■ On a regional scale the sharing of water between

Burkina Faso and Ghana will likely be a delicate issue in coming years, especially if

climate change leads to signifi cantly lower rainfall and run-off. Together Ghana and

Burkina Faso constitute 85 per cent of the Volta River Basin and much of the Volta

River’s fl ow travels through Burkina Faso before reaching Ghana. Only recently

52 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 53

decrease for reasons that have nothing to do with greenhouse gas emissions (Pielke et

al 2007:597).

Generally, it was not until we started discussing the worst case scenarios that the experts

in our workshops and interviewees felt that the impacts of climate change themselves

could be deterministic factors in serious future economic and political instability, or

indeed in violent confl ict. This may be a partial consequence of what one interviewee

termed the ‘plausibility structure’ of the people we spoke to – the diffi culty of imagining

confl ict breaking out in two stable countries with relatively peaceful histories over

the past decade. However, our worst case scenario presents so many challenges to the

environment and development that, in one sense, ‘all bets are off ’. The context becomes

harder to recognise as being ‘Ghanaian’ or ‘Burkinabe’ – and so predictions become

more tenuous.

Conclusions

Our research challenges an overly deterministic approach to climate change as a security

issue. There are plenty of well-intentioned reports aimed at increasing awareness of

greenhouse gas emissions by asserting a particular outcome. These tend to present a

worst case scenario where drought is either assumed, or the possibility of increased

rainfall is indicated only in terms of ‘devastating fl oods’ and ‘the spread of disease’, rather

than in terms of increased agricultural yields or natural re-vegetation of desertifi ed areas

(CIFOR 2005:46).

But while it may be effective as a campaigning strategy, it is not a solid foundation for

appropriate policy. At times it obscures the fact that in regions like West Africa, sustained

attention (and funding) is still required to deal with the impacts of more predictable

trends: malnutrition, poor land management, bad governance, inequitable trade, lack of

basic services and so on. The danger of course is that inappropriate policies are generated

as a result and that key underlying issues are overlooked. This leads us to our seventh

and fi nal point.

Key point 7: Adaptation needs to focus on the full range of development problems affecting countries

‘Adaptation’ to climate change and the ‘climate proofi ng’ of development aid have

become the latest mantras of the development community. The fi rst is about helping

communities manage the effects of a changing climate (for example training farmers in

water conservation practices). The second is about protecting development investments

against the impacts of climate change (such as digging deeper wells) and ensuring that

development projects do not unintentionally make people more vulnerable (by, for

example, encouraging dependence on a drought-prone crop).

balance must be struck between consumption and production, crops and livestock,

and upstream, domestic use and use by Burkina’s downstream neighbours

Relations between pastoralist and agricultural communities: ■ The expansion of farming and

population growth is combining with drought and desertifi cation to constrict the range

and resources to which Burkina Faso’s pastoralist community has access. In addition,

farmers are diversifying into stockbreeding. As a result, they rely less on the mutually

benefi cial relationships previously established with pastoralists for agricultural

inputs such as compost and fertiliser, while increasingly competing with them in the

marketplace. As productive systems evolve, so do social relationships (Reysset 2007)

Migration: ■ Longer dry seasons are driving farmers to migrate from northern and

central parts of the country into the fertile east and west, bringing them into contact

with settled farmers in these richer areas. Greater populations congregating in smaller

fertile areas may increase competition for valuable lands and accelerate environmental

degradation (MECV & SP/CONEDD 2006)

Food security: ■ Food security was deemed a concern across all three scenarios.

Unpredictable, declining rainfall and expected increases in the frequency and gravity

of fl oods and droughts have many worried about the capacity of the country to

maintain its agricultural production. Richer countries can buy ‘virtual water’ in the

form of food imports, but this is not feasible for Burkina Faso on a large scale, leaving

the country in a precarious position

Key point 6: Only in the extreme scenarios does climate change begin to be a deterministic factor in future economic and political instability

Climate change in the region is clearly one of many serious development issues. It is

straightforward to see how climate change might be a (somewhat amorphous) contributory

factor that exacerbates a number of existing problems such as land degradation, urban

migration, food insecurity, power brown-outs and the like. Under specifi c external

conditions (poor governance, recession, ethnic tensions and so on) these problems could

undermine economic and political stability.

When discussing best case and medium case scenarios, the experts at the workshops

and interviewees generally agreed that climate change could move from being a

development problem to becoming a security issue, but that this jump depends on non-

climate drivers, which are mostly external conditions such as governance and regional

relations. It is, for example, population growth, income distribution and government

policy that push people to live on marginal lands in the fi rst place. In other words,

a community’s vulnerability to climate confl ict is not a constant – it can increase or

54 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 55

On the other hand, we are concerned that some key development priorities might be

forgotten in the donor rush to ‘do something’ about climate change adaptation. A donor

budget can be a ‘zero-sum’ game, where the institutional priorities are set centrally

and money used for one objective becomes unavailable elsewhere. Universal primary

education, for example, is rarely seen as a priority for adaptation. But education levels in

Burkina Faso may well be a more important determinant of the future well-being in the

country than anthropogenic climate change.

Adaptation to climate change clearly needs to be integrated into wider plans for

development assistance, and the additional costs for that adaptation need to be funded

with ‘new money’ so as not to undercut development priorities elsewhere. In short, the

projected impact of climate change has to be examined in the context of other factors

within the region. Two key questions need to be borne in mind. First, to what extent

will other forces of change (those apart from climate change) affect natural and human

systems in West Africa in the 21st century? And second, how do their projected impacts

compare, qualitatively and quantitatively, with those of climate change?

Note

1 This article is based on a paper produced by the Climate Change and Foreign Policy Project of the

International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). The research was conducted independently

by IISD with fi nancial support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the government of Denmark. The

full report can be downloaded at www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/security_implications_west_africa.pdf.

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African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 59

the theoretical dimensions of the relationship between environmental security,

environmental change and human security. The second briefl y outlines the general state

of environmental problems in Lesotho, while the third examines the role of the LHWP

in environmental degradation, in terms of resource depletion and degradation, and its

impact on environmental and human security. In the conclusion potential solutions to

the challenges of environmental problems associated with the project and the country as

a whole are put forward.

Environmental security, environmental change and human security

Environmental security, according to Cyril Obi (2000:50–51), focuses on controlling

a range of threats or contradictions that arise due to the interaction between human

beings and nature. This can either be in the form of the extraction of natural resources or

their transformation into food, goods and services for human security and commercial

purposes. Environmental degradation arising from the extraction and transformation of

these resources constitutes a threat, however, because it may lead to the depletion of such

resources either in terms of quantity or quality. Resource extraction and transformation

are dependent on access, control, ownership and power, and are therefore linked to

political economy and security. On the whole, environmental change constitutes a major

threat to human security.

Environmental change refers to natural and human-induced changes to the earth’s

environment, which affect land use and land cover, bio-diversity, atmospheric

composition and climate (Page 2000:33). Nina Graeger (1996) argues that there are at least

four reasons for advancing a theoretical and operational relationship between security

and environmental change caused by human activity. First, environmental degradation

is itself a serious threat to human security. Second, environmental degradation or change

can be both cause and consequence of violent intra- and interstate confl ict. Third, in

order to safeguard the environment, the question of predictability and control become

integral components of security considerations. Environmental security may lead to

improvements in political security if the interaction between the two and how these

interactions contribute to an enhancement of human security are understood. Predicting

mass environmental migration from environmentally devastated areas into neighbouring

regions is a crucial aspect of such an understanding, since such a migration may directly

or indirectly lead to violent confl icts, either within a state or between one state and its

neighbours. Finally, there is a cognitive link between the environment and security that

establishes an important political contribution to the concept of environmental security.

Securitising environmental issues politicises them so that they become a concern at a

high level. In this way they become priority issues that require an urgent response at the

highest political level. If they become part of low-level politics, environmental concerns

Environmental change and human security in Lesotho:The role of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in environmental degradationOscar Gakuo Mwangi*

Introduction

Lesotho has a highly fragile environment, characterised by a number of environmental

problems that are induced by both natural and human activities. These problems have

negatively impacted on environmental and human security in the country. A major part

of the problem is that the country’s environmental issues have not yet been politicised by

the political elite, and have accordingly not yet become a concern at a high political level.

Though there are a number of factors that contribute to environmental problems in

Lesotho, this paper examines the contribution of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project

(LHWP) towards environmental change and its impact on environmental and human

security in the country. The paper is divided into three sections. The fi rst examines

* Oscar Gakuo Mwangi teaches at the National University of Lesotho.

60 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 61

environment threaten to undermine the security of states, and possibly other entities.

A number of scholars have sought to defend the view that the most salient impact

of environmental change is that it threatens human security (Page 2000:34–35).

However, in this paper the view is that particularly the way in which human-induced

environmental degradation threatens human and environmental security in Lesotho is

of prime importance in human security. The paper pays particular attention to the role

of the LHWP in environmental degradation and resultant impact on environmental

and human security. However, fi rst it is necessary to outline the general environmental

problems in Lesotho so as to obtain a clear view of the environmental conditions in

the country.

Environmental problems in Lesotho

Lesotho’s environment is characterised by a number of problems such as steep slopes and

frail soil formation, the decline in soil quality and soil erosion, scarcity of arable land, and

climate variability. Soil erosion in particular is evident throughout the country in the deep

gullies in the lowlands and exposed rock in the mountains and it is estimated that 0,25

per cent of the total arable land or 3,6 million tonnes of soil is lost through soil erosion

each year. These environmental problems have signifi cantly undermined agricultural

development and contributed to a decline in agricultural production, thus aggravating the

problems of food shortage and poverty (Mphale & Rwambali 2003:24; KOL 2004:86).

The country has also experienced a severe environmental decline with regard to bio-

diversity. There has been a loss of or decline in habitats such as grasslands, marshes, bogs

and reed meadows leading to signifi cant changes in fl ora and fauna. The loss of bio-

diversity has several adverse effects on the rural poor, including the decline or even loss of

wood for fuel and a decline in medicinal plants that are or were used extensively by poor

households unable to afford and easily access modern health services. The replacement

of indigenous grasses by invasive inedible shrubs also adversely affects the livelihoods of

those households that depend on livestock. Because rangelands have lost their diversity

and their quality and quantity have declined, too, there has been a resultant drop in

the productivity of the livestock and, hence, the income of their owners. Poverty can

therefore be regarded as both a cause and consequence of environmental degradation

in Lesotho. Natural resources are overused and thus depleted because people are poor,

which has consequently lead to further impoverishment and an inability to maintain

their livelihoods (KOL 2004:86–88).

Most of the environmental changes in the country are the result of human activity.

These include undesirable activities such as cultivating on marginal lands without

undertaking any conservation measures, practising destructive grazing patterns and

regimes, overstocking the rangelands, poor natural resource management techniques as

lose political importance and urgency and are likely to attract less public interest (Graeger

1996:109–111; Allenby 2000:6–7).

There is a perceptible relationship between environmental change and intra- and interstate

confl ict. According to Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen (1998:300), most studies that focus

on the link between environmental change and confl ict pay attention to the relationship

between confl ict and degradation and depletion of renewable resources. Resources can be

generally be divided into two groups, namely non-renewable resources like oil and iron

ore, and renewable resources like fresh water, forests, fertile soils and the earth’s ozone

layer. Renewables also include renewable goods, such as fi sh and timber, and renewable

services, such as regional hydrological cycles. In developing countries, of the major

environmental changes facing humankind, degradation and depletion of resources will

contribute more to social turmoil than climatic change in the near future. Environmental

change is only one of the three main causes of scarcity of renewable resources. The others

are population growth and unequal social distribution of resources, but the concept of

environmental scarcity relates all these factors and, indeed, environmental problems are

often characterised as resource scarcities (Homer-Dixon 1994:7–9).

Val Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon (1998:280) identify three types of environmental

scarcity, namely supply-induced scarcity caused by resource degradation and depletion;

demand-induced scarcity resulting from population growth within a region or increased

per capita consumption of a resource; and structural scarcity arising from an unequal

social distribution of a resource that concentrates it in the hands of relatively few people

while the rest of the population suffers serious shortages. Both supply-induced scarcity

and demand-induced scarcity can heighten the demand for the resource. The social effects

of scarcity and its interactions include lower agricultural production and environmental

migration, which can in turn lead to weakening of state institutions. If these results are

perceived as causing a relative decrease in their standard of living compared with other

groups or compared with their aspirations, and they see little chance of their aspirations

being addressed under the status quo, it will lead to an increase in grievances.

Homer-Dixon (1994:6) emphasises that while social confl ict is not always negative

because it can provide opportunities for positive change in resource distribution and

governance processes, scarcity is more likely to hamper efforts at meaningful social

change. He argues that environmental scarcity can sharply increase demands on key

institutions, such as the state, while at the same time reducing their capacity to meet

these demands. This increases the chances that such institutions will either fragment or

become more authoritarian.

There are two views of environmental confl ict, and thus environmental security. The

fi rst concerns the way in which confl ict over natural resources threatens to undermine

the security of states. The second concerns the way in which degradations of the

62 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 63

The main environmental impact of dams generally includes destruction of riverine

ecosystems, changes in fl ow patterns, modifi cation of erosion and deposition processes,

species extinction in freshwater and wildlife habitats, and loss of water by evaporation

and contamination. The social costs of involuntary resettlement due to construction of

large dams are as striking as the ecological ones. According to Nüsser between 40 and 80

million people worldwide are forced off their settlements, agricultural lands and forests

and lose other resources due to dam-related fl ooding. Other people also affected by dam

construction include rural dwellers residing downstream from such dams. They are often

neglected in project assessments, because of the assumption that they will benefi t from the

project. However, dams frequently have a signifi cant negative impact downstream. Several

of these environmental and socio-economic effects apply in the case of the LHWP.

The aim of the LHWP, a combined project between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the

Republic of South Africa, is to exploit the water resources of the highlands of Lesotho to

the mutual advantage of both countries. It is one of the most comprehensive engineering

projects of its kind in the world. The LHWP treaty was signed on 24 October 1986 between

the two governments (LHWP 2007). The project consists of four phases and the Lesotho

Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) is the implementing agency of the LHWP.

Phases IA and IB have already been completed. Phase IA comprised the building of Katse

Dam in the central Maluti Mountains, an 82 km transfer and delivery tunnel system

reaching to the Ash River outfall structure across the border in South Africa, and the

Muela hydropower station and associated structures. Phase IB comprised the building

of Mohale Dam on the Senqunyane River some 40 km southwest of Katse Dam, a 32

km long transfer tunnel between the Mohale and Katse reservoirs, a 19 m high concrete

division weir in the Matsoku River, and a 5,6 km long tunnel.

Phase II will entail the construction of Mashai Dam on the Senqu River at Mashai,

a pumping plant, and a water conveyance tunnel to Katse Dam. Phase III will entail

the construction of Tsoelike Dam just below the confl uence of the Senqu and Tsoelike

rivers some 90 km downstream of Mashai Dam. In Phase IV an additional dam will be

built at Ntoahae, 40 km downstream of Tsoelike Dam on the lower reaches of the Senqu

River (TCTA-LHDA 2002:3; LHDA 2004:2).

Upon completion in about the year 2020, fi ve dams, water transfer works and 200 km of

tunnels will have been constructed between the two countries. More than 2 000 million

cubic metres of water will be transferred from Lesotho to the South African network

each year.

The socio-economic and environmental impacts related to the implementation,

operation and maintenance of the LHWP form the basis of the LHDAs compensation

policy. The basis of the compensation policy is set out in articles 15 and 17 of the LHWP

well as establishing human settlements on fragile and scarce arable lands (Mphale &

Rwambali 2003:27).

Although Lesotho passed the Environment Act in 2001, it has not yet become enforceable.

One of the key objectives of the Act was to ensure that environmental impact assessments

(EIAs) are conducted to determine the negative consequences of socio-economic

development in the country on the environment. However, the recommendations of the

EIAs, which are conducted by administrative government personnel, are not legally binding.

Some stakeholders, among them line ministries, do comply with the EIA recommendations,

but the majority do not cooperate or comply with the process. The implementation process is

also hampered by the shortage of skilled personnel to monitor compliance (KOL 2004:89).

Henry Sibanda (2003:40) argues that Lesotho’s contemporary environmental problems

have reached unprecedented proportions because the country attempts to solve them by

focusing on the physical environment rather than paying more attention to the social,

cultural and political aspects of the environment. Indeed, researchers of environmental

security argue that central to the notion of a politicised environment is the recognition

that environmental problems and various dimensions of environmental confl icts cannot

be understood in isolation from the political and economic context within which they

emerge (Nüsser 2003:22).

Though there are several economic, political and social factors that contribute to environmental

change in Lesotho, this paper focuses on the role of the LHWP in environmental degradation

and the implications of this for human and environmental security.

The LHWP, environmental degradation and human security

This section examines the contribution of the LHWP, the largest water transfer scheme

in the world, to environmental change, and focuses in particular on human-induced

environmental degradation and its impact on human security in Lesotho. It can also

be considered to be a supply-induced environmental scarcity, because the Project has

contributed to the degradation and depletion of renewable resources.

Marcus Nüsser (2003:21–26) argues that large dams have become a topical issue because

of their frequently pervasive and negative environmental impact and socio-economic

consequences. Advocates of dam construction generally emphasise advantages of

modernisation, technological progress and water supply in arid and semi-arid regions,

which in turn lead to regional or national economic development. Opponents place

emphasis on a whole range of negative environmental aspects and high socio-economic

and political costs of involuntary resettlement.

64 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 65

In the case of the construction of Mohale Dam during Phase IB, the valleys, gorges

and oxbows in which a number of communities actually lived, eventually became

the catchment area of the reservoirs. According to the environmental impact studies

conducted prior to construction, approximately 1 700 individuals would be affected by

Phase IB, mainly people who had to vacate the basin areas. In terms of the resettlement

programme communities were given the option to move uphill into the highland regions,

resettle in the foothills or move to the urban centres. The resettlement was effected in

stages and Mohale Dam was impounded in November 2003. Thereafter an additional

155 families lost arable land to inundation of the dam (LHDA 2005:1, 2).

Less than 10 per cent of the total land area of Lesotho is suitable for arable farming. Phase

I of the project destroyed approximately 1 500 hectares of arable land, 1 900 hectares of

cropland and 5 000 hectares of grazing land. About 2 345 households owned fi elds in the

submerged areas and many others sharecropped it. The project has taken over Lesotho’s

most fertile land, including the Mohale area, which was the only region in the country

that produced an agricultural surplus. The alluvial soils in the mountains are rich, deep

and produce high yields. The loss of so much land has placed an acute strain on food

security, particularly as two-thirds of the people living in the affected areas depend on

locally produced food crops (Tricarico 2002:7; Mwangi 2007:12–13). Other communal

assets that have also been severely affected include fuel resources (providing energy and

income), wild vegetables (providing additional nutrition) and medicinal plants. The

depletion of these resources has led to losses in income and food energy and a decline in

health standards of the affected communities (Hoover 2001:8–9).

Soil erosion, already a major problem in Lesotho, has been aggravated by the construction

of the project and access roads to the highlands. The LHWP has contributed to the

scarcity of cultivated land and has pushed peasants onto soil more vulnerable to erosion

(Bond 1999:23). The problem is becoming worse as displaced villagers are forced to

cultivate and overgraze steeper hillsides. The downstream impacts also appear to have

been overlooked (Tricarico 2002:3). Another project-related threat to the precious

remaining arable land comes from poor drainage systems along LHWP roads. The

runoff from these culverts creates ever-widening gullies that have, in some cases, forced

farmers to plough against the contour of the hillside, accelerating erosion even more.

Side-spoil, left over from road construction, has ruined other fi elds, because the rocks

are too large to move and too numerous to plough around (Hoover 2001:7). The type

of environmental scarcity caused by the project can be referred to as supply-induced

because it was caused by resource degradation.

Project construction has also destroyed crucial habitats of endangered species such as

the Maluti minnow and bearded vulture as well as four other species considered to be

globally threatened. Since LHWP planning followed a purely economic logic, initial

feasibility studies failed to include an environmental impact assessment. Hence linings

Treaty, which deal with the LHDA and social and environmental considerations. Article

15 of the treaty states that ‘the Parties agree to take all reasonable measures to ensure

that the implementation, operation and maintenance of the Project are compatible with

the protection of the existing quality of the environment and, in particular, shall pay

due regard to the maintenance of the welfare of persons and communities immediately

affected by the Project’ (KOL/RSA 1986:10).

The compensation policy has three broad objectives. First, to facilitate and provide

mechanisms aimed at ensuring popular participation of those people and communities

directly and indirectly affected by the LHWP. Second, to ensure that compensation

principles are applied uniformly throughout the project. Third, to include all elements of

the development, environmental protection, health and social welfare as an integral part

of the environmental action plan. The costs of implementing this policy are counted as

project costs and as such are borne by the LHDA (2002:7).

Although several studies were undertaken addressing the project, and despite the treaty’s

stated commitment to social and environmental considerations, the various construction

phases of the project continue to cause unwarranted environmental destruction. The

impact of reservoir inundation and dam construction on the quantity and quality of

natural resources in the project areas has been enormous, particularly with regard to

the loss of arable, crop and grazing land, as well as soil erosion. This has in turn had a

negative impact on human environmental security in the country (Mwangi 2007:12).

Project construction has contributed signifi cantly to environmental change, particularly

with regard to environmental degradation. Thabhane (2000:635) has noted that the project

construction has affected highland communities in various ways. In some cases, residents

lost their homes but not their agricultural and grazing land; in others they lost agricultural

and grazing land but not their homes; in yet others their movement has been hampered

because reservoirs have become barriers between their villages and hitherto accessible

areas. In all these cases communities have tried to fi nd alternative resources to replace

those they had lost within the area where they originally lived and worked. In some cases,

however, people lost everything and were left with only their movable property.

The reservoir inundation and dam construction have had a massive impact on the quantity

and quality of natural resources in the vicinity of the project. It has also been a major

obstacle to restoring the livelihoods of affected people in terms of the environmental

action plan (Hoover 2001:7). During the Phase IA construction of Katse Dam, the

affected people were relocated both uphill and downhill because of activities related to

the construction of the dam, such as the erection of powerlines and road alignments.

The gorges below provided the perfect catchment area to contain Katse reservoir water.

Prior to the project the valleys were used mostly for farming and grazing purposes. The

implementation of Phase IA affected approximately 2 300 people (LHDA 2005:1).

66 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 67

There can be little doubt about the impact of the project on environmental and human

security. A decline in or adverse effect on environmental security in any country does

indeed adversely affect human security and vice versa. On the one hand, environmental

degradation contributes to amongst others poverty. On the other, human-induced

activities resulting from poverty do cause environmental degradation. The construction

of the project is a human-induced activity that has resulted in environmental change,

which has further exacerbated the problem of poverty and poverty-related environmental

activities, setting in motion a vicious circle.

A large part of the problem is directly related to the fact that environmental issues in

Lesotho have not yet been adequately politicised, so that they become a concern at

the highest political level. As was noted in the preceding sections of this paper, the

country pays little attention to the social and cultural impact of the environment when

attempting to deal with environmental problems (Sibanda 2003:40). In the case of the

LHWP, environmental concerns are often highlighted by civil society groups rather

than the state. The project itself is, however, a concern of high politics as far as the

design, implementation, operation and maintenance of the project are concerned. But

at this stage the hydro-political strategic interests of the political elite of both Lesotho

and South Africa outweigh the environmental issues or impacts of the project. The

political elite of both states often cite the project as a symbol of peaceful coexistence

and security in the region, well knowing that environmental degradation can lead to

confl ict. Furthermore, little mention is made by political leaders of its adverse impacts

on environmental and human security (Mwangi 2007:14–16). As Willemse (2007:470)

pointed out:

Phase IB of the LHWP is a classic example of an insuffi cient environmental

assessment (EA) for several reasons. First, the EA was done hastily because

political leaders wished to get the project off the ground as quickly as

possible. Second, the project incurred huge negative environmental, social,

cultural, religious and economic impacts, which continue to affect many

people and regions.

The potential for confl ict arising from environmental degradation is as high as that

arising from water as a trans-boundary resource. In order to enhance political security in

the country as well as the region, there is a need for Lesotho to politicise environmental

problems associated with the LHWP.

The construction of the LHWP has caused signifi cant environmental change that has

resulted in environmental degradation and consequently adversely affected human

security. It has reduced arable and grazing lands, contributed to reduced access to food

crops and animal stock, and deprived the affected communities of certain cultural

practices while threatening their personal, community and political security. The overall

for tunnels were inadequate and had to be cemented; reservoir-induced earthquakes

were far worse than anticipated; and soil erosion and sedimentation were not initially

taken into consideration (Bond 1999:23).

A study conducted by Motlatsi Thabane (2000:638–648) on the social and environmental

effects of the project construction on Molika-liko in the Mohale area, for example,

pointed out several adverse effects upon human security. Crop production in Molika-

liko was a relatively inexpensive undertaking and brought high returns because of soil

fertility, the absence of pests and the ability of communities living there to produce in

excess of their own needs. The Mohale area was home to a variety of grasses which

were good for animal grazing, especially by cattle. The quantity of produce, especially

maize and wheat, from their lands was more than suffi cient to satisfy the food needs of

their dependants and they sold the surplus to fi nance the children’s schooling, clothes

and other needs. However, as a result of resettlement the communities suffered palpable

losses, the most obvious being the loss of fertile agricultural and good pasture land

(Thabane 2000:638–648). As one person resettled from Molika-liko lamented, there

they used to eat papa, wild vegetables, and milk from their cows, beans and lentils, but in

their new resettled area they were starving because the wild vegetables were scarce and

so is land to grow beans, peas and lentils (TRC 2004:30).

Many of the affected communities emphasise that the LHDA has not been accountable

and transparent, adding that their lives were better off when they lived in their original

villages, which have now been taken over by the project. They have expressed grievances

over their removal from their original homes, where they did not have to buy wood,

herbal medicines, vegetables and other essentials for sustenance. According to some of

the affected communities, their present settlements pose serious problems with regard to

self-sustenance (TRC 2003:3). This is supported by a socio-economic survey undertaken

between November 2000 and March 2001 to obtain baseline data, which found that the

project construction has contributed to household food insecurity (Mail & Guardian 2005).

The adverse effects of the LHWP on food security was also examined by Sets’abi and

Mashinini (2006), who noted that the signifi cant decline in farming as a source of income

for the displaced and resettled populations is directly related to three factors. First, the

signifi cant reduction in access to arable land by the displaced populations, second, the

reduced access to natural capital resources, particularly pasture, which is important in

livestock production and third, the signifi cant reduction in draught livestock, which

made a considerable input in farming activities. They emphasised that the overall decline

in farming as a livelihood strategy has resulted in a loss of income and it may also have

led to food insecurity owing to the loss of productive assets related to food production.

Sets’abi and Mashinini (2006:143) argue that there is a direct link between the two

aspects of reduction of income and food insecurity, because food is principally acquired

through personal production or the ability to purchase it.

68 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 69

a long way towards ensuring that human security problems arising from or associated

with environmental change are acknowledged and dealt with by the country.

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result has been a deterioration in living conditions, and in some extreme cases, hunger

and starvation among the affected families and their livestock. Affected communities

are no longer able to enjoy their previous lifestyle and culture by personally providing

for their basic needs, as they used to do prior to project construction (Mwangi

2007:14–16).

Conclusion

The LHWP has contributed signifi cantly to environmental degradation in Lesotho and

has in the process also adversely impacted on environmental and human security. The

construction of the project is a human activity that has depleted renewable resources in

the country, both in terms of quantity and quality. Communities affected by the project

are no longer able to enjoy their human life, lifestyle and culture through the fulfi lment

of basic needs, like they used to prior to project construction. The problem is to a large

extent political, since the elite of Lesotho have politicised the advantages of the project,

rather than dealing with or even acknowledging the environmental problems associated

with it. Hence the adverse environmental impacts of the colossal water project are not

addressed at a high political level.

There is need for the political elite of Lesotho to securitise, and hence politicise, the

adverse environmental impacts of the project as well as the general environmental

problems in the country. Political leaders must fi rst and foremost acknowledge that

environmental problems and their socio-economic and environmental impacts are a

matter of serious concern in the country. Then they must ensure that they have the

political will not only to address these problems but to enhance the capacity of the state,

both with administrative and legal tools, to tackle these problems. The enactment and

implementation of legislation that involves civil, political and state society as stakeholders

in the process will enhance the role of the state in the formulation and implementation

of sound environmental management policies. Through partnership programmes with

relevant stakeholders, the state will be able to mobilise adequate fi nancial and human

resources required for the implementation of such policies. Through civic education the

state as well as political leaders can sensitise citizens to key environmental issues. By

doing so, leaders will also be politicising environmental matters and hence make them

concerns at the highest level.

In Lesotho the conservation of the environment should indeed be a matter of high politics

or national interest, since environmental degradation is likely to deplete or adversely

affect its most abundant resource, namely water. If not properly managed with regard to

environmental matters, the LHWP may breed the seeds of its own destruction. Hence

there is need for the elite in the country to ensure that environmental politics receive the

same priority as the politics of interstate cooperation, peace and security. This will go

70 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies

Personnel fatalities in United Nations missions, by year, up to 30 June 2008

Henri Boshoff

Senegal’s democracy:Has Wade lost his edge?

David Zounmenou

Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA–LHDA) 2002. Sustainable development: Lesotho Highlands

Water Project. Maseru: Lesotho Highlands Development Agency.

Thabane, M 2000. Shifts from old to new social and ecological environments in Lesotho Highlands Water

Scheme; relocating residents of the Mohale Dam area. Journal of Southern African Studies, 26(4):633–654.

TRC (Transformation Resource Centre) 2003. Resettled communities speak out. Work for Justice, 65, June.

TRC 2004. The irony of the ‘white gold’. Moreja: TRC.

Tricarico, A 2002. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project: massive dams for massive disasters. Available at

http://www.bankwatch.org/publications/issue_papers/2002/eib-ip-lesotho.pdf [accessed 22 July 2007].

Willemse, N 2007. Actual versus predicted transboundary impact: a case study of Phase IB of the Lesotho

Highlands Water Project. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 23(3):457–472.

AFRICA WATCH

African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Features 73

YearDPKO Non-DPKO Peacekeeping Total

Year only Cumulative Year only Cumulative Year only Cumulative Year only Cumulative

1948 8 8 0 0 0 0 8 8

1949 1 9 0 0 2 2 3 11

1950 5 14 0 0 0 2 5 16

1952 1 15 0 0 0 2 1 17

1953 1 16 0 0 0 2 1 18

1956 2 18 0 0 0 2 2 20

1957 16 34 0 0 0 2 16 36

1958 17 51 0 0 0 2 17 53

1959 10 61 0 0 0 2 10 63

1960 44 105 0 0 0 2 44 107

1961 151 256 0 0 4 6 155 262

1962 45 301 0 0 0 6 45 307

1963 34 335 0 0 0 6 34 341

1964 22 357 0 0 0 6 22 363

1965 17 374 0 0 0 6 17 380

1966 21 395 0 0 0 6 21 401

1967 21 416 0 0 0 6 21 422

1968 7 423 0 0 0 6 7 429

1969 6 429 0 0 0 6 6 435

1970 8 437 0 0 0 6 8 443

1971 9 446 0 0 0 6 9 452

1972 6 452 0 0 0 6 6 458

1973 14 466 0 0 0 6 14 472

1974 41 507 0 0 0 6 41 513

1975 17 524 0 0 0 6 17 530

1976 14 538 0 0 0 6 14 544

1977 17 555 0 0 0 6 17 561

1978 28 583 0 0 0 6 28 589

1979 31 614 0 0 0 6 31 620

1980 20 634 0 0 0 6 20 640

Personnel fatalities in United Nations missions, by year, up to 30 June 2008Henri Boshoff*

.The following table, as drawn up by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping

Operations (DPKO), classifi es fatalities in the following categories:

DPKO: Peacekeeping missions under the command of the DPKO. ■

Non-DPKO: Special political and/or peacebuilding fi eld missions and other UN peace ■

offi ces under command of the Department of Field Support and the Department of

Political Affairs.

Peacekeeping: Fatalities of the UN Secretariat, as well as the Special Committee on ■

the Balkans, which cannot be classifi ed under DPKO or non-DPKO.

Fatalities refer to all personnel losses as a result of accidents, malicious acts, illness or

other, unspecifi ed, reasons.

Seven of the current 16 active peacekeeping missions are based in Africa.

* Henri Boshoff is a military analyst in the African Security Analysis Programme at the Institute for Security Studies.

74 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Africa Watch

Senegal’s democracy:Has Wade lost his edge?David Zounmenou*

African wisdom holds that one needs to live longer to see something and its opposite.

Considered in the political context of the African continent in search of coherent and

committed leadership and political order, it refl ects the complex nature of our leaders

who waste no time in showing their true colours once they fi nd themselves in a position

of power. African political history is unfortunately replete with fast-learning dictators

who raised the hopes of their citizens but in the end left them with a painful political

legacy, if not violent armed confl ict.

The decision by opposition parties and civil society organisations in Senegal to convene

a national dialogue in what they termed an attempt to rescue the ‘sinking democratic

boat of Senegal’ under the leadership of the current president, Abdoulaye Wade, is based

* David Zounmenou is a senior researcher in the African Security Analysis Programme at the Institute for Security Studies.

YearDPKO Non-DPKO Peacekeeping Total

Year only Cumulative Year only Cumulative Year only Cumulative Year only Cumulative

1981 31 665 0 0 0 6 31 671

1982 26 691 0 0 0 6 26 697

1983 12 703 0 0 0 6 12 709

1984 14 717 0 0 0 6 14 723

1985 16 733 0 0 0 6 16 739

1986 27 760 0 0 0 6 27 766

1987 17 777 0 0 0 6 17 783

1988 11 788 0 0 0 6 11 794

1989 33 821 0 0 0 6 33 827

1990 24 845 0 0 0 6 24 851

1991 15 860 0 0 0 6 15 866

1992 58 918 1 1 0 6 59 925

1993 251 1 169 1 2 0 6 252 1 177

1994 166 1 335 2 4 0 6 168 1 345

1995 123 1 458 2 6 1 7 126 1 471

1996 52 1 510 3 9 0 7 55 1 526

1997 47 1 557 1 10 1 8 49 1 575

1998 32 1 589 5 15 0 8 37 1 612

1999 30 1 619 9 24 0 8 39 1 651

2000 59 1 678 1 25 0 8 60 1 711

2001 72 1 750 0 25 0 8 72 1 783

2002 85 1 835 2 27 1 9 88 1 871

2003 84 1 919 24 51 0 9 108 1 979

2004 116 2 035 1 52 0 9 117 2 096

2005 129 2 164 2 54 0 9 131 2 227

2006 106 2 270 2 56 0 9 108 2 335

2007 87 2 357 3 59 0 9 90 2 425

2008 46 2 403 11 70 0 9 57 2 482

Total 2 403 2 403 70 70 9 9 2 482 2 482

Prepared by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Situation Centre

Last updated Monday, 7 July 2008

76 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Africa Watch 77

that many considered to be based purely on political manoeuvring, Seck was sacked and

accused of corruption for having decided to stand as opposition candidate against Wade.

President Wade won 56 per cent of the vote in the fi rst round of the highly contested

presidential elections in February 2007 and therefore did not see the need to make

signifi cant efforts to uphold Senegal’s constitutional norms and improve his relations

with political opponents. While on the face of it democratic and peaceful changeover

have become an integral part of the Senegalese political system since the 2000 elections,

the political situation deteriorated considerably particularly in the months preceding

the 2007 elections. Tension increased after weeks of violence, as did threats against and

arrests of various political opponents.

The repeated postponement by the ruling party of the elections (originally planned for

April 2006), ostensibly in order to combine them with the presidential elections, elicited

widespread protest and cast doubt on Wade’s commitment to a transparent electoral

process. Opposition parties argued that the real motive behind the many postponements

and constitutional changes was to allow President Wade and his PDS to leave behind a

period marred by internal dissensions within the PDS and the negative impact of the

government’s poor socio-economic performance, mainly after the energy crisis. It was

also argued that the purpose of the decision was to create conditions favourable to Wade

and his Sopi coalition, and so infl uence the outcome of the elections.

By the time the elections, which were boycotted on an overwhelming scale, were

fi nally held in February 2007, President Wade and PDS had re-established their

political hegemony and consolidated their control over state institutions. The Wade-led

coalition won 131 out of 150 seats in the parliament, making it extremely diffi cult for

the opposition parties to have any signifi cant impact on national decisions. The winner-

takes-all approach to national politics could undermine national cohesion in what

amounts to virtually a one-party system. While the voter turnout for the presidential

elections was 70,5 per cent, it hit a historic low of 35 per cent for the parliamentary

elections, raising concerns over the legitimacy of the electoral process. Local elections,

which were to take place in May 2008 and in which the opposition was expected to

perform well, have been postponed to March 2009. Although accepting Wade as the de

facto president, the main opposition parties continue to reject his February 2007 victory

and the legitimacy of his regime.

The increasing deterioration in the living conditions of the citizens also tends to cloud

Wade’s political legacy. The current polarisation of the political environment is worsened

by frequent protests through which citizens voice their concerns over the deterioration

in the political climate, the abusive amendments to the constitution, the food crisis and

the quasi-permanent teachers’ strike, as well as over the socio-political impasse that has

characterised Wade’s second term in offi ce. The recent dialogue initiated by opposition

on the discovery that decades in opposition and boasting about good governance do not

necessarily transform a political leader into a democrat. Held up as one of the most stable

political systems in West Africa (based on the absence of major socio-political crises

in the decades since independence), Senegal has recently become a theatre of political

confrontation between Wade and his political opponents. What is at stake is not only

the consolidation of the Senegalese democratic experiment and a robust government

response to some of the socio-economic problems facing the population, but also

controversies around Wade’s succession.

Senegal began to improve its political system in the 1970s, well before the democratic

wave of the 1990s in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, when political party

registration, though limited, began to increase. Since gaining its independence from

France in 1960, Senegal was a model for political stability in West Africa. For almost

two decades Léopold Senghor, Senegal’s fi rst president, governed a relatively democratic

system before stepping down voluntarily in 1981. In the 1990s the party system grew

rapidly, contributing to the democratic debate in Senegal in spite of the hegemonic status

of Senghor’s Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, PS). However, fragmentation as a result of

personal rivalries over the control of increasingly scarce resources exacerbated tensions

within the party and caused it to lose the 2000 presidential elections.

When the leader of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and long-time opposition

candidate, Abdoulaye Wade, won a clear majority in the second round of presidential

elections that were held in March 2000, Senegal’s democracy gained respect and the

country was held to be one of the most stable democratic states in Africa. It is still one

of the few African countries which has never experienced a military coup and which

enjoys frequent and regular peaceful transfer of power from one regime to another.

Wade’s victory was made possible by the support of the reformist faction of the Socialist

Party, led by Moustapha Niasse, a former foreign minister under President Abdou

Diouf. As compensation for his support Niasse became the prime minister in Wade’s

fi rst government of the Coalition for Change (Sopi). In February 2001 the coalition

government offi cially amended the constitution and called for early parliamentary

elections. In these Wade and the coalition forces won a majority in the parliament, a

necessary condition for change in terms of consolidating the democratic institutions and

improving the socio-economic conditions of the citizens.

However, as might have been expected, personal rivalry between President Wade and

his prime minister, Niasse, added to tactical considerations, led to a split in the coalition.

The current political stalemate began when Wade dismissed Niasse as prime minister,

fi rst appointing Mame Madior Boye and later Idrissa Seck, whom he saw as politically

harmless, in Niasse’s place. Though Wade promised to serve only one term, his resistance

to clearing the way for his succession became contentious. Apparently President Wade

also saw the increasing popularity of Seck as a threat to his political survival. In a move

78 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Africa Watch 79

Criminal Court or Senegalese court of the former Chadian dictator Hissen Habre in

exile in Senegal, despite the recommendation of the African Union for prosecution.

In Senegal itself, the Casamance confl ict remains a security concern. Despite the 2004

agreement signed between the government and a separatist rebel movement called the

Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces démocratiques de

Casamance, MFDC to end the long-running confl ict, peace has not yet been consolidated

in the region and proposed negotiations have been postponed many times. Sporadic and

localised armed fi ghting and banditry continue to obstruct a sustainable settlement of

the confl ict, which is already compromised by divergent approaches between the political

and military factions of the rebel movement.

Although Senegal recorded robust economic performance during the 2003 to 2005

period with the growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) averaging 6 per cent per

year and infl ation at only 1,7 per cent in 2005, the situation has deteriorated since that

time. Since 2006, GDP growth plunged to less than 3,5 per cent as a result of disruptions

in energy supplies in the form of hydrocarbon products and electricity. There are

now concerns that despite its sustained pace, the economic growth is not suffi cient to

enable the country to reach the millennium development goal of halving the poverty

rate by 2015. The government has injected US$24 million into rural areas to alleviate

the impact of the food riots, but the situation in Dakar remains highly volatile with

persistent calls from civil society and consumer organisation coalitions for protests. This

in turn strengthens the opposition’s hand by increasing pressure on President Wade and

his regime.

In essence, the presidential race and parliamentary elections in 2007 posed considerable

challenges to President Wade. Since those elections, the Senegalese political landscape

is highly fragmented, and in addition Wade faces serious concerns over his age and

health. The question is whether Wade will adjust his political trajectory so as to leave

an acceptable political legacy. How Wade manages the current national crisis will have

a lasting impact on the Senegalese democratic system and his own political legacy. The

euphoria that followed the electoral victory of opposition leaders, perceived as a triumph

of democracy, will have to be revisited.

In the prevailing circumstances in Senegal, there is a need for dialogue on and

understanding of the future of Senegal’s socio-economic and political dispensation.

Although an electoral victory will provide the winner with the means to manipulate

state institutions, it also holds out the likelihood of increased confl ict and instability.

Consolidating democracy is a long-term process built on a commitment by various

political forces to reach a national consensus that reinforces dialogue, respect for national

institutions, transparency, and above all, on the willingness to put national interest

before their own.

parties in an attempt to frame a concerted response to the multidimensional crisis in

Senegal is perceived as an attempted ‘coup d’état’ or treason by Wade and his PDS. Some

of the houses of opposition leaders have even been vandalised by forces allegedly working

for the ruling PDS. However, debate is one way of helping democratic experiments to

mature and Senegal should remain committed to that.

Regardless of the conditions that surrounded President Wade’s election, the core issue in

the current Senegalese political landscape is related to the succession of the 80-year-old

President Wade. The debate on whether his son, Karim, should succeed him continues

to worsen political tensions between those opposed to a ‘dynastic succession’ within

the ruling party itself and also between the PDS and the opposition coalition. While

the next elections are only planned for 2012, initiatives being taken by Wade (such

as the appointment of his son to head the National Preparatory Committee for the

organisation of the Islamic Conference held in Dakar), are interpreted as preparation

of his son as his successor. In the view of many Senegalese, the position held by Karim

Wade and attempts by the President to protect him from parliamentary investigations

for mismanagement of the conference budget, serves to promote him as a candidate

during the next elections. The intrigues around Karim Wade could cost Macky Sall,

the current president of the national assembly both in the party and in parliament, his

position, because he seems to be planning to challenge Karim Wade’s supporters in

connection with the succession issue within the PDS. Because of this, the government

coalition is highly fragmented.

Although Senegal is striving to keep its democratic momentum, rivalries and frictions

within the different political parties – both in the opposition party and the one in power

– still feature strongly in the Senegalese political arena. While these rivalries refl ect the

nature and character of the political parties across Africa, it is interesting to note that they

are driven by personal rather than ideological ambitions in Senegal. President Wade has

been exploiting the inter-party confusion since coming to power, effectively succeeding

in keeping the opposition divided and weak.

On the diplomatic front there is no doubt that Wade has taken a number of initiatives to

raise Senegal’s diplomatic profi le in West Africa and in Africa as a whole. However, while

a number of political actors consider some initiatives to be praiseworthy, the reception of

others has been mixed. Neither his stance on the progress of Nepad nor his involvement

in peace processes in the Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe and Sudan/Chad has resulted in any

signifi cant breakthrough. The agreement signed by Chad and Sudan in Dakar remains

ineffectual and tensions persist between the two countries. President Wade’s recent calls

that the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) – led by a Senegalese

citizen, Jacques Diouf – should be scrapped add to the controversies surrounding Wade’s

regime. Wade was also the only African leader to recognise the independence of Kosovo

and continues to show reluctance over the prosecution either by the International

Developing national security strategiesin the African context

Colonel (Rtd) James D Noteboom

Oil pipeline sabotage in Nigeria:Dimensions, actors and implications for national security

Freedom C Onuoha

ESSAYS

African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 83

After the end of the colonial era, African nations began dealing with security issues

independently of European politics in which the nation’s interests were subservient to

those of the colonial powers. However, for most African nations this new independent

focus was distorted by Cold War politics, during which the global protagonists wooed

client states. Again, the national interests were often subordinated to external Cold War

interests.

Now that the Cold War has ended, African nations are freer than ever to pursue their

national interests without direct interference. But indirect forces can just as severely

impact on the protection of those interests. Those forces at present include globalisation,

the US ‘war on terror’, disease and climate change.

The challenge for African nations is now to articulate coherent national security strategies

in the face of signifi cant and evolving external forces. There is much that African nations

can learn from the efforts of Western nations to develop such strategies. But at the same

time consideration must be given to the unique circumstances on the African continent.

Increasingly, attention is being focused on the need for coherent strategies in Africa

(Koetje 1999; Hough 2006).

The purpose of this paper is to advance the discussion of this issue by describing generally

American approaches to the development of national security strategies in the context of

unique African circumstances.

General considerations

Several considerations must be kept in mind when discussing national security strategy.

First, it is necessary to understand that the development of national security strategy

and its terminology, methodology and purpose are rapidly evolving subjects upon which

there is no universal agreement. The methodology is best understood as an analytical

framework that can be used to advance a nation’s security interests, and not as an

immutable truth.

Second, national security strategy is not military strategy. Military strategy deals with

only one element of a national security strategy, namely the use of military power to

achieve strategic objectives. Other strategies, including economic and diplomatic

strategies, are at least as important and often more important in achieving strategic

objectives than military strategy.1

Third, traditional national security strategy has focused on external threats to national

security. This approach does not serve the African continent where frequently the greatest

threat to national security comes from within. Even with Western nations, including the

Developing national security strategies in the African contextColonel (Rtd) James D Noteboom*

Perception is strong and sight weak. In strategy it is important to see distant

things as if they were close and to take a distanced view of close things.

– Miyamoto Musashi

Introduction

African nations face an increasing need to develop national security strategies to deal

with the wide array of challenges resulting from rapidly changing strategic environments.

* Colonel James D Noteboom (Rtd) served 38 years in the US Marine Corps and US Army as an artillery, infantry and JAG offi cer until retiring in 2002. He has served as an adjunct instructor for the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies since 1996. He is a partner in the Karnopp Petersen LLP law fi rm, specialising in federal Indian, energy, environmental, water, and natural resources law.

84 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 85

state and the tensions that had historically existed between these groups continued to

exist. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia may be the most prominent examples of recent

collapses, but the African continent is rife with intertribal confl ict that challenges states.

Third, so-called non-state actors increasingly operate outside the control of any single

state and threaten the ordered existence of some states. The most notable threats come

from international drug cartels and terrorists. But there are other more benign actors

that nevertheless impact on world order in new ways. For example, the rise of the

multinational corporation, the Internet, world fi nancial markets, the evolving role of the

United Nations and other international bodies, and the myriad impacts of globalisation

all pose challenges to the notion of discrete sovereign entities operating and controlling

activity within their own borders.

Finally, the ‘clash of civilisations’ described by Samuel P Huntington in his 1993 article

in Foreign Affairs may pose the most serious threat to nation state organisational principles.

Huntington’s hypothesis is that the principal confl icts in the future will not be based

on ideological or economic grounds, but between nations and groups of civilisations.

He identifi es the primary civilisations at issue as Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic,

Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilisation (Huntington

1993). The article has stirred much debate and his hypothesis is currently being tested

in the laboratory of southwest and central Asia in states such as Afghanistan, Chechnya,

Pakistan, Iraq and Iran.

Why is this discussion of changing threats to the nation state important in the analysis

of national interests? There are several reasons for this. First, Western national security

strategy traditionally focused on confl ict and interrelationships between nations, that is,

‘balance of power’ strategies. The fi rst and second world wars, the Korean War and the

Cold War dominated the 20th century and were confl icts between nation states. The

current environment is more complex.

Second, historically ‘national interest’ was a term of art associated with interests in the

international arena. National interests were contrasted with ‘public interests’ which

focused on the internal interests of the nation. This tendency to analyse national interest

in the context of a strategic environment dominated by threats primarily from other

nation states does not satisfactorily acknowledge the current strategic environment in

Africa and elsewhere.

In particular, this approach is increasingly problematic in the context of modern confl ict

which is dominated by civil wars, insurgencies and confl icts involving non-state actors.

Just in terms of numbers, most current confl icts are civil wars, and this is particularly

true in Africa (Nobel Foundation 2001). Adding an additional degree of complexity

to these internal confl icts are civil wars which frequently attract international

US, this approach is becoming increasingly problematic as a result of the development

of threats from non-state actors such as drug cartels and terrorist organisations which

frequently operate both within and outside the nation. Furthermore, this approach

can result in the failure to properly assess the importance of economic power in the

achievement of national security objectives. Accordingly this paper will proceed on the

assumption that an effective national security strategy for many African nations should

deal with both internal and external threats to national interests.

Finally, it is important to recognise that the approaches to national security development

discussed in this paper are primarily American approaches, although they are often

based on the work of European or Asian theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu,

Martin van Creveld and Basil Liddell Hart. They were also developed and applied in

the context of a Western liberal democracy with well developed institutions, widespread

acceptance of the legitimacy of the government, and a strong unifi ed national identity.

Because these conditions do not exist in all African nations, it should be recognised that,

in the application of the approaches discussed in this paper, they must be adapted to the

unique circumstances of each nation.

National interests

National security strategy fl ows from national security policy. That policy is developed

to advance and protect national interests. So the fi rst step is to identify national interests,

and therein lies the fi rst level of complexity in our analysis.

A discussion of national interests is based on the assumption that the primary organising

principle underlying global affairs is the concept of the ‘nation state’; in other words, the

world is largely organised as a group of geographically defi ned political units, possessed

of government and sovereignty, with fi xed borders and a national identity. It was not

always the case. For millennia Africa’s organising principle was based on a variety of

complex social and political structures that bear little resemblance to the modern nation

state (Berman 1998). European and Asian empires were states operating under the notion

that borders need not be fi xed, but could be continually expanded to bring within the

empire’s ambit new peoples and territory.

Since the end of the Cold War the nation state concept as an organising principle has been

challenged on a variety of fronts. First, there are a number of instances where the state

imploded and although borders were maintained, there was no effective government.

Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Somalia are some of the most recent examples.

Second, nation states at their creation often contained the seeds of their own destruction.

Disparate tribal, religious, political or cultural units were often incorporated into a single

86 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 87

our Nation against its enemies is the fi rst and fundamental commitment of the Federal

Government’ (National Security Strategy 2002). A second universal interest is economic

well-being. Beyond that, the interests of nations may vary greatly. In the case of the US,

Donald Neuchterlein (1985:8) postulates that in addition to the two foregoing interests,

the US has two other enduring interests – a favourable world order and the promotion

of American values.

A cursory review of the chapter headings of the current US national security strategy

reveals how each strategic aim supports one or more of the four overriding interests:

Overview of America’s international strategy ■

Champion aspirations for human dignity ■

Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against the ■

US and its friends

Work with others to defuse regional confl icts ■

Prevent US enemies from threatening the US, its allies, and its friends with weapons ■

of mass destruction

Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade ■

Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure ■

of democracy

Develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main centres of global power ■

Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and ■

opportunities of the 21st century (US Offi ce of the Press Secretary 2006)

The four broadly stated interests are perhaps best described as categories in which more

specifi c interests might be grouped. For example, economic well-being might well

include such specifi c interests as free and open access to ports and other transportation

facilities, a region free of internal confl ict, food and energy self-suffi ciency and

sustainable resource development.

Next, no nation, no matter how wealthy, has the resources to fully protect and advance all

national interests. In recognition of this fact national interests are commonly categorised

in order of importance to facilitate allocation of resources and effort. Hans Morgenthau

(1962:191) postulated vital and secondary interests – the fi rst being those interests for

participation, as has occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan

and Mozambique.

Accordingly, for purposes of this paper ‘national interests’ are defi ned as ‘a nation’s

perceived needs and aspirations as they relate to both international and domestic matters’.

This approach takes into account that what happens domestically inevitably impacts

on the international situation and vice versa. Costly foreign wars can undermine the

economic foundation that underlies the domestic society, thereby affecting both internal

and external interests.

How are national interests divined? Generally, they are based on the fundamental

values of the nation – those values that are typically enshrined in the core documents

establishing the nation. They frequently refl ect the unique history and culture of the

nation and give a sense of national purpose. A common theme among many African

constitutions is the recognition that a history of racial, ethnic, religious and other

internal strife has fostered national unity as a key national value.2 Also, many African

constitutions contain an expressed value in developing national unity while at the same

time accommodating diversity within the culture.3

It is important to also recognise that national values can confl ict with each other. For

example, the South African constitution recognises the value of cultural and religious

practices but establishes the principle that they may not be exercised in contravention of

the Bill of Rights.4

National values often refl ect deeply held societal values. For example, Western nations

consider individual freedom to be especially important while African nations frequently

place communal welfare ahead of individual prerogatives. Islamic societies tend to place

greater emphasis on the role of religion in all aspects of everyday life than do Western

societies. Sometimes these societal values come into confl ict with national values and

threaten the nation, as is evident in some secular Islamic countries where clashes are

occurring between religious and political leadership.

With a clear understanding of national values in mind it is then possible to begin

articulating national interests that are consistent with, or fl ow out of, those values. For

example, from the foregoing discussions of national values the conclusion might be

drawn that ‘national unity’ is a national interest of some African states, whereas it is a

given for most long-established Western democracies. But that appears to be changing

as immigration issues come to the fore and concerns are voiced regarding the impact of

large groups of non-natives on the security, economy and culture of the host country.

Certainly, one national interest shared by virtually every nation is that of defence of

the homeland. The current US security strategy states unequivocally that ‘defending

88 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 89

Complexity results from the myriad factors that can have a bearing on the eventual

outcome and the diffi culty of identifying those factors that will eventually be defi nitive.

It also results from the diffi culty of identifying second, third and fourth order effects of

strategic actions.

Ambiguity exists when the meaning of events can be interpreted in more than one way.

For example, Saddam Hussein’s refusal to permit UN inspection was interpreted by

some as an indication that he was hiding weapons of mass destruction and by others

that he was hiding his lack of weapons of mass destruction, so as not to embolden Iran

(Kessler 2007:155).

The appraisal process identifi es those forces and trends in the strategic environment

that present either threats to, or opportunities for, national interests. Elements of the

strategic environment should be described in a manner that analyses and explains their

impact on national interests. So, for example, let us assume that a national security

interest is a ‘secure and sustainable food supply’. One trend that might threaten that

security interest is desertifi cation,5 which may threaten the interest in a variety of

ways. Obviously the loss of arable land is one way. It may also increase migration of

farmers and pastoralists to urban areas, which will mean that fewer food producers

have to produce food for more consumers. Desertifi cation also often results in greater

erosion, causing siltation of rivers and streams and making areas more prone to fl oods.

Internal migration of peoples displaced by desertifi cation increases the likelihood

that confl ict will develop among groups competing for an ever shrinking land base.

A similar analysis of other factors that might affect this interest, including ballooning

populations, disease, climate change, land tenure practices and capital shortages, must

likewise be undertaken.

Such analyses help political leaders to assess the level of threat that a particular trend

or force may pose to a national interest and provide a rational basis for allocating scarce

funds to address myriad threats or opportunities.

National security policy

It is the duty of political leaders to establish policies that will protect and secure national

interests. Although there are many defi nitions of the term, for purposes of this article

‘policy’ is defi ned as ‘a deliberate plan of action to guide decisions and achieve rational

outcome(s) ... Policy differs from rules or law. While law can compel or prohibit behaviors

(eg a law requiring the payment of taxes on income) policy merely guides actions toward

those that are most likely to achieve a desired outcome’ (Wikipedia 2008). Policies are

courses of action that are designed to protect and advance national interests. They are

generally broadly stated courses of action that can inform the development of national

which it is worth going to war and the second those interests in which compromise is a

possibility. Donald Nuechterlein (1979:76) describes four levels:

... (1) survival interests, where the very existence of the nation is in peril;

(2) vital interests, where probably serious harm to the security and well-

being of the nation will result if strong measures, including military ones,

are not taken by the government within a short period of time; (3) major

interests, where potential serious harm could come to the nation if no

action is taken to counter an unfavorable trend abroad; and (4) peripheral

(minor) interests, where little if any harm to the entire nation will result if a

‘wait and see’ policy is adopted.

In sum, it is important to understand that not every threat to a nation’s interests deserves

a military response, that allocation of resources should be prioritised to match the

importance of the interest, and that the urgency of the response varies with the interest

involved.

Strategic appraisal

Once national interests have been identifi ed, described and prioritised, the next

step in the development of national security strategy is to conduct an appraisal of the

international and domestic environments. Developments in those environments can

either pose threats or present opportunities for the protection and advancement of

national interests. The strategic appraisal process is critical to the success or failure

of the ultimate strategy. Consider the erroneous conclusions drawn by the US and

others regarding a strategic environment which supposedly included Iraq’s possession

of weapons of mass destruction, and the ultimate consequences that fl owed from that

(Davidson 2004).

The strategic appraisal process is especially challenging because of the nature of the strategic

environment. That environment has been described as volatile, uncertain, complex and

ambiguous (Department of Command, Leadership and Management 2004:12).

Volatility refers to the rate of change in the situation at hand. Volatility has increased

as technology has speeded the pace at which information is conveyed. We no longer

have to wait weeks for delivery and response to messages – they now occur virtually

instantaneously for all participants.

Uncertainty fl ows from a variety of factors, including insuffi cient or faulty intelligence,

disinformation and deception, confl icting data, and the inability to predict the effect that

today’s changes will have on events of tomorrow.

90 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 91

Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense. We

fi ght, as we always fi ght, for a just peace – a peace that favors liberty. We

will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We

will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers.

And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on

every continent.

The wisdom of this vision has been widely debated, but whether one agrees with it or

not, there can be no question that it gives broad guidance for the development of one

aspect of US national security strategy. Further, consider how such statements guide

strategies used to advance the US interest in establishing a favourable world order. What

do they say about the importance of alliances? About unilateral intervention? About

preferences for military action? About support for democratic elections? How could the

strategic vision be altered to provide different general guidance regarding US efforts to

achieve a favourable world order?

In this regard also consider the strategic vision of President Abraham Lincoln in 1865,

expressed in his inaugural address near the end of the American Civil War that had

deeply divided the country:

With malice toward none, with charity for all, with fi rmness in the right as

God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to fi nish the work we are in,

to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the

battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and

cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.

The fact that nations use their power to protect and advance their interests begs the

question from what sources a nation derives its power? In this context, national power

consists of both physical/natural determinants and social determinants. For example,

with regard to physical determinants, Egypt has power by virtue of the fact that the

Suez Canal runs through it. Persian Gulf states have power because they control large

oil reserves. Countries with large populations relative to other countries in the vicinity,

like Nigeria, have resultant national power. Countries with good maritime ports have

power. However, none of these physical/natural determinants are necessarily conclusive,

for they must be considered in conjunction with the social determinants of power.

The military forces of a nation are one such social determinant. The amount of military

power possessed by a nation is related to many factors, other than simply size and

equipment. Levels of training, operational experience, ésprit de corps, ability to operate

as a coalition member, willingness of military forces to subordinate themselves to civil

authorities, and degree of support by the civilian populace all affect the ultimate level of

military power.

strategies. Policy can be found in the speeches of political leaders, agency websites and

other political pronouncements.

Certainly an important part of the strategic assessment for African nations is to analyse the

stated policies of other nations directed towards Africa. The current US administration

has articulated a series of policies that some African nations may identify as either threats

to or opportunities for advancing their national interests. For example, the policy aimed

at fi ghting infectious disease in other countries provides opportunity to African nations.6

Similarly, the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act is an indication of a US policy

towards Africa that could also provide opportunities for growing African nations.7

In contrast, the establishment of the US African Command (AFRICOM) has raised

substantial concerns among many African nations about its possible impact on their

own security situations (see, for example, Defense News 2007 and US Policy World 2007).

Although it may be well intended from a US Department of Defense point of view, a

variety of questions have been raised by African leaders and others about its wisdom.

The national interests of African nations may very well be at odds with those of nations

from outside the continent seeking to interact with them. Understanding which external

policies are consistent or inconsistent with the interests of one’s own country is an

important part of the strategic assessment.

The distinction between national security policy and national security strategy is not

always clear. As the specifi city of national security policies increase, they tend to resemble

national security strategies. In some respects the difference between the two is not so

much one of kind but one of degree.

National security strategy

National security strategy may be defi ned as ‘the art and science of using all the elements

of national power during peace and war to secure national interests’ (Yarger & Barber

1987). It describes the ways in which national power are used to obtain identifi ed

objectives. The development of national security strategy is guided and infl uenced by

a ‘strategic vision’, which is derived from, supports and infl uences national security

strategy. It is the articulation of an overarching end state by national leadership that will

encapsulate all that the national security strategy is intended to achieve. It is not developed

by the leadership in a vacuum. Rather, it is the result of an ongoing dialogue between

senior leaders and at all levels of government. It takes into consideration national values

and the will of the people, and is shaped by an assessment of the strategic environment.

Consider this strategic vision expressed by President George W Bush during a speech at

the West Point Military Academy on 1 June 2002:

92 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 93

in Vietnam was without question the major reason for eventual US troop withdrawals

(Krylov 2007; Morgenthau & Thompson 1985). The socio/psychological power of the

American people may yet determine the ultimate outcome of the Iraq war. Perhaps no

better examples of the importance of socio/psychological power are the struggles for

independence on the African continent.

There are many facets to this power, being composed as it is of the broad characteristics

of the population that enable a nation to achieve its objectives. High levels of education,

belief in the legitimacy of the political system, honesty and lack of corruption, healthiness,

ability to persevere, national unity, industriousness, and adaptability to change are but a

few of the characteristics that strengthen a nation’s socio/psychological power.

Power also has an information/communication element and its importance is increasing

rapidly.8 The Internet, satellite television, 24-hour news organisations, and ubiquitous cell

phones have all been a powerful force for globalisation. This power of communication

has been one of the major tools for the protagonists in the war on terror and powerful

images of bombings, beheadings, torture and assassination are used by all sides to

advance their cause. This power can be used to reach into formerly closed societies to

alter perceptions and infl uence government action.

The powers of a nation cannot be analysed in a vacuum. They are interrelated (for example

political power infl uences the ability to exercise military power); they are dynamic (for

example internal unrest can reduce political power); and they are contextual (for instance

a regional military power may be an insignifi cant force in the international terrain).

With the foregoing in mind it becomes possible to articulate with some specifi city why

particular African nations have much power and others have little. More importantly, it

makes clear that power is not static and when preparing national security strategies, states

should consider how their actions and external forces may change national powers.

The use of power is the means by which nations seek to protect and advance their

national interests. Therefore the next step in the strategic planning process is to identify

strategic objectives that will protect and advance important national interests. Once those

objectives have been identifi ed and a strategic appraisal has been conducted, courses of

action using elements of national power to achieve them can be developed and analysed.

Consider as an example the issue of port access in Africa. As a general rule landlocked

countries are at an economic disadvantage because they lack direct access to means of

maritime trade. Fifteen African nations are in this situation and only Europe has more,

namely 16. However, Europe has an extensive river, canal, highway and rail system that

has greatly mitigated the problem on that continent. The region most similar to Africa

is central Asia where the landlocked countries of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

A military force without the underlying economic power and will of the people to

sustain it during a protracted engagement may ultimately be of little value. Furthermore,

maximising military power may render the achievement of objectives related to the

economic interests of a nation impossible. It is important to recognise that a nation’s

powers are not static. For example, once military forces are committed to a confl ict,

the military power of a nation may decrease because of limited abilities to use already

committed forces in additional confl icts. Clearly the commitment of US forces in Iraq

and Afghanistan has restricted the military options available to deal with issues involving

Iran and North Korea.

It is also important to recognise that until military power is actually used, as a practical

matter a nation possesses the amount of military power that other nations perceive it to

have. Once the military power is used the perceptions of other nations will be adjusted

to account for actual performance. Questions one could ask in this regard include, for

example, what was the perception of US military power before the Iraq war? Did it

change with the fall of Baghdad? Has it changed since then?

Diplomatic power, another social determinant, is the ability of national leadership to

infl uence actions of other nations. A nation’s diplomatic power is based not only on

the quality and effectiveness of its diplomats, but on the underlying characteristics of

the nation that give it credibility and infl uence in the diplomatic sphere. Nations with

widely perceived legitimate governments, signifi cant economic and military power, and

a record of responsible international dealings have greater diplomatic power.

Political power, a third social determinant, is the ability of the nation’s leadership to

infl uence its own people and effectively use the elements of national power to achieve its

objectives. Certainly the form of government will affect this ability, with different types

having their own strengths and weaknesses. Democracies can be effective mechanisms

for developing strategies that have broad national support and that ensure that the

relative importance of competing interests are considered in decision making, but the

process to do so can be much more diffi cult to manage, simply because the development

of the strategy involves many voices. Authoritarian governments have the advantage of

effi ciency in developing a strategy, but often at the expense of the full consideration

of all issues that take place in a broad debate. Political power is also directly related to

the degree of legitimacy that the government has in the eyes of its citizens, and will in

addition be determined by the strength, honesty and capabilities of the organs comprising

the government.

Certainly for many Western democracies the socio/psychological power of its people

may be the most important social determinant in the ultimate pursuit by the nation of its

national interests. The will and character of the Russian people in World War II helped

them through a dire situation. Conversely, the loss of public support for the US war

94 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 95

the Soviet Union simply could not match. Many may disagree with this analysis, but

the point is that it can be very diffi cult to predict the ultimate effects of a major policy

action.

In the contemporary context, what might be the second, third and fourth order effects

of a US loss in Iraq? Or of a US victory? How the events may eventually play out is

extraordinarily diffi cult to predict, but certainly they must be considered.

Setting the stage for development of African national security strategies

The methodology for the development of national security strategies is relatively straight

forward, but the complexity of its execution could be rather daunting. However, a well

thought out strategy offers so many advantages that it is worth the effort. The following

are some points to consider.

In 1986 the US congress passed legislation requiring the administration to periodically

submit to Congress a report setting out the strategic objectives for the country. As a

result, each president since that time has issued one or more security strategy reports.

The report is a public document, available to all, for several reasons. First, the nation as

a whole needs to understand the agreed-upon approach to national security. Second, it

helps reduce the chance that other nations will misread US intent with regard to security

strategy. Third, it provides guidance to all arms of government, which helps to ensure

that their plans are consistent with the unifi ed national approach to security. Although

there may be individual components of the security strategy that are classifi ed, the major

thrust is available to all.

Security strategy has traditionally been the domain of the military arm of government

in many countries. However, if the strategy sets forth how all elements of national

power will be used to attain the desired objectives, clearly many state organs need to be

involved in its crafting. Furthermore, no individual, no matter how powerful, will be

able to effectively mobilise all the elements of national power to achieve strategic ends.

The overall security strategy will then allow different ministries or agencies to develop a

pyramid structure to fi t their strategic plans to the national security strategy. The natural

tendency of most bureaucracies is to create ‘stovepipe’ type planning operations, in which

only those within their agency participate. However, effective national security strategy

planning requires breaking down these barriers so that interagency cooperation is

possible. Strategic planning, interagency cooperation and consensus building are learned

skills and those engaged in the planning process need to acquire these skills before they

can progress through what is at best a diffi cult process. Seminars, joint agency exercises

and instruction courses at universities are some of the tools available to develop these

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan face perhaps even greater challenges with

regard to port access. One of the national interests that might be categorised under the

broad national economic interests of landlocked nations might be ‘free and direct access

to maritime port facilities’. Interests are best expressed as a desired end state.

Once a nation articulates its strategic objectives, it proceeds to an appraisal of the

strategic environment. A host of factors would be examined, such as the state of existing

highway, river and rail infrastructure; international agreements in the region that have a

bearing on port access; identifi cation and analysis of physically feasible ports; the political

situation in each nation with potential port facilities; identifi cation of nearby nations in

a similar situation that might be interested in a common effort; and identifi cation of the

economic interests that will benefi t most from access.

Potential courses of action are next identifi ed, described and analysed. Each course

of action should be evaluated in terms of its suitability, for example whether or not it

would achieve the desired end; feasibility, or whether or not the resources are available

to accomplish it; acceptability, that is, whether or not the consequences or collateral

effects of carrying out the course of action are acceptable; and the risk of failure and its

consequences. After conducting such an evaluation one or more of the most appropriate

courses of action are selected.

Courses of action will utilise one or more elements of national power. For example, one

course of action might be to use a combination of diplomatic and economic power to

secure port access through a regional trade organisation. Courses of action through the

use of military power when subjected to this analysis are frequently eliminated because

of the risk of failure or unacceptable collateral consequences regardless of whether the

action succeeds.

It is also necessary to analyse potential second and third order effects of chosen courses

of action. That is, an original action will have an effect and this effect can in turn become

a cause resulting in another effect. That effect can become another effect, causing a third

order effect. That third order effect may not be consistent with the original objective

(Miller 2006:36). It is possible to argue, for instance, that a third order effect of the

US loss of the war in Vietnam was the collapse of the Soviet Union. The reasoning

would be that the US experience in Vietnam caused many military leaders to resolve

that they would ‘never again’ countenance such a war. A variety of military reforms were

undertaken to ensure that a repeat situation would not be possible – creation of an all-

volunteer military force, integration of active and reserve forces, joint operation doctrine

development, and a host of other reforms. On the political front, a demoralised US was

ripe for the entrance of a charismatic politician – Ronald Reagan – who campaigned

on a ‘morning in America’ theme emphasising a ‘prouder, stronger, better’ nation. He

succeeded in changing the mood of America, leading to a US military build-up that

96 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 97

2 See for example article 7 of the Angolan Constitution: ‘Economic, social and cultural solidarity between

all regions of the Republic of Angola shall be promoted and intensifi ed, with a view to the common

development of the Angolan nation as a whole’; chapter 6, section 5, of the Ghanaian Constitution: ‘The

State shall actively promote the integration of the peoples of Ghana and prohibit discrimination and

prejudice on the grounds of place of origin, circumstances of birth, ethnic origin, gender or religion,

creed or other beliefs’; and the preamble to the South African Constitution: ‘We, the people of South

Africa … Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.’

3 See for example article 6, section 1, of the Eritrean Constitution: ‘As the people and government struggle

to establish a united and developed Eritrea, they shall be guided by the principle of unity in diversity’;

and the preamble to the Senegalese Constitution: ‘The sovereign people of Senegal … proclaim … the

inviolable principle of national territorial integrity and national unity with due respect for the cultural

specifi city of all the components of the nation.’

4 ‘(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with

other members of that community –

(a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language; and

(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil

society.

(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the

Bill of Rights.’

5 Two thirds of Africa is desert or drylands subject to desertifi cation. Approximately three fourths of

African agricultural drylands are already degraded to some degree (UN 2003).

6 ‘The Bush Administration is committed to advancing the global fi ght against HIV/Aids, tuberculosis,

malaria and other major infectious diseases. The Administration’s goal is to halt and begin to reverse the

spread of HIV/Aids, the scourge of malaria and other major diseases that affl ict humanity’ (US Agency

for International Development 2003).

7 On 13 July 2004 President Bush stated ‘In just four years, the African Growth and Opportunity Act has

shown the power of free markets to improve the lives of people in both the United States and Africa. By

reducing barriers to trade, this law has increased export, created jobs, and expanded opportunity for Africans

and Americans alike. It has given American businesses greater confi dence to invest in Africa, and encouraged

African nations to reform their economies and governments to take advantage of the opportunities that

AGOA provides. So today I’m pleased to build on that success and extend the law’s benefi ts long into the

future by signing the AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004’ (US Offi ce of the Press Secretary 2004).

8 In the American military context the analysis and application of this power is referred to as information

operations and it has been formally embodied in doctrine (see for example US Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998).

Within the US intelligence community the term ‘information warfare’ refers to the use of information

and information technologies to infl uence the outcomes of confl icts (Jordan, Taylor & Mazarr 1999:168).

For a more general discussion see Lamb 2004.

References

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skills. Agencies often create formal cooperative relationships through memorandums of

understanding. Trained facilitators and dispute resolution experts may be used when

diffi cult issues arise between agencies. Consensus is especially important with regard to

strategic planning. Unless a broad consensus is achieved among both the general public

and the institutions that must implement it, the viability of the strategy over the long

term will be at risk.

Strategic planning needs to incorporate both a top-down and a bottom-up process.

Suffi cient planning guidance needs to be communicated from senior levels so that lower

level strategists and planners can know in general what is expected of them. They can

then begin to develop a variety of strategic options for consideration by senior executives.

This loop is iterative, with frequent communication between senior and lower levels.

The initial guidance from senior leaders is expressed as strategic vision.

Strategy is both proactive and reactive. Strategy is designed to proactively shape the

strategic environment through execution of selected courses of action. On the other

hand, it must also be fl exible enough to react to external events. Its development is a

dynamic process because threats and opportunities are constantly changing and strategy

must change and evolve in response.

Conclusions

The myriad issues facing African leaders can seem overwhelming, but there are organising

strategies that can help to create order out of chaos. These analytical frameworks are

a means of dealing with information overload. At the same time, leaders should bear

in mind they are just frameworks and cannot be used to create ‘cookbook’ solutions.

Rather, properly used, they allow for an ordered dialogue about the great issues facing

us. Furthermore, those analytical frameworks are not ends in themselves, but serve as

the basis for the development of a plan of action that must be implemented, evaluated

and adjusted as conditions change.

Notes

1 At the inception of the Cold War George Kennan, US Deputy Chief of Mission, analysed the Soviet threat

and in his 1946 ‘long telegram’ and subsequent 1947 article in Foreign Affairs recommended measures to

counter the threat. Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.

htm [accessed 24 April 2008] and discussed at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Sources_of_Soviet_

Conduct [accessed 30 March 2008]. Kennan described a variety of measures to counter the threat,

including public education, improving the economy and diplomatic measures. He was silent on the use

of military force. Also, the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu ([1963]:77–78) wrote that ‘to subdue the

enemy without fi ghting is the acme of skill … Next best is to disrupt his alliances … Next best is to

attack his army.’

98 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays

Oil pipeline sabotage in Nigeria:Dimensions, actors and implications for national securityFreedom C Onuoha*

Introduction

If situated within the Cold War era conceptualisation of national security, oil pipeline

sabotage does not seem to fi t in properly. However, when viewed from a new paradigm

of national security, recent manifestations of oil pipeline sabotage and its implications

hold out serous threats for national security in Nigeria. A recent study commissioned

by Royal Dutch/Shell put the amount of oil stolen each year by bunkerers or vandals

in Nigeria at between 100 million and 250 million barrels. At an average of US$60

per barrel, the theft translates to a loss of about US$15 billion each year (Mumuni &

Oyekunle 2007:12). This is in addition to other costs to the Nigerian state.

* Freedom Onuoha is a research fellow at the African Centre for Strategic Research and Studies at the National Defence (formerly War) College in Abuja, Nigeria.

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100 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 101

or its refi ned products for purposes of appropriating it for personal use or for sale on

the black market or any other outlet. It includes such acts as oil bunkering, pipeline

vandalisation/fuel scooping and oil terrorism. In this sense, any person(s) or company

involved in such an act is considered to be guilty of economic sabotage.

The term ‘national security’ has long been conceptualised from a narrow, militaristic

and strategic perspective. The amassment of arms and ammunition was then seen as a

key strategy for guaranteeing national security. In this context, then, the nation-state

was the key referent object that dominated security discourse and policy. From this

perspective, Hartmann (1983:13) defi nes national security as ‘the sum total of the vital

national interest of the state, and because a vital national interest is one for which a nation

is willing to resort to force or war either immediately or ultimately, concepts of national

security will vary from state to state in direct proportion to their individual willingness

to risk either confl ict or war at any given time’.

Against the same background, Lipman (1943:123) argues that a ‘nation is secure to the

extent that it is not in the danger of having to sacrifi ce core values, if it wishes to avoid

war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such war’. Hence, national

security is couched in esoteric terms, and equated with the security of the state or the

regime in power. Although the narrow conceptualisation of national security dominated

the Cold War era, the need for its expansion has long been canvassed or challenged by

scholars (see, among others, McNamara 1968:192; Falk 1975; Prins 1984, chapter 7:xiii;

Al-Mashat 1985:50; Thomas 1987).

With the end of the Cold War threats to security such as disease, natural disasters,

poverty and hunger as well as terrorism, gained new importance. The narrow perspective

of national security gradually began to give way to a more comprehensive and broad

defi nition that refl ects the multi-dimensional nature of security, and takes cognisance

of economic, cultural, technological, political, environmental and military variables. As

Tyoden (2005:172) rightly argues, ‘while security considerations are still (and will continue

to be) priority considerations for all States and while conceding that the conception of

security qua military security has its strategic relevance, a more holistic security frame-

work approximates better reality’. From this perspective therefore, Ullman (quoted in

Bassey 2001), defi nes national security as ‘[t]he capacity of society to protect individuals,

groups and the nation-state from physical and socio-economic dangers and from the

threat of such danger created by both systematic and attributional conditions’.

Another generally accepted defi nition is that national security is the ‘readiness and

capability of a country to contain internal and external threats to its existence and well-

being (the military dimension), and ensure the socio-economic welfare of its peoples

(the developmental dimension)’ (Tyoden 2005:173). The new emphasis on an expanded

defi nition of national security does not suggest that the idea is a new one, but rather that

In the present paper an attempt is therefore made to sketch the three main dimensions

of oil pipeline sabotage in Nigeria, namely oil bunkering, pipeline vandalisation/fuel

scooping and oil terrorism, from the perspective of national security. First a conceptual

clarifi cation of the meaning of ‘oil pipeline sabotage’ and ‘national security’, as used in

this context, is provided. This is followed by an overview of the oil pipeline network

in Nigeria. Then three dimensions of oil pipeline sabotage is discussed with a view to

highlighting the actors and objectives behind them. In the next section the implications of

oil pipeline sabotage for national security is examined. The paper concludes with possible

recommendations on how to curb the growing incidence of oil pipeline sabotage.

Conceptual clarifi cations

The concepts of oil pipeline sabotage and national security are pivotal to this discourse

and as such, their meanings deserve to be clarifi ed.

In terms of the Nigerian constitution, all minerals, oil and gas in Nigeria belong to the

federal government. Section 44(3) states that ‘notwithstanding the foregoing provisions

of this section, the entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and

natural gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial

waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the

Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the National

Assembly’ (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Oil extraction outside the framework of

an agreement with the federal government is illegal, as is the possession of crude oil by

anyone not licensed to do so. Specifi c crimes have also been created relating to damage

to oil installations (including for the purpose of siphoning off crude oil or petroleum

products) (Human Rights Watch 2002:27–28).

In Nigeria, oil pipeline sabotage is prohibited in section 1 of the Petroleum Production

and Distribution (Anti-Sabotage) Act (Act 353 of 1990). The Act defi nes a saboteur as

any ‘person who does; aids another person; or incites, counsels or procures any other

person to do any thing with intent to obstruct or prevent the production or distribution

of petroleum products in any part of Nigeria; or wilfully does anything with intent to

obstruct or prevent the procurement of petroleum products for distribution in any part

of Nigeria; or wilfully does anything in respect of any vehicle or any public highway

with intent to obstruct or prevent the use of that vehicle or that public highway for the

distribution of petroleum products’. Hence, the responsibility to ensure the security of

these pipelines is part of the duties of the various security agencies such as the police,

armed forces and Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps.

Oil pipeline sabotage, as referred to here, concerns the illegal or unauthorised act of

destroying or puncturing of oil pipelines so as to disrupt supply or to siphon crude oil

102 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 103

contain instability, control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine

development, progress and growth, and improve the welfare and well-being

and quality of life of every citizen (Tyoden 2005:172–173).

In this sense, national security is an ensemble of two broad focal elements: state security

and human security. It entails the preservation of the safety of Nigerians at home and

abroad and the protection of the sovereignty of the country and the integrity of its assets

(Federal Republic of Nigeria 2006:2). Thus a country is secured to the extent that the

political leadership is able to anticipate, recognise and respond effectively to these threats,

using the available national resources to ensure the safety of life and property of the

citizens, and guarantee the integrity of its territorial boundaries as well as its strategic

assets, both within and outside its territory.

The oil pipeline network in Nigeria: An overview

Nigeria has a monocultural economy that greatly depends on the petroleum industry for

survival. The petroleum industry in Nigeria was established about 50 years ago, in 1956,

when oil was fi rst discovered in Oloibiri, in the present-day Bayelsa State. Nigeria’s oil

sector has now been developed into a vast domestic industrial infrastructure, consisting

of more than 300 oil fi elds, 5 284 wells, 7 000 km of pipelines, ten export terminals, 22

petroleum storage depots, 275 fl ow stations, ten gas plants, four refi neries, and massive

liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) projects (Smith 2006).

To enhance the distribution of crude oil products from the oil-rich region of the Niger

Delta to other parts of the country, a grid of oil pipelines was constructed to link some

of the states at strategic locations. The network consists of multi-product pipelines

and crude oil pipelines that criss-cross the country and form a grid that links the 22

petroleum storage depots, the four refi neries at Port Harcourt (I and II), Kaduna and

Warri, the off-shore terminals at Bonny and Escravos, and the jetties at Atlas Cove,

Calabar, Okirika and Warri.

The Pipeline and Product Marketing Company (PPMC), a subsidiary of the Nigerian

National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), uses this system of oil pipelines to transport

crude oil to the refi neries in Port Harcourt (I and II), Warri and Kaduna – a total

distance of 719 km. The multi-product pipelines are used to move products from the

refi neries and import-receiving jetties to petroleum storage deports all over the country.

The storage infrastructure, which consists of 22 loading depots linked by pipelines of

various diameters ranging from 6 to 18 inches, has combined installed capacities of

1 266 890 (PMS), 676 400 (DPK), 1 007 900 (AGO), and 740 000 (ATK) m3 tonnes

(Special Committee on the Review of Petroleum Product Supply and Distribution

2000:10).

its relevance was greatly undermined by security doctrines and strategic considerations

that shaped the idea of security during the Cold War era.

Within the context of this paper, national security refers to the capacity of a state to

promote the pursuit and realisation of the fundamental needs and vital interests of

man and society, and to protect them from threats which may be economic, social,

environmental, political, military or epidemiological in nature. In this sense, it has both

qualitative and dynamic dimensions. Qualitatively it encapsulates the unending drive of

the state for improving the safety of, and protecting the lives, property and resources

within its defi ned territorial boundaries. It is dynamic in the sense that its broad contours

oscillate with emergence of new threats or the transformation of old threats, which may

come from within or outside its environment (Onuoha 2007a:4). Therefore threats to

national security are not static, but dynamic, and just as the political, economic, military

and social causes of threats change, so does the national security posture of a country

change (Okodolor 2004:211). In the context of Nigeria’s national security considerations,

President Olusegun Obasanjo contends that:

The primary objective of national security shall be to strengthen the

Federal Republic of Nigeria, to advance her interest and objectives to

Source: United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section, October 2004

104 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 105

Rights Watch, 2003). It is estimated that over 10 per cent of the oil exported from Nigeria

every year has actually been bunkered.

Because oil bunkering is a huge and lucrative business in Nigeria, with a whole demand

and supply chain, a network of actors have emerged to sustain the activity. These

include, but are not limited to, cult leaders, politicians, serving and retired security

agents, shipping lines, international oil dealers, and youths conscripted by the cult

leaders to puncture the pipelines as well as provide security during the transportation of

the oil to the market. Two examples serve to illustrate the magnitude of the operation:

in August 2003 the navy announced that it had arrested ten foreigners (among them

Senegalese, Burkinabe, Togolese, Ivorians and Beninois) and a number of Nigerians for

involvement in oil smuggling, and seized four ships; in late October, several more ships

were impounded, with a reported combined cargo of oil worth several hundred million

dollars (Human Rights Watch 2003).

Oil bunkering operates on two levels. On the one hand are the small-scale operations

that fl ourish at the local level and on the other the highly organised oil theft that is

perpetrated by syndicates or cartels. These cartels are always assisted by disreputable

ship owners and corrupt government offi cials that benefi t from the illicit trade.

Although illegal oil bunkering has taken place since the 1980s, it was only in 2000 when

it became so extensive that it threatened the nation’s OPEC quota supplies, that the

Nigerian state instituted rigorous measures to curtail the theft. Even then, up till 2002,

the navy could only intercept and arrest barges (Ikelegbe 2005:223). The intensifi cation

of naval patrols and the intervention of the Nigerian navy since 2003 have had some

positive effects on the illegal bunkering. In 2003 the Nigerian oil industry was losing

an average of 160 000 barrels of crude oil per day to criminal elements. This fi gure has

been brought down to less than 30 000 barrels per day (according to NNPC fi gures) or

10 000 barrels (according to the Nigerian navy) (Egua 2006:1, 7). Recently, the Nigerian

navy claimed to have arrested over 236 ships, tugboats and barges engaged in crude oil

theft, illegal bunkering and other illegal activities on the high seas, resulting in about an

80 per cent reduction in crude oil theft over the last three years (Omonobi 2007:5).

Oil vandalisation/fuel scooping

The vandalisation of oil pipelines, particularly the pipelines for premium motor spirit

commonly known as petrol or fuel, became commonplace in the terminal stages of

military rule. However, in recent times it has assumed alarming proportions in Nigeria.

A closer look at the nature and trend of pipeline vandalisation in the country reveals three

important dimensions, namely an increase in the frequency of attacks on these pipelines,

increased sophistication in the technology used, and concentration on the three axes that

are crucial to petroleum products distribution in the country.

To ensure the safety of these pipelines, which transverse the length and breadth of the

country, the government acquired a 3,5 m wide right of way on each side of the pipelines

before they were laid, and the pipes were buried a metre deep to prevent accidental

contact. However, recent experience has shown that their integrity and safety have

been compromised by vandals who now unremittingly tap into this huge artery of the

lifeblood of Nigeria’s economic wealth.

Oil pipeline sabotage in Nigeria: Dimensions, trends and actors

The tampering with oil pipelines and installations has assumed huge dimensions and a

variety of forms in Nigeria. Various terms, such as oil bunkering, oil theft, pipeline vandalisation,

fuel scooping, and oil terrorism, have been used to describe the various forms of theft of crude

oil and its refi ned products in Nigeria. In this section, these concepts are treated as different

variants under an umbrella concept of ‘oil pipeline sabotage’. There are however three

major identifi able forms, namely oil bunkering, oil pipeline vandalisation/fuel scooping,

and oil terrorism, which are briefl y discussed so as to highlight the peculiar nature, trend

and processes, the underlying objectives and the key actors involved in each.

Oil bunkering

Oil bunkering is effectively Nigeria’s most profi table illegal private business in the

petroleum industry. ‘Bunkering’ is a term used to describe the process of fi lling a ship

with oil (or coal). ‘Illegal oil bunkering’ is therefore a euphemism for theft of oil (Human

Rights Watch 2003), which involves tapping crude oil directly from the pipelines. Illegal

oil bunkering is a hazardous process that is very pervasive in the creeks of the Niger

Delta where oil pipelines criss-cross the region like a grid. Thieves build a temporary

enclosure around a small section of underwater pipe. Water is then pumped out from the

enclosure and a hole is drilled into the steel casting of the pipe through which the crude

passes. The hole is fi tted with a pipe and control valve. The creek water is allowed to fl ow

back and fi ll the enclosure so that the set-up is underwater and therefore hidden from

oil company inspectors (Junger 2007:56). When crude oil is being pumped through the

pipelines, sometimes at a pressure of 600 pounds per square inch, the bunkers are able

to fi ll up to a 1 000 metric tonne barge in a matter of hours. The barge is then moved

offshore to a transport ship and the oil is sold on the high seas.

Oil bunkering has become a sophisticated operation that does not require the co-

operation of oil company staff to operate equipment at wellheads or allow access (though

there are reports that some are indeed involved in the theft). The bunkerers now tap

directly into pipelines at a site removed from oil company facilities, and connect the

pipes to barges that are hidden in small creeks under cover of mangrove forests (Human

106 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 107

there can hardly be a successful vandalisation without security connivance

(cited in Chiedozie 2007).

It would thus seem as if the seemingly lucrative nature of the illegal trade has opened up

a new dimension to the breaking of oil pipelines to tap crude oil or its fi nished products,

and has attracted even more participants to the business of oil pipeline vandalisation.

These vandals now focus attention predominantly on three axes that are crucial to

petroleum products distribution in the country, namely Atlas Cove–Mosimi, Abuja–

Suleja, and Port Harcourt–Aba–Enugu–Markudi (Amanze-Nwachukwu 2007:39).

Oil terrorism

Unlike oil bunkering and pipeline vandalisation, oil terrorism is a new lexicon introduced

by security analysts and scholars to describe the deliberate pipeline system attacks in Iraq

and elsewhere in the world by militias, freedom fi ghters and insurgents. In Nigeria, oil

terrorism includes such acts as the blowing up of oil pipelines, installations and platforms

with explosives, and the seizure of oil barges, oil wells, fl ow stations, support vessels and

other oil facilities in order to prevent the exploitation and/or distribution of crude oil or

its refi ned products.

The fi rst act of oil terrorism in Nigeria can be traced to December 2005, when the Movement

for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) blew up Shell’s Opobo Pipeline in Delta

State (Ibinabo 2007:31). After the arrest of Alhaji Asari Dokubo, the leader of the Niger Delta

People’s Volunteer Force (who is widely regarded as a leader of the Ijaw nation) in September

2005, militant groups in the Delta region instructed all multinational oil companies to leave

the region, as they were preparing for a war with the Nigerian government. Since then

militants in the region, seeking to control a greater share of the nation’s oil wealth, have

adopted a terrorist strategy to infl ict serious damage on the Nigerian economy. Their broad

objective is to impair the capacity of the petroleum industry to export crude oil. By doing

so they hope that the federal government will lose the substantial revenue needed to sustain

the machinery of government, and so be forced to respond to their political, economic and

environmental demands (for a list of these demands, see Okafor & Olagoke 2007:4). The

following four reported cases are representative of their actions:

On 16 January 2005 a major crude oil pipeline supplying crude to the Forcades export ■

terminal was blown up, cutting supplies by about 100 000 barrels per day

On 18 March 2005 militants blew up an oil pipeline operated by an Italian company, ■

reducing fl ow by 75 000 barrels per day

On 3 October 2006 militants struck at an oil vessel at Cawthorowe Channel, killing ■

fi ve soldiers who were escorting the vessel, and later sank the vessel

In the early and mid-1990s, vandals, mainly unemployed youths operating in remote

areas and communities through which oil pipelines pass, punctured the pipes or took

advantage of ruptured or leaking pipes to siphon fuel or other petroleum products into

drums, plastic containers or storage cans for sale on the black market. The technology

employed was quite rudimentary, involving the use of funnels, drilling tools and plastic

hoses to siphon the products. Furthermore, only few cases of vandalisation occurred.

For instance, in 1995 there were only seven reported cases of vandalisation, and in the

next three years 33, 34 and 57 were recorded (Special Committee on the Review of

Petroleum Product Supply and Distribution 2000:34).

The return to democracy in 1999 witnessed an unprecedented increase in the rate of oil

pipeline vandalisation. From 497 cases reported in 1999, it increased to 909 cases in 2000.

From 2001 to 2003 the numbers declined considerably, but it started rising again in 2004 (to

971 cases) and increased sharply to 2 258 cases of pipeline vandalisation in 2005 (Onuoha

2007b:101; Africanoiljournal.com 2007). According to recent statistics released by the group

managing director of NNPC, Port Harcourt, which recorded about 600 line breaks in 2003,

had about 1 650 line breaks from January to September 2006. During the same period the

Warri area had 600 line breaks (up from 100 in 2003) and the Mosimi area had 375 (up from

50 in 2003). In the north, where such occurrences used to be rare, the Kaduna and Gombe

areas have registered frequent line breaks, too (Amanze-Nwachukwu & Ogbu 2007:14).

The rise in incidents had been accompanied by more technologically sophisticated

methods, and complicity of government offi cials and security agents also seems to have

grown. Ahmed (2007) puts it as follows:

They no longer use simple funnels and buckets. For instance, it has been

determined that the vandals at the Egborode, Oviri Court broke the pipeline

through hot tapping, a process restricted to experts in the oil industry.

Apart from the issue of changes of technology, there are increasing allegations of

complicity between oil marketers, traditional rulers, politicians, security agents, and

NNPC staff in the growing incidence of vandalisation. Such complicity has been

confi rmed in confessions by vandals, and suspected vandals caught by the police at

Awawa in October 2006 for example confessed that a local council chairman gave them

money, arms and tools to vandalise pipelines (Abubakar 2006:32). In the same vein,

there are growing allegations that security agents connive with vandals to steal oil from

the pipelines. In a presentation to President Obasanjo in February 2007, offi cials of the

Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria and the National Union

of Petroleum and Gas Workers of Nigeria submitted that:

Experience has shown that security agencies have abdicated their

responsibility of providing security for the pipelines … We believe that

108 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 109

about 872 000 barrels of crude oil per day were lost as a result of damaged pipelines

to which the oil companies could not gain access for repairs or because they could not

resume operations. SPDC’s share of the losses was put at 500 000 barrels while Mobil,

Agip and Chevron jointly lost 372 000 barrels (Onuoha 2007a:12). More so, in view of the

strategic position these facilities occupy in the political economy with regard to security

and development in Nigeria, there is no doubt that Nigeria’s oil pipeline network and

facilities still remains vulnerable to both militant and terrorist attacks.

Another major implication of oil pipeline sabotage for national security is the huge

loss of revenue by the government. Oil pipeline sabotage undermines the capacity of

the government to generate resources needed to fulfi l its responsibilities, of which the

security of its citizens is a primary consideration. In February 2007, for instance, the

NNPC estimated the nation lost about N10 billion (naira) to pipeline vandalisation. The

fi gure includes losses incurred because of damage to equipment and losses of product and

equipment (Bello 2007:18). Indeed, the loss to the Nigerian government from illegal oil

bunkering amounts to about US$14 billion a year (Ikokwu 2007:6). In such circumstances

the government may have no option but to borrow money from international fi nancial

institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Lamenting on

the loss the Nigerian government has recorded as a result of oil pipeline vandalisation, the

Group Manager, Public Affairs of the NNPC, Dr Levi Ajounuma, stated:

This country is bleeding to death. The nation’s economy is endangered as

a result of the activities of these vandals. In the past eight weeks alone, we

have lost over $100 million worth of crude oil to theft (Vanguard 2008:12).

Such funds represent lost opportunities for funding initiatives to provide basic and quality

services to citizens; better equip the security forces to ensure the security of life and

property; strengthen institutions that promote human rights; and undertake infrastructural

development, among others. As Human Right Watch (2003) has argued, reducing illegal

bunkering will not in itself necessarily improve government spending practices, but the

diversion of revenues before they reach government coffers means that there is not even

the possibility that these resources will be used for the public benefi t. Thus threats to

national wealth, such as sabotage of oil pipelines, perceived from a national security prism

not only hurts the economy through the loss of sorely needed foreign exchange to fi nance

development projects, but also erodes the base of national strength and power.

In addition, oil pipeline sabotage in the form of illegal bunkering is one of the factors

fuelling insecurity in the Niger Delta region. Together with other factors such as poverty

and unemployment, it adds to criminality, cult clashes, communal violence, proliferation

of small arms, and political instability in the region. Efforts by the federal government

to check oil bunkering activities have further triggered resistance on the part of the

bunkerers who recruit and arm youths to sustain their lucrative trade. Oil bunkerers

On 8 May 2007 the dreaded group MEND attacked three oil pipelines; two of these ■

pipelines were in the territory of Akassa and the third in Twon-Brass

It is evident from the above that the major perpetrators of this sabotage are armed

groups, particularly militant groups who profess to be defending the cause of the Niger

Delta people. Gradually, but steadily, these militants have developed both the tactics

and weaponry that have enabled them to launch devastating attacks on onshore oil

installations and near off-shore rigs.

Oil pipeline sabotage and national security in Nigeria

Governments all over the world, particularly those of developing countries, are

increasingly recognising that threats to national interests/security are more likely to

stem from internal than external sources. Such threats can assume different forms in

different countries at different times. Against this background the question is how does

one evaluate the implications of oil pipeline sabotage for national security in Nigeria?

In terms of strictly national security considerations, oil pipelines and facilities are sensitive

strategic assets that must be protected at all times. Oil pipeline sabotage, regardless of

whether it is perpetrated by nationals, foreigners or terrorist groups, is a serious threat to

national security, particularly for a country that depends heavily on oil exports for survival.

This is essentially because in a situation of war with another country, pipelines are usually

one of the fi rst targets of an enemy and preserving them could be the difference between

victory and defeat (Adeniyi 2007:72). For this reason countries will expend enormous

fi nancial and material resources on safeguarding the integrity of their strategic assets. In

2002, for example, Colombia announced plans to train and arm special troops to protect a

key oil pipeline. The United States government supported the initiative and requested that

Congress allocate US$98 million in the 2003 budget to train, arm and provide air support

for Colombian troops to defend the pipeline, which is jointly owned by the Occidental

Petroleum Corporation and the Colombian state oil company, Ecopetrol (Adeniyi 2007:72).

Given that Nigeria has a monocultural economy that largely depends on oil exports for

survival, oil pipelines and installations are the arteries and veins that supply the lifeblood

of Nigeria’s economic wealth – crude oil and its refi ned products – to various parts of the

country. It follows that attacks on them, both in peace and war situations, could strangle

the Nigerian state and render it incapable of defending itself against internal subversion

or external aggression. The impact of the increasing attacks on oil pipelines and facilities

by militants in the Niger Delta are instructive in this regard. For example, in one such

attack on an oil facility and pipelines in October 2006, in the Oporoma community of

Bayelsa State, it was estimated that more than 800 000 barrels of oil was lost. In addition,

110 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 111

exchange on their importation. For instance, in 2005 Nigeria accounted for over 35 per

cent (about US$152 million) of the 77 per cent share of the UK supplies of generating

sets to the African market (see African Review of Business and Technology 2006:46).

The overall effect is that the country cannot compete in the global market.

Another discernable implication of oil pipeline sabotage for national security is its impact

on human security. Human security, as was stated at the outset, is an integral element of

national security. Increasingly, the concept of human security is being co-opted into an

understanding of security to serve as an early warning mechanism in order to infl uence

policy actions. Human security is viewed in this context as freedom from actual and

potential threats to human life which may arise either as a result of human actions or

inactions, or from natural disasters such as fl oods, earthquakes, famine, drought, disease,

and other natural calamitous events resulting in death, human suffering and material

damage (Onuoha 2007b:97).

While it may be diffi cult to put an accurate fi gure on the loss of lives associated with fi re

disasters resulting from oil pipeline sabotage, Amanze-Nwachukwu (2007:23) contends

that no fewer than 5 000 persons, many of whom were innocent bystanders, have been

killed in various pipeline explosions since 1998. The deaths and injuries resulting from

such explosions impact on individual, family and community levels throughout Nigeria.

It has lead to fractured family structures, children have been left without parents and

husbands without wives (Brume 2006). When a family unit is disrupted, children suffer

and their future outlook is often bleak. In some cases, the children migrate to cities in

search of a livelihood. The lack of parental care or ability to earn a living may lead some

of them to join criminal gangs, such as the groups of armed robbers that now terrorise

banks and stores in cities in Nigeria (Onuoha in press). Often the injuries resulting

from explosions are horrendous, with victims sustaining severe burn injuries and

internal damage as a result of exposure to poisonous gas and fumes, invariably adding

to the number of people unable to earn a living for themselves or their dependants.

The end result is that these destitute children and families further swell the ranks of

social miscreants and contribute to social confl ict in the cities. Hence, for every death

or injury caused by a pipeline explosion, there are many who suffer the psychological,

physical and economic consequences. In this context, the poor are hardest hit (Onuoha

2007b:107).

Adding to the human cost of these explosions is the destruction of livelihoods and

properties. Both at the individual and community level, oil spillage from sabotaged

pipelines negatively affect the environment as well as socio-economic activities. As a result

residents lose not only their properties and source of income, but also have to contend

with contaminated food and drinking water. Oil spillages are known to destroy important

economic crops and contaminate water formations such as streams, rivers and lakes.

Accordingly, oil pipeline sabotage poses a threat to environmental sustainability, too.

and pirates operating in the coastal regions of Nigeria use part of the proceeds from this

illegal business for the procurement of sophisticated weapons. Their activities are linked

to small arms and light weapons proliferation, in their aim to outspend and outsource

perceived enemies in the acquisition of sophisticated weapons (Abayomi et al 2005:131).

Consequently, oil bunkering has contributed signifi cantly to shaping the economy of

confl ict in the region, which has in turn contributed to the threat to national security.

Oil pipeline sabotage is already threatening the socio-economic stability and national

development in Nigeria. Blown pipelines interrupt the supply of crude oil to refi neries,

and refi ned products to strategic loading depots. One major danger of oil pipeline sabotage

to socio-economic stability is its spill-over effect. First it leads to shortages that cause

increases in the price of petroleum products. But sabotage of pipelines in the southern part

of the country also causes serious shortages and disruptions in the northern and western

parts of the country. For example, since February 2006 two strategic refi neries in Nigeria

– Warri and Kaduna – have been shut down as a result of the vandalisation of the Escravos–

Warri pipeline which supplies crude oil to the refi neries. The impact of such shortages on

overall socio-economic development includes underutilisation of the refi neries; loss of

foreign exchange as a result of importation of fuel; disruption of the transportation of

people, goods and services; escalation of prices of goods; wastage of crude oil as a result of

the leakage; and loss of revenue spent in repairing the vandalised pipelines.

In Nigeria the sabotage of pipelines conveying crude oil or gas to power plants has

resulted in power cuts. Reliable electricity supply is critical for national development, and

by extension, national security. However, the increasing rate of oil pipeline sabotage has

negatively affected the supply of electricity in the country. For instance, the vandalisation of

a major pipeline that transports gas to Egbin and AES thermal stations in February 2006 led

to a reduction in power generation from 1 620 MW to 403 MW for more than two weeks

(Godwin & Ezeobi 2007:1). The disrupted and dismal power generation contributes to the

low infl ow of foreign direct investments and the growth of local businesses in Nigeria.

Compared to some other African countries like South Africa and Egypt, Nigeria’s available

power generation capacity with a population of 140 million people stands at 4,5 GW, whereas

South Africa with a population of more than 40 million generates a capacity of 36 GW and

Egypt with a population of 79 million generates 23 GW (Ikediashi 2007:18). Even after the

completion of four new gas power plants in 2007 at Geregu, Omotosho, Papalanto and

Alaoji, which added a total of 1 464 MW to the grid, electricity supply throughout the

country is still very poor owing to incessant vandalisation of pipelines that transport gas to

these power stations by militants in the Niger Delta.

Undoubtedly, this energy crisis hurts the economy as hospitals, industries and

manufacturing enterprises have to rely on generators to ensure a continuous power

supply. This leads to escalating operating costs and low productivity. Furthermore,

these generator sets are not produced in Nigeria, so the country has to expend foreign

112 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 113

including oil bunkering, in the region. When the issue of criminality in the region is

addressed, it is important to factor in the hydra-headed nature of the situation. Government

must separate the genuine agitators from criminals and oil bunkerers, and evolve concrete

preventive and punitive measures for fi ghting the crime on the one hand and addressing

genuine grievances on the other. To this end the design and effective implementation

of a comprehensive and redemptive development plan would contribute signifi cantly to

overcoming the problem of militancy and agitation among youths in the region.

The fi ght against corruption in the public and private sectors is one strategy that must

be strengthened and sustained if other efforts designed to safeguard the oil pipelines are

to succeed. Corruption is at the root of the problem. It is behind the rise in poverty and

unemployment in the country, resulting in increasing numbers of young people without

hope of making a living, which in turn makes it easy to recruit them for criminal activities.

Just as corrupt government institutions over the years have allowed oil bunkering

to take place on a larger scale, the lack of a comprehensive preventive programme by

the federal government to arrest the situation has contributed to the persistence of the

illegal business. Therefore there is the need to strengthen every institution, process and

agency that promotes transparency, accountability and good governance in the country.

Government should strongly encourage such initiatives as the Nigerian extractive industry

and transparency initiative aimed at getting oil companies to be more accountable and

transparent in their operations. Institutions such as the economic and fi nancial crimes

commission, the independent corrupt practices and other related offences commission,

and other security agencies need to be strengthened to make them more effective in

tackling corruption and improving the security situation in the country.

Finally, it is apposite to remark that the safety of the oil pipelines cannot be successfully

achieved in the face of the growing incidence of poverty and unemployment. Therefore, it

is suggested that government (federal, state and local) should judiciously use the available

revenue to solve the twin problems of poverty and unemployment through a massive

planned investment in public works like power, rail and road rehabilitation and construction,

and large-scale farming. Through a private-public partnership government should take the

lead in the development of small and medium scale industries by means of a well-designed

micro-credit scheme that would create jobs and alleviate poverty in the country.

Conclusion

The incidence of oil pipeline sabotage in Nigeria has not only increased in frequency but

has assumed worrisome dimensions that pose a serious threat to national security. In this

paper the dimensions the crime has assumed in recent times in Nigeria, as well as the

main actors and objectives behind them, have been briefl y examined. It was argued that

apart from being a criminal offence, oil pipeline sabotage is a serious internal threat to

Recommendations

From the foregoing it can be seen that oil pipeline sabotage poses serious threats to a

country’s security. To stem the tide of oil pipeline sabotage in all its forms in Nigeria the

following recommendations are suggested.

First, the integrity of oil pipelines in Nigeria should be treated as a national security

issue. The government should accordingly ensure effective protection and policing of

the network of oil pipelines throughout the country. This could be achieved by the

establishment of a special pipeline policing and protection agency, as well as the use of

technological apparatus such as satellite tracking and closed-circuit television (CCTV)

monitoring in strategic loading bays. This will enhance surveillance of the pipelines and

make it possible to track attacks on or rupture of the pipelines.

Second, it is imperative that the recent initiative between by the NNPC and the Plymouth

University in United Kingdom, aimed at mapping out strategies to ensure that crude oil

coming from Nigeria onto the international market is fi ngerprinted, be implemented.

This would enable buyers to determine the legality of origin and characteristics of

the product before putting a price on it. The federal government should back up such

collaboration with the necessary political will and fi nancial support, as this will further

enhance the tracking of stolen oil from Nigeria. In addition to the fi ngerprinting

technology, reliable meters should be installed at all oil installations, as this will enable

the responsible agency to ascertain how much oil is being produced, loaded, distributed

within the country, or shipped to the international market.

There is equally the need for a complete overhaul of the pipeline system. Although most

of the pipes being used to convey petroleum products have a lifespan of 50 years, lack

of maintenance during the past 15 years accounts for some leakage and ruptures. It is

imperative that these pipelines be replaced, and perhaps they can also be buried deeper in

the ground to make access by vandals more diffi cult. The overhaul process should go hand

in hand with periodic integrity checks during the lifespan of pipelines and a comprehensive

clearing of all structures that lie within the right of way along these pipelines.

Fourth, the Nigerian navy need to be supported with the necessary facilities and logistics to

enhance their effectiveness in tracking the infl ow of small arms, and combating sea piracy and

oil bunkering in Nigeria’s territorial waters. This should include capacity-building projects

such as a maritime awareness capabilities programme designed to enable them use the latest

patrol boats, such as US coast guard buoy tenders and defender class response boats, which

would improve their ability to successfully apprehend oil bunkerers and militants.

In the fi fth place, the long years of underdevelopment in the Niger Delta is part of the

formative environment that contributed signifi cantly to the rise of criminal activities,

114 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Essays 115

Junger, S 2007. Blood oil on Nigeria’s delta creeks. The Guardian, 14 January.

Lipman, W 1943. US foreign policy: shield of the republic. Boston: Little, Brown.

McNamara, R S 1968. The essence of security: refl ections in offi ce. New York: Harper & Row.

Mumuni, M and Oyekunle, J 2007. Generals behind bunkering. Sunday Sun, 10 June.

Okafor, C and Olagoke, A 2007. Militants free 24 Filipino hostages. The Guardian, 14 February.

Okodolor, C 2004. National security and foreign policy: towards a review of Nigeria’s Afro-centric policy.

Nigerian Forum, 25(7–8):209–219, July–August.

Omonobi, K 2007. Navy arrest 236 ships for illegal bunkering, other vices in three years. Vanguard, 8

September.

Onuoha, F C 2007a. Ethnic militias and national security: the transformation of confl icts in the Niger Delta.

Paper presented at the National Conference on Nigeria beyond 2007: issues, perspectives and challenges.

Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Ilorin, 27 and 28 February.

Onuoha, F C 2007b. Poverty, pipeline vandalization/explosion and human security: Integrating disaster

management into poverty reduction in Nigeria. African Security Review, 16(2):94–108.

Onuoha, F C (In press). Why the poor pay with their lives: Oil pipeline vandalization, fi re disaster and

human security in Nigeria. The Journal of Disaster Studies, Policy and Management.

Paul, O 2007. US warns of terrorist attacks in Nigeria. Thisday, 7 September.

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Vanguard 2008. Soldiers, policemen caught aiding pipeline vandals. Vanguard, 17 April

national security. If concerted efforts are not made by the federal government to contain

the rising incidence of oil pipeline sabotage in the country, the capacity of government

to discharge its responsibilities will be seriously compromised. The author therefore

advocates for the adoption of stringent measures aimed at enhancing surveillance of

the pipelines; the tackling of corruption; the entrenchment of good governance in the

country; and the reduction of poverty and unemployment.

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%20pipeline%20disaster.htm [accessed 15 September 2007].

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Understanding Egypt’s Muslim BrotherhoodLaurence Caromba and Hussein Solomon

The impacts of environmental degradation on refugee–host relationships

Leah Berry

COMMENTARIES

African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Commentaries 119

Brotherhood is its commitment to moderation, in methods if not ends. How should

such a group be treated?

When Hassan al-Banna fi rst formed the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, he had two main

goals: to expel foreign infl uence from Egypt and to reconstitute Egypt as an Islamic

state. These two goals still form the core of the modern Brotherhood ideology. Although

nationalism and Islamism are typically seen as competing ideologies in the Arab

world, one should not make the mistake of ignoring the genuine elements of Egyptian

‘nationalism’ that permeate the Brotherhood’s thinking. Today’s Muslim Brotherhood

views outside infl uences in a negative light, and pursues what might be considered a

policy of isolationism. It believes that Egypt is under political and cultural assault by

crusaders (Christians and the West), Jews and secularism (Rubin 2002:93). First and

foremost, however, the Brotherhood is committed to forming an Islamic state, which

would entail the reformation of Egypt’s entire legal system to bring it into accordance

with Shari’ah law.

Under Hosni Mubarak, the Brotherhood has adopted a three-tiered strategy to accomplish

these goals. The Muslim Brotherhood’s most important strategy is its use of the

democratic process (Swart et al 2003:3), which has allowed it to demonstrate its popular

legitimacy on several occasions. The group is technically banned and therefore prohibited

from directly competing in elections, but it has exploited loopholes in the electoral system

by allying itself with other parties and running candidates as independents.

The Brotherhood’s entry into electoral politics began in 1984 when al-Tilimsani concluded

an agreement with the Wafd Party, then the largest opposition group in Egyptian politics

(Munson 1988:81). Muslim Brothers were able to run for parliament on the Wafd Party

list in exchange for votes from Brotherhood supporters. Prior to the 1987 elections, the

Brotherhood formed a new alliance with the Liberal Party, a smaller opposition party that

was more easily dominated (Rubin 2003:33). The Brotherhood and its coalition partners

won 17 per cent of the seats in parliament – an impressive result in a country where

elections are stacked heavily in favour of the ruling party. The 2005 elections marked the

culmination of this process. Running as independents, unencumbered by alliances with

other opposition parties, the Brotherhood won 20 per cent of the seats in the Egyptian

parliament. The Ikhwan exercised deliberate circumspection by running for only a small

number of seats; nevertheless, the Brotherhood’s popularity is underscored by the fact

that they won the vast majority of seats they did contest (Dunne 2005). Though it is

diffi cult to extrapolate from these results with any degree of certainty, it is certainly

plausible that a truly free election, with every seat in parliament being contested, would

see the Muslim Brotherhood winning by a landslide.

The second pillar of the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy has been its efforts to take control

of the Egyptian student and professional unions (niqabat). As with the Brotherhood’s

Understanding Egypt’s Muslim BrotherhoodLaurence Caromba and Hussein Solomon*

The disentangling of liberalism from democracy is one of the great paradoxes of our

time, and the group that embodies this dichotomy more than any other is Egypt’s

Muslim Brotherhood.

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is the one of the oldest and most infl uential Islamist

movements in the world and seeks to impose a fundamentalist vision on Egyptian society.

The Brotherhood’s most important theoretician, Sayyid Qutb, developed a coherent

ideology of radical Islam that inspired Osama bin Laden, and the Brotherhood’s ‘secret

apparatus’ carried out attacks for decades (Munson 1988:77). The Brotherhood’s history

and rhetoric make the West nervous. But within the context of modern Egyptian politics

– and Islamic fundamentalist movements in general – the most striking thing about the

* Both authors are attached to the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria in Pretoria, South Africa.

120 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Commentaries 121

Yet repression alone does not explain the continued survival of the nationalist regime in

Egypt. The regime has survived numerous challenges to its authority, in part because it

has successfully mobilised religion for its own ends. The Egyptian government maintains

stringent control over the clerical establishment in the country, and has demonstrated a

great willingness to reward clerics who support the government line while punishing those

who do not (Rubin 2002:81). This has been used to insulate the regime from religious

criticism: after Sadat negotiated the Camp David accords with Israel, for example, the

mufti of Egypt issued a fatwa proclaiming Sadat’s actions to be in accordance with Islamic

law. Every president since Nasser has built mosques and supported religious education in

a successful effort to deny the fundamentalists a monopoly on piety.

Mubarak’s policies of selective repression and the co-option of religion have, on the

surface, been successful. His regime successfully put down a violent insurgency and

maintained a fi rm grip on power for 25 years, and has done so without radicalising

the Muslim Brotherhood. This is particularly impressive within the context of Egypt’s

numerous socio-economic problems and the war on terror. Yet there are signs that

the Mubarak’s long-term hold on power is crumbling. The Muslim Brotherhood has

become too large to be successfully repressed, and its performance in parliamentary

elections and domination of professional associations are indicative of an organisation

with genuine popular legitimacy. If the popularity of the Ikhwan continues to grow, it

is inevitable that the government’s own legitimacy will eventually start to erode. The

regime’s recent actions, including an unpopular set of constitutional amendments and

the use of state repression against even non-threatening opponents such as bloggers

(Black 2006) seem to speak of anxiety rather than confi dence. A better strategy would

have been to undercut the attractiveness of the Brotherhood’s socio-economic agenda

by becoming responsive to the needs of its citizens. In the absence of a serious strategy

designed to undermine the root causes of the Brotherhood’s support, the long-term

position of the government will become increasingly untenable.

Many of the Brotherhood’s demands are inherently just. It is diffi cult to dispute the

proposition that intimidation is an undesirable feature in elections, or that critics

of the president should not be subjected to violent harassment by police. Given the

Brotherhood’s renunciation of violence and popularity with the electorate, this raises an

obvious question: would Egypt not be better off if it simply let the democratic process take

its course? Would it not be preferable for the Ikhwan to be granted offi cial recognition as

a political party, allowed to freely participate in elections and – if the voters wished it –

govern the country? Furthermore, should the United States use its considerable infl uence

over Mubarak to try to force him to make democratic reforms? The answer depends

in part on the depth of the Brotherhood’s commitment to democracy. Pro-democracy

arguments are useful for a party in opposition; less so for a party in government. It may

be that the Brotherhood’s idea of democracy is merely a cynical ruse: ‘one man, one

vote, one time’, in the words of Bernard Lewis.

entry into the Egyptian parliament, this was accomplished using the democratic process.

In 1992 the Brotherhood took advantage of its disciplined membership and voter

apathy to take over the lawyers’ association. By 2003 it had taken over the journalists’

association, and the doctors’, pharmacists’ and engineers’ unions were under its control,

too (Aboul-Enein 2003:31). These professional organisations are the main civil society

groupings in Egypt, and controlling them gives the Brotherhood broad infl uence over

Egypt’s educated elites. Though the Brotherhood’s domination of these civil society

groups does not allow it to wield political power directly, it serves the Ikhwan’s broader

goal of cultural Islamisation, which could eventually pose a long-term threat to the

legitimacy of the secular regime.

Finally, the Ikhwans has formed a matrix of social services networks that provide food,

jobs, healthcare and a sense of community to Egyptians. Egypt is plagued by numerous

social needs that the government is either unable or unwilling to fulfi ll, allowing the

Brotherhood to fi ll the gaps left by the state. From the Brotherhood’s perspective, these

networks further its broader strategic goals in several ways. They portray the Brotherhood

as a competent organisation capable of delivering services in the areas where the government

has failed, present a positive image of the Muslim Brotherhood both inside and outside

Egypt, and offer the important message that Islam and economic comfort are mutually

reinforcing. The effectiveness of the Ikhwan’s social networks was starkly demonstrated

after the 1992 Cairo earthquake, when the Brotherhood’s humanitarian response proved

to be far more effective than that of the government. Brotherhood members rapidly set

up shelters and medical tents, provided food, clothing and blankets to residents of the

city, and donated US$1 000 to every family whose home had been destroyed (Walsh

2003:34). The Egyptian government, concerned that the Brotherhood was attempting to

compete with the infrastructure of the state, subsequently barred the Brotherhood from

carrying out such humanitarian operations in future, which only served to damage the

government’s reputation and increase the popularity of the Brotherhood.

Egypt’s secular-nationalist rulers have generally followed a two-pronged strategy

in response to both the Muslim Brotherhood and the more radical groups that have

splintered from it. The fi rst leg of this response is repression, which typically consists

of mass arrests and executions. Bouts of repression occurred in 1954, 1965, 1981, and

throughout the latter part of the Mubarak regime. Though the arrest of Islamists who

had committed violent acts was certainly warranted, many aspects of these crackdowns

were troubling. Mass arrests were frequently carried out in an arbitrary manner, and

against moderate Islamists who never organised or even advocated violence. Imprisoned

Islamists have been routinely subjected to torture and even extrajudicial execution. In

2007, in a response to the Brotherhood’s rising electoral challenge, Mubarak carried

out a sweeping set of constitutional reforms that gave him the authority to dissolve

parliament, ban religious political parties, weaken judicial oversight of elections, and

grant the government extensive new security powers (BBC News 2007).

122 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Commentaries 123

the limits of pure realism. It is an unfortunate irony that realpolitik, designed to address

the problem of interstate security, may well have exacerbated non-state security threats.

Terrorism has various causes, but it is at least partially the result of political pressure.

Closed, authoritarian rulers such as Mubarak have succeeded in shutting themselves off

so completely from criticism that they are no longer accountable to their citizenry. The

violent political pressure that builds up in these countries, stoked by poverty and massive

social problems, must fi nd another avenue of release: radical groups which are repressed

at home take their political activism abroad. The fact that 16 of the 19 9/11 hijackers

were Saudis is one manifestation of this trend, as is the prominence of Egyptians such

as Ayman al-Zawahiri in al-Qaeda. Zawahiri is part of a minority of radical Egyptian

Islamists who, in the late 1990s, decided to focus their energies on attacking the US rather

than overthrowing the Egyptian government. Rubin (2002:169–173) argues that their

decision by was not the result of religious or ideological conviction, but was a practical

decision brought about by their failures at home. Neither the Muslim Brotherhood’s

strategy of working within the system, nor the violent anti-government insurgency of

the radical groups, seemed to offer the promise of successfully establishing an Islamic

state. This lead Al-Zawahir and others to decide that ‘the road to Cairo runs through

Washington and Tel Aviv’ (Rubin 2002:171).

By marrying an Islamist political ideology to a sincere belief in procedural democracy,

the Brotherhood has evolved into the quintessential illiberal democratic movement.

The Muslim Brotherhood is undeniably popular, but the pro-democracy rhetoric of the

Brotherhood should not obscure its proscriptive policy preferences, which are likely to

undermine freedom of speech, religion and gender equality if the Brotherhood ever came

to power. Additionally, an Egypt ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood would certainly be

more hostile to the West and Israel than the current regime, and might result in domestic

sectarian violence between Muslims and religious minorities. In short, this would not be

a desirable outcome for either Egyptians or the rest of the world.

However, the maintenance the status quo is almost as problematic. The Egyptian

government has responded to growing political opposition by becoming increasingly

intolerant, brutal and capricious. Its repression of Islamists, an effective tool for

maintaining power in the domestic context, has also had the unintended consequence

of exporting fundamentalism and terrorism to other states. Even if these problems are

disregarded, and the current regime is judged to be the best of a set of bad alternatives,

the long-term survival of the regime in its current form is by no means assured. It is

true that the Brotherhood does not pose a direct threat to the Egyptian government in

the short to medium term, since its commitment to working within the political system

controlled by the regime puts it at an inherent disadvantage. In the long term, however,

the Brotherhood’s broader project of cultural Islamisation poses a direct challenge to the

legitimacy of the secular-nationalist state, and this is a challenge that the government

will fi nd very diffi cult to confront directly.

Khalil (2006) has amassed a large volume of evidence which suggests that the

Brotherhood, despite its advocacy of elections, does not desire a free society and if it came

to power would curb women’s rights, free speech and any aspect of culture perceived to

be antithetical to Islam. The Brotherhood’s 2004 election platform articulated a vision

of an Islamic state as epitomised in its statement that ‘Our mission is to implement

a comprehensive reform in order to uphold God’s law in secular as well as religious

matters … Our only hope, if we wish to achieve any type of progress, is to adhere to our

religion, as we used to, and to apply the Shari’ah.’

This vision of an Islamic state is diffi cult to reconcile with a religiously diverse society.

Though Shari’ah law may vary in its implementation, some of its basic prescriptions,

such as the death penalty for apostasy mandated by the hadith, contradict the principle

of freedom of religion, which is seen as a fundamental right in liberal states (Human

Rights Watch 2004:11). It is similarly problematic to subject minorities, who may not be

Islamic or even religious believers at all, to the dictates of Islamic law. These concerns are

particularly relevant to Egypt, with its large Coptic minority. Copts have long harboured

suspicions of the Muslim Brotherhood, which deepened in 1997 when Supreme Guide

Mustafa Mashhour voiced his support for the jizya poll tax, which was historically levied

against non-Muslims, and said that Copts could not be trusted to serve in the Egyptian

army (Murphy 2002:241). In this climate, the imposition of Shari’ah law could provoke

discontent and even sectarian violence.

In terms of specifi c policies, the Brotherhood has stated that the ‘[t]he Media should be

cleansed of anything that disagrees with the decrees of Islam’ and there should be ‘a ban

on improper and offensive series and television programs’. It has also stated that Egypt’s

economic system, political system and culture should all be ‘derived from Islam’, that

the ‘focus of education’, at least in the early years of schooling, ‘should be on learning

the Qur’an by heart’, and that ‘women should only hold the kind of posts that would

preserve their virtue’ (Khalil 2006:46). Cumulatively, it is not hard to see why Rubin

(2002:144) argues the Islamic state would inevitably be a dictatorship:

The Qur’an accepts the idea of ‘shura’ [consultative council] and this fact

makes it possible to justify parliamentary institutions as Islamic. But the

revolutionaries’ determination to impose their values and interpretations on

society requires a concentration of power beyond what a genuine representative

system is likely to supply. Moreover, the fundamentalists believe God has

specifi ed right and wrong; the people have no right to do what they wish.

What are the implications of this rising brand of democratic Islamism? From an

American foreign policy perspective, the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood

would seem to necessitate realpolitik: support for a friendly dictator over a potentially

destabilising and dangerous democracy. However, the Egyptian case also demonstrates

124 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Commentaries

The impacts of environmental degradation on refugee–hostrelationshipsLeah Berry*

Although refugees can and often do bring positive social and economic changes to host

communities, the infl ux and presence of refugees have also been shown to at times have

negative impacts on individuals within a hosting community or even on the community

as a whole. Therefore it is important not only to investigate the impacts of the presence

of refugees on the hosting communities, but also to consider how these impacts have

infl uenced the overall relationship between the two groups. In particular, one must

determine what factors and infl uences on the hosting communities could contribute

to a contentious or even confl ictual relationship between the two groups. A better

understanding of factors that contribute to or prevent confl ict will ultimately assist those

working with refugees with the coordination of projects that lessen the likelihood of

confl ict between refugees and host communities.

* Leah Berry works in the Humanitarian Policy and Practice Team at InterAction, a coalition of US-based international non-governmental organisations focusing on the world’s poor and most vulnerable people.

References

Aboul-Enein, Y 2003. Al Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: The Muslim Brotherhood. Military Review, July, pp 26–31.

Black, J 2006. Egypt releases blogger jailed for 45 days after ‘insulting’ President. Available at http://news.

independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article1093520.ece [accessed 23 March 2007].

BBC News 2007. Egyptians vote on major reforms. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_

east/6494247.stm [accessed 23 March 2007].

Dunne, M 2005. ‘Very dramatic’ achievement for Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian parliamentary elections.

Available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9318/dunne.html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F150%2Fegypt

[accessed 23 March 2007].

Human Rights Watch 2004. ‘Political Shari’a’? Human rights and Islamic law in northern Nigeria. Human

Rights Watch, 16(9A):1–113.

Khalil, M 2006. Egypt’s Muslim brotherhood and political power: would democracy survive? Middle East

Review of International Affairs, 9(2):44–52.

Munson, H 1988. Islam and revolution in the Middle East. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.

Murphy, C 2002. Passion for Islam: shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian experience. New York: Simon

and Schuster.

Rubin, B 2002. Islamic fundamentalism in Egyptian politics. Updated edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Swart, G, Solomon, H and Botha, A 2003. Egypt: Pharaohs and fundamentalists? Available at http://www.

cips.up.ac.za/f iles/pdf/uafspublications/Egypt%2520Pharaohs%2520and%2520Fundamentalists.pdf

[accessed on 23 March 2007].

Walsh, J 2003. Egypt’s Muslim brotherhood: understanding Centrist Islam. Harvard International Review,

24(4):32–36.

126 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Commentaries 127

In recognition of the fact that a rapid infl ux of people into any area will create some level

of stress on the environment, the 2005 UNHCR environmental guidelines state that

all efforts should be made to ensure that refugee camps or settlements are not located

near protected areas, so as to prevent what could be irreversible damage to these lands.

‘Uninformed decisions concerning the citing of a refugee camp in, or near, a fragile or

internationally protected area could result in irreversibly impacts on the environment.

Likewise, it is not advisable to establish a camp or settlement close to a village forest

reserve or similarly natural resources’ (UNHCR 2005:16).

However, three of the four camps in the Kibondo district are located within 15 km of a

forest reserve and two have boundaries less than 500 m from a forest reserve boundary

(Redeso 2003:5). This close proximity to the forest reserves has been a key contributing

factor to the environmental degradation in the region, as both refugees and locals enter

the reserves to collect fi rewood and wood for construction or clear areas for cultivation

(UNEP 2005; Redeso 2003; Western Tanzania Ecomonitoring Project 1997).

Deforestation and the depletion of forest resources are not restricted to the forest reserves,

and have been observed and recorded throughout Western Tanzania at a higher rate than

the national average rate of deforestation (Redeso 2003:11). Many refugees and locals

must either travel greater distances to fi nd fi rewood and wood for construction than were

necessary only a few years earlier, or resort to illegally cutting down living trees, which

further contributes to the deforestation (UNEP 2005:33). The higher rate of tree felling has

also led to wind- and water-induced soil erosion. In addition, the depletion and pollution

of water resources have been cited as a growing problem in the region. Finally, widespread

poaching of wild animals has resulted in a decrease in their overall numbers. While the

majority of the poaching is reportedly done by the locals, much of the bush meat is sold to

refugees who are often unable to afford other sources of meat to include in their diet.

Although numerous researchers have studied the refugee–host relationship in refugee

situations throughout the world and specifi cally in Western Tanzania, very few of these

have looked closely at how environmental degradation and natural resources depletion

might infl uence this relationship. This is despite the fact that many of these same studies

have noted the presence of environmental degradation in refugee populated areas and

the impact that this degradation has had on the host communities (Whitaker 2002).

It goes without saying that a number of economic and social variables do shape this

relationship, but in the context of growing concern about the destruction of the natural

environment and resources as well as an increasing number of refugees and internally

displaced persons worldwide, the impact that environmental change will have on the

refugee–host relationship is a factor that deserves serious consideration.

This is indeed apparent from the fact that while the Tanzanians and refugees generally

enjoy amicable relations, a number of problems and confl icts had appeared over the

In recent years, one of the most frequently cited negative impacts, emphasised in

particular by host country governments, is environmental degradation and natural

resource depletion. As stated in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR 2005:3) manual entitled Key principles for decision making:

Evidence shows that large-scale dislocation of people, characteristic of many

recent refugee crises, can create adverse environmental impacts. The scale

and suddenness of refugee fl ows can rapidly change a situation of relative

abundance of local resources to one of acute scarcity.

Environmental degradation and natural resource depletion have been shown to create

or exacerbate confl ict between groups competing for these increasingly scarce resources

at times (Homer-Dixon 2001; Schwartz et al 2000; Kahl 1999). This type of confl ict is

not inevitable, but a refugee hosting area that shows signs of widespread environmental

degradation and resource depletion is one type of location in which environment-related

confl ict is most likely (Martin 2005:3).

Western Tanzania is one such region where, despite implementation of environmental

management protects, the long-term presence of over 400 000 refugees has contributed

to widespread deforestation, depletion of water resources, soil erosion, and the loss of

wild animal habitat (UNEP 2005; Redeso 2003; Western Tanzania Ecomonitoring

Project 1997). While these problems would be detrimental to any community, they are

particularly problematic in areas like Western Tanzania where the great majority of both

the refugees and hosts depend on the natural resources for their daily survival.

The activities of the rapidly growing local population in the region have contributed

to these problems, but the government of Tanzania has openly stated that it is the

refugees who are mainly responsible for the incalculable environmental damage to the

country and the destruction of water sources and natural vegetation within and around

the camps. A number of non-government affi liated reports confi rm this claim, as do

the local and national media in Tanzania (Rutinwa & Kamanga 2003:4). A Tanzanian

national newspaper reported: ‘Not a single day passes in … Northwestern Tanzania

without their residents telling chilling stories on how the tens of thousands of refugees

based in the region are doing harm to the environment. A bird’s eye view of the region

tells it all: serious environmental degradation caused by the presence of the refugees …’

(Liganga 2006).

The majority of Tanzanians in the region, as well as many living in regions as far away as

Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, agree with the general premise of this and similar articles,

which is that the refugees are the primary drivers of environmental degradation in the

Western part of the country.

128 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Commentaries 129

various international organisations and NGOs working in the region, such as medical

clinics and access to medicine, schools, and improved roads and public transportation.

While many of these projects and improvements to the area infrastructure were intended

specifi cally to assist the refugees and the UN and NGO staff working with the refugees,

the local communities were indirect benefi ciaries. UNHCR and NGOs in the region

have also implemented a number of refugee hosting area projects aimed specifi cally at the

local Tanzanian population. In addition to health, security, education, and infrastructure

projects, these organisations also supported environmental management projects that

mitigate environmental degradation and restore already degraded areas.

The complex nature of any refugee situation means that myriad factors and conditions

combine to shape the refugee–host relationship. Although environmental degradation

will not necessarily ever be the most signifi cant variable in shaping the impact of the

refugees on the hosts and the overall refugee–host relationship, it is certainly a signifi cant

variable that has been shown to be present in many refugee affected areas. In light of this,

a number of points should be considered in current and future refugee emergencies to

ensure that environmental confl ict between refugees and local communities is prevented

or at least mitigated.

When studying the impacts of refugees on host populations, one must also consider how

these impacts are perceived by the local communities. Perception can indeed at times

be more important than the reality of the situation in coming to an understanding of

the refugee–host relationship. For example, while the growth in the local Tanzanian

population may have contributed signifi cantly to the environmental degradation in the

region, the overwhelming majority of Tanzanians, including those running the country

and the media, view the refugees as the cause. If the local communities themselves are

not given a chance to discuss their views on the advantages and disadvantages of the

refugee presence in their region, outsiders may see only the positive changes that have

occurred because of the presence of the refugees, such as economic growth or improved

health facilities. They thus lose sight of negative impacts, and even though on the surface

the refugee–host relationship is amicable and free of confl ict, the host communities

may indeed feel resentment that may cause confl icts between the two groups. Thus,

in order to truly understand the impacts that a refugee population may have on a host

community, the latter must be given a voice.

At the same time, it is important to investigate the reality of the situation. While refugee

communities are often blamed for the degradation and other environmental problems,

one cannot ignore the fact that the local communities may also be responsible for

some of the problems. If possible, efforts should be made to collect data on the natural

environment, climate, and natural resource stocks in any location where refugees have

settled; such data should be collected throughout the refugees’ stay in order to monitor

changes occurring to the natural environment. Host communities can also benefi t from

years, with the majority of the problems or confl icts relating to the environment and

environmental degradation. Most of the confl icts were not violent, but several resource-

related confl icts have spilled over into violence on a small scale, and villagers reported that

if they were to fi nd refugees cutting down trees illegally, they would not say anything for

fear of being hurt physically. In 2003, in response to these confl icts, a number of NGOs

in the region established confl ict resolution meetings involving all stakeholders. Such

meetings, also referred to as ‘good neighbour meetings’, were held from time to time in

the refugee camps between 2004 and 2006 and were structured similarly: the fi rst part of

the meetings touched on the successes or failures of past meetings, and the second part

was open to discussion on new or remaining problems. Two organisations working in

the refugee camps and surrounding villages in the region, CARE International and the

Relief to Development Society (Redeso), headed the meetings and attendees included

village leaders and representatives, refugee leaders and representatives, UNHCR staff,

camp management offi cials, Tanzania’s ministry of home affairs and district natural

resources offi ces employees, as well as other NGO staff.

The problems most often mentioned by the local communities include deforestation,

refugees trespassing on forest reserves and village land to collect and cut fi rewood and

farm, depletion and blockage of water resources, bush and forest fi res, cutting and

burning of trees to make charcoal, and hunting of wild animals in the nearby game

reserves. Additional confl icts and problems stemmed from issues of security within and

outside of the camps, harassment of refugees by Tanzanian government offi cials, and

complaints or grievances directed toward UNHCR or local government offi cials (Nduta

Camp confl ict resolution meeting 2005).

The Tanzanians have mixed opinions about the effi cacy of the meetings, generally

noting that the meetings are useful, but that many of the confl icts or problems brought

up in the meetings were not in fact resolved in the long term. Minutes of these meetings

confi rm this, showing that the same issues that were raised during the 2004 meetings

were raised again during the 2006 meetings. Interestingly, while there was a consensus

among the groups that most of the problems and confl icts brought up in the meetings

remained unsolved, the widely held opinion is that the meetings are benefi cial and should

continue. In fact, many of the participants suggested that one of the main problems is

that the meetings are not held often enough.

In addition to the meetings, a number of other variables were found to have infl uenced

the locals’ perception of the refugees, ultimately mitigating some of the negative feelings

associated with the environmental degradation that was blamed on the refugees. The

presence of a cheap labor force, an increase in the level of trade because of the increase

in population, mixed marriages, and friendships between the refugees and Tanzanians,

were all seen as positive aspects of the refugees’ presence. Most signifi cant, and most

often mentioned by the local communities, were the projects funded and run by the

130 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Commentaries 131

because both the natural environment and the people living in these areas will undoubtedly

be affected by an infl ux of refugees, those working with refugees and countries hosting

refugees must continue to study the impact that the environmental changes has on the

host communities and on the overall refugee–host relationship. Steps can be taken to

mitigate environmental degradation as well as to lessen the negative impact of degradation

on the host and refugee communities. While these efforts cannot necessarily prevent

confl ict between the two groups, the study in Tanzania shows that because environmental

problems do create tensions and confl icts, lessening these problems will help to improve

the overall relationship and diminish the likelihood of confl ict.

References

Engineering and Environmental Services Section (EESS) of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

1998. Refugee operations and environmental management: selected lessons learned, June. Available at

http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b03b2754.pdf [accessed 15 September 2006 ].

Homer-Dixon, T 2001. Environment, scarcity, and violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kahl, C 1999. States, scarcity, and civil strife in the developing world. Institute of War and Peace Studies.

Columbia International Affairs Online, April. Available at http://0-www.ciaonet.org.bianca.penlib.du.edu:80/

wps/kac02/index.html [accessed 3 November 2005].

Liganga, L 2006. Refugees and the environment: the other side of Tanzania’s generosity. ThisDay, 28 August,

p 16.

Martin, A 2005. Environmental confl ict between refugee host communities. Journal of Peace Research,

42(3):329–346.

Nduta Camp confl ict resolution meeting 2005. Minutes, 3 August.

Redeso (Relief to Development Society) 2003. Report on Buyungu forest reserve. Redeso, Kibondo offi ce.

Rutinwa, B and Kamanga, K 2003. The impact of the presence of refugees in northwestern Tanzania. The

Center for Forced Migration at the University of Dar es Salaam. Final report. Available at http://www.

refugees.org/article.aspx?id=1193 [accessed 26 August 2006].

Schwartz, D, Deligiannis, T and Homer-Dixon, T 2000. The environment and violent confl ict: a response

to Gleditsch’s critique and suggestions for future research. Environmental Change & Security Project Report,

6:77–93.

UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme) Division of Environmental Policy Implementation

2005. Impacts of refugees and internally displaced persons on the environment in Tanzania. Available at

www.unep.org/depi/programmes/emergencies.html [accessed 26 August 2006].

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) 2005. UNHCR environmental guidelines.

Available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3b

03b2a04 [accessed 24 August 2006].

Western Tanzania Ecomonitoring Project 1997. Environmental assessment report: refugee camps and

contingency sites in Kigoma.

Whitaker, B E 2002. Refugees in Western Tanzania: the distribution of burdens and benefi ts among hosts.

Journal of Refugee Studies, 15(4):339–358.

this, as monitoring of changes in the environment can help to prepare for potential

future environmental changes relating to climate change or natural disasters.

Locals will benefi t from learning new farming and forestry techniques that aim to

reduce soil erosion and water resource depletion, and will also gain from using new

technologies such as wood-saving stoves. UNHCR should put more emphasis on

environmental management projects in order to prevent environmental degradation,

rather than dealing with the consequences of the degradation at some future stage. An

infl ux of thousands of people into one area will inevitably create environmental problems,

particularly when both the refugees and host population depend on natural resources for

their daily survival, yet much can be done to ensure that the degradation is mitigated.

UNHCR has developed numerous manuals and statements on environmental policies

and standards, but obviously such policies need to be implemented – something that has

not occurred in the case of Tanzania. While there may be good reasons for this, such as

limited funding, more emphasis should be placed on the importance of environmental

management projects and their connection to the overall well-being of both the refugees

and host communities.

Refugee hosting area projects in general are extremely valuable, not just because of

their immediate benefi ts, but also because, as has been the case in Tanzania, they can

ultimately improve the relationship between the refugees and hosts and so lessen or even

prevent confl ict between the two groups. While many of the Tanzanians believe that

the refugees were the cause of the environmental problems in the area, they also felt

that having the refugee presence had overall positive effects, and that on the whole there

were more benefi ts than costs to the refugees’ presence.

UNHCR is not offi cially mandated to support or implement development projects,

particularly in non-refugee communities. However, in the case of Tanzania, the local

communities and government offi cials did expect UNHCR to support community

projects. Unless other UN agencies or alternative donors are willing to provide such

support, UNHCR should continue to do so. These projects may ultimately support

long-term and sustainable economic development in the refugee hosting areas (Whitaker

2002). This would be signifi cant particularly as refugee areas, including those in Western

Tanzania, are often the most underdeveloped areas in the host countries.

Additionally, confl ict resolution meetings should be held in all refugee situations and

on a regular basis. Not only do the meetings allow villagers and refugees to air their

grievances and discuss possible solutions to ongoing problems, they are also simply a

venue for interaction among the two groups.

The presence of enduring and new confl icts in the world means that people will continue

to seek refuge in neighbouring countries or in other parts of their own country, and

BOOK REVIEWThe ethics of climate change:

Right and wrong in a warming worldJames Garvey

African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Book Review 135

and to consider some scientifi c predictions concerning the impact of climate change.

With regard to Garvey’s fi rst two concerns, suffi ce it to say that at this stage there is no

real doubt that climate change is occurring. In 2007 the International Panel on Climate

Change, in a statement supported by numerous national and regional scientifi c bodies,

concluded that ‘warming of the climate system is now unequivocal, as is now evident

from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread

melting of snow and ice, and a rising global average sea level’ (p 15). However, there

remains disagreement concerning the third issue – estimates of the impact of climate

change. Some of this concerns factual predictions: estimates of increases in global

average surface temperature vary from 1,1 oC to 6,4 oC this century, though even the

lowest increase is likely to produce dramatic effects (p 24). This means that although

we can make educated guesses about how different regions will be affected, there is real

uncertainty here. It is unfortunate that Garvey does not give more serious attention to

the ways in which this affects moral judgements about how to distribute resources and

energy in reducing climate change.

The moral argument begins in chapter 2. Rather oddly, this is a review of the dominant

theories of morality, which – unless I am missing something – is not properly integrated

into a discussion of the moral issues posed by climate change. Garvey claims that he

wants to show that it is possible to justify moral claims; he would do better in a book of

this length to assume that it is, and proceed to the substantive questions. In fact, he gets

to these issues in the following chapter, where he articulates three moral principles aimed

at guiding refl ection on who should bear the burden of responsibility for taking action

against climate change. The principles may be simply stated: historical responsibilities

(the ‘You broke it, you bought it’ intuition), present capacities (if you have the resources

to address the problem, you should do so), and sustainability (concerned with our

responsibility not to damage or use up the resources needed for survival by future

generations). Later, in chapter 5, Garvey adds a fourth principle – procedural fairness

(decisions concerning policy should be made in a manner that is fair to all participants,

and should take relevant scientifi c information into account).

These fi rst three principles lead Garvey to conclude that it is the developed world –

especially the USA – that needs to shoulder the burden of responsibility in dealing

with climate change. Because the countries of the developed world are responsible for

the bulk of both current and historic carbon dioxide emissions (although developing

countries such as China and India are beginning to catch up), they need to do most

to resolve the problem. Similarly, because far more of the carbon dioxide emissions of

developed countries are luxury emissions (not subsistence emissions), these countries can

and should do more to reduce them. The principle of sustainability, on the other hand,

applies to everyone, including developing countries, and raises the possibility that poor

countries might have to engage in ‘belt-tightening’ too. Here Garvey falls back on his

fi rst two principles to insist that the principle of sustainability should not be used to

The ethics of climate change:Right and wrong in a warming worldJames Garvey*

James Garvey’s short book The ethics of climate change is designed as an introductory

text on a dauntingly complex and serious question. The issue is complex because it

involves questions of scientifi c fact, competing understandings of moral value, different

conceptions and levels of moral responsibility, and confl icts between the moral principles

that one can call upon to guide or assess policy-making. It is serious because even

conservative estimates of climate change indicate its alarming potential to disrupt and

threaten the lives of humans and other animals and forms of life over the next century.

Garvey addresses the question of scientifi c evidence for global warming in his fi rst

chapter. He has three concerns here: to convince the undecided or uninformed that

climate change is not a distant prospect but is already at work; to dispel the idea that

there is a serious scientifi c debate about the existence of anthropogenic climate change;

* London: Continuum, 2008.

136 African Security Review 17.3 Institute for Security Studies Book Review 137

levels of responsibility; exceptional individuals may choose to sacrifi ce for the sake of

sustainability – but unless the practices of businesses and local and regional governments

concerning the design and placement of homes can be changed, the costs of sustainability

will remain prohibitive for most individuals.

Finally, there is a real question about how international agreements to reduce emissions

levels are to be enforced. Garvey alludes to economic sanctions as a means of achieving

this but says nothing about what agencies could implement such strategies legitimately.

Would he support unilateral action by a developed country or set of countries who

complies with the agreement, to force a defaulting developing country such as China

into compliance? I am sure that he would not want to, though if there were a genuine

violation of an agreement and of the principle of sustainability, it would be inconsistent

of him not to support coercive action. Here again the issue of legitimacy intrudes, and

demands a more sustained treatment.

It is clear that climate change is going to pose some very unpleasant moral questions. I

must say that I do not think that this book faces up to their full weight.

Book review by Jonathan Allen, Department of Political Science,

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

prevent countries with starving populations from developing economically. He concludes

by expressing the hope that ‘the developed world will see to it that the developing world

will leapfrog the worst of industrialization and join the rest of us living sustainable lives’

(p 87).

While I sympathise with this move, it is not clearly consistent with the rest of Garvey’s

argument, which is heavily reliant on the consequentialist concern to avert disaster. In

chapter 4 he turns this concern against a range of proposals that suggests there is no need

to alter emissions-rich lifestyles, showing that new technologies alone cannot solve the

problem, and that proposals that we should wait until we are sure that others will act

are guaranteed only to make matters much worse. In this chapter Garvey seems to rely

more on considerations of fairness; he uses his fourth principle – procedural fairness –

to criticise the artifi cial targets, unequal sacrifi ces, and non-binding nature of the Kyoto

Accord. But in the end he concedes that while Kyoto seriously misses the moral mark,

some concessions will probably have to be made to developed countries to gain their

support, and that the focus will have to be on agreeing upon ‘equal per capita’ shares

of emissions that do not exceed the planet’s capacity to absorb them. Garvey praises

the ‘contraction and convergence’ version of this approach for going some way towards

recognising the present capacities principle, for placing a somewhat heavier burden on

developed countries, and for allowing emissions trading, which, Garvey claims (without

discussing the evidence), tend to ‘narrow the gap between rich and poor’ (p 129). But

it is hard to avoid the conclusion that while concerns of justice and fairness continue

to matter to Garvey, his argument is increasingly driven by the concern to minimise

harm overall, irrespective of the fairness of the policies chosen. Indeed, he comes close

to admitting this directly: ‘If there is a confl ict between sustainability and the other

criteria, in this case historical responsibility, I get the feeling sustainability wins’ (p

133).

My main complaint about Garvey’s argument, then, is that he is not suffi ciently frank

about the potential confl ict between consequentialism and considerations of justice

involved in deciding on strategies for reducing climate change. Through much of the

text, Garvey presents himself as a defender of developing countries. But when it comes

to the crunch he subordinates these concerns to the goal of sustainability. Considering

the magnitude of the crisis we are now facing, that is unpalatable but not unreasonable.

However, it is unfortunate that Garvey does not confront this confl ict consistently

and openly, or devotes more refl ection to the extent to which sustainability cannot

be achieved unless it occurs through agreements that are perceived to be fair by the

developing world.

There are other problems with the book. In his fi nal chapter, Garvey moves much

too quickly from discussing the responsibilities of national governments to a call for

action at the individual level. There is a need for a much clearer recognition of multiple

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