AGRARIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND PEASANT UNREST: A …

AGRARIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND PEASANT UNREST: A STUDY OF LAND-GRAB

MOVEMENT IN DISTRICT BASTI, EAST U. P.

RAJENDRA SINGH Delhi School of Social Work, Delhi

Modernisation, it is argued (Moore Jr. 1967: 453; Hobsbawm 1973: 3-6; Alroy 1966: 68-86), upsets the long-established traditional socio-political and economic structures of peasant societies. In the Third World peasant unrest and revolts can be attributed to the upsetting associated with the break-up of the colonial-feudal agrarian structures. Peasant rebellions have thus been treated as "purposive social acts" (Pye 1964: 164) which attempt to bring about social stability in a new frame.

Peasant conflicts are also reflected in the re-defining of goals and means, values and norms. What Worsely and Joshi (Worsely 1964: 118-72; Joshi 1971-6: 16; 1973-6: 9) call "populism", radical ideologies, sectarianism and "demagogy" are also some of the ideological manifestations of peasant conflicts. Explanations offered by social scientists indicate that the gap between programme and implementa-tion, growth and social justice, ideology and action, changing technology and peasant security (Joshi 1970-a: 33; 1971-a: 21-22; 1973-a: 2), democratic polity and "socialistic" economy (Dumont 1969; 193; 1973: 224-225), and, finally between fanned up aspirations and the chance for their fulfilment (Oommen 1971: 264), are the underlying causes and motivations behind agrarian unrest in India.

While explaining the phenomenon of peasant conflicts, agrarian reforms are being treated by most scholars as a big conspiracy organised against the real tillers of the land. Abolition of Zamindari and Jagirdari, fixation of ceiling on agricultural holdings and other tenurial changes are thus characterised as "a hoax" and "a fiasco" (Joshi, op. cit. 1973-a: 5; 1970-6: 49) and "an organised subterfuge" (Thorner 1956: 82). It is suggested that these have "signally failed to achieve any substantial measure of progress" in terms of tenurial changes (Sen 1962: v, Preface). For Kotovsky "the land problem remained for Indian peasantry as acute as before" (Kotov-

SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

Vol. 23 No. 1 March 1974

AGRARIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND PEASANT UNREST 45

sky 1964: 82); and for Dumont policies and plans to bring socia listic pattern of society at home in India have been an excercise in "Oral Socialism" (Dumont, op. cit. 1973). Agrarian unrest according to Joshi can be attributed to ''growing disparity" along with grow ing insecurity as a "pre-disposing factor" (Joshi 1970-a: 134).

There are four assumptions in most agrarian studies that are of prime interest for the present study. We have tried to formulate them as below for verification and analysis:

1. Peasant society and agrarian relations in India can be under-stood in terms of conflicting classes as objective analytical categories. Conflict is inherent in the agrarian social structure having class differentiation which has been identified in terms of Maliks, Kisans and Mazdurs (Thorners: 1956: 4); of land-loards, rich peasants and landless and land-poor peasants (Kotovsky 1964: 10-20); of upper class "quasi-tenant" and "quasi-landlord" land-holding class and the working peasantry (Joshi 1971-a: 23); the "semi-feudal" and "semi-capitalist" landlords and the "working peasants" (Sen 1962-63); of "the feudal land owners" and "the privileged farmers". Mention may be made of Gough (1968-69) and Shah and Gough (1969: 360-600) who arrive at the same type of polarised class categories. The role that castes and caste alliances play and the weight that they carry in relation to land-holdings have either been ignored or under-pla yed in the analysis of the peasantry in India.

2. All legislative measures, pertaining to Zamindari-Jagirdari abolition, fixation of land holdings and ceiling and other tenu-rial reforms have not only failed to provide security to the poor peasantry and agricultural labourers; they have also initiated a process by which the rich are becoming richer and the poor poorer (Dumont 1973: 235; Gough 1968-69; Sen 1962: 174; Kotovsky 1964; Joshi 1966: 172; 1971-a: 23). Explicit as well as implicit indications that one gets from such class analysis is that a sharp polarization is taking place in Indian peasant society.

3. The polarization seems to have become so sharp (Thorner 1956: 82-83; Joshi 1971-6: 24) as to necessitate some radical changes in present agrarian structure in favour of the poor and landless peasants. If these are not undertaken by the govern-

46 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

ment, even if they involve "confiscation" of the land from "functionless landlords", peasant unrest is to become widespread and also to break into peasant resistance in some parts of the country (Joshi 1973-a: 12-14; Thorner 1956: 83). 4. Finally, even though all the objective structural conditions for a peasant revolution are present, it is concluded by some scholars that the subjective character-structure of Indian peasantry is not favourable to such a revolution. As a result of its conditioning to fatalism for centuries the peasant is "rigid and resigned", passive to suffering and injustice, and devoid of "surging forces to shake away his agony". This peasant passivity is typical of "Indianity" (Dumont 1965: 137; 1969: 46; 1973: 238; Joshi 1974: 57).

This paper deals primarily with two issues: (i) to analyse the genesis of the 'Land Grab' movement which developed into an organised and even violent attempt by the poor and landless peasants at occupying the surplus land of the big landlords in Basti district of Eastern Uttar Pradesh in 1970; (ii) to identify those structural and emergent 'responsive' factors that resulted in the termination and failure of this movement. Structural factors cannot be explained unless one answers the following type of questions: How have various agrarian reforms introduced by the Congress government in the post-Independence period affected caste, class and land rela tions in the district? Who have been the gainers and who the losers of land as a result of these reforms? What is their caste and class position today? And finally, what is the impact of these reforms upon the emerging pattern of power-structure in the district?

While trying to answer these questions we shall also try to reexa-mine the assumptions and conclusions of other social, scientists who have studied the question of peasant movements. We shall also try to evaluate the relevance of the class-model used in the analysis of the Indian peasantry and their land relations by many social scientists. It should also be noted that we are trying to answer these questions in the light of a body of empirical data drawn from "concrete people" and "concrete community". Our study is therefore different from many previous studies of peasant movements which either drew their material from published reports or from impressions of short field visits to farflung villages of different states. The empirical material of our study pertains to a single district, Basti,


and it was collected through intensive fieldwork in selected villages by the author during the period of the land-grab movement in 1970. We present first some basic facts about district Basti which give a background for the study of the land-grab movement.

Basti has a population of 2627061 while its total area is 2821 sq. miles. 95. 5% of its population lives in 7653 villages. It has only one town which is the administrative headquarter of the district. About 91% of the district subsists on agriculture and agricultural employment. The predominance of rural population and of agri-culture in the district make it a typical agrarian society. These features are present along with a high population density. As against 648 persons per sq. mile in the state of Uttar Pradesh Basti has a weighing density of 926 persons (Government of India 1961: 21). 88. 8% of the rural population is illiterate. As regards the distribution of population by religion, Hindus account for 81. 30% and Muslims for 18. 66% of the total population. The other religious communities are Sikhs, Christians and others (op. cit. 1961: 522-23). The district is one of the poorest in the whole of the State. The per capita annual income of Basti is only Rs. 165/- and is thus very much lower than the average of Rs. 265/- for the whole State (NCAER: 1959: 8). In the light of all these facts it is appropriate to call Basti a depressed area in the State.

TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE OF CASTE, CLASS AND LAND

A hierarchical arrangement of persons and groups into superior and inferior castes has traditionally been the basis for permission and prohibition of interpersonal relationships in Basti. Being based upon the principle of purity and pollution and inherited inequalities of power and authority, the system of caste created still greater inequality in the distribution of economic resources i. e. land, groves, forests and fisheries. Economic disparity proved functional in the maintenance of the caste hierarchy. Tradition gave legitimacy to caste society in which inequality of all types got institutionalized. Inequality became the basic norm of social organisation. Conse-quently it crystallised into a bifocal social organisation in which social, religious, economic and political power and privileges tended to get polarized into the status-castes on the one hand and the exterior castes on the other.

The rich and the poor in Basti have coincided with high and low


castes. Traditionally these caste and class categories seem to have merged so completely into each other that conceptualization of one could not have been possible without an understanding of the other. What is crucial in the traditional caste structure of Basti is that it produced not only inequalities—social, political and economic but also a 'culture of inequality'. Inequality was an inalienable part of conscious and unconscious perception of differential role and status. It denoted a culture pattern in which inequality had the sanction of Dharma and it was therefore accepted without any doubt about its legitimacy.

In the agrarian social structure the top position belonged to a class of 'Maliks' who were by caste the Rajput 'Thakurs' and who, for the working peasant, stood as the 'Sarkar' (Law incarnate) and the 'Deo-Bhagwan, (God incarnate) in Basti. Their counterpart, the 'Mahant' (a priestly caste of Brahmans) and the Pandeys, came next to the Rajputs. Thus the 'Maliks' and the 'Mahants'—one Rajput and the other Brahman—stood at the apex of the social pyramid in Basti. At the bottom were the 'Praja' or the 'Riyaya' or the 'Assami'. The 'Praja' comprised two clearly identifiable categories, the caste Hindus and the untouchable landless labourers. Both these depended upon the Maliks and Mahants.

The census of 1931 reports the existence of no less than 64 different types of Hindu castes in Basti. (Government of India 1931 XXXII: 500-25). The Hindus were 82. 56% of the total popula -tion while the Muslims were 17. 4%, Majority of the Muslim castes, like Julaha, Kujra, and Manihar etc. comprised ex-tenants of the Rajput Zamindars. The exception were the Pindari muslim families who as landlords enjoyed first-class proprietary rights over land as a result of the settlement with the British Government (Government of India 1931: 520).

Rajputs

The Rajputs—the traditional 'Maliks' of Basti—had a population of 3. 12% to the total Hindu population. The census of 1901 divides them into 24 clans (Government of India 1907: 78). Among these the clans of the Suryavanshis, Sarnets, Kalhansas and the Gautams have been of dynastic origin and their clan chiefs were known as Rajas. The rest were petty landlords, 'birta' -holders or grantees of the Rajas (Government of India 1907: 142-54).

A G R A R I A N S O C I A L S T R U C T U R E A N D P E A S A N T U N R E S T 49

Each Raja was a nucleus of power in his territory in alliance with the kinsmen and grantees. The Raja and his kinsmen remained the sole lords of the land. Holt Mackenzie writes:

"The village zamindars were the immemorial occupants of the soil... They gave, sold and mortgaged their land at will... Nothing but violence appears to have disturbed the tenure of the village zamindars; neither the furthest exile, nor the longest absence, dissolved the tie that bound them to the field of their ancestors, nor destroyed their right to resume possession when they returned" (cited in Government of India 1948 Vol. I: 82-83).

Before the British occupation most of the Rajput Rajas held sanad from Muslim Kings that certified their absolute local power over land and population. British rulers acknowledged the ''Sanad" with the same sanctity as did the Msulim rulers in past.

The kin of Raja, locally called the 'Pattidar', received land both on the principle of Bhaiya-chara as well as the services rendered to the Raja. The Pattidars, however, were not subordinate to the Rajas as their proprietary rights were of the same order as those of the Raja himself. With the exception of three Brahman families of Jagdishpur, Kalayanpur and Belbharia in Harriya tehsil, who received land directly from the Mughals and not from local Rajputs, all other Brahman families in Basti were initially given land by the Rajputs as ''Dan" or "Sankalap" (Donation), as temple and Pathsala (classical school) grants and for ritual services. The Rajputs had superior proprietary right over cultivable land, forests, groves and ponds. They could transfer and mortgage their property.

Thus the actual property right was concentrated in one caste—

TABLE - 1 SHOWING THE STRUCTURE OF PROPRIETARY RIGHTS BY NO. OF

VILLAGES IN BASTI IN THE BRITISH PERIOD


the Rajputs who were the Maliks of the land. This structure of property right can be seen with the help of Table 1.

Brahmans

The Brahmans have been the next most important caste in Basti. They comprise 11. 31% of the total Hindu population. Tradi-tionally as priest, preacher, teacher and Mahants, the Brahmans used to receive different types of Birta (gift or dan) from the Rajput maliks in return of their services. The Mahants of Tameshwar Nath, Rajpur, Belwa, Madrahwa and Chetia were Birta-holders, who after 1842 emerged as big territorial magnates and Zamindars. Most of the Brahman families derived their importance from their association with some Rajput Raja or his Zamindar kin as their grantees. Usually patron-client relation between Rajupt-maliks and Brahman-Mahants was on clan to clan basis. The Malik and the Mahant remained two symbiotic castes till the fifth land settlement Act of 1842 which converted Birta right into zamindari right and upgraded the Brahmans as independent zamindars (Government of India 1907: 617). These two caste groups, Rajputs and Brahmans, were merged into one class category, the zamindars. With this development the conical apex of the class structures of Basti got flattened at the top. Before British rule only 3. 12% were Rajput zamindars functioning as Maliks; with the addition of Brahmans this figure registered an increase.

Other Castes

With the exception of trading castes like Baniyas, Halwais and Sonars, there are 62 other castes which remained either as cultivating tenants or as landless labourers of the Zamindars. Between 1842 to 1875, 14. 45% of zamindar population ruled over 86. 6% of tenant and landless population. The caste-class overlap is revealed by the pro-prietary right on land by caste -groups presented in Table 2.

The upper castes consist of Rajputs and Brahmans whose owner-ship of land has been already discussed. The middle caste group consists of traders and businessmen such as Banias, Halwais and Sonars who constitute about 8% of the entire caste population. Other castes in this group are those of Bhumihars, Kayasthas, Jats and Khatris,


TABLE—2 SHOWING THE HINDU GROUPS BY THEIR RELATIVE CASTE STATUS

AND CLASS POSITION (82. 56% OF HINDU CASTE FIGURES ARE PROJECTED ON THE BASES OF 1931 CENSUS REPORTS)

SOURCE : (Government of India 1931: XVII 500-520).

The lower middle castes are a key group. They comprise 15 different Hindu castes like Ahirs, Kurmrs, Pasis, Kahars, Kalwars, Gadarias, Barais, Harhis, Muraos, Kueris, Nais, Kumahars, Thatheras, Tamolis and Malis. The numerically dominant among these are the Ahirs and the Kurmis with 11. 83% and 8. 71% of total population respectively. These two castes have been the main peasant castes in the district. Through land settlement Acts of 1883 and 1889 the Ahirs and Kurmis received under-proprietary permanent rights on land. They became Pukhetadars and Dakhilkars (i. e. occupancy tenants). By 1901 these two castes possessed 4% of agricultural land under occupancy right. In addition they also cultivated land under temporary ownership granted by the zamindar.

The lower caste groups comprise as many as 23 castes with a population of 21. 06% of the Hindus. They include Dhobis, Faquirs, Lohars, Korias and Khatiks. These were functionary castes and were indirectly dependent upon agriculture.

The 'exterior' caste group consists of Badhiks, Bahelias, Bayars, Barwars, Chamars, Koris, Doms, Dausadhs, Mochis and Bhangis. Chamars are the most numerous caste in this group; they comprise 21. 6% of the Hindu population. In 1901, the Chamars had only 29 acres of land in the entire district. They have exclusively been land-tess labourers and serfs.


INDEPENDENCE AND THE RISE OF AGRARIAN MIDDLE CLASS

It is important to note that as in the rest of the country caste-wise distribution of land has been undergoing change also in Basti (Stokes 1970: 18-20). The beginnings of agrarian reforms can be traced during the later period of British rule. In fact agrarian reforms directed against the Rajput Maliks were initiated by the British themselves.

In order to exact more and more revenue the British brought a number of land settlement Acts in force in Basti which affected the traditional tenurial structure. These led to (a) the emergence of more zamindars and (b) the rise of occupancy tenants with same land rights from among the lower middle caste groups.

From 1801 to 1803 the revenue was based on the taluqdari system, wherein the Raja or the zamindar paid a lumpsum to the British government on behalf of their estates. In Basti this amount during 1801 to 1803 never exceeded Rs. 226660 in all. However, the same in 1859-1889-increased to 1284993 and 1991195 respectively (Government of India 1907: 114-23). This increase in revenue accrued through changes in land policy. The temporary land settlement of 1803, 1806 and 1809 reduced the revenue free areas under the possession of Rajputs and levied increased revenue taxes upon them with the result that "in some places the zamindars were beginning to quit their villages for the forest, threatening to eject by force any one who might till their land in their absence" (EVI 1907: 23).

It was, however, the fifth land settlement of 1842 that struck a serious blow upon the Rajas and Zamindars.

This land settlement delinked the birta-holders (grantees) from the Raja or Zamindars and transformed them into independent proprie -tors. Thus many Mahants (Brahmans) became Zamindars as reported also from other parts of Uttar Pradesh (Stokes 1970: 26).

The second offshot of the land settlement was the growth of a lower middle caste peasantry with occupancy rights in land. However, the 'tenants-at-will' continued to remain as an amorphous body of cultivators. The subsequent settlement of 1889 and 1929 went in favour of these "tenants-at-will" as they too received tenurial rights of superior proprietors. However, the inequality between the upper and the lower castes persisted.

Even in 1901 land disparity between the Rajputs and Brahman


S OURCE : (Government of India 1907: 88).

The agrarian changes initiated by the British gathered momentum after Independence. According to the Zamindari Abolition Committee (1948) the number of zamindars including Rajas and Mahants who had holdings above 50 acres in Basti was 873 immediately after Inde-pendence. The number of Zamindars having holdings over 25 acres was 21, 005. Out of the total of 572, 361 uneconomic holdings in Basti, the number of ex-zamindars was 113, 364 in number. The majority of Maliks and Mahants by the time of Zamindari Abolition had been reduced to the status of ordinary peasants (Government of India 1948: 390-91). These 113, 364 Zamindars required 828093 acres to render their holdings economic (Govern-ment of India 1948: 390-91).

The immediate consequences of the two processes indicated above were: (1) the increase in the number of zamindars and the growth of class solidarity among them on conservative lines; (2) the pauperisa-tion both of Zamindar 'Maliks' and 'Mahants'; (3) the emergence of a strong lower middle caste rich peasantry as a sequel to the paupe-risation of upper caste Zamindars. Though the causative factors lie deep in the pre-Independence period, the emergence of this peasantry is a post-Independence phenomenon.

Kurmis and Ahirs who came from lower middle caste groups possessed relatively more land in comparison to other lower castes (Government of India 1907: 76-77). They were the occupancy tenants and after the abolition of Zamindari they alone among the ex-tenants were entitled to purchase proprietary land rights.

Zamindars and the rest of the cultivating castes was quite pronounced in Basti as shown in Table 3.

TABLE—3 SHOWING LAND DISPARITY BY CASTE GROUPS IN 1907


In 1954 when the Zamindari system was abolished and a ceiling on holdings was fixed, the ex-Zamindars in Basti—though small in number, had as much as 1, 100, 905 acres of land as surplus (Government of India 1948: 320). This excess land was supposed to have been redistributed to those who had uneconomic holdings of land below 10 acres. Basti has as many as 572, 361 cultivators whose holdings are defined as uneconomic. In order to defeat the objective of land reforms the Zamindars took recourse to fictitious transfer of land. Field observations indicate the following types of transfers by ex-Zamindars with a view to retaining their excess landholding:

(a) Fictitious land transfer in the name of loyal tenants or distant relations.

(b) Transfer of land in the name of trusts like schools, temples or pathsalas which are mostly non-existent or in cases where they exist their manager or president is the ex-Zamindar him-self. He reaps the harvest of the field attached to such institutions and also draws annual grant of cash from the government for himself on behalf of such ghost institutions as schools of various standards and grades.

(c) Conversion of the agricultural land into grove on which ceiling was not applied initially.

(d) Transferring the land in the name of any tenant and taking loan from government or bank by mortgaging the land on behalf of such tenant.

(e) Fictitious partition and divorce in the family.

The land retained under (a), (b), (c) and (e) have been only tem-porary arrangements as the price of land had fallen in the market. Zamindars wanted to have a pause and assess the situation. Sub-sequently legal sale on a large scale took place in Basti.

In the land market, generally Maliks and Mahants were the sellers and the Kurmis and the Ahirs were the purchasers. They were the ones who had the highest potential for expanding their farm land and were prepared to give maximum price to the ex-Zamindars. Three factors were responsible for increasing the purchase capacity of these two castes. (1) As compared to other castes Kurmis and Ahirs have large-sized families. Having more than a hundred men and women under one roof and dining in one kitchen


in a Kurmi and Ahir family is not a rare phenomenon in Basti. (2) The surplus manpower of these two castes migrates to cities like Bombay, Calcutta and Kanpur. They are usually engaged in coal business. The propensity to save their cash earnings is high as the workers always leave the children and wife in the joint family at home. The earning is regularly sent back to the head of the family in the village. (3) Being agricultural castes, Kurmis and Ahirs are hard working and have no ta boos on manual labour. Most members of the family work in the fields. This increases their saving potential in comparison to high caste Rajput and Brahman farmers who always hire labour from outside to work on their farms.

These factors enable these two castes to be in a better position to purchase land from the ex-Zamindars in Basti. The new rich of post-Independence Basti is called Mahton in the village community and participates as an equal of Malik and Mahant. Thorner has seen the "Havelis" of western U. P. zamindars but not the 'Kothis' of 'Bhumidhar' Mahatons of Basti. One of the major developments after Independence is the rise of these intermediate castes into great prominence in the land and power structure which has been sharply highlighted by Joshi's study (Joshi 1970: 152). While Maliks and Mahants collected large amount of money to mechanise their farm by sale of land, the Kurmis and Ahirs have done the same by purchasing their land and accumulating more money for investment in the mechanisation of farm. Basti is also witnessing a 'Green-revolution' but this is confined to the farms of only three classes of people, i. e. Maliks, Mahants and the Mahton Bhumidhars. All the three are the products of an agrarian trans formation initiated under British rule and carried forward after Independence.

A census of agricultural machines like the use of tractors and tube-wells by caste carried out in the course of field study would confirm the above observations (Table —4).

It should be remembered that the ownership of a tractor itself is an indicator of the ownership of large holdings. Those who have smaller holding do their tilling by wooden ploughs. These facts further confirm that apart from the Maliks and Mahants who are ex-Zamindars, there has emerged a new class of rich peasants from the ex-tenant classes of the Kurmis and Ahirs, who have now raised themselves up to the level of ex-Zamindars in land holdings as


NOTE: Only those tube-wells are counted which were privately installed by the

cultivators. These do not include the governments' electrically operated tube-wells.

Bhumidar and have come to exert a strong pressure as a 'new rich class' upon the agrarian processes of Basti. Being clan Hindu castes just below the twice born, these "new rich" groups in the villages are a conservative force and attempt to identify themselves more with the traditional Malik than with the landless labourers Mahton is the new element in the agrarian structure and its role in promoting or resisting a peasant movement after its rise to influence and power needs to be analysed.

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION FOR LAND-GRAB

The district we have described so far is not a territorial isolate. Social tremors in one part of the country are transmitted to another part. What followed in Basti after 9th August, 1970 was the outcome of a long preparatory work in political agitation and struggle. This operated in the district in two ways,

(A) Basti is connected with the State and the country through a chain of communication net-works which keep it in touch with events and happenings in the wider community. While the English newspapers are confined to upper caste educated families and government officers, the Hindi dailies are widely read and circulate d by village Pradhans and Panchayat functionaries. The school teachers, village level workers, barbers and the tailors are the main disseminators and carriers of news, information and rumours in the

TABLE — 4 SHOWING THE POSSESSION OF CULTIVATING TRACTORS AND

TUBE-WELLS BY CASTE AND CLASS IN BASTI 1970


countryside. Almost all the primary schools and each of the Block Development Offices, subscribe to Hindi dailies like "Aaj" and "Saptahik Hindustan". Transistors and radios are another powerful source of news and information. These communication channels have been spreading the news of not only Naxalite terror and violence but also the inflammatory speeches of leftist leaders at State and national levels.

(B) Apart from the mass media of communications, thousands of labourers of Basti who work in the Jute and Cotton Mills of Calcutta and other cities like Bombay and Kanpur not only bring cash and domestic articles like umbrella, pairs of shoes and clothings to their respective families and the villages but also a box-load of the ideologies of unionisation, agitation, strike, Bundhs and other tech-niques of struggle. They introduce not only the concepts like "party", "organisation", "membership" and "kisan sabha" but also the notion of "rights" and "demands" into the vocabulary of the villagers4. The communication between the city and village through induction of rural manpower in urban industrial centres and their exposure to radical ideologies in the labour movement tend to shape a "political being" out of the passive peasant. On his return to his native village this "political being" is the agent of politicisation of the countryside. However, the main ground work for agitation and struggle was carried out by Leftist leaders of C. P. I., C. P. M. and S. S. P. through a series of inflammatory speeches in meetings and demonstrations organised in almost all the tehsils of the districts. The concerted efforts of Leftist leaders started from June 1970.

We present below certain case studies which would help to por tray the sequence of events relating to the land grab movement. Between June and the first week of August 1970 there were twenty such meetings in the district which were widely attended.

Case No. 1

On 13th June, the Chairman of the Basti District Committee of C. P. I, addressed a meeting at village Khunwa near the Nepal border post in tehsil Naugarha. He exhorted a gathering of about 500 Chamars, Bhars, Pasi, Lunia and Muslim peasants to attack the farm of one Rajput Raja of this tehsil. He suggested that other big landholders from the Kurmi and Ahir castes should also be attacked. The audience was advised to practise the following techniques to


bring about gradual financial decline of the big landholders: (1) To abstain from work on the farms of big landlords on the

current wage rate so that the paddy crop of these farmers remains unharvested;

(2) If 'sitting idle' is not feasible, then he advised them to demand at least Rs. 5/- per day as wage; and

(3) To cheat the farmer by 'going slow' on the farm operations of the paddy crop. They were advised to wait for the 'historic day' and be ready to s trike at the 'exploiter' at the orders of the leaders. Slogans were raised and a few landholders of the locality were named as the 'enemies of the poor'.

Case No. 2

IN the last week of June an S. S. P. leader of all-India fame belonging to Eastern Uttar Pradesh presided over a gathering of about 700 peasants and sugar mill workers of Khalelabad. He not only advised them to forcibly occupy the land of big holders and farmers but asked them also to loot the properties of businessmen of Vaishaya castes who were supporters of local rightist leaders of Jan Sangh and Swantantra parties and also of Congress leaders all belonging to the upper caste. ''Businessmen and political leaders" he said, "have amassed riches through exploitation of poor peasants and the use of corrupt practices". In his view "Government has failed to ensure even two meals and shelter to poor peasants". He argued that "peasants themselves have to improve their lot by resorting to violence". Like the C. P. I. Chairman in Case 1 he also asked the audience to wait for the date of launching of a violent movement.

Case No. 3

An educated ex-zamindar of Harriya Tehsil belonging to the Socia -list Party carried out systematically a hectic programme of meetings in the Harriya Tehsil. From the 15th June to 26th July he held regular meetings. He covered every tenth village of the Tehsil. His meetings were mostly attended by Chamars and Muslims. Unlike other leaders, this socialist leader laid much emphasis on enlisting volunteers for the participation in the agitational programmes to be launched at different places. He also advocated the use of force to bring economic equality to the villages. He repeated the four -point


plan suggested by the C. P. I. Chairman to the villagers in order to sabotage the paddy-sowing operations of the big farmers of the tehsil.

Case No. 4

A Brahmin ex-Zamindar of Khalelabad tehsil belonging to C. P. M. held a meeting at the border village of Naugarha on July 25th. He told the villagers about the Naxalbari movement and about violence against the big landholders. He emphasized that all the oppressed peasants should follow the example set by the Naxalbari peasants as "revolution and violence are the only means by which the masses can ensure their survival". This meeting was attended mainly by Chamars, Bhars, Pasis and Muslims. He re-echoed the names of a few Rajput and Kurmi families to be 'purged' by the peasants. He recommended looting, killing and use of arms against all those who oppose the "historic mission" of peasants. The meeting ended with a pro-China slogan and salute to Mao.

Case No. 5

In the last week of July an attempt was made by leftist leaders to involve the Muslim population of Basti more closely in the move ment. For this purpose the local C. P I., C. P. M., S. S. P. and P. S. P. leaders brought a Muslim who is a highly influentia l leader of C. P. I, and maintains connection with the Muslim Majlis in Uttar Pradesh. The muslim population, being in minority, is very well informed, politically most conscious and organised. A curious blend of sectarianism and leftism emerged as a result of the involvement of this Muslim leader in Basti affairs. Muslim population got united at the appeal of the Muslim Majlis. But the sectarian basis of Muslim solidarity did not offer obstacle to their equally strong affiliation with the C. P. I, and C. P. M. Actually under the influence of the C. P. I. Muslim leader the gap between the Majlis ideology and secular leftist political parties evaporated from the minds of the Muslim population. Sectarianism and leftism became synonyms with each other in Basti. This leader presided over several meetings at Naugarha tehsil where he was followed by a number of local Muslim leaders like an ex-defeated M. L. A., the Muslim leader of Barhani village in Naugarha and the Chairman of Khalelabad Wea-


vers Association. In a meeting on 28th July at village Dudhaunia these leaders raised the slogan of "Muslim Harijan Bhai Bhai, Hindu Jati Kahan Se Aai". (Chamars and Muslims are brothers and from where did the Hindu castes come into existence?) The Chairman of the Weavers Association assured the people that weaver Muslims are one organised body and would follow any instruction given by the leaders. The ideology of Muslim Majlis was also defended. The over-all advice of these Muslim leaders was that all the Muslims should unite as their 'Mazhab' (religion) was in danger and support poor peasants to abolish big farmers, big businessmen and other rich people of the district. Communal solidarity was the essence of movement at this stage.

Most of the participants in the meeting were Muslims and lower caste Hindus like Lodh, Arakh, Lunia, Bhars and Chamars. These caste groups constitute the majority of landless agricultural labourers. The Muslim peasants, in comparison to lower and exterior Hindu castes have better economic conditions but because of their ambi-valent political identity they have shown more active participation in the peasant agitation in Basti.

The 20 scheduled meetings that took place between June and the first week of August were presided over in 15 cases by local leftist leaders. Ten of the local leaders come from Brahman families of ex-zamindar class and have a landholding of five acres and below. They are all educated and fall in the age -group of 40 to 55. The Rajput leaders, too, come from the same economic and educational background. However, their age group is lower than that of former. Only one is above 60 in age.

CASES OF REVOLT AND VIOLENCE

The intensive political activities of leftist parties including a secta-rian party like Muslim Majlis among the Muslims and the lower caste peasants of Basti resulted in a series of forceful and violent attempts for land-grab. The organised attack against the land and property of richer land holders started from 9th August. The attempts in most of the cases were violent and organised. However, in a few cases, they ended up by demonstration of threatening postures at the boundary of the land to be grabbed. The list of landholders whose farms were to be forcefully occupied included not only the names of upper caste ex-zamindar Rajputs and Brahmans but also


that of the emerging middle class peasants of Kurmis and Ahirs. The sharp polarization of 'haves' and 'have -nots', could not take

place as a large number of landless exterior castes like Chamar 'Goriats' and 'Bhataits' kept intact their primordial loyalties to the bigger landholders on whose farms they have been working for generations. The traditional Jajmani relation of these Goriats and Bhatiats8 with the families of the landholders continued to exist and in most of the instances they leaked inside information of the plan and strategies of the movement. The continued flow of information allowed the landlords to have appropriate precaution and defence.

In all 19 attempts for land-grab were made in Basti during the month of August. A few cases are presented below.

Case No. 1

In Naugraha Tehsil on 9th August about twenty farm labourers of a highly influential and locally rich ex-Zamindar of Rajput caste were working on paddy operations on his farm. One Mr. K of the Brahman caste from the neighbouring village, followed and supported by fifty agitated land-grabbers, attempted to pitch their red flag at the centre of the farm. They tried to forcefully eject the working labourers from the field. The followers of Mr. K were resisted by the landless labourers. A violent lathi attack was made in the course of which the Brahman grabber received serious head and limb injuries. His followers also suffered stick wounds. The local grabbers dispersed and hid themselves in different villages. However Mr. K and his outside followers were arrested by the police. This event took place at Shohratgraha in the Naugarha Tehsil.

Case No. 2

On 13th August, infuriated by their defeat in the attempt of grabbing the land of the Rajput ex-zamindar, the leftist leaders and the land-grab volunteers launched an organised attack an the Chatera farm owned by the relative of the landlord of Shoratgraha. A brigade of about 50 volunteers of lower-caste Chamars, Pasis, Bhars and the Muslims of the neighbouring villages supported by the same number of persons from the adjoining district of Gorakhpur and led by a woman leader—a member of the National Committee


of S. S. P. of India—attempted the land-grab. They were armed with lathis, and other weapons. The landlord was also prepared to defend the farm irrespective of the consequences of the encounter. He had deputed about two hundred lathi-armed men to beat back the agitators. Danger of extreme violence was imminent. The marching grabbers were arrested before they reached the farm of the landlord by a strong contingent of the armed police. One more unsuccessful attempt by the grabbers took place in the Naugarha Tehsil against the kin of the first landlord. A few agitators who had reached the farm ahead of their group were beaten up by the landlords and subsequently handed over to the police for arrest. However tension kept on mounting.

On 21st August'70 the Ahir Sirwar who was taken by the agitators to be instrumental in foiling their land-grab attempts was surrounded by local Chamars and Muslim grabbers and their guest volunteers from Gorakhpur district. The Ahir Sirwar raised a cry for help from Hindu population to protect him from the assault of Muslims and Chamars. The land-grab movement which was so far a secular peasant movement now took a communal turn. All the Ahirs, Kurmis, Rajputs and Brahmans of the area jointly made an attack upon the grabbers in which one local Chamar and a few Mus lim grabbers were seriously injured. Upper and middle caste Hindus of the locality joined against the Muslims and Chamars. This confrontation on communal lines created the danger of communal riot. The timely intervention of the police controlled a rather very explo sive situation in Naugarha Tehsil at that time.

Case No. 3

The third land-grab attempt was made with a strength of about a hundred land-hungry people. The leader was an ex-Zamindar Rajput having a small landholding. He along with his followers attacked a Kurmi Mahton of Birdpur area in Naugarha Tehsil, while the latter was supervising the paddy plantation. Half of the grabbers tried to molest Mahton's farm labourers as well as to damage his motor tractor and the other half tried to kidnap his son. The Kurmis abound in that locality as a caste group and after getting a call for help hit back at the grabbers and inflicted serious injuries upon them. Since Ahirs are also in strength in the locality holding considerable land as tillers along with the Kurmis, they


collaborated with the Kurmis in routing out the grabbers from the area. The emergence of communal spirit, which first sparked at Chatera-farm case, generated unity among the upper, middle and lower middle caste Hindus. Their unity added to the strength of the big farmers who are mostly from castes like Rajputs, Brahmans, Kurmis and Ahirs. By the first week of September, Naugarha Tehsil was cleared of all agitators and volunteers.

Case No. 4

While the Naugarha Tehsil was the centre of peasant conflict, there were land-grab conflicts even in other tehsils. In Basti Tehsil on 14th August a Rajput ex-Zamindar was threatened by the grabbers. The Rajput farmer is from a traditionally influential family of the district and commands high respect from all the sections of the village population in his area. Still few Chamar and Bhar families supported the agitators which were sent from other districts and tehsils of Basti by the leftist leaders and planned to grab his farm near Rudhauli village. But the landlord unity of clean caste Hindus of neighbouring villages against grabbers from the Muslims and exterior castes made it a formidable task to launch any further attack. Consequently the land-grab attempt was withdrawn.

Similar failure in land-grabbing attempts was noticed in the Domariaganj Tehsil. It was directed against an ex-zamindar of Rajput caste from Naukhoria village. His farm was to be grabbed by the lower caste landless labourers with the help of outside volunteers. Local and outside volunteers gathered at the nearby village on the 19th August to chalk out the strategy of land-grab. But their gathering at the outskirt of the village itself was resented by the clean caste villagers of Naukhoria. The ex-zamindar, far from being on the defensive, launched a surprise attack with the help of his men and well-wishers and routed out the brigands from the area. Some of the lower-caste members who were in sympathy with the grabbing plan were beaten by caste Hindus.

ANALYSIS

Having presented the empirical material relating to the agrarian social structure in Section I and to the cases of land grab movement in Section II we shall try to analyse the causes and the consequences of


the land grab movement in this section. We shall also try to evaluate how far this movement can be analysed in terms of the general framework of class or caste. Our attempt here is to analyse the rise and fall of the landgrab movement in Basti with reference to the objective and the subjective prerequisites of a peasant movement.

Let us first begin with the question of the objective prerequisites of a peasant revolution. If the existence of class polarisation is one of the essential conditions favourable to a peasant revolution, it must be pointed out that the historical trend of economic evolution in Basti was not in the direction of accentuation of polarisation but of erosion of such polarisation. As pointed by us in Section I, the direction of British agrarian policy in the course of a century and a half was not towards greater and greater concentration of land among the Malik-Rajputs but, towards a certain degree of diffusion of land ownership from the Malik-Rajputs towards the Mahant-Brahmans. After 1942 land settlement in Basti 3. 12% of Malik-Rajputs yielded place to 11. 31% of Mahant-Brahmans. With the emergence of the latter as the new Zamindars, what occurred was a certain broadening rather than narrowing of the base of land ownership. This process was accelerated after the advent of Independence with the abolition of Zamindari tenures, the introduction of tenancy reforms and the imposition of ceiling on land hold ings. In fact the Basti data shows three identifiable structural processes which led more and more towards decentralization rather than towards concentration of land. These processes are: firstly, the pauperisation of traditional Rajput Maliks and the emergence of Brahman Mahants in the mid-19th century Basti; secondly, corrosion and curtailment of the land rights of Maliks and Mahants in favour of a secure landed peasantry during the later period of the British rule; and finally, the emergence and rise of a rich agrarian middle class of Kurmis and Ahirs in the post-Independence period as the Mahtons of Basti. Actually the last process is the one which seems to confirm the hypothesis of the rise of an "intermediate" class offered by Joshi in his analysis of agrarian change in India and Pakistan (Joshi 1970-6: 152).

Before we proceed further, let us briefly refer to "class" as an explanatory framework for study of peasant society as suggested by some scholars (Beteille 1974: 126). After examining the Basti situation I find the inadequacy of class as well as caste. The agrarian society in Basti conforms neither to a class nor to a caste model.


Class and caste are found to overlap and interpenetrate into each other at one time, and to bifurcate from each other at another.

In the traditional agrarian social structure Zamindars as opposed to tenants were inseparable from the hierarchy of caste. The Rajput Maliks and Brahman Mahants constituted the Zamindars at one end and the rest of castes constituted the tenants at another end. Caste also generated a "culture of inequality" on the basis of which the demand for equality amounted to deviance. In order to remain within the defined social structure and to conform to given norms of interpersonal relation one had to accept inequality as "given". Hence to infer class dichotomies and conflicts from the very fact of the existence of inequality is wrong in so far as such inference does not take note of caste which moulded the subjective perceptions of persons forming part of the agrarian system. In caste society the fact of inequality was not perceived as inequality or as "exploita tion" of the landless by the the landed castes. Moreover, the rise of a new class of landowners from Kurmis and Ahirs also shows that caste society did not have a rigid class division; there was mobility from lower to the higher levels and also from higher to the lower levels. Further, not all upper castes were rich nor were all lower castes poor. At the time of Zamindari Abolition, Basti had as many as 113, 364 ex-Zamindars whose land-holdings were so small that about 828, 093 acres of land were required to make them economic. And most of these poor Zamindars were the Rajputs and Brahmans. There also existed multiple kinship and clan ties between the rich and poor Rajput and Brahman ex-Zamindars regardless of their economic differentiation. The consciousness of "be longing together" as reflected and re-enforced by common rit uals relating to birth, marriage, death and crisis did not allow class solidarity to develop on the basis of conflict of economic interests. The poor Zamindar identified himself with the Zamindar rather than with poor peasants.

Further, to say that in Basti the rich were getting richer and the poor poorer is to make a statement contrary to facts. The process has been the reverse one. Land has always passed from the hands of few into the hands of many. The apex of the class pyramid has been caving in from the inside and as a result enough room has been provided for groups of lower caste/class segments to move upward

It is clear that the objective conditions of a peasant revolution


in terms of an agrarian society polarised between a powerful landed class and a land-hungry peasantry are not present in their pure form in the Basti district. The existence of land-hungry and poverty-stricken peasant masses at one end does not necessarily denote the existence of a landlord class monopolising all land and power. There is widespread poverty which, no doubt, causes mass discontent and unrest and such is the overall scarcity of land and such are also the peculiarities of the agrarian social structure that this discontent and unrest does not provide the objective basis of a sustained revolutionary ferment. It may provide the basis for occasional outbreaks of peasant unrest as in the form of the land-grab movement.

Let us now shift to an analysis of the subjective factors of agrarian social situation. What were the subjective factors favouring the land-grab movement?

It is important to note that even when necessary objective condi-tions to produce and sustain peasant revolts may not be present, a change in the subjective perception of injustice, exploitation and poverty may provide the basis of peasant mobilisation for a partial revolt. Populism, demagogy and radical ideological postures have been resorted to not only by opposition parties; the ruling Congress leadership has also resorted to them in the course of its power struggle.

The peasantry in India is a vote bank. Political parties must have some issues to attract the masses to their side. The issue of "land to the tiller" has been kept alive for this purpose.

The legitimacy provided to elimination of land disparity by the ruling party permits the leftist parties also to arouse not only un-realisable aspirations among the peasantry as observed by Oommen (1971: 264) but to stir up conflict and oppositions also. Consequently, the observation made by Beteille "that class consciousness not only emerges from below out of awareness of their similar material conditions but it can be shaped from above by the leaders of a political movement or a party" proved to be one of the most significant contributory factors for the land-grab movement in Basti. The intensive political socialization of the masses in agita tion and struggle carried out by local and non-local leaders of C. P. M., C. P. I., and S. S. P. by holding meetings, making provocative speeches and raising inflammatory slogans against the rich farmers did stimulate the land-hungry Chamars, Pasis, Arakh, and Lodh communities and castes to unite for a common cause.


The participation of Muslim Majlis—a sectarian party, in favour of the lower castes and against the clean Hindu castes in the movement added strength to it by pushing the Muslim population to join hands with the lower castes. Even religious differences were temporarily set aside by them. Reference may be made about the role of migrant villagers who work in the factories and indus tries of Bombay, Calcutta and Kanpur and get exposed to the norms and style of the trade union movement. When they visit their native villagers they bring agitational ideologies. In many cases the leadership of the movement at the village level was provided by the politicalised migrants who had returned to their villages.

The Basti movement also disproves the suggestion that the Indian peasantry suffers from passivity, over tolerance, immobility or such other traits which are identified by Dumont as constituting 'Indian-ity' of the peasants. Yogendra Singh's study of a village Chanukhera in Basti also confirms the fact that given meaningful goals, the peasantry can resort to resistance and rebellion (Singh 1970: 258). It is also important to note that the poor but educated high caste Brahmans and Rajputs also associated themselves with the agitation against their own clan and kin people. Here caste loyalties did not prove to be overriding. Moreover the fact that they supported the Muslims and lower caste and class Hindu was also a significant one.

We now turn to the factors responsible for the termination of the movement. Hobsbawm's observation that the "potential power of the peasantry is enormous but its actual power and influence are much more limited" (Hobsbawm 1773: 12), was suggested with reference to macro-level peasant politics. It seems to be true in case of micro-level politics also. While a loosely articulated sense of peasant "classness" as Shanin points out (Shanin 1971: 243) or "peasant consciousness" as Hobsbawm suggests (Hobsbawm 1973: 7) put serious limits on the success of peasant movement in general, there developed some responsive and emergent structural factors that are the characteristics of Indian peasantry alone.

As illustrated by caste studies, land-grab was mounted not only against the ex-Raja and Zamindar Rajputs but Kurmis were also threatened by the grabbers. Since Kurmis and Ahirs as new rich peasants tend to align more with the traditional Maliks and Mahants of Basti, all these together united in defence of their interests. These four castes are dominant in terms of economic, numerical


and political power in Basti. Here "class" as an unifying force was not manifest. Unity of the dominant castes was apparently based upon the dichotomy of clean and unclean castes. The unity became more effective under the threat of the land grab. These dominant castes exploited all along what Alavi calls "primordial loyalties" (Alavi 1973: 61-62) of the Chamar, Goriats and Bhataits and of their own kin and clan members who were in the opposite camp. Primordial loyalties and caste loyalties transcended the class situation. This enabled the big farmers to defeat the grabbers everywhere.

Finally, what in the long run proved to be the greatest weakness of the movement was that lower castes and classes ha d no leaders of their own, or from their own locality. As soon as local Brahman and Rajput leaders broke away from them or alien agents deserted, the grabbers were thrown on the defensive.

The most crucial factor that gave a death blow to the movement was the development of sectarianism. The active support of the Muslim community given to the Chamars and the participation of Muslim leaders of the C. P. I, and the Muslim Majlis created the danger of a communal riot. The slogan raised by the grabbers was: "Muslim Harijan Bhai Bhai, Hindu Jati Kahan Se Aai'' (Muslims and Chamars are brothers and where did Hindus come from?). The entire Hindu community was inflamed by this slogan. The land grab appeared to the Hindus as a conspiracy of Muslims to exploit the Cha mars and thus humiliate the Hindus of Basti. Not only Rajputs, Brahmans, Kurmis, Ahirs and rest of the neutral cases like Bania and Kayastha etc. got united but even those castes that were with the Chamar grabbers like Arakh, Pasi and Lodhs left the scene of revolt and started rebelling against the Chamars and the Muslims. Government action against the grabbers and their subsequent large scale arrests caused complete panic and disintegration among the grabbers. And this decisive government intervention against the grabbers put an end to whatever had remained of the movement.

NOTES

1. Thanks are due to P. C. Joshi and to Andre Beteille for their comments and suggestions which helped in the revision of the paper. They also provided me relevant literature on this problem for my use. The field material presented here is a part of data collected for my Ph. D. dissertation. The data on 'Land Grab' was collected during May to September 1970 when it was in operation in Basti.

2. In an earlier book in Hindi Joshi gives a trichotomous division of classes in Indian


villages (Joshi 1966: 48) They are big landlords and landholders who received the land directly from the State; peasants of small land-holdings who had the proprietary right over land but because of smallness of holding could not develop; and finally the poor tillers who either remain as the tenant of land proprietors or are engaged in share-cropping and suffer from insecurity and oppression.

3. A comprehensive geneological study of all the Rajput clans and their history can be found in T Morgan compiled, Manual of Title Holders, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Allahabad, 1901.

4. A labourer of Arakh caste from Domanaganj who was the union leader in a Calcutta mill became the leader of Land-Grab Movement in the village.

5. Goriats and Bhataits are traditional Chamar employees of relatively permanent nature who work on the farms of high caste Hindu ex-Zamindars, and, instead of being paid on the basis of daily or monthly wages, they receive one sixth share from all the crops grown on the said farms This is a traditional system of labour hiring which still continues to function in Basti

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1973. Socialism and Development London: Andre Deulsch. Gough, Kathleen 1968-69. Peasant Resistance and Revolt in South India, Pacific Affairs, 41 Hobsbawm, Eric 1959 Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels. Illinois Glencoe Free Press.

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____1971b Agricultural Policy Seminar, July ____ 1971c. A Survey of Research on Land Reform in India Part I, Delhi. I. C S S R. ___ 1973a Implementation Lag in Land Reform and How to Overcome it, August (A revised version of an article prepared for August 15th, 1973 issue of the Weekly NewWave). ____ 1973b The Root of the Crisis, Basic Issues (Mimeographed version repro duced from Times of India, August, 22 & 23 with minor changes). ____ 1974. Indian Marxism Seminar, June


Kotovsky, Gregory. 1964 Agrarian Reform m India. Delhi: People's Publishing House. Ladejinsky, Wolf 1965 A Study of Tenurial Conditions in Package Districts. Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission Moore Jr, Banngton 1967 Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy Boston: Beacon Press. Oommen, T K. 1971 Agrarian Tensions in a Kerala District: An Analysis Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, 7. Sen, Bhawani 1962 Evolution of Agrarian Relations in India. Delhi: People's Publishing House. Shah, S A and Kathleen, Gough 1969. Class and Agrarian Change: Some Comments on Peasant-Resistance and Revolt in India Pacific Affairs, 42 Singh, Yogendra 1970 "Chanukhera Cultural Change in Uttar Pradesh" in Change and Continuity in Indian Tradition Edited by K Ishawaran, New York and London: Columbia University Press. Stokes, Eric 1970 Traditional Elites in the Great Rebellion of 1857: Some Aspects of Rural Revolts in the Upper and Central Doab Elites in South Asia. Edited by Edmund Leach and S N Mukerjee, London. Cambridge University Press. Thorner, Daniel 1964 Agrarian Prospects in India Delhi; Delhi University Press. Worsely, Peter 1964 Third World London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Government of India 1907 District Gazetteer of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Vol 32 Allahabad. Supdt of Printing and Stationary ____ 1931 Census of India United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. 17(2) Allahabad:

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