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AFGHANISTAN: AFTER THE ELECTION Annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research Hollywood, Florida – May 16, 2015 Gary Langer and Gregory Holyk Matthew Warshaw Jessica Beaird

AFTER THE ELECTION - Home - AAPOR€¦ · its ongoing Afghan Futures series. Design and analysis by ... March 2014 Pre-election Poll November ... Afghans shared a growing sense of

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AFGHANISTAN:AFTER THE ELECTION

Annual meeting of theAmerican Association for Public Opinion ResearchHollywood, Florida – May 16, 2015

Gary Langer andGregory Holyk

Matthew Warshaw

Jessica Beaird

BackgroundPre- and post-election national surveys by the Afghan Center forSocio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR-Surveys) as part ofits ongoing Afghan Futures series. Design and analysis by LangerResearch Associates and D3 Systems, Inc.

March 2014Pre-election Poll

November 2014Post-election Poll

April 2014AfghanistanPresidential

Election

June 2014Runoff –

Ghani/Abdullah

September 2014Ghani declaredwinner; strikespower-sharing

accordw/Abdullah

Methodology

oNationwide random sampleso2,643 and 2,051 face-to-face interviewsoConducted in Dari and PashtooAfghan adults 18 and olderoMargin of sampling error

oMarch 10-18 and Nov. 4-12, 2014

+/- 2.5 points for full samples +/- 4 points for pre-election survey’s sample of 1,190 likely voters

Pre-election results

46%

45%

35%

32%

8%

11%

AfghanFuturessurvey

Final IECResults

Abdullah Ghani Rasul

Survey estimates closely matched the first-round outcome per the Afghan IndependentElection Commission, with 45/46 percent for Abdullah Abdullah, and 32/35 percent forAshraf Ghani.

Ethnic and regional divisions were by far the strongest individualpredictors of vote preferences.

Abdullah benefitted from higher Tajikturnout in the North, and Hazaras in theCentral region and Kabul.

Ghani was broadly backed by ethnicPashtuns in the South, as well as Uzbeks.

4%

13%

45%

38%Very easy

Somewhat easy

Somewhat difficult

Very difficult

Despite these divisions, a vast majority of Afghans said it would be very or somewhateasy for them to accept someone from an ethnic group other than their own aspresident.

71%said they wouldaccept Abdullah asthe legitimateleader ofAfghanistan.

76%said they wouldaccept Ghani asthe legitimateleader ofAfghanistan.

82%were confidentthe nextpresidentwould unite thecountry.

Post-Election Attitudes

Recap:• Abdullah and Ghani advanced to a runoff• Ghani prevailed; results were disputed• Power-sharing deal emerged: Ghani as president, Abdullah

in the new position of chief executive

44%

55%

Contrary to their expectations, fewer thanhalf of Afghans saw the election as fairand transparent.

March 2014

November 2014

87%

Yet a vast majority approved of thepower-sharing agreement.

Even among those who saw the runoff as fraudulent,

84%

approved of the power-sharing deal, indicating a willingness to tolerate improvisedmeasures in search of stability.

78%accepted Abdullahas the legitimatepresident.

84%accepted Ghanias the legitimatechief executive.

76%were satisfiedwith theoutcome.

80%expressedconfidence thata system offreely electingleaders can workin Afghanistan.

Still, fewer were very satisfied with the outcome or expressed high levels of confidencein free elections.

14%

17%

6%

7%

50%

47%

29%

29%

Very/Somewhat unsatisfied Somewhat/Very satisfied

Not at all/Not so confident Somewhat/Very confident

SatisfactionwithElection Outcome

Confidence inFree Elections

Looking Forward

48%

61%64%

73%

2013 2014

Afghans shared a growing sense of optimism after the election. Compared with 2013,more rated their overall living conditions positively and said Afghanistan was heading inthe right direction.

Compared with four years previous, Afghans were more likely to say they could afford fueland food and rated their ability to afford things and security from the Taliban positively.

47%

62%

44%

58%

39%

51%

31%

49%

2010 2014

Good security from TalibanGood ability to afford things

Can afford foodCan afford fuel

92%

4%

Current government Taliban

Nine in 10 Afghans continued toprefer the current government overthe Taliban.

12%

53%

United States Taliban

Most continued to blame the Talibanfor Afghanistan's violence.

Despite broad opposition to the Taliban, the majority of Afghans:

71%

60% 60%

Preferred a negotiatedsettlement vs. continued

fighting

Expressed willingness for Talibanmembers to join Afghan securityforces if they lay down their arms

Were unwilling to cedecontrol of some provinces to

the Taliban in a peace deal

Despite broad opposition to the Taliban, the majority of Afghans:

71%

60% 60%

Preferred a negotiatedsettlement vs. continued

fighting

Expressed willingness for Talibanmembers to join Afghan securityforces if they lay down their arms

Were unwilling to cedecontrol of some provinces to

the Taliban in a peace deal

Despite broad opposition to the Taliban, the majority of Afghans:

71%

60% 60%

Preferred a negotiatedsettlement vs. continued

fighting

Expressed willingness for Talibanmembers to join Afghan securityforces if they lay down their arms

Were unwilling to cedecontrol of some provinces to

the Taliban in a peace deal

Seventy-seven percent supported the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Manyfewer, 46 percent, said they would like to see additional U.S. forces in the country, withwide regional disparities.

52%

N

S

EW

62%

N

W E

S 27%W

S

E

N

39% 39% 37%

Jobs or other economicopportunities

Supply of electricity Support for agriculture

Problems remain. Well fewer than half rated the following positively:

73%

53%

2005 2014

In a discouraging result, the percentage of Afghans who see the cultivation of opiumpoppy as "unacceptable in all cases" has declined sharply.

Support for women's rights was substantial in most cases, but far from universal, andnot always strong.

18%

12%

7%

5%

33%

24%

20%

17%

11%

6%

28%

34%

33%

36%

28%

25%

20%

31%

40%

42%

57%

67%

Women traveling unescorted non-locally

Women traveling unescorted locally

Women holding office

Women holding jobs

Girls' education

Women voting

Strongly oppose Somewhat oppose Somewhat support Strongly support

Generally, support for women’s rights was highest among urban women,followed by urban men, then by rural women, and sharply lower, in mostcases, among rural men.

of the country’spopulation livesin rural areas.

75%

In a result that’s challenging to Western sensibilities, substantialnumbers said they would accept circumscribed women’s rights inexchange for a settlement with the Taliban.

• Sixty-five percent would accept restrictions on women leaving the homeunescorted.

• Half or nearly half would accept bans on women working, holding politicaloffice, attending school and voting.

• Men and women expressed these views in essentially equal numbers.

Afghans who said civil society organizations were active in their area were more likelyto believe CSOs make things better in their country, compared with those who wereunaware of CSOs operating locally.

43%

45%

45%

50%

51%

53%

56%

57%

61%

25%

30%

30%

38%

45%

31%

46%

52%

34%Reducing corruption

Expanding girls' education

Expanding boys' education

Improving access to health services

Expanding women's rights

Improving election participation

Providing job training

Expanding rights of thehandicapped

Supporting agriculture

Conclusions:• Relief at the peaceful transition of power presents an

opportunity to build national cohesion and democraticinstitutions.

• Brighter expectations are a positive, but a risk if unfulfilled.

• War-weariness and economic deprivation frame policypreferences.

• International development efforts can play a continuedcritical role.

Conclusions:• Relief at the peaceful transition of power presents an

opportunity to build national cohesion and democraticinstitutions.

• Brighter expectations are a positive, but a risk if unfulfilled.

• War-weariness and economic deprivation frame policypreferences.

• International development efforts can play a continuedcritical role.

Conclusions:• Relief at the peaceful transition of power presents an

opportunity to build national cohesion and democraticinstitutions.

• Brighter expectations are a positive, but a risk if unfulfilled.

• War-weariness and economic deprivation frame policypreferences.

• International development efforts can play a continuedcritical role.

Conclusions:• Relief at the peaceful transition of power presents an

opportunity to build national cohesion and democraticinstitutions.

• Brighter expectations are a positive, but a risk if unfulfilled.

• War-weariness and economic deprivation frame policypreferences.

• International development efforts can play a continuedcritical role.

For moreinformation,please contact:

8300 Greensboro Dr.Suite 450McLean, VA 22102(703) 388-2450www.d3systems.com

D3 Systems, Inc.

Matthew Warshaw

Managing [email protected]

Thank you!For more information:

Gary LangerPresidentLanger Research AssociatesNew York, New [email protected]

Matthew WarshawManaging DirectorACSOR-SurveysAfghanistanmatthew.warshaw@acsor-surveys.com

Gregory HolykResearch AnalystLanger Research [email protected]

Jessica BeairdAssistant Research AnalystD3 Systems, Inc.McLean, [email protected]