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AIR UNIVERSITY AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Slovakia 1944The Forgotten Uprising

Sean M. Judge

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College Wright Flyer Paper No. 34

Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

May 2008

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This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

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Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright Flyer Papers series. In this series, the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best student research projects from the prior academic year. The ACSC research program encourages our students to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in their own professional development and in “advancing air and space power.” The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations of Airmen. Projects selected for publication combine solid research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operational questions. Some of these studies provide new solutions to familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By making these research studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination of the findings and to stimulate further research in these areas.

JIMMIE C. JACKSON, JR.Brigadier General, USAFCommandant

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Abstract

The Slovak National Uprising of 1944 is ignored and/or treated as a nonevent in the Western historiography of World War II. The political climate during World War II and the Cold War that followed obscured and distorted the history and understanding of this revolt. The raising of the Iron Curtain in the 1990s removed the veil of secrecy from much of Eastern Europe’s wartime history, and Western historians are exploring the new resources available, but coverage of Slovakia’s story and uprising remains very limited. This work aims to fill some of the void.

Fully understanding the uprising requires an analysis of a number of different viewpoints in order to avoid capture by the political views of the parties involved: the Slovaks, the Germans, or the Soviets. Each group had different plans and goals: the Slovaks found themselves precariously between the Allies and Germany, the Germans fought to maintain their strategic position in central Europe while the Soviets hoped to expand their influence through eastern and central Europe. Each group naturally interpreted events differently and acted accordingly. Ultimately the Germans crushed the Slovak rebellion.

Events surrounding the uprising remain cloudy to this day. The Slovaks won only short-term political gains, but their Jewish and ethnic German populations paid a heavy price. The Germans won their last significant victory in the war and maintained their presence in Slovak territory until the very end. The Soviet Union suffered significant casualties, but saw Communist influence increase in the region. Recriminations swirl around the lack of Allied support and the duplicity of Stalin. Western historians have excluded coverage of the uprising in part to avoid embarrassment. Significantly, the Slovaks remain at odds among themselves about the importance and the meaning of the uprising.

�

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Introduction

“By this uprising Slovakia showed its adherence to the ideals of democracy, freedom and plural-ity,” Caplovic told CTK [the Czech News Agency], adding “it was necessary to more emphasize the international aspect of the uprising. It will only be young historians who will approach the topic in an unbiased way,” he said. “The current perception has been distorted by communist historians who did not deal with broad international connections of the uprising by which Slovakia joined the allies and returned to the ideals of the first Czechoslovak Republic,” he said.

––DusanCaplovic SlovakDeputyPrimeMinister paraphrasedontheAnniversaryof theSlovakNationalUprising,2006

Thestoryof theSlovakNationalUprisingof�944 isacomplicatedandtragiconethathasbeenobscuredanddis-tortedbythepoliticsthatitsurrounds.Slovakia’srelation-shiptoNaziGermanyduringWorldWarIIstemmedfromtheuniquehistoryoftheSlovakpeopleandtheirprecariousposition inEuropeduring�939,but it createdpolitical ten-sionbothinternallyandexternallyforthesmallnation.Thewar situation in the summer of �944 exacerbated thesetensions and presented an opportunity for the Slovakopposition to stage an uprising against their puppetgovernment,underMonsignorJozefTisoandthereby,thepower of Nazi Germany. The three primary actors in theuprisingincludedtheSlovaks,Germans,andSoviets.Eachgrouphaditsownviewpointderivedfromdivergingpoliti-cal aims and goals that guided their actions throughoutthe rebellion. The successful suppression of theuprisingby Germany required nearly two months of heavy fight-ingwithdireconsequencesfortheSlovaks,includingtheirJewishandethnicGermancompatriots.TheSlovakswononlyshort-termpoliticalgainsfortheirefforts.Thefailureoftheuprisinghasresultedinpostwarrecriminationsandaccusations,oftencoloredandskewedbyColdWarideol-ogyandCzechoslovakpolitics.Theresultingconfusionand

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polarizationhasobscuredtheSlovakrebellionparticularlyin Western historiography. Recent publications indicateanincreasingWesterninterestintheWorldWarIIhistoryofEasternEurope.TheraisingoftheIronCurtain intheearly�990sgrantedgreateraccesstohistoricalresourcesthroughoutthosenationsoncedominatedbyCommunistgovernments and historians are taking advantage of theopportunity.NormanDaviesrevisitedtheWarsawUprisingwith his well-received work Rising 1944: The Battle for Warsaw, publishedin2003,justintimeforthe60thanni-versaryofthatrevolt.AuthorDavidGlantzhaspublishedstudyafterstudyfocusingontheoperationalcampaignsoftheRedArmy,withhis latestpiecebeingRed Storm over the Balkans: The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania.RichardDiNardofollowedthistrendwhenhepublishedGermany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse in2005.Unfor-tunately,SlovakiaanditsrebellionarenotevenmentionedinDiNardo’swork,andtheyreceiveonlypassingacknowl-edgementinmostothers.�AcarefulreviewandanalysisofthevaryingpointsofviewontheSlovakNationalUprisingwillfillsomeofthisvoidandrevealamorecompletepictureofwhatreallyoccurredthatfatefulfallin�944.

Setting the Stage: Slovak History and the Alliance with Germany

PriortothecreationoftheCzechoslovakstatefollowingtheFirstWorldWar,theSlovaksasapeopleresidedinthebackwatersoftheinternationalstage.LongdominatedbyHungarianinfluence,aSlovaknationalistmovementbeganin the late nineteenth century when the pressure forassimilationintoHungary’sculture,aprocessknownasMagyarization,becameacute.2Slovaksbegantoseekuni-ficationwiththeCzechpeopletothrowofftheHungarianyokeandforgeacriticalchapterinSlovakhistory.3

Support for Czech and Slovak unity first came fromabroad, significantly from outside of Europe. Czech andSlovakAmericanorganizationsrecognizedanopportunityto exert influenceduring theFirstWorldWarandsignedtheClevelandAgreementof�9�5andthePittsburghPactof�9�8,bothseekingthecreationofaunifiedCzech–SlovakstatewithvaryingdegreesofautonomyforthesmallerSlo-

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vakpopulation.4Thedreamswere fulfilledon28October�9�8 when the Czech National Committee in Prague de-claredanew“Czecho-Slovak”stateandtheSlovakNationalCouncil,formedon30October,proposedaunionwiththeCzechs,breakingaffiliationwithHungary.5Slovakswouldsoon see that the newly created state did not meet theirfullestexpectations.

SlovakhopesforautonomyinthenewCzechoslovakstateprovedillusory.TheWestwasinstrumentalinthecreationof Czechoslovakia, but was ignorant about the Slovakpeople, allowing the Czechs to assert their own influ-enceandexploitthenewstatefortheirownagenda.6TheSlovaks’ownlimitationsalsoplayedaroleintheirsubor-dination.DecadesofHungariandominanceleftthemwithweakpoliticalorganizations,inexperiencedadministrators,andapsychologicalprofilethatdeferredtoauthority,accept-ing lowerstatus inthesocialorderof theirnewcountry.7Thesefailings,combinedwiththenumericalsuperiorityofthe Czech population, predictably resulted in benevolentdominationoftheSlovaksintheCzechoslovakconstruct.Evenaslateas�938Slovakrepresentationinthegovern-mentonlytotaled�3�outof7,470civilservants,oneoutof�39militarygenerals,and33outof�,246foreignaffairsofficials.8 Making matters worse, while Slovaks were 75percentCatholic,therepresentationintheirallotted54Na-tionalAssemblyseatsconsistedof3�ProtestantSlovaks,�3Czechs,andonly�0CatholicSlovaks.9Thestagewassetforthepoliticalturmoilthatwouldaccompanythe�938MunichAgreementandtheresultingbreakupoftheyoungCzechoslovakianstate.

Nazi Germany, under Adolf Hitler, had an unquench-abledesire forexpansion in the late�930s.Followinghissuccesses in remilitarizing the Rhineland and absorbingAustria into Germany without war, Hitler turned next toCzechoslovakiabyusing itsethnicGermanpopulationasapretense tomanufacturea crisis.Hisultimateaims to-wardsCzechoslovakiawere simple: he planned to controltheCzechsbyGermandominationandtocontroltheSlo-vaks by ensuring their allegiance as an allywith a smallmeasure of independence.�0 The international crisis cametoahead inSeptember �938 with the Munich Confer-encewhereGermany,withtheaidof Italyasasuppos-

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edlyneutralarbitrator,treatedwithBritainandFrancetode-cideCzechoslovakia’sfate.TheresultsweredisastrousfortheCzechs,whosenewCzechoslovakrepublicconsistedoftruncatedCzechlands(someborderterritorycededtoGer-many)andautonomousregionsinSlovakiaandRuthenia.��Dr.EduardBeneš, thepresidentofCzechoslovakiaandaCzech,resignedon5October�939intheimmediateafter-mathoftheMunichAgreement.�2TheincreasedSlovakauton-omy,decreasedCzechinfluence,andGerman–HungarianrelationswouldsoonforcetheSlovakpeopletosecedefromCzechoslovakia.

TheCzechoslovakgovernmentarisingfromtheashesoftheBenešadministrationwasattemptingtoretainasmuchlegitimacyaspossibleand,fearingaSlovakmoveforinde-pendence,madeplansforamilitaryoccupationofSlovakterritoryanddeclaredmartiallawon9March�939.�3AfterameetingbetweenHitlerandMonsignorJozefTiso,anin-fluentialpriest inSlovakpolitics, itwasclear thatSlova-kiahadtochoosebetweenindependenceandalliancewithGermany,orcontinuedrulefromPraguelikelyfollowedbyHungarianreoccupationofSlovaklandswithGermanper-mission.�4 The Slovak parliament unanimously approvedindependenceandinstalledagovernmentwithTisoatitshead.�5 The new and vulnerable government immediatelysignedaTreatyofProtectionwithGermanyon23March�939,aligningitsforeignanddefensepolicieswiththeNaziregime and avoiding occupation in return for protectionagainst Czech or Hungarian dominance.�6 The move wasan affront to the Czechs, while the Catholic roots of thenewgovernmentalienatedSlovakia’sownprotestantpop-ulation,sowing theseeds for futurepolitical turmoil thatwouldplayaroleinthe�944uprising.

Czech bitterness and disappointment with the Slovakmaneuveringswereimmediatelyevident.Historically,whilethe Slovaks had been at odds with the Hungarians, theCzechs’enemywasGermany,makingtheSlovakdefectiontotheNazicampevenmoregalling.�7Beneš,thedeposedCzechpresident,beganavigorousandorganizedcampaignin�939 to reverse theMunichAgreementand revive theCzechoslovakRepublic through the creation of a govern-mentinexile.�8Benešmadenoefforttohidehisanimos-itytowardtheSlovakRepublic,declaringtheentireaffair

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treasonous and its leaders traitors.�9 The Western pow-erswereslowtorecognizeBeneš’exilegovernment,stub-bornly adhering to the Munich accord, but by �942–43,nearly all the major powers, including the Soviet Union,supported thisorganizationas the legal representativeofallofCzechoslovakia.20BeneštriedtorallySlovaksupportforhisgovernmentagainsttheirnewrepublicbypointingoutthatGermanywassuretolosethewar,bydeclaringhisexiledgovernmentwouldspare theSlovaks thestigmaofdefeatbecauseherepresentedthemtoo,andbyaccusingtheTisoregimeofcomplicityinHungarianintrigueagainstSlovakia.2�ThesetwocompetinggovernmentswouldvieforSlovaklegitimacyandsupporttheentirewar,evenduringtheSlovakuprisingitself.

Thewarsituation inAugust�944playedakeyrole inthe launch of theSlovakNationalUprising. The scent ofimpending Allied victory over Germany lingered on everyfront.IntheWest,thesuccessfulinvasionofNormandyen-abledOperationCobra,25July,andthesubsequentbreak-outthatwasliberatingFrance.22Romehadfallenon4Juneof that sameyear; thefirstAxis capital tobe captured.23Finally, Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of south-ernFranceinmidAugust,seemedtoreaffirmtheWesternAllies’ mastery of the situation. The view on the EasternFront,closetoSlovakia,wasverysimilar.

TheSovietUnionwasmakingremarkablegainsagainstGermany in the East. A massive Soviet offensive waslaunchedagainstthecenteroftheGermanEasternFronton22June�944(thethirdanniversaryofGermany’sinva-sionof theSovietUnion),using�66RedArmydivisions,2,700tanks,andover�,300assaultguns.24Theattackwasanastonishingsuccess;tearinga200-mileopeningintheGermanlinesandcostingtheNazisnearly200,000men,2,000tanks,�0,000heavyguns,and57,000trucksinthefirstweekalone;andbringingthefronteverclosertoSlovakborders.25 Meanwhile, other German allies, such as Fin-land,weretotteringonthevergeofcollapseordefectiontotheAlliedcamp.26Slovakswerenottheonlypeoplewatch-ingcurrenteventsin�944;theFrenchandPoleswerewellawareofthetideofwar.

Spurred by the combined successes of the Allies andvarious othermotivations,uprisings seemed to overtake

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Nazi-occupiedlands.On�August�944,thePolishHomeArmyseizedthecenterofWarsawfromtheGermansandhopedtoholdtheirgainsuntilthearrivaloftheRedArmy,whichwasalreadytantalizinglyclose.27ThePoleswagedavalianttwo-monthcampaigntoholdoutagainstGermany,hopingforSovietassistancethatnevermaterialized,beforethey succumbed on 27 September.28 The Germans killed200,000ofthecity’sinhabitantswiththeirviolentsuppres-sionof the insurrection.29TheParisiansstagedtheirownuprisingatnearlythesametimewhen,asAlliedforcesap-proachedthecity,theyraisedthe“StandardofRevolt”on�8August�944.30TheAlliedarmiesrushedtoassistthereb-els,andFreeFrenchforcesliberatedParisby25August.3�TheadvanceoftheAlliesandtheexamplesofWarsawandParissetthestagefortheSlovakrevolt.Unfortunately,fortheSlovaks,whocouldnotforeseethetragicendofthePol-ishuprising,theirrevoltwouldmimicthePolishcourse.

The Slovak National Uprising: The Slovak, German, and Soviet Views

ThemilitarysituationonlypartiallyexplainstheSlovakrising.GivenClausewitz’sdictumthatwarisanactofpolicyandacontinuationofpoliticsbyothermeans, theSlovakNationalUprisingmustbeviewedpolitically.32TheSlovaks,Germans,andSovietseachhadtheirownviewoftheupris-ingandtheirownassociatedpoliticalagenda,whichhelpeddetermine the course of action they followed and coloredtheirperspectiveoftheevents.ItistheSlovakviewthatisthemostcomplexanddifficulttodissect.

ResistanceinSlovakiawastheresultofaconfluenceofeventsandpoliciesthatculminatedintheformationofanoutwardly unified, though internally divided, oppositionmovement.TheTisoregimeand itsCatholicheavyhand-edness,asalreadynoted,alienatedtheSlovakprotestantpopulace,whohadenjoyedasomewhatprivilegedplaceintheCzechoslovakconstruct.Theprogressofthewarandal-legiancetoNaziGermanybegancostingTisosupport,withthedisaffectionresultingintwoprimaryresistancegroups:theDemocraticPartyunderJozefLettrichandtheCommu-nistPartyofSlovakia(CPS).33Theoppositiongroupsbegancooperatingin�943andconsolidatedtheireffortsintoone

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movementundertheChristmasAgreementof�943,whichcreatedtheSlovakNationalCouncil(SNC)with50percentmembershipfrombothgroups.34Thestatedpoliticalchar-ter included the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia withgreaterSlovakautonomy,ademocraticpoliticalstructure,and freedomof religionwithinasecularstate.35Thenowunifiedoppositionmovementbegantoplanforanuprisingwiththesespecificgoalsinmind.

YetSlovakia,bythetimeoftheuprising,waspoliticallyisolatedfromtheAllies.ThethreeyearsfollowingSlovakianindependence saw the tiny state recognized by 28 othernations, including Britain, the Soviet Union, and prewarFrance, but these three later withdrew their recognition,and theUnitedStateswasnever to grant it.36 The exiledCzech government managed to isolate Slovakia and hadeven made an agreement with the Soviets in May �944.TheagreementgrantedtheRedArmymilitaryoperationalauthorityinCzechoslovakiainexchangeforCzechadmin-istrativeauthoritybehindthelinesofliberatedterritory.37Benešwenton todeclare that therewouldbea “settlingofaccountswithall collaborators”after thewar.38Slovakpoliticians were on the outside looking in and needed totakeactiontoputthemselvesinamoreagreeablepositionfollowingtheendofthewar.

Motivationsfortheuprisingcreatedthestrangebedfel-lowsofBenešandtheSNC.TheexilegovernmentneededsomeformofovertresistanceundertheCzechbannertoincrease its legitimacy and negotiating power at the endof thewar,whiletheSNCneededto justify itsownclaimto lead theSlovakpeople, so the two agreed towork to-gether.39 Specific SNC goals for the uprising includedreestablishingaCzechoslovakiawithtwoequalnation-alities,switchingtothesideofthevictorsbyaidinginthedefeat of Hitler, avoiding physical destruction of SlovakiabyGermanscorched-earthpolicies,establishingademoc-racy, and allowing a quick strategic advance through theCarpathianmountains towardsViennaby theRedArmy.40Meanwhile,agroupofmidleveldissidentSlovakofficers,in-cludingLtColsJánGolian,MikulášFerjencík,MirkoVesel,and Dezider Kišš-Kalina, also recognized Slovakia’s politicalpredicamentandcontactedtheBenešgovernmentinFebru-ary�944inthehopesofinstigatingaresistancemovement

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in the tinynation.4�Accordingly, the exiledCzechoslovakgovernment,theSNC,andthesesympathizersintheSlo-vakmilitarysetouttomakeplansforarevolt.

Theplanningforanuprisingwasextensive,butverydif-ficult,giventhemultitudeofactors,thesurroundingpoliti-calintrigue,andthegeographicseparationoftheparties.InApril�944 theSNCnamedGolianas the leaderof itsmilitarypreparationsforrevolt,andon�4MaytheBenešgovernmentconfirmedhisposition.42Thefirsttaskwasdi-vidingtheSlovakArmyofficercorpsintothreegroups:ac-tiveparticipantsintheuprising;anti-fascistswhowouldbenotifiedjustpriortothestartoftheuprising;andunreliableofficers, loyal to the Tiso regime, who would be removedassoonaspossibleaftertherevoltbegan.43Localindustryproduceduniforms,boots,blankets, rations,mines, con-crete fortifications,explosives,andevensome improvisedarmoredcars inadvanceoftheuprising.44ByJune�944secret stockpiles in central Slovakia amounted to threemonthsoffood,�.3millionlitersofgasoline,and3.5billionSlovakcrowns.45Golian’smilitaryplancalledfortheuseoftwoSlovakArmyfielddivisionsinjointoperationswiththeRedArmy toholdopen theCarpathianpassesandallowtheSovietstorushintoSlovakiafromtheeast,whilethereararmywouldholdontocentralSlovakiauntilrelieved.46ThemovementwouldkickoffoneitheracoordinatedsignalwiththeRedArmyadvance(thepreferredmethod),orasaresponsetoGermanmilitaryoccupationofSlovakia,whichtothatdatehadbeenleftlargelyunmolestedbytheNazis.47Despite theplanning, the rapidpaceof events inAugust�944wouldsoonforcetheSNC’shand.

EventsbeyondthecontroloftheSNC,ratherthancoor-dinationwiththeRedArmy,triggeredthestartoftheupris-ing.TheSovietUnion,inadvanceofitsmainforceattackofthesummer,hadbegunfomentingapartisanmovementunderitscontrolinSlovakia,whichforcedtheTisogovern-menttoappealtoGermanyforassistance,resultinginGer-manoccupationofSlovakiabeginningon29August�944.48Thiswasthefirst indicationofthecommandandcontrolproblems that would plague the uprising throughout, astheSNCandGolian trieddesperatelybutunsuccessfullytoslowthepartisanoperationsbycommunicatingtoMos-cowviatheexilegovernmentinLondon.49Presentedwitha

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faitaccompli,Goliandeclaredtheuprisingat2000hourson29August,callingforthemobilizationofthereservistclassesof�938–39.50Questionsremainabouthowmuchofthispoorcoordinationandcommunicationwasthefogandfrictionofwar,andhowmuchwasdeliberateobfuscationbytheSoviets.

TheinitialbreakdownofstrengthinsideSlovakiashowed�8,000 army troops with the uprising, 9,000 remainingloyal to theTisogovernment,and29,000 reservists join-ingtherevolt,whilethehigherestimatesclaimtheparti-sanmovementboastedbetween�8,000–26,000membersofvaryingnationalitiesincludingCzech,Slovaks,Russians,Ukrainians,Poles,Yugoslavs,Jews,andevenFrenchmen.5�Theuncoordinatedstartoftheuprising,duetothepartisanactivities,resultedinconfusionthatallowedtheGermanstocaptureanddisarmthetwoeasternfielddivisionsoftheSlovakArmyslatedtoholdtheCarpathianpassesfortheRedArmy.52Italsoresultedinthelossofcrucialsuppliesin Kvetnica, including 40 million rounds of ammunition,62,000artilleryrounds,��2,000grenades,�8�heavyma-chineguns,and632lightmachineguns.53Onbalance,therebelliousSlovaksinitiallyedgedtheGermansandTisoloy-alistsinnumbers,buttheyfacedanenemywhobenefitedfromsuperiortrainingandweaponry.

Despitethisinauspiciousstart,Golian’sforcesmanagedtoseizeaportionofSlovakiaandfoughtgallantlytoholditwhilewaiting forAllied, especiallySoviet, support. ThelossofthetwodivisionsineasternSlovakiacombinedwiththe steadfast loyalty of Slovak garrisons to Tiso in west-ernSlovakiaconfinedtheinsurgencytothemiddleofthecountry.54TheinsurgentsconsolidatedtheirforcesinandaroundtheHronValley,hopingtokeeptheGermansoutofthestrategictriangleofBrezno–BanskáBystrica–Zvolen,withBanskáBystricaasthenominalrebelcapital.55Aftertheinitialandconfusingopeningofhostilities,themoun-tainous terrain of centralSlovakiadictated the characterofcombat,forcingbrigade-sizedconventionalengagementsforcontrolofkeypassagesinstrategicrivervalleys,suchastheVáh.56Meanwhile,asthefightingraged,conditionsintheinsurgentterritoryresumedasurrealsortofnormalcy,asthetrainsranontime,fivenewspaperscontinuedprint-

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ing, and the rebel government collected taxes.57Hope forsuccessnowrestedonAlliedreaction.

Questions concerning Allied support for the uprising,bothfromtheWestandtheSovietUnion,remainthemostcontentious issues surrounding the Slovak National Up-risingtothisday.TheoriginalSNCplanreliedheavilyonSovietsupport.ManySlovaksfeelthathelpneverarrivedbecause the Soviets intentionally withheld it. AlexanderDubček, future leader of communist Czechoslovakia andanactivepartisanduringtherevolt,puttheblameforpoorcoordinationandalackofsupportsquarelyontheSovietswho,inhisview“weresimplynotinterestedinsuchcoor-dination”forpoliticalreasons.58DubčekgoesontofaulttheSovietsforbelatedlylaunchinganoffensiveintoSlovakia,oneweektoolatetosavethetwoSlovakdivisionsdisarmedbytheGermansonly30milesfromtheRussianfront.59Incontrast,theRedArmydeliveredlavishsuppliestoSlova-kiatosustaintheSoviet-runpartisanmovement,notthenativeSNCand its troopswhooperated independentlyofMoscow.60EventhesubstantialSovietcontributionoftheRedArmy–trainedCzechoslovakParachuteBrigade,flownintoTriDubyairfieldinlateSeptemberandearlyOctober,isderidedastoolittletoolate.6�

The lack of large-scale aid from the West is generallyforgivenoroverlooked.ManyblameWesternfailures,onceagain, on theduplicity ofStalinwho severely limited theWest’sfreedomofactioninornearitszonesofoperation.62Asearlyas thebeginningofOctober, the insurgentssawthe undeniable parallels to Warsaw and made frequentanalogies to thePolishsituationwhenpleading forAlliedsupport.63ManyintheSNCandthosesympathetictotheuprisingbelievedtheUnitedStatestobeachampionofde-mocracyandasourceofhope.TheymorereadilyyieldedthebenefitofthedoubttotheWestandtheUnitedStatesthantheydidtotheSoviets.64Regardlessofwhowastoblame,the lack of weapons and supplies was only one problemfacedbytheinsurrectionists.

The plethora of actors involved in the Slovak uprisingalsoresultedinpoliticaldivisionsthathamperedcommandandcontrolandunityofpurposethroughoutthecourseoftheuprisingandtherebyleftplentyofroomforpostconflictrecriminations.TheinternalforcesinvolvedinSlovakiain-

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cluded the SNC, with its communist and noncommunistelements,theMoscow-directedpartisans,andthesupport-ersofTisoandSlovaknationalism.Externally,Benešcom-petedwithStalinandTisoforinfluenceandlegitimacy.Theuprising’sSlovakcommanderswereneverabletocontrol,andcouldonlymarginallyinfluence,theoperationsoftheSovietpartisanswhotooktheirordersfrompartisanhead-quartersinKiev,Ukraine.65Dubčekconfirmsthis,stating,“Thisdivided chain of command laterposed very seriousproblems.”66Somealsoclaimthattherewasextremeinter-naldissentwithinSlovakia,asthemajorityoftheSlovakpopulationneversupportedtherebellionandwereloyaltoTisoandhisSlovakgovernmentuntiltheendofthewar.67DubčekexpoundsupontheexternalfactorsatplaybetweenBenešandStalin,saying that in theCzechoslovak–SovietAllianceTreatysignedaroundthesametimeastheChrist-masAgreementof�943BenešeffectivelydeliveredCzecho-slovakiatotheSovietsphereofinfluencebysubordinatingitsexternalpoliciestoMoscow.68Ultimately,thesedivisionsandthepoliticalintriguetheyentailedcededtheinitiativetotheGermansandproveddisastrousfortheSlovakNa-tionalUprising.

TheGermanviewoftheeventisgenerallymorestraight-forwardthanthatof theSlovaksorSoviets.Thewarhadstretched the Nazis thin and left them with limited re-sourcesinthearea,buttheywerecertainlynotcaughtun-awareinSlovakia.ManyoftheethnicGermanpopulationofSlovakia,includingthosewhoweresoldiersinitsarmy,hadpreviously beenmobilized or transferred for employ-ment in Hitler’s Schutzstaffel (SS, meaning ProtectiveEchelon).The resultingabsenceofaGerman fifthcol-umnintheSlovakarmyaidedtheelaborateSlovakplan-ningandstockpilingpriortotherevolt.69Nevertheless,theGermansmaintainedgoodenoughintelligenceinBratislavaandineachSlovakArmydivisiontorealizethatsomethingwasintheworks.70Followingthedefectionofanotherkeyally,Romania,on24August�944,GermanArmyGroupNorthUkrainepreparedaplanforOperationPotatoHar-vest (FallKartoffelernte) todisarmand intern theEastSlovakArmyCorps.7�TheGermanshadgoodreasontobeconcerned.

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TheGermangoals in relation to theuprisingstemmedfromSlovakia’sstrategicgeographicpositioninCentralEu-rope.TheswitchingofsidesbyRomania, followedby theSlovakrevolt,threatenedtoencourageasimilarmovementinneighboringHungary,somethingtheGermansdesper-ately wanted to avoid.72 They also recognized the Slovaksituation was, according to Gerald Reitlinger, a “muchmoredangeroussituationthanWarsaw,becausetherebel-lioncutofftheretreatoftheroutedGermanEighthArmyinGalicia.”73TheimmediategoalsofinterventionincludedstabilizingthesituationintheindustrialregionsofSlovakiaandproppinguptheTisogovernmentwith�0,000–�5,000menforaboutoneweek.74Thisindicatestheydidnotthinkthefight to secureSlovakiawouldbe verydifficult. Theywerewrong.

TheinitialGermanreactionwasswiftandeffective.Fol-lowingTiso’sappealforhelpincombatingthegrowingpar-tisanthreat,theGermansorderedseveraladhocSSunitsincludingKampfgruppe(KGorbattlegroup)SchillandKGWittensmeier,aswellastwobetter-organizedunits:theSSHorstWesselDivision,and theSS�8thFreewilligPanzerGrenadierRegimentintoSlovakia.75Reichsführer (Equiva-lenttofieldmarshalandleaderoftheSS)HeinrichHimmlertookcontroloftheoperationandappointedSSObergrup-penführer(lieutenantgeneralequivalent)GottlobBergerascommander.76Bergerviewedthisasasimplepoliceaction,whichwouldtakenomorethanfourdays.77Becauseoftheconfusiontheprematurepartisantriggeringoftheuprisingcaused,theGermansrapidlydisarmedtheEasternSlovakArmyCorps,removingthetwobestSlovakdivisions,con-sistingof24,000of itsfinesttroops, fromthefight.78De-spitetheiradhoccomposition,theGermanunitsretaineda strong advantage in training and experience over theirSlovak opponents, consistently defeating the larger butpoorlyarmedfoe.79Thelargescaleoftherising,however,frustratedtheGermanattemptstoquellitquickly.HimmlerreactedbyappointinganewandmoreoperationallyfocusedSScommander,HermanHöffle,inlateSeptemberandbyincreasingthetroopcommitmenttosevendivisions,withatotalofnearly45,000troopswitharmor,artillery,andairsupport.80ByearlyOctober, theGermanshadassembledtheresourcesneededtocracktheuprising’sdefensivepe-

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rimeterinthecenterofthecountry,andtheyputthemtogooduse.

German conduct during the suppression of the revoltstemmedfromNaziideologyanditsexplanationofthena-tureofpartisanwarfare.Slovakia,aslateasthesummerof�944,hadbeenaquietbackwaterwhereGermanchildrenvacationed without raising any special concern.8� Hitlerviewedtheuprisingthroughhistypicallyanti-Semiticlens:

Butthematterwentdeeper.Whyhadacountry,notasyetmenacedwith Russian occupation, welcomed British-trained parachutists?Andwhyhadpartofthearmybeenwillingtogoovertotheenemy?ForHitlertherecouldonlybeoneanswer.InSlovakiatheJewshadbeen allowed to survive. In March �942 Slovakia had set a goodexampletoothersatellitecountriesbydeportingherownJewstoPoland. But later in that year, when fifty-six thousand had beensent, itwasdiscoveredthatresettlementinPolandmeantthegaschambersofAuschwitz,Treblinka,Belsec,andSobibor.Hencefor-ward,undercoverofacomplicatedcodexoflaws,thirty-fivethou-sandJewshadremainedinthecountry.82

This ideological sentiment ensured the remaining Jewswouldsufferheavilyduringthesuppression.Brutalparti-sanfightingalsoenragedandmotivatedtheGermans.Mostof thepartisanactivityoccurredunderthesupervisionoftheSoviets,whohadletlooseareignofterrorspecificallytargeting the ethnic German population.83 Although theSNCandGolianwagedanessentiallyconventionalcam-paign during the uprising, Slovaks would pay for theSoviet-directedpartisanexcessesandsufferthereprisalsoftheSSwhobeganaseriesofmassexecutionsinthere-gion.84ThenowstereotypicalactsofNazibrutalitybecamecommonplace.

TheSovietaccountsandperspectivesoftheSlovakNa-tional Uprising follow a party-line construct. The Sovietsrecognized the strategic position of Slovakia in Europeand the lackofGerman forces in thecountryandbegantoplanaccordingly.85They,liketheNazis,wereawarethatsomethingwasintheworksinSlovakiathroughtheirowncommunist contacts in the resistance movement.86 Inde-pendentoftheinternalSlovakresistance,MoscowpressedaheadwithitsownvisionforoperationsinCzechoslovakia,whichincludedtheuseoflarge-scalepartisanwarfaredi-rectedfromKiev,andtheemploymentofRedArmytrainedCzechoslovakunitsduringthenation’sliberationfromthe

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fascistgrip.87WhentheSlovaksdidsendamissiontotryto coordinate with the Red Army, the Soviets found theproposedplanforalinkupthroughtheCarpathianswish-fulthinkingratherthanactualcapability,andrejectedtheconventionalplaninfavorofthepopularuprisingtheybe-lieved their partisan struggle would ignite.88 Additionally,the Soviets viewed the Beneš government’s request for aSoviettimetableofoperationswithgreatsuspicion,refus-ing to disclose their operational plans to the “bourgeois”body.89Naturally,Sovietplanningandsecrecywereinlinewithitsowngoalsintheregion.

Those goals contradicted the German aims, obviously,but also conflicted with the aims of Beneš and even themajorityoftheSlovaksthemselves.RepeatedlytheSovietsfault theplanners of the rebellion fornot consideringan“uprisingofthemasses,”butinsteadfocusingontheirowninterestsinthepoliticalrealm:“alltherepresentativesoftheBenešgovernmenthadinvariablystriven(covertly)topre-venttheCzechoslovakantifascistmovementfrombreakingoutonalargescale.Benešandthemembersofhiscabinetwerefar-seeing,experiencedpeoplewhorealizedverywellthattheactivationofthepeople’sforcesmeantagreatclassdangerforabourgeoisrepublic.”90Stalinwanteda“socialrevolution” aided by the great socialist power, the SovietUnion, not a victory for the exiled regime: “To allow theproponentsofthe‘LondonConcept’totriumphwithoutanychallengewouldhave been foolish andpointless politicalbenevolence.OnceaSoviet-controlledpartisanmovementwas entrenched on Slovak territory there was an instru-mentinbeingto‘activate’thestruggle,toplacetheleader-shipof thisfightfirmly in thehandsof the ‘progressives’andtopreemptthebourgeoisnationalistsbyprecipitatingrevolt.”9�“Politicalbenevolence”notbeingStalin’sstrongestsuit,theSovietsbehavedaccordinglyduringtheuprising.

The Soviets’ initial primary focus in Slovakia was onthe operations of its partisans, which forced the prema-ture launchingof thegeneraluprisingbyprovokingGer-manintervention.TheRussianshadbeenbuildinguptheirpartisanstrengthintheregionsincethefirstgroupof��men,commandedbyP.A.Velichko,wasparachuted intotheareanearRužomberokon20July�944.92TheofficialSovietversionofeventsstatesthatbyAugustof�944Red

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Armysuccessesleftnodoubtabouttheoutcomeofthewar,stirringup“anundergroundstrugglebytheSlovakpeopleagainstfascism.”93Oncefightingbrokeout,theSovietre-gimedetermined,asanally,ithadanobligationtosupporttheSlovaksasa“manifestationofproletarianinternation-alism.”94Thepredominantamountofsupportwasdeliveredto thepartisans,not theorganizedSlovakresistance,vianightlyflights into theareadeliveringmillionsofbullets,thousands of rifles and machine guns, and hundreds ofantitankweapons.95Whilethispartisanstruggleraged,theSovietsdidattempttoestablishcontactwiththoseSlovakforcesengagedagainsttheGermansviaahastilyorganizedoffensivethroughtheCarpathianmountainpasses.

ConventionalRedArmyforceswererelativelyclosetotheSlovak border in late August �944. After the completionofthemassiveOperationBagration(Oперация Багратион)of-fensiveinthesummer,thefrontstabilizedonthefarsideof the Carpathians, 50 kilometers from the northeasternSlovakianfrontier.96AccordingtotheSovietclaims(whicharenotwithoutsomejustification),theirforceswereworndown and under strength from the summer combat andhadrecentlystooddowntoadefensiveposture.97Despitetheircondition,theunitsunderthecommandofMarshalIvanKonievinthe�standthe4thUkrainianFronts(armygroup equivalents), supported by the Soviet-trained �stCzechoslovakCorps,wereordered to launchanoffensiveattheoutbreakoftheuprisingthroughthemountainstotryandreachtherebels.98Lackofcommunicationwiththeresistanceorganizersreareditsuglyheadhereonceagain.TheSovietsstillexpectedsupportfromtheEasternSlovakArmyCorps,notknowingithadalreadybeendisarmed.99S.M.Shtemenko’saccountcalls the failureof theseSlo-vak divisions an act of treason, incorrectly accusing theunit’scommander,GenAugustMalar,ofgoingovertotheGermans.�00TheSovietoffensivefaceddifficultterrainandstrengthenedGermandefenses,butstillmadesomesub-stantialinitialprogress,includinga40-kilometeradvanceby �4 September, before its advanced units were cut offandstalledbyGermanreaction.�0�Thepace thensloweddramatically,and itwasnotuntil6October that the�stCzechoslovakCorpsseized theDuklaPass fromtheGer-mansandentereditsowncountryfromtheeast.�02These

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effortsyieldedlittleimmediateresults,asthepreviousfail-ureoftheEasternSlovakArmyCorpstoholditspositionmeanttheforcesunderKoniev,despitetheiradvances,werestillfarfromtheuprisingconfinedincentralSlovakia.

October�944saw theGermans fully regain the initia-tiveandsuppresstherevolt.Theyhadbeengrindingawayat the Slovaks throughout September, making slow butsteadygains,withKGSchilldemonstratingexcellenttacti-calprowess.�03TheforcesfacingeachotherinmidOctoberconsistedofnearly36,000Slovaksintheorganizedforce,ofwhichabout9,000hadnopersonalequipment,andap-proximately48,000Germantroopsofvaryingquality,age,and health.�04 Each side received a small measure of airsupport.TheGermansenjoyedexcellentresultsfromStukadive-bombingattacks.�05TheSlovaksbenefitedwithabriefspateofsupport fromthe�stCzechoslovakFighterRegi-mentthatarrivedatTriDubyairfieldfromtheSovietUnion,anepisodethatdeservesfurtherinvestigation.�06Nonethe-less,throughoutthemonthofOctober,theinsurgentswereforcedonthedefensiveuntiltheGermanslaunchedtheirfinaleffort.Theoffensivebeganon�7October,when35,000troopspushedupfromthesouthoutofHungaryfacilitatedbythatcountry’sregimechange.�07TheunreliabilityoftheSoviet-controlledpartisangroups,whofrequentlyfailedattheirassignedmissionsorsimplyvanishedfromthefieldofbattleleavingotherunitsexposedtotheenemy,handi-capped efforts to resist the German advance.�08 BanskáBystrica, thenominalcapitalof theresistance forces, fellto theGermans�0days later.�09While thefightingragedinthecenterofSlovakia,theSovieteffortsintheeastwerefallingshortaswell.

TheSovietoffensivewasunabletogenerateanymomen-tumfollowingthecaptureoftheDuklaPass.FurthergainseludedtheSoviets,despitecontinuedfightinginthemoun-tainousarea,untillateNovember.��0TheoffensiveintoSlo-vakia cost theSovietUnion80,000 casualties, 20,000 ofwhichwerekilled,whilethe�stCzechoslovakCorpsitselfhad6,500deadandwasgrounddowntohalfstrength.���ThesenumbersareproofpositivethattheSovietsmadeaseriousefforttoforcethemountains.On28October,facingaGermancounteroffensiveandrealizingthefailureoftheRedArmytoprogressanyfurther,GenRudolfViest,who

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hadsucceededGolianasmilitarycommanderoftheupris-ing,accepteddefeat.Viestdidnotformallysurrender,butordered the remaining insurgents to head for the moun-tainstoreverttopartisanwarfare,whichwouldcontinueuntiltheendofthewar.��2OrganizedSlovakresistancehadcollapsedaftertwolong,hardmonthsoffighting.

TheSlovakNationalUprisinghad failed to liberate thecountryforanumberofreasons.Theuprisingwastriggeredprematurely,andtheSlovakforceswerenotyettotallypre-pared for thefight.This resulted in the immediate lossofitstwobestfightingunits,andthestateoftrainingandarmamentoftheremaininginsurgentswaslow.��3Dividedandcompetingchainsofcommandfurtherdilutedtheeffortsoftheorganizedinsurgentsandthepartisans,allowingthesuperioroperationalprowessoftheGermanstodecidetheissue.��4ThefinalmajorcontributortoSlovakfailurewasthestarklackofoutsidesupport.��5Theprecedingfailuresmade thisneed forsupportall themore important.Eventhoughtheuprisingfailedinitsmostambitiousgoaloflib-eratingthecountry, itproducedsomesignificantpoliticalandmilitaryeffects.

Theuprisingendedupbenefitingeachofthekeyplayerstosomedegree.BenešandtheCzechoslovakgovernmentinexilereceivedsomepro-Alliedactivitytoboosttheirinflu-enceattheendofthewar.��6TheGermanssecuredtheirlast clear-cut success of thewar andmanaged to stabi-lizetheEasternFrontandbluntaSovietpushintocentralEurope.��7TheyremainedinplaceuntilApril�945.Militarily,theuprisingonlymarginallyaffectedGermanwarefforts,andthoseSlovakmanufacturingplantsunderGermancontrolcontinuedwarproductioninsupportoftheReichthrough-out the entire period of the rebellion.��8 TheSoviets sawthe influence of the Communist movement in Slovakiastrengthenedvis-à-vistheir“bourgeois”opponents.��9TheSlovaksgarnered their ownpro-Allied credentials,whichavertedpotentialpostwartreatmentasadefeatednation,and they could take pride in the fact that it was almostentirely a Slovak affair, despite Beneš’ efforts to paint itotherwise.�20

Noneof thesebenefitscamewithoutacost.Thenum-bersofcasualtiesfortheuprisingaredifficulttoestab-lish with anydegreeofaccuracy.Conservativeestimates

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of Slovak losses for theuprising amount to �,700killed,580missing,and3,600wounded,butthereareplausibleestimatesthatclaim2,500–3,000dead,and5,000–6,000woundedforthetwomonthsofactivecombat.�2�On30Oc-tober,theGermanscollected�0,000prisonersofwarintheBystrica–Zvolen–Donovaly area and shipped them to Ger-manyforuseasforcedlabor.�22GermanlossesinfightingtheSlovaksareintheneighborhoodof3,000menkilled,wounded,ormissing.�23SovietlossesontheEasternFrontin and around the Carpathian passes have already beendescribed.

The uprising proved disastrous for the ethnic Germanpopulation in Slovakia. Partisan bands played particularhavocwiththeseSlovaksofGermandescent.Large-scalekillingswerecommonplace:30civilianskilledinDeutsch-Proben,70murderedinHochwies-Paulisch,�30killed inKrickerhau, another �87 slaughtered in Glaserhau, �43killedinRosenberg,andsoon.�24Thepartisanswereevenboldenoughtomassacre�50“German”civilianswhowereas-sisting the Slovak insurgents with construction of de-fensive positions, which then brought retribution by theSlovakmilitary,whoexecutedthemurderers.�25Himmler,everprotectiveofGermanblood,orderedtheevacuationoftheethnicGermanpopulationfromcentralandeasternSlova-kiainNovember�944,whilemanyoftherestfledfromtheRussianadvance.Thisleftonly5,000ethnicGermansofaonce-thrivingpopulationinSlovakiaby�950.�26Thebru-talpartisanactivityagainst theSlovakGermansbroughtfearofreprisalsfromtheNazisecurityforces.�27Thesefearsprovedtobewellfounded.

TheGermanshadterrorontheirmindfromthebegin-ning of their intervention, and they continued their per-secutions well after organized resistance had ceased.ThereisnoclearerindicationofNaziintentthanthepub-lic declaration in early September �944. They promised toexact a “two-thousand-fold revenge” against anyone whoharmedaGermaninSlovakia,andtheSlovakinsurgentswerelabeled“murderersandbandits.”�28ThebrutalitybeganalmostimmediatelyastheGermantroops,aidedbytheTisogovernment’sloyalHlinkaGuard,plunderedlivestockandequipmentfortheirownneedsandtorchedscoresofSlo-vak communities.�29 The fear of the local populations

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waspalpable.ThisfearlimitedassistancetotheSlovakarmyasordinarycitizenslearnedtheGermansweremur-deringentirefamiliesandburningdownthehomesofanyonecaughtsympathizingwiththerebels.�30Followingtheirbru-tal suppression of the Warsaw uprising, the infamousSS Sturmbrigade Dirlewanger arrived to assist with thesuppression,using itsnotorious“medievalmethods”againsttheSlovaks.�3�Oncetheconventionalfightingculminatedandthensubsided intopartisanwarfare, theGermanef-fortsatrepressionbecamemorefurious.TheyfollowedthestandardNaziprogrambyemployingEinsatzgruppen(specialactionunits)infamousfortheirearlyroleinexterminationof Soviet Jews and Commissars. The Germans estab-lishedfiveunitsunderEinsatzgruppeHinSlovakiawhich,inthesixweeksbefore9December,reported�8,947peo-plecapturedincluding9,653Jews,3,409“bandits,”2,�86deserters,and7�4others“whoofferedresistance.”�32“Specialtreatment,”betterknownasimmediateexecutionwasad-ministered to 2,257 victims, while �0,000 others, mostlyJews,weresentintoconcentrationcamps.�33Thenumbersabove indicate an undeniable truth: the Jews were onceagainafavoritetargetoftheNazis.

TheoutcomeoftheSlovakNationalUprisingwouldwritethe tragic final chapter in the forlorn story of Slovakia’sJews.Aspreviouslystated,Slovakia’sJewshadunder-gonesignificantpersecutionundertheTisoregime,includingthe mass deportation of 56,000 people. Yet the deporta-tionshadstopped,oncetheSlovakslearnedtheJewswerebeingexecuted, leavingbetween20,000–35,000Jewsin-countryatthetimeoftheuprising.�34TheGermansforcedtheresumptionofdeportationson30September�944,withthelasttraindepartingaslateas3�March�945.�35Duringtheuprisingitself,theGermanssummarilyexecutedanyJewcaughtintheareaofthefighting.�36Thepurgewassothoroughthatbytheendofthewaronlysixoutofanoriginal�80rabbissurvived,andtherewasnosignificantJewishpopulationremaining.�37TheNazishadconcludedtheirpostscripttothehistoryoftheSlovakNationalUpris-ingwithabloodyexclamationpoint.

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Political Obscurity and the Tides of History

Thefailureoftheuprising,inconcertwiththepoliticalclimateoftheColdWar,coloredthehistoricalcoverageofthisremarkablerebellion.StanislavKirschbaumnotesthesteadysubordinationoftheSlovakstotheCzechsinthelate�940sresultedinthewillfuldistortion,bytheCommunistsinthe�950s,oftheobjectivesandthehistoricalrecordoftheuprising.�38DivisionsexistedevenamongtheCommu-niststhemselves;theCzechoslovakCommunistPartyandtheCPSviedforpostwarpower,whiletheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnionsoughttoexpanditsowninternationalinfluence.TheCzechcommunistswentsofarastoaccusemany of thoseSlovak communists involved in theupris-ingofbeing“bourgeoiselements”and“deviationists,”moreinterested innationalismthansocialism.�39Thiscompeti-tionbetweenthesethreeCommunistpartiesisyetanotheraspectof theSlovakstory thatdeservesmorestudy.ThepoliticalthawthatfollowedthefederationofCzechoslova-kiainthelate�960ssawthebeginningofmoreaccuratecoverageoftheuprising,onlytoseeitlostagaininthesub-sequent repression after �968.�40 Alexander Dubček, thepartisanveteranandcommunistleader,claimedsomethingofanepiphanywhenherealized“thatofthemanyofficiallysanctionedbooksandstudiespublishedinthepastaboutthe uprising, only a few were more than propaganda.”�4�DiscerningthefulltruthabouttheSlovakNationalUpris-ingisextremelydifficult,atbest,andrequirespropercon-siderationofthedifferingviewpointsandthemotivationsofeachoftheirprotagonists.

WesternaccountsofWorldWarIIhavevirtuallyignoredtheSlovakNationalUprisingforanumberofreasons.Em-barrassmentat the treatmentofCzechoslovakiawithap-peasementandtheMunichAgreementin�938,andthenfailuretoholdGermanytothatsameagreementinMarch�939, which led to the creation of bastard Slovakia, hasplayedarole.�42Additionally,bothBritainandtheUnitesStatesplayedonlyaminorroleintheuprising.Theywerelargelybystanderslookinginfromtheoutside,powerlesstodoanything.TheBritishhaddeliberatelylimitedaid,withtheir Special Operations Executive restricted to sabotageandguerrillaactivities,notmajoruprisings.�43TheAmeri-

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cansandtheBritishtriedtosupporttheuprisingwithverysmall,secretmilitarymissionsthatresultedinthecaptureandexecutionof�7oftheiragents.�44ThesecovertmissionsfocusedtheireffortsontheTriDubyairfieldnearBanskáBystricaandmanaged toflyoutdozensofdownedAlliedairmen, while flying in military and medical supplies fortheinsurgents.�45Inaway,theWesterncountriestriedtoexoneratethemselvesbyblamingtheSovietUnionforpro-hibitingthemfromassistingtheSlovaksanddenyingthemoperational freedominthearea.�46 Intruth,USandBrit-ish prioritieswere elsewhere.OperationMarketGarden’slaunch and subsequent failure in mid September �944,the20October�944surrenderofAachen, thefirst largeGermancitytobecaptured,andtheWarsawuprisingallgarneredmoreattention.Sincethentheseeffortshaveen-joyedextensivecoverageinWesternmedia,overshadowingtheeventsinSlovakia.�47ThislackofexposureintheWestcontrastssharplywiththeaccountsfromtheSovietsandCommunists.

The Soviets, ever mindful of the value of propaganda,workeddiligently topresent their viewof theuprisingasthetruehistoryandinsodoingtofurthertheirownpoliti-calaimsinEurope.TheorthodoxviewportrayedtheSovietUnionasastrongandwillingallyoftheCzechoslovakpeo-ple,whichwasreadytohelpwhenthegovernmentinex-ilerequestedassistance.�48Theirversionofhistorymakesno mention that partisan activity prematurely triggeredtheuprising,butimpliesthatHitlerjustdecidedtooccupySlovakiaaccordingtohisowntimetable.�49Communistac-counts try to claim leadership in the struggleby inaccu-ratelyportrayingtheSNCasaCommunistconstruct,call-ingita“people’sfront”fightingtheNazis,ignoringthetrue,evenrepresentationofcommunistsandnoncommunistsinthe body.�50 Red accounts aim to paint a vividpicture ofCommunistresolveandglory:“Atthemosttryingmomentstheinsurgents—especiallytheCommunists—courageouslylookeddangerintheeyeandwentonfightinghard.TheyknewthattheRedArmywashurryingtorelievethem,sotheyheldout to the last.”�5�Givensuchresolve, failureoftheuprisinghadtobeattributedtoBeneš,hisofficers,andtheSlovakbourgeoisiewhoconspiredagainstthe“people’s”revolt.�52Sovietwritersalsomadesure to fault theWest,

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ingeneral,foritspaltryamountofaidgiven,whileclaim-ingtohavegrantedtheinsurgentsextensivehelp.�53Lastly,toensuretheirversionofeventswasaccepted,theSovietsroundedupandarrestedthoseSlovaks,evenmanyofthecommunists,involvedintheuprisingandplacedindividu-alsthatweremore“reliable”intheirsteadfollowingtheendofthewar.�54WhiletheSovietswereabletoprovideauni-fied,ifdistorted,accountoftheuprising,theCzechs’viewsontheaffairareslightlymorecomplex.

TwobasicCzechviewsofthesituationprevail:theversionoftheBenešgovernmentandnoncommunistsandthepost-war versionof eventsprofferedby the communist regime.TheBenešgovernmentinexiledesperatelyneededtoportraythisrevolutionastheirown,andattemptedtolayclaimtoinspiringandorganizing it for theSlovaks,whoneededtoatonefortheirsinof independence.�55Onesimplestatisticrefutesthisclaim:onlyabout�,000Czechsparticipatedintherising.�56TheBenešgovernmentwasalsokeenlyawareoftheaccusationsmadeagainsttheSovietUnionintheWar-sawuprisingandsawthesameduplicityandhencereasonsforfailureinSlovakia.�57Ultimately,BenešlaidthefailureoftheAlliestoprovidesupportontheresultsoftheTeheranConferenceinlate�943,whichyieldedupCzechoslovakiatotheSovietsphereofinfluence.�58

TheCzechcommunistswhocametopowerinthepost-war period held a slightly different position. Those com-munists involved in therevoltweresmall innumberanddidnotreceiveprominentappointmentsinthegovernmentbecausetheydrewSovietsuspicions.�59Thosewhowereinpower endeavored to paint theuprising as aCommunistventur,whileat thesametimeportraying thedemocraticgroupsashaving collaboratedwith theNazis.�60 They fo-cused their efforts on the prominent democratic patriotswhoopposedthempoliticallyandtriedtoextortothersintomakingsignedstatementsdefamingtheenemiesofCom-munism.�6� In their efforts tobolster theCommunist im-age, they attempted to switch the blame for the murderofmanyof theethnicGermanpopulation to theGermanSS.�62TheseeffortsseemtohaveconvincedmanyordinaryCzechoslovakswhobelievedtheuprisingfailedsimplybe-causeofthevagariesofwarandsawtheCommunistsastheprimaryvictorsoverGermany.�63Thecomplexityofthe

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CzechviewpointisreplicatedtoanevengreaterdegreeintheSlovakposition.

TheSlovakNationalUprisingrepresentsmanydifferentthingstomanydifferentSlovaks.Itshouldcomeasnosur-prisethatinternaldisputesoftenyieldthemostvociferousreactionsandcreatedeepwounds.Theuprising “becametheobjectofmanyconflictinginterpretations,notonlybythosewhocondemnitandthosewhojustifyit,butalsobythosewho led it.”�64Thosewhoopposed theuprisingdidnot see the eventas liberation from fascism,but insteadvieweditasabetrayalofSlovakindependenceandareturntosubordinationundertheCzechs.�65ThosethatsupportedtheuprisingclaimthatanoverwhelmingnumberofSlovaksopposed thecreationofTiso’s independentstate, viewingtheseparatistmovementastreasonousto theCzechoslo-vakstate.�66TheyalsoviewtheuprisingaspartofacentralEuropean,noncommunistdemocraticrevolution,compar-ingittothemovementsofDragoljubMihailovićinYugosla-viaandBor-Komorowski(GenCountTadeuszKomorowski)inPoland.�67TheprosecutionofSlovak“collaborators”afterthe war, only served to deepen the divide between thesegroups. “People’s courts” triedTisoandover20,000oth-ers, finding over 8,000 guilty of collaboration.�68 Furtherdivision between the Catholics, who were more likely tohave supported Tiso, and the Protestants, who favoredCzechoslovakia,occurredastheresultoftheinternmentof�0,000–20,000oftheformerintheSovietUnionfollowingthewar.�69ManySlovaks,andtheBenešgovernment,sawduplicityandtreacheryintheSoviethandlingoftheaffairanddrewparallelstoWarsaw.�70Thedebatecontinuedevenafterthewar,asmanyrememberedtheshort-livedperiodofindependenceandrelativeprosperityasapositivelegacy.�7�Reverberationsof thesedivisionsare felt even today.The62ndanniversarycelebrationofthe�944SlovakNationalUprisingwasdisruptedbyagroupofprotestorsfromtheSlovenska Pospolitost(SlovakCommunity),whichsupportsTiso’slegacyandderidestheuprisinganniversarycelebra-tionasa“festivalof traitors.”�72Clearly, thereremains inSlovakiaadeep-seateddivideovertheinterpretationofthishistoricalevent.

Despite the complexity and variance of views towardstheuprising,properanalysiscancutthroughthepolitical

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hazetoclarifysomeofthecontentiousaspectsoftherevolt.Comparisonswith theWarsawuprisingonboth thepoli-tics involvedandtheatrocitiescommittedareuseful,butonlytoalimiteddegree.Stalinwasnothingifnotashrewdpolitician,andtherecanbenodoubthewascarefullyma-neuveringtoensureSovietinfluenceinCzechoslovakia,butunlikeinPoland,theRedArmydidattemptahastyoffen-sivetoreachtheinsurgents.Infact,theRedArmylostfourtimesasmanymenattemptingtoforcetheCarpathiansastheydid on the approaches toWarsawduring thePolishrevolt.�73Reasonsforthisdifferenceareunclear,butitmaybe that the Russians believed they had a fleeting oppor-tunitytoseizepassesthroughdifficultgeographicterrainwiththehelpoftheinsurgents,ratherthanhavingtofightfor it laterundermorechallengingcircumstances.Itmayalsobeattributable to thewell-knownanimosity thatex-istedbetweenthePolesandRussiansingeneral,andSta-linandtheexiledPolishregimeatthattime.Additionally,althoughGermanreprisalsagainsttheSlovaksmimickedthebrutalityagainstthePoles,theyseemtobeonamuchsmaller scale. The figures for Warsaw are generally ac-ceptedas200,000civilianskilledduetotheuprisingthere,whilethepreviouslycited,thoughundoubtedlyincomplete,Slovakfiguresfailtoapproachthislevel.�74NorcanalltheatrocitiesbeattributedtotheNazis,muchtoCommunistchagrin, as partisan vengeance against Slovak Germanshas already been demonstrated. In laymen’s terms, theWarsawandSlovakuprisingsmaybesiblings,buttheyarecertainlynottwins.

Theoverarchingreasonforfailurewasthelackofaclear,unifiedcommand,oratleastunityofeffort.ThedivergentpoliticalaimsoftheSNC,theBenešexilegovernment,andtheSovietUnionprevented them fromeverbeingable toestablish a single coordinated plan and thereby employtheir forcesand resources in concert to greater effect. InSlovakia,theinsurgentshadtheirownchainofcommandwhichwasworkingwiththeSNCandtheexilegovernment,while the partisans answered to Moscow and, for all in-tentsandpurposes,rantheirownindependentoperations.MoscowwouldnotsubordinateitspartisanstoBeneš,andhisgovernmentrefusedtosubordinatetheSlovakarmytotheSoviets.Themutuallackoftrustwasvalidinthatthey

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allhaddifferentaims,but itprovedfatal toeachof theirefforts.Blamemustbesharedequally,asnoneofthekeyparticipantswereabletocompromiseeffectivelyenoughtofightthemutualNazienemy.

Despite claims otherwise, the Slovak National Upris-ingwaspredominantlySlovakanddemocratic,notCzech,Soviet,orCommunist.TheBenešgovernmentwasabletoportraytheuprisingasitsownbecausetheAllieshadrec-ognized it as the legitimate representative of the CzechsandSlovaks.Itwaspreciselythisrecognition,however,thatforcedtheSlovakstoworkthroughBenešbecausetheyhadnoothermeansofcommunicatingwiththeAllies.Byslightofhand,itappearedthattheCzechgovernmentwasindeedrunningtheshow.Thenumbersspeakforthemselves,andCzechs,aspreviouslymentioned,didnotmakeupalargecontingentofcombatantsduringtherevolt.Similarly,Com-munistattemptstotakecreditforleadingtheuprisingandconducting the largershareoffightingarepatently false.TheSlovakarmyborethemainburdenofcombatthrough-out the rising.�75 It is theunfortunate fateof theSlovaksthathistoryandpoliticscloudthesefacts.

TheongoinginternalrecriminationsamongtheSlovaksthemselvesareasunfortunateastheyareinevitable.Takenfromanoutsider’sperspectiveandleavingthedebateaboutthemoralityoftheTisoregimeaside,onecanseeSlovakpatriots on both sides of this issue. The idealists amongtheSlovakseparatistsnaturallyfindtheattempttoover-throwSlovakia’sfirst independentgovernmentabhorrent.When looking at it from their perspective, one must re-member that the German army did not occupy Slovakiauntilthepartisanstriggeredtheintervention.Thesepeoplefoundbeingarelativelyunmolested,butsubservient,allytoGermanypreferabletocompletepoliticalsubordinationinaunifiedCzechoslovakstate.TherealistsinsideSlovakiacouldseethewritingonthewallandrecognizedSlovakia’sbestinterestslaywithswitchingtotheAlliedsidebeforethewarwasover.TheyviewedreincorporationintoCzechoslo-vakiaasinevitableanddecideditwouldbebetterfortheirtinynationtoavoidtreatmentasadefeatedmemberoftheAxisalliance.Thusmotivated,theydecidedtoact.Regard-lessof thesetwoviews,theuprisinghadseriouspoliticalconsequencesfortheSlovaks.

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ThebottomlinefortheSlovakpeople,despitetheshort-term gain of averting treatment as a conquered nation,waslong-termpoliticalweakness,whichwouldcostthemduringtheColdWar.TheuprisingeffectivelyendedSlovakstatehoodbydestroyingthelinkbetweenTisoandthepeo-ple and turning Slovakia into an occupied German pup-petstatewithouteventhepretenseofindependence.�76ThefailureoftheuprisingalsoweakenedtheSlovaks’claimtomoreautonomyandequalityintherecreatedCzechoslovakstate,astheSoviets,theBenešgovernment,andinternalCommunistleadersallpreferredamorecentralizedpoliticalsystememanatingfromPrague.�77TheCommunistPartyofCzechoslovakiawasabletoleverageCzechfearsofrenewedSlovakseparatismtoitsownbenefit,andseizedpowerin�948.TheSlovaks,whotothelastvotedagainstcommu-nismatarateoftwotoone,nowfoundthemselvessubor-dinatetotheCzechsonceagain,andthistimeitwouldbeunderacommunistregime.�78ItwouldremainsountilthenowfamousVelvetDivorcein�993.

Conclusion

ThetruestoryoftheSlovakNationalUprisingof�944canonlynowberevealed.ThepassageoftimeandendoftheColdWarallowcloserinspectionofthedifferentviewpointsofthisrevoltandhelpwipeawaysomeofthemurkinessofthepoliticalmilieu thatsurrounds it.TheuniquehistoryofSlovakia,weddedtothetumultuousEuropeanpoliticalsceneofthelate�930s,resultedinthecreationofaninde-pendentSlovakiacloselyalliedtoNaziGermany.Thismovetoward independence and the close ties toGermany cre-atedgreat internalandexternal turmoil for the tinynewstate.Dramaticchangesinthe�944warsituationprovidedafleetingopportunityforthoseinternalandexternalactorswhoopposedtheSlovakgovernmenttoriseupandredresstheirgrievances.Theuprisingforcedthreekeyparticipantsincluding theSlovaks,Germans,andSoviets intoaction.Eachoftheseplayershadtheirownplansandgoalsfortheuprising,whichguidedtheiractionsthereinandproducedindependent and sometimes conflicting accounts of whatreally happened during the fateful event. Two months of

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hardfightingendedinthecollapseoforganizedresistanceinSlovakiawithdireconsequencesfortheSlovakJewishand ethnic German populations, while yielding only lim-itedshort-termpoliticalgainsfortheSlovaks.Followingthefailureoftheuprisingandtheendofthewar,politicalma-neuvering,influencedheavilybyColdWarpolitics,yieldedaccusationsandcounterchargesbetweenEastandWest,aswellasinternallyinCzechoslovakiaandamongtheSlovakpeople. These debates and disagreements further obfus-catedtheissuesandactualhistorysurroundingtherevolt,sendingitintoobscurity,particularlyinWesternaccountsofWorldWarII.Adisciplinedanalysisofeachofthesepost-war accounts reveals some undeniable truths about theuprisingandpaintsamuchclearerpictureofmanyofthemorehotlycontestedaspectsofthetragicevent.Itistimetosetthehistoricalrecordstraight.

Notes

(Allnotesappearinshortenedform.Forfulldetails,seetheappropriateentryinthebibliography.)

�. DiNardo,Germany and the Axis Powers.DiNardocoversthecollapseordefectionofnumerousAxisnationsincludingItaly,Finland,Romania,andHungaryinhischapter9.HemovesdirectlyfromRomania’sdefec-tioninAugust�944toaddressthatofHungary,declaringHungary“thelastGermanallytobedealtwith”onpage�88.OmissionofSlovakiafromabookspecificallyaboutGermany’salliesindicatesjusthowmuchthistinynationhasbeen,andstillis,overlookedbyWesternhistoriesofWorldWarII.

2. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,�42.3. Ibid.4. Ibid.,�50–5�.5. Ibid.,�5�–52.6. Ibid.,�58.7. Ibid.,�55–57.8. Ibid.,�75.9. Ibid.,�6�.�0. Downs,World War II,23.��. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,�8�.�2. Beneš,Memoirs,50–5�.�3. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,�82–83.�4.Oddo,Slovakia and Its People,249.�5. Ibid.�6. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,�90.�7. Brown,“TheS.O.E.,”4�.�8. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,42.�9. Beneš,Memoirs,58.

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20. Oddo,Slovakia and Its People,265.2�. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,209–�0.22. Gilbert,Second World War,56�.23. Ibid.,53�.24. Keegan,Second World War,480.25. Gilbert,Second World War,544.26. Keegan,Second World War,48�.27. Ibid.,482.28. Gilbert,Second World War,597.29. Ibid.30. Keegan,Second World War,4�4.3�. Ibid.32. Clausewitz,On War,87.33. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,206.34. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,44.ThisSNCwasadifferent

organizationthantheSlovakNationalCouncil thatproposedunionwiththeCzechsinOctober�9�8,referencedinnote6.

35. Lettrich,History of Modern Slovakia,�99.36. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,�9�.37. Erickson,Road to Berlin,292.38. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,209.39. Ibid.,2�5.40. Downs,World War II,24.4�. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,254.42. Ibid.43. KlimentandNakladal,Germany’s First Ally,92.44. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,285.45. KlimentandNakladal,Germany’s First Ally,90.46. Erickson,Road to Berlin,294.47. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,45.48. Weinberg,World at Arms,7�2.49. Erickson,Road to Berlin,296.50. KlimentandNakladal,Germany’s First Ally,93.5�. Ibid.,94.Thesenumbersdonotincludethe24,000soldiersofthe

twoeasterndivisionswhowereimmediatelycapturedanddisarmedbytheGermans,asrelatedfurtherintheparagraph.

52. Lettrich,History of Modern Slovakia,205.53. KlimentandNakladal,Germany’s First Ally,97.54. Downs,World War II,30.55. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,272.56. Ibid.,277–78.57. Downs,World War II,�03.58. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,46–47.59. Ibid.,47.60. Ibid.6�. Lettrich,History of Modern Slovakia,2�0.62. Ibid.,2�3.63. Downs,World War II,67.64. Ibid.,9�.65. Oddo,Slovakia and Its People,298.

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66. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,45.67. Oddo,Slovakia and Its People,299.68. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,44.69. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,257.70. KlimentandNakladal,Germany’s First Ally,92.7�. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,259.72. “SlovakRevolt,”New York Times.73. Reitlinger,SS,377–78.74. KlimentandNakladal,Germany’s First Ally,93.75. Hinze,To the Bitter End,47.76. Ibid.,43.77. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,272.78. Hinze,To the Bitter End,45.79. Downs,World War II,5�.80. Erickson,Road to Berlin,305.8�. Hinze,To the Bitter End,37.82. Reitlinger,SS,378.83. Hinze,To the Bitter End,38.84. Reitlinger,SS,378.85. Erickson,Road to Berlin,295.86. Downs,World War II,24.87. Ibid.,25.88. Shtemenko,The Last Six Months,290.89. Ibid.,295.90. Ibid.,287.9�. Erickson,Road to Berlin,295.92. Ibid.,292.93. Shtemenko,The Last Six Months,293.94. Ibid.,302.95. Ibid.,3�8.96. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,256.97. Shtemenko,Last Six Months,298–99.98. Erickson,Road to Berlin,299–300.99. Ibid.�00. Shtemenko,Last Six Months,306.�0�. Ibid.,308.�02. Ibid.,3�2.�03. Hinze,To the Bitter End,5�.�04. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,295–96.�05. Ibid.,280.�06. Hinze,To the Bitter End,49.�07. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,2�8.�08. Hinze,To the Bitter End,40.�09. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,2�8.��0. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,54.���. Erickson,Road to Berlin,307.��2. KlimentandNakladal,Germany’s First Ally,�08.��3. Ibid.,��0.��4. Ibid.,���.��5. Hinze,To the Bitter End,49.

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��6. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,2�9.��7. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,307.��8. Ibid.,265.��9. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,48.�20. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,308.�2�. Ibid.�22. Downs,World War II,�62.�23. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,307–8.�24. Downs,World War II,3�.�25. Ibid.,32.�26. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,3�3–�6.�27. Downs,World War II,��7.�28. “RailwaysHeldObjective,”New York Times.�29. Lettrich,History of Modern Slovakia,2�5.�30. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,56.�3�. Downs,World War II,�3�.�32. Lettrich,History of Modern Slovakia,2�6.�33. Ibid.�34. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,3�2.Estimates vary.Axworthyclaims

20,000,while,asinnote83above,Reitlingerestimates35,000.�35. Ibid.�36. Lettrich,History of Modern Slovakia,�90.�37. Ibid.,�9�.�38. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,222.�39. Erickson,Road to Berlin,306.�40. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,222.�4�. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,4�.�42. Beneš,Memoirs, 59.ForBeneš, the failure of theWest tohold

HitlertotheguaranteesoftheMunichAgreementwasasecondblatantbetrayalofCzechoslovakia.

�43. Downs,World War II,�08.�44. Ibid.,288–89.�45. Ibid.,287.�46. Korbel,Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia,7�.�47. Gilbert,Second World War,593,604.�48. Shtemenko,Last Six Months,287.�49. Ibid.,298.�50. Ibid.,293–94.�5�. Ibid.,3�8.�52. Toma,“SovietStrategy,”290.�53. Korbel,Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia,72.�54. Davidson,Nuremberg Fallacy,23�.�55. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,222.�56. Werth,Russia at War,9��.�57. Downs,World War II,�04.�58. Beneš,Memoirs,252–53.�59. Korbel,Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia,�67.�60. Ibid.,�70.�6�. Ibid.,�7�.�62. Downs,World War II,32.

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�63. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,48–49.�64. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,207.�65. Ibid.,2�8.�66. Lettrich,History of Modern Slovakia,6.�67. Ibid.,2�9.�68. Ibid.,229–30.�69. Oddo,Slovakia and Its People,305.�70. Werth,Russia at War, 9��.�7�. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,49.�72. “SlovakExtremistsDetained,”Czech News Agency.�73. Davies,Rising ‘44,350.�74. Keegan,The Second World War,483.�75. Axworthy,Axis Slovakia,304.�76. Kirschbaum,History of Slovakia,22�.�77. DubčekandHochman,Hope Dies Last,48.�78. Korbel,Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia,220–2�.

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