AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Endgame in the Pacif icComplex i t y , S t ra t egy , and the B-29

G. SCOTT GORMANMajor, USAF

Fairchild Paper

Air University PressMaxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112–6615

February 2000

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of theauthor, and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:distribution unlimited.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gorman, G. Scott , 1963–Endgame in the Paci f ic / G. Scot t Gorman. p. cm.“Fairchild paper.”Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 1-58566-075-2 1. World War, 1939–1945—Technology. 2. World War,

1 9 3 9 – 1 9 4 5 — C a m p a i g n s — P a c i f i c A r e a . 3 . W o r l d W a r , 1 9 3 9 – 1 9 4 5 — C a m-paigns—Japan. 4. World War, 1939-1945—Aerial operations, American. 5. B-29bomber. I. Title

D810.S2 G57 1999940.54’26—dc21 99-058172

ii

Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x i

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

1 COMPLEXITY AND TECHNOLOGY IN WAR . . . 1Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2 ENDGAME AGAINST JAPAN:THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3 DOCTRINAL AND TECHNOLOGICALDEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

4 APPLYING A TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION . . . . 21Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

5 UNCERTAINTY AND UNINTENDEDCONSEQUENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

6 TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONALADAPTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

iii

Photographs

A Hurricane-Hunting Superfortress . . . . . . . . . . . 5

A High-Flying Superfortress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

A Superfortress Over Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

iv

Foreword

Endgame in the Pacific: Complexity, Strategy, and the B-29 ,by Maj G. Scott Gorman, inaugurates an Air Universi ty Pressseries of substantive essays considered too short for publicationas monographs but too lengthy to be journal articles.

The series is named for Gen Muir S. Fairchild, first com-mander of Air University and widely regarded as its concep -tua l fa ther . Al though he he ld no co l lege degree , Genera lFairchild was a respected leader who was part visionary, partkeen taskmaster , and “Air Force to the core.” By the t ime thefirst classes were meeting at Maxwell Air Force Base, he hadsucceeded in defining the role of the professional Air Forceofficer and in blending that role into the curriculum of thefirst Air University schools.

General Fairchild’s legacy is one of optimistic confidenceabout the future of the Air Force and the central role AirUniversity would play in its development. This series is onlyone component of that legacy and i ts prophetic quali ty.

Endgame in the Pacific examines the chal lenges encounteredby XX and XXI Bomber Commands in employing the B-29against Japan, f i rs t f rom India and China, la ter f rom the Mari-anas . In turn , i t examines the adapta t ions required to meetthose challenges. Air University Press is pleased to presentMajor Gorman’s essay as the f irst of the Fairchild Papers.

ROBERT B. LANEDirectorAir University Press

v

Maj G. Scott Gorman, born on 19 November 1963, is anative of Wadsworth, Ohio. Following graduation from theUnited States Air Force Academy in 1986, he earned the Mas-ter of Arts degree in Russian history from Indiana University.Major Gorman is a senior pilot with instructor t ime in the T-3,the T-37, and the C-5. He has a lso taught Russian his tory,world history, and mili tary history at the United States AirForce Academy. Major Gorman is a graduate of US Air ForceSquadron Off icer School (outs tanding graduate) , US ArmyCommand and General Staff College (1998), and US ArmySchool of Advanced Military Studies (1999), where this paperwas originally developed. He was recently selected as a candi-date for a senior service school. Major Gorman is currentlystat ioned at the American Embassy in Moscow, Russia , wherehe is chief of the US Security Assistance Office. He is marriedto the former Sarah E. Cummings and is the proud fa ther ofthree children.

About theAuthor

G. Scott Gorman

vii

Acknowledgments

I would l ike to thank the entire faculty and staff of theArmy’s School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leaven-worth, Kansas. Special thanks to Dr. Jake Kipp for his wit ,wisdom, and constant encouragement .

ix

Abstract

In war , compet ing sys tems in t roduce new technologica lmeans to gain advantage. Greater technological complexity,however , creates greater uncertainty—due not only to techni-ca l p rob lems bu t a l so to un in tended consequences when newtechnology is applied within the chaotic environment of war.In the last years of the war against Japan in the Pacif ic ,Boeing’s B-29 was the technological solution to attacking Ja-pan across long distances. Applicat ion, however, was not ass imple as p lanners had hoped. Uncer ta in t ies and unin tendedconsequences accompanied the B-29’s employment .

xi

Introduction

War is an outward expression of competi t ion between com-p l e x b u t a d a p t i v e p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y s y s t e m s . T h e s esystems are complex not only because they contain a greatnumber of par ts but a lso because the par ts are in t r ica te lyre la ted to the sys tem and to the external environment . War , asa resul t of this inherent complexity, is uncertain and chaotic .This uncertainty arises from the characterist ic of nonlinearityin war. Like the proverbial flapping of a butterfly’s wings thatresul ts in a thunders torm, smal l changes to ini t ia l condi t ionsin war can have disproportionate effects. The l iving and adap-t ive nature of opponents is another source of uncertainty inwar. War, in sum, is not clockwork; i t is an organic interactionbetween competing complex and adaptive systems.

Strategy is a plan of action for negotiating complexity anduncertainty to achieve a specific goal. Strategy provides unifyingdirection—a common purpose for actions within the system.Stra tegy maps out the employment of means to achieve de-sired objectives. Unlike mathematical or mechanical solutions,mili tary strategy is aimed at a moving target—an intell igentand adapt ing opponent . S t ra tegy , g iven the uncer ta in andchanging nature of war, must s imilarly be f lexible and adap-t ive to achieve desired end-states.

Theater mil i tary strategy employs various tools and meth-ods to achieve those desired ends. Technology, which fashionsthe implements of war through the scient if ic method, is onetool available to the military strategist. In war, competing sys -t e m s i n t r o d u c e n e w t e c h n o l o g y i n a n a t t e m p t t o g a i ncomparat ive advantage over other systems and the environ-ment . Jus t as wi th o ther inputs wi th in a sys tem, the impactsof technological change are difficult to predict, often resultingin nonl inear ef fec ts and unintended consequences . Thanks tothe profoundly interactive nature of war, technological toolsthat were intended to simplify and solve complex problemsmay in fact foster additional complexity.

In i ts competi t ion with the Japanese system in the Pacif ictheater in 1944, the American mil i tary system faced the com-plex strategic problem of ending the war unconditionally while

xiii

minimizing American casualt ies. The Boeing B-29 Superfor-tress was the US Army Air Force’s technological solution tothis complex strategic problem. The B-29’s pressurized cock -p i t , l o n g e r r a n g e , m o r e a c c u r a t e b o m b i n g s y s t e m s , a n dmechanically controlled defensive systems represented a vastimprovement over earlier strategic bombardment technology.Rather than simplifying the problem, however, the B-29 withi t s uncer ta in t ies and unin tended consequences (and the in t r i-cacies of the relat ionships surrounding the new technology)further “complexified” it . Employment of the B-29 spawnedtechnological difficulties, awareness of doctrinal failings, per-sonal and in terservice r ival r ies , and Japanese responses—andthese consequences created the need for fur ther systems ad-apta tion. The B-29 was no t t he qu i ck and ea sy so lu t i onpromulgated by the Army Air Forces. Only after numerousadapta t ions a t the strategic, operational, and tactical levels—and the marriage of the B-29 with another technological tool,the atom bomb—did the United States achieve i ts desiredstrategic end-state .

Future mil i tary strategy and the applicat ion of technologicaltools within that s t rategy should be organic and adaptive, notmechanis t ic . St ra tegy should consider both the adapt ive na-ture of the enemy system and the uncer ta inty of s t ra tegicinputs in the chaotic environment of war. Future Americanmilitary strategists pondering the effects of emerging technol-ogy would do well to recall the experience of the B-29 in thePacific theater during World War II.

This paper f i rs t discusses the theoret ical aspects of technol-ogy in warfare viewed through the lens of complexity theory. Itthen details the complexity of the strategic problem facing theUni ted Sta tes in the war agains t Japan. Focusing on the ro leof a i rpower , the paper presents the s t ra tegic bombardment ofJapan us ing B-29s based on the Mar iana I s l ands a s a casestudy in the application of technology to achieve strategicends. I t examines both unforeseen diff icul t ies and the adapta-tions that were necessary to “make it work.” The conclusionoffers advice—and caution—for future strategists looking tosimplify the complexit ies of war with l inear and mechanicalso lu t ions .

xiv

Chapter 1

Complexity and Technology in War

Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing isdifficult .

—Carl von Clausewitz

Uncertainty is an unavoidable aspect of warfare. War, dueto i t s complex and nonl inear na ture , i s an inherent ly unpre-dictable venture. German mili tary theorist Carl von Clausewitzapt ly noted the inherent uncertainty of war .1 For Clausewitz,war was a “true chameleon,” ever changing due to the ele-ments of chance, fr ict ion, and the dynamic relat ionship be-tween poli t ics and mili tary operations. 2 Only in Clausewitz’s“absolute war,” a theoretical war devoid of context and inessence absent the nonlinear relat ionships of the real world,could the outcome of war be predicted with any certainty. 3

Real war is not so simple. Dynamic interact ions within thecomplex process of war do not lend themselves to this unreal-istic theoretical abstraction. “[An] attribute of military actionis that i t must expect posi t ive react ions, and the process ofinteraction that results [from the action taken]. . . . The verynature of interact ion is bound to make [war] unpredictable.”4

Greater technological complexi ty c r ea t e s g r ea t e r unce r -tainty. Innovations in mili tary technology produce quicker,deadlier , and more destruct ive ways of interact ing within themilitary environment. As a military tool, technology cannot bemechanistically applied within mili tary strategy. The certaintyof a machine in an insula ted exper imental environment doesnot guarantee cer tainty in the chaot ic environment of war.5

Although a technological instrument may theoret ical ly repre-sent a closed system intended to perform l ike clockwork, theenvironment of war in which i t is uti l ized is an open systemsubject to imponderable unforeseen inputs having nonl ineareffects. This “Machiavellian” desire to rationalize warfare is inpart a reflection of the faulty mechanistic view inherited fromNewton and passed down through modern mil i tary theoris ts . 6

1

Airpower planners, given the technical nature of aircraftand munit ions, are par t icular ly suscept ible to mechanis t ic ap-proaches to warfare . Entranced by the technical nature oftheir tools, airpower strategists tend to view airpower planningas an engineer ing science, a mere mechanical analysis ofweapons and t a rge t s .7 Despite the technical nature of the airins t rument , uncer ta inty is jus t as important in applying a i r -power as in applying other mil i tary instruments . Gen Hay-wood S. Hansel l Jr . noted the role of uncertainty in the con-cep t ion o f A i r War P l ans D iv i s ion -1 (AWPD-1) : “ I n a n ym e a s u r e m e n t s y s t e m i n v o l v i n g p r o b a b i l i t i e s , o n e n e v e rreaches cer ta inty. The more bombs you drop, the greater be-comes the likelihood of getting a hit , but you never reachabsolute cer tainty.”8 Misled by scientific paradigms and theirdoctrinal heritage, airmen frequently overlook the inevitableuncertainties entailed in the complexities of war. 9

Increased uncertainty demands technological and operationaladapta t ion to achieve desired military objectives. Systems ad-aptation is the constant revising and rearranging of the buildingblocks of a system to provide advantage over its environ-m e n t .1 0 Adaptation may involve ei ther a change in the technol-ogy itself or a change in the way the technology is applied.Adaptat ion is more than just passive defense and survival ofthe system; i t i s a proact ive measure to meet change head-on.

Adaptat ion requires both learning and ant icipat ion. Learn-ing is the gaining of knowledge from the past; anticipation ispresumed knowledge of the future. To adapt effectively, a sys -tem must recognize both pas t fa i lures and present oppor tuni-t ies . I t must then forecast future condi t ions to ant ic ipate theadaptations that will be most effective within this new envi-ronment . Successful system adaptat ion requires knowledge ofthe past and present combined with cognit ive anticipat ion ofthe future. Mil i tary adaptat ion requires learning about theoperat ional environment , ant ic ipat ing future changes in thatenvironment, and act ing to effect the necessary adaptat ion.

What i s impor tant to note i s tha t human in terac t ion i s re-quired. Al though machines of the future may change them-selves to account for environmental condit ions, machines ofthe pas t and present do not . Human innovat ion and ingenui ty

FAIRCHILD PAPER

2

are the wel lspr ings of adaptat ion. Success in war requires notonly the mechanical application of technological “rules” butalso the creative abil i ty to come up with alternative solutionsin the face of uncertainty and environmental change. Innova -t ion is the key to success. In war, and especial ly in the appli-cation of technology to war, thinking is required.

Mili tary systems improve their chances of success by in -creasing their abil i ty to adapt in a dynamically complex envi-ronment. Those that adapt in the face of dynamic complexitysurvive and prosper; those that fai l to adapt do not thrive,often suffering the catastrophic consequences of systemic break-down. Military failure is essentially the failure to cope withcomplexity.1 1 Eliot Cohen and John Gooch , in Military Misfor-tunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, s t ress that mil i taryfailures are not individual failures, but systemic failures. Mis-for tune in war is not usually the failure of individuals to act;rather, i t is the failure of the system to adequately functionwithin i ts environment. 1 2

Anticipation is particularly difficult because actions withinwar are aimed at a s imilar ly thinking and adapting enemy.Like other l iving systems, the mil i tary system must contendwith an opposing sys tem that i s a lso adapt ive and i s , in thecreative dance of coevolution, seeking to gain an advantageover i ts opponent .1 3 Successful adaptat ion requires not onlyefficacy but also speed. A military system has to functionallyadapt to i t s dynamic surroundings , and do i t quicker than i t sadversary. Military operations are not aimed at static, unchang-ing adversaries; they are aimed at dynamic, thinking, s imilarlyadapt ing sys tems that have host i le in tent ions . 1 4 Competitionmotivates adaptat ion as systems seek to gain advantage overother systems in their environment in what pre-World War IIp l anne r s identified as the “inevitable interplay of challengeand response .”1 5

This systemic coevolution is clearly evident in the applica-tion of technology to warfare. The introduction of new technol-ogy of ten inst igates a counterresponse from the enemy thatnegates the intended effects of the new technology. The tech-nical devices of war will be opposed whenever possible byother devices specifically designed against them. Often, the

GORMAN

3

very success of new technology spawns those factors thatresult in its eventual downfall. In a cycle of “action – reaction,”enemy forces focus efforts on countermeasures to neutral izewhatever devices are most threatening to thei r exis tence.Thus, to be continual ly successful , technology must continu -al ly adapt to changing circumstances .1 6 Failures of technologyin war are frequently due to fai lures in adapt ing to dynamicand complex environments .

Military strategists must recognize the complex and dynamicnature of war. Having identif ied the desired end-states, mili-tary s t rategis ts should then al low for uncertainty and adapta-t ion in applying the means to achieve these desired ends.End- s ta tes are inext r icably l inked to the means used to pur-sue them; one cannot be isolated from the other . Clausewitza ff i rmed the coevolut ionary relat ionship between ends andmeans :

B u t i n w a r , a s i n l i f e g e n e r a l l y , a l l p a r t s o f t h e w h o l e a r einterconnected and thus the effects produced, however small theircause, must inf luence al l subsequent mil i tary operat ions and modifytheir final outcome to some degree, however slight. In the same way,every means must inf luence even the ul t imate purpose . 1 7

In prescribing the employment of technological means, s tra-tegists should recognize not only the complex and uncertainnature of warfare; they should also consider the potential im -pacts of those means upon p lanned outcomes . 1 8 Stra tegis tsshould plan for adaptat ion to meet the inevi table uncertaint iesof war.

Having laid a theoretical foundation, we will now presentthe experience of the B-29 in the Pacific aga ins t J apan . TheB-29 story wil l serve as a case study in the application of newmilitary technology. It details the complexity of the strategicproblem facing the United States in the war against Japanfrom la te 1944 unt i l the summer of 1945, and i t examines therole of the B-29 in solving this problem. In analyzing the B-29story, this essay asks the following questions:

Did uncer ta in t ies and unant ic ipa ted consequences accom-pany the introduction of this emerging technology?

Did these uncertainties further “complexify” the strategicproblem?

FAIRCHILD PAPER

4

What manner of adaptat ions ( technological , operat ional ,strategic) were required by the introduction of this increasedcomplexity?

To achieve des i red ends , adapt ive act ion must outpace thecomplex of problems generated by the introduction of newmil i ta ry means . In the war agains t Japan, US adapta t ionsoutpaced the added complexi t ies generated by the introduc-tion of the B-29 in the Pacific.

Notes

1. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability ofWar,” International Security 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93): 59–90. Beyerchenwrites that Carl von Clausewitz understood that “seeking exact analyticalsolutions does not f i t the nonlinear reali ty of the problems posed by war,and hence our abil i ty to predict the course and outcome of any givenconflict is severely limited.”

(US Air Force photo)

A Hurricane-Hunting Superfortress. This B-29, serving as a “HurricaneHunter,” is taking off on the first leg of a 14-hour mission.

GORMAN

5

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret , eds.(Pr inceton: Pr inceton Univers i ty Press) , 1984, 158. Clausewitz c lear lyi d e n t i f i e d t h e n o n l i n e a r n a t u r e o f w a r a n d t h e c o m p l e x n a t u r e o finteractions in war. “But in war, as in life generally, all parts of the wholeare in terconnected and thus the effects produced, however smal l thei rcause, must inf luence al l subsequent mil i tary operat ions and modify theirfinal outcome to some degree, however sl ight. In the same way, every meansmust inf luence even the ul t imate purpose.”

3. Beyerchen, 1 7 2 .4. Clausewitz, 139.5. Ibid. , 167. “In war . . . a l l act ion is aimed at probable rather than at

cer tain success .”6 . John F . Schmit t , “Command and (Out of ) Contro l : The Mil i ta ry

Implications of Complexity Theory,” Marine Corps Gazette (Sep tember1998), 55–56. Since the enlightenment of the eighteenth century, Westerntheory has centered on scientific interpretations of the world. Specifically,Newtonian physics has shaped Western unders tanding of cause and effect .Taken f rom the wor ld o f phys ica l mechan ics and app l i ed ac ross theacademic and social disciplines from psychology to government, Newtonianmodels speak mechanis t ica l ly of “ the c lockwork universe ,” descr ib ingefficient social systems as “well-oiled machines.” Military theory is notexempt . Thanks in large par t to the nineteenth century fa thers of modernmil i tary thought , Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine de Jomini , modernmi l i t a ry theory a l so res t s upon phys ica l concep t s bor rowed f rom theNewtonian paradigm: friction, centers of gravity, geometric points and lines,and mechanical synchronizat ion of mil i tary operat ions. The Newtonianparadigm dominates modern mil i tary theory.

7. Barry D. Watts , The Foundation of U.S. Air Doctrine: The Problem ofFriction in War (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press,1984), 22–23.

8. Haywood S. Hansell Jr . , The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta,Ga.: Longino & Porter, Inc., 1972), 10.

9. Watts, 43–58. Watts points out the tendency of American airmen toignore “the complex amalgam that Clausewitz called ‘friction in war’.”

10. Mitchell M. Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edgeof Order and Chaos (New York: Simon and Schuster , 1992), 146.

11. Watts, 47. “The sine qua non of a successful military organization isthe capaci ty to adapt to changing condi t ions bet ter than the enemy, theimpl i ca t ion be ing tha t sound theo ry can do much to f ac i l i t a t e suchadaptat ion.”

12. El iot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy ofFailure in War (New York: Free Press, 1990), 94. Cohen and Gooch identifythree reasons for mili tary failure: failure to learn, failure to anticipate, andfai lure to adapt . Of these three elements , they identify adaptat ion as themost important capability for a military organization. “Indeed, the ability toadap t i s p robab ly mos t use fu l t o any mi l i t a ry o rgan iza t ion and mos t

FAIRCHILD PAPER

6

characteristic of successful ones, for with it , i t is possible to overcome bothlearning and predictive failures.”

13. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1994), 193. The ancient Chinese mili tary theorist Sun Tzu recognizedthe significance of coevolution in mili tary systems when he wrote of theimpor tance of shaping onese l f in accordance wi th the enemy. “Waterconfigures its flow in accord with the terrain; the army controls i ts victory inaccord wi th the enemy. One who is able to change and t ransform in accordwith the enemy and wrest victory is termed spiri tual .”

14. Clausewitz, 77, 149. “War is always the collision of two living forces.”In dec la r ing war as ne i the r sc ience nor a r t , C lausewi tz wr i t es , “Theessential difference is that war is not an exercise of the will directed atinanimate mat ter , as i s the case wi th the mechanical ar ts , or a t mat terwhich is animate but pass ive and yie lding, as i s the case wi th the humanmind and emotions in the f ine ar ts . In war, the wil l is directed at ananimate object that reacts .”

15. Hansel l , 49. “A highly resourceful enemy such as the Germansfound it possible to design effective countermoves. Key areas, for example,could be skillfully defended, dummy factories could be built , camouflageand smoke screens used, a i r to a i r defenses s t rengthened, repai r methodsimproved and refined, and very vi tal points hardened by putt ing themu n d e r g r o u n d . D u r i n g t h e p l a n n i n g p h a s e , w e s e n s e d t h i s i n e v i t a b l ein t e rp lay o f cha l l enge and r e sponse and , a s l a t e r even t s p roved , wesomewhat overes t imated our chal lenge and underes t imated their response.”

1 6 . E d w a r d N . L u t t w a k , S t r a t e g y : T h e L o g i c o f W a r a n d P e a c e(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 27–28.

17. Clausewitz, 158.18. Ibid., 92. “The original political objectives can greatly alter during

the course of the war and may f inal ly change entirely s ince they areinfluenced by events and their probable consequences.”

GORMAN

7

Chapter 2

Endgame against Japan:The Strategic Problem

AWPD-1, the first plan for the use of American airpower inWorld War II , was drawn up in 1941 at the behest of PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt and Gen George C. Marshall . Focusedprimarily on the air campaign against Germany, AWPD-1 pro-vided l i t t le detai l concerning any future offensive air waraga ins t J apan . 1 The United States would contemplate a s t rate-gic offensive against Japan only after victory in Europe wasassured. Unt i l then, the burden of defending the westernhemisphere against Japanese aggression fel l almost entirelyon the US Navy. Gen Haywood S. Hansell noted tha t , pr ior tothe a t tack on Pear l Harbor , “The American people simplycould not be l ieve tha t Japan would cha l lenge the Uni tedStates in open warfare.”2 With the at tack on Pearl Harbor, theJapanese inval idated Army and Navy prewar planning a s-sumptions in one swif t blow.

As an i s land na t ion , war t ime Japan depended upon main -taining her newly won “Co-Prosperity Sphere” in the Pacificregion for economic support . Hoping to knock out the Ameri-can threat to her interests in the Pacif ic by a preemptive s tr ikein 1941, Japan soon found herself f ight ing a total war toensure her survival ra ther than a l imited war to maintaineconomic resources . By 1943, Japan was on the defensivethroughout the Pacif ic theater ; only in China did Japan tenu -ously mainta in an upper hand over her adversary . The “char-acterist ically American” war aim of unconditional surrenderdeclared a t Casablanca in January 1943 left l i t t le room formilitary or diplomatic maneuver. Only by forceful occupationof the home island or defeat of Japanese decision makers’ willcould the war be ended. Adding to the strategic dilemma, USwar planners fe l t that Americans were not pat ient enough towithstand a long war against Japan. Therefore , despi te the“Europe first” global strategy, theater strategy in the Pacific

9

requi red cont inuous pressure aga ins t the Japanese to main -ta in the ini t ia t ive and win an ear ly surrender .3

Theater geography added to the difficulties facing the strate-gic planners . The terr i tor ies occupied by Japan fanned acrossan enormous geographical area , wi th landmass account ing foronly a small percentage of that area. Ocean dominated the 64million square miles between Hawaii, Australia, the Philip -pines , and Japan. Uncondi t ional defeat of the Japanese wouldrequire cross ing tha t ocean, e i ther by hopping across thechain of islands in the southwest Pacific toward the Philip -pines and China or by direct ly crossing the vast expanse ofcentral Pacific ocean toward Japan proper. Init ial defense ofthe Pacific, and the eventual counteroffensive, required thecoordinated effort of all three instruments of military power:Navy, Army, and Army Air Corps (renamed Army Air Forces on19 January 1942). Victory in the Pacific would necessari ly bea joint effort. Despite organizational parochialism, which ad-vocated plans focused upon a s ingle service , each inst rumentfaced limitations in the Pacific that could only be overcome bycooperating with the other services.

The US Army in the Pacific under Douglas MacArthur p r e-ferred the island route originating from the southwest Pacific.The US Navy under Chester Nimitz saw the Pacif ic war as ablue-water naval war tha t demanded di rec t ac t ion across thebroad expanse of the central Pacific. In a somewhat ironictwist, the Army Air Force , which coveted bases within s t r ikingdistance of Japan, supported the Navy’s plan for a more directapproach toward Japan .4 The actual plan, arr ived a t in thesummer of 1943 by the Combined Chiefs , was a somewhatdiluted compromise between the services. It embraced a “twinaxis” strategy that would al low the Army and the Navy topursue their own separate plans in contr ibut ing to the overal ldefeat of Japan. The power of personali t ies and the pe r s i s t-ence of service rivalries led the Uni ted Sta tes to spend t remen-dous resources in f ight ing this two-pronged strategy in thePacific. 5

Strategic airpower proponents saw differences of opinionbetween the Army and the Navy as an opportuni ty to provethe validi ty of their argument for autonomy of the air arm. The

FAIRCHILD PAPER

10

dis tances involved suggested that the a i r component mighthold a unique advantage over both the Army and the Navy inprosecuting the war. Yet, given the limitations of aircraft rangeand endurance, even zealots for independence of the air forceswere forced to admit the necessity of cooperating with theother services to provide and protect bases for aircraft operat-ing agains t Japan. Unl ike a i r opera t ions in Europe, whereAllied bombers were already within striking distance of Ger-many, strategic bombing in the Pacific would not be tenableuntil Allied forces advanced to occupy territory within range ofm a i n l a n d J a p a n .

In the minds of Army Air Force planners, the Army and theNavy would conquer the geography required to enable inde-pendent air operat ions—and the emerging technology of theBoeing B-29 Superfortress would provide the range and coer-c ion to br ing an uncondi t ional end to the war agains t Japan.As early as October 1940, Gen Henry “Hap” Arnold foresawthe B-29 as the one weapon that could “exer t pressure againstJapan without long and cost ly prel iminary operat ions.”6

A High-Flying Superfortress. Flying above the clouds, this B-29’s mission anddestination remain unknown.

(US Air Force photo)

GORMAN

11

Notes

1. Haywood S. Hansell Jr . , The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta,Ga.: Longino & Porter, 1972), 42–46; Barry D. Watts, The Foundations ofU.S. Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AirUniversity Press, 1984), 17–22. The strategic priority of the plan was thewar agains t Germany. The Army Air Force would suppor t a s t ra tegicdefense in the Pacific and only after the defeat of Germany would there beemphasis on an offensive strategic air war in the Pacific. Watts cri t iques themechanistic nature of AWPD-1.

2. Hansell , 34.3. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United

States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: MacMillan, 1973), 281.4. Ronald H. Spector , Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with

Japan (New York: Free Press, 1985), 279.5. J. C. Wylie Jr., “Reflections on the War in the Pacific,” United States

Naval Institute Proceedings 78, no. 4 (April 1952): 357–61.6. Richard P. Hallion, “Prelude to Armageddon,” Air Power History 42 ,

no. 3 (Fall 1995): 42.

FAIRCHILD PAPER

12

Chapter 3

Doctrinal and Technological Development

Prewar United States Army Air Corps doctrine s t r e s sed t heability of the air arm to independently provide decisive forcethrough s t ra teg ic a i r bombardment . Doct r ine for s t ra teg icbombardment derived and professed by the Air Corps Tact icalSchool (ACTS) at Maxwell Field in Alabama was built aroundfour assumpt ions .1 The first of these assumptions, init iallyespoused by I ta l ian a i r theoris t Giul io Douhet , was that thebomber would always get through. Given the speed, range,and al t i tude l imitat ions of pursui t a ircraf t , this assumptionwas well founded in the 1920s and early 1930s; however,theorists fai led to anticipate improved aircraft design and theadaptive development of defensive measures, including radar,that would make the bomber extremely vulnerable withoutfighter escort.2 Early Bri t ish and German experience had dem -onstrated the vulnerabi l i ty of the bomber , but Americans as-cribed those results not to bombing doctr ine but to a lack ofsufficient defensive armament on the bombers. Well-armedAmerican “fortresses” and “superfortresses” could do better,they thought . 3 In thei r second assumption, American plannersc o n c l u d e d t h a t h i g h - a l t i t u d e b o m b a r d m e n t h e l d t h e b e s tchance for success in keeping the bombers c lear of ground-based air defense systems and low-al t i tude f ighters . The thirdAmerican doctr inal assumption was that bombers could accu -rately deliver precision attacks against individually selectedtargets . Air p lanners pointed to the exis tence of “cr i t ica lnodes” in enemy infrastructure that could be precisely tar-geted and destroyed, the resul t of which would be the col lapseof enemy systems. The will of the enemy population was not asuitable direct target but would be secondarily affected bydestruction of the nation’s infrastructure. Finally, Americana i r p lanners de te rmined tha t s t ra teg ic bombardment dur ingdaylight hours would be the most effective tactic in achievingthe required precis ion. Since enemy f ighters were assumed topose no threat , dayl ight offered the best chance to f ind and

13

precisely str ike discrete targets . From these four basic as-sumptions, the Air Corps Tactical School developed the doc-t r ine of high-al t i tude dayl ight precis ion bombardment thatwould guide the s t ra tegic use of American ai rpower unt i l1945. The independent nature of s t ra tegic bombardment doc-trine would fuel the Army Air Corps’ informal drive for auton-omy throughout the war .4

To effect the doctrine of daylight high-altitude precisionbombardment , American a i rmen needed bombers that could“fi t the bil l .” In the 1920s and early 1930s, however, techno-logical l imitations had impeded bomber development. Onlywith the improved features of c losed cockpi ts , re t ractablelanding gear, and fully cowled engines, along with develop -ments in metal lurgy that al lowed the construction of a l ight ,all-metal monoplane, did the possibili t ies of long-range bom-bardment become real i ty. 5

Using the rubric of coastal defense to justify their position,bomber advocates from ACTS pushed for the development oflong-range bombers at the expense of pursui t a i rcraf t . 6 TheArmy Air Corps fielded the Martin B-10 in the summer o f1932. A significant improvement over previous bombers, theB-10 featured an enclosed cockpit , a monoplane design, largerwings, a power nose turre t , and a remarkable speed of 207miles per hour . 7

The real leap in bomber development, however, came withthe introduction of the Boeing B-17 in 1935, dubbed by i tsmanufacturer “an aerial battle cruiser, a veritable flying for-tress.” With i ts unique silhouette, four big engines, impressivedefensive armaments , a range of over 2,000 miles , and anaverage speed of 233 miles per hour, the B-17 Flying Fortressbecame perhaps the most famous a i rp lane in the h is tory ofthe Air Corps.8 But even the improved performance charac-terist ics of the B-17 (and other bombers, l ike the ConsolidatedB-24 Liberator) were inadequate for the operat ional demandsof the Pacific theater. What was needed was a very long-range(VLR) bomber —one that could exceed 3,000 miles in rangewith a significantly larger payload than either the B-17 or theB-24. By the end of 1941, the need for VLR bombers hadbecome especially important. The Soviet Union was nearing

FAIRCHILD PAPER

14

collapse, Britain’s demise was not out of the realm of possibil-i ty , and a broad expanse of ocean s tood between US operat ingbase s and t he J apanese ma in l and . 9

Meanwhile, in January 1940, the Army Air Corps had is-sued a des ign requirement to American a i rcraf t manufactur-ers for a VLR bomber.1 0 Boeing responded with the B-29 Su -perfor t ress; Convair’s entry, the B-32 Dominator , was cutshort almost at bir th by technical diff icult ies and productiondelays. 1 1

The B-29 was on the cutting edge of aircraft technologywhen first flown in 1942.1 2 Twice as heavy as the B-17, theB-29 could car ry a c rew of 11 men and a 20 ,000-pound bombload a dis tance of more than 3,000 miles—and i t was 30percent fas ter than the B-17. 1 3 But the advanced features ofthe B-29, progenitor of both American and Soviet modernbomber technology, taxed the limits of American aircraft in -dustry. I t was, in fact , so advanced that Boeing designersthemselves, fearing they were going too far into the technologi-cal unknown, were uncomfortable with the aircraf t .1 4 The AirForce’s program director, Gen Kenneth B. Wolfe , cal led thebomber a “three-billion-dollar gamble.”1 5 Nevertheless, giventhe demands of the strategic environment of World War II,American planners and designers were wil l ing to take thegamble.

The most technologically advanced aspects of the BoeingB-29 were i ts engines that provided the necessary range andcarrying power, the pressurizat ion system that al lowed i t tooperate at high al t i tudes, the bombing systems that faci l i ta tedprecis ion bombardment , and the automated defensive systemthat just i f ied the name Superfortress . The 18-cylinder WrightR-3350 engine, the largest engine available at the t ime, usedtwo superturbochargers to drive propellers 16.5 feet in diame-ter a t 2 ,200 horsepower . 1 6 In the 1,200-mile flight from Saipanto Tokyo, the giant engines would consume 6,000 gallons ofgas . 1 7 The engines facil i tated the cl imb to the operational al t i-tude of 30,000 feet and, combined with the huge Boeing “117”wing, gave the B-29 a maximum range of nearly 6,000 miles.

One of the technological demands of high-al t i tude bombingwas the need for a ircraf t pressurizat ion. Pressurizat ion in the

GORMAN

15

B-29 provided a cabin altitude of 8,000 feet for the crew whilef lying at an al t i tude of 30,000 feet . The B-29 had two pressur-ized sections fore and aft connected by a 40-foot tunnel largeenough for men to cl imb through. This tunnel was a solut ionto the problem of maintaining pressurizat ion while openingthe bomb bay doors . Although not the f i rs t combat a i rcraf t toincorporate pressurizat ion (German and Bri t ish air forces hadexperimented with pressurized cockpits in combat aircraft) ,the B-29 was more sophis t icated and could pressur ize largercrew areas than any of the o thers .1 8

American s t ra teg ic bombardment doct r ine a l so requi redprecision delivery of munit ions. To meet this requirement,Boeing equipped the B-29 with the Norden bombsight a n d t h eAN/ APQ-13 radar . Although primarily intended to aid in navi-gation, the B-29’s radar system could also be used for identif i-ca t ion of ground targets (as radar sys tems on B-17s and B-2 4 s h a d d e m o n s t r a t e d i n E u r o p e ) . T h i s t e c h n i q u e w a sespecially useful during periods of bad weather, when cloudsobscured the target and the s ight -dependent Norden bomb-sight was ineffective. Later B-29s were fitted with the moreefficient AN/ APQ-7 Eagle targeting radar and the AN/APN-4 /9Loran navigat ion systems.1 9

The remotely controlled defensive gunnery system p u t t h eB-29 in a class al l i ts own.2 0 This defensive system, designedby General Electr ic , included ten .50-cal iber machine gunsand one 20-mil l imeter (mm) cannon, which was mounted inthe ta i l . The four computer-control led machine gun turre tsafforded control to more than one gunner ; each gunner had apr imary tur re t but could opera te two tur re ts a t the same t imeif necessary. The central gunner’s sect ion had a master gun-nery panel that enabled the central f i re control gunner toass ign turre ts to those gunners who had the bes t v iew of thetarge t . Each gun had a sophis t ica ted s ight ing mechanism tha tused incandescent l ight to s ight targets . Gyroscopes and thefire control computer al lowed the system to lead the targetand provide the correct gun elevat ion to compensate for range.

The combined technological advances of the B-29 made i tthe weapon of choice for demonstrating the validity of high-al-t i tude dayl ight precis ion bombardment. Army Air Force plan-

FAIRCHILD PAPER

16

ners calculated that the mechanical combinat ion of the doc-t r ina l sc r ip t wi th the B-29’s advanced technology wouldequate to desi red resul ts . In the s t ra tegic environment of the

Pacific theater, however, reality proved somewhat more com-plex and infinitely less predictable.

Notes

1. For the evolution of airpower doctrine in the United States beforeWorld War II and the controversy between bomber and fighter advocates,see Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm,1917-1941 , USAF Historical Study 89 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF HistoricalDivision, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955). For a succinct

(US Air Force photo)

A Superfortress Over Japan. This B-29, flying from its base in the Marianas, iscrossing Japan’s Tama River near Tokyo.

GORMAN

17

account, see James Lea Cate, “Development of Air Doctrine, 1917–1941,”Air University Quarterly Review 1 , n o . 3 ( W i n t e r 1 9 4 7 ) . F o r a m o r ecomprehensive study, see Robert Frank Futrel l , Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine:Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1984 , 2 vols. (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989). On the development of air doctrinewithin the context of the interservice debate, see James P. Tate, The Armyand Its Air Corps: Army Policy toward Aviation, 1919–1941 (Maxwell AFB,Ala.: Air University Press, 1988). Barry D. Watts, in The Foundation of U.S.Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AirU n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 4 ) , g i v e s a s h o r t b u t c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t h edevelopment of American airpower doctrine.

2. Robert F. Gass, Theory, Doctrine, and Ball Bearings: Adapting FutureTechnology to Warfare (For t Leavenwor th , Kans . : School of AdvancedMilitary Studies, 1996), 12–15.

3. “The American observers (in England), in full knowledge of the Britishand German experience in the Batt le of Bri tain, continued to place theirfaith in the heavily armed Flying Fortress and the Liberator, flying in greatmasses and in close defensive formations. Such force, in adequate massand properly employed, they reasoned, would permit the precision daylightattacks so essential to American strategic air doctrine.” Haywood S. HansellJ r . , The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta, Ga.: Longino & Porter, 1972),33 .

4. Gass, 4 .5. Tate, 158.6. Ibid., 161–62. One notable except ion was Capt Claire Chennault , la ter

commander of the Flying Tigers in China, who disagreed with the bomberinvincibility theory.

7. Ibid., 1 5 9 .8. Ibid., 1 6 4 .9. Hansell , 57.10. Richard P. Hallion, “Prelude to Armageddon,” Air Power History 42 ,

no. 3 (Fall 1995): 42.11. For the fateful s tory of the Consolidated B-32, see Will iam T.

Y’Blood, “Unwanted and Unloved: The Consolidated B-32,” Air PowerHistory 42, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 58–71.

12. For a b ib l iographic essay cover ing both pr imary and secondarysources on the development of the B-29 and B-29 operat ions in the Pacif ic ,see Kenneth P. Werrell, Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers Over Japan in WorldWar II (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Inst i tut ion Press, 1996), 335–41.There is no central ly located holding of B-29 records and sources. Primarymater ia l s a re main ta ined a t var ious loca t ions , inc lud ing the Nat iona lArchives in Washington, D.C., the Air Force Historical Research Agency atMaxwell AFB, Alabama, and the Boeing Company in Seattle. Most of the keyplayers have wri t ten their own interest ing, al though often biased, accounts .These memoirs include Henry Har ley “Hap” Arnold’s , Global Mission,1886–1950 (New York: Harper, 1949); Curtis LeMay’s Mission with LeMay:

FAIRCHILD PAPER

18

My Story (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1965) and Superfortress: The B-29and American Air Power (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), and Haywood S.Hansell’s The Strategic Air War Against Japan (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AirUniversi ty, 1980). Of the three authors , Hansel l’s account is the mostdetailed and thoroughly analytic. Although not as extensively covered as thes t ra tegic a i r war over Europe, there are numerous secondary accountsavailable of B-29 operations against Japan. One of the most useful works isthe official history by Wesley Frank Craven and James Cate , The Army AirForces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1948–58), though itis at t imes convoluted and poorly organized. For B-29 operat ions, seeespecial ly volume 5. Other worthwhile secondary works include KevinHerbert’s Maximum Effort: The B-29s Against Japan (Manhattan, Kans. :Sunflower University Press, 1983); E. Bartlett Kerr’s Flames Over Tokyo:The U.S. Army Air Forces’ Incendiary Campaign Against Japan, 1944–1945(New York: D.I. Fine, 1991); and Conrad C. Crane’s Bombs, Cities, andCivilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II (Lawrence, Kans.:University Press of Kansas, 1993).

13. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War withJapan (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 488 ff.

14. Werrell, 57.15. Hallion, 44 .16. For the story of the marriage of the Wright R-3350 engine to the

B-29 Superfortress, see Robert E. Johnson, “Why the Boeing B-29 Bomberand Why the Wright R-3350 Engine,” American Aviation Society HistoricalJournal 33, no. 3 (1988): 174–89. See also Werrell , 68–72, and Walter J.Boyne, Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air (New York: Simon andSchus te r , 1994) , 360 .

17. Lee B. Kennett, A History of Strategic Bombing (New York: Scribner,1982), 166.

18. Chester Marshal l , B-29 Superfortress (Osceola, Wis.: MotorbooksInternational , 1993), 299.

19. Ibid., 301–3; Werrell, 195–201.20. Marshall, 299–301; David A. Anderton, B-29 Superfortress at War

(New York: Scribner, 1978), 24–31.

GORMAN

19

Chapter 4

Applying a Technological Solution

With the emergence of very long-range bombers, airmen hadrenewed confidence in the abilities of technology to fulfill thetheoretical ends of bombing doctrine that had been developed“between the wars.” Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold would laterproclaim, “The combination of technical advances and the stateof international relations . . . gave ‘air power’ a chance for mush-room growth.”1 The lack of VLR bomber availability, however,was still a limiting factor. Production schedules in 1941 sug-gested to planners that the B-29, the B-32, and the B-36 wouldnot be available for several years; the weight of any early airoffensive would rest primarily with the B-17 and the B-24. Onlywhen the B-29 and the B-36 became available in greater quanti-ties would they be given greater emphasis.2 Originally, B-29priority was scheduled for the European theater; AWPD-1 calledfor 12 groups of B-29s to operate from the Mediterranean basin,most likely to be stationed near Cairo, and another 12 groups tooperate out of Northern Ireland.3 Conditions changed, however,and the B-29s were deployed first to the Pacific theater.

After losing the backbone of the surface fleet at Pearl Harbor,the US Navy was no longer capable of performing the defensiveduties initially envisioned for it by wartime planners.4 Europeanair planners now rightfully feared that “the bombers consignedto the strategic air war in Europe [to include the B-29] might bereassigned—or diluted in number—to meet emergency demandsfrom the Pacific.”5 The first call for strategic bombing operationsin the Pacific came as a result of the Casablanca Conference ofJanuary 1943. A remedy was needed for the desperate positionof the Chinese government, and the Allies were unable to ad-minister help in any other way. AWPD-42 was the first air planto provide detailed planning for a strategic bombing campaignagains t Japan. 6 The Air War Plans Division prepared a plan inAugust 1943 for B-29s to operate from rear bases in India andforward bases in China against Japanese l ines of communica -t ion and against Japan proper .

21

To conduct this campaign, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)created an entirely new organization: Twentieth Air Force . Itwould operate under the command of General Arnold, com-manding general, Army Air Forces (AAF). At Cairo in late No-vember 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff adopted a “grands t ra tegy ”s ta tement tha t inc luded a s ign i f i can t change o fwording as recommended by General Hansell , the AAF’s chiefplanner . The change read, “Our s tudies have taken account ofthe possibi l i ty that invasion of the principal Japanese is landsmay not be necessary and the defea t of Japan may be accom-pl ished by sea and ai r b lockade and intensive a i r bombard -ment from progressively advanced bases.”7 Airpower was nolonger a supporting arm in the Pacific.

The limitations of strategic airpower doctrine were furtherexposed in operat ions l ike the disastrous Schweinfurt raids inlate 1943, 8 but perhaps nowhere more clearly than in AAFoperat ions f rom India and China known as Operat ion Matter-horn . The f i rs t a t tacks against Japanese targets by the newlyformed XX Bomber Command in China under Twentieth AirForce did not occur unt i l June 1944, near ly a year af ter theOperat ion Matterhorn concept was born.

An AAF Committee on Operational Analysis initially identi-f ied s ix Japanese targets on 11 November 1943:

1. Merchant shipping, both in Japanese harbors and at sea .2. Steel production facil i t ies, particularly coke oven plants.3 . Urban indust r ia l areas .4. Aircraft p lan ts .5. Ball bear ing p lan ts .6 . Japan’s electronics industry. 9

Due to fr ict ion generated by distance, weather , mechanicalbugs, and the underappreciated difficulties of logistically sup-port ing the operat ion, the impacts of Matterhorn upon thistarget set did not l ive up to the airpower theorists’ predic-t ions. 1 0 Logistical difficulties l im i t ed t he r e su l t s and madethem extremely costly. To get one B-29 over a Japanese target ,seven other B-29s carr ied bombs and gasol ine from India toal low the mission to occur.1 1 At its peak, XX Bomber Com-mand cou ld manage on ly two sor t i e s pe r month per a i r -

FAIRCHILD PAPER

22

craft—and only one-half of those sorties were directed againstthe main i s lands o f Japan .1 2 Ini t iated in part to meet poli t icalexigencies in China, Operat ion Matterhorn was neverthelesslimited by military realit ies—realit ies that proved beyond theadapt ive capabi l i t ies of both operators and planners .13 The lastof the Matterhorn miss ions occurred in March 1945 as basesfor the B-29 were shifting to the central Pacific.

The Mariana Islands in the central Pacific offered airpoweradvocates a viable al ternative to Operat ion Matterhorn. On 12March 1944, the JCS issued a s t ra tegic direct ive ins t ruct ingAdm Chester Nimitz to conduct the invasion of the Marianasin Operation Forager, thus enabling a new range of airpowerpossibilities.1 4 Operating from Saipan, just 1,200 miles fromTokyo, the B-29s could at tack the home is lands of Japanmore effectively than from Chinese bases.1 5 Sa ipan was one ofthree i s lands la rge enough to suppor t a i r and naval bases ; theother two were Tinian, a few miles south of Saipan, andG u a m , the sou thernmos t i s l and . Guam had been an Amer icanpossession before i t was lost to the Japanese in 1941. Withthe bruta l ly cost ly capture of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in thesummer of 1944, at precisely the same t ime B-29s were justbeginning to launch i l l -fated raids from bases in China, awindow of opportunity opened for the AAF. Engineers followedclosely behind the invasion forces to expand and improve theislands’ airfields in preparation for B-29 operations.1 6 By 24June, even before the f ight ing had ended on Saipan, the f i rs tB-29 ai r f ie ld was under construct ion.1 7 Generals Hansel l andWolfe flew the first B-29 to arrive at Saipan. It arrived on 12October 1944.

Control of the B-29s in the Marianas fell under the newlycreated XXI Bomber Command of Twentieth Air Force. Hay-wood Hansell was the XXI’s first commander. The new com-m a n d ’s crews f lew their f irst combat mission on 28 October1944. The XXI’s first missions from the Marianas were train -ing missions against the island of Truk and relatively low-riskmiss ions agains t Japanese pos i t ions on the i s land of IwoJ i m a. These missions were designed to build the crews’ expe-rience and al low them to learn about the operat ional environ-ment. Their f irst mission against the home islands, f lown for

GORMAN

23

both psychological and mil i tary reasons against the Nakaj imaaircraft plants in Tokyo, took place on 24 November 1944. Inthat in i t ia l a t tack on Japan’s home is lands , 111 B-29s werea i rborne for more than 13 hours .1 8

Like those in Operat ion Matterhorn, B-29 raids from theMarianas were not without diff icul t ies . The at tack against theNakajima aircraft plants in November 1944 was typical of thef i rs t a t tempts a t prec is ion bombardment agains t Japanese in -dustry from the Marianas. The raid was cancelled five t imesover a two-week period due to poor weather over the target. Ofthe 111 B-29s tha t par t ic ipa ted in the a t tack , 17 abor tedbefore reaching Japan and s ix were unable to bomb becauseof mechanical difficult ies. The attacking bombers encountered120-knot winds at al t i tude while overcast cloud layers almostcomplete ly obscured the target area . Of the 88 a i rplanes thatbombed the area sur rounding the p lant , 35 had to do so byradar. In the end, only 48 bombs fel l in the factory area,damaging one percent of the bui lding and 2.4 percent of themachinery while injuring or kill ing 132 people in the factorycomplex. Two B-29s were lost over the target.1 9

When XXI Bomber Command failed to deliver “the destruc-t ive potential inherent in the B-29,”2 0 General Arnold removedGeneral Hansel l on 20 January 1945 and replaced him withGen Curt is E. LeMay. 21 Wi th a bur ly phys ique and a hard-nosed reputat ion, LeMay was arguably wel l sui ted for thejob.2 2 LeMay had established a distinguished record as a bombercommander in Europe and the 37-year-old genera l had be-come a favorite B-29 troubleshooter for Arnold; earlier, Arnoldhad named LeMay to replace Gen Kenneth Wolfe as commanderof XX Bomber Command for B-29 operations from China. Nowhoping to reverse the poor performance of operat ions from theMarianas , he turned to LeMay once again . As commander ofXXI Bomber Command, LeMay was a principal player in shap-ing the operational, strategic, and tactical adaptations requiredto overcome the uncer ta int ies that emerged as the B-29s weredeployed aga ins t Japan .

FAIRCHILD PAPER

24

Notes

1. Henry Harley Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper, 1949), 158.2. Haywood S. Hansell Jr . , The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta,

Ga.: Longino & Porter, 1972), 48.3. Ibid., 54 .4. William Green, Famous Bombers of the Second World War (Garden

City, N.Y.: Hanover House, 1969).5. Kenneth P. Werrell, Blankets of Fire: U. S. Bombers Over Japan During

World War II (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Inst i tut ion Press , 1996),49–50.

6. Richard P. Hallion, “Prelude to Armageddon,” Air Power History 42 ,no. 3 (Fall 1995): 38–54.

7. Mart in W. Bowman, USAAF Handbook 1939–1945 (Mechanicsburg,Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1997), 256.

8. Richard G. Alexander, “Experiment in Total War,” in United StatesNaval Institute Proceedings 2, no. 8 (August 1956): 844.

9 . Wesley Frank Craven and James Cate , The Army Air Forces in WorldWar II. 7 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948–1958), 13–31.

10. Ibid., 13–31; Werrell, 101–2.11. Winton Close, “B-29s in the CBI – A Pilot’s Perspective,” Aerospace

Historian 30, no. 1 (1983): 13.12. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with

Japan (New York: Free Press, 1985), 491.13. Hallion, 44–48.14. Ibid. , 45.15. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United

States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co.,Inc., 1973), 290.

16. Lee B. Kennett, A History of Strategic Bombing (New York: Scribner,1982), 166.

17. Hallion, 45 .18. Ibid. , 50.19. Alexander, 844.20. Hansel l , 211.21. Victor Davis Hanson, “The Right Man,” in Military History Quarterly

8, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 56–65.22. Close, 8.

GORMAN

25

Chapter 5

Uncertainty and Unintended Consequences

A veil of uncertainty is the one unvarying factor in war.

—Erich von Manstein

The B-29 was best known for i ts technological advances inengines, pressurization, and remotely controlled defensive ar-mament . I t was these technological advances that gave theB-29 the capabil i t ies to accomplish the doctrinally designatedrole of unescorted strategic bombardment at high al t i tude. I twas, however, precisely these advances that gave both engi-neers and crew members the greatest diff iculty. The hastydevelopment of the B-29 (i t went from conceptual designs toopera t iona l miss ions in f ive yea r s ) r e su l t ed in numerous“bugs”; extensive technological adaptations were required toovercome them.

The Wright R-3350 was renowned not only for i ts power,but also for the high incidence of engine fires. 1 In fact, anin-f l ight f i re that or iginated in the engines had caused the lossof one of the two XB-29 prototypes and its entire crew.2 One-fif th of al l B-29 accidents between February 1943 and July1945 were caused by engine f ires . Once a f i re s tar ted in anengine, it was very difficult to put out; the carbon dioxide fireextinguisher system was inefficient, and several engine com-ponents were made of highly f lammable magnesium. Enginefires were the biggest fear of B-29 crews.3

The need for pressurization to perform high-alt i tude mis-sions competed with doctr inal demands for robust , remotelycontrol led defensive armaments—and both were technologi-cally challenging requirements. Arnold noted that pressuriza -tion was “one of the biggest early headaches.”4 Early problemswith pressurizat ion forced practice bombing to be carried outfrom 15,000 feet instead of the prescribed al t i tude of 30,000feet.5 Problems included rapid depressurizat ion i f there was arupture of the pressur ized compartments (a gunner’s wors t

27

fear : he might be swept from the aircraf t should his s ight ingblister fail) and window frosting at high alti tudes. Despiteseveral modifications, which included such i tems as cockpitfans, gas heaters, and f lexible ducts, these problems wouldpers is t throughout the war . 6

The remotely controlled defensive systems, which were ex-t remely heavy, used nonret rac t ing gun turre ts tha t increaseddrag whi le decreasing the speed, range, and endurance of theaircraf t . One adapta t ion required by the nonret ractable turre tswas the addition of a “tailskid” to keep pilots from grinding offthe aft lower turret when making high-angle takeoffs. 7 Airmenat Eglin Air Proving Ground complained that mainta ining theremotely controlled system was a difficult process. They alsosaid the system was vulnerable and inherent ly inaccurate .The final report of the Eglin staff concluded, “the defensivearmament of the B-29 airplane is not sui table for a series ofunescor ted combat opera t ions in theaters where the a i rp lanewil l be subjected to more than brief , desul tory f ighter at-tacks .”8

Despite the vulnerabi l i ty and inaccuracy of the system, anddespite aircrew preference for locally controlled gun turrets,the General Electric remotely controlled defensive system wasselected for the B-29 because i t made the problem of pressuri-zation easier for Boeing designers to resolve.9 Conce rns abou tthe inadequacies of the defensive system eventually drove de-cision makers toward night missions instead of daylight raids.Bombing was less accurate, but few Japanese f ighters couldeffectively operate at night; precision bombing could be moreeffect ive during daylight hours, but the B-29s were then vul-nerable to Japanese f ighters .1 0

These robust defensive systems had another important unin -tended consequence. Flying in relatively tight formations, theB-29s were highly susceptible to incidents of friendly fire. Thisvulnerability encouraged the removal (at least for a time) ofdefensive armaments and the change in tactics from formationbombing to single aircraft flying sequentially over the target.1 1

Although frequently intended to be labor-saving measures,new sys tems of ten demand more t ra in ing t ime and manpowerto physically and intellectually process the added technologi-

FAIRCHILD PAPER

28

cal complexity. The B-29 experience serves as a case in point.It was the first operationally employed aircraft to require aflight engineer among the crew posi t ions. Facing rearward be-hind the pilot, the B-29’s flight engineer was responsible formonitoring and regulat ing the aircraft’s systems. Pilots wereini t ia l ly reluctant to accept this s i tuat ion, s ince i t meant thatmany of the controls would be out of their s ight and reach.

The flight engineer position was also difficult to fill, sinceonly previously trained officer mechanics were accepted intothe flight engineer school. Later, as demand grew, the AAFaccepted enl is ted mechanics . In fact , about one-half of thefl ight engineers in this essential crew posit ion during combatoperations were noncommissioned officers. In an act of des-peration to cover unfilled manning requirements, AAF evenrecruited pilots for the position of fl ight engineer. The require-ment for a flight engineer to serve aboard the B-29, vital forsuccessfully completing long-range missions in the technologi-cally complex aircraft , created addit ional manpower and train -ing requirements .1 2

The technological complexity of the B-29 led to increasedmanning requ i rements as well as addit ional t raining require-m e n t s for other crew positions. Its design was so radically newthat i t required exclusively designed courses for each of i tscomponents . Radar operators , for example, had no experiencewith advanced radar sys tems. Even af ter July 1944 whenradar equipment was plent i ful enough to begin t ra ining, therewere not enough qualif ied instructors to carry i t out . Further-more , few of the opera tors t rus ted the radar—and the Kansasplains were i l l suited to demonstrate i ts value.1 3 Pilot trainingwas complicated early in the program by the lack of airframes.Aircrews were initially forced to use other aircraft for training;for example, the crews that would be the f i rs t to man theB-29s actually trained in the twin-engine Martin B-26 .1 4 De-spite valiant efforts by all involved, the B-29 crews initiallyoperat ing out of the Marianas averaged fewer than 100 hoursof B-29 f lying t ime and fewer than 12 hours f lying in high-a l t itude formations. 1 5

Unknown fac tors and unant ic ipa ted phenomena in the op -erating environment were also sources of “Clausewitzean fric-

GORMAN

29

t ion” in B-29 operations. Hansell described the weather overJ a p a n as “our most implacable and inscrutable enemy.”1 6

Weather was so poor, especial ly during the winter , that therewere somet imes only three or four good bombing days amonth . Obta in ing accura te weather forecas ts for the Japanesemainland presented a major chal lenge. For var ious reasons,weather analysis and predict ion were not as rel iable in thePacific as in Europe—and weather forecasting was most cr i t i-cal during the f i rs t months of B-29 operat ions. With only onerunway in operat ion on Saipan, a weather diver t or a crashedB-29 on Isley Field might spell disaster for those st i l l airborne.

Even more impor t an t ope ra t iona l ly , B-29 p l anne r s andstrategists , who advocated high-alt i tude precision bombing,failed to account for the effects of the jet stream . Aircrewssoon learned that bombing accuracy and a i rcraf t performancewere significantly affected by it.1 7 Crews operat ing at 25,000feet and above often found the river of air flowing from west toeast a t speeds above 200 miles per hour . Flying downwindcaused ground speeds exceeding 450 knots , far greater thanoptimum for accurate precision bombing ei ther visually or byradar . Flying against the je t s t ream reduced the range of thebombers and lef t them vulnerable to enemy air defense forlonger periods of t ime. On one mission flown upwind to in -crease bombing accuracy, aircrews reported flying backwardalong the ground as wind speed exceeded thei r t rue a i rspeed.1 8

In the absence of accurate forecasts , the only recourse was tofly at lower al t i tudes where the jet s tream was not as strong.

Beyond the uncertainties of employing the B-29, i ts pres-ence introduced unintended consequences for both fr iendlyand enemy sys tems . One un in tended consequence fo r thefriendly mil i tary system was further strain on the already con-voluted command relat ionships in the Pacific. The B-29s wereplaced under the direct control of General Arnold , AAF com-mander in chief in Washington.1 9

In China, both Gen Claire Chennaul t and Gen Joseph S t i l-well demanded operat ional control of resources dedicated tothe B-29 for Operation Matterhorn—especially after the re-newed Japanese Ishigo offensive in China in 1944. Gen DouglasMacArthur, through h is a i r commander Gen George Kenney,

FAIRCHILD PAPER

30

advocated using the B-29s in the southwest Pacif ic . Kenneyargued that the B-29s should operate f rom bases in nor thernAustralia in suppor t of h is i s land-hopping thrus t toward thePhilippines. 2 0

The Navy, perhaps rightly so, feared that i ts central Pacificthrus t toward Formosa would be subordinated to the strategicbombardmen t o f J apan .2 1 One member of Adm Ernest King’sstaff noted, “The interests of the AAF and the Navy clashseriously in the Central Pacific campaign. The danger is obvi-ous of our amphibious campaign being turned in to one that i sauxiliary support to permit the AAF to get into posit ion to endthe war.”2 2 Dual-hatted as commanding general of Army AirForces and commander of Twentieth Air Force, General Arnolddid not answer to Pacif ic theater or area commanders; he wascoequal with the other joint chiefs, responsible in essence onlyto General Marshall and President Roosevelt . 2 3 Had the Navyfollowed Army’s lead and placed the Tenth Fleet direct ly underAdmiral King, effective unified action in the Pacific might havebeen well nigh impossible.

In effect , command arrangements ranked the B-29 s t ra tegiccampaign against Japan over al l other efforts in the Pacifictheater . In the last month of the war, af ter the ar t i f icial areaboundaries between MacArthur and Nimitz had become obso-lete, Pacific command was equally divided between the Armyunder MacAr thur, the Navy under Nimitz, and the StrategicAir Force under Gen Carl Spaatz. Although still technicallyowned by the Army, the s t rategic bombardment force was in aposition of near equality with the Army and Navy. 2 4 The intro-duction of the B-29 enlivened tension between the servicesand added complexi ty to the command s t ructure in the Pa -cific .

The employment of B-29s from the Marianas, in a dance ofcoevolut ion, a lso affected Japanese mil i tary developments .The Japanese unders tood the dangers posed by American B-29s operat ing from these is lands. Lt Gen Yoshitsugu Saito,the Japanese defender of Saipan, wrote, “the fate of the Em-pire will be decided in this one action.”2 5 St i ff Japanese resis-tance in the Mar ianas , and la ter on Iwo J ima, was due in par tto this realization. The construction of Isley Airfield on Saipan

GORMAN

31

t r iggered increased Japanese reconnaissance sor t ies and a i r -craf t a t tacks s taged through Iwo J ima. Al though kept gener-ally under control by the combination of antiaircraft arti l leryand Northrup P-61 Black Widow f ighters , these Japanese a t-tacks did cause some damage. On 27 November 1944, forexample, four B-29s were destroyed and 28 others damagedby a Japanese a t tack. Al together , Japanese ra iders des t royedeleven B-29s, heavily damaged eight , and less ser iously dam-aged 35 o the r s . The ra ids a l so k i l l ed 45 Amer icans andwounded 200 others a t a cost to Japan of 37 a i rcraf t los t .2 6 Ini t s tu rn , the Japanese response to the employment of B-29sfrom the Marianas would shape the evolution of Americanac t ions .

Notes

1. Richard P. Hallion, “Prelude to Armageddon,” Air Power History 42 ,no. 3 (Fall 1995): 44; Haywood S. Hansell Jr. , The Air Plan That DefeatedHitler (Atlanta, Ga.: Longino & Porter, 1972), 203–4.

2. Kenneth P. Werrell, Blankets of Fire: U. S. Bombers Over Japan DuringWorld War II (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Inst i tut ion Press , 1996), 71.

3. Ibid., 64 .4. Ibid., 1 2 4 .5. Ibid., 64 .6. Ibid., 66 .7 . “Tes t s Re la t ive to the Defense and Tac t ica l Use o f the B-29 .”

Memorandum f rom the Opera t iona l Ana lys i s Div i s ion , Depar tmen t o fPhysics, University of New Mexico, 15 November 1944 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.:Air Force Historical Research Agency, 760.310–3.)

8. Being less technologically complex, locally controlled turrets wereconsidered more accurate and more easi ly maintained. Remotely control ledturre ts made pressur iza t ion eas ier because they were smal ler and neededno pressur izat ion i f no gunner was physical ly manning the guns .

9. Werrell, 63–68.10. Ibid., 155.11. Ibid. , 61–62.12. Ibid., 123–24.13. Ibid. , 92.14. Hallion, 50; David A. Anderton, B-29 Superfortress at War (New York:

Scribner and Sons, 1978), 35–36.15. Haywood S. Hansell Jr . , The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta,

Ga.: Longino & Porter, 1972), 203.16. Hallion, 51 .

FAIRCHILD PAPER

32

17. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War withJapan (New York: Free Press, 1985), 493.

18. Hallion, 44–45.19. Stanley L. Falk, “General Kenney, the Indirect Approach, and the

B-29s,” Aerospace History, 1981 , 147–55 .20. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United

States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co.,Inc., 1973), 285.

21. Spector , 492.22. Ibid., 489–90, 225; Henry Harley Arnold, Global Mission (New York:

Harper, 1949), 548–49; Jeffrey S. Underwood, The Wings of Democracy: TheInfluence of Air Power on the Roosevelt Administration, 1933–1941 (CollegeStation, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1991).

23. Louis Morton, Pacific Command: A Study in Interservice Relations,Harmon Memorial Lecture in Military History, United States Air ForceAcademy, 1961, 150.

24. Hallion, 45 .25. Ibid. , 49.26. Hansell , 30.

GORMAN

33

Chapter 6

Technological and Operational Adaptation

Improvisation is the natural order of warfare.The perfect formulas will continue to be found only on charts.

—S. L. A. Marshall

Effective and timely adaptation requi res learn ing about theoperat ing environment. Learning about the operat ing environ-ment for the employment of a irpower was the mission of theAir Intelligence Services . First formed in 1940 by HaywoodHansell and Tom White at the request of General Arnold, theStrategic Air Intelligence Section (SAIS) consisted of a systemof ass is tant mil i tary a t tachés for a i r a t US embassies aroundthe world and an analys is branch a t the Pentagon. I t s focusincluded the composition of foreign air forces, the infrastruc-ture (a i rpor ts and a i r bases) to suppor t those forces , and theeconomic-social-industrial analysis of major foreign powers.1

Although relatively successful at collecting information aboutGermany and I taly, the SAIS was not able to gather muchdeta i led informat ion on Japan. That i s land na t ion was sur-rounded by a “curtain of secrecy” as well as by the PacificOcean. Hansel l c la imed there were not even any recent mapsavailable to air planners .2 The Army Air Force in the Pacificwould learn through i ts own experience under the inevi tablestress of war.3

Surprisingly, the AAF did not take advantage of one of itsbes t sources o f opera t iona l l ea rn ing : war t ime exper iencegained f rom the European bombing campaign. Al though theAAF in the Pacific would employ methods that came to closelyresemble the night fire raids of the Royal Air Force (RAF) inEurope, there is no evidence of any shared learning betweenthe two. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, whichwas intended for use in the Pacific war, arrived too late toinf luence i t s conduct .4 Stumbling through to a sui table solu -tion, the AAF in the Pacific neglected sources of learning that

35

might have ident i f ied many uncer ta int ies and aided successfuladaptat ion. On i ts own, the strategic air war in the Pacif icevo lved toward the Br i t i sh concep t o f bombing used inEurope .

Thus, the AAF adapted operationally to the uncertaintiesinitially posed by employment of the B-29 in the Pacific byswitching from high-al t i tude daylight precision bombardmentraids against cr i t ical industr ial nodes to low-al t i tude nightincendiary a t tacks agains t Japanese c i t ies .

The turning point came in March 1945, when the com-mander of XXI Bomber Command, General LeMay, switchedexclusively to low-alt i tude attacks intended to “burn out” ma-jor Japanese ci t ies . 5 The change to incendiary at tacks resul tedin part from poor performance during conventional high-ex-plosive missions against precision targets. Despite the prom-ises of accuracy from the new technology, the results of radarbombing with the B-29’s new AN/APQ-13 rada r bombs igh t swere disappointing.

The new tactic was not an act of desperation, but a well-considered adaptat ion f irst suggested by air s trategists beforethe war. In his 1937 study, “Japan as an Objective for AirAttack,” Capt Thomas D. White of the Air Corps TacticalSchool noted, “Large sections of Japanese cities are built off l imsy and highly inf lammable mater ia ls . The ear thquake dis-aster of 1924 bears witness to the fearful destruct ion that mayb e i n f l i c t e d b y i n c e n d i a r y b o m b s . ”6 E v e n A d m I s o r u k uYamamoto had pointed out th is vulnerabi l i ty as ear ly as 1939:“Cit ies made of wood and paper would burn easi ly. The armytalks big, but if war comes and there were large-scale airraids, there is no tel l ing what would happen.”7 Japanese f ire-f ighting equipment was primit ive and inadequate for the dis-as ter that was about to befal l Japanese c i t ies . The nature oftargets in Japan was different f rom those in Germany; Japa-nese industry , more widely dispersed within Japanese c i t ies ,was less vulnerable to precision attack. The cit ies themselves,however, were extremely vulnerable to fire bombing.8

Prior to 1945, strategists in Washington, including Arnold,had pressed for incendiary a t tacks , but both Hansel l and Le-May opposed them. They favored doctrinally conventional pre-

FAIRCHILD PAPER

36

c is ion bombardment .9 Hansell’s preference for precision bom-bardment would, a t leas t in par t , cos t h im his job in the end.1 0

Motivations to move away from precision at tacks included thecost of unescorted daylight missions due to Japanese f ightersand antiaircraft f i re , the vulnerabil i ty of Japanese ci t ies , andthe fai lures of pinpoint bombing raids against Japanese in -dustry. 1 1 Still , i t was not until December 1944 that LeMay,then commanding XX Bomber Command in China , launchedt h e f i r s t i n c e n d i a r y r a i d — a g a i n s t t h e C h i n e s e c i t y o fHankow.1 2 However, since incendiaries had proven relativelydifficult to deliver from 30,000 feet during testing and evalu -at ion, B-29 crews cont inued to use high-al t i tude conventionalattacks after the Hankow raid. These difficulties in accuratelydropping incendiar ies f rom high al t i tudes led to at tacks atlower alt i tudes. Flying at lower alt i tudes also avoided the un-p r e d i c t a b l e n a v i g a t i o n a n d b o m b i n g e f f e c t s o f t h e j e tstream—and it reduced engine wear from the high-power cl imbto altitude, thereby improving engine reliability.

The M69, a more explosive incendiary int roduced by theArmy’s Chemical Warfare Service, made incendiary attackspotentially even more lethal. 1 3 An encouraging test incendiaryraid against Tokyo on 25 February 1945 resul ted in the com-plete burning of about one square mile of the city. 1 4 O n e m a s-sive raid in March burned some 16 square miles of Tokyo—about 18 percent of the ci ty’s industr ial area and 63 percent ofi ts commercial area. 1 5 The only major l imiting factor in incen-diary operations was the supply of napalm bombs; these weap-ons were in such demand toward the end of the war that supplycrews would drive them direct ly from supply ships to bomberswaiting on the airfields. 1 6 Incendiary raids at low al t itudesessentially overwhelmed Japan’s abil i ty to adapt defensively.

To facilitate larger bomb loads, LeMay stripped the B-29s ofguns and ammuni t ion. Since the B-29 normal ly carr ied 1½tons of a rmament , th is ad jus tment represented a s igni f icantincrease in bomb load capacity. 1 7 The decision to “strip theguns and add the bombs” was spurred not only by the des i refor more destruct ive effects on Japanese targets , but also bythe absence of Japanese night f ighters . Although removing theB-29’s defensive systems was efficient tactically, i t had unpre-

GORMAN

37

dictable and unintended negative effects on crew morale. De-spite the lack of Japanese f ighter opposi t ion, crew memberswere unwill ing to f ly without a defense system and the gunswere once again instal led on the B-29s.1 8

One other adaptation to defensive systems that resulted fromcombat exper ience was the removal of the 20-mm tai l gun andthe addition of two more .50 caliber machine guns to the for-ward upper tur re t . This change was implemented becauseJapanese f ighters preferred head-on at tacks agains t the fas tbombers .1 9 A simple mechanical cam follower was also in -c luded on the forward upper turret to prevent gunners fromshooting off parts of their own airplane—a worst-case fratr i-cide.2 0

The taking of Iwo Jima by US forces was a strategic adapta-t ion facil i tated by the presence of B-29s. US occupation of theisland provided several benefi ts to B-29 operations.

1 . J a p a n e s e radar outposts on the is land were e l iminated.2. The threat of Japanese f ighters operat ing from Iwo Jima

agains t B-29 bases in the Marianas was removed.3 . The d i s tance to Japanese ta rge t s was shor tened and

navigation was improved when B-29s could freely fly over IwoJ i m a .

4. Airfields could be provided on the island for emergencyB-29 recovery and for s taging deeper s t r ikes against Japan.2 1

Although the Marines did not declare the is land securedunti l 26 March, a B-29 made the f irst emergency landing onIwo Jima three weeks earl ier , on 4 March. The bomber wasreturning f rom a ra id against Japan. While the cost of takingthe is land was enormously high, the operat ion potent ia l lysaved as many as 22,000 crew members f rom the 2 ,251 cr ip -pled B-29s that landed at Iwo J ima. Without use of the is landas an emergency recovery area , those crew members mighthave had to d i tch and been los t a t sea . 2 2

Iwo Jima also could serve as a base for escort f ighters t oaccompany the B-29s on the i r ra ids in to Japan , an adapta t iondictated in part by deficiencies in the B-29’s defensive sys -tems. Ironically, by the t ime sufficient numbers of long-rangeescor ts were avai lable and a base a t Iwo J ima was ready to

FAIRCHILD PAPER

38

accept them, the escorts were no longer needed . The J apaneseair force no longer posed any real threat , given i ts virtualabsence from the scene. Instead, these long-range US f ightersproved more useful to the strategic air war by serving in theground a t tack ro le aga ins t var ious Japanese ta rge t s . 2 3 Al-though changes in the tact ical s i tuat ion lessened the impor-tance of Iwo Jima toward the end of the war, i ts value to thes t ra tegic a i r campaign must not be underes t imated .2 4

Another s t rategic and operat ional adaptat ion of the B-29was i ts use as a mine- laying ins t rumen t to b lockade Japanesesea l ines of communicat ion.2 5 The f irst of the B-29 miningoperat ions occur red as ear ly as Augus t 1944 aga ins t Japa-nese l ines of communicat ion in the southwest Pacif ic , but theB-29s of Twentieth Air Force did not launch a sustained min -ing campaign unt i l January 1945. Although the ini t ia l ArmyAir Force response to the Navy-sponsored mining plan wasnegative, aerial delivery of mines proved to be an effective useof the B-29 when weather prohibited bombing operations. Le-May eventually favored mine-laying missions for the B-29s. InOperation Starvation , Twentieth Air Force B-29s sowed some12 ,000 nava l mines .2 6 US submar ine a t t acks , which wereaided by the aerial dropping of mines, were devastat ing to theJapanese economy—perhaps decis ively so . By 1945 Japanhad lost nine million of i ts ten million tons of merchant ship -ping. 2 7 According to Japanese records, the aerial mining cam-paign accounted for 63 percent of a l l Japanese merchantshipping losses during the f inal s ix months of the war.2 8

In the closing days of the war, XXI Bomber Command c a m eup with yet another operat ional use for the B-29: droppingleaflets on Japanese ci t ies to warn the civi l ian populace thatfurther attacks were forthcoming. By dropping these leaflets,the B-29s disrupted Japanese product ion, lowered morale ,and encouraged c iv i l i ans to r ep lace the cu r ren t Japaneseleadership. Beginning on 27 July, the leaflet drops were fol-lowed by shortwave broadcasts .2 9 By the end of the war, theB-29s had sca t tered some 4 ,500,000 leaf le ts over Japanesecities.3 0

To overcome the uncertainties of weather, American crewsrelied almost exclusively upon nightly B-29 reconnaissance

GORMAN

39

f l ights toward Japan. Aircrews in Europe had depended agreat deal on Ultra intelligence reports for weather informa-t ion , but Hansel l and LeMay had assumed that th is type ofinformation was unavailable for the Pacific theater. Unfortu -nate ly , as Hansel l and others would learn 30 years af ter thewar, Allied intelligence agents in Australia had been receivingJapanese wea the r r epor t s th roughou t the war bu t had no tpassed this information along. 3 1 Put in the context of complex-i ty theory, lack of shared learning about the operational envi-ronment prohibited effect ive adaptat ion.

In addi t ion to s t ra tegic and operat ional adapta t ions , techni-ca l , mechanica l , and procedura l adapta t ions were necess i-ta ted by s imul taneous problems in product ion, t ra ining, andemployment. To improve mechanical reliabili ty and overcomethe uncertainty associated with the complex technology of theB-29, LeMay changed from “crew chief” maintenance to “pro-duction l ine” maintenance . Instead of being responsible formaintenance of the entire aircraft and al l of i ts systems, indi-vidual special is ts were now responsible for separate compo-nents on the B-29. This sys tem eased the problems created bya shor tage of maintenance personnel and the lack of adequatemain tenance training. 32 The result was more aircraft in commis -sion, fewer aborts , and a greater percentage of aircraft bomb-ing their primary targets. A secondary effect, however, hadnegative implications: crew stress and flying fatigue increased,severely affecting flight crew morale —thanks to the improvedaircraft reliability rates.3 3

Avoiding engine fires involved a combination of mechanicalfixes and changes in c rew technique. Later models of the B-29included shortened cowl f laps and improved lubricat ion toreduce the chances of engine fire. New cowl flaps, ductedbaffles to better circulate air , and oil crossover tubes to bettercirculate oil were installed at the Oklahoma City Air Depotbeginning in September 1944. Later that year, those modifica-t ions were packed in ki ts and sent to combat forces in thefield.3 4 To minimize overheating of the huge engines du r ingground takeoff run, crews ignored technical order takeoffspeeds and used the entire length of runway to achieve maxi-mum ground speed. This maneuver increased engine cooling

FAIRCHILD PAPER

40

before the aircraft became airborne by increasing airflow overthe engines .3 5 The resul t of these adapta t ions was that enginetempera tures were kept below designated limits and engine lifebegan to increase.3 6

Another adaptat ion required the development of a logist icals t ructure to support B-29 operat ions from the Marianas. LtGen Millard F. Harmon was primarily responsible for i ts devel-opment. To centralize logistical and administrative responsi-bility for all AAF forces in the central Pacific, Harmon wasappointed deputy commander of Twentieth Air Force and com-mander of the AAF Pacific Operations Area when the Twentiethwas act ivated on 1 August 1944. 3 7 Harmon’s di rect personaleffort was responsible for bringing the runway constructioneffort on the Marianas up to speed after i t had fal len behindoriginal planning schedules. Despite the 8,000 miles back tothe air logist ics center in Sacramento, California, and directcompetition with the Navy for resources, supply problems neveraffected operat ions as ser iously as they had in the China-Burma-India thea ter . 3 8

Successful adaptat ion required the energetic intervention ofkey individuals throughout the process, including not onlyCurtis LeMay but also Hap Arnold . When de lays pushed theini t ia l operat ions date back from the summer of 1943 to thespring of 1944, Arnold made an inspect ion tr ip to the Boeingproduction faci l i ty in Wichita and the B-29 training base a tSal ina , Kansas .

I was appalled at what I found there. There were shortages in al l kindsand classes of equipment. The engines were not f i t ted with the latestgadgets, the planes were not ready to go. I t would be impossible forthem to be anywhere near China by the 15 th of April unless somedras t ic measures were taken .3 9

Arnold’s “drastic measures” included an intensive six-weekmodif icat ion and upgrade effor t that became known as the“Battle of Kansas.” It would take a personal visit by Arnold tothe i s land of Guam in June 1945 to overcome command andlogistical disputes with the Navy. 4 0 One un in t ended conse-quence of Arnold’s energetic interventions was a series ofhear t a t tacks in 1944 and 1945 tha t ru ined Arnold’s hea l th .4 1

Before Haywood Hansell was removed from command, Arnold

GORMAN

41

also took severa l s teps to improve B-29 a i rcrew t ra in ing.These act ions included providing addit ional in-theater t rainingfor combat crews and establishing a school for lead crews.4 2

Adaptat ion was not the resul t of for tui tous chance, but ofhuman vision and the wil l and energy to follow through.

Notes

1. Haywood S. Hansell Jr . , The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta,Ga.: Longino & Porter, 1972), 31.

2. John F. Kreis , ed. , Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and the Army AirForces Operations in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History andMuseums Program, 1996) , 329–47 .

3. Kenneth P. Werrell , “The Bombing of Japan: Three New Insights”(unpublished paper, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Center for Aerospace Doctrine,Research and Educat ion) , 1999.

4. Ibid.5. Ronald H. Spector , Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with

Japan (New York: Free Press, 1985), 503–6.6. Thomas D. White, “Japan as an Objective for Air Attack,” paper for

the Intelligence Section, Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Field, Ala.,1937–38 (Maxwel l AFB, Ala . : Ai r Force His to r ica l Research Agency[AFHRA]), 248.501-65B.

7. Ed Whitcomb, On Celestial Wings (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air UniversityPress , 1995) , 134.

8. Lee B. Kennett, A History of Strategic Bombing (New York: Scribner,1982), 164.

9. Werrell, 6.10. Kennet t , 168–69 .11. Richard G. Alexander, “Experiment in Total War,” in United States

Naval Institute Proceedings 2, no. 8 (August 1956): 845.12. Hansel l ; Claire S. Chennault , Way of a Fighter (New York: Putnam,

1949), 330.13. Spector, 491–92; Walter J. Boyne, Clash of Wings: World War II in

the Air (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 370–71.14. Alexander, 845.15. Ibid.; Whitcomb, 134.16. Victor Davis Hanson, “The Right Man,” in Military History Quarterly

8, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 60.17. Kennet t , 1 7 0 .18 . Hanson , 59 .19. David A. Anderton, B-29 Superfortress at War (New York: Scribner

and Sons, 1978), 24–25; Werrel l , 145; Edwin Hewitt , memorandum, “Reportfor Operat ions Analysis Divis ion, 20th Air Force, 23 December 1944”(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA), 760.310-3.

FAIRCHILD PAPER

42

20. Anderton, 31.21. Edward R. Lightfoot , memorandum, subject : Operat ion Workman,

staging VLR strikes through Iwo Jima, 17 January 1945, Maxwell AFB,Ala., AFHRA, 762.322-2; Lotha A. Smith, memorandum to Chief of Staff,20 th Ai r Force , sub jec t : P rogress Repor t o f P lans fo r Ut i l i za t ion o f“Workman,” 1 March 1945 , Maxwel l AFB, Ala . , Ai r Force His tor ica lResearch Agency, 761.322-1.

22. Whitcomb, 136.23 . United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (European War) (Pacific War)

(Reprint, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1987).24 . Wesley Frank Craven and James Cate , The Army Air Forces in World

War II. 7 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948–1958), 597–98.25. Ibid., 662–73; Werrell, 170–77.26. Kennet t , 1 7 4 .27. J. C. Wylie Jr. , “Reflections on the War in the Pacific,” United States

Naval Institute Proceedings 78, no 4 (April 1952): 351–61.28. Kreis, 3 4 5 .29. Werrell , 202–3.30. Kennet t , 1 7 4 .31. Richard P. Hallion, “Prelude to Armageddon,” Air Power History 42 ,

no. 3 (Fall 1995): 51; Hansell , 203–4.32. Werrell, 146–47.33. Ibid., 166–67.34. Ibid. , 70.35. Winton Close, “B-29s in the CBI – A Pilot’s Perspective,” Aerospace

Historian 30, no. 1 (1983): 8.36. Werrell, 70.37. Hallion, 48–49.38. Craven and Cate, xvii .39. Close, 44.40. Thomas M. Coffey, Hap: The Story of the United States Air Force and

the Man Who Built It, General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold (New York: Viking,1982), 367.

41. Ibid., 358.42. Werrell, 136.

GORMAN

43

Conclusion

The war was los t when the Marianas were taken awayfrom Japan and when we heard the B-29s were coming out .We had nothing in Japan that we could use against such aweapon . From the po in t o f v iew o f the Home DefenseCommand, we fe l t that the war was los t and we said so. I fthe B-29s could come over Japan, there was nothing thatcould be done.

—Prince HigashikuniCommander in Chief

Home Defense Headquarters

Given the costs of modern mili tary technology, there is aduty for mil i tary strategists to s tudy i ts applicat ion and use i twisely. This statement is especially true for airpower strate-gists. Airpower and technology are integrally and synergist i-cally related. An understanding of airpower and its place innat ional s trategy requires an understanding of the eff icientapplicat ion of technology in warfare. As demonstrated by theAmerican experience with the Boeing B-29 Superfortress , effi-cient application of military technology requires an apprecia -tion for the inevitably of uncertainty in war and the need foradaptat ion to these inevitable uncertaint ies. Mili tary plannersshould not avoid new technologies because of the increasedcomplexi ty that they represent . Instead, they should acknow-ledge the new demands that increased complexi ty encom-passes, and they should allow for flexibili ty and adaptation inthe use of mili tary technology. Technology and military strat-egy should be ful ly integrated so commanders can conduct thekinds of campaigns and mil i tary operat ions that offer the bestchance for success in achieving the nation’s poli t ical and mili-tary objectives.

One finding from the study of B-29 operations in the Pacificthrough the lens of complexi ty theory is that the Japanesefailed to adapt defensively to American offensive adaptations.Similar to the American neglect of Brit ish experience, but to agreater degree , the Japanese fa i led to learn f rom German suc-

45

cesses against the European a i r campaign. Unl ike the Ger-mans , the Japanese d id not d isperse the i r indust r ies unt i l i twas too late—and they did not organize a credible air defense.The Japanese d id not acqui re German radar technology, butins tead used Br i t i sh and Amer ican radars cap tured dur ing thefirst years of the Pacific war. What l i t t le adaptation the Japa-nese d id show (such as concentra t ing f ighters and f lak aroundprobable targets and creat ing “aerial Kamikazes” by rammingA m e r i c a n b o m b e r s ) w a s u n c o o r d i n a t e d a n d n o t w i d e l yadopted. In response to the threat of aer ial and naval Kamika-zes

The Japanese thea te r p resen ted uncer ta in t i es and un in -tended consequences tha t requi red adapta t ions by each of theservices. The Army shaped itself into an image of the Marines,learning the demands of is land warfare. The Navy evolvedfrom the ba t t lesh ip to the a i rcraf t carr ier and from “Ma-hanian” decis ive engagements to submarine warfare a i m e d a ts t rangl ing the enemy into submission. The Air Force and theB-29 were not alone in the need for adaptations of strategy,operational methods, and tactical devices in the Pacific thea-t e r .

Adaptat ion is required to solve the problems created by un-certainty—and war is f i l led with uncertainty. The uncertain -t ies presented by the introduction of the B-29 to the Pacifictheater inc luded mechanica l malfunct ions, doct r ina l shor t-comings , and un in tended consequences within the mili taryenvironment in the Pacific. Overcoming these uncertaintiesrequired extensive technical , operat ional , and strategic adap-tat ions.

Despite the difficulties it presented, the B-29 proved to be asuccessful ins t rument for achieving s t ra tegic and operat ionalgoals agains t Japan. But the bomber was successful in waysthat p lanners and a i rcraf t des igners had not ant ic ipated. WithLeMay’s operational adaptations, the technology-based doc-tr ine of precis ion dayl ight bombardment gave way to the ne-cessity of military expediency. The technological developmentsthat drove the AAF’s initial employment of the B-29 proved tobe leas t impor tan t in the success fu l conduct o f s t ra teg icbombing against Japan. Touting the technological advances of

FAIRCHILD PAPER

46

pressurizat ion and remotely control led defensive armaments ,the B-29 succeeded not as a h igh-al t i tude precis ion bomberbut as a low-al t i tude area bomber us ing incendiar ies agains thighly vulnerable Japanese ci t ies . Range, payload, and adapt-abil i ty became its greatest assets.

Taking into account the costs of both the unforeseen diff i-cul t ies and the necessary adapta t ions , the B-29 was a cos t lyhigh-maintenance tool for use in achieving wartime objectives.Given the probable cost of the alternatives, however, the B-29was almost certainly well worth i t . The bomber was awesomein sheer kil l ing power alone; the strategic bombing surveyde te rmined tha t t he B-29s caused 330 ,000 f a t a l i t i e s and806,000 injur ies , far exceeding Japan’s 780,000 combat casu -alt ies for the entire war. And Japan’s economy was twice de-stroyed , with B-29s part icipat ing in both arms of the eco-nomic s t rangulat ion of Japan—destroying industr ies f rom theair and laying mines to cut off imports by sea. With or withoutthe technology of the atom bomb, the technology of the B-29was a war winner . The exper ience in the Japanese theaterof fe rs va luab le ins igh t in to the success fu l app l ica t ion ofemerging technology in war.

GORMAN

47

Appendix

Timel ine of Events

J a n u a r y 1 9 4 0 Army Air Corps design requirement for VLR bomber

21 September 1942 First Boeing XB-29 flown in Seattle

4 April 1944 Twentieth Air Force activated in thePacific

5 J u n e 1 9 4 4 First XX Bomber Command missionfrom China; first B-29 mission of the war

June – August 1944 Guam, T in ian , and Sa ipan in theMarianas secured for B-29 opera-t ions

1 5 J u n e 1 9 4 4 Firs t B-29 miss ion agains t main-l and Japan f rom China

12 October 1944 First B-29 arr ives in Saipan

1 November 1944 Firs t B-29 reconnaissance miss ionover Japan f rom Saipan

24 November 1944 First B-29 raid on Tokyo from theMarianas

2 0 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 5 LeMay replaces Hansell as Com-mander , XXI Bomber Command

25 February 1945 Experimental low-level incendiaryraids against Tokyo

4 March 1945 First B-29 emergency landing onIwo Jima

9 – 10 March 1945 Ful l -scale incendiary a t tack againstTokyo

April – May 1945 B-29s operate in support of Okina-wa invasion

49

Ju ly 1944 Headquarters, Twentieth Air Force,t ransferred f rom the Uni ted Sta tes t o G u a m

16 Ju ly 1945 Gen Car l Spaa tz assumes com-mand of the newly created US ArmyStrategic Air Force

6 August 1945 Firs t a tomic bomb dropped by aB-29 on Hiroshima

9 August 1945 Second atomic bomb dropped onNagasaki

14 Augus t 1945 A record 809 B-29s bomb targetsin Japan ; Japanese governmentsu r r ende r s

50

Bibliography

Theory: Complexity, Strategy, and Technology

Alberts , David S. , and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. Complexity,Global Politics, and National Security . Washington, D.C.:National Defense University (NDU), 1997.

Bertalanffy, Ludwig von. General System Theory: Foundations,Development, Applications . New York: George Braziller,1968 .

B e y e r c h e n , A l a n . “ C l a u s e w i t z , N o n l i n e a r i t y , a n d t h eUnpredictability of War.” International Security 17 , no . 3(Winter 1992–93): 59–90.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Michael Howard and PeterParet , eds. Princeton: Princeton Universi ty Press, 1984.

Cohen, El iot A. , and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: TheAnatomy of Failure in War. New York: Free Press, 1990.

E t z o l d , T h o m a s H . “ C l a u s e w i t z e a n L e s s o n s f o r M o d e r nStrategists.” Air University Review 31, no. 4 (May–June1980): 24–28.

Gass, R. F. Theory, Doctrine, and Ball Bearings: AdaptingF u t u r e T e c h n o l o g y t o W a r f a r e . M o n o g r a p h . F o r tLeavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies,1996 .

Gle ick , James . Chaos: Making a New Science . New York:Viking, 1987.

Griggs, Roy A. “Technology and Strategy.” Airpower Journal10, no. 2 (Summer 1996) : 105–13.

Holley, Irving B. Ideas and Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Officeof Air Force History, 1985.

Jones , Archer . Elements of Military Strategy: An HistoricalApproach . Westport , Conn.: Praeger, 1996.

Luttwak, Edward N. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace.Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987.

51

Marg io t t a , F rank l in , and Ra lph Sanders , eds . Technology,Strategy and National Security . Washington, D.C.: NDUPress , 1985.

McDonnell, Robert H. “Clausewitz and Strategic Bombing.” AirUniversity Review 6 , no. 1 (Spring 1953): 43–54.

Moore, Thomas E. “Employment of Strategic Airpower.” AirUniversity Review 1 , no. 4 (Spring 1948): 57–65.

Ropp, Theodore. “The Strategic Dimensions of Global War.” AirUniversity Review 31, no. 5 (July–August 1980): 58–64.

Tr imble , Wil l iam F. “When a Torpedo is Not a Torpedo:West inghouse and the Hydrobomb.” Aerospace Historian35, no. 4 (1988): 244–50.

Waldrop, M. Mitchell. Complexity: The Emerging Science at theEdge of Order and Chaos . New York: Simon and Schuster ,1992 .

Walker, Scott. “A Unified Field Theory of Coercive Airpower.”Airpower Journal 11, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 70–79.

Watts, Barry D. The Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine: TheProblem of Fric t ion in War. Maxwell AFB, Ala. : AirUniversity Press, 1984.

The Boeing B-29 Superfortress

Air Technical Service Command (ATSC). The Superfortress.Historical Study No. 192. April 1945.

Alexander, Richard G. “Experiment in Total War.” UnitedStates Naval Inst i tute Proceedings 2, no. 8 (August 1956):837–47.

Allen, Thomas B., and Norman Polmar. Code-Name Downfall:T h e S e c r e t P l a n t o I n v a d e J a p a n a n d W h y T r u m a nDropped the Bomb. New York: Simon and Schuster , 1995.

Anderton, David A. B-29 Superfortress at War. New York:Scr ibner and Sons , 1978.

Army Air Forces Tactical Center (AAFTAC). Tactical Doctrine forVery Heavy Aircraf t . M a x w e l l A F B , A l a . : A i r F o r c eHistorical Research Agency (AFHRA), 248.232-11.

Arnold, Henry Harley. Global Mission . New York: Harper ,1949 .

Berger, Carl. B-29: The Superfortress . New York: Ballantine,1970 .

52

Bernstein, Barton J . “The Dropping of the A-Bomb: HowDecisions are Made When a Nation is at War.” The CenterMagazine (March–April 1983): 7–15.

———. “The Perils and Politics of Surrender: Ending the Warwith Japan and Avoiding the Third Atomic Bomb.” PacificHistorical Review 46, no. 1 (1977): 1–27.

B o w m a n , M a r t i n W . U S A A F H a n d b o o k 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 5 .Mechanicsburg, Pa. : Stackpole Books, 1997.

Boyne, Walter J. Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air. NewYork: Simon and Schuster , 1994.

Brown , Michae l E . Flying Blind: The Polit ics of the U.S.Strategic Bomber Program . Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress , 1992.

Byrd , Mar tha . Kenneth N. Walker: Airpower’s UntemperedCrusader. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997.

Caldwell, Cyril Cassidy. Air Power and Total War. New York:Coward-McCann, 1943.

Capio, Ralph J. “The Atomic Bombings of Japan: A 50-YearRetrospective.” Airpower Journal 9, no. 2 (Summer 1995):65–73 .

C a r t e r , W i l l i s G . “ S t r a t e g i c B o m b a r d m e n t a n d N a t i o n a lObjectives.” Air University Review 4, no. 3 (Spring 1951):5–14.

Close, Winton. “B-29s in the CBI – A Pilot’s Perspective.”Aerospace Historian 30, no. 1 (1983): 6–14.

Coakley, Robert W., and Richard M. Leighton. Global Logisticsand Strategy, 1943–1945 in United States Army in WorldWar II. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of MilitaryHistory, 1968.

Coffey, Thomas M. Hap: The Story of the United States AirForce and the Man Who Built It, General Henry H. “Hap”Arnold . New York: Viking, 1982.

Collison, Thomas. The Superfortress is Born: The Story of theBoeing B-29 . New York: Duell , Sloan, and Pearce, 1945.

Cornel ius , Wanda, and Thayne Short . Ding Hao: America’s AirW a r i n C h i n a , 1 9 3 7 – 1 9 4 5 . G r e t n a , L a . : P e l i c a nPubl ishing, 1980.

53

C r a n e , C o n r a d C . Bombs, Cit ies, and Civil ians: AmericanAirpower Strategy in World War II . Lawrence, Kans. :Universi ty Press of Kansas, 1993.

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Cate . The Army Air Forcesin World War II. 7 volumes. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress , 1948–1958.

Craven, Wesley Frank. The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki,June 1944 to August 1945 i n The Army Air Forces in WorldWar II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

Daniels , Gordon. A Guide to the Reports of the United StatesStrategic Bombing Survey . London: Offices of the RoyalHistorical Society, 1981.

Daso, Dik. “Origins of Airpower: Hap Arnold’s Early Career inAviation Technology, 1903–1935.” Airpower Journal 10 ,no. 4 (Winter 1996): 70–92.

Dower, John W. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in thePacific War. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986.

Edoin, Hoito. The Night Tokyo Burned . New York: St. Martin’s,1987 .

Ell is , John. Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in theSecond World War. New York: Viking, 1990.

Falk, Stanley L. “General Kenney, the Indirect Approach, andthe B-29s.” Aerospace History, 1981, 147–55.

Fennessy, M.D. Project Matterhorn: A Lesson in Strategy andPolitics . S tuden t pape r . Maxwel l AFB, Ala . : A i r WarCollege, 1993.

Green, William. Famous Bombers of the Second World War.Garden City, N.Y.: Hanover House, 1969.

Greenfield, Kent Roberts. American Strategy in World War II: AReconsideration . Westport , Conn.: Greenwood, 1979.

Griffith, Thomas E. MacArthur’s Airman: General George C.Kenney and the War in the Southwest Pacific . Lawrence,Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1998.

Hal l ion , Richard P . “Pre lude to Armageddon,” Air PowerHistory 42, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 38–54.

Hansell , Haywood S. , Jr . The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler.Atlanta, Ga.: Longino & Porter, 1972.

54

———. The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: AMemoir. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History,1986 .

———. The Strategic Air War Against Japan . Maxwell AFB,Ala.: Air University, 1980.

H a n s o n , V i c t o r D a v i s . “ T h e R i g h t M a n . ” Military HistoryQuarterly 8, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 56–65.

Haugland, Vern. The AAF Against Japan . New York: Harper,1948 .

Herbert, Kevin. Maximum Effort: The B-29s Against Japan .Manhattan, Kans. : Sunflower Universi ty Press, 1983.

Hewitt , Edwin. Memorandum. “Report for Operations AnalysisDivision, 20th Air Force, 23 December 1944.” MaxwellA F B , A l a . : A i r F o r c e H i s t o r i c a l R e s e a r c h A g e n c y ,760.310-3 .

———. “Use of the B-29 Fire Control System Against NoseA t t a c k s . ” R e p o r t p r e p a r e d f o r O p e r a t i o n s A n a l y s i sDivision, 20th Air Force, 26 February 1945. Maxwell AFB,Ala.: Air Force Historical Research Agency, 760.310-4.

Huston, John W. “The Impact of Strategic Bombing in thePacific.” Journal of American - East Asian Relations 4, no.2 (1995): 169–79.

“The Wartime Leadership of ‘Hap’ Arnold,” in Alfred F. Hurleya n d R o b e r t C . E h r h a r t , e d s . Air Power and Warfare.Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1979.

Johnson, Rober t E. “Why the Boeing B-29 Bomber and Whythe Wright R-3350 Engine.” American Aviation SocietyHistorical Journal 33, no. 3 (1988): 174–89.

Kennett, Lee B. A History of Strategic Bombing. New York:Scr ibner , 1982.

Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports: A Personal Historyof the Pacific War. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air ForceHistory, 1987.

Kerr, E. Bartlett . Flames Over Tokyo: The U.S. Army Air Forces’Incendiary Campaign Against Japan, 1944–1945 . NewYork: D.I. Fine, 1991.

Kohn, Richard H. , and Joseph P . Harahan , eds . Strategic AirWarfare . Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History,1988 .

55

Kreis , John F. , ed. Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and the ArmyAir Forces Operations in World War II. Washington, D.C.:Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996.

Laws, Bradford. “Directive Carried Out.” Media release for20th Air Force Headquarters, 1945. Maxwell AFB, Ala.:AFHRA, 760.01.

Levine, Alan J . The Pacific War: Japan Versus the Allies .Westport , Conn.: Praeger, 1995.

LeMay, Curtis E. Mission With LeMay: My Story . Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965.

———. “The Role of VLR Aircraft in Victory Over Japan.”A r t i c l e f o r p u b l i c a t i o n i n A r m y a n d N a v y J o u r n a l ,1943–1944. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 761.04-1.

LeMay, Curtis E., and Bill Yenne. Superfortress: The B-29 andAmerican Air Power. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988.

Lightfoot, Edward R. “Operation Workman.” Memorandum onstaging VLR st r ikes through Iwo J ima, 17 January 1945.Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 762.322-2.

M a c F a r l a n d , S t e p h e n L e e . America’s Pursuit of PrecisionBombing. W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : S m i t h s o n i a n I n s t i t u t i o nPress , 1995.

MacIsaac, David. Strategic Bombing in World War II: The Storyof the United States Strategic Bombing Survey . New York:Gar land, 1976.

———. “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,”i n P e t e r P a r e t , e d . Makers of Modern Strategy fromMachiavelli to the Nuclear Age . Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1986.

Manzo, Louis A. “Morali ty in War Fighting and StrategicBombing in World War II.” Air Power History 3 9 , n o . 3(Fall 1992): 35–50.

Marshall , Chester. “B-29 Superfortress” in Big Bombers ofWWII. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Lowe & B. Hould Publishers,1998 .

Marshal l , Chester , and Warren Thompson. Final Assault onthe Rising Sun: Combat Diaries of B-29 Air Crews overJapan . North Branch, Minn.: Special ty Press Publishersand Wholesalers , 1995.

56

Maurer , Maurer , ed. Air Force Combat Units of World War II:The Concise Of f ic ia l Mi l i tary Record . E d i s o n , N . J . :Chartwell Books, 1994.

McClendon, R. Earl. Autonomy of the Air Arm . Washington,D.C.: GPO, 1996.

Mikesh, Robert C. “B-29: Made in Japan.” American AviationSociety Historical Journal 41, no. 4 (1996): 296–99.

Miles, Rufus. “Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a MillionAmerican Lives Saved.” International Security (Fall 1985):121–40.

Mondey, David, and Lewis Nalls. USAAF at War in the Pacific .New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1980.

Moody, Walton S. Building a Strategic Air Force . Washington,D.C.: GPO, 1996.

M o o n , J o h n E l l i s v a n C o u r t l a n d . Conf ines o f Concep t :American Strategy in World War II . New York: Garland,1988 .

Morgan, Lt Col Henry G., Jr. Planning the Defeat of Japan: AStudy of Total War Strategy . Washington, D.C.: Office ofthe Chief of Military History, [n.d].

Morrison, Wilbur N. Hellbirds: The Story of the B-29s inCombat. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1960.

Morton, Louis . Pacif ic Command: A Study in InterserviceRelations . Harmon Memorial Lecture in Military History.United States Air Force Academy, 1961.

Myers, G. E. “The Swords of Armageddon: A Discussion of theStrategic Mystique.” Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air UniversityPress , 1987.

M u n d a y , E r i c . USAAF at War in the Paci f ic . New York:Scribner’s Sons, 1980.

———. USAAF Bomber Units, Pacific 1941–1945 . L o n d o n :Osprey Publishing, 1979.

Nalty, Bernard C. , John F. Shiner, and George M. Watson.With Courage: The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II.Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994.

Newman, Robert P. “Ending the War with Japan: Paul Nitze’s‘ E a r l y S u r r e n d e r ’ C o u n t e r f a c t u a l . ” Pacific HistoricalReview 64, no. 2 (1995): 167–94.

57

Norstad, Lauris. “Organization and Command in the Pacific.”Memorandum to Brig Gen R.C. Candee, USA, 9 July1 9 4 5 . F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h , K a n s . : C o n s o l i d a t e d A r m sResearch Library, N-10240.

O’Bryan, Carey L., David W. Raudenbush, and Alan D. Clark.“The Superfortress.” Intelligence report presented October1944. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combined Arms ResearchLibrary, S-4207.

O’Bryan, Carey L. “Very Heavy Bomber Operations.” Reportprepared for AAF School of Applied Tact ics , January1945. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 248.231-1.

———. “Capabilities and Limitations of the B-29 Airplane.”Repor t p repared for AAF School of Appl ied Tac t ics ,November 1944. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 248.231-1.

Office of Statistical Control. “Summary of Twentieth Air ForceOperat ions , 5 June 1944 – 14 August 1945.” 1 October1945. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combined Arms ResearchLibrary, R-11628.

O p e r a t i o n a l A n a l y s i s S e c t i o n , T w e n t i e t h A i r F o r c eH e a d q u a r t e r s . “ A L i g h t w e i g h t R a d a r C o m p u t e rCombination for the B-29 R.C.T. System.” 23 October1944. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 760.310-2.

Overy, Richard J. The Air War, 1939–1945 . New York: Steinand Day, 1981.

P a p e , R o b e r t A . “ W h y J a p a n S u r r e n d e r e d , ” InternationalSecurity (Fall 1983): 154–201.

Perret, Geoffrey. Winged Victory . New York: Random House,1993 .

Price, Alfred. Combat Development in World War II: BomberAircraft. London: Arms and Armour Press , 1989.

Quester, George H. Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The AirpowerBackground of Modern Strategy . New York: John Wiley,1966 .

Roberts, Dr. Jeffrey J. “Peering through Different Bombsights:M i l i t a r y H i s t o r i a n s , D i p l o m a t i c H i s t o r i a n s , a n d t h eDecision to Drop the Atomic Bomb.” Airpower Journal 12,no. 1 (Spring 1998): 66–78.

58

Rodenhauser, Jermain F. “The Dooli t t le Experience on thePacific War.” Air University Review 3, no. 4 (Spring 1950):25–30 .

S a l i s b u r y , R e x f o r d H . “ R a d a r B o m b i n g . ” R e p o r t f o rCommanding Genera l , Twent ie th Ai r Force , 27 Apr i l1945. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 762.502-1.

S a l l a g e r , F r e d e r i c k M . L e s s o n s F r o m a n A e r i a l M i n i n gCampaign (Operation “Starvation”). Santa Monica, Calif.:RAND, 1974.

Schaffer, Ronald. Wings of Judgement: American Bombing inWorld War II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Shannon, Donald H. “United States Air Strategy and Doctr ineas Employed in the Stra tegic Bombing of Japan.” Studentpaper. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1976.

Shockley, W. B. “A Quantitative Appraisal of Some Phases ofthe B-29 Program.” Memorandum from the Office of theSecretary of War, 1945. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA,170.1-16.

Sinclair, William Boyd. The Big Brothers: The Story of the B-29.San Antonio, Tex.: Naylor, 1972.

Smith, Lotha A. “Progress Report of Plans for Utilization of‘Workman’.” Memorandum for Chief of Staff, TwentiethAir Force, 1 March 1945. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA,761.322-1 .

S m i t h , P e r r y M c C o y . T h e A i r F o r c e P l a n s f o r P e a c e ,1943–1945 . Balt imore: Johns Hopkins University Press,1984 .

Spaatz, Carl. “Strategic Air Power: Fulfillment of a Concept.”Foreign Affairs 24 (April 1946): 385–96.

Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: The American Warwi th Japan . New York: Vintage Books, 1985.

S t r a t e g i c B o m b a r d m e n t S e c t i o n , A A F S A T . “ V e r y H e a v yB o m b e r O p e r a t i o n s . ” L e c t u r e , N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 4 a n dJanuary 1945. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 248.231-1.

Swann, R.L. Unit History of the 315th Bomb Wing: 1944–1946 .Student paper. Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air Command andStaff College, 1986.

59

T a t e , J a m e s P . The Army and Its Air Corps: Army PolicyToward Aviat ion, 1919–1941. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AirUniversity Press, 1998.

“Tests Relative to the Defense and Tactical Use of the B-29.”Memorandum from the Operat ional Analysis Divis ion,Department of Physics, University of New Mexico, 15November 1944. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 760.310-3.

“The St ra teg ic Bomber .” Air University Review 8 , n o . 1(Summer 1955): 89–137.

The Twentieth Air Force. A Brief Summary of B-29 Strategic AirOperations, 5 June 1944 - 14 August 1945 . Maxwell AFB,Ala.: AFHRA, 760.421A.

Twentieth Air Force Headquarters. Air Estimate and Plans for20th Air Force Operations, November 1944 to January1945 . Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 760.317-1.

———. The Twentieth Air Force Over Japan. 1945. MaxwellAFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 760.01.

Underwood, Jeffrey S. The Wings of Democracy: The Influenceof Air Power on the Roosevelt Administration, 1933–1941 .College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1991.

United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Records of the Joint Chiefso f S t a f f : P a r t 1 , 1 9 4 2 – 1 9 4 5 ( T h e P a c i f i c T h e a t e r ).Microf i lm. Freder ick, Md. : Univers i ty Publ ica t ions ofAmerica, 1981.

United S ta tes S trategic Bombing Surveys (European War)(Pacific War). Reprint. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air UniversityPress , 1987.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Campaigns of thePacific War. New York: Greenwood Press, 1969.

———. Index to the Records of the United States StrategicBombing Survey . Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947.

———. Summary Report: Pacific War. Washington, D.C.: GPO,1946 .

Van Slyck, DeFores t . “Superfor t ress In te l l igence.” Specia lI n t e l l i g e n c e R e p o r t , 1 5 D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 4 . F o r tLeavenworth, Kans.: Combined Arms Research Library,N-5513.

60

Walker , J . Samuel . “The Decis ion to Use the Bomb: AnHistoriographical Update.” Diplomatic History 14, no. 1(1990): 97–114.

Werrell , Kenneth P. Blankets of Fire: U. S. Bombers OverJ a p a n D u r i n g W o r l d W a r I I . W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . :Smithsonian Ins t i tu t ion Press , 1996.

———. “The Bombing of Japan: Three New Insights.” Unpub-lished paper. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Center for AerospaceDoctr ine Research and Educat ion , 1999.

Whitcomb, Ed. On Celestial Wings. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AirUniversity Press, 1995.

White, Thomas D. “Japan as an Objective for Air Attack.”Paper for the Intel l igence Sect ion, Air Corps Tact icalSchool, Maxwell Field, Ala., 1937–1938. Maxwell AFB,Ala.: AFHRA, 248.501-65B.

Wylie, J. C., Jr. “Reflections on the War in the Pacific.” UnitedSta tes Naval Insti tute Proceedings 78, no 4 (April 1952):351–61.

XX Bomber Command. “ Impac t o f the B-29 on JapaneseMorale.” Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 761.639-1.

XXI Bomber Command. Tactical Doctrine. Maxwell AFB, Ala.:AFHRA, 762.054-9.

61

Index

Arnold, Henry “Hap”: 11

AAF adapted operationally: 36advanced radar sys tems: 29aerial mining campaign: 39Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS): 13, 36Air Intelligence Services: 35Air War Plans Division-1: 2aircraft carrier: 46Airpower and technology: 45Allied intelligence agents in Australia:

4 0AN/APN-4/9 Loran navigation systems:

16AN/ APQ-13: 36

AN/ APQ-13 radar: 16AN/ APQ-7 Eagle targeting radar: 16Army Air Force: 10Army and Navy prewar planning: 9Arnold, Gen Henry H. “Hap”: 21, 30, 41Arnold’s “drastic measures”: 41Arnold’s health: 41Australia: 31AWPD-1: 2, 9, 21AWPD-42: 21

B-29 aircrew training: 41B-29 in the Pacif ic: 4B-29 mining operat ions: 39B-29 Superfortress: 45B-29 t raining base: 41“Battle of Kansas”: 41bat t leship: 46Boeing B-17: 14

C a s a b l a n c a : 9Casablanca Conference: 21Chennault , Claire: 30Clausewitz, Carl von: 1, 4Cohen , E l io t : 3command structure in the Pacif ic: 31Consolidated B-24 Liberator: 14crew technique: 40cutting edge of aircraft technology: 15

doctrinal shortcomings: 46

Effective and timely adaptation: 35effects of the jet stream: 30

Eglin Air Proving Ground: 28engine fires: 27escort fighters: 38escorts were no longer needed: 38Europe f i r s t : 9

fire bombing: 36first emergency landing on Iwo Jima: 38first incendiary raid: 37f i rs t to man the B-29s : 29flight crew morale: 40flight engineer: 29Flying Fortress: 14Formosa: 31friendly fire: 28

Gooch, John: 3grand strategy: 22G u a m : 2 3

Hansell , Haywood S. Jr . : 2, 9Harmon, Millard F.: 41head-on a t tacks : 38high-altitude daylight precision

bombardment : 16

inadequacies of the defensive system: 28ini t ia l a t tack on Japan’s home is lands: 24Ishigo offensive: 30island warfare: 46Isley Field: 30Iwo J ima: 23, 38

J a p a n : 4Japan was on the defensive: 9Japan’s economy was twice destroyed: 47Japanese a i r f ie lds on Kyushu in suppor t

of the: 46Japanese a t t acks : 32Japanese reconna i s sance : 31je t s t ream: 30

Kenney, George: 30King, Ernest : 31

larger bomb loads: 37las t of the Matterhorn miss ions: 23leaflet drops: 39LeMay, Gen Curtis E.: 24, 36, 41

63

operat ional adaptat ions: 46Logistical difficulties: 22M69, a more explosive incendiary: 37MacArthur , Douglas: 10, 30, 31manning requi rements : 29Mariana Islands: 23Marshall , Gen George C.: 9, 31Martin B-10: 14Martin B-26: 29mechanical fixes: 40mechanical malfunct ions: 46Mil i tary adapta t ion: 2mine-laying: 39Misfor tune in war : 3

Nakajima aircraft plants in Tokyo: 24na tu re o f war : 4need for pressurizat ion: 27negative effects on crew morale: 37Nimitz, Chester: 10, 23, 31Norden bombsight : 16

Oklahoma City Air Depot: 40Operation Forager: 23Operat ion Matterhorn: 22Operat ion Starvat ion: 39organizational parochialism: 10overheating of the huge engines: 40

P-61 Black Widow: 32Pearl Harbor: 9, 21Philippines: 31power of personalities: 10pre-World War I I planners : 3Pressurization in the B-29: 15Prewar United States Army Air Corps

doctrine: 13problems with pressurizat ion: 27“Production line” maintenance: 40

remotely controlled defensive gunnerysystem: 16

remotely controlled defensive system: 28

Roosevelt, President Franklin D.: 9, 31Saipan: 23Saito, Yoshitsugu: 31service rivalries: 10Spaatz, Carl : 31Stilwell, Joseph: 30Strategic Air Intelligence Section: 35stress and flying fatigue: 40submarine warfare : 46Superfortress: 11

technological advances: 27technological and operational adaptation: 2technological complexity: 1technology of the B-29: 47tension between the services: 31Tenth Fleet: 31theater s trategy in the Pacif ic: 9Tinian: 23training requirements: 29Truk: 23Twentieth Air Force: 22

Ultra: 39unintended consequences : 46United States Strategic Bombing Survey: 35US Army in the Pacific: 10US Navy: 9, 10, 21US submar ine a t tacks : 39

very long-range (VLR) bomber: 14

weather forecasting: 30weather over Japan: 30White, Capt Thomas D.: 36White, Tom: 35Wolfe, Kenneth B.: 15Wright R-3350: 27Wright R-3350 engine: 15

XX Bomber Command: 22, 23, 24, 39XXI’s first missions: 23

Yamamoto, Isoruku: 36

64

Endgame in the PacificComplexity, Strategy, and the B-29

Air University Press Team

Chief EditorPreston Bryant

Copy EditorLula Barnes

Book Design and Cover ArtDaniel M. Armstrong

Composition andPrepress ProductionMary P. Ferguson