Aging and Political Participatio in Japan

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Aging and Political Participation in Japan: The Dankai Generation in a Political SwingAuthor(s): Yasuo TakaoSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 5 (September/October 2009), pp. 852-872Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2009.49.5.852 .

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Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 5, pp. 852–872, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2009 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis-sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights andPermissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2009.49.5.852.

852

AGING AND POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION IN JAPAN

The Dankai Generationin a Political Swing

Yasuo Takao

AbstractPopulation aging is not just the socioeconomic issue of Japan’s future, but the

political issue as well. The sharing of resources for an aging society will re-

shape policy strategies and democracy-building. This article will examine the

direction and nature of participation by the elderly in the political process of

Japanese society.

Keywords: Japan, aging, elderly, political participation, intergenerational justice

Most people have heard the old saying, “The older we

get, the more conservative we tend to become.” Is it true that the elderly

are by nature resistant to change? In 2007, some 2.7 million Japanese com-

pany workers born between 1947 and 1949 retired or planned to retire in

the near future.1 These company workers are the eldest of the first-wave of

baby boomers, who are politically influential and have done much to bol-

ster Japan’s economic growth. They are the most likely to emerge as the

Yasuo Takao is Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences and

Asian Languages, Curtin University of Technology, Western Australia, Australia. The author

gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Masaharu Hori and Susan Takao. Email: .

1. The 2005 population census of Japan indicated that the population aged 65 and over

was 25.8 million, accounting for 20.1% of the total (127.8 million). According to material

provided by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC),

as of 2007, there were 6.8 million people who were born between 1947 and 1949 and are still

alive today.

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YASUO TAKAO 853

spearhead of socially mobilized senior citizens’ groups. It appears that re-

tired baby boomers are already in the process of organizing and institu-

tionalizing themselves as a social movement in major urban areas such as

Tokyo and Osaka. In October 2005, Kan Naoto, a representative of the

major opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), identified himself as

a baby boomer when he proposed the formation of a new political party

known as the Dankai (Baby Boomer) Party. There is a large body of liter-

ature on public policy toward old people in Japan, yet probably the single

most important factor for explaining policy change, the elderly themselves,

remains largely unexplored.2 A corollary of this omission is the assump-

tion that Japanese elderly remain poorly organized for participating in

policy making. This article examines the potential influence of elderly

voters and socially mobilized elderly groups in Japan on the politics of

the welfare state.3

Researchers in the field of general electorate studies have demonstrated

the significance of generational differences in political attitudes and po-

litical participation.4 One common approach to examining changes in

our political preferences over time is to apply the liberal-conservative po-

litical spectrum to generational cohorts.5 Some researchers suggest that

the assumption that “the older individuals are, the more likely they are

conservative” is not necessarily true. Rather, they argue, the generational

differences may derive significantly from the varying ways in which a set

of individuals born within the same time span experience historical events

at similar life stages. In other words, those differences may be a reflection

of environmental and social conditions that each generation experiences

differently.6

2. See, for example, John Creighton Campbell, How Policies Change: The Japanese Gov-

ernment and the Aging Society (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Stephen

John Anderson, Welfare Policy and Politics in Japan (New York: Paragon House, 1993).3. It is easy to stereotype the elderly as “conservative” on the political spectrum, but the

elderly are not necessarily resistant to change. There are significant findings in the literature

that see the lives of older individuals as shaped by social contexts: culture, religion, state poli-

cies, and historical changes in family structures and economic markets. See, for example,

Robert H. Binstock and Christine Day, “Aging and Politics,” in Handbook of Aging and Social

Sciences, 4th ed., eds. Robert H. Binstock and Linda K. George (San Diego: Academic Press,

1996); John M. Cornman and Eric R. Kingson, “Trends, Issues, Perspectives, and Values for

the Aging of the Baby Boom Cohorts,” The Gerontologist 36:1 (February 1996), pp. 15–26.

4. Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 1996); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival

of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).5. See, for example, Stephen J. Cutler, “Attitudes,” in The Encyclopedia of Aging , ed.

George L. Maddox (New York: Springer, 1987).

6. Binstock and Day, “Aging and Politics,” pp. 362–87.

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854 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2009

This generational hypothesis is an alternative to the life-cycle hypothesis,7

which suggests that the generational differences reflect life stages that in-

volve age-related factors such as income, education, parental responsibili-

ties, and physical mobility. According to the generational hypothesis, the

Dankai cohort that came of age in the 1960s student movements and spear-

headed the effort to reinvent Japan in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis should

have been more strongly affected by those historical events than those born

much earlier or later. This is not to say that life stages do not spawn signifi-

cant differences. But the Dankai-specific socializing experiences reveal life-

long patterns of political participation, and deserve attention.

Japan’s current population of 128 million is aging faster than that of

any other industrialized nation.8 A rapidly growing body of retirees in

Japan has good potential to shift from being purely reactive recipients of

social services toward being more proactive participants in political pro-

cesses. According to the National Institute of Population and Social Secu-

rity Research, by 2013 more than one-quarter of the country’s population

will be 65 or older.9 Japan will reach a two-to-one ratio of its working age

population (aged 15 to 64) to its elderly population (aged 65 or older) by

2015.10 The shrinking population of Japanese workers needs to support

this growing pool of elderly as well as their own children. Irrespective of

their financial preparedness for retirement, the massive numbers of these

future pensioners will impose a heavy burden on Japanese society, particu-

larly as everything they consume will need to be produced by the working

population (unless it is acquired from outside Japan).

However, birth rates are falling and the proportion of work-capable citi-

zens is declining accordingly. The unprecedented, continued increase in

the elderly population will not only place a heavy burden on the working

7. Lester W. Milbrath and M. L. Goel, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally,

1977), pp. 134–35; Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, andDemocracy in America (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 139. Rosenstone and Hansen also

suggest that as people grow older, they gain resources and experiences that promote participation.

See Rosenstone and Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America, p. 137.

8. Based on the results of the medium variant projection, the elderly population (aged 65 or

over) as a percentage of the total population among “more developed regions” (Europe plus

North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) will be an estimated 17.3% in 2015 and

26.1% in 2050. In contrast, Japan’s elderly as a percentage of the total population is expected to

increase from 26.9% in 2015 to 39.6% in 2050. See Population Division of the Department of

Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat,World Population Prospect: The

2006 Revision, , accessed November 3, 2007.

9. Japan, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Nihon no ShoraiSuikei Jinko [Japan’s population projection for future dates], December 2006 (Tokyo: National

Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2006), p. 5.

10. Ibid.

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YASUO TAKAO 855

age population. It will also place retired people in a position to act as deci-

sion-making partners of the shrinking work force in Japanese politics. Theelderly population as a percentage of Japan’s eligible voters (aged 20 or

older) will increase from 21% in 1991 to an estimated 33% in 2025 and

40% by 2050 (see Figure 1).11 As the age of the median elector rises rap-

idly, the center of political gravity in Japan may shift away from taxpayers

toward pensioners, with the expectation that the elderly will exert increas-

ing political pressure as the population ages.12

11. Japan, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Ippan Jinko

Tokei, accessed November 27, 2007. In Japan, the legal voting age is 20 for all elections at thenational, prefectural, and municipal levels.

12. Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of

Public Expenditures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

FIGURE 1 Changes in Population Structure by Age Groups, 1955–2055

SOURCE: The figures are adapted from Japan, National Institute of Population and Social

Security Research, Ippan Jinko Tokei [General population statistics], , accessed January 10, 2008.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055

P e r c e n t a g e

o f T o t a l P o p u l a t i o n

Working Population (aged 15 to 64)

Elderly Population (aged 65 or over)

Young Population (aged 0 to 14)

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The following arguments are organized into four sections: (1) an exami-

nation of current generations of the Japanese elderly who are not optimally

organized to represent their broad interests, (2) an investigation of the new

generation of Japanese elderly who are expected to be more active in orga-

nizing their interests than previous generations, (3) an identification of thekey political issues in interest representation for the aging Japanese popu-

lation, and (4) an analysis of the nature and patterns of the political mus-

cle exercised by the new generation of Japanese elderly.

Why Are the Japanese Elderly Not as WellOrganized as Possible?

Well-organized senior-advocacy groups like the American Association of

Retired Persons (AARP) in the United States have yet to emerge in Japan.

There are specific reasons why the Japanese elderly are not as well organized

as they could be for interest representation. First, the task of organizing se-

nior citizens into socially mobilized groups requires active members from 60

to 70 years of age who are mentally and physically fit. But Japanese men

tend to work well beyond age 60, the official retirement age for those work-

ing in most medium and large companies. Elderly persons still active in

labor markets, who tend to demonstrate strong group identification and

obligations to their work place, do not necessarily support the group inter-

ests of retirees. The tendency of employed elderly to find security in be-

longing to a particular company prevents them from forming coalitions

with elderly outside their firm. As Table 1 demonstrates, Japan’s elderly

cohort has the highest labor participation rate among the Organization

TABLE 1 Senior (65 and Older) Labor Force Participation Rates amongMajor OECD Countries, 2005

Nation’s ElderlyEmployed

(in ten thousands)

Labor Participation Rates (%)

Total Male Female

Japan 495 19.4 28.7 12.6USA 509 14.5 19.1 11.1

Canada 31 7.9 11.4 4.6

UK 58 6.3 9.0 4.3

Germany 52 3.4 5.1 2.2

Italy 35 3.1 6.0 1.1

France 13 1.3 1.7 1.0

SOURCE: Figures are adapted from the OECD, 2006 OECD Employment Outlook , except

for Japan’s figures, which are provided by MIAC.

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YASUO TAKAO 857

for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) group of major in-

dustrial countries. Approximately one-half of all Japanese men aged 60 to

70, and one-quarter of those aged 70 to 75, remain in the work force.

Second, the importance of koenkai (personal support organizations),

which are organized by politicians to mobilize voters at the local level,

poses a barrier to the consolidation of elderly voters and groups. Elderly

participation in the koenkai of individual politicians limits the potential

for the elderly to organize their own interests. According to the Akarui

Senkyo Suishin Kyokai (Association for Promoting Fair Elections), koen-

kai participation rates of eligible voters peaked at 19.7% for national poli-

ticians in the 1979 lower house election and 30% for local politicians in the

1987 unified local election.13 Association surveys found that respondents

are more likely to participate in koenkai as they get older.

However, beginning around 1990, these participation rates began to de-

cline continuously because of a series of events such as Japan’s decision to

open its rice market, the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) loss of its lower-

house majority in the 1993 general election, and the 1994 abolition of the

koenkai -driven multi-seat constituency. These events provided less incentive

to join koenkai where LDP politicians had distributed favors to constituents

in the past. These support organizations are major channels through which

senior citizens can request a politician’s help in solving their problems and

can seek personal favors.14 The basis of koenkai strategies can be found in the

mobilization of chien (neighborhood ties), ketsuen (kinship ties), and kai-

shaen (company ties), the sources of favoritism and exclusiveness in tradi-

tional Japanese society.15 These ties tend to function as a rigidly closed system

that excludes the elderly who are not linked to the population by the ties.

Third, self-employed individuals such as farmers and shopkeepers, who

have no mandatory retirement age, are more likely to encourage the interests

of the producer rather than the consumer through their support of the pro-

business LDP. The bulk of the demands voiced by elderly shopkeepers tends

13. See Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai, Senkyo no Ishiki Chosa [Survey on voters’ attitudes],

, accessed November 2, 2007.

14. In 1994 a new electoral system of single member districts (SMD) for the lower house

was introduced to create incentives for party/policy-centered elections rather than candidate-

centered campaigns. Many findings suggest that the post-reform elections are still largely

candidate-centered. See, for example, Ichiro Miyake, Senkyo Seido Henkaku to Tohyo Kodo

[Electoral reform and voting behavior] (Tokyo: Mokutakusha, 2001); Motoshi Suzuki,

“Shugiin Shinsenkyo Seido ni okeru Senryakuteki Tohyo to Seito Shisutemu” [Strategic voting

and party systems in the new electoral system for the lower house], Leviathan 25 (Fall 1999),

pp. 32–51; Sadafumi Kawato, Takashi Yoshino, Koji Hirano, and Junko Kato, Gendai no

Seito to Senkyo [Contemporary political parties and elections] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2001).

15. The term chien-ketsuen refers to ties of both neighborhood and kinship. Within

neighborhood-based or kinship-based groups, members feel secure through tightly knit

activities, but their security is often maintained at the expense of their individual autonomy.

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to be directed toward small-business protection. Elderly farmers hold opin-

ions consonant with their keen interest in receiving agricultural subsidies.

The interests of small business and farming often run counter to those of

elderly consumers. Most elderly people living in rural areas belong to senior

clubs for recreation and leisure; they are heavily dependent on agricultural

associations, the strongest lobbying groups in Japan, to voice their political

concerns. As of 2007, 7.8 million households (99% of farm households) be-

longed to the Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai (Nokyo), Japan’s Association of Agri-

cultural Cooperatives. Nearly 60% of those who are engaged in farming are

aged 65 or over.16 The membership of Nokyo is larger than that of any po-

litical organization in Japan. Members are kept in close contact with con-

servative national elites through the group’s executives. Nokyo continues to

lobby individual politicians and bureaucrats on agricultural legislation. It

provides its members with help for a wide range of services such as financ-

ing, crop sales, purchases of production equipment, and insurance schemes.17

To the extent that Nokyo represents and promotes their interests, the elderly

in farming households have less incentive to organize their interests.

Fourth, Japan’s government-sponsored health insurance that covers all

elderly persons also reduces the likelihood of senior citizens’ participation

in public policy making. In the United States, a government health care

system for the elderly has been a partial solution to the need for medical

care, requiring them to purchase health care services in markets. This flaw

in U.S. elderly policy explains the success of the AARP’s political activi-

ties, including lobbying to address issues affecting elder Americans while

providing services the government does not.

In Japan, public demand for health services for the elderly has been rela-

tively moderate because of two basic factors: the Japanese tradition of family

care for the elderly, and a government health care program to cover everyone

in the elderly population, which began in 1963.18 A decade later, the Japanese

government made medical care virtually free for persons age 70 and older,

although this was scaled back with the 1983 introduction of ichibu futan (co-

insurance), which required the patient to pay a small portion of the costs.19

16. Japan, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Heisei Jukyu-nen Nogyo Kozo

Dotai Chosa Hokoku [2007 report on changes in agricultural structure], , accessed December 3, 2007.

17. In the 1990s, as the Nokyo had monopolized financing of all crop sales and purchases

of production equipment, farming families began to increasingly drift away from the central-

ized Nokyo’s control and purchase such services in open markets.

18. William E. Steslicke, “The Development of Health Insurance Policy in Japan,” Journal

of Health Policy, Politics, and Law 7:1 (Spring 1982), pp. 197–226.

19. John Creighton Campbell, “The Old People Boom and Japanese Policy Making,”

Journal of Japanese Studies 5:2 (Summer 1979), pp. 321–57; John Creighton Campbell,

“Problems, Solutions, Non-Solutions, and Free Medical Care for the Elderly in Japan,”Pacific

Affairs 57:1 (Spring 1984), pp. 53–64.

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YASUO TAKAO 859

Fifth, Japan’s service organizations for the elderly, which operate on a

not-for-profit basis, have performed poorly in the market-oriented task of

meeting their particular needs. Although pursuing a social mission driven

by a commitment to shared values, these non-profit organizations (NPOs)

often pay little attention to effective performance. Effectiveness requires

the ability to act on information provided by the elderly, the availability of

consumption choices, the efficient delivery of services, fund-raising exper-

tise, accountability, and proximity to clients. Shakai fukushi hojin (social

welfare corporations), which are private, non-profit service providers, are

heavily regulated by the government and dependent on public funds, rely-

ing on such for 80%–90% of their income.20 Bureaucrats tend to treat such

organizations as an extension of the government for providing national

government-defined services.

In contrast, NPOs in the United States have historically distanced them-

selves from the state and have legal leeway in supporting and promoting

the interests of the elderly. The AARP, for example, offers a range of

health insurance and pharmacy products and provides counseling for in-

vestment, legal issues, and tax aid.21 As compared with Japan’s service or-

ganizations for the elderly, the AARP has effectively used the benefits of

market economies, promoted consumption choices, and served the needs

and interests of the elderly through legislative advocacy.22 Today, with

more than 35 million members, the AARP is the second largest organiza-

tion, after the Roman Catholic Church, in the United States.

Why Are the Japanese Elderly NowExpected to Organize More?

Several potential factors account for an expansion of elderly interest rep-

resentation. The most general explanation sees the growth as a response to

increased needs. Because of demographic shifts, the elderly have become

acutely aware of greater needs; they are seeking more from the governmenton their own behalf. Another explanation can be found in the allocation of

scarce resources. As tax revenues stagnate along with the demographic shift,

20. Their scope of activities is defined and audited under the Social Welfare Service Law of

1951. See Yasuo Takao, “The Rise of the ‘Third Sector’ in Japan,” Asian Survey 41:2 (March/

April 2001), pp. 293–98.

21. AARP, , accessed December 3, 2007.

22. Allan J. Cigar and Burdett Loomis, Interest Group Politics, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.:

Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995), p. 12; Robert H. Binstock, “The Old-Age Lobby in aNew Political Era,” in The Future of Age-Based Public Policy, ed. Robert B. Hudson (Baltimore,

Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press 1997), pp. 57–74; Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, “Follow the

Money,” Fortune, December 6, 1999, p. 206.

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the elderly need to exert political pressures on the government to devote

more resources to them.

Even more fundamental is a change in the collective beliefs of the el-

derly. This explanation for their efforts at interest representation reflects a

structural shift in basic values. Indeed, the elderly direct attention to the

quality of life in post-industrial society. Increasing needs, stagnant re-

sources, and changing beliefs all appear to be contributing to the growing

efforts of the elderly to organize their interests.23 Apart from these funda-

mental factors that may be influential in the longer term, however, there

are potential determinants that may be applied to a relatively short-term

explanation of the expansion of elderly interest representation in Japan.

First, the speed of aging of Japan’s population in urban areas is much

faster than in rural areas. In the past, population aging took place in rural

areas rather than urban areas. The Dankai generation left rural areas in

the 1960s and early 1970s seeking a better life in urban areas, thereby cre-

ating the aged small population of villages and towns across the nation.

Now the eldest cohort of the Dankai has reached 60 years of age in urban

areas. As of 1995, the elderly population (i.e., aged 65 or older) as a percent-

age of Japan’s eligible voters was much higher in rural prefectures (22.6% in

Shimane, 21.0% in Kochi, 20.5% in Yamagata, and 20.1% in Akita) than

in urban ones (10.4% in Saitama, 11.3% in Chiba, 11.4% in Kanagawa,

and 12% in Aichi).24 Only a decade later, in 2005, the major urban prefec-

ture figures began to exceed the threshold of 20% (20.3% in Saitama,

21.5% in Chiba, 20.6% in Kanagawa, and 21.5% in Aichi).25

Now in the Tokyo metropolitan area, even after the youngest members

of the Dankai generation reach 60 years of age in 2010, the large body of

Dankai juniors (the second wave of baby boomers in post-World War Two

Japan) born between 1971 and 1974 may slow down the expansion of el-

derly shares of votes. However, once the Dankai juniors reach 60 years of

age or over in 2035, it is estimated that the elderly will account for about

35% of eligible voters in metropolitan areas. As discussed below, given

that the elderly cohort’s voter turnout has traditionally been much higher

than in other age groups, as early as 2040 elderly votes may represent more

than half of the total votes in Japan’s national elections.

Second, the age group with the highest voter turnout in Japan has been

shifting steadily toward an older cohort of eligible voters. As Figure 2

23. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equity; David Truman, The Government Process (New

York: Knopf, 1953).

24. The figures are calculated from Japan, Statistical Bureau, MIAC, 1995 PopulationCensus, , accessed January 10, 2008.

25. The figures are calculated from ibid., 2005 Population Census, , accessed January 10, 2008.

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http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kokusei/index.htmhttp://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kokusei/index.htmhttp://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kokusei/index.htmhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kokusei/index.htmhttp://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kokusei/index.htmhttp://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kokusei/index.htm


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FIGURE 2 Voter Turnouts by Age Groups in Lower House Elections,

1967–2005

SOURCE: Japan, Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai, “Shugiin Giin Senkyo Nenreibetsu Tohyoritsu

no Suii” [Trends of voter turnout rates in lower house elections], , accessed January 10, 2008.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1967 1969 1972 1976 1979 1980 1983 1986 1990 1993 1996 2000 2003 2005

Election Years

P e r c e n t a g e

20s 30s

70s

40s

50s 60s

AS4905_06_Takao.indd 861 10/9/09 2:55:26 PM




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indicates, Japanese eligible voters in their 50s had the highest turnout in lower

house elections from 1967 to 1980. In the 1983 election, for the first time those

in their 60s had the highest turnout rate. They have continued to do so. Since

1990, the turnout gap between those in their 50s and those in their 60s has

gradually widened over a series of lower house elections. Even more interest-

ing is the case of voters in their 70s. Their turnout rate was at the bottom in

the 1967 election yet began to continually rise with the 1969 election, eventu-

ally reaching the second highest rate overall in the 2005 election.

Among the most critical factors in understanding the generational dif-

ferences of political participation are physical and mental limitations.26

In the 1950s and 1960s, although eligible voters aged 60 or older remained

active, once they reached their 70s their voter turnout rates abruptly

dropped. This would suggest that growing physical and mental limita-

tions may have impaired their ability to vote. In contrast, their increased

turnout in recent years suggests that eligible voters aged 70 or older may

be more physically and mentally fit for political activity than in previous

generations.

A third reason for an expansion of elderly interest representation is that

the aging of Japan’s population in urban areas is expected to increase the

weight of elderly demand for providing individualized social services. In the

past, Japanese public policy on national government aid concentrated on

rural prefectures such as Shimane and Tottori. Depopulated rural prefectures

need more money per capita to provide the same level of service as urban

ones. This is because it is costly for rural prefectures to improve their

infrastructure in depopulated areas. In 1995, for example, residents of 11

rural prefectures including Shimane and Tottori received national transfer

payments of $2,891 each, seven times the $409 level for persons living in

the urban prefectures Aichi, Osaka, or Tokyo. In the same fiscal year, the

rural prefectures spent more than twice per capita ($3,545) the level of the

urban prefectures ($1,445).27

However, as the population aged 65 and over has grown, individualized

social services for the elderly have also expanded dramatically. Unlike

public infrastructure development, which is relatively independent of pop-

ulation size, individualized service delivery in densely populated urban

zones is much more expensive than in sparsely populated rural areas. Local

public welfare expenditure as a percentage of gross national product (GNP)

increased continuously from 1.9% in 1985 through 2.4% in 1995 to 3.1% in

26. Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy inAmerica (New York: Macmillan, 1993).

27. The figures are calculated from Japan, Ministry of Home Affairs, Chiho Zaisei Hakusho

[White paper of local public finance], 1997 ed. (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1997).

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YASUO TAKAO 863

2004. As discussed below, the government’s initial response to the demand

of individualized social services was the 2000 introduction of public, man-

datory long-term care insurance (LTCI). Yet, in recent years, cutbacks in

grants-in-aid by the national government have hit social benefits particu-

larly hard. This is especially the case for individualized social services,

which represent over 90% of the affected amount.28 The elderly in Japan’s

urban areas are expected to become quite vocal in decrying the lack of

funds for individualized services.

Fourth, the LTCI will politicize individualized care for the elderly: the

program is designed to shift responsibility for care from the family to the

state.29 This mandatory program will create new public pressures to bring

the elderly together for interest aggregation. Under this scheme, everyone

aged 40 and older drawing an income must contribute; all elderly, regard-

less of income or family situation, are eligible for nearly the full range of

institutional or community-based care, depending on the level of physical

and mental disability (functional and cognitive status). Half of total LTCI

spending is subsidized by the government—50% national, 25% prefectural,

and 25% municipal. Another half comes from social insurance based on

premiums paid by persons aged 40 to 64 and those aged 65 and older. The

municipal government has its responsibility to implement the LTCI pro-

gram, yet the same level of insurance premiums across Japan has produced

different qualities of service delivery. This imbalance must withstand the

scrutiny of both voters and emerging networks of elderly.

With voter concern over possible increases in premiums and decreases

in the minimum age of insurance contributors, care for the elderly has

become a major political issue. In the past, Japanese social policy was

formed within the framework of agendas, which are set by the state

bureaucracy.30 Social welfare has been seen as the heart of bipartisan

efforts in the Japanese party system, and thus was depoliticized in policy

making. However, the case of LTCI legislation tells otherwise. At the early

stage of the LTCI proposal, interest groups––representatives of medical

doctors, national associations of employers, and labor unions––bargained

hard to protect their vested interests in the new system.31 Perhaps the

28. The figures are calculated from Japan, MIAC (formerly Ministry of Home Affairs),

Chiho Zaisei Hakusho, various years.

29. John Creighton Campbell and Naoki Ikegami, “Long-Term Care Insurance Comes to

Japan,” Health Affairs 19:3 (May/June 2000), pp. 26–39.

30. Campbell, How Policies Change; Junko Kato, The Problem of Bureaucratic Rationality

(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).31. Mikitaka Masuyama, “Kaigo Hoken no Seijigaku” [The policy making process of the

LTCI], Nihon Kokyo Seisaku Gakkai Nenpo [Annual report of Public Policy Studies Association

Japan] (June 1998), pp. 1–26.

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single most important factor for Japan’s move toward “socialization of

care”32 for the frail elderly was public support, evident in major opinion polls

as the LTCI proposal became public. Nearly three-quarters of respondents

were in favor of the LTCI.33

Fifth, senior citizens’ networking has been shifting the basis of mobili-

zation from exclusive chien-ketsuen to inclusive voluntarism. Far from

being a collective product of voluntary, individual decision making, senior

citizens’ organizations historically derived from neighborhood-based net-

working. They became an integral part of state policy in post-World War

Two Japan. One such organization is the Zenkoku Rojin Kurabu Rengokai

(Japan Federation of Senior Citizens’ Clubs [JFSCC]), the largest senior

citizens’ grouping in Japan. Its membership has remained at 8.8 million over

the past decade. The federation consists of about 134,000 senior clubs, es-

tablished in each neighborhood association across the nation.34 Since the

1963 enactment of the Elderly Welfare Law, the federation has received na-

tional and local operating subsidies.

The presidents of the federation have been either former LDP parlia-

mentarians or former welfare bureaucrats. The federation worked closely

with the national government. However, participation rates in those senior

clubs dropped significantly, to about one-third of those aged 60 and older

in 2000 from more than one-half in the 1980s. In 1997, these rates were

much higher in rural prefectures (e.g., 63.5% in Toyama) than in urban

prefectures (e.g., 17.7% in Tokyo). This trend coincided with the LDP’s

reliance on rural votes.35 The motives that influenced senior citizens to join

the senior clubs did not derive primarily from individuals’ proactive be-

liefs, but rather from social norms requiring acceptance as a community

member in their neighborhood.

By the mid-1980s, signs of attitude change began to appear amid the

passive, reactive status quo. As existing welfare organizations found them-

selves unable to cope with the demand for individualized social services

for the elderly, private voluntary organizations oriented toward self-help

and advocacy were organized in increasing numbers to meet this need.36

32. The LTCI is aimed at the “socialization” (shakaika) of care through mandatory social

insurance; all elderly, regardless of household income levels, are eligible for a wide range of

institutional or community-based care.

33. Yomiuri Shinbun [Yomiuri News], Tokyo edition, September 14, 1996.

34. JFSCC, Zenkoku Rojin Kurabu Rengokai [Japan Federation of Senior Citizens’ Clubs,

Inc.], , accessed January 10, 2008.

35. Katsuyoshi Iwabuchi and Mitsuru Uchida, Eijingu no Seijigaku [Aging and politics]

(Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppankai, 1999), pp. 66–67.

36. Japan, Economic Planning Agency (EPA), ed., Shimin Katsudo Repoto: Shimin Katsudo

Dantai Kihon Chosa Hokoku [Report on citizens’ activities: Basic research report on citizens’

action groups] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1997), p. 6; Kansai Sogo Kenkyujo, ed.,

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YASUO TAKAO 865

One of the pioneering organizations is the Koreika Shakai o Yokusuru Josei

no Kai (Women’s Association for Better Aging Society), established in

1983.37 This organization is small, with about 1,500 members, but Chairper-

son Higuchi Keiko and other members have contributed significantly to

national agenda-setting in public policy for the elderly and presented pol-

icy proposals from the viewpoint of women.

A more inclusive organization is the Nihon Koreisha Seikatsu Kyodo

Kumiai Rengokai (Japan Older Persons’ Co-operative Union),38 reorganized

in 2001 by developing its 23 local unions across the nation. The national of-

fice has just launched a vigorous campaign to increase its membership from

about 36,000 persons in 2008 to a target of one million members within sev-

eral years. The union has grown as a service provider of senior citizens’ em-

ployment and individualized social help; it also promotes senior citizens’

social participation. Its board of directors has learned from the AARP’s ex-

perience in the United States and aims to become an AARP for Japan.

Perhaps the most singular organization is the Nihon Sekando Raifu

Kyokai (Japan Association of Second-Life Service or JASS Club), created

in 1992 to support retired company workers.39 Building on the existing

networks among corporate firms rather than on community-based net-

works, the association has extended support for social participation of

about 600,000 retired company workers in the Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya

areas and worked with voluntary enterprises of retired company workers.

Many retirees who are still physically and mentally fit have utilized their

expertise for enterprises such as recycling programs, pollution control, and

social services for frail older people.

What Is the Main Political Issuein Managing Population Aging?

In aging Japan, a national consensus has yet to be formed in the policy

area of social welfare: adequate levels of medical costs, equality of life-time contributions and benefits among generations,40 and burden sharing

“1996 NIRA Research Report: Chiiki Fukushi ni okeru NPO Shien Ikusei Hosaku no Teigen”

[Proposals for the ways to support and promote local welfare NGOs] (Tokyo: National

Institute for Research Advancement, 1996).

37. Global Action on Aging, “The Women’s Association for Better Aging Society,” 2002,

, accessed January 10, 2008.

38. Japan Older Persons’ Cooperative Union, Nihon Koreisha Seikatsu Kyodo Kumiai

Rengokai [Japan Older Persons’ Co-operative Union], , accessed January 10, 2008.

39. Iwabuchi and Uchida, Eijingu no Seijigaku, pp. 78–79.

40. Such equality also needs to be ensured between rural and urban areas, the rich and

poor, and the genders.

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among employees, employers, and the state. The point at issue is the shar-

ing of resources. In particular, intergenerational justice needs to be en-

trenched, in the sense that each birth cohort takes responsibility in an

effort to ensure that the next generation is no worse off.41 In Japan’s low-

birth-rate, aging society, if the current system of social security remains

intact, the work-capable generation will continue to bear heavier burdens

than ever and the inequality of net benefits (or net burdens) among gen-

erations will increase significantly. According to Cabinet Office figures as

of 2002, generations aged 60 and older will receive net benefits of $510,000

($1.82 million of lifetime benefits of social security and government

consumption/investment, minus $1.31 million in lifetime contributions of

taxes and social security). However, for those younger than 40 years old,

the pattern will be reversed, with net burdens of $68,000 (aged 30–39) and

$127,000 (aged 20–29).42

From the viewpoint of intergenerational justice, we would expect that

present generations ought not to pursue policies that produce benefits for

themselves yet impose costs on future generations. But Japan’s dependence

on deficit-covering bonds tells another story. The Ministry of Health,

Labor, and Welfare estimated that the per capita contribution to social se-

curity should be $5,900 in fiscal year 2006, but it ended up with the re-

duced amount of $5,200. This shortfall was mainly covered by government

borrowing. Future generations in fiscal year 2015, for example, will not

only need to make an estimated per capita contribution of $8,300 but may

also bear an extra burden if they are expected to pay to help reduce the

public debt.43 A sense of unfairness from one generation to another ap-

pears to be widespread and persistent in the future of Japan. The imbal-

anced burden sharing not only surpasses simple numbers but may result in

a political battle among generations.

Will the Japanese Elderly Impose UnfairConsequences on Future Generations?

In the United States, many observers warn that the elderly are becoming

more numerous and influential; some even suggest that their expanding

41. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 284–93;

Derek Parfit, “On Doing the Best for Our Children,” in Ethics and Population, ed. Michael D.

Bayles (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1976), pp. 100–15.

42. The figures were provided on February 15, 2005, Japan, Council on Economic and

Fiscal Policy.43. Japan, Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, “Shakai Hosho no Kyufu to Futan no

Mitoshi” [The prospect of benefits from and contributions to social security], May 2006,

, accessed January 10, 2008.

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YASUO TAKAO 867

political power must be curbed.44 The popular press increasingly describes

U.S. welfare-state spending as benefiting the elderly unfairly at the expense

of the young.45 Although the influence exerted by interest groups on such

policy outcomes is extremely difficult to measure,46 the great fear that the

elderly will garner unfair short-term interest for themselves may be ground-

less in the case of the Japanese welfare state.

First, Japan’s LTCI will reduce the growing weight of self-interested

elderly voters at the expense of younger generations, although the program

will politicize care for the elderly as the state implements it. Japan is not

the only country to implement a public LTC insurance policy, but eligibility

in Japan is not a matter of income. Rather, it is defined purely in terms of

age and physical/mental condition.47 In the United States, under Medicare

and Medicaid, LTC benefits such as nursing-home care are provided to

those with low incomes. Otherwise, privately provided LTC insurance is

necessary for the American elderly to receive such benefits.48 Yet, private

insurance providers are less interested in underwriting LTC policies

because of the high risk levels within the elderly cohort.49 Both the limited

provision of government programs for LTC and the lack of interest from

private insurance providers are contributing to the political activism of

the American elderly. The far greater inequality between those who can

afford to purchase health insurance and those who cannot is also likely to

make this issue more salient in the United States than in Japan. However,

Japan’s move in 2000 toward “socialization of care” for the elderly is not

fully age-inclusive but may become divisive among generations. In future,

the financing of Japan’s LTC, which partly relies on social-insurance

contributions levied on employers and employees, is uncertain to sustain the

LTC program. As discussed earlier, increases in the starting age of financial

contribution to the LTCI or in the minimum age for LTC benefits could

become an issue of intergenerational justice.

44. See, for example, Phillip Longman, Born to Pay: The New Politics of Aging in America

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987); Alexi Bayer, “Let’s Give Parents an Extra Right to Vote,”

New York Times, May 4, 1997.

45. See, for example, Margot Hornblower, “Gray Power,” Time, January 4, 1988, pp. 36–37.

46. Henry J. Pratt, The Gray Lobby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); Christine

L. Day, What Older Americans Think: Interest Groups and Aging Policy (Princeton, N. J.:

Princeton University Press, 1990).

47. Japan, Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, Long-Term Care Insurance in Japan,

July 2002, , accessed January

15, 2008.

48. See, for example, William J. Scanlon, “Possible Reforms for Financing Long-TermCare,” Journal of Economic Perspective 6:3 (Summer 1992), pp. 43–58.

49. David Cutler, “Why Doesn’t the Market Fully Insure Long Term Care?” NBER

(National Bureau of Economic Research) Working Paper, no. 4301 (1993).

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Second, the Dankai generation plus those who were born in 1950 and

1951 accounts for more than 10 million of Japan’s population. Their par-

ticipation in social networks is expected to bring different generations to-

gether across various social divides. According to a household survey

conducted by the MIAC in 2004,50 the home ownership rate among the

Dankai cohort is nearly 90%, and they have average current assets of

$150,000. Members have or will soon receive lump-sum retirement allow-

ances of $220,000, on average. There is a possibility that the Dankai gen-

eration will significantly change Japan’s patterns of household consumption

and market investment. Equally important, this generation shows signs of

activism in the public space of social and political participation as well as

private marketplaces. A nationwide survey on the Dankai cohort, con-

ducted by the National Institute for Educational Policy Research in 2007,

found that its members are increasingly interested in developing networks

for inclusive activities rather than exclusive ones.51

Dankai participation in organized voluntary activity, pursuing public

purposes, is expected to increase at very high rates, reflecting the inclusive

nature of the coming aged population. The nationwide survey on the co-

hort shows the percentage rates of change for various activities from past

Dankai participation to their intended future participation. Activities such

as volunteering to help with social welfare and natural disaster, school ed-

ucation support, and recycling projects represent more than a 10% in-

crease over previous levels, while neighborhood association activities show

only declining trends. Interestingly enough, about 5% of the respondents

are active members of NPOs or non-governmental organizations (NGOs),

and more than half of these respondents are organizers. About one-third

of the respondents who are not current members of NPOs or NGOs indi-

cate that they wish to get involved in such groups in future. Figure 3,

adapted from the 2004 Nippon Active Life Club (NALC) survey, corrobo-

rates this trend. After retirement, most Dankai company workers neither

wish to join senior citizens’ clubs nor continue to participate in neighbor-

hood association activities, which are seen as reflecting a net of obliga-

tions rather than being a voluntary act. Instead, they increasingly wish to

50. Japan, MIAC, Kakei Chosa Nenpo [Annual report of family income and expenditure

survey], 2004, , accessed January 15,

2008.

51. Japan, National Institute for Educational Policy Research, Dankaisedai no Borantia

Katsudo ni kansuru Chosa Kenkyu [Investigation on the volunteer activities by the Dankai

generation], 2007, , accessed January 15, 2008;Shusuke Igarashi, “Borantia Katsudo ni kansuru Chosa Kenkyu” [Investigation on the

volunteer activities], Shakai Kyoiku [Social Education] 62:11 (November 2007), pp. 48–51.

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YASUO TAKAO 869

develop a social network of broad, citizen-based inclusiveness beyond the

exclusive ties of their immediate neighborhood.Third, socially mobilized groups of the Dankai cohort have taken seri-

ously the concerns that younger generations have that the Dankai genera-

tion might be “bilking their pension bills.” The Dankai groups have been

seeking a solution through burden-sharing with other generations.52 In

November 2006, three socially mobilized groups (the Dankai Party, Proj-

ect Wild Boar, and the Dankai Policy Studies Network) formed a nation-

wide coalition known as Dankai Net, which began in 2007 to endorse and

financially support Dankai candidates for local assemblies. Most local au-

thorities applaud Dankai civic activism. According to a survey conducted

52. Dankai Net, Manifesuto [Manifesto], 2006, , accessed February 3, 2008.

FIGURE 3 Senior Citizens’ Participation in Public Space

SOURCE: NALC, “Dankai no Sedai Teinengo no Seikatsu Ishiki Chosa” [Survey of livelihood

attitudes of the Dankai generation after retirement], May 2004.

NOTE: In January 2004, the NALC conducted a nationwide survey of retired company

workers and their spouses aged 50–79. The data in this figure come from part of the sample:

681 respondents of the Dankai generation. The “Participants in Future Activities” indicates

the number of the respondents who wish to participate in each activity area in future.

Sports

Volunteer Activities Cultural Activities

NPO/NGO

Senior Citizens’ Clubs

Women’s Associations

Neighborhood

Associations

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

Participants in Current Activities

P a r t i c i p a n t s i n

F u t u r e

A c t i v i t i e s

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by Yomiuri Shimbun in August 2006, 97% of local chief executives wish to

invite Dankai retirees to move into their communities, and 66% of those

executives expect them to actively contribute to community revitalization.53

Some local authorities, such as Adachi and Nakano Wards in Tokyo

and the city of Yokosuka, have started to implement policy measures and

provide incentives to enhance Dankai participation in community devel-

opment.54 Perhaps the most important principle is kyosei (the idea of con-

viviality) shared between those socially mobilized groups and government

authorities. This idea focuses on human relationships in which all people,

regardless of age, gender, race, or social status participate equally in all

areas of society for the common good. All are given the opportunity to

use their abilities at work.55 Kyosei has become a guiding principle of local

governance in Japan, transcending social divides in local communities.56

Reflecting this principle, those socially mobilized groups tend to be better

informed than the Dankai generation about the political feasibility of pol-

icy alternatives. Members of such groups often understand when cuts to

elderly benefits are necessary for fiscal or political reasons in order to pre-

serve programs for the elderly in the longer term. It is unlikely that those

socially mobilized groups will pursue the benefits of elderly programs un-

fairly at the expense of youth.

Elderly Prospects in Japanese Politics

In coming years, the Japanese government will need to solve problems

generated by the inevitable rapid growth in government consumption, par-

ticularly the increasing demands placed on the health care system, through

policies that will incur tax increases and/or cuts in government programs.

It is unlikely that the introduction of such policies will be popular with the

electorate. Policymakers will also face close scrutiny, as well as organizing

efforts by the elderly, whose electoral power will clearly grow in Japan as it

53. All prefectural governors and mayors of government-designated cities responded to

this survey. Yomiuri Shinbun, August 9, 2006.

54. Japan Center for Cities, Dankai Sedai no Chiiki Sanga [Local participation by the

Dankai generation] (Tokyo: Nihon Toshi Senta, 2007), chs. 3, 4.

55. The conceptualization of kyosei was pioneered in 1987 by Kisho Kurokawa, and

embraced and expanded by other scholars. From 1998 to 2004, the Inquiry Committee on

Kyosei Society, established in the House of Councillors, extensively investigated the problems

between elderly and youth, men and women, and handicapped and non-handicapped people.

The idea of kyosei has become an integral part of national policy. See Kisho Kurokawa, Kyosei

no Shiso [The philosophy of kyosei] (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1987); Japan, Cabinet Office,

Kyosei Shakai Seisaku Kanren Joho no Teikyo [Information dissemination with regard to kyoseisociety policies], , accessed February 3, 2008.

56. Almost all Internet home pages of local governments in Japan are partly used to

disseminate information with regard to their kyosei policy.

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http://www8.cao.go.jp/souki/index.htmlhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www8.cao.go.jp/souki/index.html


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YASUO TAKAO 871

has in many other countries. The Japanese elderly have yet to systemati-

cally organize themselves into groups and associations (which they will

need to do to have their voices heard within the political arena), but orga-

nizational processes are now underway to represent their interests.

In the past, high levels of Dankai labor force participation well beyond

retirement age have combined with patron-client politics (implemented

through Dankai membership of koenkai and the Nokyo) to prevent the

Japanese elderly from organizing their generation-specific interests within

political processes. In recent years, however, an upsurge of activity has

been observed among the elderly in metropolitan areas to take part in or-

ganized voluntary activity and the creation of policy advocacy groups. In

Japan, the elderly are living longer and wielding more disposable income

than ever before. They are not only mentally and physically fit to remain

politically active but have an increasing desire to develop a participatory

lifestyle within local governance. The proliferation of these groups in future

may significantly alter the relationship between the state and the elderly, be-

tween the youth and the elderly, and between taxpayers and pensioners.

It is possible that the growing political power of elderly voters may

prove counterproductive to a sustainable Japan, particularly if they adopt

a traditional pressure-group focus in pursuit of entitlements for individu-

als or narrowly focused interests at the expense of collective needs. The

relatively high numbers of senior citizens with political and social clout

could also hamper much-needed welfare reform. Given Japan’s “socializa-

tion of elderly care,” however, elderly voters are likely to make more mod-

erate demands about their entitlements. Well informed groups of the

elderly are less likely to act unilaterally in their self-interest at the expense

of other cohorts.

The Dankai cohort of baby boomers, who collectively experienced tur-

bulent events during their youth, may create a new social value in Japan.

Indeed, as they get closer to retirement, they are increasingly interested in

forming a social network of trust that brings people together across differ-

ent social divides. It is a finding of this study that the socially mobilized

groups of the Dankai generation actually help further voluntarism in

Japan by forming coalitions and networks with other civil society groups.

Together, they provide the necessary incentive to make decisions for the

common good rather than for special or sectional interests alone. Such

coalitions and networks may help to refine understandings of the empiri-

cal link between consumption and production, perhaps balancing the

needs and entitlements of senior citizens with those of the existing work

force (as the future recipients of retirement benefits). This includes the un-

paid and largely unrecognized female work force based at home, which

provides care for the elderly under Japan’s often patriarchal framework.

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The aging of the population will change the landscape of democracy-

building in 21st-century Japan. It is inevitable that people will rethink the

existing practices of Japanese democracy. There will be simply too many

senior voters, and their numbers will continue to grow. Many retired com-

pany workers are coming back to the urban communities, without their

previous obligations to the work place. Whether they like it or not, the el-

derly residents will be poised to become frontrunners for reshaping the

way in which Japan’s democracy is currently organized. The degree of sup-

port for the LTCI program and the old age pension system is strong among

all age groups. It is hoped that the future of Japan’s democracy-building

will tend toward embracing the principle of kyosei rather than on practic-

ing blindly the principles of majority rule.

Finally, the alarming increase in Japan’s aging population will affect a

range of other issue areas including foreign policy and defense. The pro-

jected costs of an aging country are so high that Japan will have extreme

difficulty in maintaining its allied military commitment and budget share

with the United States. This adds yet another reason for Japan not to en-

gage in large-scale remilitarization in the foreseeable future. The United

States, whose population is moderately aging, will be placed in a position

of having to pay for even more of the costs to maintain credible security.

The problems associated with Japan’s population aging may thus be seen

as a contributing factor in the loss of its credibility as a strong ally. In-

ward-looking foreign policy strategies will likely become more compelling

for Japanese leaders in an aging world.

Documents

Aging and Political Participatio in Japan