Robert James Neo

ESCUETA, RUBIO & THE HEIRS OF BALOLOY V. LIMG.R.No.137162 January 24, 2007Facts: Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title to, real property, with preliminary injunction and issuance of [a hold-departure order] from the Philippines against Ignacio Rubio. Respondent amended her complaint to include specific performance and damages. She alleged that she bought the hereditary shares consisting of 10 lots of Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy and that a contract of sale was executed in her favour. Allegedly, said vendors received a downpayment or earnest money of P102,169.86 and P450,000. Also, it was agreed in the contract of sale that the vendors would secure certificates of title covering their respective hereditary shares; that the balance of the purchase price would be paid to each heir upon presentation of their individual certificates of title; and that Rubio and the heirs of Baloloy refused to receive the other half of the down payment and refuse to deliver to the respondents the certificates of title covering his share on the two lots.As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her knowledge that the disputed lots have already been sold by Ignacio Rubio to respondent, it is alleged that a simulated deed of sale involving said lots was effected by Ignacio Rubio in her favor and that the simulated deed of sale by Rubio to Escueta has raised doubts and clouds over respondents title.In their separate amended answers, petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged inter alia the following:The heirs of Baloloy said that respondent has no cause of action, because the subject contract of sale has no more force and effect as far as the Baloloys are concerned, since they have withdrawn their offer to sell for the reason that respondent failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as orally promised on or before May 1, 1990.As for Rubio and Escueta, they said that respondent has no cause of action because Rubio has not entered into a contract of sale with her; that he has appointed his daughter Patricia Llamas to be his attorney-in-fact and not in favor of Virgiania Laygo-Lim who was the one who represented him in the sale of the disputed lots in favor of respondent; that the P100,000 respondent claimed he received as down payment for the lots is a simple transaction by way of a loan with Lim.The trial court ruled in favour of Lim, and so did the CA. Now, petitioners are alleging that the CA erred, considering that the CA did not consider the circumstances surrounding petitioners failure to appear at the pre-trial and to file the petition for relief on time. As to the failure to appear at the pre-trial, there was fraud, accident and/or excusable neglect, because petitioner Bayani was in the United States. There was no service of the notice of pre-trial or order. Furthermore, petitioner Alejandrino was not clothed with a power of attorney to appear on behalf of Bayani at the pre-trial conference.Second, petitioners allege that the sale by Virginia to respondent is not binding Virginia was not authorized to transact business in his behalf pertaining to the property. The Special Power of Attorney was constituted in favor of Llamas, and the latter was not empowered to designate a substitute attorney-in-fact. Llamas even disowned her signature appearing on the "Joint Special Power of Attorney," which constituted Virginia as her true and lawful attorney-in-fact in selling Rubios properties.Petitioners further allege that the amount encashed by Rubio represented not the down payment, but the payment of respondents debt. His acceptance and encashment of the check was not a ratification of the contract of sale.Also, they say that the contract between respondent and Virginia is a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. The real character of the contract is not the title given, but the intention of the parties. They intended to reserve ownership of the property to petitioners pending full payment of the purchase price. Issue: W/N the contract of sale between petitioner and respondent is valid.

Ratio: YES, valid.1. No fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence exists in order that the petition for relief may be granted. Article. 1892 provides that the agent may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so, although such agent shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute when he was not given the power to appoint one. 2. Applying the above-quoted provision to the special power of attorney executed by Ignacio Rubio in favor of his daughter Patricia Llamas, it is clear that she is not prohibited from appointing a substitute. By authorizing Virginia Lim to sell the subject properties, Patricia merely acted within the limits of the authority given by her father, but she will have to be "responsible for the acts of the sub-agent," among which is precisely the sale of the subject properties in favor of respondent.3. Even assuming that Virginia Lim has no authority to sell the subject properties, the contract she executed in favor of respondent is not void, but simply unenforceable, under the second paragraph of Article 1317 of the Civil Code which provides that a contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.Applying this to the case at bar: Rubio is now estopped since he accepted and encashed the check. Such acts constitute ratification and produce the effects of an express power of agency. The same applies to the Baloloy heirs.4. Indeed, Virginia Lim and respondent have entered into a contract of sale. Not only has the title to the subject properties passed to the latter upon delivery of the thing sold, but there is also no stipulation in the contract that states the ownership is to be reserved in or "retained by the vendor until full payment of the price."Other Doctrines:1. As regards the pre-trial: The notices of pre-trial had been sent to both the Baloloys and their former counsel of record. Not having raised the ground of lack of a special power of attorney in their motion, they are now deemed to have waived it. For lack of representation at the pre-trial, Bayani Baloloy was properly declared in default.2. All the elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are present, such as: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. Ignacio Rubio, the Baloloys, and their co-heirs sold their hereditary shares for a price certain to which respondent agreed to buy and pay for the subject properties. The offer and the acceptance are concurrent, since the minds of the contracting parties meet in the terms of the agreement. In fact, earnest money has been given by respondent and it shall be considered as part of the price and as proof of the perfection of the contract. Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48282, dated. Consequently, Ignacio Rubio could no longer sell the subject properties to Corazon Escueta.October 26, 1998 and January 11, 1999, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR v. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, EULOGIO M. MARIANO, JOSE D. JIMENEZ, JR.,TORIBIO E. ILAO, JR. and ERNESTO R. SALENGA 510 SCRA 74 December 6, 2006 FACTS: Paciencia Regala owns a seven (7)-hectare fishpond located at Sasmuan, Pampanga. Her Attorney-in-Fact Faustino R.Mercado leased the fishpond to Eduardo Lapid for a three (3)-year period. Lessee Eduardo Lapid in turn sub-leased thefishpond to Rafael Lopez during the last seven (7) months of the original lease. Ernesto Salenga was hired by EduardoLapid as fishpond watchman (bante-encargado). In the sub-lease, Rafael Lopez rehired respondent Salenga. ErnestoSalenga Salenga, sent the demand letter to Rafael Lopez and Lourdes Lapid for unpaid salaries and non-payment of the 10% share in the harvest. Salenga was promted to file a Complaint before the Provincial Agrarian ReformAdjudication Board (PARAB), Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga docketed as DARAB Case No. 552-P93 entitled Ernesto R. Salenga v. Rafael L. Lopez and Lourdes L. Lapid for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession, Collection of Sumof Money and Supervision of Harvest.Pending resolution of the agrarian case, the instant case was instituted by petitioner Antonio Baltazar, an allegednephew of Faustino Mercado, through a Complaint-Affidavit against private respondents before the Office of theOmbudsman which was docketed as OMB-1-94-3425 entitled Antonio B. Baltazar v. Eulogio Mariano, Jose Jimenez, Jr.,Toribio Ilao, Jr. and Ernesto Salenga for violation of RA 3019. Petitioner maintains that respondent Ilao, Jr. had no jurisdiction to hear and act on DARAB Case No. 552-P93 filed by respondent Salenga as there was no tenancy relation between respondent Salenga and Rafael L. Lopez, and thus, the complaint was dismissible on its face.ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to pursue the instant petition? Whether or not the Ombudsman likewise erred in reversing his own resolution where it was resolved that accused as Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator has no jurisdiction over a complaint where there exist no tenancy relationship?HELD: The "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, there is no question on his authority and legal standing. The Ombudsman can act on anonymous complaints and motu proprio inquire into alleged improper official acts or omissions from whatever source, e.g., a newspaper. Faustino Mercado, is an agent himself and as such cannot further delegate his agency to another. An agent cannot delegate to another the same agency. Re-delegation of the agency would be detrimental to the principal as the second agent has no privity of contract with the former. In the instant case, petitioner has no privity of contract with Paciencia Regala, owner of the fishpond and principal of Faustino Mercado. The facts clearly show that it was not the Ombudsman through the OSP who allowed respondent Ilao, Jr. to submit his Counter-Affidavit. It was the Sandigan bayan who granted the prayed for re-investigation and ordered the OSP to conduct the re-investigation. The OSP simply followed the graft courts directive to conduct the re-investigation after the Counter-Affidavit of respondent Ilao, Jr. was filed. Indeed, petitioner did not contest nor question the August 29, 1997 Order of the graft court. Moreover, petitioner did not file any reply-affidavit in the re-investigation despite notice.

The nature of the case is determined by the settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss. Respondent Salengas complaint and its attachment clearly spells out the jurisdictional allegations that he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected from it, clearly, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not be faulted in assuming jurisdiction as said allegations characterize an agricultural dispute.Besides, whatever defense asserted in an answer or motion to dismiss is not to be considered in resolving the issue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent upon the allegations of the defendant.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the Order and the October 30, 1998 Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 23661 (OMB-1-94-3425) are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with costs against petitioner employee.

MENDEZONA V VIUDA DE GOITIAMarch 11, 1930; VILLAMOR, J. (lora)

FACTS:- Defendant Encarnacion C. Vda, de Goitia has been duly appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband BenignoGoitia- BenignoGoitia was the representative and attorney- in-fact of the plaintiffs in the joint-account partnership known as the Tren de Aguadas, of which the plaintiff Leonor Mendezona, widow of Juan Bautista Goitia, owns 180 shares worth P18,000, and the plaintiff ValentinaIzaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares worth P7,200- Prior to 1915, BenignoGoitia, at that time the manager of the co-partnership, collected the dividends for the plaintiffs, which he remitted to them every year. That the usual dividends which BenignoGoitia forwarded to plaintiff Leonor Mendezona each year were P540, and to plaintiff ValentinaIzaguirre y Nazabal, P216- From 1915 until his death in August, 1926, BenignoGoitia failed to remit the dividends- Some time before his death, more particularly, in July, 1926, BenignoGoitia, who was no longer the manager of the said business, receive as attorney-in-fact of both plaintiff, the amount of P90 as dividend upon plaintiff Leonor Mendezona's shares, and P36 upon ValentinaIzaguirre y Nazabal's stock- During the period from 1915 to 1926, BenignoGoitia collected and received certain sums as dividends and profits upon the plaintiffs's stock in the Tren de Aguadas in his capacity as representative and attorney- in-fact for both of them, which he has neither remitted nor accounted for to the said plaintiffsEvidence- Counsel for both plaintiffs filed their claims with the committee of claims and appraisal of the estate of BenignoGoitia, and, upon their disallowance, appealed from the committee's decision by means of the complaints in these two cases.- The court below ordered the defendant, as judicial administratrix of BenignoGoitia's estate to render a judicial account of the intestate estate of the deceased BenignoGoitia, to render an account of the amounts collected by her aforesaid husband as attorney-in-fact and representative of the plaintiffs in the copartnership from 1915 to July, 1926, within thirty days from notice of this decision- Defendant, reiterating her exception to the court's decision enjoining her to render accounts, manifested that after a painstaking examination of the books of account of the copartnership and several attempts to obtain data from Ruperto Santos, the manager and administrator thereof, she has found no more evidence of any amount received by her late husband than a book of accounts where she came upon an item of P90 for Leonor Mendezona, and another of P36 for ValentinaIzaguirre.- The court ordered the defendant, as judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased BenignoGoitia, to pay the plaintiff Leonor Mendezona the sum of P13,140 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint, and to pay the plaintiff ValentinaIzaguirre P5,256 likewise with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint, and moreover, to pay the costs of both instances.- The defendant appealed from this judgment.-The appellees made depositions before the American consul at Bilbao, Spain, in accordance with section 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Counsel for the appellant was notified of the taking of these depositions, and he did not suggest any other interrogatory in addition to the questions of the committee. When these depositions were read in court, the defendant objected to their admission, invoking section 383, No. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Her objection referred mainly to the following questions:1. Did Mr. BenignoGoitia render you an account of your partnership in the "Tren de Aguadas?" Yes, until the year 1914.2. From the year 1915, did Mr. BenignoGoitia send you any report or money on account of profits upon your shares? He sent me nothing, nor did he answer, my letters.3. Did you ever ask him to send you a statement of your account Yes, several times by letter, but I never received an answer.ISSUE:WON the appellees' depositions are admissible.HELD:YES. The first of these questions tends to show the relationship between the principals and their attorney- in-fact BenignoGoitia up to 1914. Supposing it was error to permit such a question, it would not be reversible error, for that very relationship is proved by the Exhibits . - As to the other two questions, it is to be noted that the deponents deny having received from the deceased BenignoGoitia any money on account of profits on their shares, since 1915. We are of opinion that the claimants' denial that a certain fact occurred before the death of their attorney-in-fact BenignoAgoitia does not come within the legal prohibitions (section 383, No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure).- The law prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim against the estate of a decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which took place before the death of the deceased. The underlying principle of this prohibition is to protect the intestate estate from fictitious claims. But this protection should not be treated as an absolute bar or prohibition from the filing of just claims against the decedent's estate.- The facts in the case of Maxilom vs. Tabotabo differ from those in the case at bar.- Maxilom vs. Tabotabo: the plaintiff Maxilom liquidated his accounts with the deceased Tabotabo during his lifetime, with the result that there was a balance in his favor and against Tabotabo of P312.37, Mexican currency. The liquidation was signed by both Maxilom and Tabotabo. In spite of this, some years later, or in 1906, Maxilom filed a claim against the estate of Tabotabo for P1,062.37alleging that P750 which included the 1899 liquidation had not really been received, and that therefore instead of P312.37, Mexican currency, that liquidation should have shown a balance of P1,062.37 in favor of Maxilom. It is evident that in view of the prohibition of section 383, paragraph 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, Maxilom could not testify in his own behalf against Tabotabo's estate, so as to alter the balance of the liquidation made by and between himself and the decedent.-But in the case before us there has been no such liquidation between the plaintiffs and the deceased Goitia. They testify, denying any such liquidation. To apply to them the rule that "if death has sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law seals those of the other," would be to exclude all possibility of a claim against the testamentary estate. This was the legislator's intention. - The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact which took place before their representative's death, but on the contrary denied that it had taken place at all, i.e. they denied that a liquidation had been made or any money remitted on account of their shares in the "Tren de Aguadas" which is the ground of their claim. It was incumbent upon the appellant to prove by proper evidence that the affirmative proposition was true, either by bringing into court the books which the attorney-in-fact was in duty bound to keep, or by introducing copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew them, as was the decedents's usual practice according to Exhibit I, or by other similar evidence.- The appellant admits having found a book of accounts kept by the decedent showing an item of P90 for the account of Leonor Mendezona and another of P36 for the account of ValentinaIzaguirre, which agrees with the statement of Ruperto Santos, who succeeded BenignoGoitia in the administration of said partnership, to the effect that the deceased attorney-in-fact had collected the amounts due the plaintiffs as dividends on their shares for the months of May and June, 1926, or P90 for Leonor Mendezona, and P36 for ValentinaIzaguirre, amounts which had not been remitted by the deceased to the plaintiffs.Disposition Judgment affirmedMetropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 88866 February, 18, 1991Cruz, J.:

Facts: Eduardo Gomez opened an account with Golden Savings and deposited 38 treasury warrants. All warrants were subsequently indorsed by Gloria Castillo as Cashier of Golden Savings and deposited to its Savings account in Metrobank branch in Calapan, Mindoro. They were sent for clearance. Meanwhile, Gomez is not allowed to withdraw from his account, later, however, exasperated over Floria repeated inquiries and also as an accommodation for a valued client Metrobank decided to allow Golden Savings to withdraw from proceeds of the warrants. In turn, Golden Savings subsequently allowed Gomez to make withdrawals from his own account. Metrobank informed Golden Savings that 32 of the warrants had been dishonored by the Bureau of Treasury and demanded the refund by Golden Savings of the amount it had previously withdrawn, to make up the deficit in its account. The demand was rejected. Metrobank then sued Golden Savings.

Issue:1. Whether or not Metrobank can demand refund agaist Golden Savings with regard to the amount withdraws to make up with the deficit as a result of the dishonored treasury warrants.2. Whether or not treasury warrants are negotiable instruments

Held: No. Metrobank is negligent in giving Golden Savings the impression that the treasury warrants had been cleared and that, consequently, it was safe to allow Gomez to withdraw. Without such assurance, Golden Savings would not have allowed the withdrawals. Indeed, Golden Savings might even have incurred liability for its refusal to return the money that all appearances belonged to the depositor, who could therefore withdraw it anytime and for any reason he saw fit.It was, in fact, to secure the clearance of the treasury warrants that Golden Savings deposited them to its account with Metrobank. Golden Savings had no clearing facilities of its own. It relied on Metrobank to determine the validity of the warrants through its own services. The proceeds of the warrants were withheld from Gomez until Metrobank allowed Golden Savings itself to withdraw them from its own deposit.Metrobank cannot contend that by indorsing the warrants in general, Golden Savings assumed that they were genuine and in all respects what they purport to be, in accordance with Sec. 66 of NIL. The simple reason that NIL is not applicable to non negotiable instruments, treasury warrants. No. The treasury warrants are not negotiable instruments. Clearly stamped on their face is the word: non negotiable. Moreover, and this is equal significance, it is indicated that they are payable from a particular fund, to wit, Fund 501. An instrument to be negotiable instrument must contain an unconditional promise or orders to pay a sum certain in money. As provided by Sec 3 of NIL an unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional though coupled with: 1st, an indication of a particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made or a particular account to be debited with the amount; or 2nd, a statement of the transaction which give rise to the instrument. But an order to promise to pay out of particular fund is not unconditional. The indication of Fund 501 as the source of the payment to be made on the treasury warrants makes the order or promise to pay not conditional and the warrants themselves non-negotiable. There should be no question that the exception on Section 3 of NIL is applicable in the case at bar.Austria v.s. Court of Appeals 39 SCRA 527 (1971)G.R. No. L-29640DATE: June 10, 1971FACTS:Guillermo Austria gave Maria G. Abad a pendant with diamonds to be sold on a commission basis or to return on demand. However, on her way home, 2 men snatched her pursue which contained the jewelry and cash. In short, Abad failed to return the jewelry upon demand. A case was filed for the recovery or for damages. In defense, the alleged robbery extinguished the obligation.ISSUE:Whether or not Abad is liable?HELD:YES. The Court cited Article 1174 of the Civil Code is not applicable, in the case the agreement provided that except in cases expressly specified by the law or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable. It is a recognized jurisdiction that to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility. It is necessary that the event must be independent of the human will or the obligors will.

International Films (China) Ltd. v.s. The Lyric Film Exchange, Inc. 63 Phil. 778 (1936)DOCKET NO. / CASE NO.: G.R. No. L-42465DATE: November 19, 1936FACTS:On April 5, 1933, the plaintiff company made Bernard Gabelman as its agent in the Philippines through a power of attorney. Through its agent, he can lease the films and show them in Cavite and other places. One of the conditions of the contract was the defendant (Lyric) would answer for the loss of the film in question whatever the cause. Thereafter, the chief of the film department, Vicente Albo of Lyric telephoned the said agent (Gabelman) informing that the showing of said film had already finished and asked at the same time, where he wished to have the film returned to him. Gabelman went to Albos and asked whether he could deposit the film in question in the vault of the defendant as the plaintiff did not have a safety vault, yet as required by the fire department. Albo declined the offer but Gabelman insisted thus there was a verbal agreement. Gabelman was replaced by Lazarus Joseph, a new agent and informed the latter of the agreement they took immediately the deposited films except of one which was in their possession of their bodega.ISSUE:Whether or not the defendant is responsible for the destruction of the film Monte Carlo Madness?

HELD:NO. Verbal contract between Gabelman and Albo was a sub-agency the defendant company is not civilly liable for the destruction because a mere submandatroy or sub-agent, it was not obliged to fulfill more than the contents of the mandate and to answer for damages caused to the principal (Art. 1718 of the Civil Code). The fact that the film was not insured against fire does not constitute fraud or negligence on the part of Lyric because as sub-agent, it received no instruction to that effect from its principal and the insurance does not form a part of the obligation.