Agricultural development and impeded growth:

the case of Hungary 1870–1970

Michael Kopsidis

Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO)

Theodor- Lieser-Strasse 2

06120 Halle (Saale)

Germany

kopsidis@iamo.de

Preliminary draft chapter for Agriculture and Economic Development in Europe since 1870,

edited by Pedro Lains and Vicente Pinilla

IEHC 2006 Helsinki Session 60

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1. Introduction

Until the Second World War agriculture constituted Hungary’s largest economic sector, and

structural transformation from an agricultural to an industrial country proceeded slowly.

Starting at the end of the 1870s, it took nearly a century for agriculture’s proportion of

national product to fall from around 75% to just below 20% in 1970/74 (table 1). During the

seven decades of ca. 1895–1965, Hungary’s structural transformation proceeded under the

condition of poor agricultural growth or stagnation. In addition, industry was not able to

compensate for the poor performance of agriculture until the Second World War.

Explanations for the structural weakness of Hungarian agriculture concentrates on adverse

macroeconomic or political developments, i.e., “external shocks”: the dissolution of the

Austrian-Hungarian Customs Union in 1918 as a result of the break-up of the Habsburg

Empire, extremely unfavourable developments on agricultural world markets during the inter-

war-period and the Soviet rule of Hungary after 1945.

But concentrating only on external shocks implicitly means that developments within

Hungary’s biggest sector did not affect its economy. In contrast, modern development

economics suggests that agricultural land and labour relations have to be considered when

explaining economic growth in a less-developed agrarian country like Hungary. Both

agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction is difficult when faced with the bimodal

unequal distribution of land characterised by the so-called dual structure of a few latifundias

and a mass of tiny peasant holdings. Findings from development economics substantiate the

idea that due to a lack of competitiveness with the smallholder sector, large Junker (wage)

estates created an unstable form of production relations which demanded intensive lobbying

for protection and systematic discrimination of the more efficient peasant family farms via

control of the state and society by the landed aristocracy [H. P. Binswanger et al., 1995, 2686,

H.P. Binswanger, M. Rosenzweig, 1986, N. L. Johnson, V.M. Ruttan, 1994, B.F. Johnston, P.

Kilby, 1975, M. Lipton, 1989]. This is especially true for the type of pre-industrial, non-

mechanised agriculture with very limited economies of scale and high transaction cost of non-

family labour, which existed in Hungary before the 1960s. The maintenance of such an

inefficient dual farm structure would significantly slow down agricultural growth.

Furthermore, experience has shown that a dual structure is rather inappropriate for adjusting

to structural changes or exogenous shocks.

Until the Second World War, due to the high concentration of landownership Hungary has

often been referred to as “the quintessential home of a landed aristocracy” [S. M. Eddie, 1989,

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Table 1. Structural Change from 1870–1980

Year Agricultural

labour force

(in 1,000)

Share of agri-

culture in total

labour force

Share of agri-

culture in the

national product

Share of agri-

cultural

products

in all exports*

Kingdom of Hungary

1870 5,015 70.0–75.0% ca. 75% --

1910 5,601 60.0–65.0% #43–62% 74.6

Hungary after the Trianon Peace Treaty

1920 2,128 58.3% +32.0% +80.4

1938 -- -- 34.0% 65.3

1949 2,191 55.2% 27.0% 39.2

1960 1,843 38.9% 21.0% 22.1

1970 1,223 26.4% 18.0% 23.0

1980 1,116 22,0% 14.0% 22.4

Notes: B.R. MITCHELL, 2003, 151, 931, T. KOLOSSA, 1965, 141–142, 931, S.M. EDDIE, 1968,

209–212, 1977, table A5, I.T. BEREND, G. RÁNKI, 1970, 15, 1985, 16, 23, L. KATUS, 1970,

110, F. V. FELLNER, 1916, 594, P. GUNST, 1981, 407–408, #M.-S. SCHULZE (2000, 338)

calculated nearly unchanged shares of only around 48% for 1870 and 1910, S. EDDIE, 1977,

337, I.T. BEREND, G. RÁNKI, 1985, 278, *agricultural exports includes processed food, +1924.

249]. Analysing Hungary’s agricultural development using new development economics

improves our understanding of the structural deficiencies of Hungarian agriculture by

highlighting systematically important topics which have thus far been unexplored.

Furthermore, it helps to explain why Hungary’s agricultural crisis continued over seven

decades despite all the fundamental political and economic changes that occurred. Past

research has already intensively analysed the relationship between rural poverty and the

pronounced dual structure of Hungarian agriculture. In addition, impediments to agricultural

growth brought about by preserving extensive large estate farming at the costs of much more

intensive peasant farming have been observed by scholars [S. M. Eddie, 1968, P. Gunst, 1981,

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401]. However, thoroughly analysing the causes of the growth-reducing effects or

inefficiencies of large estates was often beyond scholarly imagination. By adhering to a Neo-

Marxist or “Weberian” version of “agrarian fundamentalism” [R. C. Allen, 1992, 1-2]

Hungarian scholars especially still saw large estates as the best engine for “capitalist”

agricultural growth, and considered small-scale peasant farming, in principal, to be backward

and not fit for capitalist agriculture. According to this view, the prime cause of rural poverty

and stagnating growth was not the extremely unequal distribution of land property, but the

inability of the dynamic but too small industrial sector to absorb the fast increasing rural

population [P. Gunst, 1998, 1–5, 125–175]. Until now it has not been systematically

examined how the enforced prevalence of large, if not mammoth, estates as an inefficient

farm type negatively affected Hungarian agricultural growth between 1850 and 1940 and

afterwards.

During the last third of the 19th century, even in East European countries with powerful

landed aristocracies and large estates such as the Tsarist Empire, peasants significantly

augmented their share of land either by buying or renting [H.-D. Löwe, 1987, 101-110].

However, Hungarian large estates held if not strengthened their position as production units,

whereas many European regions saw the rise of the family farm in connection with the

gradual disappearance of large-scale, wage-labour based farming [J. L. van Zanden, 1991,

216, N. Koning, 1994, esp. 25-29]. The consolidation of large, centrally-operated estates in

Hungary before 1914 was unique in Europe, aside from some less-developed parts of

Southern Europe [F. DOVRING, 1965, 240].

This contribution searches for the causes of the long-lasting structural crisis of Hungarian

agriculture from ca. 1895 to 1965. Besides the important and changing exogenous factors, the

sector-immanent endogenous factors should be considered properly when explaining this kind

of path-dependency. Two reasons are important to concentrate on during the decades prior to

the First World War. First, Hungary’s dual agricultural structure fully developed during this

time. Second, during the “long 19th century” agriculture played a central role in Hungary, not

only for the acceleration of economic development, but for its industrial revolution as well.

It will be shown that during the so-called grain invasion [ K. O’Rouke, J. G. Williamson,

1997] the dual structure of Hungarian agriculture made it much more difficult to react to

adverse developments on international commodity markets without slowing down agricultural

growth and thus increasing rural poverty. As will be demonstrated, despite vigorous rural

population growth, the pressure on large estates to practice extensive grain cultivation, and

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their inability to leave the unprofitable grain sector, significantly reduced the capability of

Hungarian agriculture to absorb labour. In other words, is was not only the low capability of

the small Hungarian industrial sector to employ the growing rural population that was

responsible for the spread of rural poverty after 1890. In fact, the dual structure reduced the

ability of agriculture, which was by far the largest sector of the Hungarian economy, to absorb

population growth and maintain agricultural growth by employing all factors within the

sector.

According to modern development economics, peasant agriculture is much better able to

simultaneously absorb labour and ensure high rates of agricultural growth. This was

especially true for Hungary, whose agricultural boom after 1870/75 proceeded as a very

labour-intensive pre-industrial “Boserupian growth process.” As will be shown, particularly

during such a process, discrimination of the peasant sector has strong negative effects on

agricultural growth.

The following two chapters analyse how the dual structure of Hungarian agriculture

aggravated, until 1940, the negative effects of adverse developments on international markets.

Chapter four deals with the period after 1945, which faced the same structural problems upon

other terms. The fifth chapter presents the conclusions.

2. Agricultural development until 1914: from outstandingly dynamic to

structural crisis

In 1867, the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary together formed the Habsburg

Empire, which comprised most parts of Central and large parts of Southeast Europe [I.

Romsics, 1999, 11–17].1 In 1910, 20.9 mio of its 49.5 mio inhabitants lived in the Hungarian

portion of the Empire, and 28.6 mio in the Austrian portion [T. Kolossa, 1965, 137]. Around

1865/70, Hungary’s economy was predominately agrarian, with industry contributing around

just 10% to the Hungarian GDP [T. Berend, G. Ránki, 1970, 15, L. Katus, 1970, 110, M.-S.

Schulze, 2000, 338]. Agriculture very likely contributed to 70% – 80% of Hungarian GDP

(table 1) [J. Komlos, 1983, 209-213]. An agricultural share of more than two-thirds of

Hungarian GDP is a proper estimate, keeping in mind the sustained dynamic growth of

1 The following current states and regions formed the Austrian Empire in 1867: Austria,

Czech Republic and the South of Poland. Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia and the Western half

of Romania made up the Kingdom of Hungary.

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Hungarian agriculture during the entire 19th century as part of a clear-cut regional

specialisation within the Habsburg Empire [J. Komlos, 1983, D.F. Good, 1991, 224] and

taking into consideration the poor development of urban handicrafts and rural proto-

industrialisation compared to the more developed Western half of the Empire. In addition,

virtually all calculations of the Hungarian labour force’s composition assume a share around

75% for the agricultural sector for 1870 (table 1).

Within the Habsburg Empire, regional specialisation driven by comparative cost advantages

developed at the end of the 18th century and accelerated vigorously after 1830 as the Austrian-

Bohemian lands entered the modern industrial phase of economic development [J. Komlos,

1983, 52–147]. At the beginning of the 1870s, Hungary as the Empire’s granary had already

covered a great distance on its way to becoming an export-oriented agricultural economy.

After 1870, export-induced agricultural development further accelerated and reached a new

stage. Hungarian agriculture, which could be described as a “grain” if not a “wheat economy”,

increased 1.4% p.a. between 1789 and 1868/70 (all grain). This rate accelerated to 3.6% for

1869/70–1881/83 (all plant production) [J. Komlos, 1983, 59, also J. Puskás, 1982, 110].

Even if the driving force of Hungarian agricultural growth – export demand – remained the

same before and after 1870, the level of market integration within the Habsburg Empire

reached a new high during the 1870s, creating a nearly perfect environment for demand-

driven, market-oriented agricultural growth for the next two decades. Three developments

caused the Customs Union between Austria and Hungary, which was founded in 1850, to

become more important than ever before for Hungarian agricultural development after

1875/80: First, declining prices on international grain markets outside of the Empire during

the “grain invasion”; second, the “transport revolution” which created for the first time an

Empire–wide, unified, domestic agricultural market, and third, the influx of Austrian capital.

The latter largely financed the Hungarian infrastructure boom after 1867, and its

industrialisation, which started during the 1870s. It was strongly based on the expansion of

the milling industry and the existence of a capable infrastructure.

The steady drop of international grain prices and growing agrarian protectionism within

Europe caused the “pricing out” of Hungarian grain and flour on its most important export

markets outside the Empire since the end of the 1870s. The trade of these pivotal commodities

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was nearly completely diverted into the Austrian market [S. M. Eddie, 1977, 345–352].2 Only

the Austro-Hungarian Customs-Union and its rising agricultural tariffs [S. M. Eddie, 1989b,

824–844] protected this large domestic market and ensured that agricultural products

dominated Hungarian trade between 1870 and 1914 (S. M. Eddie, 1977, 337). Relative prices

of agricultural products, especially of grain, increased substantially within the Empire

compared to the trends on international markets.

Agricultural boom and industrialisation were strongly connected in Hungary. This is clearly

demonstrated by looking at the boost of the Hungarian food and milling industries in the late-

1870s. Food processing remained by far the most important manufacturing sector until World

War I, and played a vital role for the first wave of Hungary’s industrialisation from 1873–

1896 [J. Komlos, 1983, 132–147]. In 1909/13, flour and all foods accounted for 31.4% and

46.1% of all manufacturing production [own calculation, data from J. Komlos, 1983, 298–

299]. Hungary’s clear comparative advantages in building up a milling industry within the

Habsburg Empire was based on the good quality of its wheat and its relatively low price. But

it was especially the steeply rising flour demand of Austria and Germany during the 1870s

that induced the rapid acceleration in Hungarian grain production. Even Hungary’s

agricultural production started to grow as never before as the “grain-hunger” of the then-

rapidly mechanising milling industry could only be satisfied by large imports from the

Balkans, which were based on bilateral trade treaties that allowed duty-free imports for grain

designated for processing. As flour exports outside the Dual Monarchy started to significantly

shrink during the 1880s, Hungary’s exports to Austria boomed, growing at an annual rate of

10% until 1896 [J. Komlos, 1983, 141]. After 1896, the boom of the Hungarian milling

industry ended and it ceased developing as a consequence of simultaneously stagnating

Austrian demand and the nearly complete loss of virtually all markets outside the Customs

Union. The importation of wheat was finally abolished.

Other East European low-cost grain producers such as Romania and Russia were not able to

develop a large flour export trade, thus enhancing the domestic value added within the food

chain as well as domestic capital accumulation due to the fact that they had no access to a

promising West European market. In contrast, the customs union with Austria provided

Hungary’s milling industry with a large market. Without the Customs union, it would have

2 Whereas in 1882/91 two-thirds of all Hungarian grain and flour exports went out of the

Habsburg Empire, this share declined to one-tenth for 1902/1911 [M. Szuhay, 1998, 120].

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been difficult if not impossible for Hungary to find a similarly large market for its flour [J.

Komlos, 1983, 143–144].

The export-oriented agricultural upswing after 1830, and its transition into a two decade-long

boom after 1870, was strongly connected to inland navigation, and above all, a railway-based

“transport revolution” [L. Katus, 1983] After 1870, for the first time most parts of Hungary,

not only the river areas, were well connected with Austrian and European markets. In contrast

to most European countries before 1880, the needs of the agricultural export sector, not the

requirements of the industrial sector, determined the routing of the so-called grain railways.

Starting in the 1850s, three labour-demanding developments absorbed, for three decades, the

bulk of unskilled labour provided by a fast-growing agricultural population: the rapid

construction of modern infrastructure, the extension of farmland, and the diffusion of

intensive farming systems [P. Gunst, 1998, 26]. The pace of agrarian intensification strictly

followed the development of export demand, especially on the Austrian market. It had been

gaining momentum since the 1830s, decades before the peasant emancipation, and strongly

accelerated during the late-1870s and early-1880s. During the 1870s, due to geographic

differences in the pace of market integration, agricultural development started to vary greatly

by region, and a clear West-East difference emerged [A. Voros, 1980, 61–64].

According to van Zanden, Hungary achieved outstanding growth in agricultural gross output

from 1870–1910, far above the European average [J.L. van Zanden, 1991, 229].3 But, unlike

in developed European countries, the “Green Revolution” that started in Hungary around

1870 proceeded similar to a Boserup-like process of pre-industrial agricultural growth,

heavily dependent on rising labour intensity and an increasing “frequency of cropping” that

reduced all types of fallow as well as the vigorous enlargement of high-value agricultural area

such as arable land [P. Gunst, 1998, 106–109, J. Puskás, 1982, 110, J. Komlos, 1983, 137].

Hungary’s exceptional performance, even when compared to leading European countries, was

mainly achieved during the 1870s and 1880s, and was accomplished within the framework of

pre-industrial agriculture. It was hardly touched by the “first European green revolution” [J.L.

van Zanden, 1991] mainly based on industrial inputs. Purchased inputs played only a

negligible role; most mechanical technical change concentrated on the improvement of

3 According to van Zanden, Hungarian GAO increased 1870–1910 by 1.61% p.a. compared to

1.06% for Europe (Belgium: 0.97%, France: 0,37%, Sweden and Netherlands: 1.29%,

Britain: 0.15%, Germany: 1.68%).

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traditional hand tools or better draft animals. Only threshing was mechanised significantly.

Labour intensive, biological, technical change concentrated on the diffusion of fallow-

reducing intensive agricultural systems and high-yielding animals. Mineral fertilisers as the

main productivity-enhancing, land-saving technical innovation of the time were nearly

unknown before 1900 [A. Voros, 1980, 65–66, M. Szuhay, 1998, 105]. The extraordinary

growth that was realised after 1870, which in contrast to more developed parts of Europe was

not induced by the diffusion of industrial inputs, can be explained by the exceptional extensity

of Hungary’s agriculture.4

According to Boserup’s theory of pre-industrial agricultural growth, low intensity farming

provides, for a certain time, a large scope for high output and productivity gains, even under

the conditions of poor technical change [E. Boserup, 1965, 65–69, 88–94, 116–121]. In the

first phase of accelerated growth, the marginal product of every additional labour unit is

relatively high compared to the following stages of intensification. The more intensive

agricultural production becomes, the more difficult and costly it is to further increase labour

productivity and output. Without dynamic technical change and under an increasing profit-

orientation in agriculture, labour intensity and output will only further increase if agricultural

prices follow an upward trend. Furthermore, different types of farms, in the Hungarian case

large wage estates and small family farms, face quite different labour costs. According to the

results of modern development economics, wage labour on large estates is connected with

extremely high transaction costs, giving an edge to peasant farms dependent on family labour

(Y. Hayami, 1998, H.P. Binswanger et. al., 1995, 2685–2706]. Due to significantly lower

transaction costs and a ‘labour market dualism’ caused by different farm-type dependent

optimisation principles, even fully market-oriented peasant households in general face much

lower ‘internal wage’ or labour costs than large wage estates. This is the main reason why

family farms realise higher labour-inputs and output increases than large wage estates, and

why the latter had to rely on much more extensive farming systems to maximise their profit

[F. Ellis, 1996, 203–217]. Thus, under labour-intensive Boserupian growth, especially if a

declining price-trend prevails, the ability of agriculture to absorb labour and simultaneously

enhance output strongly depends on the scope of the more competitive farm type, the family

4 Even around 1870, the intensity of agriculture in most parts of Hungary was rather low,

equivalent to a less-developed medieval three- or two-field system. In contrast to most parts

of Europe, manuring of arable land was not practised, and animal husbandry often took

place within a semi-nomadic system [A. Voros, 1980, 21–56].

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farm, to displace inefficient large estates. If the latter are preserved by systematic

discrimination against peasants and privileged by public support in manifold ways,

decelerated growth and soaring rural unemployment are the consequences.

In light of the experience of modern, less-developed countries, Hungary’s agricultural

structure developed in the most unfavourable way after 1850. It was the deliberate aim of

serf-emancipation to transfer as much land as possible to the former feudal landlords and to

prevent the emergence of full-time family farms to provide the emerging estates with

sufficient wage labour [E. Niederhauser, 1998, I. Orosz, 1998]. Thus, the expansion of full-

time family farms between 5 and 50 hectares, which efficiently used wage labour without

reaching the point of disproportional growing marginal transaction costs, and which was the

most competitive type of farm in Europe during the second half of the 19th century [H. P.

Binswanger, M. Elgin, 1998, 319, P. Gunst, 1998, 25, G. Grantham, 1989, 14, F. Ellis, 1996,

218–220], was systematically obstructed.

Instead, an unstable and inefficient dual structure emerged, characterised by large estates on

the one hand, and a mass of small part-time holdings on the other. The manifold measures that

the large landowners used to conserve the large estate system that resulted from the strict

control of the state - measures such as massive credit subsidies, expanding mortmain

holdings, and above all a protective grain tariff policy after 1878 - were rather effective [M.

Szuhay, 1998, 99–101, 103, J. Komlos, 1983, 149, 205, S. M. Eddie, 1967, 296–299, 1989b,

824–844, P. Gunst, 1981, 398–402]. Despite an overwhelming peasant demand for land – the

legendary ‘land hunger’ – the effective market supply of land was severely restricted and

extremely uneven land distribution did not change significantly.

Even if large estates introduced the first crop rotation farming to enhance their grain

production [M. Szuhay, 1998, 108] the intensification of farming after 1870 was strongly

based on export-oriented peasant agriculture. The enormous qualitative improvements in

animal husbandry and its significant expansion to meet a growing demand on urban-industrial

export markets, as well as the boost of fruit and vegetable cultivation, was mostly carried out

by peasants. Peasants were much more able to diversify their production and to adjust to the

increasing demand for high value-added animal and horticulture products, both of which

showed a greater income elasticity of demand compared to cereals [S. M. Eddie, 1968, 220–

221, P. Gunst, 1981, 401, M. Szuhay, 1998, 113–118]. Production and exports of the above-

mentioned “peasant products” increased much faster between 1880–1910 than grain and even

flour [J. Puskás, 1982, 122–123, S. M. Eddie, 1968, 203, 207, J. Komlos, 1983, 256–264].

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Additionally, intensive grain farming was widely adopted by peasants as well [J. Puskás,

1982, 128].

All available evidence not only supports the existence, but even the sharpening, of a

pronounced inverse relationship between farm size and factor intensity, as well as

productivity (physical output and income per hectare) [S. M. Eddie, 1968, 218, S. M. Eddie,

1989a, 247, for 1929–1941: P. Gunst, 1998, 216–223, J. HELD, 1980, 312–313]. It seems very

likely that, fully in line with results of modern development economics, large Hungarian

landowners under-utilised the total land area at their disposal compared to small farms

because of the much lower implicit price of land for larger than for smaller farms [F. Ellis,

1996, 209]. In addition, according to modern experience, land reforms enhance agricultural

growth only when they support the substitution of compulsory and wage labour, which are

connected with extremely high transaction costs, by much more efficient family labour (H.

Binswanger et al., 1995, 2687). Following this argumentation, Hungarian agricultural growth

and its capability to absorb labour was very likely hampered in the long run by the fact that

serf emancipation transformed serf labour mainly into inefficient wage labour, and that

heavily distorted land markets prevented the transfer of land to the more efficient peasant

producers. The structural weakness of Hungarian agriculture was concealed during the

agricultural boom, but fully manifested itself in the post-1890 crisis.

The outstanding dynamics of Hungarian agriculture slowly diminished after 1885. Instead,

after 1895/1900 agriculture “became a major drag on economic growth, effectively preventing

a return to the high growth rates of expansion prevalent during the 1870s and 1880s” [M.-S.

Schulze, 2000, 327, table 2]. Until around 1895, Hungary’s export-dependent “grain

economy” could compensate for its shrinking share on international markets by increasing its

agricultural exports to the Austrian portion of the customs union. After 1895, even growing

animal exports could not offset the “grain decline” [S. M. Eddie, 1977, 350, 335, 349, J.

Puskás, 1965, 218–223]. To sum up, agricultural growth significantly slowed after 1890/95,

since for the first time shrinking international exports coincided with a stagnating domestic

market. Yield and total crop output increases slowed significantly after 1885/1890 [J. Puskás,

1982, 110]. The downward slide of the Hungarian grain economy dragged the whole

agricultural sector with it. It must be asked why Hungarian agriculture could not overcome its

grain dependency by diversifying much more of its production and finding new markets.

The main reason seems to be that the large estate owners persisted in their dependence on

cereal grains [S. M. Eddie, 1968, 221]. Whereas after 1880, Hungarian peasants reacted to the

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Table 2. Annual Agricultural Growth 1850–1980

Period Grain Period Gross Agricul-

tural Output

Kingdom of Hungary

1850–1868/70 1.4%1) 1870–1912 2.08%2)

1869/70–1881/83 3.6%1) 1871–1895 2.41%2)

1881/83–1911/13 1.4%1) 1895–1912 1.59%2)

Hungary after the Trianon Peace Treaty

1924–1938 0.5%3)

1950–1980 2.4%4)

1950–1965 1.6%4)

1965–1980 3.3%4)

Notes: 1) J. KOMLOS, 1983, 59 (1913 prices), 2) M.-S. SCHULZE,

2000, 319 (1913 prices), 3) P. GUNST, 1981, 70 (rough estimation

based on output volumes supported by B.R. MITCHELL, 2003, 283–284, 350),

4) P. ROMÁNY, 1998, 360 (own calculation based on a production index

at comparative prices).

grain invasion and promising urban-industrial markets in Austria by strongly expanding

intensive livestock breeding and commercial horticulture, and by significantly improving

product quality to meet international standards [M. Szuhay, 1998, 113–118], large estate

owners strictly resisted diversification and stuck to grain. As flour exports began to stagnate

after 1895 and grain prices on the world market induced further decline within the Empire, the

large estate owners preferred to use their political power to enforce, after a deep political

crisis, prohibitive grain tariffs in 1906, thus isolating the large Habsburg Empire from the

world market.

This political victory saved the endangered grain-dependent large estate system [P. Gunst,

1981, 397–402, S. M. Eddie, 1967, 308] and as a result of this protective tariff policy, the

severe social tensions in rural areas were reduced. At the end of the 1880s, the lessening

infrastructural and agricultural boom led to a strongly growing labour surplus in rural areas,

which could not be absorbed by the dynamic but smaller industrial sector. In addition, grain

producers reacted to cost pressures by cutting wages and other labour-saving measures. The

coincidence of shrinking agrarian and non-agrarian demand for unskilled labour in the face of

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an expanding rural population caused political radicalisation in the agrarian population. Thus,

severe social unrest increasingly resembled a pre-revolutionary situation during the 1890s [P.

Gunst, 1998, 140–165, B.K. Kiraly, 1980, S. M. Eddie, 1967, 306–309]. After 1906, due to

rising grain prices within the Empire, agricultural wages and employment stabilised, if not

increased and social tensions lessened significantly. But a real solution of the severe structural

problems in Hungarian agriculture would be postponed.

Only an increased capability of the agricultural sector to absorb the expanding rural

population could have overcome the agrarian crisis. As in many modern, less-developed

countries, an expanding market-oriented peasant sector would have improved the situation.

Because large estates were nearly completely unable to compete with family farms in care-

intensive branches of agricultural production such as dairy farming, a market-oriented

diversification of the entire Hungarian agriculture sector as a result of more open markets

would have inevitably led to significantly smaller production units. Bearing in mind the

highly critical economic situation of many large estates without prohibitive grain tariffs,

peasants would have significantly enhanced the share of land under their control [P. Gunst,

1981, 399–402]. The latifundia system would very likely have been replaced by a more stable

and competitive diversified peasant farm structure resembling contemporary Western

European conditions. Even with stagnating agricultural prices, labour-intensive Boserupian

growth could have been realised, very likely, at distinctly higher rates if the dual structure of

Hungarian agriculture would have disappeared under the pressure of more open markets.

3. A period of crisis: agricultural development from 1919–1938

After tremendous war damage, Hungary’s agricultural recovery lasted until 1928/29. During

the agricultural crisis of 1928/29–1933/34, output diminished by only one–tenth, but

agricultural prices nearly halved [J. HELD, 1980, 214, P. GUNST, 1981, 407, 412, B.R.

MITCHELL, 2003, 283–284, 350]. After 1933/34 which saw a slight recovery in agricultural

prices, production and agricultural exports again started to increase slowly, but hardly reached

pre-war levels. All in all, from 1924–1938, Hungary’s export-led agricultural growth nearly

came to a halt, measuring only roughly 0.5% p.a. [production in terms of volume, P. GUNST,

1969, 70]. As a result Hungary belonged to the most slowly developing countries during the

inter-war period [I.T. BEREND, G. RÁNKI, 1985, 289].

The loss of the large Austria-Hungarian market is the prime cause for the lasting stagnation of

Hungarian agriculture and economy during the interwar-period [D.H ALDCROFT, S.

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MOREWOOD, 1995, 46–52, P. GUNST, 1981, 1974, 130, M. SZUHAY, 1998, 177–178, A.

TEICHOVA, 1989, 889–890]. When the Habsburg Empire collapsed in 1918, the Austrian-

Hungarian Customs Union area was divided unto eight states, and in 1920, the Trianon Peace

Treaty reduced Hungary to one-third of its previous territory, and roughly 40% of its former

population [I. ROMSICS, 1999, 117–125, F. VON FELLNER, 1923]. The disruption of intense

regional agricultural trade within Central Europe strongly hit Hungary. During the interwar-

period, crisis-ridden international markets could not compensate for shrinking regional trade.

One reason for this was that all successor states, as well as other European countries,

implemented more and more protectionist agricultural policies. Without the Customs Union,

the development of Hungary’s important flour milling industry was seriously hampered.

Whereas before 1914, semi-manufactured and finished food products played an important role

in Hungary’s exports, unprocessed agricultural commodities replaced them after 1918 [P.

GUNST, 1981, 409, 1969, 4–5, A. TEICHOVA, 1989, 890]. Thus, the growth-stimulating

linkages between agriculture and industry, which had heavily relied on the Customs Union,

weakened significantly. In contrast to the pre-1914 period, agriculture did not trigger any

more growth impulses in industry. Quite the opposite was true. Concerning capital

accumulation, dept-ridden agriculture acted as a drag on the rest of the economy and not as a

source of capital [D.H ALDCROFT, S. MOREWOOD, 1995, 46–47, 73, J. HELD, 1980, 210–214].

After the demise of the Customs Union, adverse developments on international markets

affected Hungarian agricultural prices without any buffer. The overwhelming dependency on

primary exports, and especially on cereals, left Hungary very exposed to the risks of

international agricultural markets. During the world-wide agricultural overproduction crisis,

[W. MALENBAUM, 1953, 3–11] price transmission from international markets led to a 50% cut

in Hungary’s agricultural prices from 1928–1933, most dramatically for wheat [P. GUNST,

1981, 410–412, M. SZUHAY, 1998, 181].

Farming intensity decreased as prices collapsed. After 1928, the use of purchased inputs such

as mineral fertilisers or machines significantly diminished or virtually stopped [M. SZUHAY,

1998, 187–188, P. GUNST, 1981, 413–414]. Nevertheless, during the Great Depression,

extremely low real wages allowed it to prevent sharp declines in crop production by

substituting labour and land for purchased inputs. The entire sown area increased at the

expense of fallow area, which was nearly halved between 1925/28 and 1928/33; nutrient

supply per acre also strongly dropped as a result of falling livestock numbers. Yields per area

declined slightly from 1928–1934 and reached pre-war levels again only at the end of the

1930s [M. SZUHAY, 1998, 185–186, P. GUNST, 1981, 412–413, 1969, 1974].

15

When mass migration to the United States had come to a halt and Hungary’s industrial

development had slowed down, [P. GUNST, 1998, 225, F. DOVRING, 1965, 101] a continuously

expanding excess supply of rural labour made it possible for large estate owners to respond to

the world market-induced cost pressure, mainly by cutting wages. During the Great

Depression, real agricultural wages declined strongly and reached, in 1931/34, only 40% of

their already low pre-1929-level. Even after four years of recovery, real agricultural wages

were still almost 30% lower in 1938 than before the agricultural crisis, and well below the

levels that prevailed before the First World War [J. HELD, 1980, 226–228, P. GUNST, 1998,

212–224, D.H ALDCROFT, S. MOREWOOD, 1995, 72]. Thus, no economic incentive for

mechanisation existed even on 1,000 ha farms, and Hungarian agriculture remained pre-

industrial.

To sum up, due to radically changing relative factor costs in favour of labour, and under the

conditions of imperfect agricultural credit markets, the aggravated cost pressure on Hungarian

agriculture did not lead to modernisation. Instead, quite the opposite occurred. The relatively

expensive factor of capital was widely substituted by the drastically cheapened factor of

labour. Nonetheless, total labour input decreased in 1911/15 compared to 1931/35 due to

shrinking output [F. DOVRING, 1965, 101].

Against the upward European trend and in stark contrast to the less-developed Mediterranean

and strongly intensifying Balkan countries, the intensity of Hungarian farming stagnated, if

not slightly diminished from 1910–1939 [F. DOVRING, 1965, 90–112]. The Hungarian farm

structure likely aggravated the labour-reducing effects of the agricultural crisis, whereas small

family farms in the Balkans functioned much more as a social buffer as opportunity costs of

labour outside agriculture fell to zero. This phenomenon is well-known from modern Central

and Eastern Europe during the transition crisis.

Agriculture’s severe structural deficiencies, mainly the latifundia system, were concentrated

in Trianon-Hungary, whereas the peasant-dominated areas were assigned to the neighbour-

states. The importance of extensive, pre-industrial grain farming on, even by English

standards, very large farms of 500–1000 ha was much greater than before 1914 [D.

WARRINER, 1964, 107, M. SZUHAY, 1998, 178]. Despite an expanding labour surplus - a

necessary precondition for running large, wage estates - the inefficient and inflexible

Hungarian latifundia system could only survive because the landed aristocracy further

controlled state and society. The main purpose of agricultural policy was to preserve the

latifundia system at all costs by implementing only very moderate land reform and by

16

perpetuating the entailed property. Although export-dependent large grain estates faced the

most pressure from international markets, land distribution did not change in Hungary [D.H

ALDCROFT, S. MOREWOOD, 1995, 17–20, M. SZUHAY, 1998, 178, P. GUNST, 1998, 199–200,

A. TEICHOVA, 1989, 897–904]. During the Great Depression, the grain producing large estate

sector nearly exclusively benefited from newly-introduced governmental measures (public

procurement, price interventions, export promotion). In addition, the taxation of large estates

was relieved. Virtually no measures were undertaken to support the peasant sector which was

also strongly market-oriented and whose market quota amounted to around 60% [J. HELD,

1980, 227, 232, 295–307, M. SZUHAY, 1998, 182–185, P. GUNST 1981, 412, 415].

Agriculture started to recover in 1934 when Hungary became more and more part of the

economic and geo-political sphere of war-preparing Germany, which wanted to tie Central

and Southeast Europe to itself and thereby secure its supply with agricultural goods and raw

materials for the planned war [J. HELD, 1980, 227–233, M. SZUHAY, 1998, 184–185]. A

system of bilateral or even multilateral trade agreements opened new export markets for

Hungarian agriculture under very favourable conditions. Generous export quotas and higher

purchase prices, subsidised by Germany, were guaranteed. Governmental trade agencies more

and more monopolised agricultural export trade. In Hungary, the government assigned the

organisation of the booming state trade to the large estate owners’ associations. Thus, nearly

exclusively, the large estate sector benefited from these effective market interventions, which

led to a stabilisation of prices and a recovery of export incomes after 1934 [P. GUNST, 1969,

4–5, 1981, 410]. However, only in 1940 was the pre-depression-level of agricultural output

again reached as Hungary supplied the axis armies.

During the interwar-period, structural transformation nearly came to a halt and the agrarian

population fell from around 55% to 50%, while absolute numbers slightly increased [P.

GUNST, 1998, 201–204]. At around 33%, agriculture’s share of GDP oscillated in Trianon-

Hungary, the most industrialised part of the former Hungarian Kingdom, and industry’s share

stayed constant despite efforts to foster industrialisation by a mainly tariff-based import-

substitution-policy, which favoured the industrial at the expense of the agricultural sector. In

spite of the stronger industrial base of Trianon-Hungary and the deteriorating terms of trade

for agriculture, exports continued to be dominated by agricultural commodities, with a share

of 67% for 1935/38 [P. GUNST, 1980, 407–408]. Even if adverse international developments

created extremely unfavourable conditions for agricultural and economic growth, radical land

reform in favour of the peasants would have alleviated, for most groups of the agrarian

population, the catastrophic effects of both the Customs Union’s dissolution and the Great

17

Depression. Furthermore, it would have significantly reduced the grain-dependency of the

Hungarian “wheat-economy”. Indeed, a more diversified agricultural production and structure

would have created more scope for growth and flexible adjustments to the great agricultural

crisis.

4. The primacy of politics: agricultural development from 1945–1975

Agricultural growth from 1948–1975 was strongly influenced by political struggle between

the more moderate and dogmatic wings within the ruling communist party [Z. VARGA, 2004,

S. SZAKÁCS, 1998, D.H ALDCROFT, S. MOREWOOD, 1995, 110–124, J. SOKOLOVSKY, 1990,

87–150, I. VOLGYES, 1980]. Until the 1960s, hardliners believed that the only way to rapidly

modernise backward Hungary was to accomplish a soviet-style collectivisation at any costs

and to drain as many resources as possible out of agriculture and into heavy industry. Later

on, they insisted in the supremacy of heavy industry over all other economic activities. The

moderate wing refused a purely Stalinist development policy and wanted to first improve the

catastrophic supply situation by ceasing the “war against the peasants” which had started with

collectivisation, and to reanimate the agriculture and consumer industries with more

individual incentives and not through administrative coercion or total control. After crushing

the Hungarian revolution in 1956, the communist party tried to stabilise its regime by

reconciling the party and the overall population without fundamentally changing the system.

The result was the Hungarian “consumer socialism”, which consciously integrated market

elements into a centrally-planned economy and was unique in the Soviet orbit.

During phases of enforced collectivation (1950/53, 1955, 1958/61) and after its

accomplishment, agricultural production slowed dramatically 1961/65 [P. ROMÁNY, 1998,

360]. The mass exodus of young workers away from rural areas and the total negligence of

agricultural investments led to supply shortages in agricultural commodities. Hungary

became, for the first time, a net grain importer and was not able to feed itself. Whereas the

majority of the Eastern Bloc states tried to solve their agricultural problems by reorganising

the state and party apparatus to make central planning more efficient, Hungary started to

rigorously reshape the cooperatives; they were not abolished to avoid conflicts with the

Soviets, but after the economic reforms of 1963–1968, they resembled autonomous

enterprises much more than in any other state in the Soviet orbit [Z. VARGA, 251–263].

In addition to much more independent farm management, the reforms, which culminated in

1968 with the introduction of the “New Economic Mechanism”, included a significant rise of

18

procurement prices, a remission of farm debts and the introduction of a free input market.

Although five-year plans continued to be made, they were no longer broken down to company

level. Indirect economic regulators (taxes, credits, non-repayable subsidies, etc.) replaced

direct command. Publicly-funded farm investments soared and rural infrastructure

significantly extended. The results were impressive; Hungary experienced an agricultural

boom from ca. 1965–1980, rural incomes improved significantly, industrial agriculture was

fully established and agricultural products again played an important role for Hungarian

exports [Z. VARGA, 265–273]. Still, around 1970 agriculture produced nearly 20% of

Hungarian GDP and employed ca. 25% of the labour force (table 1).

Nevertheless, limited market reforms within the socialist system could only stabilize the

economy in the short run, and the economic decline during the 1980s included agriculture.

Despite limited market elements, the absence of a real market pricing system, a lacking price-

based mechanism to allocate investments, the strong preference for present consumption, and

the existence of only soft budget restraints preventing the failure of inefficient cooperative

farms all culminated in a deep crisis of agriculture which fully unfolded as Hungary became

an open economy again during the transition period.

5. Conclusions

In the European context, Hungary’s agricultural growth from 1870/75–1970/75 followed a

unique pattern characterised by a long-lasting period of stagnation from 1890/00–1961/65.

Hungarian crop (especially wheat) yields remained constant over these seven decades as well

[P. GUNST, 1974, 128, 132]. Thus, most structural transformation took place under the

conditions of sluggish agricultural growth, which formed a major drag on economic growth.

The maintenance of an inefficient dual agricultural structure by a powerful, landed aristocracy

and their strict adherence to grain cultivation, even as its competitiveness severely

deteriorated, seemed to be the prime cause for the exceptionally long stagnation period. After

1945, the communists abolished the large estate system and replaced it with the even more

inefficient Soviet-style large farming. Only after 1965 did market-oriented economic reforms

and strongly increasing economies of scale, as a result of a quickly “industrialising”

agriculture, cease the stagnation period that had started at the end of the 19th century.

In addition, Hungary from 1880–1940 seems to prove an important finding of modern

development economics, namely, that no self-induced equilibrium process existed between

rural population growth, agricultural labour demand and output expansion. Disequilibria,

19

which are responsible for an increasing gap between rural population expansion or agrarian

labour supply and lagging labour demand, are often caused by a dual farm structure with

dominating large estates [M. Lipton, 1990]. In Hungary, the premature release of labour from

agriculture in 1885/90 did not accelerate industrialisation. Instead, it only further swelled a

rural “labour surplus economy” and caused nothing but poverty. This situation mirrors

England’s experience during the rise of large-scale farming in the 18th century [R.C. Allen,

1992, 262]. Modern development economics delivers a thorough and empirically well-

founded explanation for the enduring existence of rather inefficient and non-competitive

large-scale farming in many less-developed countries. Its increased application on the

Hungarian case would significantly deepen our understanding of its crisis-ridden historical

agricultural development.

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A1. Agricultural land in the territory of present-day Hungary, 1853–1999* (in 1,000 ha)

Year Arable land

Horticul- tural land

Vineyard

Pasture

And meadow

Agriculturalland

1853 3,452.8 80.6 201.4 2,681.6 6,416.4 1867 3,758.9 86.3 202.6 2,732.3 6,780.1 1883 4,849.4 89.2 216.9 2,173.0 7,328.5 1895 5,103.0 95.0 175.0 2,065.7 7,438.7 1913 5,577.6 97.5 214.7 1,682.9 7,572.7 1915 5,506.4 95.8 215.8 1,670.3 7,488.3 1918 5,514,7 96.1 216.4 1,672.8 7,500.0 1921 5,578.2 99.4 218.2 1,678.3 7,574.1 1923 5,599.4 99.4 218.0 1,677.0 7,593.8 1925 5,590.3 102.2 215.9 1,681.0 7,589.4 1926 5,588.4 102.6 215.2 1,680.1 7,586.3 1927 5,588.6 104.0 214.5 1,678.4 7,585.5 1928 5,586.2 106.0 215.8 1,677.1 7,585.1 1929 5,589.3 107.2 215.3 1,670.4 7,582.2 1930 5,586.7 107.0 214.2 1,668.6 7,576.5 1931 5,588.2 108.4 212.4 1,668.5 7,577.5 1932 5,589.0 108.9 211.9 1,665.6 7,575.4 1933 5,593.3 110.3 210.4 1,661.5 7,575.5 1934 5,595.7 112.4 207.8 1,655.7 7,571.6 1935 5,601.1 113.9 206.8 1,644.4 7,566.2 1936 5,611.4 116.5 207.2 1,631.1 7,566.2 1937 5,613.9 117.8 208.1 1,622.3 7,562.1 1938 5,618.1 119.6 208.3 1,610.7 7,556.7 1939 5,611.5 119.6 209.6 1,603.1 7,543.8 1940 5,616.9 119.6 211.7 1,604.5 7,552.7 1945 5,567.1 115.1 215.4 1,600.7 7,498.3 1950 5,518.1 152.5 230.2 1,474.7 7,375.5 1951 5,518.7 145.6 228.5 1,455.3 7,348.1 1955 5,402.9 169.8 201.4 1,471.4 7,245.5 1960 5,309.8 189.8 203.6 1,437.9 7,141.1 1965 5,084.5 318.6 246.6 1,303.9 6,953.6 1970 5,046.2 317.9 229.7 1,281.3 6,875.1 1980 4,734.7 429.8 167.8 1,294.2 6,626.5 1990 4,712.8 436.2 138.5 1,185.6 6,473.1 1999 4,708.0 204.1 127.0 1,147.2 6,186.3 Notes: HUNGARIAN CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE (2000), Hungarian Agriculture 1851–2000, Budapest 2000 (CD-ROM). *Area of present-day Hungary (in 1,000 ha): 9,303.0.

A2. Index of Hungarian agricultural production, 1870–1915 (Hungarian Kingdom without Croatia)

Year

All Crops Production-

index 1913=100

(Gross Output)

Grains Production-

index 1913=100

Year

All Crops Index

1913=100

Grains Production-

index 1913=100

1870 36.1 45.7 1893 72.8 93.4 1871 32.1 36.4 1894 64.6 78.3 1872 31.4 36.6 1895 79.8 91.5 1873 31.6 36.0 1896 73.0 88.0 1874 30.2 38.1 1897 60.6 56.4 1875 33.9 38.5 1898 68.8 74.4 1876 30.2 39.3 1899 75.7 82.8 1877 39.3 47.6 1900 76.1 80.8 1878 56.8 71.1 1901 71.6 75.4 1879 34.4 38.5 1902 80.5 89.6 1880 46.7 59.3 1903 84.4 92.1 1881 54.6 57.5 1904 59.3 68.7 1882 64.5 80.4 1905 78.1 84.1 1883 57.2 59.2 1906 95.9 107.5 1884 60.3 65.1 1907 78.7 81.4 1885 60.6 71.2 1908 78.9 87.5 1886 54.9 61.2 1909 81.5 84.0 1887 64.7 78.8 1910 94.2 99.0 1888 64.9 75.1 1911 89.1 94.3 1889 56.9 59.0 1912 100.8 101.8 1890 66.9 79.8 1913 100.0 100.0 1891 70.9 83.4 1914 84.7 80.8 1892 68.2 81.8 1915 89.3 89.8

Notes: J. KOMLOS, 1983, 260–261. According to FELLNER (1916, 24, 31), the value added in the agricultural sector corresponds very closely with the production of all crops or gross output in columns 2 and 5 [J. KOMLOS, 1983, 257].

A3. Crop production in the territory of present-day Hungary, 1921–1999 (in 1000 tons)

Year

Main cerelas1)

Main

fodder crops

Sugar beets

Potatoes

Fresh

vegetabels

Total Crop

Production2)

Crop production

index (1925=100)3)

1921 3,613 4,158 543 1,249 295 10,400 63.2 1924 4,396 5,410 1,274 1,535 223 13,075 79.4 1925 5,936 5,830 1,527 2,310 309 16,457 100.0 1926 5,696 6,084 1,445 1,875 251 15,595 94.8 1927 5,240 5,529 1,455 2,005 290 14,841 90.2 1928 5,855 4,384 1,438 1,471 263 13,902 84.5 1929 5,726 4,347 1,607 2,168 357 14,637 88.9 1930 5,286 3,881 1,461 1,841 301 13,438 81.7 1931 4,713 3,654 966 1,447 379 11,809 71.8 1932 5,991 4,439 849 1,557 476 13,932 84.7 1933 6,587 4,678 944 1,856 378 14,979 91.0 1934 5,285 4,478 922 2,119 388 13,689 83.2 1935 5,241 3,280 769 1,393 249 11,461 69.6 1936 6,617 5,094 1,124 2,451 468 16,574 100.7 1937 6,168 5,182 1,013 2,559 449 16,204 98.5 1938 7,189 5,586 969 2,141 500 17,051 103.6 1939 6,609 5,372 918 2,026 477 16,183 98.3 1945 3,446 3,412 177 1,691 292 9,721 59.1 1950 5,431 3,616 1,640 1,350 362 13,412 81.5 1951 6,884 3,871 2,712 2,052 787 17,388 105.7 1952 4,114 2,517 1,307 1,170 398 10,274 62.4 1953 6,266 3,388 2,523 1,901 749 15,653 95.1 1954 5,428 3,909 1,924 1,991 681 14,621 88.8 1955 6,558 4,220 2,241 2,467 790 17,251 104.8 1956 5,193 4,031 1,948 2,055 607 14,609 88.8 1957 6,904 4,764 1,878 2,707 891 18,006 109.4 1958 5,617 4,208 2,070 2,600 607 16,279 98.9 1959 7,259 5,621 2,679 2,366 702 19,582 119.0 1960 6,815 6,118 3,370 2,656 632 20,372 123.8 1961 6,071 4,841 2,356 1,630 557 16,389 99.6 1962 6,691 5,849 2,653 1,882 686 18,694 113.6 1963 6,321 6,590 3,434 2,026 969 20,497 124.5 1964 6,778 6,209 3,554 1,650 830 20,347 123.6 1965 7,370 6,457 3,452 1,485 790 20,393 123.9 1966 7,464 7,305 3,570 2,433 980 22,745 138.2 1967 7,771 6,066 3,356 1,507 1,070 20,989 127.5 1968 8,326 6,365 3,471 1,335 968 21,609 131.3 1969 9,555 7,922 3,301 1,590 1,017 24,761 150.5 1970 7,496 6,659 2,174 1,430 820 19,719 119.8 1980 13,774 9,080 3,927 941 1,119 30,538 185.6 1990 12,164 7,225 4,741 746 910 27,817 169.0 1999 11,051 5,426 2,934 1,199 922 23,434 142.4

Notes: HUNGARIAN CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE (2000), Hungarian Agriculture 1851–2000, Budapest 2000 (CD-ROM), 1) wheat, maize, barley, rye, oats, 2) colums 2–5 plus dried pulses, grapes, oil seeds, soy beans, hemp, flax and tobacco, 3) 1925 roughly meets average crop production around 1913 [J. HELD, 1980, 214].

A4. Animal production in the territory of present-day Hungary, 1857–1998 (in 1,000 tons)

Year

Milk (mio. Litres)

Eggs (mio.

pieces)

Meat

(1000 tons)

Milk- production-

index (1938=100)

Egg- production-

index (1938=100)

Meat- production-

Index (1938=100)

1857 335,0 -- -- 21,1 -- -- 1895 610,0 -- -- 38,5 -- -- 1928 1590,0 777 -- 100,3 87,1 1938 1585,8 892,2 438,1 100,0 100,0 100.0 1949 1466,9 994,1 -- 92,5 111,4 0.0 1950 1464,7 1029,3 597,4 92,4 115,4 136.4 1951 1470,8 1013,8 502,9 92,7 113,6 114.8 1952 1442,1 1116 595,6 90,9 125,1 136.0 1953 1387,2 690,4 431,3 87,5 77,4 98.4 1954 1475,6 1039,9 546,7 93,1 116,6 124.8 1955 1538,3 1350,1 633,8 97,0 151,3 144.7 1956 1530,1 1566,3 699,5 96,5 175,6 159.7 1957 1787,0 1615,7 658,9 112,7 181,1 150.4 1958 1953,1 1742,2 722,7 123,2 195,3 165.0 1959 1989,6 1886,7 818,1 125,5 211,5 186.7 1960 1959,8 1881,5 781,9 123,6 210,9 178.5 1961 1908,4 1932,1 812,6 120,3 216,6 185.5 1962 1819,8 1875,9 830,7 114,8 210,3 189.6 1963 1823,1 1924,5 839,7 115,0 215,7 191.7 1964 1882,8 2251,8 392,1 118,7 252,4 89.5 1965 1781,4 2427,8 411,7 112,3 272,1 94.0 1966 1872,5 2464,5 419,5 118,1 276,2 95.8 1967 1997,2 2745,1 415,3 125,9 307,7 94.8 1968 1959,1 2821,8 458,8 123,5 316,3 104.7 1969 1916,2 2745,6 432,1 120,8 307,7 98.6 1970 1895,7 3327,2 479,5 119,5 372,9 109.4 1971 1826,6 3506,2 559,5 115,2 393,0 127.7 1972 1822,2 3256,4 592 114,9 365,0 135.1 1973 1960,9 3325,7 549,2 123,7 372,8 125.4 1974 2021,6 3666,6 625 127,5 411,0 142.7 1975 1973,6 4047,2 633,4 124,5 453,6 144.6 1976 2077,9 4041 608,9 131,0 452,9 139.0 1977 2134,8 4588,3 665 134,6 514,3 151.8 1978 2266,0 4748 683 142,9 532,2 155.9 1979 2383,0 4721 689,2 150,3 529,1 157.3 1980 2540,0 4437,7 732,6 160,2 497,4 167.2 1985 2631,0 4228,2 820,7 165,9 473,9 187.3 1988 2787,0 4584,7 890,1 175,7 513,9 203.2 1989 2779,0 4576 850,6 175,2 512,9 194.2 1990 2763,0 4679,1 852,5 174,2 524,4 194.6 1994 1878,2 3877 586,2 118,4 434,5 133.8 1995 1919,6 3466,5 617,4 121,0 388,5 140.9 1998 2045,2 3387,7 1082,1 129,0 379,7 247.0

Notes: HUNGARIAN CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE (2000), Hungarian Agriculture 1851–2000, Budapest 2000 (CD-ROM), own calculation of the indices.

A5. Agricultural labour force for the territory of present day Hungary, 1900–1999* (in 1,000 heads)

Year Hungary's population

Economicallyactive

population

population involved in agriculture

and forestry

population involved in

forestry only

share of

agriculture and

forestry (in %)

1900 6,854 2,901.3 1,734.9 -- 59.81910 7,612 3,144.0 1,685.3 -- 53.61920 7,987 3,652.5 2,128.0 -- 58.31930 8,685 3,822.1 2,030.8 -- 53.11941 9,316 4,297.4 2,165.0 -- 50.41949 9,205 3,969.6 2,190.9 32.6 55.21950 9,293 4,106.8 2,134.7 42.2 52.01951 9,383 4,254.2 2,111.6 29.7 49.61952 9,463 4,306.4 2,053.4 38.2 47.71953 9,545 4,349.0 1,934.0 40.6 44.51954 9,645 4,400.0 1,910.0 43.7 43.41955 9,767 4,470.0 1,952.4 43.6 43.71956 9,883 4,563.0 1,990.1 45.1 43.61957 9,829 4,520.0 2,031.9 40.5 45.01958 9,850 4,582.0 2,006.0 47.8 43.81959 9,913 4,652.0 1,976.0 52.0 42.51960 9,961 4,735.0 1,842.6 47.7 38.91961 10,007 4,626.1 1,661.3 64.9 35.91962 10,052 4,543.6 1,533.5 56.7 33.81963 10,074 4,569.3 1,468.7 53.6 32.11964 10,108 4,634.7 1,423.3 62.1 30.71965 10,140 4,649.2 1,382.1 59.2 29.71966 10,166 4,665.6 1,348.3 59.6 28.91967 10,203 4,710.2 1,344.1 57.0 28.51968 10,244 4,767.3 1,340.1 56.6 28.11969 10,284 4,887.1 1,325.0 49.1 27.11970 10,322 4,980.2 1,313.3 60.1 26.4

1975b/ 10,501 5,085.5 1,156.8 49.5 22.7 1975c/ 10,501 5,085.5 1,150.0 49.5 22.61980 10,709 5,073.6 1,115.6 50.0 22.01990 10,375 4,652.1 938.0 50.0 20.21992 10,337 4,162.2 588.9 59.5 15.6

1993d/ 10,310 3,866.9 391.9 32.1 10.11999 10,092 3,690.2 294.1 13.9 8.0

Notes: HUNGARIAN CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE (2000), Hungarian Agriculture 1851–2000, Budapest 2000 (CD-ROM). b) According to the branch classification effective until 1975.

c) According to the branch classification effective from 1976.

d) According to the branch classification effective from 1993.