AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH–EXTENSION LINKAGE …Agricultural Research & Extension Network Network Paper No.106 July 2000 ISBN 085003 488 4 The Agricultural Research and Extension Network

Agricultural Research& Extension Network

Network Paper No.106

July 2000

ISBN 085003 488 4

The Agricultural Research and Extension Network is sponsored by the UK Department for International Development (DFID)The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of DFID.

We are happy for this material to be reproduced on a not-for-profit basis. The Network Coordinator would appreciate receiving detailsof any use of this material in training, research or programme design, implementation or evaluation.

Network Coordinator: Catherine Longley Assistant Editor: Helen Suich Administrator: Alana Coyle

ABSTRACTBoth of these papers offer conceptual frameworks for the analysis of agricultural research and extension systems.The first paper focuses on the linkages between research and extension and how these linkages can be enhanced.Based on a study of seven countries – Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Mexico, Nigeria, Tanzaniaand Thailand – five forms of research–extension linkage are presented. The paper discusses the institutionalarrangements governing agricultural research–extension linkages in each country, the procedures through whichfarmers’ problems are identified and research themes decided, and the administrative levels at which linkagesoperate. The paper examines how the procedures for linking research systems and extension services are managedand highlights the key weaknesses of each linkage type. It concludes that policy changes, institutional reorganisation,and the strengthening of institutions are required to enhance agricultural research–extension linkages in developingcountries.

The second paper is concerned with alternative means of financing agricultural extension and the ways inwhich different financial mechanisms may influence the type of extension support offered to farmers. The paperexamines the motives of different organisations for investing in agricultural extension and analyses the implicationsof alternative funding mechanisms. It offers some hypotheses regarding alternative funding mechanisms in relationto the flow of knowledge to, in and from extension organisations; the management of these knowledge flows; thegoals of the extension organisation; the choice of extension messages; extension methods and approaches; thetarget groups; and the management of the extension organisation. In many countries a pluriform extension systemis developing in which different organisations are financed in different ways. Whether or not the privatisation ofextension is desirable depends on factors such as labour productivity, the extent to which there are surpluses orshortages in the production of food, and the impact of extension on consumer food prices.

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH–EXTENSION LINKAGESYSTEMS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Joseph U. Agbamu

DIFFERENT WAYS OF FINANCINGAGRICULTURAL EXTENSION

Anne W. van den Ban

Contact details

Dr. Joseph U. Agbamu can be contacted at the Department ofAgricultural Economics and Extension, Delta State University, AsabaCampus, Delta State, NIGERIA.

Anne W. van den Ban can be contacted at Gen. Foulkesweg 82A,6703 BX Wageningen, THE NETHERLANDS. Tel: 31 317 412748Email: 31 317 418025.

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106a.

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Perspectives on agricultural extension

CONTENTSPage

Abstract i

Contact details i

Acronyms iv

106a. Agricultural research–extension linkage systems:an international perspective

— Joseph U. Agbamu

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 1

3 A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH–EXTENSION LINKAGES 3Forms of research–extension linkageFactors and indicators of linkage forms

4 FORMS OF RESEARCH–EXTENSION LINKAGE IN SEVEN COUNTRIES 3IndonesiaJapanMexicoNigeriaSouth Korea (Republic of Korea)TanzaniaThailand

5 CONCLUSION 6

REFERENCES 7

Acknowledgements 7

Figures and tablesFigure 1 The connection between the main actors in the agricultural research–extension linkage system 1Figure 2 A conceptual schema for the functioning of research–extension linkages 2Table 1 Indicators of research–extension linkage forms: the outlook of seven countries 4

Agricultural Research and Extension Network Paper

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106b. Different ways of financing agricultural extension— Anne W. van den Ban

1 INTRODUCTION 8

2 FACTORS INFLUENCED BY THE WAYS IN WHICH AN EXTENSIONORGANISATION IS FINANCED 8

3 WHY DO DIFFERENT ACTORS FINANCE AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION? 9GovernmentCommercial companiesFarmers’ associationsConsultancy and accounting firmsNon-governmental organisations

4 SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION ISFINANCED 13

AcronymsAARD Agency for Agricultural Research and DevelopmentADP Agricultural Development ProgrammeAEC Agricultural Extension CentreAEIC Agricultural Extension and Information CentreAIAT Assessment Institute for Agricultural TechnologyBAE Bureau of Agricultural ExtensionBAIF Bharatiya Agro-Industries FoundationDDR Directorate of Rural DevelopmentDOAE Department of Agricultural ExtensionINIFAP National Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry Research InstituteIPM Integrated pest managementNAERLS National Agricultural Extension and Research Liaison ServiceNGO Non-governmental organisationOECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentPRDA Provinicail Rural Development AdministrationRDA Rural Development AdministrationSEDAGRO State Secretariat of the Agriculture Department

Flow of knowledgeKnowledge managementGoals and accountabilityExtension messagesExtension methods and approachesTarget groupsManagement of the extension organisationEconomic theories

5 CONCLUSIONS 17

REFERENCES 18

ENDNOTES 19

Acknowledgement 19

BoxesBox 1 Extension organisations can be financed by: 8Box 2 Situations in which a government should invest in agricultural extension 9

106a. AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH–EXTENSION LINKAGE SYSTEMS:AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Joseph U. Agbamu

1 INTRODUCTIONThe concept of linkage implies the communication andworking relationship established between two or moreorganisations pursuing commonly shared objectives inorder to have regular contact and improved productivity.Havelock (1986) contends that linkage is a term usedto indicate that two systems are connected by messagesso as to form a greater system. He argues that if thebarriers between two systems are permeable enoughfor messages and responses to flow out of each to theother, then a link has been created between the two.From this viewpoint, agricultural research and extensionservices are two systems which are linked by informationflow and feedback.

For agrotechnologies to be relevant to local needs,researchers, extension workers and farmers must playimportant roles in identifying research problems,adapting the recommendations to local conditions andproviding feedback to researchers about the innovationsthat have been developed. Effective communication linksbetween researchers and extensionists are vital in themodification of technological recommendations and ininitiating further research; such links enable newtechnologies and management practices to be suited tolocal ecological conditions. The participation ofextension workers in adaptive research trials allows themto become familiar with the technologies they areexpected to promote and also helps to ensure that thesociological dimensions of farming are not neglected.

The relationship between key actors in the research–extension linkage system is illustrated by Figure 1. Aconceptual schema for the functioning of the linkages,as shown in Figure 2, can be conceived as havingrelational parts which have been grouped into: (a) theformal agricultural knowledge system embracingresearchers, extensionists, subject-matter specialists,linkage activities and methods; (b) the client system,i.e. farmers (the end users of technologies); and (c)problems affecting the linkage activities.

Depending on the country, linkage activities areusually managed at varying administrative levels –national, regional, state and local levels. The agriculturalresearch and extension system identifies farm familiesas their target and the hub around which researchersand extensionists focus their actions. The constraintswhich hinder research–extension linkage potentiallyaffect the agricultural output of farmers, whereaseffective links will allow farmers to enhance their outputthrough the availability of farming innovations.

This study is based on the premise that agriculturalresearch and extension organisations are established asinstruments for promoting agricultural development, andthat effective linkages between these organisations helpthem to achieve their goal. Since the methods of forginglinks between research and extension organisations differfrom one situation to another and from country tocountry, this paper presents five types of agriculturalresearch–extension linkages, as found in seven countries:Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Nigeria,Tanzania, and Thailand.

The study on which this paper is based sought toanswer the following questions: What form of research–extension linkage exists in each of the seven countries?How are the procedures for linking research stationswith extension centres managed in each country? Whatare the key weaknesses in the research–extensionlinkage in a given country? How can weak links bestrengthened to improve agricultural communicationbetween research and extension organisations in thecountries under study?

2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGYThis study formulated a theoretical framework ofagricultural research–extension linkages from a globalperspective and identified the positions of variouscountries within the framework. A survey was thenundertaken in seven countries to collect information toelaborate and substantiate the linkage types in the

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Research Extension

Farmers

Figure 1 The connection between the main actorsin the agricultural research–extensionlinkage system

Agricultural Research and Extension Network Paper 106

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theoretical framework. This study focused exclusivelyon formal public-sector linkage mechanisms. It did notexamine informal linkages, commercial or profit-orientedresearch and extension systems.

The seven countries surveyed were selected on thebasis of world regional groupings and developmentlevels using the World Bank economic classificationsystem in which countries are grouped into six categories(World Bank, 1992). Japan was chosen from high-incomeand Organisation for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD) countries; South Korea from high-debt and medium-income countries; Thailand from low-debt and medium-income countries; Mexico from heavy-

debt and lower medium-income countries; Indonesiafrom high-debt and low-income countries; Nigeria andTanzania from heavy-debt, lower low-income countries.Apart from Japan which was purposely selected, theother six countries were randomly selected from regionalgroupings.

Personal interviews, field visits and questionnaireswere used to collect information. In each country 30agricultural research and extension personnel and 10key farmers contributed information to the survey.Official publications of research institutes, extensionorganisations, and ministries of agriculture constitutedsecondary sources of data.

Figure 2 A conceptual schema for the functioning of research–extension linkages

Special feedback

Target

Impingement

PROBLEMS- Organisational issues- Method of linkage- Finance- Adaptive trials

Formal agricultural knowledge system

Extensionist(Technoloy dissemination)

Subject-matterspecialist(Liaison service)

Researcher(TechnologyGeneration)

Linkage methods- Formal and- Informal methods

Administrative levels ofoperations1. National and regional2. Provincial/State3. Local/grassroot

Link activities

- Identifying research needs- On-farm experiments- Joint evaluation- Committee meetings- Farmers’ participatory actions

Farm families(end-users ofinnovations)

CLIENTSYSTEM

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3 A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FORRESEARCH–EXTENSION LINKAGES

A theoretical classification framework was fashioned toprovide a general basis through which the linkage formsof non-privatised public research–extension within theseven countries could be discerned.

Forms of research–extension linkageThe type of research–extension linkage in a givencountry can be determined by using the theoreticalframework embodied in the five forms of linkage listedbelow. The overall criteria used in the theoreticalclassification of linkage forms are: (1) the status ofagricultural research and extension organisations relativeto one another, and (2) the transfer methods of sourcingresearch problems, deciding on research themes, andresearch results – these methods are classified as eithertop-down or bottom-up approaches.Form A: Research and extension organisations operate

at the same status in a country, using a bottom-up approach in decision-making on linkageactivities.

Form B: Both organisations have the same operativestatus, using a top-down approach to managethe links.

Form C: Research and extension organisations haveunequal status, and the linkage systemoperates according to a bottom-upmanagement approach.

Form D: Both organisations are unequal in status, andthe linkages operate according to a top-downmanagement approach.

Form E: There is no organised linkage system betweenagricultural research and extensionorganisations.

The bottom-up method of sourcing research problemsand decision-making in linkage forms A and C presumethat these forms of linkage work more efficiently ifprefectural, provincial or state governments possess theirown independent agricultural research stations andextension agencies.

Factors and indicators of linkage formsThe study considered five factors in identifying the formsof linkage: the size of the national research system; sizeof the extension service; level of adult literacy; theorganisation of agricultural administration; andagricultural policy in terms of the importance attachedto research and extension. The five indicators used tomeasure the five factors were: (i) number of researchinstitutes/experiment stations at national and state levels;(ii) ratio of extension workers to farm families; (iii)percentage of adults with basic education; (iv) theorganisational nature of agricultural administration; (v)research and extension budgets as a percentage of thenational agriculture budget, together with the existenceof laws and regulations for agricultural policy. Theindicators of research–extension linkage factors as theyapply to Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, South Korea,Tanzania, and Thailand are shown in Table 1.

4 FORMS OF RESEARCH–EXTENSIONLINKAGE IN SEVEN COUNTRIES

IndonesiaThe Agency for Agricultural Research and Development(AARD) administers the 16 national research centres/institutes in Indonesia on behalf of the national Ministryof Agriculture. There are no independent researchcentres operating at provincial level. The agriculturalextension service is controlled by the Bureau forAgricultural Extension (BAE), under the Ministry ofAgriculture. The BAE supervises extension services atall levels through regional offices and works incollaboration with the heads of districts and villages. Aspart of the BAE, the Agricultural Extension andInformation Centre (AEIC) operates at district level. Atthe sub-district level is the Agricultural Extension Centre(AEC); 10–20 field extension workers are attached toeach AEC.

The Rural Socioeconomic Research Centre of AARDis responsible for monitoring all on-farm experimentsin the regions and provinces. These on-farm experimentsare conducted by the Assessment Institute for AgriculturalTechnology (AIAT) at provincial level, and by theAgricultural Technology Assessment Place (a substationof AIAT) at village level. Adaptive research staff of AIATwork with subject-matter specialists to developtechnology packages which are then passed on to theextension centres. AIAT thus exists as a linkage interfacebetween research and extension organisations inIndonesia.

The AECs, subject-matter specialists and researchersall serve as sources of research needs, but only nationalresearchers make final decisions in selecting researchproblems and themes. The AECs receive innovationpackages from research centres through the subject-matter specialists deployed to AIAT. Although there hasrecently been more interaction between nationalresearch staff, extensionists and farmers at the provinciallevel, this heightened interaction has not led to finaldecisions on linkage activities being controlled at theprovincial and district levels: the management ofagricultural research–extension linkages in Indonesiadepends mainly on AARD-supervised institutes and isstill largely a top-down approach.

With a nationally controlled research–extensionlinkage system in which decision-making is concentratedin the hands of national officers, and AEICs and nationalresearch centres are unequal in status, research–extension links in Indonesia can be classified as form Dof the theoretical framework.

JapanJapan’s 13 national research institutes have networkswith 255 prefectural research institutes and experimentstations through six national agricultural experimentstations. Since the national government does not directlyoffer extension services, agricultural research–extensionlinkage in Japan operates at the prefecture (state) level.It is a bottom-up management system in which decisions

Agricu

ltura

l Resea

rch a

nd

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sion N

etwork P

aper 1

06

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Table 1 Indicators of research–extension linkage forms: the outlook of seven countries

*Figure given is for the State of Morelos, since the Federal Government has no budget for extension services.Note: Budget figures are for 1997/98, but in Indonesia and Tanzania they are for 1996/97.

Source: Agbamu (1998)

Tanzania

3

-

1:1000

66.8%

Simpleorganisationalarrangement withregional andprovincial structure

5

1.4%

1.2%

Yes

Thailand

7

-

1:1000

93.5%

Semi autonomousdepartments inMinistry ofAgriculture andCooperatives. 9

4.5%

8.5%

Yes

South Korea

13

-

1:500

98.0%

A central systemwith hugecommand structure

5

2.2%

1.5%

Yes

Nigeria

19

-

1:1615

55.6%

Under two tiers ofgovernmentstructure with ameasure of federalcontrol

6

3.0%

2.1%

Yes

Mexico

15

32

1:800

89.2%

Complex anddecentralised withmore roles to states

5

7.7*%

10.0*%

Yes

Japan

19

255

1:252

99.0%

Decentralised andmany roles given toprefectures

8

1.8%

1.0%

Yes

Indonesia

16

-

1:1200

83.2%

Webbed with localleadership in acentralised system

7

8.0%

6.0%

Yes

Indicators

1 (a) Number ofnational researchinstitutes

(b)Number of researchinstitutes/experimentalstation operating atstate level

2 Ratio of extensionworkers to farm families

3 Adult literacy(percentage of totalpopulation with basiceducation)

4 (a) Nature ofagriculturaladministration

(b)Number of bureaux/department/agencies inagricultural ministry

5 Importance attachedto research andextension

(a) Research budget aspercentage of nationalagricultural budget

(b)Extension budget aspercentage of nationalagricultural budget

(c) Existence of policylaws and regulations


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on linkage activities are taken at prefecture level withoutthe direct involvement of national officers.

Research–extension linkage involves the use ofsubject-matter specialists, technical committees, jointstudy meetings, and staff exchanges between prefecturalresearch and extension organisations. Farmers’ problemsand needs are compulsorily sourced by district extensioncentres from farmers, agro-cooperative societies, schools,and town/village administrative offices. Local needsidentified by extensionists are supplemented with thoseidentified by researchers and subject-matter specialists.In general, decisions on the selection of farmers’problems/needs as annual research themes are finalisedat prefectural level by a committee comprised ofresearchers, administrators, subject-matter specialists,extension workers, farmers’ representatives andknowledgeable persons. Although national officers arenot directly involved in this process, they make inputby putting forward unresolved research themes that havebeen referred to them and by highlighting policydirectives on research themes from the National Ministryof Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.

The Japanese research–extension system ischaracterised as form A; a bottom-up approach withprefectural research and extension organisations of equalstatus.

MexicoThe seven main agricultural research institutes and eightregional experimental stations in Mexico fall under theauthority of the Federal Secretariat of Ranch, Agriculture& Rural Development. The university-based NationalAgriculture, Livestock and Forestry Research Institute(INIFAP) is the key organisation in the promotion ofresearch–extension linkages at national level. INIFAPforms one of the seven main institutes and has officesin each state for networking with local extensionworkers. Under the National Alliance Programme, INIFAPdistributes publications on on-farm technology testing,including validation and demonstration trials.

At state level, each of the 32 states has an agriculturalexperimental station under the State Secretariat of theAgriculture Department (SEDAGRO). SEDAGRO’sDirectorate of Rural Development (DDR) has extensionoffices and farmers’ support centres in state zones,municipalities and villages. It is the DDR that employssubject-matter specialists and extension workers. Thestate-level research–extension linkage is promotedthrough meetings between researchers from stateexperimental stations and DDR and through jointactivities between DDR, state researchers, INIFAP andnetworks of farmers’ foundations.

The Mexican research–extension linkage systemallows the devolution of decision-making power to statesand farmers’ cooperatives. Farmers’ foundations and non-governmental organisations take final decisions onresearch needs/problems for the projects they financeor undertake jointly with government research stations.

With research–extension linkages operating at statelevel, the lower status of extension service, and thestrong participation of farmers’ cooperatives in decision-making, the Mexican system is classed as form C of thetheoretical framework.

NigeriaAll the agricultural, forestry and fisheries researchinstitutes in Nigeria are owned by the federalgovernment; the states have no research institutes. Eachof the 36 states is divided into extension zones, blocksand cells. The extension workers and subject-matterspecialists of the state Agricultural DevelopmentProgrammes (ADPs) depend on the national researchsystem for most technologies. Nigeria is divided intofive ecological regions. Five regional coordinatingresearch institutes (operating under the NationalAgricultural Research Project) oversee the research needsand coordinate farming systems research activities ineach ecological region.

Research–extension linkages are promoted at regionallevel through regional research–extension committeesand quarterly technology review meetings involvingsubject-matter specialists. In addition, the NationalAgricultural Extension and Research Liaison Service(NAERLS) operates through the programmes of eachnational research institute and through NAERLS regionaloffices. The Federal Agricultural Coordinating Unit workswith collaborating institutions (research institutes,universities, and ADPs) in coordinating linkage activities.Although provision is made for farm input traders toparticipate in Nigeria’s research–extension-farmer-inputsupply linkage system, their level of participation hasbeen very weak.

The identification of annual research needs is donethrough a joint problem diagnostic survey in each stateby staff of national research institutes, universities andstate ADPs. There is lesser involvement of villageextension agents and block extension supervisors incollating farmers’ needs for the formulation of researchthemes and plans. Although state ADP officers andnational researchers participate in discussing the researchproblems at regional level, national officers assumepower in finalising decisions on research themes(without farmers’ representation). Most decisions on thedirection of linkage activities are taken from above (atnational level), and research and extension organisationsin Nigeria are unequal in status. For these reasons,Nigeria is best categorised as form D of the theoreticalframework

South Korea (Republic of Korea)Agricultural research and extension in South Korea areintegrated under a huge national institution called theRural Development Administration (RDA) withheadquarters in Seoul. The RDA, which is an organ ofthe Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, has jurisdictionover nine Provincial RDA (PRDA), nine research


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institutes, four regional experiment stations, 32 location-specific commodity experimental sites, 154 city/countyextension offices, and 1,380 farmers’ consulting offices.To ensure the harmonisation of agricultural extensionprogrammes between national and local levels, thefunding of extension services comes from national,provincial, and city/county governments.

In South Korea, linkages between research andextension are made easier by virtue of the fact thatboth are administered by the same institution. Linkagesare also promoted through joint evaluation committeesand on-farm adaptive experimental activities. Farmers’problems are identified through data collected byresearchers, and final decisions regarding researchthemes are jointly taken by researchers, subject-matterspecialists and other officers. The results of researchare screened and subjected to economic analysis byresearch evaluation committees. Subject-matterspecialists from the extension management bureau ofRDA participate in research planing and evaluationactivities. Similarly, researchers participate in extensionprogrammes and have opportunities to review theapplicability of their research findings.

Both the research management bureau and theextension management bureau have equal status insidethe RDA/PRDA. Research–extension linkages areadministered at national level, and decisions from thetop are passed down to lower levels of theadministration. The Korean system thus fits linkage formB of the theoretical framework.

TanzaniaIn Tanzania, research and extension are in differentdivisions in the Ministry of Agriculture and linkagemechanisms are not clearly spelt out. The three nationalresearch institutes fall under the authority of the Divisionof Research and Training and have substations in the47 provinces. The Farming Systems Research–ExtensionProgramme – also under the Division of Research andTraining – is managed by zonal directors andimplemented at provincial level through Liaison Offices.Extension falls under the authority of the Division ofAgriculture and Livestock Extension Services. Agricultureand Livestock development officers are stationed atregional level, with agricultural extension officers andsubject-matter specialists based in the provincialheadquarters. District-level extension officers and village-level farm advisers use the training and visit extensiontechnique. Although the official link between researchersand extensionists is weak (e.g. researchers and subject-matter specialists meet once a year), extension officersand subject-matter specialists unofficially informresearchers about farmers’ problems. Subject-matterspecialists are also informally involved in on-farm trials.Farmers and outsiders are mobilised to participate inresearch–extension linkage programmes, particularly inrice production.

Currently, the Tanzanian research–extension systemis classified as linkage form D due to the unequal statusbetween research and extension organisations, and theconcentration of power at national headquarters. ForTanzania to enhance the linkage between research andextension, it will have to improve the quality of itsextension staff through training, undertake institutionalreorganisation to empower the provinces, increasefunding for linkage activities and provide better meansof transportation for district/village-level officers.

ThailandThe agricultural research system in Thailand is not yetintegrated under a single authority at the national level.Under Thailand’s Ministry of Agriculture andCooperatives, there are departments of agriculture,agricultural extension, livestock, irrigation, forestry,fisheries, land development and others. Each of thesedepartments has research institutes which areadministered separately. The provincial governmentshave no independent research stations.

The Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE) islinked to regional extension offices, and these areconnected to the provincial agricultural extension offices.There are also district and sub-district extension offices.The extension services aim to raise farmers’ income/quality of life by focusing on the promotion of improvedcrop and livestock technology, crop protection andinput/credit support. The subject-matter specialists arebased in the provinces. Provincial extension officesformally receive research results by requesting researchreports or when DOAE arranges a seminar, conferenceor group training; staff can also informally obtain resultsfrom the mass media on a personal interest basis.

It was found that only researchers identify farmers’needs and take decisions on resarch themes. Apart frommeetings between researchers and subject-matterspecialists twice a year, there is no other evidence ofroutine linkage mechanisms between research andextension. There is no joint evaluation of on-farm trials,no farmers’ participation, no joint decision-making, andno staff exchanges. Since there is no systematisedresearch–extension linkage, Thailand can be classifiedas form E of the theoretical framework.

5 CONCLUSIONThis paper has presented evidence from seven countriesof the diversity of agricultural research–extension linkagesystems prevalent around the world. This diversity isthe result of contrasting sociocultural situations and thedifferent development models adopted by differentcountries.

The specific formal linkage mechanisms in the variouscountries studied include:1. apex management with research, extension and

training in the same institution;2. matrix management i.e. research and extension as


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semi-autonomous bodies under the same ministry;3. coordinating committees/meetings;4. communication units or liaison departments;5. use of a task force;6. staff exchanges;7. cooperation between universities’ research

programmes and extension organisations.In addition, informal linkage mechanisms based on

friendship and mutual interest include the promotion ofjoint social activities and the use of existing personal ties.

Japan’s research–extension linkage system offers arange of opportunities for farmers’ participation in jointdecision-making on research themes at the prefecturelevel. The strong research–extension linkage in Japancan partly be attributed to the exchange of staff betweenagricultural research and extension organisations,enabling personnel to work for a specified time in eachother’s establishment.

In Indonesia, Nigeria and Korea the research–extension system is such that decision-making power isconcentrated at the top, in the hands of national researchofficers. In order to strengthen the Indonesian linkagesystem, each province should have its own experimentstation; researchers and extension personnel should meetmore often; and the AECs should be more activelyinvolved in identifying farmers’ problems. It isrecommended that Nigeria should change its agriculturalresearch policy to allow state governments to controlagricultural research stations and conduct researchappropriate to the distinctive characteristics of each state.In the Republic of Korea, the placement of researchand extension in one institution is commendable butgreater devolution of power to PRDA would be desirable.

In Tanzania and Thailand, bold institutional reformswill be required to improve the linkages betweenagricultural research and extension. In Mexico, the gapin status between extension and research needs to benarrowed for greater linkage between the two systems.

The findings of this study show that policy changes,institutional reorganisation, and the strengthening oforganisations are required to enhance research–extension linkages in developing countries. This paperhas provided a theoretical framework through whichglobal agricultural research–extension systems can beanalysed in order to highlight specific ways in whichresearch–extension linkages can be improved.

REFERENCESAgbamu, J.U. (1998) ‘A study on agricultural research–

extension linkages: with focus on Nigeria and Japan’.Ph.D. thesis, Tokyo University of Agriculture.

Havelock, R.G. (1986) ‘Linkage: a key to understandingthe knowledge system’ in G.M. Beal, W. Dissanayakeand S. Konoshima, (eds) Knowledge Generation,Exchange and Utilisation. Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press.

World Bank (1992) Economic Classification of Countries.Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Acknowledgements

This study was funded by the Monbusho Award of the Govt. ofJapan. I wish to thank the following persons for their support duringthe study: Professor Yasuki Fujita of Tokyo University of Agriculture,Japan, Professor Sung Soo Kim in South Korea, Assoc. ProfessorTunji Arokoyo and Mr Kolawole Adebayo in Nigeria, MessrsHaruhiko Sakamoto and Rinzo Isokawa for their help in Indonesiaand Mexico respectively, Assoc. Professor (Mrs) ChatchareeNaritoom in Thailand and Mr Noboru Koibuchi in Tanzania.


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106b. DIFFERENT WAYS OF FINANCING AGRICULTURAL EXTENSIONAnne W. van den Ban

with information. In contrast, only one person ororganisation benefits from a private good. Extension isusually somewhere in between a public and a privategood, but how close it is to either depends on thesituation (Beynon et al., 1998).

What kind of farmer decision-making is the extensionorganisation trying to influence? This might include:• adoption of technologies;

• management of technologies;

• optimal use of resources by a farmer;

• change in farming systems;

• changes in the supply of inputs/credit and themarketing of products;

• transfer of the farm to the next generation;

• changing from farming to another occupation;

• collective decision-making on resource use and onthe way farmers try to influence government policies(van den Ban, 1998).In several developing countries, e.g. India, extension

mainly places attention on the adoption of innovations,while in many former communist countries mostattention is on investment and marketing decisions.Farmers all over the world may need support with thewhole range of decisions.

1 INTRODUCTIONIn most countries agricultural extension has long beenprovided by a government service paid for by taxpayers.More recently a variety of ways to finance extensionhas emerged mainly as a result of the tendency toprivatise government services and the increasing rolecommercial companies play in agricultural research andextension. This raises the question: What are theimplications of the ways in which agricultural extensionorganisations are financed regarding the service that isprovided to farmers? This paper addresses this questionby focusing on the principles underlying decisionsrelating to optimal funding sources for extension.

Since very little research has been published on thisquestion to date, this paper presents a conceptualframework that can be used in analysing theseimplications. It also puts forward some hypotheses forfurther research, though there remains the question ofwho might be willing to fund such research. This paperwill show that decisions regarding how extension isfinanced have important implications for farmers andfor the development of national agriculture.

2 FACTORS INFLUENCED BY THE WAYSIN WHICH AN EXTENSIONORGANISATION IS FINANCED

Box 1 lists the major ways in which extension organisationscan be financed. The mechanisms through which anextension organisation is financed can affect the decisionsmade by the extension organisation relating to:• goals;

• target groups;

• extension methods used;

• extension messages;

• internal organisation;

• cooperation with other organisations promotingagricultural development.Decisions that are made regarding these issues carry

with them a number of implications for the ways inwhich extension supports farmers. For example, doesone teach farmers to use technologies which incorporateinformation and skills in specific devices and products(seeds, agrochemicals, machinery, etc.), or theinformation and skills of management practices?1

Economists make a distinction between public andprivate goods. Everybody can benefit from a public good,i.e. it is not exclusively or excludably available to thosewho have paid for it. A public good is not subtractable,i.e it is still possible for others to use the good after ithas been used by someone – this is usually the case

Box 1 Extension organisations can be financed by:

1. a government service paid for by taxpayers;2. a government service paid for by a levy on certain agricultural

products;3. a commercial company selling inputs to farmers and/or

buying their products, which in its relationship with itscustomers also uses extension;

4. a farmers’ association which pays for extension from itsmembership fees;

5. a farmers’ association which is subsidised by the government;6. a non-governmental organisation (NGO) which is financed

by donations from inside or outside the country and/or bycommercial companies for public relations purposes;

7. an NGO which is financed by subsidies from or contractswith the government (either the national or a donorgovernment);

8. a consulting firm which charges a fee from the farmers, whoare its customers;

9. a publishing firm which sells agricultural journals or otherpublications to farmers;

10. different combinations of the above. For example, it ispossible for a government to pay the salaries of extensionagents, whilst most of the operational expenses are coveredby a farmers’ association, or for a commercially-orientedcooperative or input-supply company to send a farm journalto its members/customers.


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Is decision-making within the extension programmecentralised or decentralised? To whom are extensionagents accountable? (Edwards and Hulme, 1996) Thesefactors are interrelated; for instance information on adecision to adopt a technology is less excludable thaninformation on the transfer of the farm to the nextgeneration.

3 WHY DO DIFFERENT ACTORSFINANCE AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION?

Actors who finance an agricultural extension organisationdo so because they see it as a method to reach theirown goals. Since the goals of different actors in anagricultural knowledge and information system (AKIS)are different, so are their reasons for investing inextension.

GovernmentIn an important article, Bennett (1996) analysed thesituations in which a government should invest inagricultural extension. He concluded that governmentshould finance agricultural extension in the four casesdescribed in Box 2. Each of these situations is describedin more detail in the paragraphs that follow.i. Government should invest in agricultural extension

when the public benefits more from extension thanthe participants. Extension work on the use offertilisers illustrates this point. A soil test can showthe optimal quantity of potash fertilisers specific fora crop in a particular field. Nearly all the profit fromthis knowledge is for the individual farmer cultivatingthe field, which makes it hard to defend that thegovernment should pay for this advice. The situationis different when the extension organisation tries toteach farmers in a community to use fertilisers at theoptimal time. Extension agents will not have time toteach this to all farmers individually. Therefore theymay discuss this at a farmers’ meeting and contactthe opinion leaders personally in the expectationthat other farmers will follow their example. Whereasthe soil test was a private good, through teachingopinion leaders extension becomes more of a publicgood. There is less reason to charge farmers for thisinformation, which enables them to demonstrate totheir neighbours that they can get higher yields byspreading fertilisers at the right time. Teachingfarmers how to interpret the soil test themselves isanother approach the extension organisation can use.To defend that this should be (partly) paid for bytaxpayers one can argue that the government alsosubsidises other kinds of education and that thefarmer who has learned how to interpret a soil testmay teach this to his colleagues.

There is a lot of research which shows thatinvestments in agricultural research and extensionoften have a high rate of return. A major return isthat these investments reduce the costs of producingfood that, on a large scale, results in a reduction offood prices for the consumers and makes it more

possible for farmers to compete on the world market(Beynon, 1998). This also decreases the need forthe government to support prices of agriculturalproducts.

It depends on the market situation whether thebenefits are mainly for the consumers or for theproducers. If a country produces coffee for exportand contributes 0.1 per cent to world production,increased productivity of its coffee farmers will notchange market prices but it can increase the incomeof these farmers considerably. If a country producesand consumes nearly all its rice, an increase in riceyields will be a major benefit for consumers throughlower prices but farm families are also consumers.In this case it can be very profitable for consumersto finance extension on rice production with thetaxes they pay. An example is the change in milkproduction in India. Between 1978 and 1993 milkproduction in this country increased by 114 per centHowever, the real consumer price of the milkdecreased by 32 per cent, mainly because farmerslearned to produce, process and market milk in amore efficient way thus benefiting consumersconsiderably (Candler and Kumar, 1998).

In many countries governments have supportedthe income of their farmers by restricting the importof agricultural products. The regulations of the WorldTrade Organization make it increasingly difficult toachieve this goal in this way. Improving thecompetitiveness of farmers by financing agriculturalresearch and extension may be a more effective andless costly way. However, voters may realise whatthey have to pay in taxes to finance research andextension, but not what they would pay if importduties on food products were raised.

ii. Is this a kind of extension which can be done betteror cheaper by the government than by others? Onereason to privatise government extension services isthat these are often bureaucratic organisations whichare not very cost conscious. Many observers havenoticed that government extension organisations,especially in developing countries, do not performtheir role in a very efficient way. However, this doesnot imply that there are no extension roles whichcan be performed better by a government agencythan by private consultants.

.

Box 2 Situations in which a government shouldinvest in agricultural extension

i. when the general public benefits more from extension thanthe individual participants;

ii. for a type of extension which can be done better or cheaperby the government than by others;

iii. when government agricultural development programmes canbe made more effective if they are combined with extension;

iv. when necessary public benefits are not sufficiently providedby private enterprise.


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Bell (1998) stresses that a government extensionorganisation tries to help a community to develop,whereas a consulting firm helps individual farmersto increase their income. Without increased incomes,farmers are not willing to pay the consultancy feewhich is needed by the firm to make a profit. Thisinfluences the choice of extension methods and oftarget groups. For example, a demonstration can bea very effective way of introducing improved farmpractices in a community, but the consulting firmwill not use this method if it cannot charge eachfarmer who learns from it.

Usually a consulting firm will work with only asmall proportion of the farmers and will not stimulatethem to teach other farmers what they have learned,unlike government extension services who oftenencourage them to pass on knowledge. Farmers wholearn from opinion leaders may feel less need topay a consultant for his services. In a situation likethis a government extension service may prove tobe cheaper and better than a consulting firm.

iii. Government agricultural development programmescan be made more effective if they are combinedwith extension. For instance many governmentssubsidise improvements in infrastructure, e.g.irrigation, in order to promote agricultural develop-ment. These improvements open opportunities forfarmers to increase their income by growing cropswith a higher value. The sooner and more effectivelythey use these opportunities, the higher the rate ofreturn on these investments in infrastructure.Extension can teach farmers to use theseopportunities rapidly and effectively. Therefore theIndian government has for some years financed anextension programme as part of their irrigationprojects. These investments in extension are lowcompared to the investments in the irrigation project.

iv. Government should invest in agricultural extensionservices when public benefits which are considerednecessary by society are not sufficiently providedby the private sector. For instance, much of theextension work on plant protection is done bycompanies selling pesticides. One would not expectthem to teach farmers to reduce their use of pesticidesby adopting integrated pest management (IPM), butin some situations lowered pesticide use is nowpossible. Since this is a change which is also desirablefor environmental reasons the government maydecide to finance an IPM extension programme.

Often a goal of government policy is to decreasepoverty. In many countries a large proportion of thepoor are small farmers, and extension can be a wayto decrease their poverty. Therefore a governmentextension service might, but not always does, focusits attention on small farmers. This is not profitablefor a commercial company or a consulting firm,unless they are paid by government for workingwith this target group.

In poor countries it is difficult for many farmersto find the money needed to pay for extension (e.g.Rasheed Sulaiman and Gadewar, 1994). A farmerwhose family consumes 70 per cent of productionand who sells 30 per cent, will usually not be ableto buy the help of a consultant. From the moneyearned from sales the farmer also has to pay forclothes, school fees, medicines and other itemsneeded by the family. For a poultry farmer in theNetherlands, whose family consumes 0.01 per centof the eggs produced, the situation is quite different.Too often donors and foreign experts insist on policychanges which might be desirable for their homecountry but not for a developing country.There have been other reasons to privatise

government agricultural extension organisations inindustrial countries. In many of these countries thepricing policy results in the over-production ofagricultural products, and it is quite expensive for thegovernment to store and dispose of these surpluses. Inthis situation it does not make sense for the governmentto finance an agricultural extension service, which hasthe effect of increasing agricultural production andraising the cost of disposing of these surpluses.

In many developing countries the situation is quitedifferent. There the demand for agricultural products isincreasing rapidly, both through population growth andthrough an increase in average income, which makes itpossible to eat more expensive foods. It is often difficultto increase food production at the same rate as theincrease in demand and also to find the foreign exchangeneeded to import food. Therefore a major goal ofgovernment policy is to increase food production (Umaliand Schwartz, 1994). A danger in developing countriesis the privatisation of extension services without realisingthe degree to which investments in extension cancontribute to the national policy to meet the growingdemand for food from local production.

Financing agricultural extension by the governmentcan work well if the goals of the agricultural policy ofthe government are felt by the farmers to be in theirinterest. In European countries this was the case shortlyafter the war when increasing agricultural productionwas a major goal. However this is no longer the casenow the government tries to prevent the production ofsurpluses of agricultural products and is seriouslyconcerned about the environmental problems causedby intensive farming. The extension agents can onlyachieve changes among farmers if farmers are convincedthat it is in their interests to change. By promotingchanges which are popular with farmers, extensionagents can come into conflict with their employers, whoare attempting to realise the goals of the governmentagricultural policy. This was one reason for theprivatisation agricultural extension in the Netherlands,where the government expected their extension agentsto promote environmental policies which decreased farmincome (Tacken, 1998).


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During the last decade budget deficits have forcedmany governments to reduce their expenditures.Whether this is done by reducing the extension budgetor other budgets depends partly on political power. Inmost developing countries urban dwellers have morepolitical power than those in rural areas. In manyindustrial countries the proportion of the labour forceworking in agriculture has decreased to less than fiveper cent; as a result farmers no longer have muchpolitical power. In addition, giving subsidies to farmersmay be more beneficial to politicians in helping themto be re-elected than to improving extension.

In most countries the government agriculturalextension service is funded by the national government,but in the USA it is partly paid for by local government.This has the advantage that the budget of an extensionunit depends partly on the citizens’ satisfaction with theservices provided by the local unit. If agriculturalextension is paid by the national government, hard workby a group of extension agents will have very littleinfluence on their budget. In this way some of theadvantages of privatisation of extension are realisedwithout resulting in the disadvantages mentioned in thispaper.

Commercial companiesCommercial companies, including farmers’ cooperatives,try to make a profit through trade. They will invest inextension only if they are convinced that this willpromote their trade. It is usually in the interests of boththe company and their customers that their productsare used well. For example, a pesticide will not work ifit is used on the wrong disease or applied at the wrongtime. A farmer who uses a pesticide incorrectly mayadvise his or her colleagues against the pesticide, thusdecreasing the sales of the pesticide company. It istherefore in the interest of the company to teach itscustomers how to use their products properly.

In the long term, a cooperative or commercialcompany will only make a profit if it is able to respondto the needs of the market. This may make it necessaryto teach farmers how to produce the products for whichthere is a market demand. For instance, the Tamil NaduMilk Producers’ Federation, an Indian cooperative, sawthat with increasing prosperity a market developed fordairy products with a higher value. Since it is onlypossible to produce high-value dairy products from cleanmilk, the Tamil Nadu Milk Producers’ Federation taughtfarmers in some villages how to produce clean milk,for which the Federation paid a better price. Thisextension campaign has been quite profitable both forthe farmers in these villages and for the Federation(Ambalavanan, 1999).

For a long time farmers have produced mainly bulkproducts. In other branches of the economy brands havebeen developed through which producers try to presentthe image that their particular product is of better qualitythan that of their competitors and therefore worth a

higher price. A similar development is now evolving infood production, particularly for niche markets such asorganic produce. In order to be able to guarantee thequality of such produce, the marketing company aimsto control the whole chain from the producer toconsumer, because at each link in this chain somethingmight happen which reduces the quality of the product.

In commercially-oriented agricultural production itis in the interests of both banks and some commercialcompanies that farmers are successful. The probabilitythat a farmer is able to repay a loan from a bank dependson whether or not the loan has been invested for agood return without too much risk. Many banks haverealised that it is profitable for them to advise their clientson investment decisions and sometimes also on otheraspects of farm management. It can also be in the interestof input supply companies for their customers to earnwell. In industrial countries many farmers will have tostop farming in the next decade because agriculture isno longer profitable. A particular input supply companywants a smaller proportion of its customers to stopfarming than that of its competitors. This can make itprofitable for such a company to teach its customershow to increase their income, e.g. by producing thekind and quality of products for which there is a goodmarket. But commercial companies will only give theircustomers advice on a small proportion of the decisionsfarmers have to make because it is not profitable forthem to advise on the other decisions (Schwartz, 1994).

Farmers’ associationsLarge and influential farmers’ associations perform twomain roles: (i) they try to influence collective decisionsby the government and others in such a way that theinterests of their members are taken into account; and(ii) they support their members in fields for which theyhave specialised knowledge. For example, a farmers’association may represent its members in a conflict withthe government over land use regulations or taxassessment.

Government decisions are increasingly taken at adistance from farmers, e.g. in the World TradeOrganisation. It is difficult to show farmers that it isprofitable for them to be a member of an associationwhich is in turn a member of an organisation, which isitself a member of an organisation representing them atthese top-level decisions. For the survival of the farmers’association it is therefore important to show the farmersthat it pays to be a member; this is achieved by providingindividual assistance to members, i.e. through performingthe second role. Such assistance can be provided throughextension, but the farmers’ association should find aniche in the agricultural knowledge and informationsystem where it has a competitive advantage over otheractors. This will not be the same niche in all countries.

In Denmark, for example, farmers’ associations havelong played an important role in providing advice onproduction technologies (Albrecht, 1954). Farmers’


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associations in the Netherlands, in contrast, have givenmuch attention to advice on contracts for the transfer ofthe farm to the next generation. In recent years, however,the advisory service of the Dutch farmers’ associationshas developed into competing consulting firms, such asthe privatised former government extension service DLV.Associations of producers of a certain crop or animalcan play a useful role in giving technical and economicadvice to their members. Advisers of a general extensionorganisation, e.g. a department of the Ministry ofAgriculture, may lack the specialised knowledge to givegood advice for a particular branch of agriculture. Wesee this for instance in an association of grape growersin India.

Farmers’ associations cannot only play a useful roleby employing extension agents but also by puttingpressure on research and extension organisations to workin a more demand-driven and client-oriented way(Collion and Rondot, 1998). However, one difficultymight be that the farmers representing the associationare themselves relatively well educated and resourcerich and may not fully understand the problems ofresource-poor farmers with a low level of education(Likert and Lippitt, 1953).

Consultancy and accounting firmsConsultants who advise farmers for a fee have existedin many countries for a long time. They have been ableto compete with the free advice given by governmentextension services because they visited their customersmore frequently, providing services which aneducational agency could not provide (e.g. as a pestscout) and they had more specialised knowledge ofspecific farming systems. This last point has becomemore important with the increasing specialisation amongfarmers; to some extent private veterinarians have alsobeen working in this way.

With the privatisation of government extensionorganisations the market for consultancy services hasincreased rapidly. In several countries the governmentextension organisation has been transformed into acommercial consultancy firm. The transformationrequired a change in attitudes of the staff members, butnot everyone was able to make this change. In theNetherlands more than 60 per cent of the extensionagents had to be replaced, mainly because they couldnot make enough profit for their firm (Duijsings, 1998).Having worked both as an extension agent and as aconsultant, Bell (1998) made an interesting analysis ofthe differences between extension and consultancy:‘extension is a process, hopefully, to successfuldevelopment and change in a farming community’,whereas ‘consultancy is a business activity providingservices in the market place’.

Consultancy firms do business in the field ofagriculture because they see a possibility to make aprofit by advising farmers on particular issues. Farmersare most willing to pay for a tailor-made service, e.g. to

help them to make decisions regarding investments andother issues for which they have limited experience.Large farmers are better able to pay the necessaryconsultancy fee than small farmers. Consultancy firmsmay also enter areas related to agriculture, particularlyif they see possibilities for profit: a consultancy firmmay advise a municipality on the maintenance of cityparks, for example. It may also expand its operationsto other countries: the former Dutch governmentextension service, DLV, now works in over 30 countries,helping farmers to compete with Dutch farmers.

Many former government extension services whichhave been privatised can only make a profit if theyhave a contract with the government to do extensionwork on problems which the government considersimportant, e.g. the reduction in the use of agrochemicals.In several Central European countries the governmentgives farmers a voucher which they can use to pay partof the costs of private extension services. In Hungarythe introduction of these vouchers has resulted in theestablishment of a large number of small consultancyfirms, but only those firms which are certified by theMinistry of Agriculture will be paid by the governmentfor the vouchers they receive from farmers. To receivesuch certification the staff of these firms have toparticipate in training courses taught by researchers orstaff members of universities to ensure that they areable to do their job well (Kozari, 1999).

In countries where farmers have to pay income tax,the accountants who prepare tax declarations have alsoentered into consultancy since they keep records whichcan be used for making better farm managementdecisions. Such firms also prepare the business plansrequired by a bank before honouring a loan application.

Non-governmental organisationsIt is difficult to generalise about NGOs because theydisplay a wide range of variation in their aims andmotivations. An NGO can be a church relatedorganisation which for religious reasons aims to improvethe welfare of poor people. It can also be a group ofentrepreneurs who earn their living by distributing grantsfrom the government or from foreign donors to poorpeople. Another NGO might consist of a group ofindividuals who for political reasons want to increasethe power of low status people in order for them to beable to influence their own future.

The Indian Ministry of Rural Development often usesNGOs because it found that NGOs are better able thangovernment agencies to work with poor people fromthe lower castes. An important goal of the Indiandevelopment policy is to decrease poverty and to helplow caste people to organise themselves in such a waythat they can better influence their own future. For thispurpose the Ministry might contract an NGO to achievespecified changes, e.g. to introduce crossbred cows intoa region with the additional condition that more thanhalf of these cows should be with families who are


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classified as poor. A problem with this approach is thatthe most important changes are also the most difficultto measure; for example it is easier to measure who hasa cow than who manages this animal well.

Another reason why extension services might beprovided through NGOs and not through Ministry civilservants is to avoid working through an inefficientgovernment bureaucracy. Compared to governmentextension agents, NGO staff are also often better trainedto support group formation among farmers. These groupscan play an important role in agricultural development.On the other hand, staff members of several NGOs lackthe technical competence needed to advise farmers onhow they can increase their productivity. The roles thatNGOs can play in agricultural development have beenanalysed in detail by Farrington (1997).

4 SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAYAGRICULTURAL EXTENSION ISFINANCED

There has been little research into the implications ofthe way extension is financed for the way extension isgiven or for the way the extension organisations operate.It may be useful to outline some topics which deservefurther study.

Flow of knowledgeA feature of successful government agricultural extensionorganisations in several countries was the free flow ofknowledge between researchers in different disciplines,extension agents and farmers. This made it possible todevelop solutions for farmers’ problems by integratingknowledge from different sources. Although theextension organisation usually lacked the staff to contactmore than half of the farmers on a regular basis, localopinion leaders were often able to influence otherfarmers by way of example and through discussionswith colleagues (van den Ban, 1965). This has changeddrastically with the privatisation of extension services.Duijsings (1998), the deputy Chief Executive Officer ofDLV, observed that privatisation and reduced govern-ment funding create competition within the knowledgesystem, hampering the communication of extension withresearch, education, farmers’ associations, privateconsultants, sales representatives and suppliers. Similarexperiences in West Australia are reported by Marshand Panelli (1998).

Farmers who have paid for information and adviceare less inclined to share this knowledge freely withtheir colleagues. This ‘commoditisation’ of knowledgemay also reduce the consultants’ access to farmers’experience and the freedom to use this information tohelp other farmers. Tacken (1998) the Chief ExecutiveOfficer of DLV reveals that the information his companyneeds to be able to give good advice comes to a largeextent from farmers themselves. Although farmers haveto pay for the information they receive from DLV, DLVdoes not pay farmers for the information it receives

from them. How long are farmers willing to provide aconsultancy firm with the information it needs to beable to earn money? In several countries farmers arereportedly now less willing to receive excursions ofresearchers or extensionists/consultants onto their farmthan in the past, when knowledge was available forfree. A good extension agent – by asking the rightquestions in a counselling process or by facilitating agroup discussion among farmers –- allowed farmers torealise for themselves the need for new managementpractices. Are farmers willing to pay the consultancyfee for an extension agent who continues to use thismethodology? Donors have financed many consultancyfirms to help governments develop and implementagricultural development strategies. In their reports onecan find valuable information for development planning,but after the consultant has left the country it is oftenvery difficult to find these reports. A similar developmentmight happen now that consultants advise individualfarmers. A firm which has developed an effectivemethodology for making farm plans will often try toprevent competing firms from learning this methodology,whereas a government agent who developed such amethodology was proud if his colleagues also used it.

Knowledge managementThe system of research–extension linkage is an importantfactor influencing the success of an extensionorganisation (Agbamu et al., this issue). In severalgovernment extension organisations there is a wellestablished system of subject-matter specialists who keepfield workers informed about relevant newdevelopments in research and inform researchers aboutthe problems and experiences of farmers. It can bedifficult to organise this linkage in a consulting firm.There are many small consulting firms, and researchersdo not have the time to interact with all of them.Competition may make it difficult to bring consultantsfrom different firms together in a training course. Theadvisers in the consulting firm are under pressure towork as many declarable hours as possible (Duijsings,1998), making it difficult for them to spend enoughtime interacting with researchers. On the other hand, aconsulting firm may realise that their firm can onlysurvive if their staff are made aware of newdevelopments in agriculture earlier than the staff ofcompeting firms. By working in more countries theymay gather a wider range of experience than staffmembers in national extension. Similarly, in commercialcompanies the staff will usually be quite well informedabout the research done by its own research institutes,but they may have less access to the research doneelsewhere, especially in the research institutes ofcompeting firms.

An advantage of extension by commercial companiesis that they are able to realise an integration ofcommunication of new knowledge, input supply,marketing and often also credit supply. Government


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extension organisations may make recommendationsfor which the necessary inputs or credit are not availableto their farmers, or which result in an increase inproduction which cannot then be sold in the market.This is much less likely with commercial extension, asshown by the example of cotton production infrancophone African countries.

There are NGOs which have a good linkage withagricultural research. For example, a large Indian NGO,Bharatiya Agro-Industries Foundation (BAIF), whichworks mainly in the field of animal husbandry, has itsown research station with competent researchers. Itstraining centre not only gives training to staff membersof BAIF but also to other NGOs and even governmentagencies. BAIF field staff are often considered to bemore dynamic and more capable of helping farmersthan the staff of the State Department of AnimalHusbandry. However, it is often difficult to establishgood linkages between staff of NGOs and those ofagricultural research institutes and universities, because:

• NGOs may see each other as competitors forgovernment or donor funds. The researchers do nothave the time to work with all NGOs separately, yetit is also difficult to bring them together for a regularexchange of experiences.

• As mentioned previously, many staff members ofNGOs are social scientists, who lack a basic trainingin agriculture.

• Most of the research in developing countries isfinanced by the government and one of the roles ofthe researchers is to support governmentdevelopment agencies.The long-term success of an extension organisation

depends to a large extent on the quality of theknowledge management in the organisation (e.g. vanden Ban, 1999). It is quite important that all staffmembers are eager to discover and to develop newknowledge which is relevant for the work of theorganisation. In some extension organisations managerssee it as an important aspect of their task to stimulatenew knowledge (Duijsings, 1998). Yet there are alsogovernment extension organisations in which managersare trained to maintain rules and regulations and do notstimulate the creativity of their staff or encourage themto learn from farmers’ experience.

Goals and accountabilityThe goals an extension organisation tries to achieve arerelated to whom the staff of the organisation feelaccountable. In a government organisation they mayfeel accountable to politicians who decide about thebudget for extension and higher-ranking governmentofficers who decide which staff member will bepromoted. Alternatively, an extension agent may feelaccountable to their farmers since it is the farmers whoinfluence their status in the community. In manydeveloping countries extension staff tend not to feelaccountable to farmers since farmers often have a low

status in society. In contrast, Dutch field-level extensionagents largely used to feel accountable to farmers,particularly around 1970 when the budget for theextension service was secure and farmers had a highersocial status in the community: they themselves wouldhave liked to be farmers, but they lacked the requiredaccess to land and capital.

The issue of accountability in NGOs is thoroughlydiscussed by Edwards and Hulme (1996). Since thefinancing of many NGOs is often insecure, both themanagement and staff try to please (potential) financiersbecause otherwise the continuity of their organisationwould be in danger. NGO staff may also feel accountableto their directors or board of trustees who are oftenideologically motivated, e.g. to empower poor people.On the other hand, it is also possible that the managersestablished their NGO in order to increase their ownincome: although they operate in a similar way to aconsultancy firm, by calling themselves an NGO it maybe easier to obtain money from donors. Such an NGOmay not feel a high degree of responsibility towards itsbeneficiaries.

The main goal of some NGOs is to implement welfarepolicies rather than to enhance the capabilities andknowledge that would allow rural people to increasetheir productivity. Politicians and rural people indeveloping countries often do not recognise thatincreasing knowledge can be a major way to improveproductivity and hence to increase the income of poorpeople. In some countries NGOs are only allowed towork with permission of government regulators.Therefore the management of the NGOs tries to pleasethese regulators, who may not approve of NGO attemptsto change the power structure in the society. An NGOwhich is partly financed by the national governmentmay also be unable to change this structure, even if thestaff would like to do so. However, if it is financed by aforeign NGO, the contribution it makes to such a changein power structure may be an important criterion forthe evaluation of its performance.

In commercial companies and consulting firms thefield staff feel accountable mainly to the managementof their firm, which tries to judge how much each staffmember contributes to its profit. Educating farmers toincrease their capability to make better decisions isseldom seen as an effective way to increase this profit.It may be better for the company if the farmers remaindependant on the support of their (commercial)extension agent. These companies will try to increasethe income of their customers and to obtain a smallshare of this increase for their company.

The effectiveness of government extensionorganisations can be decreased by the influence ofpoliticians on the selection of staff members, targetgroups and messages. For example, extension agentsmay come into difficulties if they refuse to spreadpropaganda for the party of the local member ofparliament. Does privatisation of extension decreasethese problems?


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An important reason for governments to privatise theiragricultural extension service has been that they havefelt that they lack the budget to finance a largeagricultural extension service. Therefore they havedelegated this responsibility to organisations which raisetheir own budgets, e.g. farmers’ associations, consultingfirms or commercial companies. At the same time thegovernment may use more money from its taxpayers orraise the prices of agricultural products to finance subsidyprogrammes for farmers . This may give a lowereconomic rate of return than investing in extension, buta higher political rate of return because the recipientsof these subsidies or higher prices are willing to votefor politicians who supported the programmes. If thisresults in a lower increase in the productivity ofagriculture, one should wonder whether the governmentcan afford not to pay for agricultural extension.

Everyone occasionally makes mistakes, and the sameis true of extension agents. If a farmer follows incorrectadvice from an extension agent, he or she may lose alot of money. Is the extension organisation liable forthese consequences or does the farmer have to pay forthis loss? In this regard the laws and the jurisprudenceare different in different countries. Governmentextension services may not be liable, but consultingfirms often are. Therefore these firms may do all that ispossible to prevent such mistakes, including not makingrecommendations in cases where some risk is involved.For extension provided by a commercial company thefarmer can not only try to get the loss refunded in courtbut can also withhold his or her custom until the loss isrefunded.

Extension messagesIn many government extension organisations the choiceof the extension messages is based either on the goalsof the government policy or on research findings whichare considered to be important for farmers. A consultantcannot earn a living by working in this way becausefarmers are only willing to pay for information or otherhelp for which they feel a need. A good consultant canhelp farmers to discover that changes in theirenvironment may mean that they need help withdifferent problems than they encountered in the past. Amajor reason to privatise government extension serviceswas that these services were not very effective in manycountries because they did not provide the informationwhich farmers felt they needed. Farmers are free tolisten or not to listen to their extension agent: they willonly take notice if they are convinced that theinformation the agent provides will help them to realisetheir goals or if they consider him a nice fellow.

Increasingly extension agents are not only talkingabout production technologies but also aboutgovernment rules and regulations and subsidy schemes,e.g. to reduce environmental problems. Governmentpolicies are most effective if farmers follow these rulesand regulations voluntarily and use the subsidy schemesin the way they were intended by the government. This

is most likely to happen if farmers are convinced thatthe government has made the right kind of policies.However, many farmers feel threatened in their abilityto earn a good income and in their freedom to managetheir farm in the way they like as a result of such policies.They may follow the rules out of fear of punishmentbut will change as little as possible. In this situationone cannot expect farmers to be eager to learn aboutthese policies (Bahn, 1999). The chance that farmersaccept these policies is highest when farmers themselveshave participated in their design (van Woerkum, 1999).Farmers, leaders of environmental groups, policy makersand others may learn from each other by meeting todiscuss the alternatives available to solve the problemsinvolved. However, even if farmers are involved indesigning these policies it is usually only a few leadersof farmers’ associations who actively take part.

Extension messages about government policies arequite important, but what type of organisation is willingto promote such messages? It is most likely that farmerswill accept this information if it is provided by extensionagents from their own farmers’ association, even if theassociation is paid by the government for this work.However, there are two reasons why an associationmay not be willing to offer extension messages aboutgovernment policies. Firstly, the association may losemembers as a result. Secondly, the position of thefarmers’ association in its policy negotiations with thegovernment may be weakened. Although thegovernment may also want to contract a privateconsulting firm to teach farmers how they can reduceenvironmental problems, the firm may not be willing toaccept this contract unless the extension messages areperceived by farmers to be in their interests. Commercialcompanies seldom see it as their task to explaingovernment policies to their customers, though theywould be willing to inform farmers about the subsidiesavailable to buy their product. In cases wheregovernment extension services have been privatised, aunit is often maintained in the Ministry of Agriculture toexplain government policies to farmers. This unit mayfind it difficult to work effectively owing to a lack ofunderstanding of the problems faced by farmers.Consequently there may be a lack of trust on the farmers’part.

It is not only important that farmers understandgovernment policies but also that policy makersunderstand farming and farmers. With a decreasingproportion of the labour force working in agriculture inmany countries this becomes more important, yet atthe same time more difficult. In many industrial countriesfarmers’ associations have a public relations division topromote this understanding. In the Netherlands acommercial television station broadcasts a programmeto illustrate how the most entrepreneurial farmers workand what problems they face.

Since it is possible that commercial companies maytry to cheat farmers by providing biased information, itis important that farmers are able to check whether the


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information is true. In some countries farmers’ associationsor the government extension service play this role.

Extension methods and approachesMany extension scientists are now convinced that it isno longer desirable to use a transfer of technologyapproach in which the extension administrators decideon the targets to be realised by the field-level extensionagents. A more participatory approach is insteadpreferred, in which farmers decide which changes aredesirable and what kinds of support are needed fromextension to realise these changes (Roling and de Jong,1999; Haug, 1999). How are the possibilities for realisingthe changes needed related to the ways of financingthe extension organisation? A participatory approachrequires that the extension organisation becomes alearning organisation with the ability to discover whichchanges are desirable in each specific situation. It iseasier to adopt a participatory approach or a farmer-ledextension system within an NGO or a farmers’association than in a government extension organisation.To what extent can a government organisation whichworks nationwide adopt a participatory approach toextension? Which options do consultancy firms orcommercial services have to select different extensionapproaches?

One problem with a participatory approach can bethat some farmers expect their extension agent to provideservices for them (i.e. how to solve a problem), whereasthe extension agent sees himself as an adult educator,whose role is to encourage farmers to develop solutionsfor themselves. For a consultant who needs the feesfrom his customers to earn a living, it can be moredifficult to realise this educational role than for agovernment extension officer, who will not be financiallypenalised if he refuses to perform a service role. A farmercan put pressure on the extension agent of a commercialcompany to provide free services by threatening not tobuy the company’s products any longer.

Target groupsWhilst government extension organisations have beenquite successful in increasing agricultural productionthrough the introduction of high yielding varieties inhigh-potential, irrigated areas, they have been muchless successful in helping farmers in diverse and risk-prone rainfed areas to increase their income.Unfortunately we cannot claim that we know how bestto assist farmers in complex and risk-proneenvironments. Some NGOs have been rather successfulin helping farmers to increase their income and/or inmaking their farming system more sustainable throughthe use of participatory extension approaches. So far,however, these approaches have been successful onlyin small-scale projects (Garforth, 1997). We have yet todiscover how such approaches can be scaled up toincrease the productivity of millions of farmers, as isneeded in many countries (Farrington, 1994).

Many of the poorest people in the world are smallfarmers with a low level of productivity. Although

agricultural research and extension ought to be able tooffer opportunities to increase their productivity andhence their income, these poor farmers do not constitutean attractive target group for a consultancy firm or theextension division of a commercial company becausethere is little profit to be earned from working withthese people. The very poorest farmers are seldommembers of farmers’ associations and therefore they donot form the target group of the extension service ofsuch associations. Poor farmers can be an importanttarget group for a government extension service wherethe goal of government extension is to decrease incomedifferences. However, experience shows that evengovernment extension services work mainly with thelarger farmers. This may be because increasing nationalfood production is a more important policy goal thandecreasing income differences; because poor farmershave little political power; because it is difficult to workwith resource poor farmers who have a low level ofeducation; or simply because neither extension agentsnor researchers know how to increase the income ofpoor farmers.

Consequently, it is often left to NGOs to target thepoorest farmers. In some cases NGOs have beensuccessful in helping these farmers, especially wherethere is an increased market demand for products whichcan be produced on small farms with a surplus of labour,e.g. vegetables. If a government is not willing to financesupport to these poor farmers, it can expect that serioussocial problems will develop in the country (Sachs,1999). The international community is beginning torealise that the increasing income difference betweenrich and poor countries is a serious danger for socialand political stability.

The target group with which an extension organisationworks depends partly on decisions made by theorganisation but also on decisions made by farmers.This second possibility is often neglected in the literature,but some farmers realise that in order to compete withother farmers they need good advice. In general wesee that those who have most knowledge are also moreeager to obtain new knowledge from extensionorganisations and other information sources. Farmerswill also decide from which extension organisation toseek advice. This decision is partly based on costs andpartly on confidence. For example, a farmer may knowthe cost of the fee needed to pay a consultancy firm fortheir advice, but not how much he or she pays for thisadvice from a commercial company where these costsare included in the price of the product. A farmer mayhave more confidence in the ability of his or her ownfarmers’ association to serve his/her interests than thatof a government extension service. However, thepersonality of the field-level extension agent is oftenmore important than the organisation for which heworks.

It has been mentioned above that extension from aconsultancy is mainly useful in helping a farmer to solvea specific problem rather than a problem which is facedby many farmers. These specific problems are probably


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more frequent now than they were a generation agobecause farms have become more specialised; farmerstry to produce more for niche markets and often combinefarming with off-farm income sources (Schwartz, 1994).In consultancy more attention is probably given tomanagement advice than to the adoption of newtechnologies and practices: In which situations is thisdesirable?

Management of the extensionorganisationIn commercial companies and in consulting firms profitis an important criterion for management decisions. Staffmembers are not paid according to their age or level ofeducation, as was often the case in governmentorganisations, but according to the contribution theymake to realising this profit. How valid are the criteriawhich are used to measure this contribution? What arethe consequences of the use of these criteria for therelationship between farmers and the consultants?

When a farmer asks for help from a consulting firm,he/she knows the cost of this advice. The cost of helpprovided by a commercial company is hidden in theprice of the product, possibly reducing the incentivefor cooperation in a cost-effective way between thefarmer and the adviser. If extension is free many farmersprefer to receive services rather than education. It isargued that the cost of extension provided throughconsulting firms or commercial companies is lower thanthrough a government extension service, because thesefirms and companies have to be cost conscious in orderto make a profit. On the other hand, in situations wherethere may be many different firms, companies or NGOsworking in the same area, the combined costs oftravelling and of staff training will be higher than forone government extension service. We do not yet knowwhich way of financing agricultural extension is mostcostly.

It has also been suggested that the cost of extensionmight be reduced by replacing personal contact betweenfarmers and extension agents by mass media or byinformation and communication technology. Whilst theseare undoubtedly useful, research has clearly shown thatthey are mainly effective in the first stages of the adoptionprocess and have to be supplemented by interpersonalcommunication in later stages (e.g. van den Ban andHawkins, 1996).

A study on the privatisation of different governmentorganisations in the Netherlands found that afterprivatisation their performance increased by 30 to 200per cent, partly because the staff services decreased innumber and in size (de Koning et al., 1997). Similarfindings have also been reported for the extensionservice (Tacken, 1998). With privatisation, the extensionmanagement system changed from an input-directedsystem to an output-directed system: i.e. the criteria forevaluation changed from inputs (e.g. the number offarmers’ meetings) to outputs such as change at thefarm level. Such a change in organisational culture isnot easy to realise.

In many developing countries the salaries of thegovernment extension agents are so low that they haveto find an extra source of income for the survival oftheir family. One possibility is to ask the farmers theyvisit to give them some of their products.

It is also possible that the extension agent can earnextra money by selling seeds, agrochemicals, etc. Thedanger in this is that agents may recommend thoseproducts for which they or their organisation can earnmost, rather than those which are most beneficial to thefarmer. This apparently happens sometimes in theChinese government extension service, which isexpected to earn part of its budget by selling inputs tofarmers. On the other hand, there is no use in advisingfarmers to apply inputs which they cannot accessbecause the input distribution system is ineffective.

Economic theoriesThe most influential publications on the privatisation ofextension are written by economists who often workwith the World Bank (e.g. Umali and Schwartz, 1994).One wonders whether the economic theories they useto analyse this topic are still valid in the present era. Abasic assumption of these theories is that if costs ofproduction decrease, production will increase andsuppliers can sell their products for a lower price, leadingto an increase in demand. In this way a new balancebetween supply and demand is achieved. However, asShapiro and Varian (1999) have shown, this assumptionis not valid for the production of knowledge distributedthrough a communication network such as the Internet.Here a decrease in price results in an increase in thenumber of participants in the network and in this wayin an increase in the supply of knowledge which isavailable. Contrary to economic theory, the distributionof scarce goods is no longer the basic problem, and thecost of multiplying information has been lowered.Instead, the problem becomes one of electing the mostrelevant knowledge and integrating knowledge fromdifferent sources. It is not yet clear what implicationsthis paradigm shift in economic theory might have fordecisions on financing agricultural extension.

5 CONCLUSIONSIn many countries we see the development of a pluriformextension system in which only a part of the extensionservice is either provided or funded by the Ministry ofAgriculture. Other organisations such as commercialcompanies or NGOs may be involved both in providingand funding extension services, and farmers themselvesmay also help to finance these services. The questionof how one can promote cooperation and coordinationbetween these various organisations is discussed byRivera and Gustafson (1991). Although it is hard todefend public funding of agricultural extension if thebenefit is only for the farmers who use this service,there are many situations where the public at large alsoprofits from the extension services, e.g. by lower pricesfor their food or a reduction in environmental problemsbrought about by a change in production.


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The analysis presented in this paper broadly confirmsthe findings of Rivera and Cary (1997), who concludethat government-funded extension is likely to focus itsactivities on public good activities which the marketplace is unlikely to provide. Such activities include‘broad’ rather than ‘specific’ technology transfer,dissemination of environmental and resource technology,and human resource development. Some additionalpoints can also be made:• It is important to analyse what effects the financing

of extension (and research) will have on the flowand management of information, the choice ofextension goals, methods used and the groupstargeted.

• In deciding who pays for extension one should takeinto account the wider benefits brought about by anincrease in the efficiency of agricultural productionand associated decrease in the cost of food.

• In countries with the highest levels of productivity,agricultural labour productivity is over 100 times ashigh as in the countries with the lowest levels ofproductivity (World Bank, 1998). Extension incountries with high productivity levels should befinanced quite differently from those with lowproductivity levels.

• In countries where the price policy causes surplusesof agricultural products, one cannot expect that thegovernment will be willing to pay an extensionservice to increase agricultural production.

• Farmers have to make a range of very differentdecisions. The optimal way of financing agriculturalextension depends on which type of decisions onetries to improve. Advice from a consultant paid bythe farmer is most desirable for farm-specificinvestment decisions.

• The way of financing agricultural extensioninfluences to whom the extension agents feel thatthey are accountable. This affects whether they tryto work in the interest of (a certain group of) farmers,government policies, politicians, managers/shareholders of their organisation or others.

• Extension messages about government policiesshould be financed in a different way from extensionwhich tries to help farmers to increase theirproductivity and their income.Decisions on the privatisation of agricultural extension

are often based on very limited knowledge about theconsequences of such a change. More research in thisarea is urgently needed. There is more experience ofprivatisation in industrial countries than in developingcountries. Extension administrators in developingcountries should make use of this experience in theirdecisions. But of course, they may also have to considerwhether the recommendations of a consultant from anindustrial country are really valid in their situation.

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ENDNOTES1 Technologies and practices can also be combined,

e.g. with the introduction of a new seed variety whichgives an optimal yield when it is sown at a differenttime than the varieties used in the past (Bennett,1996).

Acknowledgement

Valuable comments on a draft of this paper by P. Finlayson, C.Leeuwis and M.D.C. Proost, are appreciated. Ideas developed indiscussions with participants in the 14th European Seminar onExtension Education have improved this paper.

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AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH–EXTENSION LINKAGE …Agricultural Research & Extension Network Network Paper No.106 July 2000 ISBN 085003 488 4 The Agricultural Research and Extension Network