Agnes Heller - The Moral Situation of Modernity

8/10/2019 Agnes Heller - The Moral Situation of Modernity

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The Moral Situation in ModernityAuthor(s): AGNES HELLERSource: Social Research, Vol. 55, No. 4 (WINTER 1988), pp. 531-550Published by: The New SchoolStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40970520 .Accessed: 26/09/2014 12:55

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The MoralSituationinModernity BYAGNESHELLER

X HiLOSOPHERSave always disagreed on the essence ofhumannature, heorigins f morals, nd the nterpretation fvirtues nd vices.As a result, heyhave tended odisagree ntheir moral recommendations. ut when, onversely, t cameto describing he moral status f the world, heir greementwasoverwhelming. oday, on the contrary, e have dozens ofmicrocommunities,ach of which peaks different anguageasif heywere ommunities elonging odifferent orlds. hemoral ymptoms ne schoolrefers o bear no likeness o themoral ymptoms hematized yother microcommunities.

One particular iscourse issects ur world n the terms fnihilism. articipantsnthis iscourse ssume hat here re no

longer ny validnorms, hatvirtues re goneand that, n theone hand, persons ct nstrumentally hile, n the other hand,they it nto xternal-institutional oles nd requirements ith-out having ny ntrinsic oral motivation t all. Another micro-discourse efers o this elfsame world s the climax f moraldevelopment nsofar s universal ormative peech nd moralrationality avegainedmomentum gainst rrational estraints,repressions, nd ethical utelage. he third ypeof microdis-course dismisses oth the paradigm f nihilism nd that ofuniversalism-rationalismsequally mpty alkwhich asnobear-ing whatsoever n our own moral ituation. articipantsn thisthird ind of discourse laim hat iberal emocraciesmaintain

quite healthy nd vigorousmoral ife which sonlymildly go-istic, airly ragmatic, nd yetwhich s also public-issuesrientedwhen t comes o concreteecisions oncerningustice nd injus-tice. leave everal ther xistingmicrodiscoursesnmentioned

SOCIALRESEARCH,Vol. 55,No. 4 (Winter 988)

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532 SOCIAL RESEARCH

because heir mpact oes not transcend he ecture alls f theacademy.However, he mpact f the three mentioned o. Weconsume ur weekly osage of Nietzsche nd postmodernismwith ur Sundaybreakfast s it s presented n our newspaper.During that ame afternoon e will be involved n a heateddiscussiononcerning ffirmative ction. n the vening, ewillwatch hepicturesque mages f worldpoverty n the TV and

begin oponder howwemight estbe involved n remedies fthat overty. e are thus quallyncludedwithin heframeworkof the discourses f nihilism, iberal emocracy, nd universal-istic ationalism.

And yet hepersonwho s exposedto this unday plethoraof popularized hilosophicalxperiences s not nihilist t thebreakfast able, concerned, lbeitmildly goist itizen n theafternoon, nd a universalisticationalist ynight. erhaps heis a bit of the first, hesecond, nd the third, r

perhapshe

understands, r at east scapableof understanding, erworldin terms f all three microdiscourses.n what follows wouldlike to take the position f the innocent eader-listener ndcontend: All of the symptomsescribed y each of the threediscourses re truly ymptoms f the moral ife of modernsocieties, nd neither roup of symptoms s more decisive roverarching han he other wo. ince the three iscourses recompetitive nd mutually xclusive, nd since participants none discoursewould t best dmit hat he symptoms isted yothers xist s secondaryhenomenawhichhave been mistak-enly r wrongly levated othe rank f basicfeatures, nd viceversa,my pproach might ppear at first lance o be eclectic.It is my ntention o demonstrate hat t s not.

TheDostoevskyictum

Dostoevsky'speru- if God does not exist, verything spermitted- as been repeated ever since by almost all



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THE MORALSITUATION 533

participants f the microdiscourse f nihilism. his was soirrespective f whether they believed that the predictedoutcome everything s permitted ) s unavoidable orGod isanyhow lready dead, or whether hey hared the hope thatGod still ould be kept liveor resurrected, hat he was onlyin eclipse, nd thus hat hemoralworld rder would, r at

least might, scape total destruction. ostoevsky's ormula

brings the central ssue into focus, and it is sharp andepigrammatic- erhaps his s why t s also misleading. f wetake the aperu everything s permitted t its face value, tmeans that there are no moral norms and rules, neitherconcrete or bstract; here re no regulations hatsoever, ndin the end therefore veryone oes whatever e or she deemsbest for his or her own sake,be it interest r pleasure. t isobvious or veryone, nd it must have been obvious or hose

underwritinghe formula n the

past,that

societyn which

everything s permitted s simply mpossible. ince socialregulation s regulation y rules, here cannot be a singlesociety n which verything s permitted, or he nfringementof rules is by definition npermitted. n a more pragmaticformulation his might read as follows: Societieswithoutethical religions, acking he image of a deity ndowed withmoralpowers, an stillhavevery ensesystems f rule n theframework f which large number f actsare disapproved,even everely unished. he formula f Dostoevsky ust henmeansomething hichhas not beenspelled ut, only mplied,and as such understood by people who share the sametradition. he tradition n question s the Christian ne whichincludes ignificant oral lements f Judaism nd Hellenism.Against hisbackground, he Dostoevsky ormula houldberead as follows: If our (Christian)God does not exist, ctswhich had been prohibited n our moral tradition will be

permitted n the future ; nd, one could add, actswhichhadbeen permitted- moreover,morally raised- maybe prohib-ited in that future. t was exactly n this way that theDostoevsky ictum was interpreted fter the formidable



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experiences f Nazism and Stalinism. Not that Nazism andBolshevism ad permitted verything. n fact, oth prohib-ited wide range f activities,ven deas. To mention nly neexample, heymorally isapproved f indulging n empathywith heir ictims r practicing harity oward he wrongkindof people.At the ametime, owever, hey ermitted nd evenencouraged articipationn deologicallynderpinned, nstru-

mentalizedmass murder which, n the spirit f our tradition,shouldhavebeen prohibited. he real ssue, herefore, s not,as manyfirmly elieved t was,that f God does not exist,wecannot ellgood from vil. The real question s what hall weconsider ood,what vil.

If we read into the Dostoevsky ormula verything hathasonly een mplied n the text, ewquestions mmediately rise.If there is no God, in other words, f the transcendent

guaranteeand fountainhead f a traditional

Christian)morality oses ts uthority nd spell,what ind f actions will epermitted? t was exactly hiskind of nquirywhich nfoldedin modern ationalism. easonbecame he uthority f ssuingpermissions nd underwriting raditional rohibitions. n thecourse of this change of authority, ne prohibition fteranother ecame anceled ut and invalidated ecause they adbeen proven irrational, prejudiceor a mere fancy. Thenihilism arrative nsists hat his rend s unstoppable nce

reason takes he placeof the dead God. This is allegedly hecase since s soon as the validity f moralnorms s no longervouchsafed y the highest uthority, heevildoerwill sk youto give your reasons for refraining rom deeds which hepractices. ou willgiveyours, ewillgivehis, nd if rgumentis pitted gainst rgument, o possibility f a moral decisioncan be reached.What decides s interest, orce, omfort, ndconformity.

There s no need to describe modern imes s the hotbed fmoral nihilism n order o face the problemwhichhas givenrise to the nihilism arrative. ll the serious modern moralphilosophers avehad their ayof reckoning ikeour ancester



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Jacob. f we do not notice he marks f the struggle n thebody of their philosophy, his s only because they overedthem p with lternative arratives. lthough heparadigm fnihilism s normally ssociatedwithNietzsche ecause he gaveit a positive urn n the most radicalway, he narrative adalready made its appearance a hundred years earlier. Theclassic xamples f reckoning ith he specter f nihilismmay

be found n Diderot'sRameau'sNephews well as in Kant'smoral philosophy. iderot's philosopher, he narrator f thedialogue,recognizes uring he courseof the discussion hatthe arguments f his interlocutor, he moral nihilist, reunbeatable. t onlyremains or him n defense f goodness oexpresshis disgust f the nihilist an emotivistmoral gesture)and to reaffirm is own esolutionobe, and remain, decentman, for t is better o be an honest person than a wickedclown.Of course, t cannot e

rationally rovenhat t sbetter

to be good than vilunlessone can pinpoint bsolute, ternalnorms.And if one can, one does not need to prove nything.Diderot'swork ends on the theme of an existentialhoice fgoodness.n the absence of a God (and moral bsolutes), necan still e good if, nd only f, ne choosesoneself s a goodperson.Without oubt, choice ike his s not rational ecausebetween ll my reasons and my resolve here s the leap,asKierkegaard as to point ut ater.

Kant chessmated ihilism hile t the same time cceptingevery piece of nihilistic rgumentation. f theoretical eason(speculation, alculation, rgumentation) was supposed toprecede ction n validating r devalidating orms, herewasno longer ny doubt n Kant's mind as to everything eingpermitted. or the empiricalman, motivated y thirsts orwealth, power, and fame, would anyhow prove, and proverationally, hatwhatever edesires s good.Theoretical eason

doesnot provide ertainty, nd yet t s certainty hichmoralsmust be based on. But certainty liminates hoice. And howcan one eliminate hoicewithout acking wayfrom moder-nity otraditional orms uaranteed ydivine evelation? ow



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can one preserve autonomy, personality, nd subjectivitywithout hoice nd at the same time eject nderstanding ndknowledge s the ources f validation r devalidation f moralnorms?Kant has invented hemost ophisticated, nd almostflawless, hilosophical nswer o the new situation reated bythe ncrease n rationality n the one hand and the discovery fthe imits o reason on the other. As is wellknown, he whole

edifice f the Kantian olution ests n his dual anthropology.Eliminate noumenal man and you will arrive at modernnihilism ure and simple. liminate henomenalman and youwill rrive t speculative ormal niversalism romwhich heactor s absent. hould one rejectKant'sdual anthropology orany theoretical r empirical eason (including ntrospectionand valuepreferences), he fragile alancebetween ertitudeand relativism illbe upset.

Hegel,whohad hisown

daysof

reckoning,adethe heroic

effort o rebuild nd refurbish nnerworldly thical uthoritynamed Sittlichkeit;e knew, much as Diderot and Kant hadpreviously nown, hat pinpointing n existing ittlich orldorder with he gesture: here t is, these are the norms ndrules to follow, will not suffice. For the addressee willcertainly etort y asking, Why s that so? Why should Iobserve henorms f this articular orld rder nd not thoseof other nes,or none at all? Hegelbelieved,much s Kant,that in order to fight nihilism and, he added, emptysubjectivism), he sittlich rder must shine in the light ofabsolute certitude. Hegel could make a case for a morerelaxed, elastic, and complex moral universe, for moreliberalism nd more eniency, ecause hebasicgroundwork fhis ethical dificewas erected n a fixed and rigid manner.World history, e contended, his supreme udge, had ledhumankind o tspresent tate; heWorld pirit tself resents

us with he outcome of its own long wandering. et such abalance is again utterly ragile. Curtail the emphasis onSittlichkeit hile maintaining he grand narrative lone, andyouwillget an objective eleologyn which heethical ontent



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THE MORAL SITUATION 537

of subjective elos s of no relevance whatsoever. he result fthis mputation s that verything hich upposedly urthersthe development f world history ill ndeedbe permitted ndnihilism econfirmed. r conversely, liminate he world-historical narrative, while maintaining he emphasis onSittlichkeit,nd you will arrive t a pragmatism f a kind nwhich ertainmodern ules of the gameare taken or granted

without urther do.The solution f existential hoice Diderot's mpasse)doesnot require the backing of any particular metaphysics,ontology, ystem, peculative difice or anthropology. ow-ever, both Kant's nd Hegel's respective olutions, nd to thesameextent, must e backed up or evenfounded ycompletesystems. hilosophically hey are convincing ut amid thevicissitudes f modern morals these complete ystems ausemore

problemshan

theyan solve. But there are

perhapsother venues o be explored.Derrida embarked n a voyagewhich did not seem to be

worth he while: deconstructing seemingly ather nsignifi-cant paper written y Kant in 1796 (Von einem euerdingserhobenen ornehmen on in der Philosophie). rom our perspec-tive, t s not the parody f Kant'sutterly edantic pproach osomething ssentially npedanticwhich s of relevance ous,nor even the apocalyptic llusions unearthed from underKant's ilence yDerrida, ut rather heway n whichDerridamagnifies hat he terms Kant's gesture f reconciliation. nbrief, ant mounts n unusually itriolic ttack unusualgivenhis mild tandards) gainstmystical latonists, hoare abusedby him s mystagogue-eschatologists,nd in particular gainstSchlosser, ho s accusedby Kantof castrating hilosophy ndalmost inishing ff heenterprise. he real surprise rrives tthe end: the conclusion f the paper is the recommendation

that he, Kant, and his contemptible hilosophical nemiesshould work together or the same purpose. We all want tomakehumanbeings ecent, e insists, nd we allwant o servethe moral aw.Whatever ur respective hilosophiesmight e,



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we could venture this supreme task together. think that thissmall pedantic piece of writing y an old and declining man,this awkward gesture toward alien philosophical tastes andinterests, s absolutely wonderful and heroic. The attempt toaccept the modern condition of theoretical pluralism with theproviso that all philosophers should work for the samepractical purpose (more decency, obedience to the moral law)

is not merely n exercise n liberal tolerance, t also expresses anew philosophical nsight.

We know that Kant needed his dual anthropology, inparticular he fact of reason, n order to prove the existence ofmoral law, although t could not in fact be proven in terms ofhis own philosophical conviction ither. He needed it in orderto make a case for certainty, he absolute, the categorical; to beable to dismiss choice, even the choice of the self, the risk, he

leap. When he therefore conceded that the cause of moralreason, of moral law, can be furthered, presented, andrepresented by completely different philosophers, whosephilosophies were grounded in different ypesof metaphysics,in different ontologies and anthropologies, with this samegesture he resigned the tenet that the work of practical reasonin the world can be grounded in a fully rational way. For thisnew position t now sufficed imply o assert that those who did

not ground goodness completely ationally, s Kant did, couldstill, however, work for the same moral purpose. With thisgesture, the philosophical grounding of morals has alreadybeen relativized. From this I would derive my preliminaryconclusion: It is ill conceived to establish a direct relationbetween the increasing relativism f world iews philosophies)and the relativism f morals. Perhaps the opposite is the case:Through absolutizing heir own philosophies and world iews,

philosophers contribute more to the relativizationf

morals,even to boosting nihilism, han by the acceptance of the mutualrelativization f their philosophical nterprises, y finding nlya single and restricted ommon ground: a few moral norms



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and valueswhichmight e regarded s valid and binding orall of us.

The diversity f worldviews, hilosophies,metaphysics,ndreligious faiths does not bar the emergence f a commonethos, nless ne of the competing orldviews etermines hecommandments nd the nterdictions ompletely, nd does sonot only for ts own adherents ut also with universalizingaspiration.

The ndividual s Universal

The categorical igures f thewhole nd the part, s wellas the one-several-many, irst made their appearance asmoral,

olitical,nd

metaphysicalonfigurationst the time f

the birth of philosophy. Other metaphysical nd logicalfigures, the universal, the singular, nd the particular,becameheavily oliticized irst n the new ge and alsoappliedto morals. n structural erms, he singular roved the leastproblematic lement f the triad. There was no contender orthis position ther han the single ndividual, he person quaactor, ua moral responsible) ubject.The universal urnedout to be the most problematic lement of the triad. n auniversal roposition, he same s predicated bout all (same)cases. If therefore the single ndividual s the singular, tfollows hat individual s such, that is, all individuals,should be the universal. ut this never eventuated n actualmoral discourse. The position of the universal has beenoccupied by the notion mankind, which s itself olysmieand which can devote shades of meaning other than theuniversal quivalent f all singular ndividuals. r, evenworse,

this position as been occupiedby any category f ntegrationwhich encompasses either hierarchically r structurally, rboth senses)severalhuman ntegrations hich re no longerpolysmie ut simply ot equivalent o all individuals. or



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how can an entity uch as the state be identified with theuniversal? n order to substitute the state for all individu-als, one must supply a new singular for the singleindividual. This new singular s no longer the human beingbut the singlecitizen r the single German, French, tc. Wethus have a moral agent, alias the single individual, whoserelation to the universal (mankind, all human agents) is

mediated by the particular (e.g., the state), and we have amoral agent (termed single citizen, the French, theGerman, etc.) who relates to a universal the state) which forhim or her as a human being is not a universal t all, or at leastnot meant to be such. One of the most serious problems anddilemmas of modern morals is encapsulated in this seeminglysemantic-logical ilemma.

The new occidental philosophy, s it had taken shape by theseventeenth

century,deduced moral facts (norms, ideas,

obligations, mages of the right and the good) from a fewanthropological assumptions, that is, from certain eternalattributes of human nature in general. An abstract and ahistorical nthropological universalism ouched for the expla-nation, for the genesis. As far as this genesis was concerned,the propensities f each and every man were the Propensitiesof Man (of all men) as such, and it was only the social contractwhich was believed to engender moral duties and obligationsof a proper (and concrete) kind. The citizen, as the singularappertaining othe general, the state, was ethically elated tothe state. However, the individual human being, as a humanbeing, could not be related to all human beings (its ownuniversal) with ny kind of ethical ties, for all human beingsdid not, and still do not, constitute ny integration whatsoever.As a result there were no obligations or duties which thesingular was bound to heed due to its membership in the

human race. Instead of being properly related to its ownuniversal, the singular termed man or human being wasnow related to civil society nd the family. These integrationswere considered more particularistic han the state, not only



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for Hegelbut lso for Hobbes,Locke, nd Rousseau. n a strictphilosophical ense, Marx was right when he claimed thatman is tantamount o the bourgeois, because the single

human personwhoseduties nd obligationsinsofar s he hasany)are exclusivelyo his business nd his family s preciselythe bourgeois. et the claim to be related, n a positive enseand therefore lso morally, to all humans, or to hu-

mankind r to the human essence above and beyond allparticularistic bligations nd determinations, as alsomade tsappearance.A certain kind of secularized or almost ecular-ized) Christianity, ometimes n the form of Freemasonry,became merged with the concerns of modern theories ofnatural aw. This is the tendency which will refer to asmodern humanism. n my opinion, humanism s not

identicalwith he Cartesian egacy f subjectivism; either s itcoterminous ith heventure o

placethe ndividual

ersont

the center of the universe. Humanism does not stand forleniency, for tout comprendre, 'est tout pardonner; nor does itstand or he ttempt omake ll of our moralnorms nd rulesrational. here is an element f subjectivismn humanism utnot of the pistemological ind. f someone akes pon himselfor herself ertain uties nd obligations n behalf f an entity(humankind)which does not exist, the subjective spect ofethics morality) illunquestionably e morepresent n suchgesture than in the same person's relation to existingintegrations with a dense ethical substance. n a directcommitment o the universal here s a strong lement f acertain ind f rationality, hich havetermed the rationalityof ntellect. his s particularly oif the elf-imposed uties oa nonexisting ntity ollide with duties mposedby existingentities, or the person iving mid such a collision, nlessheremains n the evel of a mere gesture, ormally ives easons

for preferring heuniversal o the particular, tc. Yet modernhumanism, uch as the kind exemplified y Lessing, oesnotcenter on the single person. Rather, there is a touch ofmysticismn modern humanism, commitment osomekind



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of common mana dwelling in all of us irrespective of ournationalities, ffiliations, eligious commitments, metaphysicalcreeds, and beliefs. This mana makes us turn toward eachother as we suspend our particular affiliations, withoutabandoning or resigning hem; a mana which furthermore edo not lose except in the event of an ultimate moraltransgression.

Thinking in terms of rights has simultaneously gainedprominence with modern humanism. Modern humanismembraced right thinking s the negative aspect of its ownvision. Attributing inalienable rights to members of anintegration on the basis of their personhood could beconsidered the single greatest contribution f liberal theoriesto the development of modern Sittlichkeit. odern humanismsimply must subscribe o the liberal norm of the rights f man.For if all

particularisteterminations re to be

suspendedin

our intercourse with other humans qua humans, then everysingle individual being has to be protected against the force,pressure, and interference f particularist ntegrations deter-minations). Thus modern humanism comprises right think-ing, but it also has both different nd broader connotations.The enthusiastic gesture of seid umschlungen, illionen annotbe equated with he defense of human rights. One can ponderwhether millions re worth being embraced or what such ametaphor s really trying o aim at.

It is in Kant's moral philosophy that all these threads weretied together n a philosophically onclusive way. He shiftedboth the individual and the particular onto the side of therecipient, assuming that they will put up resistance whilereceiving the universal message. As members of the rationalworld, we are universal. As members of the empirical world,weare particular nd single entities; hemoral aw, humankind

as such and humankind in us, is the universal. Finally, theparticular the constitution f the republic, or the legal-ethical,though not moral, world) is to be related to the universal. Itbecomes clear from Kant's way of argumentation that if all



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constitutions re good, then they are all also completely like,and that n the world republic or Commonwealth), n the signof the eternal peace, all constitutions nd political arrange-ments must in fact be alike. Finally, Kant makes a minorconcession to the particular nd the ndividual, specially n hisMetaphysicsf Morals,but they remain mere concessions.

Hegel accused Kant of being guilty of neglecting the

particular and the individual. The freedom of particularityand the well-being of the individual rests n pluralism. Civilsociety, the sphere which comprises particularity n themodern age, consists of a variety f institutions, ntegrations,corporations, professions nd the like. Each of them developsits own intrinsic Sittlichkeit. he state is tantamount to theuniversal. The moral order of the state warrants theuniversality generality) of all the particularities emergingaround the institutions f civil

society.The individual,

havingattained the highest form of subjectivity, ubjects himself o hiscorporation relatively, but he subjects himself to the statecompletely for supreme Sittlichkeit emands Einordnung n dasAllgemeine,which in plain English means fitting oneselfproperly nto generality/universality, hat is, the state. So themodern state s the main source of Sittlichkeit, ecause it is theuniversal- but which modern state? There are several states,and Hegel appreciates wars among them also from an ethicalpoint of view. If all modern states represent universality ydefinition, then the universal is the particular, and theparticular s only termed universal. f two countries wage waragainst each other, s there never and nowhere any criteria odecide whose case is ust, whose is unjust, whose case is morejust or more right han the other? If there s no answer to thisquestion, then complete relativism s the end result. Theuniversalism of the world spirit will then result in the

simultaneity of unmediated yet conflicting particularitieswhich claim absolute loyalty rom the individuals because theyall identify hemselves s the universal.

Modern humanism was lofty ut it did not provide the world



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with visible bonds, with a set of transparent norms; in otherwords: Sittlichkeit. nstead, nationalism has supplied them.Precisely s Hegel predicted, t happened in war that the bruteegoism of the spiritual nimal kingdom was overcome. t wasthe experience of totalitarianism hich made the dentificationof the particular a state) with the universal humankind, theend result of human history, tc.) deeply suspect. Although

nation has remained the major object of moral commitment,or rather more so than ever, especially given that wholecontinents oined the choir of nationalism nd jingoism, moraltheory and philosophy has been forced to explore thepossibilities nd realities n other directions.

All these directions an be seen as recycled versions of theanswers lready given to the dilemma some two hundred yearsago. Recycled does not stand here for the statement hat the

questions,r the

nquiriesnto the answers, re

exactlydentical.

Obviously he experiences of two hundred years have been di-gested, reflected upon, and expressed. The word recyclingrefers rather to the types of answers and the tendencies theyrepresent. Modern humanism, specially n its Kantian version,is again with us, and it has come to its fruition n the theory fcommunicative thics. n the framework f the atter, ndividualsraise truly niversal laims, not simply laims which are in factparticular ut only ermeduniversal. his stand alsoimplies hatwe have once again relapsed back to Kantian formalism. hedense ethics f Sittlichkeit,houghmentioned nd referred o, renot reflected upon in a positive manner. Practical reason be-comes the twin brother f theoretical eason, for phronesis hasdisappeared from hehorizon. Something imilar ould be statedof self-professed antians ikeBair, Singer, Gerth, Gewirth, ndthe others. Whereas n Hegel all particularities ere believed tolead toward hehighest ne termed universal, amely, hestate,

modern types of discourse revert back to the category of theindividual.There is such a great variety f this language game,to use one of their favorite erms, hat only certain alient ypescan be mentioned.



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Closest o Hegel remains he discourse hat dominates hephilosophy of American iberalism. For Rawls, Dworkin,Ackerman t lii the tate s identical with he constitution, ndthe ethos of human corporation s to be sought in aconstitution hich s fair and thus right. Human right, hemain property f every erson, s understood s the right fthe citizen. t is assumed that human beings who are well

endowedwith ights liberties) onduct heir usinesswith neanother while respecting he liberties f others within heframework f this selfsame onstitution. he most rece... Awritings f Walzer and Rorty make a plea for a thickcontextuality, n the framework f which very articipant npublic ffairs nows what hewholeframework s all about ndwhere veryone hares he rules of an ethicalworld nd takesthem orgranted.

Inmy

brief overview f theoretical eflectionpon

therelationship etween he members f the triad particular-universal-individual)t the dawnof the modern ge, I did notmention he radical shift n direction f the individual.Ofcourse, almost everything ppears sporadically before itbecomestruly epresentative. fter ertain omantic recur-sors, Kierkegaard s the first hilosopherwho looks for thesource of morality n the individual in the individual'sexistential hoice of himself) without dentifying he object(territory, phere) or moral practice with ts source. Theindividual ua individual s the universal, et the territory fmoral ife s to be sought n interpersonal elations includingparticularity). he discourse nitiated yKierkegaard eed notbe recycled ecause it has been continuously f not alwaysconspicuously resent n our modern ge.

TheContingentndividualIn the first aragraph mentioned hree ypical iagnoses f

our contemporary oral ondition. have added that hey re



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546 SOCIAL RESEARCH

all in a sense correct. n the second paragraph put theparadigm f nihilism nder closer crutiny nd dissected heitems belonging under this heading. At that point, twoconclusions ould be drawn. First, he dangers which havebeen discovered within he paradigm of nihilism re notpreempted y the assumption hat he diagnoses f the othertwoparadigms re also correct. econd, t s not pluralism ut

rather the claim to absolutism which prevents ompetingmetaphysics nd philosophies rom inding commonmoralground. n the third paragraph, continued o present hevery ssuewhich n my mind ies at the heart of division fphilosophical,metaphysical ystems. have added that thedecisivedivision s backed by life experiences, nd that thesamedivision asbeen recycled or wo hundred years, nd insomecases even more. This circumstance lone should makeus

suspiciousnot

onlyof too

straightforwardnd unilinear

narratives f ethical rogression r moraldecaybut lso of theself-complacency f the discourse of the healthy moraltraditions f liberal democracy. Neither n the case of anincreasingmoraldecay,nor under he onditions f a vigorousmoralprogression, or, finally, nd for hat matter nder theauspicesof the smooth operation f the modern tradition,would the same theoretical onfiguration e recycled gainand again. If viewed from this position all apocalypticstatements ut fairly omic igures.We haveheard ooften orsuch a long time that we are right-at-the-beginning-ofor,alternatively, hatwe are right-at-the-end-ofthe realthing,that pocalyptic anguagehas becomeeveryday anguageforcommon se.But there sequally touch f the comical n theconviction hat those who learn to take a positive tand onaffirmative ction have already solved the major moralproblems f our time.

The simultaneous rocess f universalization, articulariza-tion, nd individualizations equivalent o the appearanceofcontingency s the condition f the modern world. f there snot World Spiritwith ts nherent elos, henhistory s world



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history s itself ontingent; o are all particularities onstitutedby, or unfolding within, his history. t is above all theindividual, he person, who becomes contingent nd whoknows himself-herself, nderstands his or her world andsituation, s such.Whendiscussingndividualsnsofar s theyare situated, current igure f speech in modern moralphilosophy, e have n mind he contingent ndividual erson.

In recycling heold questions nd theoretical igures, hich sunavoidablewithin he same world-historical poch, moralphilosophies f the present willhave to concentrate n themodern human condition,which s one of contingency, norder to shape a moral philosophy hat will apply to acontingent erson.

The rebirth f Aristotle's oralphilosophy, heemergenceof a certain ype f neo-Aristotelian oral philosophy, analsobe understood rom his

perspective.ristotle's oral

philos-ophy ummed p in a way ll the questions nd answerswhichhad been previously osed and formulated, nd recycled nsuch slightly ifferent ultures s the Athenian, he Ionian,and others. nsofar s it waspossible n a fairly taticworld,Aristotlemade an inventory f the plurality f Sittlichkeit,fthe diversities f personal tastes, f the possibledifferencebetween the good citizen and the good person, to thedifferentiation f techne rom action. In addition, he, incontradistinction o the tragic xtremity f Plato, settled n,so to speak,with his moral nd political hilosophy. ristotlecame after the Greek enlightenment; e inventoried hepotentials f, nd the imits o,reason, nd finally eofferedfair ombination f formal with ubstantive thics.

Neo-Aristotelians, t east omeof them, ook for model nthe philosophy f the Stagerite n order to contrast t with healleged contemporary oral decay. Others, ike Castoriadis

and Arendt, re more eager to discover imilarities etweenour problems nd his, rather han oppose the ancient read:authentic) ith he modern read: the decadent). f wedepartfrom Aristotle'smoral philosophy, e will ndeed find stark



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548 SOCIAL RESEARCH

contrasts o, and great similarities ith, ur modern moralworld nd moral hinking. he main ine of division etweenAristotle's erception f morals nd ours resides n the bsenceand presence f contingency. ven f his relation o his worldwas relatively etached,Aristotle'smoral political ndividualwas far from eingcontingent. e was not situated, e waswhathe was and could not have been anybody lse. If he had

been anyone lse,he would not have had a place n Aristotle'sethics at all. Because contingency s not a philosophicalconstruct hich ould be replacedby any other onstructs utthe life experience of the modern individual, vexing,threatening ut alsopromising xperience termed y Kierke-gaard the experience of possibility r anxiety). A moralphilosophy uch s Aristotle's hich emains naffected y, rnoncognizant f, hismatter ecessarily alls hort f authentic

contemporaneity.The impossibilityf coming oagreement n the descriptionof moral facts in modern life simply follows from theontological rounding ituation f contingency. his s why nattempt t agreement ardly has any chance.The recurringcomplaint hat philosophers re one-sided, hat they missthis r that qually xisting, r perhaps ll-important, spect flife s a modern omplaint. t the sametime, t s a pointlessone. One need not discover neself, ne's own environmentand situation, ne's own feeling nd concern, n each andevery ontemporary hilosophy. ne can absorb philosophyas the expression f the ife xperience f another ersonwhois as contingent s I am.

However, o moral relativism ecessarily ollows rom his.The circumstance hat my ife experiences re expressed nthis philosophy, hoseof another n another hilosophy, oesnot transform r degrade philosophies hemselvesnto idle

games.Apart rom he desire nd the resolve o transform urown contingency nto our own destiny, ur contingency scertainly omeone lse's ituation nd viceversa.Whatever urcontingencies re, we also havecommon usiness o attend o.



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550 SOCIAL RESEARCH

themes nd old solutions, lbeit n new orchestrations ndvariations; he first ormulations f the concerns f modernmoral philosophy re roughly wohundred years old. Theuniversal gesture, which is far from dependent on theuniversal xplanation, as been traced back to the old age ofKant. However, the idea that moral universalism an beachieved not by surpassing ontingency, articularity, nd

individuality, ut rather y changing ur attitude within neand the sameform f ife, oesback to Lessing, nd has beenrecycled by Hannah Arendt. If the process of recyclingcontinues, ooner r later fourth ype f main discoursemayemerge which would oin the discourses f nihilism, ormaluniversalism, nd concrete particularism. his new type ofdiscourse efers ackto the ontingent ndividual s its tartingpoint, otto the hero, hegenius, or to the role-player r theone-dimensional

uppet,ut to a

personike

youand me.

Documents

Agnes Heller - The Moral Situation of Modernity