Agnew, John - Sovereignty Regimes Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary Wolrd Politics, 1995

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Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World PoliticsAuthor(s): John AgnewSource: Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 95, No. 2 (Jun., 2005), pp.437-461Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Association of American Geographers

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Sovereigntyegimes: erritorialitynd StateAuthoritynContemporaryorldolitics

John gnew

DepartmentfGeography,niversityfCalifornia,osAngeles

I proposeconceptf ffectiveovereigntyoarguehat tates articipatensovereigntyegimeshat xhibitdistinctiveombinationsf entraltateuthoritynd oliticalerritoriality.wo asic onclusions,rawingromrecentesearchnpoliticaleographynd therields,re hatovereigntys neithernherentlyerritorialorsit xclusivelyrganizedn state-by-stateasis. hismattersecauseomuch oliticalnergyas eennvestedinorganizingoliticsngeneralnddemocracynparticularn relationo states.ypically,ritingbout ov-ereigntyegardsovereigntysprovidingnorm hategitimizesentraltateuthority.nfortunately,ittle rno attentionsgivens towhyhishouldlwaysntail territorialefinitionfpoliticaluthoritynd owhystatesre herebyts ole roprietors.hedominantpproachontinuesoprivilegehe tate s the ingularontof uthorityvenwhen state'sovereigntyay e decriedshypocrisynd een s divisibler ssue-specificratherhanreal" r bsolute.

putorwardmodel f

overeigntylternativeothedominantne

byden-

tifyingoursovereigntyegimes"hat esultromistinctiveombinationsf entraltateuthoritylegitimatedespoticower) n theonehand, nddegreefpoliticalerritorialitythe dministrationf nfrastructuralpower)nthe ther.y regime"mean systemfrule, otmerelyome ort f nternationalrotocolragreementetweenutativelyqual tates. then xaminehegeneralrajectoryf he ombinationf ov-ereigntyegimesromhe arly ineteenthenturyo thepresent.hecontemporaryeographyf urrencies(specificallyxchange-raterrangements)erveso mpiricallyllustratehe eneralrgumentboutovereigntyregimes.inally,briefonclusionuggestshat he ominantestphalianodelf tateovereigntynpoliticalgeographynd nternationalelationsheory,eficients thas ong een or nderstandinghe ealitiesfworldpolitics,s evenmorenadequateoday,ot nly orts gnoringhehierarchyf tatesnd ourcesf uthorityotherhan tates,ut lsobecause f tsmistakenmphasisnthegeographicalxpressionf uthoritypar-ticularlynderhe mbiguousign f"sovereignty")s invariablynd nevitablyerritorial.eyWords:tates,effectiveovereignty,erritoriality,overeigntyegimes,ollarization.

hesovereigntyf tates as ong een iewedsboth a source f and a responseo inter- ndintra-stateonflict. mongpolitical heorists,

most ttention asbeengiven o therelationshipe-tween overeigntyndpolitical uthority:nparticular,that tate overeigntyas risen oenforcenternalrderlegitimatelynd toprotectgainstxternalhreat. e-cently,hegroundingf his laim bout e ure r egalsovereigntyn relationo assumptionsf nternationalanarchyndequalitymong tates as beensubject osome examinatione.g., Badie 1999; Krasner 999,

2001;Lake2003). Indeed, cross number ffields-fromeographyo aw andsociology-theres a sharedsense thatthe conventionalnderstandingf sover-eigntys unlimitednd ndivisibleule y state verterritorynd thepeoplen t s nneedof erious riticalscrutinye.g.,Camilleri nd Falk 1992;Walker 993;Murphy 994;Anderson 996;Bierstekernd Weber1996; Luke 1996; Hashmi1997; Ong 1999; Mason2001; Sidaway 003; Stacy2003). But theconceptualconnection etweenovereigntynd state erritoriality

hasenjoyedess ystematicnalysisMurphy996;Ko-brin 997;Biersteker002). Implicitn all claims boutstatesovereigntys thequintessentialorm akenbypolitical uthorityre associated laims boutdistin-guishing strictlyounded erritoryromn externalworldndthus ixinghe erritorialcope f overeignty(Agnew1994). Territoriality,he use of territoryorpolitical,ocial, ndeconomicnds, swidelyeen as a

largelyuccessfultrategyor stablishingheexclusivejurisdictionmpliedy tate overeignty.

Buteffectiveovereigntys notnecessarilyo neatlyterritorialized.n a landmarkaper n sovereigntyndterritoriality,urphy1996) distinguishesetween ejureand de facto overeigntyo make hispoint.Thisdistinction,owever,ecessarilymplieshat here c-tuallys a purede jure overeigntyrom hich e factosovereigntys a lapseoranomaly. yclaim s thatdefactoovereigntys all theres.TheU.S.government,orexample,ince 001,hasrefusedorecognizedenial f

rightso so-called nemyombatantsrom fghanistanheld ttheU.S.base nGuantanamoay, uba,onthe

Annals f heAssociationfAmerican eographers,5(2), 2005,pp.437-461 C 005byAssociation fAmerican eographersInitial ubmission, arch 004;revisedubmission,eptember004;final cceptance, ctober 004

PublishedyBlackwell ublishing,50 MainStreet,Malden,MA 02148,and9600Garsingtonoad,Oxford X4 2DQ, U.K.

This content downloaded from 193.54.67.91 on Wed, 17 Apr 2013 13:29:07 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions






438 Agnew

claim thatthe base is notwithin he urisdictionfAmerican ourts ndthusnot ubject o udicial eviewconcerningheconstitutionalityfholding eople n-definitelyithoutharge. utGuantinamo ay s justone of large hain fdetentionenters,nAmericangulag, hich heCentralntelligencegencyCIA) and

American ilitaryperate orldwideithcarcelynodto local claimsof territorialovereigntyPriest ndStephens004). ndeed,ocal overeigntys then maskto allow reatingrisonersnways hatwould otentiallybe subject o judicialreviewn theU.S. proper. e-markably,ndsubject o scarce ommentarytthe imeorsince, nder Militaryrder f 13November001,Presidentushgavehimselfherightodetain nynon-U.S. citizennywherentheworldor s ong s hechoseif thereweresuspicion f involvementn anti-U.S."terroristctivity."n thewakeof o-called umanitar-ian crises,s in Somalia,Bosnia ndKosovo, heU.S.

andother overnmentssometimesnder hemantle fthe UnitedNations)have also intervenedmilitarilyacross heglobe, venwhen he tates acingnterven-tionhavedefendedhemselvesgainstuch violations"ofterritorialovereigntyMills 2000). Various hreatsanddangersmotivatedepeatedmilitarynterventionsbyAmerican ndSovietgovernmentsn stateswithintheirputative espectivepheres f influence uringtheCold War (e.g.,Weber1995). Mostrecently,hesupposedhreat o theterritorial.S. fromweaponsfmass estruction"llegedlyeldby he raqi overnmentwastheprima acereason or he U.S.-led nvasion f

Iraq in 2003. But it was clear thatwhenthe U.S."handedback"sovereigntyo an Iraqi-staffedovern-menton 28 June 004 that effectiveovereigntye-mained pfor rabs.t is not usttheso-calledGreatPowershathavesuch nextended eographicaleach,however.or xample,hroughtsheavy roop resence,theSyrian overnmentxercisesremendouseverageover hegovernmentfLebanon,ndAustralia as n-tervenedmilitarilyn the faceofpoliticalnstabilitynvarious acificsland tates.

More pecifically,he mpactfglobalizationnstatesis felt ot nlynthe hallengetposes o their verall rissue-specificuthorityrom ther tates,but also in itsconsequences for the territorializationf sovereignty(e.g., Zacher 1992; Cohen 1998; Agnew 1999; HardtandNegri2000; Slaughter nd Burke-White 000; Halland Biersteker002; Langewiesche 004; Singer2004).Forexample, heworldwidexplosion n negative nvi-ronmental xternalities oes not respect nternationalboundaries; urrencies,ongseen as thebadgesof statesovereignty,re increasinglyenationalized;many peo-ple hold citizenshipn multiple tates;borders re in-

creasingly orousto flows f migrantsnd refugeeswithout tateregulation; nowledgend innovationnetworkso longer onor ational oundaries;t s in-creasinglyifficulto establishtateorigin or largenumberfcommoditiesn world rade s transnational

corporationsoordinateheir ctivitiescrossmultiple

locationsndifferentountries;large umberfpublicand private rganizationsntervene, ediate,nd en-

gage in the provision f publicgoods acrossstateboundaries;erhapshe mostmportantoliticalnno-vation f recent imes,heal Qaeda terroristetwork,workscrosstate oundarieshile xploitinghe ack fterritorialovereigntyxercisedy ome f tshost tates(suchas Pakistan); rivateersin the form fprivatemilitaryontractorsicensed ypowerfultates) ndpi-rates n thehigh eas (popular ith ocalpopulations)havemade eriousomebackshat hallengehethesisthat tatesnvariably onopolizehe egitimatese of

violence; nd udicial egulation ithintatesncreas-inglynvolveseferenceosupranationalourtsaswiththeEuropean nion EU]) or to thedecisionsfforeignones as intheU.S.).

In otherwords,ffectiveovereigntysnotnecessarilypredicatedn anddefinedy he trictndfixederritorialboundariesf ndividualtates.nmy iew,henegotiationand redefinitionfpoliticaluthorityngeographicallycomplex ays uggestsheneedtochange hetermsfdebate bout overeignty.hepurposef his rticlestodosoby: a) criticalnalysisf he onventionalisdomaboutsovereignty,aying articularttentiono the

expansion f sources f authorityeyond tates ndthe attenuationfterritorialitys sovereignty'srimarymode ofgeographicalrganization;b) examininghehistoricalndgeographicalncidence fdifferentsov-

ereigntyegimes"capacitiesf tatesndifferentlobalsituationsoexercise e factoovereigntynternallynd

externally);nd c) showinghroughhe xamplef he

"geographyfmoney,"rhow urrenciesperateroundtheworld oday, owthese egimesavecometooper-ate nrecent ears.

The questioningf territoriale jure sovereigntymattersnot simplybecause of the challengeto state

political primacyfromglobalizationbut because theequationof tatewith overeigntys ntrinsic othewaysin whichpoliticsn general nd democracynparticularhave been considered n moderntimes. For one thing,democracyhas been historicallyependent upon thenation-state-the state as underwritteny a singularnational identity. emocracyand popularsovereigntygrewtogether fter he Americanand Frenchrevolu-tions.The riseof nationalism urthereinforcedhe ink

(Dallmyr nd Rosales 2001). I and othershave recited







Sovereigntyegimes:erritorialitynd StateAuthoritynContemporaryorld olitics 439

thewaysnwhich hedeliberativeature fdemocracyas it developed eemsto require erritorialdjacencyamong itizens nd nwhichtssymbolicontent estson common erritorialistories fstrugglend socialorganizationThaa2001;Agnew 002,166-67).But sthere necessaryonceptualependencef ach on the

other? tatementsuch s"the deals f itizenshiplashwith he overeignation-statenwhich heywere irstdeveloped"Linklater 998,182) imply hattheynolonger o. Indeed,much f the o-called osmopolitanliteraturen democracye.g., Linklater 998; Held2004)holds o this iewpoint,hetoricallydvocatingmove eyondhe tate oworlditizenship.ut he nlyway hat hey anconceive fworld itizenshipithoutopening ptoquestionhefoundingonditionfdem-ocratic heory-the resumptionf a territorializedo-litical ommunity-isy"scaling p" fromndividualstates o theworldsawhole.nthis ccount,herefore,

normativeategoriesf onsent nd egitimacyased nterritorializationemainnaffectedyglobalization.hisis becauseestablishedemocraticheorynd practicehaverequired necessaryictiono make hem ossibleat all,that s,that here sabsolute opular overeigntyvestedn a national/territorialolitical ommunityig-idlymarked ff rom llothers(Niisstr6m003;Runci-man2003).Absoluteovereigntyherebyontinues ounderwriteemocracys it is typicallyhoughtfbycosmopolitanemocrats,ven as the contemporaryworld alls for ttentiono divisibleovereigntynddeterritorializedegitimacy.emocracy'sdvocateswill

have to respond o thischallengefdemocracys tosurvivend prospern a globalizingorld Anderson2002).

SovereigntytBay?

In conventionaloliticaldiscourse,overeigntysabout central tate uthority.his is a relationshipnwhich n agent f state anmake ommandshat revoluntarilyomplied ith y hose verwhom he tateclaims uthority.n thetypicaltory,uch nternalr"domestic"sovereigntyequiresa source of authority

(kingship, he nation,the-people-in-government,tc.)thatoperates ffectivelyithin heterritoryf the state.Explicitly,herefore,overeigntys seen as state-basedand territorial. urrently ominantunderstandingsfstatesovereigntyre based on older ones in which sov-ereigntywas associatedwith the physicalpersonof amonarch.Thus, the incorporeal ealm of the state isoften escribednWestern hought s a "body." n earlymodern uropean bsolutism,he"bodypolitic s alwaysan adultmalebody hathasnohistoryfbirth nd is not

subject onatural eterioration.hisbody,whoseheadis a king nd whose imbs nd organs re subjects fvarious ank, an die only yviolent ttack r the n-fectionfsomeof tsparts" Shemek 002,5). Thephysicalityf the sovereign as been symbolicallytransferredrom he monarch o the stateterritory

(Bartelson995,98; alsosee Kantorowicz957;MelzerandNorberg998).Thismetaphoresistshe dea thatsovereigntyanbe deterritorialized.t the sametime,and in thesamestory,overeigntyas an external i-mension. nygiven tatemust e recognizeds sover-eignbyother tates n order o qualifys such. Suchrecognitionmplies formalquality etweentatesnwhich onecanexerciseommandver thers.Jurid-ical" or egal overeignty,herefore,rovidesheneces-sary eographicalonditionor he perationfdomesticsovereignty:rigid istinctionetween hehierarchyexercisedythe statewithintsterritoryrom hean-

archyhat revailseyondt.From hisviewpoint,tatesovereigntyaybe un-derstoods the bsoluteerritorialrganizationfpoliticalauthority.ost ccountsf overeigntyccept ts ither/orquality: state ither oesor doesnot have sover-eigntyseeLake2003).Theydiffers towhetherheysee this s a foundationalrincipleoriginatingn,forexample, he seventeenthentury iththe Peace ofWestphaliarearlier) ras anemergentocialpractice.They lsovarynacceptinghat here reactorsn in-ternationaloliticssuch smilitarilyeakertates) hatare notfullyovereign.romHobbes 1651) and Locke

(1690) to Schmitt1985) and Agamben 1998), toname usta few, owever, oderntates ndpoliticalauthorityre seen as practicallyonded ogether.venFoucault1991,93),a theoristith less tate-centeredview f heworld,eems osee centraltate uthoritysachievingovereignowern themodern orldwith atriangle,overeignty-discipline-government,hichhasas itsprimaryargethepopulationnd as itsessentialmechanismhe pparatusesf ecurity"s the xclusive

politicalenterpiece.fcourse, oucault1980) is alsothe theoristwho pointedto the conflict etweenthesovereign ower frulesbackedby anctions nd the

actualdaily xperience fpower xercised y multitudeof nonstate sourcesas a fundamental lement of dis-

course and social practice.Unfortunately,his dualistvision has rarelyprevailed n criticalanalysisof the

practices f state overeignty.ather, or xample,whenstatesshow evidence of ncreasing conomic and polit-ical interdependence,his s construed s either choicethattheyhave made in pursuit fself-evidentnterestsrather han an exogenouschallengeto them Helleiner1994), or sovereigntys seen as totally nder threat r







440 Agnew

"atbay" romnew echnologies"fpowerLuke ndOTuathail 998).Butwhat f he bsolute nd ndivisiblepoliticaluthoritymplicitnthis torybout tate ov-ereigntynd tspresumederritorialasis sproblematictobeginwith?

The conventionaltorysbased ngivinghe tate n

ontologicalnd a moral haracterquivalento that fthe ndividualersonnclassicaliberalismN.Jacobson1998;Agnew1999;Skinner 999). The state s thustreated s a "given."t is rootedna grammarffixedboundariesnd dentities.s a naturalizedbstractn-dividual,he tatehasacquired personhoodhat henunderwritests pecial tatus s the ocus f overeignty.Thisdepictionfthestate s especiallyonvincinge-causea moral laim quatingheautonomyfan indi-vidualpersonwith hatofthe state s masked ythenatural laim hat smadeonbehalf fthe state s anindividual.n thisway, hehistoricalonstructionf

statehoods a particularype fpoliticalnterprisesgiven transcendentalakeover.he sovereigntateis exalted sthe ingularolution oboth heproblemfhuman ggression,ydisplacinghataggressionromwithinheterritoryfthe tate nto herealm f nter-staterelations,nd to theproblemforganizingco-nomic ife,byusing ts unique qualities o competewithin global ivision f abor InayatullahndRupert1994).

In fact, tatehood ndpersonhoodlike renotthepregivenhenomenahis toryuggests.ather,heyreboth ubjectivitiesormedutof social nteractionnd

mutual ecognition.ersonsnd tates nly ormssuchthroughhe nteractionndrecognitionfhouseholds,tribes, ynasties,ocialmovements,nd such.Moreparticularly,tatehoodmergesut of trugglesor on-trol;t snever preexistingasis or hose truggles.notherwords, state snotontologicallyrioro a setofinterstateelations. state mergesnd srecognizedssuchwithinsetof elationshipshat efinehe ules orwhat s andwhatsnot "state." tatehood esultsrommutual ecognitionmongtatesBierstekerndWeber1996). It is not the outcome of "isolated tates"achieving tatehood eparatelynd thenengagingwith

one another s abstract ndividuals. he importance fthe Peace ofWestphalian 1648,for xample, ay n themutualrecognition mongelitesof the new Europeanterritorialtates as a set of neutral centers of publicpower n the faceofdevastating eligiouswars.Yet,thelegitimationf tate overeigntylsodepended n the n-creased loyaltynd support fpopulations hrough hecross-mappingfnationwith tate Gottmann 973). Inthe nationalist magination, he state then becomessomethingf a superpersone.g.,Schmitt 985).

From hebrief verviewfdominanttrands fcon-

temporaryhinkingbout sovereigntyhreeaspectsstandnneed ofparticularcrutiny.he firstwohavereceivedncreasingttention.ut thethird as been

largelyeglected.he firsts theassumptionhat ov-

ereigntysacquiredxogenously,r n a "state fnature,"

ratherhan n an ongoingystemfstates. o-calledconstructivistsavebeenespeciallyoncerned ith hisaspect f ontemporaryhinkinge.g.,Wendt 999).Keyto theirnterpretationsthe dea that overeignty-bothdomesticnd external-is ociallyonstructeds statesinteract ith, mitate,nd conflict ith ne another."Domestic rder"s thuspremisedn"external"isor-der nddangerCampbell 992). nthis nderstanding,sovereigntys a social factproduced ythepracticesof states. o, rather hanemergingrom he "state-of-nature"-the ar of all against ll-that ThomasHobbes 1651[1968,186])used s thebasis or ositing

theoriginsf thestate, overeigntyomes boutas aresultf he purposes"f tatesn nteractionndcaninvolve wide ange f ctual racticesndpolicieshatchange ver ime. his s all goodandwell, s I have

emphasizedbove,but it fails o address wofurtherassumptionshat recriticalo the dominantiews fsovereignty.

One of hese s that f n essentialqualityetweenstates laimingovereignty,otwithstandinghe bviousrealityfhierarchyn power etween ctorsn world

politics.he modern orldsone ofmajornequalitiesn

power etween tatesndifferentorld egionsSlater

1997).Muchofthis nequalitys theresult f mperial-ism n thepast nd thehegemonyxercisedy heU.S.and its allies n thepresent. hus,althoughhe as-

sumptionfequal sovereigntybothdomesticnd u-ridical)may pply,t east oa degree,o theEuropeanstates,heir ettlerffspringtates, apan, hina, nd afew thers,tatesntherest f heworld avea serioussovereigntyeficit.orthem,overeigntys as yet un-realized"InayatullahndBlaney 995).They implyonothave thepower esourcesochallengeeriouslye-strictionslaceduponthembymorepowerfultates(and other actors such as international nstitutions,

banks,and multinational usinesses).Nor can they x-pect ready recognition f their internalpolitical au-

thority hen theyhave either nherited heir laimtorule from olonialpowersor depend for heir ontinu-ance in poweron external upport Keene 2002). Ofcourse, dangerhere ies nseeing tate overeigntys a

largely ealizedphenomenon n the West and absentelsewherewhen it is better hought f as "unrealized"everywheren thede jureform hat t is usually llegedto take.







Sovereigntyegimes:erritorialitynd tateAuthoritynContemporaryorldolitics 441

But theproblemf ackof onformityo an absolutesovereigntysevenmore ervasiveimplyecausehier-archicaldominance n worldpolitics s even morewidespreadn ts ffectshanust nthe elationetweenimperialorhegemonic) owers nd subordinatenes(Krasner999;Lake2003).Moregenerally,ituationsf

"sharedovereignty"such s oneChina, wo ystemsnHong Kong, he emergencef supranationalystemssuch s theEU,and theceding f conomic owerntothe handsof nternationalnstitutionsuch as the n-ternationalonetaryund IMF) inthe ase ofheavilyindebted,ndevelopingountries)ndothernomaloussituationssuch as that of the Palestinian ationalAuthority,hegovernmentfBosnia, nd theBritish/Irish ollaborationverNorthernreland) uggestowwidespreadxceptionsotherule f bsolute,ndivisiblesovereigntyxercisedqually yall states anbe. Sov-ereigntysdivisiblend seemsncreasinglyo across he

world Delbruck 003; Stacy2003). In thiscontext,internationalawyersncreasinglyistinguishetweenhistoricnsularovereignty,hich mphasizes rightoresist,ndan emergingelationalovereignty,hich sthecapacityoengage e.g., laughter004).Theyusethis istinctions thebasisfor xplainingheprolifera-tion of networks f governmentfficials ho shareinformationnd coordinate heiractivities roundtheworld. his disaggregatedovereignty"ointso thewillingnessf states o share uthorityn the face ofenvironmental,conomic,nd socialproblemshatgowell eyondheirndividualapacityomanage ntheir

own.The lastproblematicssumption,ne that has re-

ceived ess ttention,s the ssumptionhat overeigntyis invariablyerritorialrexercised verblocs fterres-trial pace.Modern oliticalheoryends ounderstandgeographyntirelys territorial:heworld sdivided pinto ontiguouspatial nitswith heterritorialtate sthebasicbuilding lock fromwhichother erritorialunits suchas alliances,pheres f nfluence,mpires,etc.)derive rdevelopAgnew 994).' This stherea-sonwhymuch f the peculationbout thedecline fthestate"or"sovereigntytbay" sposedas the"end of

geography."et,thehistorical ecord uggests hatthereisno necessity or olities o be organized erritorially.sSpruyt1994, 34) claims,

Ifpoliticss about ule, hemodern tate sverilynique,for t claims overeigntyndterritoriality.t s sovereignnthat t claimsfinal uthoritynd recognizeso highersource f urisdiction.t s territorialn that ule s definedas exclusiveuthorityver a fixed erritorialpace.Thecriterionor etermininghere laims o sovereignuris-

dictioneginr nd s thus purelyeographicne.Mu-tuallyecognizedorderselimitpheresfurisdiction.

Territoriality,heuse ofterritoryor olitical,ocial,and economicnds, s n fact strategyhathas devel-

opedmore n somehistoricalontexts han n others.

Thus, he territorialtate, s it s knownocontempo-rary oliticalheory,evelopednitiallynearlymodernEuropewith he etreatfnonterritorialynasticystemsofrule nd the transferf overeigntyrom heperson-hood of monarchs o discretenationalpopulations(Neocleous2003). That modern tate overeignty,susuallyonstrued,idnotoccur vernightollowinghePeaceofWestphalian1648 snowwell stablishede.g.,Osiander2001; Teschke2003). Territorializationfpolitical uthorityasfurthernhanced ythe deve-

lopmentfmercantilistconomiesnd, ater, yan in-dustrialapitalismhatemphasizedapturingowerful

contiguous ositivexternalitiesromxponentialis-tance-decayeclinesn transportationosts nd fromthe clusteringfexternalconomiesresourcemixes,socialrelations fproduction,aborpools, tc.)withinnational-stateoundariesKratochwil986; Teschke2002).

Absent uch onditions,overeignty-inhe ense fthe ociallyonstructedracticesfpoliticaluthority-may e exercisedonterritoriallyr nscatteredocketsconnected y flows crossspace-spanningetworks.From hisviewpoint,overeigntyan be practicednnetworkscross pacewith istributedodes n places

that are eitherhierarchicallyrranged r reticular(withoutcentral rdirectingode). n theformerase,authoritys centralized,hereasn the atter,t is es-sentiallyhared cross henetwork.llformsfpolity-from unter-gathererribes hrough omadickinshipstructureso city-states,erritorialtates, pheres finfluence,lliances, radepacts,seaborne mpires-therefore,ccupy ome ort f pace Agnew nd Cor-bridge 995;Smith 003).What sclear, owever,fnotwidely ecognized ithin ontemporaryebates boutstate overeignty,s thatpoliticaluthoritys notnec-

essarily redicatedon and definedby strict nd fixed

territorialoundaries.Two issuesare crucialhere: thatpolitical uthoritys

not restrictedostates nd that uchauthoritys therebynot necessarily xclusively erritorial. uthoritys the

legitimate xerciseofpower.The foundation nd attri-butionof legitimacy o differentntitieshas changedhistorically.y wayofexample, he egitimacyf rulebymonarchsn themedievalEuropeanorderhad a differ-entmeaning rom hat of ater bsolutist ulers nd that

operatingundermore recentdemocratic ustifications







442 Agnew

for tate owerBobbitt002). nnocase,however,astheauthorityf the state verbeencomplete. herehavealways eencompetingources fauthority,romthe churchn themedieval ontext o internationalorganizations,ocialmovements,usinesses,ndnong-overmentrganizationsNGOs) today. ore pecifically,

transparency,fficiency,xpertise,ccountability,ndpopularityre asmuch oundationsf egitimacys arenationalitynddemocraticrocessDelbruck003,30-34; but also see Hudson2001;Mulligan 004). Thus,evenostensiblyrivatentitiesndsupranationalov-ernmentsre often ccorded s great r evengreaterauthorityhan re tates. or xample,ntheU.S.,thereiswidespreaduspicionf theefficiencyndaccounta-bility f the federal overnment.his often eads toperhapsxcessive aithn thevirtue fprivatizationfwhat reelsewhereeenas "public" ervices.n Italy,much f hepopularnthusiasmor heEU isdriveny

thehope hat russels illncreasinglyupplantome sthe seatofpowermost ffectivenrelationopeople'severydayives.

Phrases uch as "divisible"nd "graduated"over-eigntyreoften sed ogive he ense f n ncreasinglylabile overeigntypolitical uthority)ot mmediatelyassociated ith erritorializedtate ower. hus,for x-ample, ng (1999,217) claims hat

Globalizationas nduced situationfgraduatedover-eignty,herebyven s the tatemaintainsontrolvertsterritory,t ... lets orporatentitiesetthe termsor

constitutingnd egulatingome omains.....Weakerndlessdesirableroupsregivenver o theregulationfsupranationalntities.

It is not theexistence ut thenature fsovereigntythat s transformedytheworkingsfgraduatedover-eignty. uthoritysvestednagentswhomanage lowsthroughpace r hroughction t a distancesmuch sin thosewhomanage erritories.djacencynd terri-torial ivisionf paceas modalitiesfpower hus acethe hallengef oerciveowernd uthoritymanatingfromcatteredites.The spatialityfauthority,here-fore, annotbe entirely educed to the territorialem-

plateof tate overeignty.ndeed,withglobalization,hetransactional alance is increasinglyippingnfavor fanetworkedystem fpolitical uthorityhatchallengesterritorializedtate sovereigntys the singular ace ofeffectiveovereigntyAppadurai1996).

In thisregard, he terms territory"nd "space" needto be verycarefully istinguished rom one another(Durand et al. 1992; L~vy 2001).2 Simplybecause theformermight e superseded r supplementedn the or-ganization fpolitical uthorityoes not mean that the

latter isappears.erritorys notgeographyout ourt.Indeed, states" fonetype r another ancontinueoserve s lociofpoliticaluthorityven s their owers

deployedynetworkedlows ather hanbyterritorialcontrolenetratingther ominallyovereigntates. or

example, elativelyowerfultates oday an supervise

securityhreatsn distant laces nd financialransac-tionsn offshore"enterseven sthey ave ittle irectregulatoryontrol) y rewardingnd/orunishingc-tions hat heyudge nrelationo the patialfficacyftheiruthoritye.g.,Roberts994;Hudson1998;Palen2002).Ofcourse,nsuch ituations,overeigntys notabsolute. ut, hen, s is increasinglylear, ndas crit-icism f the firstwoassumptionsboutconventionalviewsof statesovereigntymplies, tatesovereigntyrarelyverhasbeen, r s,absolute,venwhen ppar-ently eatlyerritorializedLind2004).

The main ssue sthat erritorialitysonly netypef

spatialityrway nwhich pace s constitutedociallyandmobilizedoliticallyDurand t al. 1992;OffnerndPumain 996;Agnew1999;Allen2003).Territorialityalways astwo eatures:locks frigidlyorderedpaceanddominationr ontrols themodalityfpower ponwhich heborderingeliesGottmann973; ack1986).Suchpowermaywellbe legitimate,.e.,exercised ithauthorityeither ureaucraticr charismatic),ut itultimatelyests n demarcationhroughomination.It workshrougherritorialivisionf pace,boundarycontrol,nd the hierarchicalisseminationf authori-tativecommands. et,space and powerhave other

possiblemodalitiesMann1993;Allen2003). Central-izedpower,nvolvingommand ndobedience,anop-erate etween oints ver ongdistancesswell s overterritoriallocs, or xample,hroughhedeploymentfmilitaryssets, utthismayhave esspossibilityf us-tained,nd egitimate,mpactnthepeoplewithwhomitcomes nto ontact. ut this sthen till networkedformf ower.t sbased nflowshroughpace-spanningnetworks,ot privilegedccess to territoriesblocksof pace).On the ontrary,iffusedower efersopowerthat s not centeredr directlyommandedutthatresultsromatternsf ocial ssociationnd nteractioningroups nd movementsas,for xample,n NGOs andglobal social movements) r throughmarket xchange(credit ating gencies uch as Moody's re one example,see Sinclair2000). Diffused owercan be territorializedand authoritative,ut only n so far s the networkstdefines re territoriallyonstrained ycentral tate au-

thority.therwise, etworksre limited patiallynlybythe purposesfor which theyare formed. n thisway,power s generated hroughocial and market-baseds-sociation, ffiliation,nd reticular iffusionather han







Sovereigntyegimes:erritorialitynd tateAuthoritynContemporaryorld olitics 443

throughuthoritativeommandr domination.his spowerhat omes nto xistencehroughssociationndassent s a result fhumangencyArendt958).Whennotsustainedhroughegitimateollectivection, ow-ever, hepower etworkshus reatedwilldisintegrate.Today,oth entralizednd diffusedowersrearguably

lessterritorializedystateboundarieshan t any imesince the nineteenthenturyAgnew nd Corbridge1995;Paasi1999).

Sovereigntys the legitimatexercise f power asauthority),herefore,s necessarilyboutceded,se-duced, ndco-opted iffusedower swell s coercionby and acceptance f)centralizedower. he precisecombinationf powermechanismscoercion, ssent,seduction,o-optation,tc.) nvolvedntheexercise fauthorityydifferenttates anbe the ame or ll ssueareas trade,ecurity,urrency,tc.)ormay iffercrossthemndoperateolely ithin state's erritoryrmore

widelyithererritoriallyrnonterritorially.utwithoutat least modicumf ctive ollaborationy ollectiveactors nboth ides fborders,tate overeigntyanbeneitherustained or undermined.n short, s JohnAllen 2003, 159) remarks,dominations notevery-where."ndeed, vendemarcationymeans fborders,the quintessence f state territoriality,elies to aconsiderableegree n theextent o whichnetworksofassociationnd affiliationarallel heboundaries fdomination. ven the seeminglymostWestphalianof states, hen, re riddledwith authoritativeowernetworksbasedon centralizednd/or iffusedower)

whose xtensioneyond erritorialoundariesan ren-der laims o absolute tate overeigntyoot utwhosecontinuingresencenside heboundariess criticalotheirpparentredibility.

EffectiveovereigntyndSovereigntyRegimes

Politicaluthoritys the egitimateracticefpower.In otherwords,t is themyriadffectsf an ascribedasymmetryetween ctors hatpermitsomeactorsnot

justto command ut also to enroll thers n their esiresand activities. Ascribed" s the key term. As BruceLincoln puts it, "Persuasion and coercion alike areconstitutive f authority,ut once actualized and ren-dered explicitthey signal-indeed, theyare, at leasttemporarily-its egation" Lincoln 1994, 6). Today, trequiresboth communicative nd infrastructurale-sources nd a highdegreeofpopular cceptanceto op-erateeffectively.orespecifically,olitical uthorityuasovereignty equires: 1) a governmentalpparatusto

serve s a final eatofauthoritynd (2) an accepteddefinitionffunctionalndgeographicalcope territo-rial ndnonterritorial)eyondwhich ts commandsounheeded nd unenforced. hat has beenlackingneffortstunderstandinghe ange fpracticesssociatedwith overeigntyas been a meansofidentifyinghe

effectsf co-variationn the effectivenessf state u-thority,n the one hand, nd its relative eliance nstate erritoriality,ntheothere.g.,Hurd1999).

A usefulpproachodoing ocomes rom ritingnthehistoricalociologyfpower. pecifically,he terms

despoticnd infrastructuralowerhave been used byMann 1984)to dentifyhe wo ifferentaysnwhicha governmentalpparatuscquiresndusescentralizedpower.notherwords,hese ermsdentify,espectively,thetwodifferentunctionshat tates erformnd thatunderpinheir laims o sovereignty:he struggleorpower mong lites ndinterestroupsnone state n

relation oelites nd nterestroupslsewherend theprovisionf publicgoodsthatare usuallyprovidedpubliclyby tates).n Mann's 1984,188)words,

Letusclearlyistinguishhese wo ypesf tate ower.Thefirstensedespoticower]enotesowery he tateelite tselfver ivil ociety.he secondinfrastructuralpower]enotes hepowerf he tate openetratendcentrallyo-ordinatehe ctivitiesf ivilocietyhroughits wnnfrastructure.

Historically,nfrastructuralower asrisenn mpor-tance ince he ighteenthentury.his sbecause lites

havebeen forcedhrougholiticaltruggleso becomemoreresponsiveo their opulationsnd,as a result,rising ressureroups ave demandedmorenfrastruc-tural oods.n turn,hedeliveryfpublic oods aveboostto theterritorializationfsovereignty.ntilre-cently,hetechnologiesor rovidingublic oodshavehad a built-in erritorialias,not eastrelatingo the

capture fpositivexternalities.ncreasingly,owever,infrastructuralower an be deployedcrossnetworksthat, houghocated ndiscrete laces, re notneces-

sarilyerritorialn theexternalityields hat hey ro-duce. Thus, currencies, ystemsof measure, trading

networks, ducational provision, nd welfare ervicesneed notbe associatedwithexclusivemembershipn aconventionalnation-state.New deployments f infra-structuralowerbothdeterritorializexisting tates ndreterritorialize embership round cities and hinter-lands, regions, nd continental-level oliticalentitiessuch as the EU (Cox 1998; Scott 1998). International

organizations,othprivate nd state-run,ikewisehave

developedthecapacity o deliver widerangeofpublicgoods associatedwith nfrastructuralower.There is a







444 Agnew

simultaneouscaling-upnd scaling-downftherele-vantgeographicalields f infrastructuralowerde-pendingn thepoliticalconomiesf caleofdifferentregulatory,roductive,nd redistributiveublicgoods(e.g.,Brenner 998; Ilgen2003). Consequently,themore conomiesfscale ofdominantoods ndassets

divergerom he tructuralcaleof henational tate-and the more hosedivergenceseedback into eachothern complexways-thenthe more heauthority,legitimacy,olicymakingapacity, nd policy-imple-mentingffectivenessfthe [territorial]tatewill beerodedand underminedoth within nd without"(Cerny 995, 21).

At the ametime, espotic ower inMann's ense)hashistoricallyome orelymuchmore nestablishingits egitimacyhan ncewasthe ase. Direct oercionssimplyess ffectives a mode frule nmoderntates.Though t can be usedagainst ecalcitrant inorities,

large egmentsfthepopulation ust e placated ndpleasedratherhan coerced.Rulersneed to establishat least a modicum fpopular uthorityefore heycanachieve heir oals. uch egitimacysalsofragile.tcannot e taken or ranted.utestablishinguthorityneed notalwaysnvolve singularocus n fixedtateterritoriesf elites and pressure roups djusttheiridentitiesnd nterestso other erritorialevels such scity-regions,ocalities,ndempires)r shiftoyaltiesononterritorialntities uch as internationalrganiza-tions,corporations,ocial movements,r religiousgroupingse.g.,Gill 1994;Kobrin 997;Cutler t al.

1999).Thisshift ould nvolve heenhancingf terri-torial ierarchynpursuitf, or xample,n imperium,or the attenuationf territorialovereigntyntheformof hediffusionf uthoritycross multinodalinancialnetworknvolvingransnationalorporations,anks,other tates, ebt-ratinggencies,nd NGOs. There sno necessaryssociation,herefore,etween espoticpower nd central tateauthority.othdespotic-gov-ernmentalnddiffuseocial oweranworkogetherochallengeentral tate uthority.onsequently,n up-scaling ra fragmentationfsovereigntyan result selites and social groupspursuetheirgoals in waysthat

potentially erritoriallyxpand or nonterritoriallyn-dercutthe authorityfthe centralgovernmentalppa-ratus, espectively.

By wayofrecentexample, he use ofAmericanmil-itaryforces o invade Iraq in 2003 withoutbenefit fsanction fromthe United Nations had a number of

shiftingationales: weaponsof mass destruction" hatthreatened heU.S., Iraqi ties to al Qaeda, and so on.Most of these turnedout to be based on pooror falseintelligence. ne outcome,however, as been todeploy

despotic mericanower owards sort f mperiumsthe U.S. governmentestroyedhe authoritywhattherewas of t)ofthegovernmentf raq.But this e-structionn turn ad a number fdevastatingideef-fects,ncludingbitter ar fresistancensideraq, he

prospect f internal isintegrationlongethnicand

religiousines, nd a generalworldwideiminutionnrespect owardsheU.S. government.his is becausethe nvasion asbeennot nly ereftf egitimacyn the

eyes fmostraqis ut lso nthose fmuch f he est fthe world nd oflarge egmentsfAmerican ublicopinion.Coercivepower s an element f effective

sovereignty,herefore,as limited ossibilityf long-term uccess nlesstcansimultaneouslynrollndgainthe consent fothers.t can actuallyndermineffec-tive overeignty,s it seems ohave donefor he U.S.in Iraqand more enerally.hroughts timuluso re-cruitmentfmoremembersnto nti-Americanerrorist

networks,tcertainlyeems ohavemade he erritoryftheU.S. itselfn evengreaterargethan t wasbeforethe events f11September001 that tartedhe rushto war.

A second xamplendicates differentspect fthe

sovereignty-territoryexus. n Britain,nthe1980s, i-nancial lites, singheirong-termoliticalscendancywithinhe tate, ushed hegovernmentor egulationsthatwould nhance heperformancef London s aninternationalankingentersee Ingham 994on the

long-runningity fLondonvs.Britainonflictf n-terests).houghuchregulationsfornstance,elaxing

capital ontrolsnd deregulatingommodity arkets)benefitedondon's inancialector,heyhadgenerallynegativemacroeconomicffectsnthe tate erritorysa whole. n the ong erm,heymay lso havehad theunintendedegative ffectn theabilityfthegov-ernmento move n contraryirectionsecausetheygenerated owerfulnterests hose oyalties owlinkthemto otherfinancialenters ather hanto theirnominal ome tates. ritishovernmentnxietybout

joiningheEuropeanMonetaryystem as beenexac-erbated ythedespotic ower owexercisedmost f-fectivelywithinBritishpoliticsby London's financial

center, ven thoughsuch a move mightbe helpful omanufacturingnd agriculturalnterests lsewhere nBritain. his conundrums related o the "who is us'?"

questionraised aboutnominally .S.-ownedbusinessesin theearly1990sthatpaid low or no taxes n theU.S.,investedheavily n jobs in othercountries, nd yetde-

pended on Americanconsumersfor final demand forwhattheyproduce.

Buttherecastingf the territorialasis to sovereigntyand the challenge to central state authority hrough








deterritorializationt thestate eveland reterritoriali-zation t ocal ndsupranationalcales f nfrastructuraland despotic ower reuneven round he worldD.Jacobson001;Newman 001).There sno onetrendtowards hat omehavecalled the"migrationfau-thority"e.g.,Kahler nd Lake 2003). And,as noted

previously,uchtrends renot nvariablyquivalentothe erosion fstate territorialovereigntyoutcourt.What sneeded,herefore,s a typologyf hemainwaysinwhich overeigntys currentlyxercised o takeac-count f: 1) itssocial onstruction;2) its associationwith ierarchicalubordination;nd (3) itsdeploymentin territorialnd nonterritorialorms. he twobasicdimensionso thetypologyredefinedythe relativestrengthf entraltate uthoritystate espotic ower)on one axis and tsrelativeonsolidationnstate erri-torialitystate nfrastructuralower) n theother. heformernvolvesudgmentbout heextent o which

statehasacquiredndmaintainsneffectivend egit-imate pparatusf ule. he atterefersothedegreeowhich rovisionfpublic oods ndoperationfmarketsisheavilytate egulatedndbounded erritorially.e-garded s social onstructions,hesedimensionsefineboth the extent f state utonomynd thedegree owhicht s territorialnpractice.ntersectingontinua,ratherhandiscreteategories,he twodimensionse-fine our xtremeasesthat an be identifieds idealtypesor urposesf heoreticaliscussionndempiricalanalysis. hese arerelationaln character,eferringohowsovereigntys exercisedffectivelyver time nd

space,rather handiscrete erritorialategoriesntowhich xistingtates an be neatly lotted. referothese ourdealtypess sovereigntyegimes,ystemsfeffectiveovereignty,ecognizinghat nyactualreal-world ase neednotexactlyonformo oneparticularregimeTable1).

Of thefourxemplaryases, he lassicxamplestheone closest othe toryrequentlyold bout tate ov-ereignty,lthoughvenhere here an be complications(forxample,nHongKong ndTaiwan or hina).Thesense s one ofbothdespoticnd nfrastructuralowerstill largely eployedwithin bounded state territory

Table1. Sovereigntyegimes

STATETERRITORIALITY

Consolidated Open

Stronger Classic GlobalistCENTRALSTATEAUTHORITY

Weaker Integrative Imperialist

(even ifincreasinglyependentn foreignirect n-vestmentnd overseasmarketsor tsexports)nd ahigh egree feffectiveentraltate oliticaluthority.Contemporaryhina s a goodtest ase forhow ongabsoluteovereigntyan surviveressuresor ivisibilityand theneed to establishhe state's emocraticegiti-

macywhen ncreasinglypento therest ftheworld.Thesecond ase resembles ost storyhat mphasizeshierarchyn world olitics utwithnetworkedeachover paceas well s direct erritorialontrol. his m-perialistegimes nallrespectshe xact ppositef heclassic ase.Notonlyscentraltate uthorityeriouslyin question ecauseof external ependencend ma-nipulations wellas corruptionnd chronicmisman-agement;tate erritorialitys alsosubject o separatistthreats,ocal nsurgencies,ndpoor nfrastructuraln-tegration.nfrastructuralowers weakornonexistent,anddespotic owers oftenffectivelyn outside ands

(includingnternationalnstitutionsuch as theWorldBank s well s distant ut more owerfultates). t isimperialist,f lso reliantn theassent ndcooperationof ocal lites, ecause hepracticef overeigntystiedineluctablyo thedependent olitical-economictatusthatmany tates ndure n theregions,uchas theMiddleEast,sub-Saharan frica,nd LatinAmerica,where tprevails.3

The other wo casesare lessfamiliarn relationoboth conventionalnd critical erspectivesn statesovereignty.he third egimes the ntegrative,epre-sentedherebytheEU. In thiscase, sovereigntyas

complexitieselatingo the coexistenceetween iffer-ent levelsor tiers fgovernmentnd thedistinctivefunctionalreas hat rerepresentedifferentiallycrossthedifferentevels, rom U-wide o thenational-stateand subnational-regional.ut the territorialharacterof someof ts nfrastructuralowers difficulto deny(considerheCommon griculturalolicy,orxample),even f entraltate uthorityor oth he ntire U andthe member tates s weaker hanwhen each ofthestateswas an independentntity.uiteclearly, any fthe foundingtatesof theWestphalianystem avethrownn their ot with one another o create a larger

and, as yet,politically nclassifiablentity hat chal-lenges xistingtatesovereigntynfunctionallyomplexand oftentimes onterritorialays.

Finally, he fourth egime s the globalist. he bestcurrent xampleofthis s the effectiveovereigntyx-ercisedbyU.S. within nd beyond ts nominalnationalboundaries nd throughnternationalnstitutions ithinwhich it is particularlynfluentialsuch as the IMF).Certainly, ritain n the nineteenth entury lso fol-lowed a version of this regime.But, in both cases,







446 Agnew

attemptsavebeenmade o recruitther tates, y o-optationnd assent s much s bycoercion,ntotheregime.ndeed, lobalizationan be seen as theprocess(along withnecessary echnologicalnd economicchanges) fenrollingtatesn theglobalistovereigntyregime.romhis iewpoint,heglobalisttate elies n

hegemony,nthe ense f mix fcoercion ndactiveconsent,obringthersnto inewithts bjectives.herevolutionn nformationechnologiesndtelecommu-nications asalliedwith heend oftheBrettonWoodsmonetaryystemnthe arly 970s o ower ransactioncosts n financialenters nd spur hederegulationffinancialmarketso theextent hatvarious lobalfi-nancial entersinNewYork, ondon, ndTokyo,nparticular)re ncreasinglyhecollective enter ftheglobalist egime Martin1994). AlthoughAmericancentral tateauthorityemains elativelytrongnot-withstandingheproblemsf itsrepublicanonstitu-

tionalismncopingwith tsglobal ole), ts entralityoworld oliticsatchestbetweenwo onflictingoliticalimpulses:ne that ressesowards scatteredmperium(as in Iraq) andone thatpushes owards eepingheU.S. as an openeconomy.he basisof tshegemonyswelcomingfimmigrantsnd foreignnvestmentndgoods nd encouragingfthese endencieslsewhere,but t the ame ime eingncreasinglyubject ofiscaloverextensions it endeavorso intervenelobally etalso erve hedemands f tspopulationor ensionsndhealthcare enefits.tatesother hanthehegemoniconethat nternto heglobalistegimerenot ikelyo

experiencehetension ecausethey an restrictheirmilitaryxpendituresnd thus can benefit rom heglobalist egimes long s they etain relativelyighdegree f centraltate uthority.n otherwords,penborders an be beneficials longas states etain hecapacityo close them own.Otherwise,hedangersalwayshat heglobalistegimeecomesmperialistorstates ther han hedominantne.

HistoricalGeographyfSovereignty

RegimesNone of the sovereignty egimes s totallynew,al-

though heprecise orm hateach takesvaries ver timeand from lace to place. Theyare ideal types r modelsthat cannot map exactlyonto real-world ases. Giventhiscaveat, however, strong ase can be made forhistoricalpatternto theircoappearance (Agnew andCorbridge 995). The purpose f this ection s togiveasense of the historical eographyf effectiveovereigntysincethepresumed mergence fthe modern tatesys-

temnthe arly ineteenthentury.erhapsour eriodscan be identifiedrom heearly ineteenthenturyothepresentn whichdifferentombinationsf sover-eignty egimesaveprevailed ith istinctiveeograp-hies to them.Not surprisingly,heseperiods oincidewith eneral rendsnworld istoryhatresult rom

complexmix feconomic,eopolitical,ndtechnologi-cal change.Needless o say, heperiods re heuristicrather handefinitiveor hepurpose fexploringherelativencidence fsovereigntyegimes. nyperiodi-zation s inherentlyontestable.he present urposesmerelyohistoricizend contextualizehe relativep-pearancef overeigntyegimesver ime nd pace, ottoprovide total ccount fworld istoryver hepasttwohundred ears.4

The classic egimes, f ourse,loselyssociated iththe so-calledWestphalianersion f state overeignty,althoughtreally nly mergeds a potentiallyractical

formnthenineteenthenturyCroxton999;Murphy1996). If the Concert fEurope s itsmainhistoricallegacy s newstatesformed "balanceofpower" n

Europentheyears fterhedefeat fNapoleon,t co-existed romhe outset utside fEuropewithmperi-alist egimessuch s theBritishn ndia, heFrenchnAfrica,nd the Dutchin the East Indies)and witha relativelyeakBritishlobalistegimehat, hroughcommitmento free rade nd a gold-sterlingtandard,deployedome ypesf nfrastructuralower ell eyondBritain's oundaries.hisgeopoliticalrderwas under-minednthe ate nineteenthenturyy he mergence

of setof ivalmperialistrojectssGermany,heU.S.,andJapanndifferentays hallengedritain'slobalistregime.

The net ffectver1875-1945wastoencourageheconsolidationf classic nd imperialistegimest theexpense ftheglobalistne. Borders ardenedven astheywere threatenedy the expansionismf thosepowerfultates uchas GermanyndJapan hat awthemselvess closed out of or disadvantagedytheprevious mperialistnd globalist egimes. he Great

Depressionf the 1930sreinforcedrotectionistres-sures o seal off erritorialconomies romoreignco-

nomiccompetitors. lausibly,hissimply eepened theeconomic misery.But it also encouragednationalistsentiments. his periodreached a crescendo with theSecond WorldWar.

The outcomeofthatwarushered na period nwhichan overarching old War led to twocompeting mperi-alist regimesof which one (the U.S.) had incipientglobalistelements. The countries of WesternEuropeand Japan,however, etaineda relatively igh degreeof central state authority,nd the rapid expansionof








welfare tatesacrossstates n theseregions reatedsomethingkin to the classicregime. he BrettonWoodsmonetaryystem,ased n a fixedxchange-ratebetween heUS$ (backed ygold)and themain ur-rencies f Westernurope ndJapan, ended, ntil tsdisintegrationnthe ate1960s ndearly 970s, o re-

inforcehe erritorialasis osovereigntynthose tateswhose urrencies ere onvertible ithint. As formercolonial ountrieschievedndependenceromhe ate1940sdowninto the 1970s,they spired o classicsovereignty.nfortunately,he termsftrade or heirmainproductsnd theweaknessftheir entraltateauthorityorkedgainsthis, eproducingnmanyasesthe mperialistegime. nlywhere tates ould teercourse etweenheir astdependencend theglobalistregimencipientn Americanovereigntyas in EastAsia)wasthis ath voided.

When theU.S. governmentcted ntheearly 970s

toprotecttsdomesticconomyromseries f xternalshocksnitiatednthe1960s by brogatingheBrettonWoodsAgreementf a dollar-goldtandard),t inad-vertentlyurtheredhe peningpof heU.S. andothereconomies o relativelynregulatedlows f capital,goods, nd ervices. longwith he ctionsf range fnewpolicies romxisting.S.-dominatednternationalinstitutions,uch s the MFandtheGATT (after994,theWTO), this timulatedheworldwidepread f anew"marketccess"model fglobal rade ndinvest-ment.Together ith he endoftheColdWar, s theSovietUnion ndits allies ssentiallybandoned heir

imperialistegime ecauseof tsfailure odeliver co-nomic rowthndpolitical articipation,his iberatedtheU.S. for nrestrictedursuitf globalistovereigntyregime.n many arts ftheworld, owever,heper-ceptions that his s simply newversionfthe m-perialistegime.n Europe, hedeepeningfthe EUsince he ate1980s epresentshemajor xamplef heconstructionf an integrativeegime. here re,how-ever, numberfpossibleandidates or uch sover-eigntyegimehould heU.S.-sponsoredlobalistegimefaltere.g.,theFreeTradeArea of theAmericas,heAssociation of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN],

etc). States such as China, ndia,andpossibly ussia, lllarge ountries, emain s the bestsurvivingxamples ftheoperation f the "classic"sovereigntyegime.

Previousperiodsfaded away.There seems no goodreason to thinkthat the presentone has unlimitedstaying ower. o, whatmight ring t to an end? Themajorconflict otential oday iesbetween theglobalistregime, n the one hand,and thosetrapped n the im-perialist egime, n the other.Even though symmetricin orthodox ecurityerms, histension ies at theheart

of much ontemporarylobal onflictn,for xample,theMiddle ast ndLatinAmerica. lassic ndglobalistregimes, owever,re also basicallyntithetical.hecurrent .S.-China onflict ver trade nd exchange-ratevaluations an example f this ension.fthe n-

tegrativeegimenEurope ives ise oa globalistegime

incompatibleith he urrentne,then his, oo, ouldproduce major onflictf nterestss globalistegimescompete or lobal each.

Currencies ndSovereignty egimes

This argelybstractrgumenteeds mpiricalem-onstration.nthe ontextf tate overeignty,urrenciesare nterestingor hree easons.n thefirstlace, heyare a keymaterialndsymboliceature f entral tateauthorityCohen 1998;Simmons000).National ur-rencies nly ose oprominencen themid-nineteenth

centurysstate uthoritynWesternurope nd NorthAmericawas firmlystablished.heycontributedofirmingpnationaldentities,educedransactionostswithin ationalconomies,aised evenueshroughhemintingf urrencyseigniorage),ndprovidedmeansfortates opay or heir urchaseshroughaxes ntheincreasingncomesmanatingromndustrialapitalism(Helleiner003b).As a result,urrenciesre lso, hen,oneofthemain xamplesf nfrastructuralower. utmany urrencieslso seemto be losing heir ationalcharacterither ecause hey ave much nlarged eo-graphic cope (becauseofelectronicankingnd the

ease ofcurrencyxchangecross orders)rthey avebeeneffectivelyeplacedy oreignurrenciesor widerange f ransactionsnot east he toragefwealth).

Second, it s in themonetaryealm,"ccordingoHelleiner1999, 09),"wherehallengeso thepracticeof sovereigntate] erritorialityreparticularlypparentin thepresentge."Thus,the variousmpacts fglo-balizationn the erritorialityf tate overeigntyhouldbe most mmediatelybvious n relation o thegeo-graphicalynamicsfnational-stateurrencies.ecauseit sprimarilymedium f xchange,[m] neysa beliefthat astobe shared ith ther eople"Goodwin003,4). This makes it a relatively luidmedium n whichauthority ver its issuance and management s alwaysvulnerable o challengefrom n array f actors centralbanks, investmentbanks, transnational orporations,speculators,tc.) and yet,because of tssymbolismnotleast that displayedon coins and banknotes), s fre-

quently one of the most visible examples of state

sovereignty.Finally, ecisionsby governmentsnd other actors

aboutwhether o maintain nationalcurrency,harea







448 Agnew

new ne, ubstitutenational newith global ne, ndhow tomanage global neprovide commonmetricfor xamininghedescriptive eritsfthetypologyfsovereigntyegimes.n otherwords,hecontemporarygeographyfmoney rovides way fboth llustratingthe typologyf sovereigntyegimesnd showinghe

territorialndnonterritorialays hese egimes ork.To be more pecificbouttheconnectionsetweenglobalizationnd monetaryovereigntyirst equiresidentifyingheprocesseswherebyurrenciesakeondistinctiveelationshipsith articulartates ndmap-ping hese ntothesovereigntyegimesdentifiedre-viously. ince the collapseof the BrettonWoodsAgreementntheearly 970s,no singleworldwidex-change-raterrangementas prevailed.5hissuggeststhatmonetarylobalizationnvolves varietyfpoliti-cal-economicrocesses,otsimply single mperialismor free-floatingarket apitalismBernhardnd Le-

blang1999).There arefourways nwhich urrenciestend owork ith espectoany iven ationalerritory,parallelinghefour overeigntyegimes.his fact, nitself,uggestshat, t east or hegeographyfmoney,theressomethingsefulheoreticallybout hefourfoldschema fsovereigntyegimes.he four urrencyro-cesses reas follows:

(1) the erritorial,nwhich national-stateurrencydominates stateterritorynd thepopulationhas restrictedccess to currenciesf wider ir-culationxcept hroughfixedxchangeate,

managedloat,rothermechanismontrolledycentral tate uthority;(2) thetransnational,nwhich hecurrencyssued

by ne tate invariablypowerfulne)circulateswidely mongworldfinancial enters, loatsfreely,s a standardorreserve)urrencynre-lation o which ther urrenciesredenominat-ed, and is a preferredurrencyor ransactingglobal ommerce;

(3) the hared,nwhich formal onetaryllianceoperatesither hroughullmonetarynion aswiththe Euro and the EU) or through n ex-

change-rate nionamongeconomicequals withan internalmanagedfloat nd, in bothcases, anexternal loatingxchangerate;

(4) thesubstitute,nwhich a transnationalurrencysubstitutesither fficiallyrunofficiallyn all ormany transactionsfor the nominal territorialcurrencyf a given tate.The substituteurrencyis particularlymportants a storeof wealth nlocal banks,a hedge against nflation n thena-tionalcurrency,nd a medium fcapitalflighto

foreigninancialenters orocal lites. iven hedominant conomic ole of the U.S. in someworld egions,his s usually process f dollar-ization.

Theseprocessesmap

onto the fourovereignty

e-gimeswith hefour asestaken romable1 (seeTable2). Theyreflectecisions n thepart f tate nd otherinfluentialctors asedon socialized nderstandingsftheirmonetarynterests"Widmaier004, 37).Theseunderstandingseflect,oonedegreer nother,iews fstate nd marketerformancenrelationothedifferentstructuralositions is-a-visheworld conomyhatstates nd local actors ind hemselvesn. Thus,theclassic asecan be seen s based n theKeynesianogicthatstates an mitigatemarket ailures,heglobalistrepresents neoclassicalpproach hatstates hould

retreatnd etmarkets ork heirmagic,he mperialiststresses heclassicalmonetaryheoryhat tatefailurenecessitatesadical ecouplingf domesticnd mone-tary olicies,nd the ntegratives a mix fKeynesian/inside ndneoclassical/outsidehegroupingf tatesnquestion. urrencyrocesses,herefore,renot thedi-rect esult f materialistressuresut aremediated ytheunderstandingsovernmentsnd other ctors ringto theirmaterialituations.

Inthe ontemporaryorld,herere till xamplesfterritorialurrencieshatreflectclassic" tatesover-eignty.6ut thenet trendnrecent earss away rom

this egimeowardhe thers. ne of hebest xamplesof classic overeigntyegimesChina,whose urrency,therenminbioryuan), speggedgainstheUS$ in a

managed loat ndwhose conomystherebynsulatedto a certain egree rommonetaryhocks manatingfromhewiderworld conomy.he only ontemporaryexampleof an intersectionetween transnationalcurrencyrocessnda "globalist"overeigntyegimesthe U.S. The US$ is themainmetricftransnationaltrade nd commercend themain urrencyhat ther

Table2. Currencyrocesses ndSovereigntyegimes

SOVEREIGNTYEGIME

ClassicGlobalistntegrativemperialist

TerritorialChinaDOMINANTCURRENCY Transnational USPROCESS

Shared EULatin

Substitute America








states includinghina)hold s a reserve. s a result,theUS$ is alsothe urrencyhats themainnstrumentofglobalization.he exchange-rateechanismssoci-atedwith heglobalistegimesthefree loat.' heonlycurrentxample fa shared urrencystheEuro, sso-ciated s it swith heprojectfpan-Europeannifica-

tion.Historically,any ational urrenciesuch s theUS$ emergedutoftheunificationfmore eographi-callyvariegatedurrencyystemssee, e.g.,Helleiner1999;Broz1999;Goodwin 003).Finally,o the xtentthat ertainerritorialurrencieseflectheweaknessftheir ationalconomies,heyre ubstitutedor y heuse oftransnationalurrencies.urrently,heUS$ isthemostmportantf he ransnationalurrencies,itherthroughnformalrformalollarization,nd,more n-frequently,hrougho-called urrencyoards r somevariant hereofhat nsulatemonetaryecisions romdomesticoliticalressures.nboth ases, nypretense

at territorialonetaryovereigntys essentiallyacri-ficed o dampennflation,ncrease oreignnvestment,and reducethe proclivityorgrowthn governmentspending. any atinAmericanountriesaverecentlyexperiencedhis ntersectionetween urrencyubsti-tutionndwhat call the mperialistovereigntyegime,eventhough elativelyew ountriesave engagednfull-fledgedr officialollarization.8ach of thefourcurrencyrocessess discussedwithreferenceo thespecificxample.

Buta second ssue oncerns ow thecurrencyroc-essesoperate eographicallynder given overeignty

regime.heterritorialnd haredurrencyrocessesrethemostevidentlyerritorialized.ut even they rehardlyotallylosedmonetarypaces. heymust oexistwith transnationalurrencyhat reaks own ordersand challengeshehold ofnational urrenciesver arange ftransactions,ot eastbyencouraginghede-velopment f currencymarkets t financial enterswithinheir erritories.his s an opening pofpossi-bilitiesor he edistributionfpoliticaluthorityeyondcapital itieswhose entral anks ndfinanceministriesmust owwork oshare owerwith ther ctorsnthemonetaryealm. fcourse,much fthemonetarylowacrossterritorialoundaries odaytendsto be betweenfinancial entersn the richest ountries.Wall Street inNew York)and theCity in London) are thekeyplacesofauthority ith ffiliatesnd collaborators cattered llover the world conomybut withthe densestpresencein NorthAmerican,European, and East Asian cities(Martin1994; Thrift 994). This is becausemostglobalflows re nvolved n"diversificationinance," intendedto reduce riskthrough he fine-tuningf portfolios"(Taylor 004, 31). One hundredyears go a significant

proportionfworld apitalflowsmovedfrom ichtopoor ountries. fcourse,much f thiswaswithino-lonial urrencylocs hatusedthe ameorclosely eg-gedcurrenciesHelleiner002).That this s no longerthe case suggestshattheuseof substituteurrenciestoday s morea question f subordinatetate elites

lookingor monetaryortn an economic tormhanof hegemonictate ctivelyookingo usecurrencys amechanismfsubordination.et, usceptibilityo thedemandsfforeignapital rovidesmajorncentiveorsomestates nd local actors o find helter,owever

problematic,n theholding fa less volatile ransna-tional urrencyuchas theUS$, as evidenced ythe

largedomestic ndforeignoldingsfsuchcurrencies(in offshorendother dollar alting"enters) ythenationalsndgovernmentsfmany ountries.

China

Ifthe ndustrializationfAsia was the "most pec-tacular conomic appeningfthe secondhalf f thetwentiethentury"Daly1994,165),then t hasbeenChina'srapid mergenceince1978as a major lobaleconomic ctor that s perhapsts most remarkablefeature. losedoffo the apitalist orldconomyrom1949until he ate1970s,Chinahasquicklyecomemajor resencen both heworld'sradingnd financialeconomies.nparticular,hinahas become n incredi-bleexportingachine asedonmassive oreignswellas domesticnvestment.hina'sexports rew ight-

fold-to more han$380 billion-between 990 and2003.Between 000 and2003 this epresentedn in-crease ffrom .9 to 6 percentf heworld otal.Alliedtodomesticnvestment,his xportxplosionasgen-erated huge emand or awmaterialss ocalfirmsndforeignnvestorsavevastlyncreased roductiona-

pacitynsuch ectorss steel nd cement. s of2002,Chinaconsumedmore teel 25.8percentftheworldtotal)thantheEU (16.8 percent), rNAFTA (16.0percent).n2002China ccountedor 6percentf he

growthn the world conomy,econd nly o theU.S.

(McGregor003;Hale andHale 2003,37-38).Since 1978, but especially ince 1987, the Chinese

economyhas gonefrom command-and-control odelto a state-managed, ut market-driven,ne. Undoubt-

edly,however, hina has entered nto theworldecon-

omy argely n its own terms.Much of its growthhasbeen drivenbyforeign irect nvestmentFDI), whichaccounts forover 40 percentof GDP (compared toa minuscule.1 percent in Japan). But the central

government as retainedmuch more control over itsnational economy than is characteristicof most







450 Agnew

contemporarytates.One of the mainmechanismsorcontinuingentralontrolasbeen hemanagedloat ftheChinese enminbitheyuan) gainstheUS$. Thiscontrol as served o bothkeepChinesegoodscom-petitiven the Americanmarket s thoseof othercountries avebecome ess so because f theapprecia-

tion f heir urrenciesgainstheUS$ since 001andto buildup massiveUS$ reserves hich he Chinesegovernmentas been investingn, interalia, U.S.Treasuryonds, nd thushelpingo finance oththeAmerican ederal udget nd currentccount eficits.Indeed, s the Americanradedeficit ithChinaex-pandedmonotonicallyetween1996 and 2003, theChinese urchasefU.S.Treasuryecuritieslimbedt amuch asterate, speciallyfter 000 Economist003).China, hen, sesthemonopolyf herenminbi ithinthe ountryokeep utexternalurrencyhocks ndtocultivatetselfs a destinationormassiveoreignirect

investmentremisedn low laborcosts and a stableexchange ateagainst heUS$. Twomajor uestionsarise: owdoesthiswork nd s tsustainablen a worldwhere onventionaltatemonetaryovereigntyeemsunder onsiderableressure?

The Chinesemanaged-floatystemegan n 1994.Before hatdate, herenminbi asseverelyvervaluedat about1.7to theUS$ to segregateheplanned hi-neseeconomyromherest f theworld. he officialexchangeatewaspeggedn1994 t8.4to theUS$,butonly n December 996 did theChinesegovernmentacceptMFArticle and et boutmakinghe enminbi

convertibleorcurrent ccounttransactions.9ince1996, he ate gainstheUS$hasbeenvirtuallyixed tRmb .28.Therelativelyixedxchangeate ncouragesboth xportsotheU.S.andFDI inflowsenominatednU.S. dollars.Muchof China'sgrowthincethemid-1990s s owedto this xchange-rateystem.t allowsChina to profitxternallyhilemaintainingnternalcurrencyomogeneityndstability.he renminbis aterritorialurrency hosevalue is moreor less fixedagainsthecurrencyf tsmain xportmarketnd themain urrencyfworld rade.

By wayofexamplefor his criticalmonetarynsula-

tion,during heAsian financial risis f1997-1998, theChinese economyremained argely naffected ecausethe renminbi s not convertible n capitalaccounts, oinvestors ould not suddenlywithdraw heir fundsasthey ould elsewhere.Though therewas somepressurefrom nternational usiness to devalue the renminbi,not least from he ethnic Chinese businessnetworksthat provide foreign apital forChinese developmentfrom an Francisco nd Vancouver, anada, as well asfromaiwan,HongKong, ndSoutheastAsia,theChinese

governmentesistedhis.Wang 2003) claims hat hiswasmainly questionfmaintaininghegovernment'sself-imagef ontrolnd utonomy.uthe alsopointsotherole f ommitmento ow nflationnd the ackofinfluence n governmentolicy f local and foreign-owned nterprisesn China that obbied nsuccessfully

for devaluation.o, even n thefaceof ncreased e-pendence n FDI, theChinesegovernmentas moreconcerned bout other, argely olitical, oals than

pleasingtsforeignnvestors.Whether hiscurrencyystems sustainables an

open question. ne dangeromesfromverheatingfthemanufacturingector. s fixed sset nvestmentrewby 1.1percentnChinaforll sectorsn thefirst alf f2003,three imes he ratefor he whole f2000,con-

sumptionrewnly t8.8percentHaleandHale 2003,39). Thisdisparityndicates high egree f xcess a-

pacity.hefixedxchangeate ncourageshegrowthf

foreignxchange eserves, hich thenpush up themoneyupplyupfrom 2percentn2001to20percentin 2003). In turn,his ncourages ore ixed sset n-vestmentyspeculativeapital, hus xacerbatinghe

problemf hrinkingrofit arginss morenvestmentchases tagnantrshrinkingemand. tthis oint,heChinesemonetaryuthoritiesould avetostrengthencapital controls nd intervenen foreign xchangemarkets o suppressheappreciationf the renminbi(Kuroda 003).As ofNovember004, however,herewas no signofeither.ndeed,Chineseofficialspokeopenlyf asing-not f trengthening-capitalontrols

(Kynge004).A secondthreat omesfrom he effortsfforeign

political eaders, uch as the U.S. Secretaryf theTreasury,opersuadeheChinese overnmento moveto a freelyloatingenminbin order o avoidthe m-

positionf trade nd financialanctions. isturbedyChina's bilityoexploitheUS$ by hiding"ehind

managed loat, hosewho wouldchange he Chinesemonetaryystem, owever,houldnote how muchAmericanusinessesnvestingnChina owerabor ostsandreaphigher rofitsndAmericanustomers/workersreceive lowerpricesand low-payingobs (both in the

same building t Wal-Mart)from he current ystem.China has also increased tsimportslargely awmate-

rials) at a higher ate than its exports ver the period1998-2003. But the pressure s likely o continue.Aterritorialurrencynd a globalizing orld conomy renot easilyharmonized, ne with the other, articularlyfor countryuch as China with an increasingly eavypresence n world rade Leblang2003). As of summer2003, the renminbiwas approximately0 percentun-dervalued gainst heUS$ (Swann 2003). This hands an








enormousompetitivedvantageobusinessesperatingin China versus usinessesn theU.S., resultingn amajoross fAmericanobs nrelevantectors. any fthe 2.8 millionmanufacturingobs ost nthe U.S. be-tween hebeginningftheGeorgeW Bushpresidencyand summer 003 disappearedecauseofcompetition

fromhina:an amazingne out ofeveryeven obs nAmericanmanufacturing.o American residentverpresidedver uch hemorrhagingf obsover uchshort eriod ftime Beddoes 003).That this ossoc-curred t a timewhenevenmany ervice ectorobswere also becoming ulnerable o relocationverseasfromheU.S. andEurope o countriesuch s India ndChina e.g., oftwarerogrammingndcallcenters)nlymade hepoliticalension hatmuch reaterEconomist2003). Only a radicalrestructuringf the Chinesemonetaryystemhroughelaxingapital ontrols ndallowingheUS$ andotherurrenciesofreelyirculate

betweenChinesefinancial enters uch as ShanghaiandHongKong ndforeignnes s ikelyoassuage hecritics.Whether his is possiblefor a governmentseeminglytillntent or oliticaleasonsnmaintaininga classic overeigntyegime-keepinghepoliticalmo-nopolyxercisedytheCommunistartynd reestab-lishingheprestigeostwhenChinawassubject o thedepredationsfcolonial owersn thenineteenthndearlywentiethenturies-remainso be seen.

The United States

As one of thevictoriousowers fter he SecondWorldWar, heU.S. wasthemain gent f mposingfixedxchange-rateystemnthe nternationalcono-my f hetime. his ystem,nown y hename f heplace in New Hampshirewhere t was negotiated(mainlyetweenheU.S. governmentndBritishov-ernmentepresentativesn 1944)-the BrettonWoodsAgreement-peggedxchangeatesgainst dollar-goldstandard or heperiod rom945until 971.Althoughfullconvertibilityf European urrenciesgainst heUS$ did not occur until 31 December 1958, politicalacceptance of the system n the U.S. and elsewhererestedmoreon its stimulus o open,multilateralradethanon itsparticular ropertiess a strategyor rgan-izing internationalmonetaryrelations (Eichengreen1996, 99). Although he system an be seen as partofthe"embedded iberalism"hat the U.S. extendedto its

sphere f nfluence uring he Cold War (Ruggie1982),it was a deeplyterritorializedayofmanaging urren-cies. It restedinitially nd finally n the capacityofgovernmentsand centralbanks) to regulate heir ur-

renciesgainstnexternaltandardrovidedy heUS$peggedgainst fixed rice fgold.

Bythe1960s, hesystem as n deeptrouble. he

problem as theincreasingeakage f dollars eyondAmericanhores hroughhe accumulationf dollarreservesyforeignentral anks ndtheemergencef

the so-called urodollar arket. n theonehand, heeconomicecoveryfEuropendJapanmeant hat heyaccumulatedarge ollar eservesut thiswas ttractive

only s long s therewasno questionbout heir on-vertibilityntogold.But once foreignollarbalancesloomedarge elativeoU.S.gold eserves,he redibilityof thiscommitmentight e cast into doubt" Eic-hengreen996,116).As early s 1947,the economistRobert riffinadpredictedhat hiswould e a prob-lem.By1960,U.S.foreignollariabilitiesxceeded .S.

goldreserves.fforeignountries anted o converttheir eserves,herewould rush o cash n dollars e-

fore heAmericanuthoritiesould evalue. his hreatbecame major efrainf nternationalonetaryebateinthe1960s.

On the otherhand, hedollar ncreasinglyecamea transnationalather han territorialurrencyn thesense t had to be for heBrettonWoodssystemofunctionroperly.eginningn 1958, Eurodollar ar-kethadsprung p in London o service ollars eyondtheregulatoryomain fboth heU.S. andBritain. s aresult, ollars lowednto hismarket here heywerethenlent out without eferenceo capitalcontrols.Banking egulation , which apped nterestates n

the U.S., encouragednvestmentn the Eurodollarmarket rom he U.S. Multinationalusinessesarkeddollar undsnEurodollarccounts o avoidAmericantaxes and to gain nterest-rateifferentialselative oU.S.-locatedanks.AttemptsyAmericanovernmentsto correct he imbalances y manipulatinghe U.S.

capital ccount id slowdown hedevelopmentf theoffshoreollarmarket. utthe Eurodollar arketen-abledprivate inanciersoengagenexactlyhetype fhot-moneyransactionshat heBrettonWoods egimehad sought o eliminate. s predictedyTriffin'si-lemma,the opportunityor rbitrage rofitsgainst he

dollar nd the othermajor urrencies asoverwhelming.Speculationconsequentlyworsened, nd ultimatelyhe

system ollapsed" (Blyth 003, 240).The action taken by PresidentNixon in 1971 in

unilaterally brogating rettonWoods can plausibly eseen as an attempt t reassertinglassicsovereignty.notherwords,giventhat a fixedexchangerate systemseemed to deliverdecreasing enefits o the Americanterritorialconomy,hen t wouldbe best to abandon t

(e.g.,Gowa 1983).Whatever he ntention,heoutcome







452 Agnew

was systemn whichhedollarwas iberatedromold,and after 973, t floated reelygainst thermajorcurrenciesEichengreen,996).Ratherhan returnotheUS$ as a territorialurrency,herefore,heUS$ hasbecome n evenmore ransnationalurrencyhan hatauguredy heEurodollar arketf he1960s.

Arrangedndiscussionmonghe inance inistersftheG-5 theU.S.,Japan,rance, ermany,ndBritain)in 1975, hefloatingxchange-rateystem as formal-ized n 1978by second mendmento theArticles fAgreementfthe ME Thisremoved heroleofgoldand egalized loatingndobliged ountriesopromotestabilityn exchange atesby authorizingheIMF tooversee hemonetaryolicies fmembers.hiswasallsomethingf a "leap n the dark" Eichengreen996,139). No one really newhow twouldwork.n the1970s,many stablishedmonetaryolicies oexistedwith henew ystem,uch s capital ontrolsndcon-

certedntervention.ew financialevices, esignedocopewithncreasedolatilitynexchangemarkets,uchas futuresnd options, redspeculationnd furthervolatilityStrange 994, 59). The largequantityfdollars ntroducedntoworld inancial arketsytheOPEC-inspiredncreasesn theprice f oilhad an ad-ditional timulativeffect,iven hatworld il priceswere enominatedntheUS$. This ncreaseedto thespateof ending y nternationalanks hatproducedthedebt risis or ountrieshat eceivedoansbut henwerefacedwith ecliningerms ftrade lus arge n-terest-ratencreasesn the 1980s, s theU.S. Federal

Reserve ried o wringnflationut ofthe Americaneconomy.ut n the 1980s,partlyn responseo per-sistingtagflationndpartlyo the ncreasedopularityof deas fmarketuperiorityver tate egulation,ostindustrializedountries oved owardreaterxchangerateflexibilityyabolishingargetingndreducingn-terest ate interventions.olicy oordinationmongcountriesidhelp o somedegreenreducing olatilityinforeignxchangemarkets.

The net effect f thepost-Brettonoodsturn fevents, herefore,as been to maketheUS$ into atransnationalurrency.n a sense,the dollar has inher-

ited tsrolefrom rettonWoodswhen twas "the centralnumeraire" or hesystems a whole (McKinnon2001,3). As the currency f the world's argestterritorialeconomywith long-establishednddominant resencein world financialmarkets, he dollar was not "de-throned"when the official xchangerate parities ol-lapsedin 1971. Ifanything,heoppositehas happened.The US$ has become "the vehicle currencyn the in-terbank pot and forward xchangemarkets, he cur-rencyof invoice forprimary ommodity rade and for

manyndustrialoods ndservices,nd themain ur-

rencyf denominationornternationalapital lows-

particularlyt short erm nd interbank.utsideof

Europe, overnmentsse thedollar s their rimen-terventionurrency-ofteneggingothedollar-andU.S. Treasuryonds rewidely eldby foreignentral

banks and treasuries s official xchangereserves"(McKinnon,001, ). This sbecause,s McKinnonndothers ave argued, rovidingransnationaloney otheworldconomys a naturalmonopoly.or nething,in a world f about 150potentialerritorialurrencies,tremendousavingsntransactionosts ccurfust necurrencys chosen s a vehicle urrency.ll foreign-exchange ids nd offersan be madeagainst heone

currency.or another,ignificantconomies f scaleaccrue romricingnd nvoicingoods ndservicesninternationalradenoneterritorialurrency.he factthatmanyf heworld's ajorommodityxchangesre

also ocatedntheU.S., nChicago ndNewYork, ivesa furtherillipothedollar.Thedollar,herefore,s not ust matter or merica,

because he dollarsnot ustAmerica'surrency.verone-halff lldollar ills reheldoutside .S.borders.Almost ne-half fU.S. Treasuryonds reheld as re-servesby foreignentral anks,particularlyhose of

Japan ndthePeople'sRepublic f China PorterndJudson996;Davidson 002).Other urrenciesannot,at least s yet, ival hisglobal each.Consequently,osome conomists,heworlds nowon a de facto ollarstandardMcKinnon 001;Davidson 002). Certainly,

morendmore ominallyerritorialurrenciesow loatfreelygainsthedollarandother urrencies)ith heUS$ as the ommon nit f omparison.hepercentageof IMF members ithpegged xchange rrangementsdeclined rombout 7percentn1977to 36percentn1997 nd34percentn2001,while hepercentageithfree-floatingrrangementsncreased rom 2 percentin 1975 to 25 percentn 1997 and to 32 percentn2001(IMF1997;Hochreitertal. 2002).Butthetrendfrom ixedxchangeates o more lexiblerrangementscan be exaggeratedoth ngeneralnd with espectofree loating gainst he dollar nparticular. ather han

freely loating gainstthe dollar,manycurrencies tilltake the form fmanagedfloats rrelativelyixed egs.Moreover, he comingofthe Euro offers potential l-ternative urrencyfwideruse to thedollar.

What is more mportantbout the dollar han ts roleas a monetary tandard s the revolutionaryollowingout ofother erritorialurrencieshat t has facilitated.tis now a directmeans of exchangein manycountriesthat tillhave their wnterritorialurrencies.ndeed, n

manyfinancial enters rrespectivefcountry,t is the








currencyfmost ransactions.tsauthority,nd that fthose ctorswho ommandt, soften reaterhan hatof henominallyovereigntate. his sone of hemainfeaturesf thetransnationalsesof theUS$. At thesame ime,hedollarsstill lsothe urrencyf heU.S.Specifically,heU.S. uses ts dollar o financets arge

currentccount nd federal udget eficitse.g.,Cor-bridgendAgnew 991;Wolf 004).Ofcourse,llthoseforeignersoldingollars ave stake nkeepingptheflow fdollarsnto herest ftheworld. heyhaveaninterestnkeepinghewhole ystemnmotion. or hisreason,sMcKinnon2001)argues, merica'sreditorshave a stake npreservinghe dollar's ole s a trans-national urrencyven as the U.S. current ccountdeficit alloons.As a country ith a largefinancialservicesector,heU.S. alsobenefitsndirectlyromheglobalistegimehat heUS$ serves s a transnationalcurrency.hissector as a vested nterestnseeing se

of the dollar xpand round he world. heyalso arepowerfuloliticalroponents,s s thefinancialectornBritain,heonly ther ountryhathas both chroniccurrent-accounteficit nd a majorfinancialervicessector,f iberalizedlobal apitalmarketsBlyth003,255).

The Achilles'heel of theUS$ as a transnationalcurrencys that lthoughtgives heU.S. a "uniquelysoft redit inewith he rest f theworld"McKinnon2001, ), t lso as nrelations ith hina)opens ptheU.S. economyocompetitionnsectors heret s lesscompetitiventernationallyas in labor-intensivean-

ufacturing)ndportendsfuturenwhich heU.S.willhavetorelynforeign-ownedapital ndforeignentralbanks even f ndollars) o financetsdomesticcon-omy.As a net mporterf 69.2 percentf totalglobalcapital lowsn2001, heU.S. risks nbalancingts wneconomythroughhe ossof ertain inds f obs, tc.)inorder oprovide transnationalurrencyo the est fthe world. oreigners aynot needto care thatmuchabout he Americanurrentccount eficit,herefore,butAmericansre a differentuestionntirely.

The EuropeanUnion

Thoughwhattoday s known s the EU can trace tsrootsback to theEuropeanCoal and Steel Communityof the early1950s and the EuropeanEconomic Com-munity f 1957, it was not until the disintegrationfBrettonWoods in 1971 that much effort as made to

implementome sort fmanaged urrencyystemmongmember tates. And it was not until the late 1980s, infact, hat fully-fledgedonetarynionbecame a majorobjectiveof theorganization. uropeanmonetary nifi-

cation through he creation f a sharedcurrency,therefore,as had twodistinctrigins. ne is as aneconomic esponseo the end of BrettonWoods.Theothers muchmore learlyolitical: uilding uropeanintegrationnmonetarynification.

In theEuropean ommunityEC), attemptst re-

ducing olatilitymong uropean urrenciesaverisefirsto "the nake" rmanaged loat n the arly 970s.This was a collective rrangementherebyhe sixoriginalmembersegged heir xchange ateswithin2.25percentands. heSnakedidnot ast ong,mainlybecause he ilshock f1973haddevastatingffectsnthe weaker urrencies,nd as governmentsdoptedexpansionaryiscal olicies,uch s France id n 1976,they ad to leave theSnake.Eventually,y1978,theidea ofpeggingurrenciesithinnchangingandshadrun tscourse, articularlyhen heEuropeanurren-cieswere imultaneouslyloatinggainsthedollar. he

EuropeanMonetaryystemEMS) replacedheSnakein 1979.Underthisarrangement,he Germanmarkassumed hestrong-currencyolethat thedollarhad

performednderBrettonWoods.Eightof nine ECcountries articipatedn the EMS from he outset(Britain as the soleexception).talywas allowed ohave 6 percentand or "transitional"eriod ecauseof persistingigh nflation, hereas he systems awholehad one of2.25 percent. herewereno with-drawals uringhe1980s, utthe firstour earswereturbulentainlyecause heMitterrandovernmentnFrancembarkedn anexpansionaryiscal olicy. nce

thiswas bandoned,owever,olicyonvergencecrossmembers ade t easier or he ystemorespondo therelativetrengtheningf the dollar n the ate 1980s."Europe'sminilateralrettonWoods'appeared o be

gainingesilience"Eichengreen996,167).It waspreciselyt thismoment,owever,hat setof

nonmonetaryoncerns merged crossthe countriesoftheEU.These ncludedhe bilityfEuropean irmstocompete ith heU.S. andJapan, educe nemploy-ment,maintainuropean elfarerogramsntheface f

pressuresxertedhroughhefloatingollar o iberalizelabor markets nd pensionprograms, einvigoratehe

"Europeanproject," ndcreate single uropeanmarketthroughhe removal fcapitalcontrols.A new visionof

Europebased on theseconcerns ound xpressionn theDelorsReport f 1989 and in the MaastrichtTreaty fDecember 1991. Eliminating urrencyonversion ostswas one of the waysof forgingn integratedmarket.Concurrently, ne way of liberalizing rade amongmemberswithout timulatingrotectionism as to re-move the threatofmembergovernmentsngaging n

exchange-ratemanipulation. he onlywayto do these







454 Agnew

two hings astocreate sharedurrencyor he ntireEU. Withoutmoving orwardo monetarynion, hefear lsowasthat hepolitical rojectfEuropean ni-fication ould lsofoundern thefaceof thetransna-tional hreatoEurope rom .S. andJapaneseconomiccompetition.

The Maastrichtlueprintormonetarynion hrewcontinuingoliticalommitmento theEMS into m-mediate oubt.Alongwith heglobal ecessionf1990-1992, hedecline f hedollargainsthemark,ndtherise nGermannterestates ollowingerman eunifi-cation, his ealedthefateofEurope's xperimentnmanagingurrenciesEichengreen996, 71-81).Whatreplacedt in the 1990s was themovementowardsharedurrencyydeclaringsetoffiscalndmonetarycriteriaor ccession o monetarynion.These crite-ria-freeingentral anks romoliticalontrol,ettinginflation,overnmentebt, nd governmentpending

targets,tc.-shouldbe understoodot ust s goals nthepursuitfprice tabilityndtrade enefits.ather,"Europeanmonetaryntegrationanbe bestunderstoodas a politicalompromisenvolvingivergentdeas ndpreferencesithin urope,pecificallyetween ranceandGermany"Chang2003,219). Ifthe French ov-ernment esired o enhance rance's ndEurope'sn-dependenceromheU.S.,Germany anted o see itsreunificationccepted s unthreateningo therest fEurope. f the Bundesbank-likeole assumed y theEuropeanCentralBank (ECB) represents hattheGermanswanted ut of the system,n independent

bank devoted o keepingnflationnder ontrol,heFrench ave acquired currencyhatcan potentiallychallengeheUS$ as a transnationalurrency.

Thetransitionoa sharedurrencyasgone hroughthreetagessforeseenntheDelorsReportndagreedto ntheMaastrichtreatyArtis 992).Thefirsttage,from990 to 1994, aw theremovalfcapital ontrolsamongpotentialmembers,oliticalndependenceorcentral anks, nd convergenceoward reaty bliga-tions.The second tage, rom 994to 1999,sawtheconvergencefmacroeconomicndicatorsndpoliciesand planning or ntroduction f the new currency. i-

nally, he third tagehas seen the introduction f thenewcurrency,irstlongside heexisting erritorialur-rencies nd then nsteadof them. The implementationwentremarkablymoothly.inceJanuary002,theEurohas been the sole legal tender n all of the then-EUcountries xceptBritain, enmark, nd Sweden,whichhave chosento remain utsidefor he timebeing Un-derhill 002).

In a sense,ofcourse, he sharedcurrencys simplynew territorialurrencyor larger rea. But it also has

a couple f ther eatureshat o set tapart romeingjustthat.One is that t is already transnationalur-rency,n that, fterhedollar,t is nowthemost m-

portanturrencyorworldwideinancial ransactions.Critically,nside urope,t has replaced he mark ndthe dollar s the twopreviously ost mportantur-

renciesn cross-borderlows. econd, t is peculiarnthat ndividualtateshave retained ontrol verfiscal

policy ven as they ave ceded control vermonetarypolicyo theECB and theforeignxchangemarkets.fthe atter as tended o lead toward more Anglo-American" arketapitalismnEurope's inancialen-ters Dyson 002,363), the formeras created eriousproblemss somememberountries,otablyrance ndGermany,aveviolatedheexcessive overnmentefi-citsrule no more han3 percent fGDP) thattheyagreed o followwhenplanninghe shared urrency(Major2003). The EU's fiscal ules, herefore,ppear

simultaneouslynenforceablendunchangeable.ntiltheres some arallelismnEurope etweenhe evels twhich iscalndmonetaryoliciesremade, hiss ikelyto be a continuingroblemor he hared urrencyndany eepeningf ts ole sa transnationalne Wachtel2003).

LatinAmerica

The U.S. has onghad a strongnfluencevermon-etary olicyn LatinAmerica.n theearly wentiethcentury,his ook heformf ncouragingheuseof he

US$ as part f "gold tandardiplomacy"Rosenberg1985,1999)thatwould ringmonetarytabilityotheregionnd make teasier orAmerican usinessoop-erate fcountries ossessed urrencynits hat wereidenticalnvalue o thedollar.nRosenberg's1999, 4)words,he dea wasto "create golddollar loc,cen-terednNewYork,orival hedefactoBritish]terlingstandard."t the ame ime, ollar iplomacylso ouldinvolveencouragingtraightforwarddoption f thedollar tself. hisdollarization,owever,suallymeanttheuse of heUS$ alongsidehe erritorialurrency,otexclusive se of hedollarn tsplace Helleiner003c).By the 1920s, dollar diplomacyof both species hadlargely eaked. Increasing atin Americannationalism,the variousadvantagesof issuing territorialurrency(identified arlier),and seriouscurrent ccount crisesthat he economic hinkingf the time uggested eededactivistmonetary oliciesconspired o limit he substi-tution f nationalcurrencies ythedollar.

After heSecondWorldWar, fficial mericanpolicywas to discourageuse of the dollar as a substitute orterritorialurrenciesn theregion. he newpriority as








national conomic evelopment,o the bestmonetarypolicyhould e an independentnewith achcountryhaving tsowncurrency.f course, hisfit ntotheconventionalconomicwisdom f the times s mani-festedntheBretton oodsAgreementndmanytherU.S.-sponsoredolicies n the late 1940sand 1950s.

Indeed,American overnmentsven endorsed co-nomicnationalistolicies uch as import-substitutionindustrialization,artlys a tool oundermineeft-winggroupsndco-optnationalistso theAmericanide ntheColdWar, utalsobecause argeAmericanmanu-facturingirms anted o buildfactories ehindhightariff allsto serve ocalmarketsMaxfieldndNolt1990).This illustratesow muchAmericanmonetarypolicynLatinAmericat thetime eflectedmericanforeignolicy nterestsnd the relativenfluenceflarge-scalemerican anufacturersomparedoforeignfinancialnvestorsndAmericannvestorsn minesnd

agricultureHelleiner 003c,419). But t alsosuggestsstronglyhat he tate erritoriesere eenby ocals ndAmericanslike s verymuch hebasicbuildinglocksfor lleconomicolicies.nthis egard,mericanolicyinLatinAmerica ifferedonsiderablyromritishndFrench oliciesn Africandelsewherehat ften u-shed for urrencylocs suchas theFrancCFA zonein formerrench oloniesnWestAfrica) rcurrencyboards o limit hemonetaryiscretionf the localgovernmentsHelleiner003a).

Beginningnthe1970s, ollar iplomacyeturnedotheAmericangenda nLatinAmerica. rice tability

replacedconomic rowths thecentral oalofAmer-icanpolicy owardheregion. doption f thispolicywasobviouslyart fthe deologicalhiftoward eo-liberalismhatfollowedhefreeingfcurrenciesromfixedxchangeates fterhe ollapse fBretton oods.Buteconomic onditionsn LatinAmerica lsomadethe change eemmore mperativehan t otherwisemight aveappeared.n particular,numberffactorsplayed role nmakingrice tabilityhigherrioritythan ormerly.wowere speciallyrucial:he xtremelyhighnflationatesnthe ountriesf he egionndthegrowthf xport-orientedDI as themotor f conomicdevelopmentnplaceof mport-substitution.s a result,the elimination f exchange-rate isk has come to bewidely een as likely o fosterAmerican tradeand in-vestment hroughoutheregion Helleiner2003c,421).In 1999, a bill devotedto the spreadof official ollar-izationthroughout atin America was actually ntro-duced in the U.S. Senate. But after flurryf nterest,enthusiasm eems to have faded.Cohen (2002) main-tains hat, rom nAmerican erspective,t s likely hatAmerican governmentswill remain passivelyneutral

about official ollarization. lthough here are sei-gniorage,ransactionost, onversionost, restige,nd

geopoliticaldvantages, any f hese an begained yunofficialndsurreptitiousollarization.fficial ollar-ization as themajordrawbacksfexposinghe U.S.

politicallyf conomicrowthtallsnd mposingostsf

theU.S.hasto ntervenen financialrises. nly f heEuro came to challenge he status f the dollarasthepreeminentubstituteurrencyn LatinAmerica,thecurrencyatinAmericanseally ant ohave,doesCohen think hatAmericanolicymightecomemoreaggressivenpushingfficialollarization.

In LatinAmericatself,cuadorndEl Salvador aveenactedegislationn recent ears ofullyollarizeheireconomies.anamahas been argelyollarizedromtsoriginss an American ependencyt the time f theconstructionf hePanamaCanal.Elsewhere,owever,full ollarizationseitherfficialrunofficial)avenot

occurred.rom 991until 002,Argentinaidemploysomethingike a currencyoard to maintain fixedexchange atebetweenhepesoandtheUS$ but thecharterf theboard llowed onsiderableiscretionothemonetaryuthoritiesHanke2003).Thiscannot eseenas a true ase ofofficialollarization.any therLatinAmerican ountriesn factnow float heir ur-rencies gainst he dollar nd other urrenciesIMF1997;Berg t al. 2003).From hispoint fview, atinAmericas nowrelativelyessdollarizedfficiallyhanit was in the late 1980swhenmany fitscountrieshad currencieshatwereclosely egged o thedollar

oradopted o-called ntermediateechanismsuch ascrawlingegs ndbands Jameson990;more enerallyon trendsn adopting ixed ersus loatingxchangeratesacrossdeveloped nd developingountries,eeBernhardt al. 2002;Joshi 003). In otherwords,hecontinents stuck etweenheglobalistndthe mpe-rialistegimes,ven houghmany overnments,fgivena choice,would spire o classic overeignty.

Unofficialollarizations a differentatterntirely.Although uchmore ifficulto documenthan fficialdollarization,his s clearlyubstantialn amount ndeffectsDoyle2000). Forexample,nArgentinan 1992,

one study estimates that the dollars in circulationamountedto $26 billionor around 11 percentof Ar-

gentineGDP (Kaminand Ericsson 993). In Boliviaand

Uruguay n the sameyear, he ratio ofpaperdollarstolocalcurrency asreporteds an incredible hree rfourto one (Calvo and Vegh1993). Bankdeposits n differ-ent currencies re easierto track hanphysical lows fcash. Many Latin American countriesallow dollar-denominated eposits n domestic anks. Cohen (1998,112-13) reports igureshatsuggest erhaps s much as







456 Agnew

80.9percentf lldepositsndomesticanksnBoliviain 1992were fforeignurrencyalmostntirelyollars,one surmises).n the same year n Argentina,hecomparableigure as41.5percent.n 2000,therangewent romhigh f 2.5percentf lldepositsnUS$ inBolivia o a lowof4.9 inMexicowith meanof49.2

percentcross ll countriesn LatinAmerica hat l-lowed oreignurrencyankdepositsBerg tal. 2003).Allthis ddsuptoamajor nofficialor pontaneous)

dollarization.hereasons renotdifficultofind. heyrangefromhefactthatdrug rafficking,ne oftheAndeancountries' ain conomicctivities,s an en-tirelyollar usinesshroughemittancesrommigrantsto theU.S. (this s particularlymportantn CentralAmerica) o the salting wayofdollars s a defenseagainstnflationndto aid in theacquisitionfdollarassets abroad i.e., capitalflighto offshoreankingcentersntheCaribbeannd toMiami).The fact hat

manytates, articularlynCentralnd AndeanAmer-ica,fail oraise nough axrevenue opayfor venthebarest f moderntates,ncludingdequatemonetaryregulation,lso leads their wn elites o look to thedollar s thebestguaranteeffuture ealth. ying e-hind much of the unrealized overeigntyf LatinAmericantates s thefact hatLatinAmericas noworiented lmost ompletelyowardhe U.S. both s asource f nvestmentnd as thedestinationormany ftheregion'sommodityxports, igrants,ndcapital.tis LatinAmerica's ependencen theAmerican con-omy hathasproducedhe ubstitutionf hedollar or

territorialurrencieshroughoutheregion. hat thissmainlynofficialr the result fdiffusionf the dollarintotheeconomic iber ftheregion ather hantheoutcome f a formaldoption f thedollar s a re-placement or territorialurrenciess neverthelesssignificanttrikegainsthepossibilityfrealmonetarysovereigntynthepart fLatinAmericanountries.nthis egard,ffectiveovereigntyiesto El Norte nd sexercisedhroughrivatizedetworklows fU.S. dol-larsrather hanthroughxplicittate doption f thedollar s a territorialurrency.

Conclusion

The conception f overeigntyhathaspredominatedinmodern olitical heory elies n the dea ofexclusivepolitical uthorityxercised ya stateover a giventer-ritory.his idea reflects heconceptofsovereigntyhatemerged romWestphalia nd thendeveloped longwithEnlightenmentnd Romantic deals ofpopularrule andpatriotism. anygovernmentsontinue o act as iftheconcept is actually descriptiveof the contemporary

world. utthis tandardonceptions a poorguide o

politicalnalysis.t is a "truth"hathasalways iddenmore han t reveals.n a globalizingorld,his bfus-cation sparticularlyroblematic. e cannotmeaning-fullypply heorthodoxonceptionfsovereigntyotheconditionalxercise frelative,imited,ndpartial

powershat ocal,regional,ational,nternational,ndnonterritorialommunitiesnd actors ow xert.I haveproposedn alternativeo theorthodoxp-

proach osovereigntyhat raws romecentritiquesftheorthodoxy'snderstandingfpoliticaluthority,owhich have addeda critiquef tsunderstandingf

spatialitysabsoluteerritoriality.his lternativeodelrelies n the dea of "sovereigntyegimes,"r combi-nations fdegrees fcentral tate uthoritynd con-solidatedor open territoriality.have empiricallyillustratedheefficacyf his pproachodisentanglingthe impacts f globalizationn stateterritorialityy

examiningariouswaysnwhichmonetaryovereignty,perhapshemost bviouslyymbolicswell s mportantmaterialmanifestationf tate overeignty,peratesf-fectively.have identifiedour distinctiveurrencyprocessesnder ontemporarylobal olitical-economicconditions-territorial,ransnational,hared, nd sub-stitute-thatmaybe mapped ntothe four ypes f

sovereigntyegime,espectively,lassic, lobalist,nte-

grative,nd mperialist.histypologyasthevirtue f

distinguishingariousways n whichglobalizationn-tersects ith tate erritorialityoproduce ery ifferentmodes f ctuallyxistingr effectiveovereigntynthe

worldoday.Wedonot ive na worldhat ssingularlyimperialist,lobalist,ntegrative,r Westphalian.he

typologylsoprovidesway fgaugingifferencesn the

meaningf overeigntyver ime nd pace ndtherebymoves eyondhe terileebate verwhetherome ortof universalstate overeignty"s eroding.Whenas-

sumptionsbout he fixed nd universalature f ter-

ritorialityolonger ork o ocate overeigntynplace,webegin o see,for etternd forworse,hat heres

politicaluthorityeyondhe overeignonstructionfterritorialpace.

Notes

1. This sthe ppositef hehistoricalituationnthefieldfgeographys a wholewhere,sSack 1983, 6) oncenoted,"conventionalpatialnalysisas argelygnorederritorial-ity." Fleeting, f important, xceptions uch as Gottmann

(1973) onlyhelptoprove he rule.Morerecently,owever,particularlynder the influenceof a certainreadingofFoucault and the strangerevival of interestn the Nazi

philosopherchmitt,t is as ifpower annotbe thought f

except n terms f erritorialitysee,e.g.,Hannah 2000for n








examplef heformerndBarnett004for critiquef helatter),venthough,s Allen 2003)persuasivelyemon-strates,t sFoucault ho anprovidehebest heoreticaltake-offoint or much ichernderstandingfthe om-plex patialitiesfpowerndauthority.

2. This onflations notunusualneven hemostophisticatedoftheoreticalrguments.ee, for xample, lden 2005,

forthcoming).3. This"regimefsovereignty"s addressednmoral ot npolitical-economicermsyGrovogui's2002)essay n Af-rica's elations ith urope.

4. Bobbitt2002),for xample, rovides differenteriodiza-tionbasedon theoutcomes fwars ather han ny thercriteriauch s economicownturnsr the omplexfpo-litical-economicnddiscursiveactorsnderpinninghat fAgnewndCorbridge1995).

5. A goodtextbookurveyf currenciesnd exchange-rateregimessprovidedy achs nd Larrain1993).

6. As of2001, hirty-nineountriesad no independentur-rencyi.e.,relied otallyn a foreignurrencyuch s theUS$), fifty-onead currencyoards r pegged xchangerates,eventeen adexchangeates djusted y ndicators

(inflationr xchange-rateargets),hirty-oneadmanagedfloats,ndforty-sevenreelyloatedHochreitertal.,2002,29). The freelyloatingurrenciesre themostntegratedinto heglobal conomy ith hemostndependentlyow-erful inancialenters hereheUS$ serves sthe ommonmetricftransactions.he countries ith o independentcurrencybviouslysesubstitutenes.Themanagedloatssignifyhose tatesnwhichtatemonetaryuthorityandother lementsf authority)s relativelyerritorial.hecountries ith urrencyoards ndpegged ates reofteneithernmacroeconomicrisis r ntransitionowardomeother xchange-rateegime.Networkxternalities,"hesnowballffectf urroundingountriesperatingiththersystems, ake hese intermediate"xchange-rateegimes

inherentlynstable ith inanciallobalizationndwill ushthem owardhared urrenciesas with entral uropeancountrieswaitingdmissionothe uro fteroininghe Uin2004), ubstituteurrenciesno ndependenturrency)r,most ikelyf all in most ases under resentonditions,towardsree loatingBubula nd Otker-Robe002;Joshi2003).In otherwords,nly hirty-oneountriesplus heU.S.) could claimthattheyhave the mainfeatures f"classic"monetaryovereignty.s laterhow,heU.S. caseisrather ore omplexhan his.n most ases he etreatfcentraltate uthoritysparalleledy n increasinglyom-plex patialityfcurrencylows ndregulation.everal e-cent tudieshow hat wide angef tate conomicolicydecisionsrefundamentallyonstrainedythetype fex-change-rate echanismndmonetaryargetshat tatesadopt e.g., MF 2000;Dgbrowski002;Hochreitert al.2002;Joshi 003).

7. Strangely,n some fthemacroeconomicsiterature one-taryovereigntys associated ith free loatingurrency(e.g.,Dybrowski002).Whygivingpcontrolver cur-rencyo themarketshould e seen hisway erhapseflectsthe classical nd neoclassicalensibilityhata currencyshould itherstand nddeliver" rgoto thewall. t cer-tainlyeems ohave ittlernothingodo withhe ealityfcentral tate uthoritys indicatedydifferentxchange-ratemechanisms.n the ontemporaryorldt s successful

managedloats,s the losestmechanismo fixedates,hatsignifyhigh egree fcentraltate uthorityn themon-etaryealm.

8. Recentlyn Canada public iscussionaseruptedver hemeritsfdollarizings oneway frespondingo the mpo-sition fmore estrictiveorderontrolsetween heU.S.and Canada n the ftermathf heterroristttacksnthe

U.S. of 11 September001.Emily ilbert2005)has ex-pertlyxploredhe iscussionn recentssue f hisournal.9. A fullyonvertibleurrencys convertibley nyholderor

anypurpose. nder urrentccount onvertibility,s pres-entlyperativenChina,holdersftherenminbiavetherightfconversionor urposesuch s trade r travel utnotfor apital ccount urposesuch as makingoansorbuyingoreignssets. bsence fcapital ccount onverti-bilityequireshat ational onetaryuthoritiesonitorheuseof llfunds;nderullonvertibility,sprevails ith ullyfloatingnd some ypesfmanagedxchangeates,his snotnecessary.

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Agnew, John - Sovereignty Regimes Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary Wolrd Politics, 1995