Akin david[1]

HyPerPLSS Phase I ReportNIAC Phase I Fellows Meeting

U N I V E R S I T Y O FMARYLAND

HyPerPLSSDevelopment of a Single-Fluid Consumable Infrastructure for Life Support Power

Propulsion and Thermal Control

1

Dr David AkinCraig Lewandowski

Dr Carol SmidtsJinny McGill



Presentation Outline

bull Background and Concept Overviewndash Dr David Akin

bull Chemistry Thermodynamics and Componentsndash Craig Lewandowski

bull Reliability and Risk Analysisndash Dr Carol Smidtsndash Jinny McGill

bull System Applicationsndash Dr David Akin

2



EVA Life Support Background

bull Portable life support system (PLSS) required for unrestricted extravehicular operations (EVA)

bull Supplies oxygen power cooling

bull ~120 lbs (Earth) weight on back

3



Apollo PLSS Internal Layout

4



Genesis of the Concept

bull Current PLSS recharge requires battery replacement water refill high pressure oxygen recharge contamination control cartridge replacement - each with external support requirements

bull Observe that 2 H2O2 rarr 2 H2O + O2 + heatbull Hydrogen peroxide (room temperature liquid)

might be able to supply all requirements for life support rarr Hydrogen Peroxide PLSS rarr ldquoHyPerPLSSrdquo

5



H2O2 Requirements

bull Assumed requirementsndash 06 kg O2ndash 5 kg of H2Ondash 800 Whr of electrical

energy

bull 885 =gt minimum mass (chemistry only)bull Increased to 95 to generate enthalpy needed

by power system (thermodynamics added)bull Required H2O2 mass = 109 kg

6



System Schematic

7



Component Description

bull 210 gallon tankbull Protection against freezing

ndash Band heaterndash Temperature sensor

bull Flow adjusted with varying demand requirementsndash Pumpndash Throttle valve

8



H2O2 Catalyst Bed

bull Significant knowledge base exists for H2O2 propulsion

bull SOA Silver-based catalyst bedsbull General Kinetics Inc COTS product

ndash Silver screensndash L = 33 in D = 075 in

bull Ensure H2O2 decomposition byincreasing residence time H2O2 Gas Generator

(wwwgkllccom)

9



Power System

bull Convert thermal energy toelectricity

bull Stirling enginendash Sunpower ASC COTS system

bull 80 W 36 efficiency

ndash H2O to generate temperature gradient

bull Battery provides and stores excess energy

Sunpower ASC(Wong etal)

10



Sublimator and Supply Loops

bull Sublimator overviewndash Phase changesndash Heat removal

bull HyPerPLSS fluidsndash H2O phase changendash Cooled streams

bull Water separatorbull Conventional supply

loops

11



Reliability and Risk Analysis Motivation

bull Inform design decisions with considerations of reliability and riskndash Increase reliability of systemndash Decrease risk of design

bull Consider hazards to equipment and crew healthndash Hydrogen peroxide can cause spontaneous combustion with

organic materials and is incompatible with many metals (eg iron copper brass silver zinc)

ndash Corrosive to skin membranes and eyes at high concentrations

ndash Vapors from concentrated solutions of hydrogen peroxide can result in significant morbidity

12



Parallel Process

bull Conceptual designbull Reliability analyses

ndash Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

ndash Fault Tree Analysis

bull Parallel process with feedback between design and analyses

Reliability andRisk AnalysesDesign

13



Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

bull Technique for reliability analysisbull Describes failure causes and effect on systembull Results are used to consider design changes

that may be necessary to reduce unreliability and risk

14



Failure Modes and Effects Analysisbull Failure Modes

ndash Manner of the failure

ndash Tumer et al (5) provides an updated failure mode taxonomy

bull Severityndash Qualitative rating assigned

for the worst possible effect

ndash MIL-STD-1629A severity levels were modified to differentiate between Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission

15



Fault Tree Construction

bull The top level event is the undesirable event (eg system failure)

bull Lowest level events are basic events (eg component failure)bull Boolean logic gates are used to communicate event effects on

the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis

bull The Boolean expression for the fault tree is written then expanded

bull This expression is simplified (ie Boolean reduction) to achieve the simplest logical expression from which the minimum cut sets can be obtained

bull Birnbaum importance measure represents the change in system risk with respect to changes in basic event probabilities

17



Event Tree

18



Quantification

bull Fault tree analysis gives qualitative results in the form of cut sets quantitative results can also be obtained

bull Probabilities (or frequencies) of basic events are used to compute probability of top level events

bull Failure probabilities (or frequencies) can be obtained in several waysndash Databases of component failure frequenciesndash Expert elicitationndash Human Reliability Analysis Models (eg THERP)

19



Scope of Analyses

bull Operation phasesmodes for HyperPLSS include and are not limited tondash Storage for launchndash Maintenancendash Power operation

bull Analyses thus far have focused primarily on the power operating mode during EVA

bull Direct functional dependencies are considered in the FTA common cause failures have not been considered

20



Scope of Analysesbull Several system aspects are not yet modeled in detail

ndash Electrical systemndash Piping systemndash Stirling enginendash Packaging structures and insulation ndash Software (control system)

bull Failure is assumed rather than degraded statesbull Qualitative analyses only thus far (no probabilities or

frequencies have been applied yet)bull Risk analysis has been limited to a review of the hazards

of hydrogen peroxide to health

21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25



Comments about the Process

bull For systems where reliability and risk are of concern these analyses should be performed in parallel with design

bull Such a parallel process requires that a structured approach be taken configuration control can become an issue during conceptual design phase

bull Feedback early during the FMEA and FTA has resulted in several HyperPLSS design changes (eg addition of a filter downstream from catalyst bed)

26



Reliability Conclusions and Future Work

bull Consideration of other operating modes (eg storage maintenance)

bull Identify and gain access to sources of failure probabilities (frequencies) for quantitative analyses

bull Bayesian framework will be devised to combine sources of relevant data

bull Safety (risk) analysis scenario development and event tree construction

27



In-Situ Production of H2O2bull Anthraquinone Process

ndash Requires H2 and O2ndash Transport H2 from Earthndash Moon O2 from regolithndash Mars O2 from atmosphere

bull CO2 + 4H2 rarr CH4 + 2H2Obull 2H2O rarr 2H2 + O2

bull Produces 30 Concentrationbull Increase to 90 with vacuum distillationbull Electrolysis-based production also feasible

H2O2 Manufacturing Process(Ventura and Yuan)

28



Synergistic Growth Opportunities

bull In-backpack regeneration of metal oxide CO2 scrubbers using waste heat

bull Use of surplus products for in-space propulsionndash Oxygen cold gasndash H2O2 monopropellant thrusters

bull The ldquohydrogen peroxide economyrdquondash H2O2 single-supply for PLSSndash H2O2 energy source for small roversndash H2O2 + fuel for largelong-range rovers

29



Plans for Phase 2bull Refine thermodynamic modelingbull Extend and enhance reliability and safety

analysisbull Extensive experimentation

ndash Prototyping of H2O2 feed systemcatalytic reactorndash Prototyping of multipass sublimatorndash Development of human respiratorymetabolic

simulator

bull Phase 2 milestone - full HyPerPLSS breadboard operating in thermal vacuum chamber

30



Phase II Test Bed

31



Research Statusbull We have demonstrated that the HyPerPLSS

concept is technically feasible (TRL 1)bull Remaining Phase 1 goals are to

ndash refine end-to-end thermodynamic cycle analysisndash complete FMEA and PRAndash detail requirements for in-situ H2O2 productionndash develop non-sublimation cooling concept for Marsndash conceptualize EVA packaging and operations approach

bull Phase 2 will experimentally demonstrate PLSS operations in space environment (TRL 3-4)

32



Conclusions

bull The ldquohydrogen peroxide economyrdquo offers unique advantages for future space operationsndash Single-point recharge for EVA (easy to do in field)ndash EVA duration is unlimited by life support systemndash Logistics simplified by single room-temperature liquidndash Shared consumables between EVA and robotic

systemsndash Readily replaceable from in-situ resources

Successful development of the HyPerPLSS can revolutionize human exploration of MoonMars

33



Referencesbull Reliability Engineering and Risk Analysis A Practical Guide M Modarres M New York NY 1999

bull Risk Analysis in Engineering Probabilistic Techniques Tools and Trends M Modarres Taylor amp Francis Group LLC Boca Raton 2006

bull Collins J A Failure of Materials in Mechanical Design John Wiley amp Sons 1993

bull Fault Tree Handbook with Aerospace Applications Prepared for NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance August 2002

bull Requirements for a Failure Mode Taxonomy for Use in Conceptual Design International Conference on Engineering Design ICED 03 August 19-21 2003 Irem Y Tumer et al

bull An implementation of reliability analysis in the conceptual design phase of drive trains Avontuur GC van der Werff K Reliability Engineering amp System Safety Aug 2001 vol73 no2 pp 155-65 Elsevier Journal Paper

bull Risk-informed design guidance for future reactor systems Delaney MJ Apostolakis GE Driscoll MJ Nuclear Engineering and Design June 2005 vol235 no14 pp 1537-56

bull A risk evaluation approach for safety in aerospace preliminary design Fragola JR Putney BF Mathias DL Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium 2003 Proceedings 2003 pp 159-63 xviii+622 pp USA Piscataway NJ

bull Practical solutions for multi-objective optimization An application to system reliability design problems Coit DW et al Reliability Engineering amp System Safety March 2007 vol92 no3 pp 314-22

bull Medical Management Guidelines for Hydrogen Peroxide (H2O2) Agency for Toxic Substances amp Disease Registry Department of Health and Human Services accessed on 25 January 2007 httpwwwatsdrcdcgovMGMImmg174html

bull Wong W A Anderson D J Tuttle K L and Tew R C ldquoStatus of NASArsquos Advanced Radioisotope Conversion Technology Research and Developmentrdquo NASATM 2006

bull General Kinetics Product Catalog General Kinetics Inc httpwwwgkllccom accessed 15 February 2007

34



Presentation Outline

bull Background and Concept Overviewndash Dr David Akin

bull Chemistry Thermodynamics and Componentsndash Craig Lewandowski

bull Reliability and Risk Analysisndash Dr Carol Smidtsndash Jinny McGill

bull System Applicationsndash Dr David Akin

2







3




4







5



H2O2 Requirements


energy



6



System Schematic

7







8



H2O2 Catalyst Bed





(wwwgkllccom)

9



Power System







10







loops

11









12



Parallel Process






13






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34







3




4







5



H2O2 Requirements


energy



6



System Schematic

7







8



H2O2 Catalyst Bed





(wwwgkllccom)

9



Power System







10







loops

11









12



Parallel Process






13






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34




4







5



H2O2 Requirements


energy



6



System Schematic

7







8



H2O2 Catalyst Bed





(wwwgkllccom)

9



Power System







10







loops

11









12



Parallel Process






13






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34







5



H2O2 Requirements


energy



6



System Schematic

7







8



H2O2 Catalyst Bed





(wwwgkllccom)

9



Power System







10







loops

11









12



Parallel Process






13






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



H2O2 Requirements


energy



6



System Schematic

7







8



H2O2 Catalyst Bed





(wwwgkllccom)

9



Power System







10







loops

11









12



Parallel Process






13






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



System Schematic

7







8



H2O2 Catalyst Bed





(wwwgkllccom)

9



Power System







10







loops

11









12



Parallel Process






13






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34







8



H2O2 Catalyst Bed





(wwwgkllccom)

9



Power System







10







loops

11









12



Parallel Process






13






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



H2O2 Catalyst Bed





(wwwgkllccom)

9



Power System







10







loops

11









12



Parallel Process






13






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



Power System







10







loops

11









12



Parallel Process






13






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34







loops

11









12



Parallel Process






13






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34









12



Parallel Process






13






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



Parallel Process






13






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34






14









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34









15






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34






the system

16



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



Fault Tree Analysis




17



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



Event Tree

18



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



Quantification




19



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



Scope of Analyses




20








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34








21



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



FMEA Example

22



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



Fault Tree Example

23



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



Fault Tree Cut Sets

24



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



Fault Tree Example

25







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34







26








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34








27








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34








28







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34







29






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34






simulator


30



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34



Phase II Test Bed

31







32



Conclusions




33















34







32



Conclusions




33















34



Conclusions




33















34















34

Documents

Akin david[1]