Agricultural Public Services Delivered by Chilean

Municipalities: a Free-Market approach?

Paul Lewin

Content Background Agricultural Public Services in Chile What Motivates the Chilean Municipal

Government? Why some Municipalities are able to

produce higher-quality services? Conclusion

Background Public services production based on:

Demand: Needs of citizens (preferences)

Supply: Prioritization of public goods Taxation Economies of scale

Consistency between Demand & Supply Decentralized governance structure

Agricultural Public Services in Chile Chile is a unitary political system. Public funds are arranged through market

instrument. Funding is decided upon by central

government. Municipalities don’t have Legal obligation

Specific budget support to supply agricultural services

Law doesn’t compel Agricultural Agencies to coordinate their activities with the municipality

Chilean Municipalities Responsibilities They are quite broad and most of them are

shared with other public entities. Sports and recreation Social welfare

Support low-income sectorsAllocation of monetary subsidies to poor

familiesPublic housing

Education Health

Therefore,… Any action performed by the municipalities

to deliver agricultural services is voluntary and must be self-funded.

Questions: Why local politicians invest their scarce

resources into these programs? Why some municipalities are able to produce

higher-quality services?

What motivate the Chilean Municipal Governments? Existence of a central Government

Commitment Communication between Municipality and

Central Government Existence of Financial Gains

Raise funds from agricultural sector Existence of Specific Stakeholder Groups

Producer organizations Higher number of landowners

Why some Municipalities are able to produce higher-quality services? Popular participation in public decision-making

processes Bridging the information gap between government and

civil society; Creating alternative channels for the delivery of public

services; and Preventing the development of perverse incentives in

government Viable institution for the transfer of information

among local actors Incorporate the local knowledge Take into account the particularities of each locality

Conclusion Municipal performance is related with local

institutional arrangements Local governments represent a potential

for rural development Municipalities might act as intermediaries

between local farmers and central government. Current knowledge in Chile about

consensus-building mechanisms at local level need research

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