LAND VALUATION

SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. - In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land,

the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax

declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic

benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by government to the property as well as the non-

payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as

additional factors to determine its valuation.

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. - The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may

be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP or as may be finally determined by the court as just

compensation for the land.

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes at the option of the landowner:

    (1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:

(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage isconcerned - Twenty-five percent (25%)

cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.

(b) For lands above twenty-four hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares - Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be

paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.

(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below - Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid in

government financial instruments negotiable at any time.

    (2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or

other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;

    (3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

    (4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:

(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall

mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner choose

to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;

(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his successors-in-interest or his

assigns, up to the amount of their face value for any of the following:

(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets under the Assets Privatization

Program and other assets foreclosed by government financial institution in the same province or region where the

lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;

(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or shares or stock owned by the

government in private corporations;chan robles virtual law library

(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or for performance bonds;

(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall be invested

in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small and medium-scale industry, in the same province or region as the

land for which the bonds are paid;

(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to the government: Provided, That the use of these bonds for these purposes

will be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instrument: Provided, further, That

the PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned above;

(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government universities, colleges,

trade schools and other institutions;

(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government hospitals; and

(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.

In case of extraordinary inflation, the PARC shall take appropriate measures to protect the economy.

SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.- For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:

(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine

the compensation of the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to summit evidence as

to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the

above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days

after it is submitted for decision.

CASES

[G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, and JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T. BARTOLOME and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN, respondents.

TINGA, J p:

This is a Petition for Review 1 dated December 6, 1996 assailing the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court 3 dated July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the amount of P30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the State's acquisition of private respondents' properties under the land reform program.

The facts follow.

On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered tenants of the land.

After trial, the court rendered the assailed Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents, particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.

Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorney's Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 4

DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court in its Order 5 dated July 30, 1996 for being pro forma as the same did not contain a notice of hearing. Thus, the prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the assailed Decision became final and executory. CDTHSI

Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996, 6 citing excusable negligence as its ground for relief. Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit claiming that the failure to include in the motion for reconsideration a notice of hearing was due to accident and/or mistake. 7 The affidavit of Land Bank's counsel of record notably states that "he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing" 8 due to his heavy workload.

The trial court, in its Order 9 of November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own negligence.

In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to pressure of work constitutes excusable negligence and does not make the motion for reconsideration pro forma considering its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for relief from judgment was erroneous.

According to Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR's valuation of their properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private respondents' evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Bank's evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.

Private respondents filed a Comment 10 dated February 22, 1997, averring that Land Bank's failure to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration due merely to counsel's heavy workload, which resulted in the motion being declared pro forma, does not constitute excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission of Land Bank's counsel that he has been a lawyer since 1973 and has "mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading."

Land Bank filed a Reply 11 dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity considerations demand that it be heard on substantive issues raised in its motion for reconsideration.

The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 12 Both parties complied. 13

The petition is unmeritorious.

At issue is whether counsel's failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land Bank to a relief from judgment.

Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 1.Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. — When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. 14

Measured against this standard, the reason profferred by Land Bank's counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload prevented him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no means excusable. DaIACS

Indeed, counsel's admission that "he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing" speaks volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable negligence.

The failure to attach a notice of hearing would have been less odious if committed by a greenhorn but not by a lawyer who claims to have "mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading." 15

Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge. 16 The trial court therefore correctly considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it cannot be faulted for denying Land Bank's motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.

It should be emphasized at this point that procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice. 17

Aside from ruling on this procedural issue, the Court shall also resolve the other issues presented by Land Bank, specifically as regards private respondents' alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the question of just compensation.

Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR's valuation instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.

The records reveal that Land Bank's contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter 18 to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court.

At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, 19 we declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DAR's primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function. 20

 

Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice. EHIcaT

Land Bank's contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, 21 we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.

Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) 22 before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche. 23

Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads as follows:

Sec. 17.Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. 24

In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. DHSACT

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 170220. November 20, 2006.]

JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAY TAÑEDO and EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, petitioners, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 27, 2005 Amended Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530, which vacated its May 26, 2004 Decision affirming (a) the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court, in Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, dated March 31, 2003 directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying LBP's motion for reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V. Tengco, LBP's Land Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee 2 of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326) 3 of the Registry of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972) 4 and Executive Order No. 228 (1987). 5 The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica. IHCacT

On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Tañedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro covered by TCT No. T-128 6 of the Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05.

Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation. On January 29, 2003, the PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-128). 7

Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17, 2003, two separate petitions 8 for judicial determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled to Branch 46 thereof.

Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (1988) 9 and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that LBP deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the PARAD.

On March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order 10 granting petitioners' motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation Department I (LCD I), Land Bank of the Philippines, is hereby ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 in relation to Section 2, Administrative Order No. 8, Series of 1991, to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the PARAD in cash and bonds, as follows:

1.In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P51,800,286.43, minus the amount received by the Landowner;

2.In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P 21,608,215.28, less the amount of P 1,512,575.16, the amount already deposited.

Such deposit must be made with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this order and to notify this court of her compliance within such period.

Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of the movants.

SO ORDERED. 11

LBP's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 12 dated May 26, 2003. The following day, May 27, 2003, the trial court issued an Order 13 directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, LBP's Land Compensation Department Manager, to deposit the amounts.

Thus, on June 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77530. 14

On June 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day temporary restraining order 15 and on October 6, 2003, a writ of preliminary injunction. 16

On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 17 in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Order dated March 31, 2003, Resolution dated May 26, 2003, and Order dated May 27, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. The preliminary injunction We previously issued is hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED. 18

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally determined by the PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just compensation. It also noted that there is no reason for LBP to further delay the deposit considering that the DAR already took possession of the properties and distributed the same to farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.

LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted. On October 27, 2005, the appellate court rendered the assailed Amended Decision, 19 the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula in the case of Gabatin which We hold as cogent and compelling justification necessitating Us to effect the reversal of Our judgment herein sought to be reconsidered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our May 26, 2004 Decision is hereby VACATED and ABANDONED with the end in view of giving way to and acting in harmony and in congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of Gabatin. Accordingly, the assailed rulings of the Special Agrarian Court is (sic) commanded to compute and fix the just compensation for the expropriated agricultural lands strictly in accordance with the mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our May 26, 2004 judgment in the case of Gabatin.

SO ORDERED. 20

In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the immediate deposit of the preliminary value of the expropriated properties is improper because it was erroneously computed. Citing Gabatin v.Land Bank of the Philippines, 21 it held that the formula to compute the just compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production x Government Support Price. Specifically, it held that the value of the government support price for

the corresponding agricultural produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal taking of the subject agricultural land, that is, on October 21, 1972 when landowners were effectively deprived of ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27. According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of P500 and P300 which are the prevailing government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the time of payment, instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at the time of the taking in 1972.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

A.THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LATEST DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R. NO. 127198, PROM. MAY 16, 2005; and 22

B.THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION. 23

Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated properties at the time of payment. Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims that the value of the realties should be computed as of October 21, 1972 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.

The petition is impressed with merit.

In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 24 the Court ruled thus:

Land Bank's contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation. STcADa

The Natividad case reiterated the Court's ruling in Office of the President v. Court of Appeals 25 that the expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972 but seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation judicially determined.

 

Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 26 we held that expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of just compensation.

In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the just compensation therefor. The parcels of land were already subdivided and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately depriving petitioners of their use. Under the circumstances, it would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners to compute the just compensation using the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land although ownership thereof have not yet been transferred in their names. Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its owners. 27 The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the

receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner. 28

Our ruling in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 29 is instructive, thus:

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmer's cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement. cDACST

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers’ cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. . . .

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. EaSCAH

We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant case was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering that the just compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory effect. 30

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 31 we held that:

RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless. And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to.

Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the land. In determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. 32

Corollarily, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada 33 that the above provision was converted into a formula by the DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to wit:

Land Value (LV)=(Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) + (Market Value per Tax Declaration x 0.1)

Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet received just compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. 34

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just compensation provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita V. Tengco, respondent’s Land Compensation Department Manager to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and to compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on the aforementioned formula. aEcSIH

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118712. October 6, 1995.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.

[G.R. No. 118745. October 6, 1995.]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL., respondents.

Gonzales, Aquino & Associates for petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines.

Fernando A. Santiago for private respondents.

The Solicitor General for respondents. aisadc

SYLLABUS

1.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW; LAND ACQUISITION; SECTION 16(e) THEREOF; CONSTRUED. — Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows: "Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands — . . . (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . ." It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at

least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit."

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN CASE THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE BASIC LAW AND AN IMPLEMENTING RULE OR REGULATION; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; FAIR AND IMMEDIATE COMPENSATION MANDATED. — The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred. The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must rectify. Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 of purposes of exercising the landowner's right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that: ". . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered 'just' for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss."

FRANCISCO, J p:

It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. 1 As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz: cdasia

". . . social justice — or any justice for that matter — is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are

poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law." 2

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its resolution.

Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were ordered consolidated. 3

Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and ruled as follows: cdtai

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby GRANTED:

a)DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declared null and void insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;

b)Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit — not merely 'earmark', 'reserve' or 'deposit in trust' — with an accessible bank designated by respondent DAR in the names of the following petitioners the following amounts in cash and in government financial instruments — within the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657: cdt

P 1,455,207.31Pedro L. Yap

P 135,482.12Heirs of Emiliano Santiago

P15,914,127.77AMADCOR;

c)The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the petitioners to withdraw the above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just compensation by the proper authorities; and

d)Respondent DAR is ordered to 1) immediately conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving the petitioners 15 days from notice within which to submit evidence and to 2) decide the cases within 30 days after they are submitted for decision." 4 aisadc

Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18, 1995, 5 denying their motion for reconsideration.

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 6 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, 7 and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked," "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. cdta

Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this Court referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition.

 

As found by respondent court, the following are undisputed:

"Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that '(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283 respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES 'C' & 'D') without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank.' (Rollo, p. 6).

"The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.

"Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and December 1990, without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX 'B') to pay rentals to the Landbank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in the amount of P135,482.12; that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX 'E'; Rollo, p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the Landbank (Rollo, p. 133).

"The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount as rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99). cdasia

"Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges — with respect to its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon — that the properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX 'F') fixing the compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX 'G'). With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of 1,629.4578 hectares; that emancipation patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for

said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83, three notices of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)

"The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case) despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100)." 8

Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. 9 Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked," "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 10 cdtai

Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. 11 Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343). 12

For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used. 13

On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private respondents. 14 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the same. 15

Hence, the instant petitions. cdt

On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended to delay the finality of the appealed decision. 16 The Court, however, denied the motion and instead required the respondents to file their comments. 17

Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.

Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657. aisadc

The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:

"SECTION 16.Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — . . .

(e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit." cdta

The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. 18 In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, 19 for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. 20

In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.

 

Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the negative. cdasia

The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 18 21 of the same law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform." 22

"The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-accepted principle of eminent domain.

xxx xxx xxx

"The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. cdtai

xxx xxx xxx

"Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected."

Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding petitioners' assertion as it found that:

". . . despite the 'revolutionary' character of the expropriation envisioned under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that 'payments of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money' — even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case 'that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other' — the Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the 'recognized rule . . . that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation." 23 (Emphasis supplied.) aisadc

We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.

The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must rectify.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that: cdta

". . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered 'just' for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss." 24 (Emphasis supplied.)

The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. 25 But despite this, cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. 26

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. cdasia

SO ORDERED.

LAND REDISTRIBUTION

SEC. 22.  Qualified Beneficiaries. - The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to

landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the

following order of priority:

    (a) agricultural lessees and share tenants; 

    (b) regular farm workers; 

    (c) seasonal farm workers; 

    (d) other farm workers; 

    (e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands; 

    (f) collective or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and 

    (g) others directly working on the land.

Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are qualified under Section 6 of this Act shall be given

preference in the distribution of the land of their parents; and: Provided, further, that actual tenant -tillers in the

landholding shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.

Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land are

disqualified to become beneficiaries under their program.

A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate and make land as

productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the record or performance of each beneficiary,

so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right

to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the

PARC.

If, due to landowner's retention rights or to the number of tenants, lessees, or workers on the land, there is not

enough land to accommodate any or some of them, they may be granted ownership of other lands available for

distribution under this Act, at the option of the beneficiaries.

Farmers already in place and those not accommodated in the distribution of privately-owned lands will be given

preferential rights in the distribution of lands from the public domain.

SEC. 23. Distribution Limit. - No qualified beneficiary may own more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land.

SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. - The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the time the

DAR makes an award of the land to him, which award shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from

the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land. Ownership of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a

Certificate of Land Ownership Award, which shall contain the restrictions and conditions provided for in this Act, and

shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds concerned and annotated on the Certificate of Title.

SEC. 25. Award Ceilings for Beneficiaries. - Beneficiaries shall be awarded an area not exceeding three (3) hectares,

which may cover a contiguous tract of land or several parcels of land cumulated up to the prescribed award limits.

For purposes of this Act, a landless beneficiary is one who owns less than three (3) hectares of agricultural land.  The

beneficiaries may opt for collective ownership, such as co-workers or farmers' cooperative or some other form of

collective organization: Provided, That the total area that may be awarded shall not exceed the total number of co-

workers or members of the cooperative or collective organization multiplied by the award limit above prescribed,

except in meritorious cases as determined by the PARC. Title to the property shall be issued in the name of the co-

owners or the cooperative or collective organization as the case may be.

SEC. 26. Payment by Beneficiaries. - Lands awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to the

LBP in thirty (30) annual amortizations at six percent (6%) interest per annum. The payments for the firs three (3)

years after the award may be at reduced amounts as established by the PARC :  Provided, That the first five (5)

annual payments may not be more than five percent (5%) of the value of the annual gross production is paid as

established by the DAR. Should the scheduled annual payments after the fifth year exceed ten percent (10) of the

annual gross production and the failure to produce accordingly is not due to the beneficiary's fault, the LBP may

reduce the interest rate or reduce the principal obligation to make the payment affordable.

The LBP shall have a lien by way of mortgage on the land awarded to beneficiary and this mortgage may be

foreclosed by the LBP for non-payment of an aggregate of three (3) annual amortizations. The LBP shall advise the

DAR of such proceedings and the latter shall subsequently award the forfeited landholding to other qualified

beneficiaries. A beneficiary whose land as provided herein has been foreclosed shall thereafter be permanently

disqualified from becoming a beneficiary under this Act.

SEC. 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. - Lands acquired by beneficiaries under this Act may not be sold,

transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other

qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the children or the spouse of the

transferor shall have a right to repurchase the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due

notice of the availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of

the barangay where the land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), as herein

provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC. 

If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the right to the land may be transferred or conveyed, with

prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such

transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to

the LBP which shall give due notice of the availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding

paragraph. 

In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the beneficiary in one lump sum for the amounts

the latter has already paid, together with the value of improvements he has made on the land.

INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE (CASE):

G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE D. AGUILAR, TACIANA D. AGUILAR, ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS, MARIO ERIBAL, REYNALDO C. ESENCIA, EMMA GONZAGA, RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL JAMANDRE, HILARION V. LANTIZA, ANSELMO LOPEZ, TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E. NASTOR, NELSON L. NULLAS, CARLITO S. OLIA, ANA PATIÑO, ROBERTO T. PATIÑO, ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C. RUFINO, PATERNO P. SAIN, CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and JOEMARIE VIBO, Petitioners, vs.DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA, INC., Respondents.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review and reversal of the Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and 28 August 2003, respectively.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their respective Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and EP numbers presented below:

Petitioners TCT/EP Nos.Areas(has.)

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675 1.7833

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293

2.00000.1565

3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295 3.1441

4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296 4.2405

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809 3.3082

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676 3.1437

7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658 4.0128

8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836 2.3087

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844 2.0950

10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873 1.5737

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348 2.2670

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825

4.55260.4579

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840 4.4939

14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849 2.2140

15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829 3.9291

16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826 2.7491

17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673 1.7954

18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860 6.4266

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830 2.2143

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848 4.5322

21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813 4.3223

22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880 3.7151

23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827 1.31852

The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patiño, are the surviving spouses of deceased recipients of EPs over parcels of land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their corresponding TCT and EP numbers identified as follows:

(Deceased) Registered Owners TCT/EP Nos. Areas

(has.)

1. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832 4.1953

2. RAFAEL PATIÑO TCT No. T-929/EP No. A-037861 3.00783

The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.

HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land with a total area of 527.8308 hectares, to wit:

Lot No.Area

(in hectares)

Lot No. 1620, Pls – 4 28.52

Lot No. 1621, Pls – 4 11.64

Lot No. 1622, Pls – 4 487.47

TOTAL 527.834

On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 275 was issued mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.

HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.

In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of 527.8308 hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976, the DAR approved the Parcellary Map Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings.

HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant proceedings, including the determination of the Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land Production, and was a signatory of an undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in 1977.

Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among other persons, which was registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT No. P-3077-1661. The annotation in the OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of Assignment.

In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons.

In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII, 17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions, which were later consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares which had been awarded to petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the other 250.3300 hectares under Presidential Decree No. 27 despite claiming that the entire landholdings were untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.

On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972. The Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria Action Team. Petitioners’ TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision.

After the DARAB denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued the following assailed Resolution:

A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED.6

Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners." The Court of Appeals denied the motion by issuing the following assailed Resolution:

Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated on January 27, 2003 which dismissed the petition for certiorari.

We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to be reconsidered, since petitioners have failed to show that their belated submission of the special power of attorney can be justified as against the unequivocal requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special circumstances that justify the relaxation of the rules on non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in the case at bar.

More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Loquias vs. Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification [on] non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.

Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the proper authorization from all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby rendering the petition fatally defective.

Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended states:

"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice x x x"

It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should be dismissed forthwith. Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed could cure the petition’s defect, the requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still has not been met since some of the other petitioners failed to sign the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.7

Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their registration.

The petition is impressed with merit.1awphil.net

Petitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the Certification Against Forum shopping

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid the filing of multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies would have to resolve the same issues. Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

Revised Circular No. 28-91 "was designed x x x to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible."8 Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice.9 The same guidelines should still apply in interpreting what is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within the phrase "plaintiff or principal party" who is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held in Mendigorin v. Cabantog10 and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio11 that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,12 we likewise held that:

The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of petitioner. For a certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the principal parties and not by counsel unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do so. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a cause for the dismissal of this action. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman,13where this Court ruled that:

At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. (Emphasis supplied)

Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners seeking relief from the Resolution of the Ombudsman charging them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the above declaration "at the outset" was made together with a determination on the lack of jurisdiction on our part to decide the Petition.14 There being only five petitioners in Loquias, the unreasonableness of the failure to obtain the signatures of Antonio Din, Jr.’s four co-accused is immediately apparent, hence the remark by this Court that "[p]etitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification." In the present petition, petitioners allege that they are farmer-beneficiaries who reside in a very remote barangay in Agusan del Sur. While they reside in the same barangay, they allegedly have to walk for hours on rough terrain to reach their neighbors due to the absence of convenient means of transportation. Their houses are located far apart from each other and the mode of transportation, habal-habal, is scarce and difficult. Majority of them are also nearing old age. On the other hand, their lawyers (who are members of a non-government organization engaged in development work) are based in Quezon City who started assisting them at the latter part of the RARAD level litigation in 1998, and became their counsel of record only at the DARAB level. The petitioner who signed the initiatory pleading, Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was able to travel to Manila at the time of the preparation of the Petition due to very meager resources of their farmers’ organization, the Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga Mag-uugma Para sa Ekonomikanhong Kalambuan (KAMMPE). When the Petition a quo was dismissed, petitioners’ counsel went to Agusan del Sur and tried earnestly to secure all the signatures for the SPA. In fact, when the SPA was being circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named petitioners therein failed to sign for various reasons – some could not be found within the area and were said to be temporarily residing in other towns, while some already died because of old age.15 Be that as it may, those who did not sign the SPA did not participate, and are not parties to this petition.

The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the relaxation of the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at bar,16 without discussing the circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are special circumstances that would justify the suspension or relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping, such as those which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.

In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,17 the appeal to the Court of Appeals had a certificate against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did not contain a board resolution authorizing the signatory of the Certificate. Petitioners therein attached the board resolution in their Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, as in this case, denied the same. In granting the Petition therein, we explained that:

[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it was not accompanied by a board resolution or a secretary’s certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case. It would appear that the signatory of the certification was, in fact, duly authorized as so evidenced by a board resolution attached to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the appellate court. It could thus be said that there was at least substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural requirements.

The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs. Court of Appeals; BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA 484].

In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,18 the authority of petitioner’s resident manager to sign the certification against forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only after the latter dismissed the Petition. It turned out, in the Motion for Reconsideration, that he already had board authority ten days before the filing of the Petition. We ratiocinated therein that:

On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.

In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy’s petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping.

In the instant case, the merits of petitioner’s case should be considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretary’s certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping. Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.

In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,19 we, likewise, considered the apparent merits of the substantive aspect of the case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the reinstatement of the case, and invoked our power to suspend our rules to serve the ends of justice. Thus:

The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. In those cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the reinstatement of the petition. x x x

There were even cases where we held that there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on the merits. In De Guia v. De Guia,20petitioners raised in their Petition for Review the allowance of respondents’ Appeal Brief which did not contain a certificate against forum shopping. We held therein that:

With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial justice behooves us to agree with the disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the shortcomings of respondents’ counsel, but we simply cannot ignore the merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been held that "[i]t is within the inherent power of the Court to suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do justice."

In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 the non-compliance was disregarded because of the principle of social justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:

We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. The certifications in their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not correct. The certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioners could have warranted the outright dismissal of their actions.

But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of social justice involving labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties. Moreover, we must stress that technical rules of procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the working woman.

The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would be justified for two compelling reasons: social justice considerations and the apparent merit of the Petition, as shall be heretofore discussed.

Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration proceedings.

Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of its issuance. The DARAB, however, ruled that the EP "is a title issued through the agrarian reform program of the government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is governed by the rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it is not the same as or in the same category of a Torrens title."

The DARAB is grossly mistaken.

Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 provides that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.

There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land patent is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by implication by this Court to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in accordance with law. The date of issuance of the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases because the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. This, to our mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation of a family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in favor of the homesteader would be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the Government through the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there would arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the government’s system of distributing public agricultural lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the State.

The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate of title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:

Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles granted thereunder, such silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who come into the possession of his homestead after complying with the requirements thereof. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be interpreted to apply by implication to the patent issued by the Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in accordance with law.23

After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), 24 the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person."25

As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr.26 :

The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent

therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.   (Emphasis supplied.)

The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX27 on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.

The only defense of respondents, that the issue of indefeasibility of title was raised for the first time on appeal with the DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was already raised before the RARAD.28

The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to have the EPs cancelled and the lots covered under the Republic Act No. 6657,29 with the farmer-beneficiaries later on being issued with CLOAs, would only delay the application of agrarian reform laws to the disputed 277.5008 hectares, leading to the expenditure of more time and resources of the government.

The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for cancellation more than 20 years after the alleged wrongful annotation of the Deed of Assignment in OCT No. P-3077-1661, and more than ten years after the issuance of the TCTs to the farmers, is apparently motivated by its desire to receive a substantially higher valuation and just compensation should the disputed 277.5008 hectares be covered under Republic Act No. 6657 instead of Presidential Decree No. 27.30 This is further proved by the following uncontested allegations by petitioners:

(i) HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to oust petitioners from the farm they were cultivating;

(ii) HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property from 1972 onwards and never protested petitioners’ act of declaring the same for realty taxation;

(iii) HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares, signed the LTPA covering the entire landholdings or the area of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be rice and corn lands;

(iv) HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing the Deed of Assignment of Rights in 1977.

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73902 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their successors-in-interest are hereby declared VALID and SUBSISTING:

Original Grantees TCT/EP Nos.

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293

3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295

4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676

7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658

8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844

10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840

14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849

15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829

16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826

17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673

18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848

21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813

22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSON TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880

23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827

24. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832

25. RAFAEL PATIÑO TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861

Costs against respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

RESOLUTION OF AGRARIAN DISPUTES

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and

adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the

implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of

Agricultural (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases,

disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of

every case in accordance with equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of

procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it.

It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports,

compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena,

and subpoenaduces tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise

have the power to punish direct and indirect contempt in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as

provided in the Rules of Court

Representatives of farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers or their

organizations in any proceedings before the DAR:Provided, however, that when there are two or more

representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves to

represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings.chan robles virtual law library

Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory.

SEC. 51. Finality of Determination. - Any case or controversy before it shall be decided within thirty (30) days after it

is submitted for resolution. Only one (1) motion for consideration shall be allowed. Any order, ruling or decision shall

be final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.

SEC. 52. Frivolous Appeals. - To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals from the decisions or orders on the local or

provincial levels, the DAR may impose reasonable penalties, including but not limited to, fines or censures upon

erring parties.

SEC. 53. Certification of BARC. - The DAR shall not take cognizance of any agrarian dispute or controversy unless a

certification from the BARC that the dispute has been submitted to it for mediation and conciliation without any

success of settlement is presented:  Provided, however, that if no certification is issued by the BARC within thirty (30)

days after a matter or issue is submitted to it for mediation or conciliation, the case or dispute may be brought before

the PARC.

CASES

[UDK No. 9864.  December 3, 1990.]

 

RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE of the [CAR] RTC,

Branch 4, Iligan City, and SPOUSES DOMINGO and EUGENIA MARTIL, respondents.

 

Dulcesimo P. Tampus for petitioner.

Alan L. Flores for private respondents.

 

SYLLABUS

 

1.         REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION, ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE; OVER CASES INVOLVING

AGRARIAN LAWS; VESTED IN THE AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATORY BOARD OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM. — The jurisdiction conferred on the Department of Agrarian

Reform, i.e.: (a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; (b) resolution of

agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and (c) approval or disapproval of the conversion,

restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-

agricultural uses, is evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court by

Presidential Decree No. 946, which extended to the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and

use of agricultural land, and other matters affecting tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-

cultivators, farms' cooperatives or organizations under laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, instructions, Rules

and Regulations in relation to the agrarian reform program. Clearly, the latter must be deemed to have been

eliminated by its being subsumed in the broad jurisdiction conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform.

The intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition

stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the executive

orders just quoted. (Rules of the DAR Adjudication Board, which took effect on March 8, 1988) The rules

included the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory

functions of the Department, and the allocation to it of — ". . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over the

subject matter vested upon it by law, and all cases, disputes, controversies and matters or incidents involving

the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Executive Order No. 229,

Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6289, Presidential

Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations." The implementing rules

also declare that "(s)pecifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to . . .  (that theretofore

vested in the Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the

cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and

other agrarian laws . . . "

2.         ID.; ID.; OVER TWO GROUPS OF CASES; RESTORED TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS AS

SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS. — Republic Act No. 6657, was signed into law by President Aquino on June

10, 1988 and became effective immediately after its "publication in two (2)  national newspapers of general

circulation" on June 15, 1988. The Act makes references to and explicitly recognizes the effectivity and

applicability of Presidential Decree No. 229. More particularly, the Act echoes the provisions of Section 17 of

Presidential Decree No. 229, investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with original jurisdiction, generally,

over all cases involving agrarian laws, although it restores to the Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction over

two groups of cases. The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction

over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special jurisdiction" on

"Special Agrarian Court," which are Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court — at least one

(1) branch within each province — to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts qua Special Agrarian Courts

have, according to Section 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over: 1) "all petitions for the

determination of just compensation to land-owners,"  and 2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . .

(the) Act." In these cases, "(t)he Rules of Court shall apply . . . unless modified by . . . (the) Act."

3.         ID.; APPEAL; CASES INVOLVING AGRARIAN DISPUTES; PROCEDURE, FOLLOWED. — It is

relevant to mention in this connection that - (1) appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be

taken by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of

the decision, . . ." (Sec. 60) and (2) appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any

agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation

of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari

(This mode of appeal is sui generis. It is only instance when an appeal by certiorari may be taken to the Court

of Appeals. Heretofore, appeals by certiorari were authorized only when taken to the Supreme Court) except

as otherwise provided . . .  within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof," the "findings of fact of the

DAR . . . (being) final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence." (Sec. 54)

 

D E C I S I O N

 

NARVASA, J p:

        The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, acting as a special agrarian court, in the light of Executive Orders

Numbered 129-A and 229 and Republic Act No. 6657, is what is at issue in the proceeding at bar.

        Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte

in March, 1988, "an agrarian case for damages by reason of the(ir) unlawful dispossession . . .was tenants from the

landholding" owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil. 1 Several persons were also impleaded as

defendants, including the Philippine National Bank, it being alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a

mortgage on the land involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the acquisition of the property by the bank

as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and in the sale by the latter, some time later, of portions of the land to

the other persons named as its co-defendants (all employees of the National Steel Corporation), and it being prayed

that mortgage and the transactions thereafter made in relation thereto be annulled and voided. 2 

        In an Order rendered on August 24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint. 3 He

opined that by virtue of Executive Order No. 229 "providing the mechanisms for the implementation of the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program approved on July 24, 1987" — Executive No. 129-A approved on July 26,

1987, as well as the Rules of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform, jurisdiction of the

Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform. 

        The Tangub Spouses filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, docketed as UDK-8867, assigned to the

Second Division. Discerning however no special and important reason for taking cognizance of the action, this Court

referred the same to the Court of Appeals, that tribunal having concurrent jurisdiction to act tereon.

        The Court of Appeals, by Decision promulgated on October 23, 1989, 4 dismissed the petition, finding that the

jurisdictional question had been correctly resolved by the Trial Court. The Court of Appeals, adverted to a case earlier

decided by it, on August 30, 1989,Estanislao Casinillo v. Hon. Felipe G. Javier, Jr., et al., in which it was

"emphatically ruled that agrarian cases no longer fall under the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under

the jurisdiction of the DAR Adjudication Board." 5 The ruling was grounded on the provisions of Executive Orders

Numbered 229, approved on July 22, 1987, and 129-A, issued on July 26, 1987, in relation to Republic Act No. 6657,

effective on June 15, 1988. Said executive orders, it was pointed out, were issued by President Corazon C. Aquino

undoubtedly in the exercise of her revolutionary powers in accordance with Section 6, Article XVIII [Transitory

Provisions] of the 1986 Constitution providing that the "incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative

powers until the first Congress is convened."

        The petitioner Rufina Vda. de Tangub, now widowed, is once again before this Court, contending that the Trial

Court's "order of dismissal of August 26, 1988, and the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals affirming it, are

patently illegal and unconstitutional" because they deprive "a poor tenant access to courts and directly violate R.A.

6657, PD 946, and Batas Bilang 129."

        The petition is without merit.

        Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

(CARP). It states that the program —

". . . shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produce, all public and private agricultural land as

provided in Proclamation No. 131 dated July 22, 1987, including whenever applicable in accordance with law, other

lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture."

        Section 17 thereof.

1)      vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with "quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate

agrarian reform matters," and

2)      granted it "jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling

under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture [DA], as well as

"powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders

or decisions."

        Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A made the Department of Agrarian Reform "responsible for implementing

the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and, for such purpose," authorized it, among others, to —

"(g)    Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian conflicts and land tenure

problems; . . (and)

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

(j)      Approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural

uses: . ."

        And Section 5 of the same Executive Order No. 129-A specified the powers and functions of the Department of

Agrarian Reform, including the following: 

"(b)   Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose, punish for contempt and issue subpoena, subpoena duces

tecum, writ of execution of its decision, and other legal processes to ensure successful and expeditious program

implementation; the decisions of the Department may in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but

shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal;

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

(h)     Provide free legal service to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian conflicts and land tenure related

problems as may be provided for by laws;

(i)      Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial,

industrial, and other land uses as may be provided . . ."

        The jurisdiction thus conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform, i.e.:

(a)     adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;

(b)     resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and

(c)     approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into

residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses,

is evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court by Presidential Decree No.

946, which extended to the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land, and

other matters affecting tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-cultivators, farms' cooperatives or

organizations under laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, instructions, Rules and Regulations in relation to the

agrarian reform program. 6 Clearly, the latter must be deemed to have been eliminated by its being subsumed in

the broad jurisdiction conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform. The intention evidently was to transfer

original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules formulated and

promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the executive orders just quoted. 7 The rules included

the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions of the

Department, and the allocation to it of —

". . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested upon it by law, and all cases, disputes,

controversies and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

under Executive Order No. 229, Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No.

6289, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations."

        The implementing rules also declare that "(s)pecifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited

to . . (that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights and obligations of persons

engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

(CARP) and other agrarian laws . . ."

        The matter has since been further and definitively clarified by Republic Act No. 6657, which was signed into law

by President Aquino on June 10, 1988 and became effective immediately after its "publication in two (2) national

newspapers of general circulation" on June 15, 1988. The Act makes references to and explicitly recognizes the

effectivity and applicability of Presidential Decree No. 229. 8 More particularly, the Act echoes the provisions of

Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 229, supra, investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with original

jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving agrarian laws, although, as shall shortly be pointed out, it restores to

the Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction over two groups of cases. Section 50 reads as follows:  

"SEC. 50.      Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to

determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all

matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of

the Department of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].

It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all

cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain

the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it

shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every

action or proceeding before it.

It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports,

compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and

issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized

officers. It shall likewise have the power to punish direct and indirect contempts in the same manner and

subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

Notwithstanding an appeal to the court of appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory." 9

        The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform

matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which

are Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court — at least one (1) branch within each province — to act

as such. These Regional Trial Courts qua Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same law,

original and exclusive jurisdiction over:

1)      "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners," and

2)      "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."

        In these cases, "(t)he Rules of Court shall apply . . unless modified by . . . (the) Act."

        It is relevant to mention in this connection that —

(1)       appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be taken by filing a petition for review with

the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the decision, . ." 10 and

(2)       appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any

matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other

pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari 11 except as otherwise

provided . . . within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof," the "findings of fact of the DAR [being]

final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence." 12 

        The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in dismissing Agrarian Case No. 1094. It being a

case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special jurisdiction" of

said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the

Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely

to wield the adjudicatory powers of the Department, supra.

        The petitioner had not bothered to substantiate her contention that she has been denied access to the courts,

which is just as well. The contention is on its face utterly without merit. It may profit her and her counsel to realize that

apart from granting all concerned parties access to a quasi-judicial forum (the Adjudication Board of the Department

of Agrarian Reform), the law strives to make resolution of controversies therein more expeditious and inexpensive, by

providing not only that the Board "shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence," supra, but also

that, as explicitly stated by the penultimate paragraph of Section 50 of the Act:

"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or their organizations in

any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That when there are two or more representatives for any

individual or group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent such party or group

before any DAR proceedings."

        WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

SP. No. 16725 dated October 23, 1989, AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.

        SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 112526.  October 12, 2001.]

 

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN B. AMANTE,

FRANCISCO L. ANDAL, LUCIA ANDAL, ANDREA P. AYENDE, LETICIA P. BALAT, FILOMENA B. BATINO,

ANICETO A. BURGOS, JAIME A. BURGOS, FLORENCIA CANUBAS, LORETO A. CANUBAS, MAXIMO A.

CANUBAS, REYNALDO CARINGAL, QUIRINO C. CASALME, BENIGNO A. CRUZAT, ELINO A. CRUZAT,

GREGORIO F. CRUZAT, RUFINO C. CRUZAT, SERGIO CRUZAT, SEVERINO F. CRUZAT, VICTORIA DE

SAGUN, SEVERINO DE SAGUN, FELICISIMO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO A. GONZALES, GREGORIO

GONZALES, LEODEGARIO N. GONZALES, PASCUAL P. GONZALES, ROLANDO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO

A. JUANGCO, GERVACIO A. JUANGCO, LOURDES U. LUNA, ANSELMO M. MANDANAS, CRISANTO

MANDANAS, EMILIO M. MANDANAS, GREGORIO A. MANDANAS, MARIO G. MANDANAS, TEODORO

MANDANAS, CONSTANCIO B. MARQUEZ, EUGENIO B. MARQUEZ, ARMANDO P. MATIENZO, DANIEL D.

MATIENZO, MAXIMINO MATIENZO, PACENCIA P. MATIENZO, DOROTEA L. PANGANIBAN, JUANITO T.

PEREZ, MARIANITO T. PEREZ, SEVERO M. PEREZ, INOCENCIA S. PASQUIZA, BIENVENIDO F. PETATE,

IGNACIO F. PETATE, JUANITO PETATE, PABLO A. PLATON, PRECILLO V. PLATON, AQUILINO B. SUBOL,

CASIANO T. VILLA, DOMINGO VILLA, JUAN T. VILLA, MARIO C. VILLA, NATIVIDAD A. VILLA, JACINTA S.

ALVARADO, RODOLFO ANGELES, DOMINGO A. CANUBAS, EDGARDO L. CASALME, QUIRINO DE LEON,

LEONILO M. ENRIQUEZ, CLAUDIA P. GONZALES, FELISA R. LANGUE, QUINTILLANO LANGUE, REYNALDO

LANGUE, ROMEO S. LANGUE, BONIFACIO VILLA, ROGELIO AYENDE, ANTONIO B. FERNANDEZ, ZACARIAS

HERRERA, ZACARIAS HERRERA, REYNARIO U. LAZO, AGAPITO MATIENZO, DIONISIO F. PETATE, LITO G.

REYES, JOSE M. SUBOL, CELESTINO G. TOPI NO, ROSA C. AMANTE, SOTERA CASALME, REMIGIO M.

SILVERIO, THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

ADJUDICATION BOARD, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA,

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR

REGION IV, and REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER FOR REGION IV, respondents.

PARDO, J p:

        The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming

the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board 2 (hereafter, DARAB) ordering the compulsory

acquisition of petitioner's property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

        Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the registered owner of two

parcels of land, situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, with a total

area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water

to the Canlubang community, and that ninety (90) light industries are now located in the area. 3

        Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem.

Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case 4with the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, seeking an

easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the

ejectment of private respondents.

        In October 1986 to August 1987, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna separate

complaints for forcible entry against respondents. 5

        After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the

compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP.

        On August 11, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a notice of

coverage to petitioner and invited its officials or representatives to a conference on August 18, 1989. 6 During the

meeting, the following were present: representatives of petitioner, the Land Bank of the Philippines, PARCCOM,

PARO of Laguna, MARO of Laguna, the BARC Chairman of Barangay Casile and some potential farmer

beneficiaries, who are residents of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was the consensus and recommendation of

the assembly that the landholding of SRRDC be placed under compulsory acquisition.

        On August 17, 1989, petitioner filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), Cabuyao, Laguna a

"Protest and Objection" to the compulsory acquisition of the property on the ground that the area was not appropriate

for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the

land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. 7

        On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC chairman answered the protest and

objection stating that the slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically

viable for agricultural purposes, as evidenced by the Certification of the Department of Agriculture, municipality of

Cabuyao, Laguna. 8

        On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a summary investigation report and forwarded the

Compulsory Acquisition Folder Indorsement (CAFI) to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (hereafter, PARO). 9

        On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the

Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

        On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C. Visperas of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and

Development, DAR forwarded two (2) Compulsory Acquisition Claim Folders covering the landholding of SRRDC,

covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T-84891 to the President, Land Bank of the Philippines for further review and

evaluation. 10

On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of

acquisition 11 to petitioner, stating that petitioner's landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, containing an

area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed

under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

        On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two letters 12 separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad

and the Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting not only the amount

of compensation offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2) notices of acquisition.

        On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just

compensation under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16.

        On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim folders previously referred for review and evaluation to

the Director of BLAD mentioning its inability to value the SRRDC landholding due to some deficiencies.

        On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S. Galvez wrote Land Bank President Deogracias Vistan to

forward the two (2) claim folders involving the property of SRRDC to the DARAB for it to conduct summary

proceedings to determine the just compensation for the land.

        On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating that its property under the

aforesaid land titles were exempt from CARP coverage because they had been classified as watershed area and

were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion.

        On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned over the two (2) claim folders (CACF's) to the

Executive Director of the DAR Adjudication Board for proper administrative valuation. Acting on the CACF's, on

September 10, 1990, the Board promulgated a resolution asking the office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

to first resolve two (2) issues before it proceeds with the summary land valuation proceedings.13

        The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1) whether the subject parcels of land fall within the

coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion of the

parcels of land may be granted.

        On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant

Secretary for Luzon Operations) and the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted a report answering the two issues

raised. According to them, firstly, by virtue of the issuance of the notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice

of acquisition on December 12, 1989, the property is covered under compulsory acquisition. Secondly, Administrative

Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D also supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said property.

During the consideration of the case by the Board, there was no pending petition for land conversion specifically

concerning the parcels of land in question.

        On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all the parties interested, setting the hearing for the

administrative valuation of the subject parcels of land on March 6, 1991. However, on February 22, 1991, Atty. Ma.

Elena P. Hernandez-Cueva, counsel for SRRDC, wrote the Board requesting for its assistance in the reconstruction

of the records of the case because the records could not be found as her co-counsel, Atty. Ricardo Blancaflor, who

originally handled the case for SRRDC and had possession of all the records of the case was on indefinite leave and

could not be contacted. The Board granted counsel's request and moved the hearing to April 4, 1991.

        On March 18, 1991, SRRDC, submitted a petition to the Board for the latter to resolve SRRDC's petition for

exemption from CARP coverage before any administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board.

        On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and subsequently, different dates of hearing

were set without objection from counsel of SRRDC. During the April 15, 1991 hearing, the subdivision plan of subject

property at Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna was submitted and marked as Exhibit "5" for SRRDC. At the hearing on April

23, 1991, the Land Bank asked for a period of one month to value the land in dispute.

        At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning Administrator Generoso B. Opina was

presented. The certification issued on September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of land subject of the case were

classified as "Industrial Park" per Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 45-89 dated March 29, 1989. 14

        To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the lands to the farmer beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991,

petitioner filed a petition 15 with DARAB to disqualify private respondents as beneficiaries. However, DARAB refused

to address the issue of beneficiaries.

        In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a

decision, 16 finding that private respondents illegally entered the SRRDC property, and ordered them evicted.

        On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a memorandum directing the Land Bank of the

Philippines to open a trust account in favor of SRRDC, for P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC property.

        On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated a decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby orders:

"1.     The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa

Realty Development Corporation (Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 81949 and 84891 with an area of 254.766

hectares) in Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna under the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Program is hereby affirmed;

"2.     The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation the amount of

Seven Million Eight Hundred Forty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Sixty-Four centavos

(P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title mentioned above. Should

there be a rejection of the payment tendered, to open, if none has yet been made, a trust account for said amount in

the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation;

"3.     The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with dispatch Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.

84891 and 81949 and new one be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and

encumbrances;

"4.     The Department of Environment and Natural Resources either through its Provincial Office in Laguna or the

Regional Office, Region IV, to conduct a final segregation survey on the lands covered by Transfer certificate of Title

Nos. 84891 and 81949 so the same can be transferred by the Register of Deeds to the name of the Republic of the

Philippines;

"5.     The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian

Reform Office to take immediate possession on the said landholding after Title shall have been transferred to the

name of the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the same to the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents

to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna." 17

        On January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a decision in Civil Case No. B-

2333 18 ruling that respondents were builders in bad faith.

        On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the DARAB decision. 19 On

November 5, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming the decision of DARAB. The decretal

portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB decision dated September 19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without

prejudice to petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation ventilating its case with the Special Agrarian Court

on the issue of just compensation." 20

        Hence, this petition. 21

        On December 15, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution which reads:

"G.R. Nos. 112526 (Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.) — Considering the

compliance, dated December 13, 1993, filed by counsel for petitioner, with the resolution of December 8, 1993 which

required petitioner to post a cash bond or surety bond in the amount of P1,500,000.00 Pesos before issuing a

temporary restraining order prayed for, manifesting that it has posted a CASH BOND in the same amount with the

Cashier of the Court as evidenced by the attached official receipt no. 315519, the Court resolved to ISSUE the

Temporary Retraining Order prayed for.

"The Court therefore, resolved to restrain: (a) the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board from enforcing

its decision dated December 19, 1991 in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG- 0001, which was affirmed by the Court of

Appeals in a Decision dated November 5, 1993, and which ordered, among others, the Regional Office of the

Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Reform Office to take immediate possession of

the landholding in dispute after title shall have been transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines and to

distribute the same through the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as

determined by the Municipal Agrarian Officer of Cabuyao, Laguna, (b) The Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, and all persons acting for and in their behalf and under their

authority from entering the properties involved in this case and from introducing permanent infrastructures thereon;

and (c) the private respondents from further clearing the said properties of their green cover by the cutting or burning

of trees and other vegetation, effective today until further orders from this Court." 22

        The main issue raised is whether the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire

property was formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 6657.

        Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary. In

the case at bar, the Department of Agrarian Reform sought the compulsory acquisition of subject property under R. A.

No. 6657, Section 16, to wit:

"Sec. 16.       Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following

procedures shall be followed:

a.)        After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire

the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in

the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer

of the DAR to pay corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other

pertinent provisions hereof.

b.)        Within thirty (30) days from the date of the receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the

landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.

c.)        If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land

within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and other

muniments of title.

d.)        In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to

determine the compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit

fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted

for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.

e.)        Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or no response from the

landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP

bonds in accordance with this act, the DAR shall make immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper

Register of Deeds to issue Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The

DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

f.)         Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court 23 of proper jurisdiction for final

determination of just compensation.

        In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be

identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or

registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the

property is located.

        Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative

shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.

        If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders

the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the

Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of

transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the execution of the

deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects

the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just

compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence

on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the

case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation.

        Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the

latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall

immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the

Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may question

the decision of the DAR in the special agrarian courts (provisionally the Supreme Court designated branches of the

regional trial court as special agrarian courts) for final determination of just compensation.

        The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to hasten the implementation of

the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory

acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on

how the identification process shall be made. To fill this gap, on July 26, 1989, the DAR issued Administrative Order

No. 12, series of 1989, which set the operating procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as

follows:

A.     The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), with the assistance of the pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform

Committee (BARC), shall:

1.         Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP in his area of responsibility; the

masterlist should include such information as required under the attached CARP masterlist form which shall include

the name of the landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number.

2.         Prepare the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title (OCT/TCT) or landholding covered

under Phase I and II of the CARP except those for which the landowners have already filed applications to avail of

other modes of land acquisition. A case folder shall contain the following duly accomplished forms:

a)         CARP CA Form 1 — MARO investigation report

b)         CARP CA Form No 2 — Summary investigation report findings and evaluation

c)         CARP CA Form 3 — Applicant's Information sheet

d)         CARP CA Form 4 — Beneficiaries undertaking

e)         CARP CA Form 5 — Transmittal report to the PARO

The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-mentioned forms have been examined and

verified by him and that the same are true and correct.

3.         Send notice of coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the

Compulsory Case Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said conference meeting shall also be sent to the prospective

farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC representatives, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) representative, and the other

interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property.

He shall discuss the MARO/BARC investigation report and solicit the views, objection, agreements or suggestions of

the participants thereon. The landowner shall also ask to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the meeting shall

be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form an integral part of the CACF.

4.         Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO).

B.      The PARO shall:

1.         Ensure the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his MAROs.

2.         Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6,

series of 1988. The valuation worksheet and the related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the

PARO and all the personnel who participated in the accomplishment of these forms.

3.         In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through ocular inspection and verification of the

property. This ocular inspection and verification shall be mandatory when the computed value exceeds P500,000 per

estate.

4.         Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, together with the duly accomplished valuation

forms and his recommendations, to the Central Office.

The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy each of his report.

C.        DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall:

1.         Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO, review, evaluate and determine the final

land valuation of the property covered by the case folder. A summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared

and duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel directly participating in the review and final valuation.

2.         Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized representative, a notice of acquisition

(CARP Form 8) for the subject property. Serve the notice to the landowner personally or through registered mail

within three days from its approval. The notice shall include among others, the area subject of compulsory

acquisition, and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR.

3.         Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for

approval the order of acquisition. However, in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)

shall conduct a summary administrative hearing to determine just compensation, in accordance with the procedures

provided under Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of the DARAB's decision on

just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the required order of acquisition.

4.         Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or upon deposit of payment in the

designated bank, in case of rejection or non-response, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of

Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

Once the property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall take possession of the land for redistribution to

qualified beneficiaries."

        Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep

an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required

information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The

MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over

the land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives

of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested

parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements

of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.

        The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall complete

the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory when the

computed value of the estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the valuation, the PARO shall forward all

papers together with his recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the

Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) shall prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly

authorized representative, a notice of acquisition of the subject property. From this point, the provisions of Section 16

of R. A. No. 6657 shall apply.

        For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter

of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer-

beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of

acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.

        The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference, and

its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative

due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent

domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police

power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such

regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking

under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere limitation on the use of the land. What is

required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the

owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.

        In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment of just

compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP

bonds, not by trust accounts as was done by DAR.

        In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that "The CARP

Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt of the

landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with

an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is

contemplated either." 24

        Consequently, petitioner questioned before the Court of Appeals DARAB's decision ordering the compulsory

acquisition of petitioner's property. 25 Here, petitioner pressed the question of whether the property was a watershed,

not covered by CARP.

        Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067) provides:

"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may be

declared by the Department of Natural resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by

such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area

which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation,

use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters."

        Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or

divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds." Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so

why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The answer is simple. At the time of the titling, the

Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not the declared the property as watershed area. The parcels

of land in Barangay Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao

in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of

Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution 26 voiding the Zoning classification of the lands at Barangay Casile as Park and

declaring that the land was now classified as agricultural land.

        The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police

power, not the power of eminent domain. "A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which

logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present

and future projection of needs." 27

        In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, 28 we held that lands classified as non-agricultural prior

to the effectivity of the CARL, may not be compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries.

        However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and

survey showed that the parcels of land in question form a vital part of a watershed area. 29

        Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in dispute is a "watershed or part of the protected area for

watershed purposes." Ecological balances and environmental disasters in our day and age seem to be

interconnected. Property developers and tillers of the land must be aware of this deadly combination. In the case at

bar, DAR included the disputed parcels of land for compulsory acquisition simply because the land was allegedly

devoted to agriculture and was titled to SRRDC, hence, private and alienable land that may be subject to CARP.

        However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth study, survey and reassessment. We cannot ignore the

fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. In

a report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the

environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds, they concluded that:

"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the

barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil

and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have

double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit river which

drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest

covers which acts as recharged areas of the Matang Tubig springs.

Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matang Tubig structures they

couldn't care less even if it would be destroyed.

The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of

inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious

resource — water. . . . . .

Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so, the introduction

of earth disturbing activities like road building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious

agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds

would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people

dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and

program be immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens.

Hence, the following are recommended:

7.2       The Casile farmers should be relocated and given financial assistance.

7.3       Declaration of the two watersheds as critical and in need of immediate rehabilitation.

7.4       A comprehensive and detailed watershed management plan and program be formulated and implemented by

the Canlubang Estate in coordination with pertinent government agencies." 30

        The ERDB report was prepared by a composite team headed by Dr. Emilio Rosario, the ERDB Director, who

holds a doctorate degree in water resources from U.P. Los Baños in 1987; Dr. Medel Limsuan, who obtained his

doctorate degree in watershed management from Colorado University (US) in 1989; and Dr. Antonio M. Dano, who

obtained his doctorate degree in Soil and Water Management Conservation from U.P. Los Baños in 1993.

        Also, DENR Secretary Angel Alcala submitted a Memorandum for the President dated September 7, 1993

(Subject: PFVR HWI Ref.: 933103 Presidential Instructions on the Protection of Watersheds of the Canlubang

Estates at Barrio Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna) which reads:

"It is the opinion of this office that the area in question must be maintained for watershed purposes for ecological and

environmental considerations, among others. Although the 88 families who are the proposed CARP beneficiaries will

be affected, it is important that a larger view of the situation be taken as one should also consider the adverse effect

on thousands of residents downstream if the watershed will not be protected and maintained for watershed purposes.

"The foregoing considered, it is recommended that if possible, an alternate area be allocated for the affected farmers,

and that the Canlubang Estates be mandated to protect and maintain the area in question as a permanent watershed

reserved." 31

        The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a

watershed is water which is one of the most important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an

adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but

cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an "intergenerational responsibility" that needs to be answered now.

        Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof

that the Casile property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No.

6657, Section 10, provides:

"Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. — Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary

for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves,

national defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private

schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and

convents appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually

worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen percent

(18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act."

        Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed parcels of land may be

excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes.

        To resolve the issue as to the nature of the parcels of land involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the

DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.

        IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27234.

        In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of

the parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.

        In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to

be stayed by the temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final

decision on the case.

        No costs.

        SO ORDERED.

AUTHORITY OF THE DAR SECRETARY TO NULLIFY TITLES UNDER THE CARP

RA 6657

SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. - The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the time the DAR makes an award of the land to him, which award shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land. Ownership of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award, which shall contain the restrictions and conditions provided for in this Act, and shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds concerned and annotated on the Certificate of Title.

AS AMENDED BY RA 9700

AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INSTITUTING NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Section 9. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. - The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiaries shall commence from their receipt of a duly registered emancipation patent or certificate of land ownership award and their actual physical possession of the awarded land. Such award shall be completed in not more than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of registration of the title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines:Provided, That the emancipation patents, the certificates of land ownership award, and other

titles issued under any agrarian reform program shall be indefeasible and imprescriptible after one (1) year from its registration with the Office of the Registry of Deeds, subject to the conditions, limitations and qualifications of this Act, the property registration decree, and other pertinent laws. The emancipation patents or the certificates of land ownership award being titles brought under the operation of the torrens system, are conferred with the same indefeasibility and security afforded to all titles under the said system, as provided for by Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended by Republic Act No. 6732.

"It is the ministerial duty of the Registry of Deeds to register the title of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, after the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) has certified that the necessary deposit in the name of the landowner constituting full payment in cash or in bond with due notice to the landowner and the registration of the certificate of land ownership award issued to the beneficiaries, and to cancel previous titles pertaining thereto.

"Identified and qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries, based on Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657, as, amended, shall have usufructuary rights over the awarded land as soon as the DAR takes possession of such land, and such right shall not be diminished even pending the awarding of the emancipation patent or the certificate of land ownership award.

"All cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership award, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR."