Agents, Structures and International Relations support. 46 The scientiﬁc realist approach to epistemological concerns is to reject ‘epistemological monism’ in favour of epistemological oppor- tunism. 47 This can be viewed as a rejection of all attempts to build robust epistemological fortresses that allow us to ‘be certain of our experiences but not about that of which they are experiences (the external world, other minds, or even our own bodies)’. 48 Understood as the attempt to provide depth explanations, however, a series of metaphysical commitments is still implied. Broadly put, I consider these to be: ontological realism (that there is a reality independent of the mind(s) that would wish to come to know it); epistemological relativism (that all beliefs are socially produced); and judgemental rationalism (that despite epistemological relativism, it is still possible, in principle, to choose between competing theories). Ontological realism Every theory of knowledge must logically presuppose a theory of what the world is like (ontology), for knowledge (epistemology) to be possible. In which case, all philosophies, cognitive discourses and practical activities presuppose a realism – in the sense of some ontology or gen- eral account of the world – of one kind or another. 49 The question is not whether to be a realist, but of what kind. The history of philosophy is replete with examples of philosophers, often self-professed idealists, who are forced in one way or another to be realists about something: Plato about the forms; Hegel about Geist; Berkeley about God; Hume about his own scepticism and sensations; Nietzsche about will to power; Derrida about the text. For good reasons philosophical realism is an unfashionable position within contemporary social theorising. 50 Realism normally implies that objects have a mind-independent existence. Social objects clearly violate this principle: no people, no social objects. Social objects depend upon minds. This has led all manner of positions to declare that ‘reality is a social construct’, 51 or that ‘there is nothing outside of discourse’. 52 And there is something important to these claims as a result of well-founded epistemological humility regarding existential claims. Contemporary anti-realism can be traced, on the one hand, to the rejections of, and attempts to transcend, positivism, which is wrongly believed to adhere to philosophical realism; and, on the other hand, to 46 Wight (1999). 47 Morrow and Brown (1994). 48 Outhwaite (1987: 19). 49 Bhaskar (1989: 2). 50 See Hacking (1999). 51 Berger and Luckmann (1967). 52 Campbell (2001). 26

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Agents, Structures and International Relations

support.46 The scientific realist approach to epistemological concerns isto reject ‘epistemological monism’ in favour of epistemological oppor-tunism.47 This can be viewed as a rejection of all attempts to build robustepistemological fortresses that allow us to ‘be certain of our experiencesbut not about that of which they are experiences (the external world,other minds, or even our own bodies)’.48

Understood as the attempt to provide depth explanations, however,a series of metaphysical commitments is still implied. Broadly put, Iconsider these to be: ontological realism (that there is a reality indepen-dent of the mind(s) that would wish to come to know it); epistemolog-ical relativism (that all beliefs are socially produced); and judgementalrationalism (that despite epistemological relativism, it is still possible,in principle, to choose between competing theories).

Ontological realismEvery theory of knowledge must logically presuppose a theory of whatthe world is like (ontology), for knowledge (epistemology) to be possi-ble. In which case, all philosophies, cognitive discourses and practicalactivities presuppose a realism – in the sense of some ontology or gen-eral account of the world – of one kind or another.49 The question isnot whether to be a realist, but of what kind. The history of philosophyis replete with examples of philosophers, often self-professed idealists,who are forced in one way or another to be realists about something:Plato about the forms; Hegel about Geist; Berkeley about God; Humeabout his own scepticism and sensations; Nietzsche about will to power;Derrida about the text.

For good reasons philosophical realism is an unfashionable positionwithin contemporary social theorising.50 Realism normally implies thatobjects have a mind-independent existence. Social objects clearly violatethis principle: no people, no social objects. Social objects depend uponminds. This has led all manner of positions to declare that ‘reality is asocial construct’,51 or that ‘there is nothing outside of discourse’.52 Andthere is something important to these claims as a result of well-foundedepistemological humility regarding existential claims.

Contemporary anti-realism can be traced, on the one hand, to therejections of, and attempts to transcend, positivism, which is wronglybelieved to adhere to philosophical realism; and, on the other hand, to

46 Wight (1999). 47 Morrow and Brown (1994). 48 Outhwaite (1987: 19).49 Bhaskar (1989: 2). 50 See Hacking (1999).51 Berger and Luckmann (1967). 52 Campbell (2001).