Alcohol strategy and the drinks industry · the alcohol retailers to contribute to local initiatives, in the form of alcohol disorder zones (ADZs), which were strongly opposed by

Alcohol strategy and the drinks industry

A partnership for prevention?

Rob Baggott

The government has identified the drinks industry as a key partner in preventing alcohol

problems and reducing levels of harm. This report examines how policy has developed as a

result.

The research considers the perspectives of various stakeholders, and sheds light on thegovernment’s approach to alcohol problems and the drinks industry. This plan was set out inits Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for England and the Public Health White Paper ‘ChoosingHealth’, both published in 2004. This approach, which emphasised corporate socialresponsibility within the industry, was heavily criticised in some quarters. Critics believed thatthe government had delegated an important area of public policy to a powerful commercialinterest.

The report examines the nature of the drinks industry, its perspective on alcohol problemsand the formation and implementation of key elements of the government’s alcohol strategy. Italso looks at the industry’s previous involvement in education and research, its efforts to self-regulate and the role of industry within partnerships. The author suggests ways to improveregulation, self-regulation, industry activity in education, training and research, andpartnership working. There are also recommendations for future research into alcohol policy.

The research took the form of a literature review and semi-structured interviews withrepresentatives from the drinks industry, the professions, the voluntary sector, academics,government and the public sector. It is of interest to anyone researching, developing orimplementing alcohol policy, and to those in the drinks industry, the NHS and the voluntarysector.

This publication can be provided in alternative formats, suchas large print, Braille, audiotape and on disk. Please contact:Communications Department, Joseph Rowntree Foundation,The Homestead, 40 Water End, York YO30 6WP.Tel: 01904 615905. Email: [email protected]

Also in this series

The Report of the Independent Working Group on Drug Consumption Rooms

Independent Working Group on Drug Consumption Rooms

Occasional and controlled heroin use: Not a problem?

Hamish Warburton, Paul J Turnbull and Mike Hough

Understanding drug selling in communities: Insider or outsider trading?

Tiggey May, Martin Duffy, Bradley Few and Mike Hough

Temperance: Its history and impact on current and future alcohol policy

Virginia Berridge

Drugs in the family: The impact on parents and siblings

Marina Barnard

Underage ‘risky’ drinking: Motivations and outcomes

Lester Coleman and Suzanne Cater

Parental drug and alcohol misuse: Resilience and transition among young people

Angus Bancroft, Sarah Wilson, Sarah Cunningham-Burley, Kathryn Backett-Milburn and

Hugh Masters

Alcohol strategy and the drinksindustryA partnership for prevention?

Rob Baggott

The Joseph Rowntree Foundation has supported this project as part of its programme of researchand innovative development projects, which it hopes will be of value to policy makers, practitionersand service users. The facts presented and views expressed in this report are, however, those of theauthor and not necessarily those of the Foundation.

Joseph Rowntree Foundation, The Homestead, 40 Water End, York YO30 6WPWebsite: www.jrf.org.uk

About the authorRob Baggott is Professor of Public Policy in the Leicester Business School at De Montfort University,Leicester, where he directs the Health Policy Research Unit, a cross-faculty research group. ProfessorBaggott’s research interests include public health, alcohol policy, the voluntary sector and healthservice reform. His publications include Health and Health Care in Britain (third edition, 2004), PublicHealth: Policy and Politics (2000) and Speaking for Patients and Carers (with Judith Allsop and KathrynJones, 2004). He has worked on various projects in the alcohol field – including projects funded bythe Economic and Social Research Council, the Alcohol Education and Research Council, and theInstitute of Alcohol Studies. He is a member of the Advisory Council for the Institute of AlcoholStudies and a member of the Parkinson’s Disease Society’s Research Advisory Panel.

© Leicester Business School, De Montfort University 2006

First published 2006 by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation

All rights reserved. Reproduction of this report by photocopying or electronic means for non-commercial purposes is permitted. Otherwise, no part of this report may be reproduced, adapted,stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, orotherwise without the prior written permission of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

ISBN–13: 978 1 85935 541 1ISBN–10: 1 85935 541 2

A CIP catalogue record for this report is available from the British Library.

Cover design by Adkins Design

Prepared and printed by:York Publishing Services Ltd, 64 Hallfield Road, Layerthorpe, York YO31 7ZQTel: 01904 430033; Fax: 01904 430868; Website: www.yps-publishing.co.uk

Further copies of this report, or any other JRF publication, can be obtained either from the JRF website(www.jrf.org.uk/bookshop/) or from our distributor, York Publishing Services Ltd, at the above address.

Contents

Acknowledgements vii

List of abbreviations viii

Executive summary ix

Introduction 1

1 The alcoholic drinks industry and social responsibility 2Representing the industry 2The industry’s perspectives on alcohol problems 3Criticism of the industry’s efforts 6Conclusions 7

2 The formation and implementation of the alcohol strategy 9National social responsibility scheme 9The independent national fund 10Local schemes 11Conclusions 13

3 Industry initiatives in education and research 14Education 14Research 15Conclusions 17

4 Self-regulation 18What is self-regulation? 18Advertising standards 20The Portman Group code 22Trade association codes 23Corporate codes 25Evaluating the codes on advertising, marketing and promotion 26Responsible retailing 27Other self-regulatory initiatives 31Self-regulation: an overview 31Conclusions 34

5 Partnerships 36The importance of partnership … and its perils 36National partnerships 37Local partnerships 38Conclusions 41

6 Conclusions 42Government’s alcohol strategy 42The drinks industry 42Education and research 43Self-regulation 43Partnership 44

References 46

vi

vii

I would like to thank all participants for theircontribution. Thanks to Katherine Hooper, theHPRU administrator, for her research andsecretarial assistance, and also to Charlie Lloyd

Acknowledgements

and Betsy Thom for advice during the course ofthe project. I am grateful to the Joseph RowntreeFoundation for funding this project.

viii

ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers

ACS Association of Convenience Stores

ADZs Alcohol disorder zones

AERC Alcohol Education and ResearchCouncil

AFS Alcohol Focus Scotland

AMR Association of Multiple Retailers

ASA Advertising Standards Authority

BBPA British Beer and Pub Association

BCAP Broadcast Committee ofAdvertising Practice

BEDA Bar Entertainment and DanceAssociation

BII British Institute of Innkeeping

BIIAB BII Awards Board

BRC British Retail Consortium

CAP Committee of Advertising Practice

CDRPs Crime and Disorder ReductionPartnerships

CSR Corporate social responsibility

DCMS Department for Culture, Mediaand Sport

ERAB European Research AdvisoryBoard

ICAP International Center for AlcoholPolicies

IPPR Institute for Public Policy Research

LACORS Local authorities co-ordinators ofregulatory services

NGO Non-governmental organisation

OCPA Office of the Commissioner forPublic Appointments

OFCOM Office of Communications

PASS Proof of age standards scheme

SAOs Social aspects organisations

SMACAP Scottish Ministerial AdvisoryCommittee on Alcohol Policy

SWA Scotch Whisky Association

TASC Tackling Alcohol-related StreetCrime

WSA Wine and Spirits Association

List of abbreviations

ix

• The Government’s alcohol strategy identifiedthe drinks industry as a key partner intackling alcohol problems. Specific proposalsincluded local and national socialresponsibility schemes with financialcontributions from the industry. This arousedconcern among those dealing with theconsequences of alcohol misuse who doubtedthe willingness and ability of the industry todevelop effective self-regulatory systems orto engage in genuine partnership working.

• The Government’s initial proposals changedconsiderably following discussions with theindustry. At national level, a new industry-wide social responsibility standardsdocument was produced. Although this setout key principles, standards and goodpractice, it did not supersede existing codesand was not accompanied by newmechanisms for monitoring, implementationand accreditation. The standards documentalso failed to address some of theacknowledged weaknesses of self-regulationin this field, such as fragmentation,duplication, gaps and inconsistenciesbetween existing codes covering differentsectors and aspects of the industry.Furthermore, it did not set out ways ofstrengthening enforcement, extendingindependent input into self-regulation orimproving public accountability.

• The industry strongly opposed proposals tocreate new independent funds at local andnational level for tackling alcohol problems.At national level, a compromise was reached,which led to the reform of an existingindustry trust (the Drinkaware Trust) to give

it greater independence. At local level,Government sought new statutory powersfor the police and local authorities to compelthe alcohol retailers to contribute to localinitiatives, in the form of alcohol disorderzones (ADZs), which were strongly opposedby the industry.

• The industry acknowledges that theproduction and sale of alcoholic drinkscarries with it important socialresponsibilities. Efforts to strengthen socialresponsibility followed adverse mediacoverage about binge drinking. Widercommitments to corporate socialresponsibility (CSR) across the businesssector also provided an impetus. The largemultinational drinks producers have played akey role in promoting CSR within the drinksindustry. These businesses have beenmotivated by the need to protect both brandand corporate reputations. Retailers have alsobeen motivated by a concern for reputation.However, there are differences in perspectivebetween and within different sectors of theindustry, which rarely become public.

• The industry’s response to alcohol problemshas so far depended heavily on thewillingness and ability of the largercompanies to lead a diverse and dynamicindustry. In future much will depend on, notonly their continued commitment, but on theextension of social responsibility across theindustry as a whole.

• Competitive pressures within the industryare strong and can operate against socialresponsibility.

Executive summary


x

• The industry is opposed to policies that seekto control overall levels of alcoholconsumption. Its critics are concerned that itcan discredit and resist effective public healthinterventions that it perceives as a threat toprofitability. They are worried about theindustry’s economic and political power, andits influence over policy. They are particularlycritical of the Portman Group, which in theirview lacks independence. Critics urge thatboth the educational and regulatoryfunctions of the Portman Group betransferred to a body independent of theindustry. It is envisaged that most of thePortman Group’s educational functions willbe transferred to the new Drinkaware Trust.

• Those outside the industry acknowledge thatit has a role to play in reducing alcoholproblems. However, many are sceptical aboutthe industry’s social responsibility initiatives.Critics argue that it could do much more,especially in changing marketing practices,improving product development andshaping the drinking environment.

• The drinks industry has supportededucational projects in the alcohol field. Criticsbelieve that, although education can form auseful part of a broader strategy, it is relativelyineffective on its own. Some respondents werevery critical of the industry’s role in educationand argued that it could do more to promoteresponsible drinking.

• The industry has supported alcohol research.Critics are concerned about the possiblemanipulation of research agendas and projectfindings by the industry. They pointed outthat research, particularly when funded bythe industry, must be governed in a way that

explicitly protects the independence ofresearchers. It would appear that clearercriteria for research governance in the alcoholfield are needed.

• Despite attempts to introduce nationalindustry-wide standards, the industry isgoverned by a bewildering array of self-regulatory systems, which vary considerablyin detail. Most are viewed by critics asrelatively weak, particularly in terms ofenforcement.

• Both industry and non-industry respondentsstated that more could be done to promote amore effective system of co-regulation withthe alcohol industry. In particular, self-regulation could be bolstered by clarifyingthe legality of socially responsible practices.

• Respondents from both within and outsidethe industry argued that training has acrucial role to play in supporting bothstatutory and self-regulation. Training shouldbe evidence-based and informed by researchon the impact of programmes on sociallyresponsible practice, self-regulation and lawenforcement.

• In the traditionally adversarial world ofalcohol politics, partnership with industrycan create tensions. On a positive note, theindustry can bring resources as well asexpertise (from the producers’ knowledge ofmarketing and drinking patterns to the local‘street knowledge’ of Pubwatch schemes). Torefuse to have any input from the industrywould cut off a potential source of resourcesand expertise. To exclude it frompartnerships as a matter of principle wouldbe short-sighted.

Executive summary

xi

• The industry’s commercial objectives canconflict with the public interest and thislimits what it is able to do in the context ofpartnerships. The best way forward is toestablish a coherent framework, whichclarifies the scope and purpose ofpartnerships and which protects weakerparticipants and the public interest. Thismight include a national alcohol foruminvolving all stakeholders, including theindustry.

• The industry must be engaged where itmakes a genuine contribution to thereduction of alcohol problems. One such areais local retailing schemes, such as Pubwatchand other locally based alcohol partnershiparrangements and projects. There is alreadyevidence from ‘flagship’ projects to suggestthat partnership with the industry can bringbenefits. However, there needs to be acomprehensive review of the impact of suchschemes and widespread dissemination ofthe lessons they hold, which could bereflected in future guidance and monitoringof partnership arrangements.

• There needs to be a full and open debateabout the role of the drinks industry in thegovernance of alcohol, includingpartnerships.

• Many topics merit further research including:

– an independent evaluation of the nationalstandards, the new Drinkaware Trust andalcohol disorder zones, followingimplementation

– an investigation of how the different partsof the industry relate to each other onsocial responsibility issues

– a study of the influence of the industrywithin the policy process

– an examination of the facilitators andbarriers to socially responsible practicewithin the drinks industry

– a comprehensive study of the impact ofalcohol education campaigns

– an investigation of different models ofresearch governance in the alcohol field

– an assessment of the impact of self-regulation in specific fields, includingadvertising, marketing and promotion,the drinking environment, under-agedrinking and training

– an evaluation of training schemes andhow they contribute to self-regulation,socially responsible practice and theobservation of legal provisions

– a comprehensive review of the impact ofpartnership working at local level.

1

The Government’s Alcohol Harm ReductionStrategy for England (Cabinet Office, 2004), andthe subsequent White Paper on Public Health(Cm. 6374, 2004), identified the drinks industryas a key partner in tackling alcohol problems.The industry was called upon to strengthen itsown standards and practices while contributingfinancially to projects in the alcohol field.Specific proposals included the establishment ofnew ‘social responsibility’ schemes for theindustry at national and local level.

The prominence given to the industryaroused concern, particularly among thosedealing with the consequences of alcohol misuse(see Drummond, 2004; Alcohol Concern, 2005;Room, 2005). Doubts were expressed about theindustry’s willingness and ability to developeffective self-regulatory systems and to engagein genuine partnership working. Criticsbelieved that the industry would notcountenance measures that threatened itscommercial objectives and that the Governmenthad, in effect, delegated an important area ofpublic policy to a powerful commercial lobby.

This report examines this crucial aspect ofthe Government’s alcohol strategy and its earlyimplementation. Chapter 1 examines the nature

of the industry, its key institutions andperspectives on alcohol-related harm. Chapter 2explores the formation and implementation ofthe elements of the Government’s alcoholstrategy that relate to the industry. Chapter 3examines the industry’s involvement ininitiatives in the field of education and research.Chapter 4 focuses on self-regulation within theindustry, while Chapter 5 considers theactivities of the industry within variouspartnership arrangements.

The research took the form of a literaturesearch on industry initiatives in the alcoholfield, self-regulation and partnership working.In addition, 25 semi-structured interviews wereundertaken during 2005 with participants fromthe drinks industry, the voluntary sector,professional organisations, academia,Government and the public sector. (To maintainconfidentiality, interviewees’ contributions arereferenced in the text as follows: I1–14 forindustry respondents and N1–11 for non-industry respondents – including governmentpersonnel.) The researcher was also invited toparticipate in and observe two stakeholdermeetings held by the Portman Group.

Introduction

2

This chapter examines the nature of thealcoholic drinks industry in the UK, its mainrepresentative organisations and institutions onalcohol policy issues, and its perspectives onalcohol-related harm.

In 2004, the estimated value of the UKalcoholic drinks market was over £40 billion,around 6 per cent of consumer spending (see KeyNote, 2005). However, this economicallyimportant industry has undergone many changesin recent years. Production is concentrated in largemultinational corporations with interests acrossthe main types of alcoholic beverage: beer, spiritsand wine. These corporations, which includeDiageo, Scottish and Newcastle, and PernodRicard, increasingly focus on heavily promotedand advertised global brands. The rise of globalcorporations and their brands has strengthenedboth the market power and the political leverageof these large producer companies. However,several other developments have provided acounterweight to this. Smaller, ‘niche-market’producers have emerged, focusing on specificsectors of the market (such as ‘designer drinks’).There have also been important structural changesin the retail sector, such as the transfer of mostbrewery-owned pubs to new independent retailoperators known as ‘pubcos’. Other importanttrends have been the increase in supermarket salesof alcohol and the growing numbers ofentertainment establishments associated with thenew night-time economy.

Representing the industry

The industry is represented by several tradeassociations. These include the British Beer and

Pub Association (BBPA), which represents overhalf of all pubs and all the large brewers. It isregarded as an effective trade association and, inthe words of one informant (N11), ‘is a strongnegotiator on the industry’s behalf’. In recentyears, the BBPA’s profile has grown in relationto social responsibility issues, particularly withthe development of the code on point of salepromotions (discussed in Chapter 4). Otherassociations involved in social responsibilityissues include the Scotch Whisky Association(SWA), the Wine and Spirits Association (WSA),the Association of Convenience Stores (ACS),the British Retail Consortium (BRC), theAssociation of Multiple Retailers (AMR), the BarEntertainment and Dance Association (BEDA),the British Institute of Innkeeping (BII) and theAdvertising Association.

The Portman Group

The key industry organisation on alcoholmisuse issues is the Portman Group, formed in1989 by the leading drinks producers to bringtogether various ‘social responsibility’initiatives. Although retailers may join thePortman Group as associate members, andindeed provide a small part of its funding,producers continue to dominate both itsfunding and governance. The Portman Grouphas a number of roles. It operates a self-regulatory scheme for alcohol producers on themarketing, packaging and promotion ofalcoholic drinks (see Chapter 4). It also currentlyfunds various educational initiatives to promoteresponsible drinking and to reduce alcohol-related harm (see Chapter 3), though most ofthis activity will be superseded by the

1 The alcoholic drinks industry and social

responsibility

3

The alcoholic drinks industry and social responsibility

Government’s plans for an independentnational fund (see Chapter 2).

The industry respondents interviewed forthis study argued that the Portman Group has aconsiderable amount of independence. In thewords of one, it could be ‘tough on itspaymasters’ (I7). Internal criticisms were minor,mainly about governance arrangements, notablyfrom retailers who thought the organisation wastoo closely tied to large producer interests. Someindustry informants stated that the PortmanGroup could do more to include non-industrystakeholders. Indeed, a stakeholder group wasestablished during the period covered by thisresearch (including academics, civil servants,alcohol charities, health professionals and youthorganisations).

Non-industry respondents were far morecritical. They saw the Portman Group as apowerful public relations body and lobbyist forthe industry. Critics argued that there wasconflict between its roles of ‘industrywatchdog’, ‘alcohol misuse prevention body’and ‘representative of the industry’. Theymaintained that the Portman Group lackedindependence and would inevitably reflect theinterests of its funders by, for example, ignoringor discrediting evidence that did not fit with theindustry’s perspective on the causes of alcoholmisuse. There was also criticism of itseducational and information campaigns forplacing too much emphasis on the responsibilityof individual consumers and for not sufficientlyhighlighting the long-term risks of heavydrinking (see Chapter 3). Added to this waswider concern about the influence of thePortman Group over alcohol research, whichfollowed the decision to appoint its then chiefexecutive to the Alcohol Education and

Research Council (AERC) – discussed further inChapter 3.

Indeed, the Portman Group was portrayedby these respondents in a similar light to other‘social aspects organisations’ (SAOs) funded bythe industry. SAOs exist within variouscountries and also operate at the European andinternational level (for example, the AmsterdamGroup and the International Center for AlcoholPolicies – ICAP). Elsewhere, critics of theindustry have concluded that the main aim ofSAOs is to manage issues that are potentiallydetrimental to the alcohol business (Babor, 2000;Eurocare, 2003).

The Portman Group strenuously denies thatit is a lobbyist for the industry. Its former chiefexecutive has stated that:

… the Portman Group is not a trade association ora lobby group. It does not represent the industry.It has no commercial purpose. Its role is topromote responsible drinking by the consumerand responsible marketing by producers.(Coussins, 2004)

Even so, non-industry respondents arguedthat a lack of transparency undermined thecredibility of the Portman Group and of thealcohol industry as a whole. The majority ofnon-industry people who were interviewedfavoured transferring the Portman Group’seducational functions and regulatory roles to abody with visible independence from theindustry.

The industry’s perspectives on alcohol

problems

The industry acknowledges that a range ofindividual and social problems are associated

4


with alcohol. However, it views these as aconsequence of misuse by a minority of thepopulation. Furthermore, the industry focuseson causal factors pertaining to the individual orparticular ‘high-risk’ population groups, ratherthan on social or environmental influences onthe population as a whole. It follows that theinterventions endorsed by the industry arethose that target individuals and populationsubgroups, including education, biomedical andpsychosocial research, support and treatmentfor those with alcohol problems. The industryrejects policies that target whole populations,particularly those that seek to control overallalcohol-consumption levels, despite evidence oftheir potential effectiveness in reducing alcoholproblems (Babor et al., 2003; Academy ofMedical Sciences, 2004; Room et al., 2005). Butthe industry does accept that its practices canimpact on factors such as the drinkingenvironment and culture. Indeed, it maintains ithas always acknowledged that its products arecapable of being misused and claims to havepursued a socially responsible approach formany years. More recently, heightenedawareness of corporate social responsibility(CSR) across the wider business sector hasforced the industry to be more explicit in settingout its position.

Corporate image and reputation

The key principle of CSR is that moderncorporations will thrive, not by being narrowand self-interested, but by being good corporatecitizens. Advocates of CSR argue that projectsbenefiting the public along with voluntaryefforts to reduce external costs imposed bycorporations on society can have a positiveeffect on the enterprise, by creating a better

environment for business, new markets andimproved relationships with consumers andemployees (see Grayson and Hodges, 2004).

Although critics of CSR are correct inidentifying its limits within the corporateentities that predominate today (see Bakan,2005), there are situations where the profitmotive may be compatible with greater socialresponsibility. In the drinks industry, the largemultinationals seem particularly concerned thatthe brands in which they have heavily investedmay attract adverse publicity linked to alcoholproblems. When asked about the motivation forsocial responsibility, one respondent from alarge producer replied ‘we don’t want ourbrands brought down’ (I11), while another saidit was ‘driven primarily by pride andprofessionalism in our products. The companywants to take care of its brands’ (I13) (see alsoGrant and O’Connor, 2005). The large producersare also anxious that the activities of otherproducers (and also some retailers) may damagethe reputation of the industry as a whole.Indeed, as one industry respondent put it, ‘thereis now a free-trade mentality with many smalloperators, the old authority structures havegone’ (I11).

A concern for reputation is not confined tothe large producers. An interviewee from apubco stated that its policy on socialresponsibility emerged from ‘a concern forreputation’ and ‘the prospect of having thecorporate name dragged into bad publicityabout alcohol’ (I14), while a spokesperson froma retail trade association observed that:

The drinks industry is anxious about its image. Itis not just worried about the consequences ofthis in terms of government intervention. It is also

5


concerned about the public, shareholder andinvestor confidence in the industry. The publicimage of the industry is very important.(I8)

Recent social responsibility initiatives havebeen triggered by bad publicity surroundingalcohol problems – and in particular bingedrinking. Industry respondents argued that themedia exaggerated these problems. Indeed, onerespondent (I14) stated that some landlords hadbanned from their premises copies of the Daily

Mail and Mail on Sunday because of theirhostility towards the industry. Yet it was theextensive and negative media coverage onalcohol that forced the Government to take amuch tougher line with the industry. Notably,the Government’s alcohol strategy (see Chapter2) had threatened further intervention if theindustry did not respond accordingly.Interviewees seemed convinced that this was agenuine threat that created a powerful incentivefor the industry to act.

Competitive pressures also played animportant part in shaping the industry’s views.The large operators stated in interview that theywanted to protect their brands, not only fromadverse publicity, but also from opportunisticnew entrants. The industry interviewees – allfrom larger companies and established tradeassociations – were scathing about the‘cowboys’ who could ruin the industry’sreputation. These included ‘rogue landlords’and ‘get-rich-quick’ producers and retailers whohad no long-term commitment to the industrybut wanted to make a ‘fast buck’.

In other circumstances, however, it may suitlarge corporations to turn a blind eye to theoperations of ‘rogue’ companies if their

products and practices offer potential futuregains for all, as suggested by one non-industryinterviewee:

What seems to have happened is that the ‘badboys’ have ‘slashed and burned’, carving out newmarkets and developing new products, with newapproaches to marketing and promotion. Largercompanies have watched them and condemntheir practices when they attract criticism frommedia or Government. But they also have theoption of developing similar products if they feel itis commercially viable.(N2)

Fragmentation and leadership

There are clearly limits to social responsibility.One limiting factor, noted by both industry andnon-industry observers, is the dynamic anddiverse nature of the industry (see also SocialMarket Foundation, 2006, pp. 30–3). Althoughthe industry is adept at producing a commonfront, it does disagree in private. Each drinkssector has its own traditions and representativeinstitutions. There is a tendency to blame andcriticise other sectors for the problem. Hence,producers tend to complain about poor retailpractices, pub landlords blame off-licences forunder-age sales and cheap alcohol, and off-licence proprietors see binge drinking as chieflya problem for pubs and bars. However, someindustry respondents in this study believed thatthe rivalry and tensions between the differentparts of the trade were exaggerated, and thateach sector now had much in common intackling alcohol problems.

The involvement of large producercompanies in social responsibility initiatives hashelped to offset the effects of fragmentation.

6


Most interviewees (from both within andoutside the industry) acknowledged that thelarge multinational companies were at theforefront of efforts to improve standards. Froman industry perspective, the Portman Groupwas seen as an integrating force, though itsdomination by producers undermined itslegitimacy as the voice of the industry as awhole. Another integrating factor is that variouscompanies, trade associations and otherindustry bodies are linked by overlappingmemberships, and key industry figures sit onseveral important committees. Furthermore, themajor companies, trade associations and thePortman Group are in regular contact with eachother on issues of common interest.

Although there is leadership in the industry,interviewees from within and outside it stressedthe importance of a continued commitment bythe large producers and trade bodies to tacklingalcohol problems. Furthermore, they said it wasimperative that social responsibility extendsthroughout the whole industry.

Although there are internal debates, opendisagreements are extremely rare. It is relativelyunusual for one company or sector of theindustry to ‘break cover’, for example by takingadditional steps that might pressure others todo more. However, this does occasionallyhappen, as the following two examplesillustrate. When Diageo hosted a conference onalcohol misuse, organised by the Institute forPublic Policy Research (IPPR), at which thePrime Minister Tony Blair made a speech aboutthe urgent need to tackle binge drinking, somewithin the industry were reportedly furious(Finch, 2004, p. 31). When, on another occasion,the Scotch Whisky Association (SWA)introduced financial penalties for breaches of its

advertising and marketing code of practice (seeChapter 4), others within the alcohol industrywere critical, believing that this set a dangerousprecedent for other codes.

Criticism of the industry’s efforts

Critics of the industry acknowledged that it wasconcerned about its public image. They alsorealised that in some circumstances it wasprofitable for the industry to be sociallyresponsible. For example, by increasing theamount of food served in licensed premises, theindustry could increase profits and contribute toa reduction in alcohol problems, such asdisorder. Moreover, in certain circumstances,producer and retailers could increase profits byraising prices, which could reduce excessiveconsumption. However, the contemporarydrinks market was seen as pulling in theopposite direction. Reduced margins andincreasing numbers of outlets tended to driveprices down, increasing both consumption andalcohol problems. Given these pressures, criticsdoubted the industry’s commitment to socialresponsibility. According to one, for example:

CSR … enables the companies to dispelsuspicions, appear caring and satisfy shareholdersthat it is dealing with the long-term potentialthreats to its business such as anti-industrycampaigns and increased government regulation.(N9)

The broad sentiment from critics was thatCSR was ‘tokenism’. Some felt that the industrywas adopting a minimal approach, others saw itas an attempt to pass the blame. As onerespondent observed: ‘the trade tends to blameeveryone else for the problem. Yet it has helped

7


create the conditions for today’s problem’ (N5).Another noted that the industry had lobbiedsuccessfully for longer licensing hours inEngland and Wales, and against safeguards thatmight have reduced the potential for disorder –such as statutory controls on the number ofoutlets in areas that were already ‘saturated’(N10) and the designation of public health as alicensing objective.

Critics felt that the drinks industry could domuch more to improve the drinking culturethrough product development and marketing,in particular through the development of low-and non-alcoholic drinks. One commented that‘the drinks industry has done much to create thedrinking culture we have through its marketingactivities’ (N9). Another identified the impact ofsenior management on the cultural environmentof its employees, in particular the impact ofdemanding sales targets, noting that ‘somecompanies are very ruthless in setting salestargets for their retail managers. This createsincentives to engage in irresponsible promotionssuch as Happy Hours’ (N1). With regard to thislatter point, an exposé in The Observer inOctober 2005 uncovered:

… a ruthless campaign of economic incentivesand psychological tricks to get customers to drinkas much as possible when licensing laws arerelaxed.(Hinsliff and Asthana, 2005, pp. 1–2)

The non-industry respondents were criticalof the industry’s perspective on alcoholproblems. One said she was surprised ‘howlittle senior people in the industry understandabout alcohol problems’ (N3). Others saw this asdeliberate ignorance; in the words of one, the‘industry won’t accept the evidence’ (N9). The

body of public health evidence was seen as aparticular threat to the industry because itprovided strong arguments for control policies.

Above all, critics were concerned about theindustry’s economic and political power. Theyfelt the Government’s Alcohol Harm ReductionStrategy had been strongly influenced by theindustry. This was summed up neatly by onerespondent:

The industry proved to be very influential duringthe review of alcohol strategy. Initially, before thepoliticians really got involved, much was left tothe civil servants and an expert group. Problemsbegan when the politicians got involved. Industrylobbied them behind the scenes about theirconcerns regarding the strategy. The strategythen began to move away from the evidencebase and more aligned with the industry’sperspectives.(N11)

Conclusions

• The industry acknowledges that theproduction and sale of alcoholic drinkscarries with it important socialresponsibilities. Efforts to strengthen socialresponsibility followed adverse mediacoverage about binge drinking. Widercommitments to corporate socialresponsibility (CSR) across the businesssector were also important. The largemultinational drinks producers have played akey role in promoting CSR within the drinksindustry. These businesses have beenmotivated by the need to protect both brandand corporate reputations. Retailers were alsomotivated by a concern for reputation.

8


However, there are differences in perspectivebetween and within different sectors of theindustry, which rarely become public.

• The industry’s response to alcohol problemshas so far depended heavily on thewillingness and ability of the largercompanies to lead a diverse and dynamicindustry. In future much will depend, notonly on their continued commitment, butalso on the extension of social responsibilityacross the industry as a whole.

• Competitive pressures within the industryare strong and can operate against socialresponsibility.

• The industry is opposed to policies that seekto control overall levels of alcoholconsumption. Its critics are concerned that itcan discredit and resist effective public healthinterventions that it perceives as a threat toprofitability. They are worried about theindustry’s economic and political power, andits influence over policy. They are particularlycritical of the Portman Group, which in theirview lacks independence. Critics urge thatthe educational and regulatory functions of

the Portman Group be transferred to a bodyindependent of the industry.

• Those outside the industry acknowledge thatit has a role to play in reducing alcoholproblems. However, many are sceptical aboutthe industry’s social responsibility initiatives.Critics argue that it could do much more,especially in changing marketing practices,improving product development andshaping the drinking environment.

• Further research should include anexamination of the facilitators and barriers tosocially responsible practice within thecontemporary drinks industry. There is alsoscope for an investigation of the relationshipsbetween the different sectors of the industryon social responsibility issues, in particularbetween the on- and off-trade, and betweenthe traditional producer enterprises and ‘newentrants’. In addition, a study of the influenceof the drinks industry within the policyprocess, including its relationships withGovernment, Parliament and the media,would be timely.

9

2 The formation and implementation of

the alcohol strategy

This chapter examines the Government’sproposals to establish national and local socialresponsibility schemes for the drinks industry,and its subsequent decision to introduce alcoholdisorder zones at local level.

National social responsibility scheme

One of the key proposals in the Government’sAlcohol Harm Reduction Strategy was atripartite national social responsibility schemefor drinks producers covering: the promotion ofgood practice in product development,branding, advertising and packaging; donationsto an independent fund for alcohol projects; andpromotion of good practice down the supplychain. However, following discussions with theindustry, important changes were made. Theindependent fund proposal upset the industryand was temporarily put to one side. Theremaining elements were fed into theproduction of a single document, Social

Responsibility Standards for the Production and Sale

of Alcoholic Drinks in the UK, published inNovember 2005 (hereafter known as the‘national standards’). This represented anattempt to persuade the whole industry toexplicitly endorse key principles, standards andgood practice.

However, the industry was adamant that thenational standards would not replace existingcodes, which governed specific aspects andsectors of the industry (such as advertisingstandards, point of sale promotions in pubs andbars, marketing and packaging, nightclubvenues, the Scotch Whisky industry and so on –see Chapter 4). Arguments about how to resolve

differences between the various codes led todelays in the production of the nationalstandards document. Further delays resultedfrom the dissatisfaction by Government with thedraft document. The Home Office called forstronger and more explicit statements,particularly on issues such as under-age drinkingand drunkenness. According to industry sources,delay was also caused by differences inperspective and poor co-ordination between themain government departments involved inalcohol policy (in particular the Home Office,Department of Health and the Department forCulture, Media and Sport).

The Government heralded the nationalstandards document as a worthwhile exercise insetting ‘aspirational’ standards and achievingcollaboration between all the major industryassociations (and their member companies). Thedocument included new industry-widecommitments to sensible drinking messages,display of alcohol content, training, andcontrolled exit and dispersal from licensedpremises, while reiterating existing standardson advertising, marketing and promotion,under-age sales and serving to intoxicatedpersons. Although the industry representativeswho were interviewed were pleased with thenational standards document, they wereworried that the Government would overstateits importance. For example, one industryinsider, while welcoming the nationalstandards, warned that the document was‘incredibly complicated, unenforceable andgimmicky’ (I2). Another pointed out that ‘weare slightly unclear about what the Governmentwill be measuring the industry against’ (I12).

10


Those from outside the industry agreed thatthe development of industry-wide standardsprovided both a statement of intent and aframework for the development of goodpractice. But they expressed doubts aboutmonitoring, implementation and enforcement,noting that the document did not set cleartargets or benchmarks against which theindustry’s efforts could be judged. They werealso disappointed that the national standardsdid not promote the rationalisation or reform ofexisting sector-specific codes and therefore didnot address the problems of fragmentation,duplication, gaps and inconsistencies that arose(see Chapter 4). Concerns were also expressedabout the absence of an independent scrutinyand weak public accountability of the scheme.In addition, the national standards documentlacked key elements mentioned in the originalalcohol strategy, including means of spreadingbest practice, advising businesses that soughtaccreditation under the scheme, promoting thescheme and managing accreditation. There wasno mention of an independent board to run thescheme, as in the original proposal.

At the time of writing, discussions continueabout how to implement the national standardsand monitor the performance of the industryagainst them. Some parts of the industryalready have an internal review of performance,such as the Portman Group’s audit of its‘commitment to action agreement’, discussed inChapter 4. It is possible that this ‘self-audit’approach could be rolled out across theindustry, tailored to the specific needs of eachsector.

Meanwhile, the Government’s proposedevaluation of the national standards scheme,mentioned in the original alcohol strategy

document, has yet to be clarified and it remainsuncertain whether this will now take the form ofan external review by an independent body or‘self-evaluation’ by the industry itself. Thetiming of any evaluation is also unclear,although the alcohol strategy originallyproposed a review early in the next Parliament(i.e. the current Parliament, elected in 2005).

The independent national fund

The alcohol strategy proposed a new nationalfund, with donations from industry, to financeprojects to tackle alcohol-related harm. It wasenvisaged that this fund would be administeredby an independent board with representativesfrom Government, industry, the voluntarysector, the health service and the community.This worried the industry, not least theindustry-funded Portman Group (see Chapter1). Some respondents argued that theestablishment of a national fund would, ineffect, nationalise the Portman Group. Otherssaid that it would undermine or duplicate itsefforts (and possibly other bodies, such as theAlcohol Education and Research Council –AERC – discussed in Chapter 3). Industryinsiders argued that an independent fund wasunnecessary because – in their eyes – thePortman Group was already sufficientlyindependent. The industry viewed theGovernment’s response as a rather underhandway of increasing its contribution to socialresponsibility projects. According to onerespondent, the industry ‘was implacablyopposed’ to the proposal and had told theGovernment that, if it wanted a national fund, itwould have to legislate.

Those outside the industry endorsed an

11

The formation and implementation of the alcohol strategy

independent national fund to replace thePortman Group. They argued that the industryshould not participate in the allocation of fundsto projects. However, some agreed that theindustry should be included in advisorystructures along with other stakeholders. Thiswould enable it to contribute to debates aboutpriorities, but not dictate them. The keyproblem identified by non-industry respondentswas how to separate the raising of funds fromtheir allocation. Suggestions included a ‘blindlevy’ on drinks companies, or an additional taxon alcohol, channelled through an independentbody.

The Government decided against a new non-departmental body to administer theindependent fund. (To have done so wouldhave been at odds with its policy of reducingthe number of ‘arm’s-length’ public bodies.)Instead, it backed a proposal from the industryto separate the Portman Group’s regulatory andeducational roles. It was proposed that the latterwould be transferred to a new trust based onthe Portman Group’s charitable arm, theDrinkaware Trust (see Chapter 3). Followingmonths of deliberation between Government,the industry and other stakeholders (includingalcohol agencies and health professionals), amemorandum of understanding was agreed inJune 2006. This established a new trust (whichfor the time being will retain the ‘Drinkaware’name). The trust will be run by 13 trustees (fivefrom industry, five non-industry alcoholstakeholders, two lay people with noprofessional interest in alcohol and anindependent chair). These will be appointed bya panel consisting of government, industry andnon-industry representatives. The trust will befunded by industry, initially from Portman

Group member companies but with acommitment to encourage the wider industry toinvest in the fund. According to industryinsiders, suggestions for a turnover-based levyon all drinks producers and retailers werevetoed, largely because of opposition from theretail trade, particularly the large supermarkets.The Drinkaware Trust will be formallyseparated from the Portman Group and willhave a new chief executive, though it mayemploy current Drinkaware Trust staff, subjectto a review of staffing needs. The trust wasgiven three key objectives: to increase awarenessof safe and responsible drinking, and the impactof alcohol misuse on society and individuals; toimprove attitudes towards safe and responsibledrinking and the unacceptability of bingedrinking; and to effect positive changes inbehaviour related to alcohol consumption. Thetrust’s performance against these objectives willbe independently audited within three years ofits creation. A number of principlesunderpinning the trust’s work were also set outin the memorandum of agreement, includingthat the trust should act in the interests of thepublic and undertake programmes that areevidence-based.

Local schemes

The Government’s Alcohol Harm ReductionStrategy proposed a code of good practice forretailers, along with local funds to combatalcohol misuse. It was intended that local codeswould be shaped by a national frameworkdrawn up by the industry and Government,which would include commitments to: tackleunder-age drinking and set out proof of agerequirements; impose guidelines on

12


irresponsible promotions; encourage the displayof sensible drinking messages; and outlineminimum staff training requirements.

In the event, separate codes were devised byon- and off-licence retail sectors. Retail issueswere also incorporated in the national standardsdocument mentioned earlier. The nationalstandards document does not, however, giveany indication about how these elements will beimplemented at local level. This is in contrast tothe proposals in the alcohol strategy, whichsuggested that a form of accreditation would beintroduced and that adherence to local codeswould be taken into account when officialcomplaints were made against particularpremises. Accreditation, it appears, has beendiscarded as a means of recognising goodpractice (see Social Market Foundation, 2006).The alcohol strategy also stated that take-up ofthe code at local level would be assessed as partof the proposed review of the socialresponsibility scheme. So far there has been noindication of when, or how, this will be done.

The alcohol strategy also proposed financialcontributions from the industry towardsmanaging crime and disorder, subject to aconsultation process. The idea was that theindustry would pay into a local fund, collectedand managed by local authorities. Crime andDisorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) andlocal communities would then decide how thefunds would be used to tackle alcohol problems.This might include additional communitysupport officers or late-night transport services.This aspect of the policy shifted considerablyduring 2005 in the face of opposition by retailersto new local funds (Social Market Foundation,2006, p. 10) and the Government’s proposals foralcohol disorder zones.

Alcohol disorder zones

Further concern about binge drinking andalcohol-related crime and disorder led theGovernment to issue a new consultation paper(DCMS et al., 2005) containing plans for alcoholdisorder zones (ADZs), alongside more powersfor police to tackle under-age drinking anddisorderly premises. Legislation was broughtforward during 2005 in the form of the ViolentCrime Reduction Bill, which at the time ofwriting is completing its final parliamentarystages.

ADZs were proposed as a means by whichlocal authorities and the police could promoteaction on alcohol problems, such as nuisance ordisorder. Licensed premises in problem areaswill have eight weeks to implement an actionplan prepared by the local authority and chief ofpolice. Failure to comply will lead to thedesignation of an ADZ, which will forcelicensed premises to contribute financially to thecost of managing and reducing the area’salcohol-related problems.

The drinks industry respondents in thisstudy were scathing about ADZs, onedescribing the idea as ‘wacky and crass’ (I4) andanother as ‘upside down, back to front andwrong-headed’ (I8). They believed that ADZsheralded a more adversarial and confrontationalapproach by the Government, and argued thatthe policy was unfair to well-managedpremises. Critics maintained that ADZs failed totake into account that the causes of alcoholmisuse might lie outside the designated zone –for example, excessive drinking could take placeat home or in other establishments prior to anydisorder. They also argued such zones couldstigmatise the designated areas and mightactually make disorder worse by attracting

13

The formation and implementation of the alcohol strategy

hooligan elements. Furthermore, the zonescould have adverse effects on businesses in thearea by discouraging well-behaved customers. Itwas argued that ADZs could remove theincentive for businesses to undertake voluntary,partnership and self-regulatory activities toreduce alcohol problems. Finally, criticsmaintained that there was no clear relationshipbetween resources raised and spending onalcohol-related initiatives because the fundswere not ring-fenced.

Some non-industry respondents shared theseconcerns, notably with regard to possible stigmaassociated with ADZs, the failure to ring-fencefunds and unfairness to well-managed outlets.In addition, there were fears that the proposalsmight be unworkable or could be vulnerable tolegal challenge both in relation to practice (onthe grounds for designation, for example) andon principle (enforced contributions frompremises not promoting disorder). The lack ofdetail about how the scheme would actuallywork in practice was heavily criticised. Thebroad sentiment expressed by these respondentswas that the ADZ proposals were ‘a stopgap’(N5) or a ‘piecemeal intervention’ (N3), whichwould do little to prevent alcohol problems.

From the Government’s perspective, thispolicy reflected a manifesto commitment onalcohol-related disorder and violence (LabourParty, 2005), which arose both from sustainedmedia pressure on the binge drinking issue andfrom the reluctance of the industry to contributeto the local funds identified in the AlcoholHarm Reduction Strategy. Ministers alsoclaimed that ADZs would be used only as a lastresort, where voluntary co-operation with theindustry was not forthcoming.

Conclusions

• The Government’s initial proposals changedconsiderably following discussions with theindustry. At national level, a new industry-wide social responsibility standardsdocument was produced. Although this setout key principles, standards and goodpractice, it did not supersede existing codes.It was not accompanied by new mechanismsfor monitoring, implementation andaccreditation. The standards document alsofailed to address some of the acknowledgedweaknesses of self-regulation in this field,such as fragmentation, duplication, gaps andinconsistencies between existing codescovering different sectors and aspects of theindustry. Furthermore, it did not set out waysof strengthening enforcement, extendingindependent input into self-regulation orimproving public accountability.

• The industry strongly opposed proposals tocreate new independent funds at local andnational level for tackling alcohol problems.At national level, a compromise was reached,which led to the reform of an existingindustry trust (the Drinkaware Trust) to giveit greater independence. At local level,Government sought new statutory powersfor the police and local authorities to compelthe alcohol retailers to contribute to localinitiatives, in the form of ADZs, which werestrongly opposed by the industry.

• Further research must include anindependent evaluation of the impact of thenational standards, the new DrinkawareTrust and, when implemented, ADZs.

14

There are many possible ways of preventingalcohol problems. For reasons explored in theprevious chapter, the drink industry favoursthose that focus on individuals or groups ofpeople, rather than population-wideapproaches. It also prefers interventions thatseek to educate or inform people about alcoholproblems rather than restrictions on theindustry or its customers. Education (includingthe provision of public information) and certainresearch activities tend to score highly on bothcriteria and are therefore strongly favoured bythe industry. This chapter examines theinvolvement of industry in sponsoring activitiesin education and research, and considers theviews of those critical of the industry’s role inthese areas.

Education

During the late 1970s, heightened concern aboutalcohol problems in general, and drink-drivingand under-age drinking in particular, led theindustry to extend its efforts to educate andinform the public. Although individualcompanies and trade associations hadpreviously undertaken public informationcampaigns – on drink-driving, for example – theindustry began to engage in a more collectiveeffort. A number of high-profile industryprojects were subsequently launched, includingthe ‘Wheelwatch’ and ‘Agewatch’ campaigns,aimed at drink-driving and under-age drinkingrespectively.

In the 1990s, many of the industry’seducational initiatives were taken up andextended by the Portman Group, which

undertook a range of activities including the ‘I’llbe Des’ campaign, aimed at deterring drinkingand driving, and the provision of educationalmaterials for use in schools and colleges.Meanwhile, individual companies continued tosponsor educational activities and in some casesran their own information campaigns. Morerecently, companies have included educationmessages in their own sponsorship andadvertising (see below).

Although drink-driving and under-agedrinking remain important areas of activity, theindustry has moved beyond these to addressissues of drunkenness and binge drinking.Examples include the Portman Group’s ‘Don’tdo drunk’ campaign (launched in 2001) and,more recently, the Diageo TV advertisements(‘Many me’ and ‘Mirror’, screened fromFebruary 2006). Other initiatives to disseminateinformation on responsible drinking includeactivities under the aegis of the DrinkawareTrust (the Portman Group’s charitable arm,which is currently in the process of beingrestructured as a semi-independent body – seeChapter 2). These include: the Drinkaware.co.ukwebsite, which carries information onresponsible drinking; various educationalmaterials for parents and schools; and otherresources including ‘unit calculators’, whichenable people to estimate the number of units ofalcohol consumed from a range of standarddrinks.

Notwithstanding these variousdevelopments, there remains much scepticismabout the industry’s motives and activities. Onenon-industry interviewee in this study arguedthat the Portman Group’s activities were ‘one-

3 Industry initiatives in education and

research

15

Industry initiatives in education and research

off initiatives that lacked overall coherence’(N3). Other respondents expressed fears aboutthe industry controlling funds for educationcampaigns, particularly with regard to school-based education. Indeed, among those in thepublic health arena, there is an underlyingscepticism about the impact of educationalinterventions on alcohol problems. Education isseen as part of the armoury of policyinstruments that can, in conjunction with others,reduce harm, but is regarded as relativelyineffective on its own (see Babor et al., 2003).

The alcohol strategy includes a commitmentto work with industry to include sensibledrinking messages on products alongsideinformation about unit content. The PortmanGroup has encouraged member companies tosupport the principle of unit labelling and to useconsumer brand advertising or sponsoredevents to promote responsibility messages. Unitlabelling on alcohol products and packaging isnow widespread. In addition, drinks companiesand retailers are placing messages on theirproducts, including the official ‘sensibledrinking’ guidelines of a maximum three to fourunits per day for men and two to three units forwomen, as well as ‘warning messages’ such as‘enjoy your alcohol responsibly’, ‘drink inmoderation’, ‘excessive drinking can causeharm’ or ‘don’t drink and drive’. Sensibledrinking messages are also appearing onadvertising and promotion materials (forexample, TV, press and cinema advertisements)and at sponsored events. For example, drinkscompany sponsorship of the Ashes in 2006 andthe British Grand Prix was accompanied byresponsible drinking and anti-drink-drivingmessages. Sensible drinking messages are alsofound at point of sale; Waitrose, for example,

displays sensible drinking limits on its shelves.More generally, products and marketingmaterials increasingly carry references to theDrinkaware.co.uk website.

Some non-industry respondents weresceptical about unit labelling and sensibledrinking messages on products and inmarketing. Even an industry source admittedthat ‘health warnings don’t really do any good’(I7). There is little evidence to suggest that suchmessages alone have an impact on drinkingbehaviour (see Andrews, 1995; Grube andNygaard, 2001; Agostinelli and Grube, 2002).Also, the reliance on self-regulation means thatthe messages will probably remain fairly weak.Stronger warnings will probably require directintervention, as the industry is opposed toplacing ‘official warnings’ on their products andin their marketing.

Research

The drinks industry has a long history offunding research into alcohol problems. By thelate 1980s, it estimated that it spent around£0.5m per annum on research. Also, itsupported the establishment of the AlcoholEducation and Research Council (AERC) in1981, which still exists today. This organisationallocates grants for research and for thedevelopment of capacity (of people andorganisations) to address alcohol issues. Itsbudget is derived from capital raised from anobsolete drinks industry compensation fund(see Baggott, 1990).

In the 20 or so years after its creation, theAERC avoided controversy. Despite widerconcerns about industry involvement inresearch (see below), the fact that the AERC

16


administered funds derived from the industry,and had a ruling council that contained industrynominees, attracted little attention. However,the appointment of Jean Coussins, then thePortman Group’s chief executive, to the board ofAERC produced a strong reaction from seniorfigures in the alcohol research community (seeEdwards et al., 2004), who argued that this gavethe industry undue influence over researchpriorities and decisions. In their view, thePortman Group had:

… consistently propagated interpretations of theresearch evidence that promote the commercialinterests of the drinks industry while seeking todiscredit research findings that would lead toeffective policy measures supporting theinterests of public health.(Edwards et al., 2004; see also Mayor, 2004)

Coussins (2004) vigorously denied that thePortman Group was a lobbyist for the industryand argued that it was perfectly legitimate forher to take up the appointment.

In the face of this controversy, DCMS (theDepartment for Culture, Media and Sport,which currently has overall responsibility forAERC) commissioned a review, which found noimpropriety in Coussins’ appointment (DCMS,2006). However, the review did recommendpossible options for future engagement withindustry, which included a continuation of thepractice of nominated members, subject tojudgements about suitability, and theestablishment of formal methods of consultingwith the industry. The review alsorecommended that the ruling council be smallerand appointed by the relevant sponsoringdepartment (which should in future be theDepartment of Health rather than DCMS) in

accordance with the OCPA (Office of theCommissioner for Public Appointments) rules.Furthermore, it recommended that the AERCconsider external validation for themanagement of future conflicts of interest.

Meanwhile, the industry continues to fundresearch through other channels. For example,the BBPA has earmarked £6 million for medicaland scientific research. Drinks companies andtrade bodies also allocate money to researchbodies, such as the European Research AdvisoryBoard (ERAB), which distributes funds forbiomedical and psychosocial research into beeror alcohol. This body is administered by aboard, which includes drink industry personnel.Grant applications are independently externallypeer reviewed, and overseen by an advisoryboard of doctors and academics.

Interviewees from the industry were proudof their involvement with various researchinitiatives. Their enthusiasm was not matchedby non-industry observers, several of whomexpressed concern that industry funding couldfacilitate the manipulation of research agendasand project findings. According to one, forexample, ‘the drinks industry is always seekingto use and manipulate. Academics must be ontheir guard’ (N7). The same respondentrevealed that a senior executive from a drinkscompany had once tried to persuade him topublicly endorse the industry’s perspective onalcohol problems, offering in return a largedonation to a charity of his choice. In thiscontext, it should be remembered that, over adecade ago, a number of academics wereallegedly offered £2,000 each by the industry tocriticise a report that had called for a stronger‘public health’ approach to alcohol problems(Doyle, 1994, p. 1).

17

Industry initiatives in education and research

These may be extreme cases, but they dohighlight the need for clearer rules ofengagement. In an effort to clarify the industry’srelationship with researchers, various principlesof co-operation on alcohol research amongindustry, Government and the scientific andacademic communities have been set out. Theseare part of the ‘Dublin Principles’ established ata meeting of scientists, researchers and industryrepresentatives under the auspices of theNational College of Ireland (1997) and theindustry-funded International Center forAlcohol Policies (ICAP – see Chapter 2). Theseprinciples include: a commitment toindependent scientific research; high ethicalstandards in the conduct and reporting ofresearch, irrespective of the source of funding;avoidance of arrangements that compromise theintegrity and freedom of inquiry of researchers;disclosure by researchers of conflict of interestsand sources of funding; and free disseminationof results (subject to reasonable ethicalrestrictions and commercial confidentiality).

These principles seem reasonable, thoughthey need to be more widely owned. They arealso very general and as such are open to wideinterpretation. A step forward from theseprinciples would be to establish clear criteria forresearch governance in alcohol, to protectresearchers from any allegations of undueinfluence over research agendas and findings,especially where funding is derived fromindustry sources.

Conclusions

• The drinks industry has supportededucational projects in the alcohol field.Critics believe that, although education canform a useful part of a broader strategy, it isrelatively ineffective on its own. Somerespondents were very critical of theindustry’s role in education and argued thatit could do more to promote responsibledrinking.

• The industry has also supported alcoholresearch. Critics are concerned about thepossible manipulation of research agendasand project findings by the industry. Theypointed out that research, particularly whenfunded by the industry, must be governed ina way that explicitly protects theindependence of researchers. It would appearthat clearer criteria for research governance inthe alcohol field are needed.

• Further research should include studies ofthe impact of alcohol education campaigns,including those that are part of a broaderprogramme of action on alcohol problems.This evidence must be used to inform futurecampaigns. Also, an investigation of differentmodels of research governance in the alcoholfield is needed to provide a basis for clearercriteria for future research, including thatfunded by the industry, government andnon-governmental organisations.

18

The Government and the drinks industry haveplaced great emphasis on self-regulation as ameans of promoting social responsibility andpreventing alcohol-related harm. This chapterexplores the various codes of practice and self-regulatory activities within the alcohol industryand assesses their advantages and limitations.

What is self-regulation?

Self-regulation has been defined as:

… the means by which members of a profession,trade, or commercial activity are bound by amutually agreed set of rules that govern theirrelationship with the citizen, client or customer.Such rules may be accepted voluntarily or may becompulsory. They will normally include aprocedure for resolving complaints and for theapplication of sanctions against those whoinfringe the rules.(Better Regulation Task Force, 1999)

Self-regulation is best seen as a family ofregulatory instruments (National ConsumerCouncil, 2000). It can take the form ofindependent action by individual organisations– such as companies – to set internal standardsof conduct. Alternatively, it may be driven by anindependent collective body, such as a tradeassociation. Self-regulation can also beembodied in formal codes of practice negotiatedbetween Government and the representatives ofa particular sector.

The UK has a long tradition of self-regulation associated with its informal ‘club’style of governance (Baggott, 1989; Moran,2003). However, many self-regulatory activitiesare now quite formal and subject to greater state

involvement. Indeed, many contemporary self-regulatory systems are best described as ‘co-regulation’ (Grabosky and Braithwaite, 1986).Government is closely involved in monitoringself-regulation and may possess reservestatutory powers, either to prevent certainactivities or compel action, including redress.Moreover, according to Levi-Faur and Gilad(2004, p. 19), self-regulation acts as a tool ofpublic control, by internalising social norms andresponding to public pressures and demands.Efforts to improve responsiveness andaccountability include regular public reports onthe conduct of self-regulatory systems and theinvolvement of independent experts or laypeople on self-regulatory bodies.

Given the variety of self-regulatory systems,it is difficult to comment on their overalleffectiveness. Nonetheless, one can identify‘theoretical’ advantages and drawbacks of self-regulation compared with direct stateregulation. The main advantages are as follows.

1 Self-regulation harnesses the ‘inside’knowledge and expertise of those who arebeing regulated.

2 It is based on consensus and is likely to leadto higher compliance.

3 The spirit as well as the letter of regulation ismore likely to be upheld.

4 It is less costly to Government and may beless costly to those being regulated.

5 It is more flexible and therefore more able torespond quickly to new and changingcircumstances.

4 Self-regulation

19

Self-regulation

These are balanced by disadvantages.

1 Self-regulation tends to be complacent andrules may be unenforced or under-enforced.

2 It lacks legitimacy and attracts suspicion thatself-regulatory bodies are concernedprimarily with protecting their members’interests.

3 Few real sanctions can be applied, as self-regulatory bodies have limited powers toensure compliance.

4 Self-regulatory bodies cannot control theactivities of non-members (unless there is anexternally enforced system of compulsorymembership or licensing).

5 Self-regulatory bodies often have conflicts ofinterest. For example, the exclusion of amember may lead to loss of revenue. Self-regulatory bodies that also have arepresentative role (such as tradeassociations, for example) experience internaltensions that undermine their regulatory role.

6 Self-regulation is not as publicly accountableas state regulation.

7 Self-regulation can be costly, placing aconsiderable burden on the industry (orprofession) and also on Government,particularly where there is a ‘co-regulation’element.

In the past, debates about self-regulationhave been polarised, with critics seeing it as asoft option. More recently, it has beenacknowledged that self-regulation can beeffective, providing that key principles areupheld. According to the National ConsumerCouncil (2005), for example, self-regulatory

systems should have the following features:

1 clear objectives

2 ingredients of regulation (rules/monitoring/enforcement/redress)

3 wide consultation about design andoperation

4 a dedicated structure (separate from theindustry) to engender public confidence

5 independent representation (majority ofmembers of regulatory body should beindependent including, ideally, the chair)

6 monitoring of compliance

7 public accountability (through an annualreport, for example)

8 good publicity about the scheme

9 adequate resources

10 a well-publicised complaints procedure

11 effective sanctions

12 performance indicators

13 regular reviews of the self-regulatorysystem.

Turning specifically to the drinks industry,self-regulation covers many areas of socialresponsibility, such as the advertising,marketing and promotion of alcohol products,and standards of retailing in the licensed trade.Some self-regulatory practices are formalised incodes and are enforced by collectiveorganisations, while others remain informal.Figure 1 shows the variety of self-regulatorysystems that operate in this field.

20


Advertising standards

Alcohol advertising is covered by national codesfor broadcast and non-broadcast media,respectively. For non-broadcast media (press,magazines, direct mail, posters and cinema), thecode is drawn up by the Advertising StandardsAuthority’s (ASA’s) Committee of AdvertisingPractice (CAP), whose members are drawn fromthe advertising industry. Following recentchanges to media regulation, ASA now also hasresponsibility for the broadcast advertisingcodes (drawn up by a Broadcast Committee ofAdvertising Practice – BCAP) on behalf of thegovernment regulator, OFCOM, whichapproves the codes for TV and radio, and haspowers to intervene if it believes the regulatory

system is not working effectively. ASA’s work isfunded by independent boards of finance,which levy the advertising industry. The ASACouncil – which has a two-thirds majority of laymembers (including Jean Coussins, the formerchief executive of the Portman Group) –adjudicates complaints about breaches of thecode through separate panels for broadcastingand non-broadcast media. ASA also offersadvice and guidance on interpretation of thecodes and monitors the media for possiblebreaches.

Those who breach the non-broadcast codeface several possible sanctions. ASA judgementsare made public and this may reflect badly onthe advertiser. In addition, ASA may advise thatadvertising space or other services are withheld

Figure 1 Self-regulation in the alcoholic drinks industry

Advertising Standards Authority• British Code of Advertising, Sales

Promotion and Direct Marketing• Television Advertising Standards Code*• Radio Advertising Standards Code*

National standardsSocial responsibility standards forthe production and sale ofalcoholic drinks

Company codes and policiesFor example: Diageo marketingcode, Mitchells & Butlers’ alcoholand social responsibility policy

Portman Group• Code of Practice on Naming, Packaging and

Promotion of Alcoholic Drinks• Commitment to Action agreement• Guidance on Unit Labelling• Guidance on Retail Sales Promotions

Trade associations• For example: British Beer and Pub Association

Code on Point of Sale Promotions• Scotch Whisky Association Code of Practice

for Responsible Marketing of Scotch Whisky• British Institute of Innkeeping Code of Practice• Bar Entertainment and Dance Association

Dispersal Policy• Responsible retailing of alcohol: guidance

for the off-trade

*Subject to OFCOM approval.

21

Self-regulation

from non-compliant advertisers. It is alsopossible that non-compliant advertisers couldlose trade association privileges or be expelledfrom membership. Advertisers that persistentlybreak the rules may have their marketingcommunications vetted. Moreover, those thathave complaints upheld on their posteradvertisements may be required to submitfuture copy for pre-clearance, a schemeimplemented with the co-operation of theOutdoor Advertising Association. Point of saleadvertising is not covered by ASA’s rules unlessassociated with a specific sales promotion.Although internet advertising is within itsremit, website content is excluded. Cinemaadvertising is covered by ASA’s non-broadcastcode and subject to pre-clearance by the CinemaAdvertising Association and the British Board ofFilm Classification. For broadcasters,compliance with ASA is a licence requirementand failure to comply risks intervention fromOFCOM. All broadcast advertisements aresubject to pre-clearance (by radio and TVclearing centres, separate from ASA).

The rules on alcohol advertising in broadcastand non-broadcast media have beenstrengthened over the years. The current ruleson television advertising require that‘advertisements for alcoholic drinks must not belikely to appeal strongly to people under 18, inparticular by reflecting or being associated withyouth culture’. In addition, new rules wereintroduced on associations of alcoholic drinkswith sexual activity, daring, toughness,aggression or anti-social behaviour, and withhandling and serving of drinks. The non-broadcast rules were revised along similar lines,though with different wording. For example,ASA’s non-broadcast code rules now state that:

… marketing communications should not beassociated with people under 18 or reflect theirculture. They should not feature or portray real orfictitious characters who are likely to appealparticularly to people under 18 in a way that mightencourage them to drink.

And that:

… marketing communications should not bedirected at people under 18 through the selectionof media, style of presentation, content orcontext in which they appear.

And specifies that:

… no medium should be used to advertisealcoholic drinks if more than 25 per cent of itsaudience is under 18 years of age.

Alcoholic drink is a heavily advertisedproduct. In 2004, over £180 million was spent onmain media advertising, excluding sponsorshipand internet marketing (Key Note, 2005). In thesame year, complaints about alcohol advertisingrepresented around 1 per cent of total complaintsresolved by ASA. It has upheld complaintsagainst several drinks companies in recent years,including some members of the Portman Group.

Industry respondents were satisfied with thenew advertising rules and the expanded role ofASA into broadcast advertising. For example,one commented that the industry ‘was broadlyhappy with the new codes’ (I8). Another statedthat ‘the new advertising rules are robust andmust be given time to work’ (I7). On the otherhand, non-industry respondents were morecritical of the self-regulatory approach to alcoholpromotion in general, rather than of ASA inparticular, and their concerns are discussed inmore detail later.

22


The Portman Group code

The Portman Group (2003) has its own code ofpractice on naming, packaging and promotionof alcoholic drinks. This was initially introducedin 1996 to stave off a ban on alcopops. Thecurrent version of this code covers sponsorship,sampling, websites, advertorials (anadvertisement designed to simulate editorialcontent), branded merchandise and pressreleases, and includes the naming andpackaging of products within its remit. It coverspoint-of-sale activities and materials generatedby UK producers and distributors, but excludeswholesaler- and retailer-led promotions (exceptwhen these promote own-brand products).Previous editions of the Portman code coveredmerchandising of alcoholic drinks. Retailerpromotions are now covered by the BBPA code(for pubs and bars) and a new code of practicefor off-licensed premises (both of which arediscussed below).

The Portman code covers similar‘associations’ as the ASA codes. For example, itstates that naming, packaging and promotionalmaterial should not be associated with bravado;with violent, aggressive or anti-socialbehaviour; with drugs; with social or sexualsuccess; or with illegal, immoderate orirresponsible consumption. In addition, suchmaterial must not ‘have a particular appeal tounder 18s’. In a similar way to ASA, thePortman Group provides an advisory service tocompanies developing new products andcampaigns before they reach the market, whichreceives around 150–200 queries a year.Enforcement of the Portman code relies oncomplaints, which are investigated by anindependent panel. This comprises individualswith no connection to the Portman Group or its

member companies and is chaired by a formerCommissioner of the Metropolitan Police.

Complaints to the Portman Group, whichpeaked at 38 in 1997, have been in the range often to 20 per annum in recent years. In 2004, thepanel upheld ten complaints (out of 11). Productsand promotions found in breach of the code arefollowed up by the Portman Group, which mayrequest modification or withdrawal. It claims ahigh level of compliance, with a third of productsbeing withdrawn and over 40 per cent modifiedas a result of adverse judgements. However, in afifth of cases where complaints were upheld,compliance was either not achieved or unknown.The Portman Group can issue alerts requestingretailers not to reorder stocks until a decision hasbeen complied with, though existing stock maycontinue to be sold. One industry informantcommented that proposals to force retailers totake stocks off the shelves and compensate themaccordingly had been rejected (I5).

The Portman Group stated that failure byretailers to comply with such alerts could leadto relevant licensing authorities and/or tradingstandards bodies being informed. Although itscode has been recommended by the Secretary ofState for Culture, Media and Sport for inclusionin local statements of licensing policy, it isunclear how and to what extent breaches of thecode are actually followed up by theseauthorities (to ensure compliance with the codefor example). At present, licensing authoritieshave no powers to promote compliance with thePortman code or its retail alerts. Indeed, theextent of licensee compliance with alerts isunknown. Similarly, nothing is known about theextent to which non-compliant licensees arereferred to the authorities or the consequencesof such referrals.

23

Self-regulation

As noted earlier, previous versions of thePortman code covered merchandising. The codestill covers producer-led retail promotions andthe promotion of own-label products byretailers. The Portman Group has issuedadditional guidance on avoiding immoderateconsumption in such promotions. Among otherthings, this guidance suggests spreadingpromotions over longer periods to avoid short-term excessive consumption (for example, byissuing proof of purchase coupons, which canthen be redeemed at the end of the period of theoffer).

Interviewees from the industry were highlysupportive of the Portman Group code and itsadvisory service. They argued that the codediscouraged bad practice and was particularlyeffective in dealing with promotional materialsthat associated alcohol with sexual themes.Organisations representing the retail sector saidthey believed that the retail alerts were effective,especially with larger businesses, but thatsmaller operators were more difficult to reach.While acknowledging the importance of alerts,most retail associations did not see themselvesas having a role in enforcing them, though somesaid that they notified breaches to the PortmanGroup. Industry respondents firmly rebuttedthe idea that the Portman Group was soft on theindustry and pointed out that complaints hadbeen upheld against companies that actuallyfunded it.

Non-industry respondents took a morecritical view. Although the Portman codeaddressed important areas of alcohol marketingand promotion not covered by ASA, therespondents believed that the Portman Grouplacked the independence to undertake such animportant regulatory role. Others said the

regime lacked effective sanctions. Indeed, onerespondent from local government said thatcouncils could do little to prevent a retailer fromstocking a ‘banned’ product unless itsassociation with a particular problem could beproved. Some non-industry respondentsacknowledged that producers seeking notorietyas a means of gaining access to youth marketscould get considerable short-term publicity bybreaching the code. This was denied by industryrespondents, including the Portman Groupitself. Even so, the precise impact of adversejudgements was not clear and merits furtherinvestigation.

Trade association codes

Trade associations have their own codes. Forexample, the Scotch Whisky Association has acode on responsible marketing, which coversinternet promotions and sponsorship, as well asadvertising. Uniquely within the industry, itprovides for financial penalties for breachingthe code (‘up to £10,000’) and expulsion in thecase of a company failing to take remedialaction. Members are expected to appoint asenior director in the company to regulatecompliance. Furthermore, although the SWAcode is complaints-led, with cases initiallyconsidered by a complaints committee of theAssociation, there is an independent panel, towhich member companies and the public canappeal, which is chaired by the director ofScotland’s national alcohol charity, AlcoholFocus Scotland.

The BBPA, meanwhile, has a code on drinkspromotions at the point of sale. Initially, thistook the form of a Good Practice Guide for pubowners and licensees, warning of adverse

24


consequences associated with some salespromotions (BBPA, 2001). This was later revisedas Point of Sale Promotions: Standards for the

Management of Responsible Drinks Promotions,

including Happy Hours (BBPA, 2005). The latterwas more explicit in setting out principles andstandards with regard to preventing alcoholmisuse and anti-social behaviour. It alsoidentified irresponsible promotions, includingdrinking games, free drinks, entry fees withunlimited amounts of drinks and rewardsschemes that are only redeemable over shortperiods. The new scheme was publicised as aban on ‘happy hours’ and other sociallyirresponsible promotions. Because the BBPArepresents the major brewers and over half thepubs in the UK, it argued that compliancewould be high. In interview, industryrespondents endorsed the new code and statedthat it was the best that could be achieved in thecurrent circumstances.

Non-industry respondents broadlywelcomed the BBPA code, but several expresseddoubts about enforcement, particularly giventhe substantial minority of pubs that were notmembers of the BBPA. Others identified strongcommercial pressures and managerialimperatives within the industry, which createdincentives for licensees to engage inirresponsible promotions, notwithstanding thecode. Some argued that the code was not ascomprehensive as claimed and that it did notactually ban happy hours, or indeed any otherpractices, but attempted to improve themanagement of point of sale promotions.

The BBPA has stated that it will act on anycomplaint about breaches of its code and willpursue matters with the company concerned,which is then responsible for dealing with the

licensee. Ultimately, the latter could be in breachof their contract as an employee or tenant.However, this is uncertain legal territory – muchdepends on the extent to which the licensee isadjudged to be putting the premises’ licence injeopardy. Moreover, the licensee would have astrong defence if they could prove that theiractivities were in response to a competitivecommercial environment or a managementdirective to increase sales.

As noted by some non-industry respondents,many licensees are outside the jurisdiction ofthe BBPA and its member companies. Industryinsiders acknowledged that this could make thecode difficult to enforce, though they, alongwith some non-industry respondents, believedthat, if licensing authorities used the code as abenchmark for good practice when approvingor revoking licences, its impact could bestrengthened. They pointed out that the codewas mentioned as ‘good practice’ in guidance tothe Licensing Act (DCMS, 2004), though this isregarded as a fairly weak legal foundation.

Industry respondents were reluctant to playan enforcement role in this area. Even those thatsupported minimum pricing rules as a means ofpreventing irresponsible promotions noted thatcompetition law could restrict the ability ofregulators and the industry to take action. Forexample, a voluntary collective ban on happyhours or an agreement on minimum prices isopen to challenge as an anti-competitivepractice. However individual companies can setminimum prices, providing that they do notcollude with others in so doing.

The legal position on discounted prices ismore complex where local licensing bodies areinvolved. In England, these authorities mayencourage voluntary codes, such as the BBPA

25

Self-regulation

code. They may also attach conditions regardingirresponsible promotions to a premises licence,where there is clear evidence that this willpromote consistency with the licensingobjectives. The imposition of such conditionscould, however, be challenged in the courts (seeKolvin, 2005, p. 509). Licensing authorities havealso been warned against adopting policies onminimum prices and drinks promotions becauseof fears of legal challenge (DCMS, 2004). Evenso, pricing conditions are permitted within bothEuropean and domestic law, providing that theyare unilaterally imposed by public authoritiesand compulsory (Kolvin, 2005, p. 511).Nonetheless, they may provoke legal challengesunder competition law, deterring licensingauthorities from pursuing such a policy. It is inthis rather confusing context that the HomeAffairs Committee (2005, p. 108) called forstronger guidance from Government onirresponsible promotions and clarification bythe Office of Fair Trading on the legality of localminimum pricing policies. This is an importantissue in other jurisdictions. Recently, in Victoria,Australia, an inquiry into alcohol policyrecommended that national competition laws bereviewed to ensure that they did not impedealcohol strategies (Victoria Parliament Drugsand Crime Prevention Committee, 2006).

In Scotland, short-term discounted pricepromotions and other irresponsible promotionswill be prohibited by statute when schedule 4 ofthe Licensing Scotland Act 2005 comes intoforce, while the Irish Republic already has legalprovisions preventing licensees from reducingprices for any limited period during the day. Asa footnote to this, one should be aware thatprevious efforts to set minimum prices havebeen challenged, not by consumers or ‘rogue

landlords’, but by some of the leading pubcos.Although the industry is genuinely concernedabout adverse publicity associated with happyhours and other discounted drinks promotions,it nonetheless wishes to retain the commercialfreedom to set prices and promote its products.

The off-licence retailers also have codes ofpractice that mention alcohol promotions. Theseform part of wider policies on socialresponsibility, and include issues such as under-age sales and staff training, which are discussedfurther below (see Association of ConvenienceStores et al., 2004).

Corporate codes

Most of the larger producer companies haveinternal codes of practice on the promotion andmarketing of alcohol. For example, Diageo’smarketing code sets out key principlesincluding ‘compliance with laws andregulations’, ‘not targeting under-age drinkers’and the ‘depiction of responsible drinking’, aswell as provisions on abstinence, offensiveadvertising, alcohol content, medicinal ortherapeutic value, drinking and driving, socialand sexual success, anti-social activities andpromotional activities in the retail sector. Staffare also issued with guidelines to accompanythe code. The code and the guidelines apply toall stages of the marketing process, includingproduct innovation. At various stages in theproduct development and marketing processthere is an opportunity to identify concernsthrough a traffic-light system. Hence a red lightwill halt the project until the issue is resolvedand may result in it being referred back to theprevious stage in the process. An orange ratingwill lead to a review of the particular aspect

26


causing concern, which must be addressed bythe next stage. Ultimately, at least two peopleincluding the project leader will sign off theproject, stating that it is code-compliant. Thecode also applies to agencies undertaking workon behalf of the company and covers internetpromotions as well. In addition, staff in relevantareas including marketing, innovation, marketresearch and promotion receive inductiontraining and are offered refresher courses atleast every 18 months.

Other major producer companies havereviewed their codes in recent years and havemoved in the same direction. Industryrespondents spoke of considerable peerpressure to improve codes in line with industrybest practice. The Portman Group has advisedcompanies on how to improve their marketingcodes. Retail companies also have their owncodes, which extend beyond marketing andpromotions to the drinking environment. Forexample, Mitchells & Butlers, a pubco, has analcohol and social responsibility policy thatcovers the sale of alcohol, the operation oflicensed premises, pricing and responsiblepromotions. These retail sector codes arediscussed further in the context of efforts topromote responsible retailing.

It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness ofcompany codes. Industry critics state that theyare ‘mainly window dressing’ (N9) and allegethat companies regularly flout their own codes.They note that even the larger companies with areputation for social responsibility have beenfound in breach of the ASA and Portman Groupcodes. Nonetheless, interviewees from the largeproducer companies claim that their internalcodes do work and that, in the words of one,‘the plug has been pulled’ (I11) on products and

marketing campaigns that are likely to breachthese codes. Some companies havecommissioned external audits of their codesand/or their marketing activities. But, from anoutsider’s point of view, there is really no wayof evaluating the impact of these codes withoutunprecedented access to internal productdevelopment processes and marketingactivities.

Evaluating the codes on advertising,

marketing and promotion

Although the industry has made efforts tostrengthen its codes and to bring them together(most recently in the national standardsdocument – see Chapter 2), obviousshortcomings remain. The national standards donot supersede other codes. There areinconsistencies between codes (for example, thedifferent wording used to describe productappeal to under 18s, noted earlier). Thejurisdiction of different codes is confusing – forexample, point of sale advertising andpromotions could be covered by any one ofthree different codes (Portman, ASA non-broadcast and BBPA). The independence of self-regulatory systems is limited, though there islay involvement in the complaints procedures ofASA, the Scotch Whisky Association and thePortman Group. Mechanisms of enforcementrely heavily on complaints, rather than onproactive monitoring or policing (though somehave an element of self-policing, notably theASA codes). Few codes are independentlymonitored, audited or evaluated. Most lackvisibly effective sanctions against transgressors.There is also an uncertain relationship betweenself-regulation and statutory regulation, which

27

Self-regulation

means that the scope for subjecting persistentoffenders to even tougher penalties is not fullyexploited. An attempt has been made to ‘co-regulate’, as in broadcast advertising where thestate regulator OFCOM and the self-regulatorybody ASA share responsibilities, but this fairlynew arrangement awaits proper evaluation.

Although most non-industry respondentsbelieved that there was a place for self-regulation, they argued that reform was neededto promote consistency between codes and tointroduce stronger sanctions. More extensiveinvolvement by lay people and non-industryexperts in the processes of self-regulation wasalso suggested. A minority wanted a partial oroutright statutory ban on alcohol advertisingand promotion, which would reduce or removethe scope for self-regulation.

A full and systematic evaluation of the actualeffectiveness of the self-regulatory system acrossthe whole range of alcohol marketing andpromotion would be timely. It should be notedthat there is considerable scepticism aboutcurrent systems of self-regulation in this field.Evidence from other countries – including NewZealand, Australia, the Netherlands, and theUSA – suggests that self-regulatory systemshave fallen short of expectations (Federal TradeCommission, 1999; Jones, 2000; STAP, 2003; Hill,2004). Jackson et al. (2000) argue that theindustry has been unable to resist commercialimperatives – such as the need to appeal to theyouth market – and has espoused marketingpractices (such as designer drinks) that haveserious adverse implications for public health.To expect the industry to self-regulate in suchcircumstances is, these authors argue,hopelessly unrealistic. They conclude that theregulatory process is reactive, ad hoc and weak

and can be more effective only by controllingthe whole marketing mix. This would involvecomprehensive powers to regulate promotion(including point of sale promotions) vested instatutory, independent bodies, which wouldreplace current systems of self-regulation.Further recommendations are that international-level regulation is needed to reflect theindustry’s global operations; that regulationmust be informed by reliable marketintelligence; and that the public healthcommunity needs to achieve a betterunderstanding of young people’s lifestyles withregard to alcohol. Similar arguments are madeby Caswell and Maxwell (2005), who call for anew statutory framework to monitor andcontrol the full marketing mix.

Recent research has provided a basis forstricter regulation. For example, an Australianstudy identified the role of the internet inmarketing products to under-age drinkers andthat this required more policing (Carroll andDonovan, 2002). A host of studies from severalcountries have identified the appeal of alcoholadvertisements to adolescents, even when theyare not deliberately targeted at them (Dring andHope, 2001; Cragg Ross Dawson, 2004; Hastingset al., 2005; Jernigan et al., 2005; Mosher andJohnson, 2005), while others suggest that alcoholmarketing has actually impacted on youngpeople’s drinking habits (Ellickson et al., 2005;Hastings et al., 2005; Snyder et al., 2006).

Responsible retailing

A further set of important self-regulatoryactivities come under the rubric of responsibleretailing. This includes the activities of tradebodies as well as company initiatives. It is not

28


possible to explore all of these in depth, butsome key areas are discussed below.

Under-age drinking

The drinks industry has pursued variousinitiatives to discourage under-age drinking,including efforts to remind licensees of theirlegal responsibilities. Trade associations, such asthe BBPA, the WSA, the ACS, the BRC, and thePortman Group, have been active in this area formany years. In addition, pubco, off-licencechain and supermarket company policiesemphasise the importance of adhering to thisand other aspects of the law. These policies aresupported by staff training – to promoteunderstanding, awareness and key skills (seebelow) – and by disciplinary procedures.

The industry has backed ‘proof of ageschemes’ to assist with enforcement of the law.In the past, proof of age has been relatively easyto fake. However, there is now an accreditedscheme (the proof of age standards scheme –PASS), which the retail trade believes to be moresecure. The Portman Group Proof of Age Card,an initiative begun in the early 1990s, hasreceived accreditation under this scheme (alongwith several others). Other initiatives in thisfield include ‘Challenge 21’, backed by themajor retailers and retail trade associations. Thisrequires staff to ask people seeking to purchaseor consume alcohol from licensed premises,who appear to be under 21, for proof of theirage (such as the Portman Proof of Age Card,Citizen Card or passport/driving licence).

Critics argue that the industry is still notdoing enough to combat under-age purchaseand consumption of alcohol. Test purchasing,which focuses on premises most likely to offend,continues to find high levels of serving to

under-age customers. In the summer 2004alcohol misuse enforcement campaign inEngland and Wales, 45 per cent of on-licensedpremises and 31 per cent of off-licensedpremises targeted by the authorities were foundto have sold alcohol unlawfully to people under18. In the subsequent winter 2004/05 campaign,32 per cent of both on and off licences subjectedto test purchasing were caught selling to under-age drinkers. A further enforcement campaignin 2005 found that 29 per cent of on-licences and19 per cent of off-licensed premises broke thelaw on under-age sales (Home Office, 2006).

Industry sources argued that improvedsystems of identity (which may follow from theintroduction of national identity cards) andbetter staff training were needed. The industryremains to be persuaded that stronger laws andpenalties for serving under-age drinkers arerequired, but agrees that the law should beproperly enforced and that persistent offendersbe punished accordingly. Recent changes inlicensing legislation have emphasised theimportance of requesting evidence of acustomer’s age as a defence against servingunder 18s. In England, the DCMS (2004)emphasised the role of ‘PASS-accredited’schemes in its guidance on the 2003 LicensingAct. In Scotland, the required ‘evidence’ isactually specified in the Act as a passport, aEuropean Union photocard driving licence orsuch other documents as may be prescribed bythe Government. Meanwhile, in the Republic ofIreland, it is a requirement that people agedbetween 18 and 21 carry a valid proof of agedocument when in a bar. The Irish Governmenthas proposed that this requirement be extendedto people under 25.

29

Self-regulation

The drinking environment

Although focusing primarily on the individualaspects of alcohol misuse, the drinks industryacknowledges that the drinking environment isan important factor in alcohol misuse. Theindustry can contribute to the quality and safetyof the drinking environment, and therebyreduce the chances of excessive drinking anddisorder. Voluntary efforts are encouraged bytrade bodies but depend largely onimplementation by individual companies andlicensees. Increasingly company-wide policieshave been adopted. Pubcos have policies orcodes that cover aspects of the drinkingenvironment. Mitchells & Butlers’ ‘alcohol andsocial responsibility policy’, referred to earlier,mentions ‘common-sense’ factors such as goodmanagement and design of premises, and listsunacceptable promotions (for example, drinkinggames, initial payments to obtain cheap alcohol,time-limited promotions lasting less than threehours, ‘two for one’ type deals). Another pubco,Wetherspoon, previously noted by somecommentators for its ‘low cost approach toselling booze’ (see Warner, 2006), introduced anew policy aimed at preventing binge drinkingand alcohol-related disorder. This included: anend to ‘two for one’ offers and spirit offers(where doubles were sold for less than the priceof two singles); ceasing ‘all you can drink for £x’offers; availability of fair-priced soft and non-alcoholic drinks; the serving of reasonablypriced food later in the evening; installation ofCCTV; improved toilet facilities; a 48-hour weekfor managers and staff with two days off perweek; a high level of managers per pub; andstaff training (evidence submitted to HomeAffairs Committee, 2005).

Another relevant issue concerns the

prevention of glass injuries in licensed premises.Following publicity about the severity of glassinjuries associated with alcohol-related violence,the industry has moved towards the use oftoughened glass. However, this has been offset toan extent by the increased popularity of drinkingfrom glass bottles. Moreover, it should be notedthat the evidence on the protective effect oftoughened glass is equivocal. One study foundthat injuries to staff actually increased followingthe introduction of toughened glass (Warburtonand Shepherd, 2000).

Training and professional standards

Industry and non-industry respondents agreedthat better standards of training could improvesocial responsibility and help to preventalcohol-related problems. Training can enhanceimplementation of both voluntary codes ofpractice and statutory provisions. There is also asignificant evidence base to supportinterventions to extend and improve stafftraining. According to one review:

… intensive, high quality face to face servertraining, when accompanied by strong and activemanagement support, is effective in reducingintoxication rates in customers.(Mulvihill et al., 2005, p. 3; see also Stockwell etal., 1993; Shults et al., 2001; Toomey et al., 2001)

Training schemes are even more effectivewhen supported by enforcement fromregulatory authorities. Training on socialresponsibility issues occurs at all levels andsectors of the industry. The training of staffinvolved in product development, marketingand promotion by drinks producers has alreadybeen mentioned. The remainder of this sectionfocuses on retail standards.

30


As one industry respondent observed, ‘mostresponsible operators have their own stafftraining programmes’ (I6). Both induction andrefresher courses cover aspects of socialresponsibility. For example, a spokespersonfrom one pubco explained how potentiallicensees are screened for suitability and aresubject to a key skills audit. An inductioncourse, based on a plausible scenario, uses aninteractive case study approach. Furthertraining, in the form of workshops, is availablefor existing licensees. Pubcos also offer trainingopportunities for supervisors and staff.

Trade associations (in both on- and off-licence sectors) and the Portman Group supporttraining with materials such as videos andleaflets setting out legal responsibilities andhow to deal with difficult situations. Tradebodies also provide further advice and support.For example, the Association of ConvenienceStores offers practical advice to smallshopkeepers to help them develop strategies forresisting under-age sales and skills in dealingwith intimidation from gangs of youths.

A key body in this field is the BritishInstitute of Innkeeping (BII), founded in 1981 toimprove professional standards in the licensedtrade. It currently has over 17,000 members.Those found to be in breach of its code ofpractice face exclusion from membership.Meanwhile, the BII Awards Board (BIIAB) is anaccredited vocational qualifications body for thelicensed retail sector. BIIAB qualifications caterfor the training needs of licensees, supervisors,bar staff and others in the licensed trade, as wellas licensing regulators. Courses are delivered atlocal centres across the country. Other providersare also engaged in training and qualificationsfor the licensed trade. North of the border,

training is also provided by the alcohol agencyAlcohol Focus Scotland (AFS) through its‘Servewise’ programme. This has three maincomponents: law, alcohol and people skills.Separate courses are provided for licensees,managers and staff, and for on- and off-licensedpremises. AFS trains the trainers who thendeliver the course across 60 centres. It sets thecurriculum, standards and examinations. Thecurriculum has been developed and reviewedwith input from the drinks industry.

Training is an emerging area of co-regulation.Under the 2003 licensing legislation, newapplicants for personal licences in England andWales must have a mandatory qualification.These are accredited by DCMS and thequalification and curriculum authorities andinclude the BII’s National Certificate forPersonal Licence Holders. However, there isexemption for existing licensees withexperiential knowledge who have been grantedso-called ‘grandfather rights’ under the newlaw. In Scotland there are no such rights. TheScottish licensing legislation of 2005 requires alllicensees to hold a qualification from anaccredited body. It also specifically requiressupervisors and bar staff, as well as licensingauthority members and officers, to undertakeapproved training programmes. More detailedprescriptions on training (including ‘refresher’training) are currently being formulated andwill be subject to secondary legislation.

Most observers (from both the industry andoutside) agree that improvements are takingplace in training. Even so, there is a view, notconfined to non-industry respondents, thatfurther improvements could be made, forexample to strengthen the social responsibilityelements of training, ensure all licensees and

31

Self-regulation

their staff are properly trained, and require that‘refresher’ training is undertaken.

Other self-regulatory initiatives

In July 2003, the Portman Group established asocial responsibility scheme for producersknown as ‘Commitment to Action’. Thisagreement, which has since been updated(Portman Group, 2005a), sets out the actionsthat member companies are prepared toundertake beyond their existing legal and self-regulatory obligations. It covers severaldomains of activity including promotion, unitlabelling and social responsibility messages. ThePortman Group regularly monitors thecompliance of each company in each domain.The October 2005 audit showed that, whererelevant, all companies complied withcommitments on unit labelling (with minorexceptions on non-UK brands), responsibilitymessages at sponsored events, straplines onbrand advertising referring to the PortmanGroup, annual code awareness training forproduct development and marketing staff andexternal agencies, and use of the PortmanGroup’s pre-clearance advice service beforelaunching a new product or promotion. All butone member complied with a commitment toreview social responsibility clauses in supplycontracts. Compliance with other commitmentswas mixed (with regard to social responsibilitymessages on consumer advertising andpackaging, and website links toDrinkaware.co.uk). Compliance in anotherdomain – distribution of Portman Groupcampaign materials – did not apply, as no suchrequests had been made during this period(Portman Group, 2005b).

Self-regulation: an overview

The industry clearly favours self-regulation.Industry respondents believe that it imposesless of a burden than direct regulation. Theyalso claim that self-regulation is more effectivethan direct regulation in responding flexiblyand quickly to problems. Non-industryrespondents were more sceptical. Some blamedthe Government for seeking to evade itsresponsibilities and place them on the shouldersof industry. However, most of them agreed thata degree of self-regulation was needed.

Although, as this chapter has shown, there isplenty of self-regulatory activity, there areweaknesses in the current system, which can besummarised as follows.

The codes lack consistency and overallcoherence. As one non-industry respondentnoted ‘a whole-industry approach is needed’(N11). The formulation of a new industry-widecode on social responsibility (see Chapter 2) isviewed as a step in the right direction but, asnoted, does not replace existing codes, nor doesit address the variations between codes in termsof their language and scope. Previous moves torationalise the codes did not succeed. Theinclusion of all point of sale promotions withinthe Portman code (a scheme known as ‘Portmanplus’) was considered, but never commandedsufficient support from within the industry.

More could be done to establish effective co-regulation, with tougher statutory backing.According to one non-industry respondent‘there has to be a closer relationship betweensystems of state regulation and self-regulation’(N8). Another stated that ‘self-regulation shouldnot be seen in isolation, but in the context of theState’s regulatory powers ... it is a question of

32


balance between state and self-regulation’ (N7).Some within the industry shared these concernsand urged a clearer framework of statutoryregulation. One stated that ‘co-regulationrequires a clear and effective relationshipbetween statutory and self-regulation’ (I12)while another acknowledged that:

… self-regulation does need a broaderframework. It needs official approval and must beconsistent with statutory and self-regulation.Indeed co-regulation is the best way forward,where statutory and self-regulation work inpartnership.(I11)

Co-regulation is already undertaken in thefield of broadcast advertising. There areelements of co-regulation in other areas(including the legal requirements regardingtraining for licensees and the appearance ofindustry codes in licensing guidance). Butstatutory provisions could be strengthened inorder to give these self-regulatory systems moreteeth. As one non-industry respondent argued‘codes need to be tied into existing licensinglegislation’ (N5). The Scottish approach, whereissues such as training and drinks promotionsare covered by stronger statutory provisions,could be a way forward.

Which leads on to a further point aboutenforcement. As one non-industry respondentnoted ‘there is no real punishment forcontravening codes’ (N4). Another observedthat the absence of sanctions meant that thecodes lacked weight especially in a competitivebusiness environment. ‘Codes lack impact whenpeople are struggling for business. They fall bythe wayside’ (N5). The non-industryrespondents believed that current codes

provided little incentive to comply and thatstronger sanctions should be implemented.Indeed, critics remained convinced that self-regulation as currently practised represented asoft option. One observed that ‘pure self-regulation is a fool’s game and a smokescreen’(N11) while another stated that ‘voluntaryregulation should be a step on the road toproper regulation’ (N3).

The industry denied that self-regulation wasweak. According to one respondent:

… people see self-regulation as industryregulating themselves in a what hurts least way,which enables them to get away with a lot … inreality compliance is very high in the field of self-regulation.(I8)

Another claimed that:

… drinks companies can be and are critical ofrogue elements. They censure behaviour ofcompanies that don’t uphold the spirit ofregulation. Peer pressure is strong and evenlarger companies have been internally criticised.(I10)

Most industry sources argued that the bestweapon is ‘name and shame’, and that financialsanctions (as in the Scotch Whisky code, forexample) were unnecessary.

However, ‘name and shame’ is a relativelyweak weapon, particularly in the absence offurther sanctions. Expulsion or suspension frommembership might carry weight. But tradeassociations and membership organisationsfound this problematic. Expelling or suspendingmembers could reduce membership andincome, and their ability to speak for theindustry or sector. Indeed, a non-industry

33

Self-regulation

respondent observed that ‘trade associationsfind it very difficult to kick out members whodon’t meet standards’ (N6). While a tradeassociation spokesperson agreed that ‘we can’tbe in the business of throwing out our members;that will make us weaker’ (I2).

A related issue was the regulation of non-members who lay outside the remit of tradebodies. Several industry respondents observedthat organisations that are not members are themost problematic. Sanctions against non-members (by trade association and byproducers) raised matters of competition law.For example, attempts to refuse to supply a‘rogue trader’ (for promoting drinks in asocially irresponsible way, for example) mightlead to legal challenges. As one industryinformant admitted, even where supplycontracts specified that supplies could bewithdrawn in certain circumstances, this tendedto form a basis for negotiation rather than theactual cessation of supplies (I12).

Although some codes do have proactivemonitoring, most self-regulatory activities are‘complaints-led’. Complaints rely on vigilanceby the public, non-governmental organisationsand the industry itself. The problem is that,even when a breach is identified, it takes time tostop it, by which time considerable damage mayhave been done. As one non-industryrespondent commented:

… a problem with relying on complaints is thatmost of these people who are likely to complainare unaware of the very forms of advertising andpromotion that are least socially responsible.(N4)

However, in broadcast and some non-broadcast advertising, there is pre-clearance,

which should minimise the possibility of futurebreaches. Some regulators also offer advice(such as the Portman Group and ASA) to helpadvertisers and marketers avoid breaching thecodes. This is good practice, but does notprevent all socially irresponsible promotionalactivities. Most codes have an element of self-policing. In the main this depends on othercompanies informing the self-regulatoryauthorities (which does happen). Other meansof promoting compliance (through theappointment of dedicated compliance officersby self-regulatory bodies and the publication ofstatistics on compliance, for example) are lesscommon.

Some codes do have an independentelement. Notably, the ASA bodies do have asignificant lay input, both on their governingbodies and on complaints panels. The PortmanGroup has an independent complaints panel,while the Scotch Whisky Association has anindependent complaint appeals panel. But thereis no apparent lay involvement in other codes,such as the BBPA promotions code. Theinvolvement of lay people does not guaranteeindependence. But it does create a sense ofopenness and accountability, and helps to instilpublic confidence in self-regulatory systems,especially where matters of public health andwelfare are concerned. Another issue is thefunding of self-regulatory systems. ASA bodiesare funded by a levy via an independentfunding mechanism. Others are financeddirectly by the industry, which leaves themopen to accusations of bias.

Finally, public reporting is regarded as apositive attribute of any self-regulatory system.In the alcohol field, public reports are availableon the Portman code and the advertising codes.

34


Complaints judgements are published (andavailable on the web). Some individualcompanies also produce reports on theircorporate social responsibility policies or codesof practice. However, across the industry as awhole, there is no systematic approach toreporting on self-regulatory processes and thereports that are available vary considerably intheir public profile and accessibility. Very fewself-regulatory systems are independentlyaudited.

Non-industry commentators are scepticalabout self-regulation (see also Babor et al., 2003).They advocate stronger sanctions and more co-regulation. They want self-regulatory systems tocover all parts of the industry and to have astronger independent input. Some within theindustry also realise that self-regulation must bestrengthened. More specifically, theyacknowledge that self-regulatory systems mustbe more inclusive, more comprehensive andsupported by appropriate training. However,there is more disagreement between theindustry and others on other key issues, such asindependent input into self-regulatory systems,external evaluation and stronger enforcementand sanctions (see also ICAP, 2004; EPC, 2006).

Conclusions

• A bewildering array of self-regulatorysystems govern the drinks industry. Thesesystems vary considerably in their scope,inclusiveness, independence, degree of layinvolvement, extent of proactive monitoring,sanctions and public accountability.However, most systems are seen as weak bycritics, particularly in terms of enforcement.There is also confusion about how these

codes relate to each other, notwithstandingrecent efforts to produce a single set ofnational standards for the industry.

• Both industry and non-industry respondentsstated that more could be done to provide anappropriate balance and greater consistencybetween statutory and voluntary self-regulation systems. There was support forstrengthening self-regulation by clarifyingthe legal requirements for good practice (instandards of training, for example). Self-regulation could also be bolstered byclarifying the legality of socially responsiblepractices (particularly with regard todiscounted price promotions and competitionlaw).

• An assessment of the overall impact of self-regulatory systems is needed, particularlywith regard to advertising, marketing andpromotion of alcoholic drinks, but also inother areas such as under-age drinking,training and the drinking environment. Theimpact of the different approaches toregulating point of sale promotions inEngland and Wales compared with Scotland(and the Irish Republic) is worthy of analysis.It would also be interesting to compare theoutcomes of different regulatory systems formarketing and promotion that have anelement of self-regulation, such as thoseoperating in the UK, Australia, the USA andNew Zealand.

• Both industry and non-industry respondentssaw training as having a crucial role, both inrelation to statutory and voluntaryregulation. Given the potential forimprovements in this area, more research is

35

Self-regulation

needed into the impact of trainingprogrammes within the industry and howthey support socially responsible practice,self-regulation and law enforcement. It isimportant that future training programmesare informed by this research.

• As one of the potential barriers to effectiveself-regulation is the competitive nature ofthe drinks business environment, there mustbe further analysis of the relationshipbetween market conditions and competition,

management strategies and processes, andregulatory compliance with both self-regulation and statutory regimes.Furthermore, the impact of contractualarrangements to promote social responsibilitywithin the industry requires evaluation.There should also be a closer examination ofthe practices of the so-called ‘rogues andcowboys’ in the industry, how they operateand how they can be more effectivelyregulated.

36

This chapter examines the advantages anddisadvantages of partnership with the drinksindustry. It also examines the participation ofthe drinks industry as a partner in local andnational initiatives to prevent alcohol problems.

The importance of partnership … and its

perils

Partnership has been recognised as animportant component of corporate socialresponsibility (Grant and O’Connor, 2005).Potential partners include Government, otherprivate sector organisations, professionalgroups, non-government organisations and theresearch community. Partnership has thepotential to avoid duplication, harness resourcesand expertise, build trust and promoteconsensus. Orley and Logan (2005) argue thatthe alternative to partnership is an exclusionarymodel that creates an adversarial relationshipbetween the industry and others. Althoughpartnership working can lead to greater co-operation, there are disadvantages, particularlywhere partners have unequal status, resourcesand power. In such circumstances, partnershipsmay be dominated by corporate interests, whichcan use their position to block policies andinterventions that threaten their commercialinterests (Babor, 2000; McCreanor et al., 2000).

There are several principles that shouldgovern any partnership. It is important that theaims of partnerships are clearly specified. Theymust be as inclusive as possible and operatewith clear rules of engagement that protect theinterests of the weaker and poorly resourcedparticipants. The dilemmas raised bypartnership must be explicitly acknowledged: inparticular, participants may have to sacrifice

self-interest for the collective aims of thepartnership. Partnerships should not be viewedas a magic solution to entrenched problems ofpublic policy. They are particularly difficult toestablish in areas that have a long history ofentrenched adversarial politics, such as alcohol(Berridge, 2005). When partnerships areestablished in such circumstances they oftenfail, leaving an aftertaste of bitterness thatimpedes future efforts to promote dialogue andcollaboration. This happened during the 1980s,when the UK Government established analcohol forum involving three industryassociations, the Health Education Council andAlcohol Concern. The forum collapsed when theindependent chair of the group insisted on alarge increase in industry funding for researchinto alcohol problems (see Baggott, 1990, p. 47).

Twenty years on, partnership is once againbeing encouraged by Government. Are theprospects any rosier? Industry respondentswere positive about working with non-industryorganisations including government and publicsector bodies, the police and health professions,and the voluntary sector. Most intervieweesfrom industry said they welcomedopportunities to openly debate and discussissues with these other stakeholders, calling fora ‘round table’ (I6, I8) or ‘big tent’ (I5) approach.Some mentioned that this represented a changein attitudes within the industry, where there hadpreviously been fear and reluctance to engage,particularly with alcohol agencies.

Although industry personnel emphasisedthe importance of inclusiveness, they remainedcritical of organisations and individuals whothey believed were intransigently opposed tothe industry, though, as one respondent from alarge drinks producer conceded, ‘there are

5 Partnerships

37

Partnerships

zealots on both sides’ (I11). Some industryrespondents were also cautious about workingin partnership with Government. Onecommented that, though his trade associationwas keen to work with Government, ‘it must bea partnership of equals’ (I10). Finally, someindustry respondents noted that some aspects ofpartnership could be construed as collusion andmight be considered anti-competitive. This wasraised particularly in the context of minimumprice agreements between the trade and publicauthorities (see Chapter 4).

There was a mixed response from non-industry respondents. Some saw clearadvantages in working with the industry. As onerespondent observed: ‘it would be boneheadednot to work with the industry’ (N7). But therewas anxiety about the scope of such partnershipsand the rules of engagement. Underlying thiswas a fear that the industry would dominatepartnership arrangements and manipulate themto its advantage. One respondent was worriedabout the undue influence of the industry onvoluntary organisations in particular: ‘they canget drawn in and get out of their depth’ (N2).Another observed that ‘views change whenpeople get close to the industry’ (N9). In thewords of another, ‘there was inevitable caution’when dealing with the industry and ‘always thepotential for being manipulated’. This wasendorsed by others, including one respondentwho commented that ‘by working with NGOs,industry gets credibility; the problem is they useit’ (N10).

Non-industry respondents saw theirindependence as crucial. One way to safeguardthis would be to have no dealings whatsoeverwith industry, an approach backed by aminority. But the majority were pragmatic. It

was suggested that the scope of partnershipsshould be restricted. One interviewee acceptedthat partnership could be useful with regard tostaff training and marketing issues, but that itsinvolvement was inappropriate in areas such asresearch and school-based education (N10).Another suggestion was to create a strongframework to protect the independence of non-industry participants. This could take the formof comprehensive formal partnershiparrangements in which Government would‘hold the ring’ and protect ‘weaker’organisations (notably charities and voluntarybodies). This was contrasted with currentinformal, ad hoc and less inclusive ‘bilateral’arrangements, where it was believed theindustry’s interests predominated. A non-industry interviewee put this very clearly:

It would be far easier to work with the industry ifthere was a clearer strategic framework and theindustry’s position within this was moreappropriate and more clearly defined. This wouldenable discussions to take place in a clearer, moretransparent and open atmosphere than atpresent. In other words there is a need for clearerrules of engagement with the industry. Thiswould produce a win-win situation in that allparties would know what is expected of them.(N3)

National partnerships

Many interviewees endorsed the idea of anational forum to bring together stakeholders inthis field, as illustrated by the followingcomments from, respectively, an industryrespondent, a non-industry stakeholder and acivil servant:

38


… perhaps a national-level body is needed tobring all views together, identify good practiceand reach greater consensus on alcohol issues.(I6)

A national forum on alcohol, including allstakeholders in the field including the industry,would be really useful in taking the alcoholstrategy forward.(N6)

There is a need for a national stakeholders’ forumat a strategic, national level to advise Governmentin this field. This would be a large body – it shouldinclude all stakeholders such as the police,medical and NGOs – in addition to the industry.(N1)

These ideas are consistent with proposals tocreate a national alcohol advisory forum to leadon or oversee campaigns aimed at reducingalcohol misuse (see Alcohol Concern, 2005). Thismight include representatives of alcoholagencies, the royal medical colleges, researchers,law and order professions, local governmentand the drinks industry. A similar body alreadyexists in Scotland – the Scottish MinisterialAdvisory Committee on Alcohol Policy(SMACAP). Its membership is drawn fromGovernment, police, prison service, healthprofessions and the NHS, licensing authorities,alcohol agencies, the industry and otherstakeholders.

England also has previous experience ofadvisory forums in this field. An officialadvisory committee on alcohol – the Kesselcommittee – existed in the 1970s, though it didnot contain any industry representatives (seeBaggott, 1990). More recently, advisory groupswere established on the national alcoholstrategy and on licensing reform. Several

interviewees suggested that these advisorymechanisms be revived, while others alluded torecent moves to create a new inclusive forum forthe discussion of alcohol policy.

Others were more cautious aboutestablishing a new alcohol policy forum. Therewere fears among the non-industry respondentsthat such a body would be captured by industry.Several urged that its structure and governancemust be carefully thought out. Others warnedthat the body should not be a talking shop butmust be empowered to do things. It was alsopointed out that, given the large number ofpotential stakeholders, the forum would find itdifficult to be both inclusive and manageable.

Local partnerships

Interviewees identified local partnerships asmaking an important contribution to reducingalcohol problems. Pubwatch schemes werementioned favourably by industry and non-industry respondents, particularly by the policeand local authorities. These are local schemesrun by licensees, which aim to reduce crime anddisorder through communication and mutualsupport. Each local Pubwatch is autonomousand depends largely on the voluntary efforts oflocal licensees, though they do receive financialsupport from pubcos, some of which stronglyencourage their licensees to join.

A national voluntary organisation, NationalPubwatch, promotes the take-up of localschemes and provides support and advice.Police and local authorities also offer advice onhow licensees can prevent alcohol-related crimeand disorder. Close liaison between locallicensees and the authorities is increasingly thenorm, with the latter becoming much more

39

Partnerships

proactive in recent years. Notably, the DCMS(2004) guidance on the implementation of the2003 Licensing Act states that licensingauthorities should familiarise themselves withPubwatch schemes in their area. In its report onanti-social behaviour, the Home AffairsCommittee (2005) also identified Pubwatchschemes as a means of promoting co-operativeworking arrangements between the trade andthe police.

The strength of Pubwatch schemes is theirvoluntary nature and their focus on localproblems and issues. But there are concernsabout their lack of sustainability in the longerterm (often because of shortage of funding andturnover of licensees), an absence of inclusivity(particularly with regard to the off-licencetrade), poor integration with other localinitiatives, and a failure to monitor, evaluateand improve schemes.

Nonetheless, the Pubwatch schemes arebecoming more closely integrated with otherlocal strategies and more subject to evaluation.Increasingly, with the creation of Crime andDisorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) andSafer Communities Partnerships at local level,the on-licensed trade has been incorporated onlocal bodies. According to BBPA, over 200industry personnel now sit on CDRPs(interview data). Meanwhile, BII and BEDAhave also encouraged their members to joinlocal partnerships.

Other forums exist at local level. In variousparts of England and Wales, one can find non-statutory liaison groups on licensing matters,which involve a range of stakeholders. InScotland, licensing forums – which includerepresentatives of licensees, police, localresidents, and health, education and social

services – are statutory and will review theoperation of licensing law and advise licensingboards.

Meanwhile, the Alcohol Education andResearch Council (AERC) part-funded threecommunity alcohol harm reduction initiatives,which became known as the UK communityalcohol prevention programme (UKCAPP – seeMistral et al., 2006). These projects, based inCardiff, Birmingham and Glasgow use multi-agency partnerships to influence local alcoholpolicies, in an effort to shape the drinkingenvironment and reduce alcohol problems (forexample by improving law enforcement or thetraining of bar staff).

There are many other examples where localagencies have joined together to combat alcoholproblems, particularly those related to crime anddisorder. The ‘TASC’ (Tackling Alcohol-relatedStreet Crime) project, funded by the HomeOffice, attempted to address alcohol problems inCardiff through a multi-agency approach. One ofthe positive outcomes was a closer and more co-operative working relationship with the locallicensed trade (Maguire and Nettleton, 2003, p.17). Another project that received much attentionis Manchester City Centre Safe (Brown andGreenacre, 2005). This partnership initiative wasaimed at the growing night-time economy andinvolved the police working closely with thelicensed trade, business and local government.The scheme aimed to reduce serious assaults,promote safe drinking and reduce perceptions ofdrunkenness and disorder. Strategies includedstructured ‘multi-agency’ visits to licensedpremises, safety-glass requirements, servertraining, a clampdown on irresponsiblepromotions, identifying the top ten worstestablishments and awards for socially

40


responsible practice (‘best bar’ awards), use of analcohol by-law to prevent street drinking,targeting ‘hot spots’, support and informationnetworks for licensees, advice on how to copewith disorder and improvements in late-nighttransport. The introduction of the project wasfollowed by a reported reduction in seriousassaults. These schemes – and other ‘flagship’projects such as ‘Nightsafe’ (a scheme focused onimproved standards of retailing, pioneered byWest Lancashire Police and now beingimplemented in other towns and cities includingGloucester, Ipswich, Oxford and Cheltenham andcounties such as Norfolk and Bedfordshire) –have been endorsed by the drinks industry,police and local authorities. Where projects havebeen evaluated, they appear to have curbedalcohol-related crime and disorder. However, asseveral interviewees observed, it is crucial thatthe lessons from the schemes are carefullyanalysed and widely disseminated.

Partnership can also take the form of ad hocco-operation between companies and/orindustry bodies and others, such as agovernment department, professional group orvoluntary organisation. Many examples werefound by this study and it is possible to mentiononly a few for purposes of illustration. ThePortman Group, for example, has workedjointly with the Department for Transport ondrink-driving issues. BII has engaged with thepolice, the Home Office, local authorities andLACORS (the local authorities co-ordinators ofregulatory services) on its training programmes.The British Retail Consortium has worked withthe Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)and the Local Government Association onlicensing and public order issues. Individualcompanies have also been active in establishing

working partnerships. For example, Scottishand Newcastle graduate trainees haveundertaken projects with the charity TurningPoint. Meanwhile, Diageo has collaborated withthe National Union of Students on a nationalcampaign to promote responsible drinking. Thisinvolves campaign materials in student unionbars (including beer mats, unit stickers forglasses and bar staff T-shirts). Finally, Coorsworked closely with the Scottish Executive andAlcohol Focus Scotland to ensure that their own‘sensible drinking’ campaign – which involvedsporting figures from soccer clubs sponsored bythe Carling brand – complemented existingcampaigns in this field.

It is difficult to form a judgement about suchdiverse activities. Industry respondents werevery enthusiastic about these and other specificprojects. Many non-industry participants alsoapplauded these initiatives. Others from outsidethe industry, while not criticising specificprojects, expressed general concerns that theindustry’s approach could be construed as a‘public relations’ exercise. Fears were alsoexpressed that ad hoc partnerships could beused to exert undue influence over thevoluntary sector. However, it was recognisedthat such fears are easier to dispel wherepartnership initiatives are based on clearagreements between participants, where theyare subject to proper independent evaluation,and where the lessons from successful andunsuccessful partnerships are widely shared.

At the international level, the industry hasattempted to draw up framework principles onpartnership. The Dublin Principles, mentionedearlier in the context of research, also cover co-operation among industry, Government, thecommunity and public health advocates

41

Partnerships

(National College of Ireland, 1997). These, likethe research principles, are fairly general. In2000, these were taken forward in the ‘GenevaPartnership’, also an ICAP initiative, which setout an agenda for partnership working byhighlighting common ground and outlining theresponsibilities of various stakeholders. Therehave also been attempts to identify the degree ofconsensus on various policy issues among thedifferent stakeholders (see EPC, 2006). But whatis really needed is a full and public debate aboutthe proper role of the industry as a partner, andclarification of the rules of engagement with theindustry, including any safeguards that mightbe needed to protect the public interest.

Conclusions

• In the traditionally adversarial world ofalcohol politics, partnership with industrycan create tensions. On a positive note, theindustry can bring resources as well asexpertise (from the producers’ knowledge ofmarketing and drinking patterns to the local‘street knowledge’ of Pubwatch schemes). Torefuse to have any input from the industrywould cut off a potential source of resourcesand expertise. To exclude it frompartnerships as a matter of principle wouldbe short-sighted.

• The industry’s commercial objectives canconflict with the public interest. This placeslimits to what it is able to do in the context ofpartnerships. The best way forward is toestablish a coherent framework, whichclarifies the scope and purpose ofpartnerships and which protects weakerparticipants and the public interest. Thismight include a national alcohol foruminvolving all stakeholders, including theindustry.

• The industry must be engaged where itmakes a genuine contribution to thereduction of alcohol problems. One such areais local retailing schemes, such as Pubwatchand other locally based alcohol partnershiparrangements and projects mentioned above.There is already evidence from ‘flagship’projects to suggest that partnership with theindustry can bring benefits. However, thereneeds to be a comprehensive review of theimpact of such schemes and widespreaddissemination of the lessons they hold, whichcould be reflected in future guidance andmonitoring of partnership arrangements.

• There needs to be a full and open debateabout the role of the drinks industry in thegovernance of alcohol, includingpartnerships.

42

Government’s alcohol strategy

Although the drinks industry remains central tothe government’s alcohol strategy, the details ofthis policy have changed considerably. In somerespects, the Government’s policy appears tohave hardened against the industry (forexample, alcohol disorder zones). Elsewhere ithas sought compromise with the industry (forexample, on the national standards and thenational alcohol fund).

It is important that policies be properlyevaluated. Further research must thereforeinclude an independent evaluation of theimpact of:

• the national standards

• the new Drinkaware Trust

• when implemented, alcohol disorderzones.

The drinks industry

The drinks industry has not ignored alcoholproblems. But it has taken a particular view ofthem, focusing strongly on individualresponsibility, and emphasising the role ofeducation and research. It has accepted thatexisting commitments to social responsibilitymust be strengthened across the industry. Itremains wedded to education and research asthe principal instruments of prevention, whileacknowledging that self-regulation andparticipation in partnership arrangements withGovernment and other stakeholders may helpto prevent alcohol problems. However, it isopposed to policies aimed at regulating overalllevels of alcohol consumption in society.

The industry is not a monolith. It presents a

united front in public, despite privatedisagreements between different sectors andbetween traditional corporations and ‘newentrants’. Competitive pressures within theindustry are strong and can operate againstsocial responsibility. There is also a danger thatsocial responsibility can be wrongly construedas anti-competitive behaviour. The industry’sresponse to alcohol problems depends heavilyon the willingness and ability of the largercompanies, particularly the providers, to lead adiverse and dynamic sector.

Critics view much of the drink industry’sefforts as tokenism. Even so, most acknowledgethat the industry has a role to play in reducingalcohol problems and could do more, especiallyin changing marketing practices, improvingproduct development and shaping the drinkingenvironment. Critics remain concerned aboutthe economic and political power of theindustry and its influence over policy, and arehighly critical of the Portman Group, believingthat its regulatory and educational functionsshould be transferred to an independent body.The creation of the Drinkaware Trust willremove most of the Portman Group’seducational functions.

Although this study has shed some light onthe industry and its activities, further research isneeded, including:

• an examination of the facilitators andbarriers to socially responsible practicewithin the contemporary drinks industry

• an investigation of the relationshipsbetween the different sectors of theindustry on social responsibility issues, inparticular between the on- and off-trade,and between the traditional producer

6 Conclusions

43

Conclusions

enterprises and the ‘new entrants’,including niche producers and pubcos

• a study of the influence of the drinksindustry within the policy process,including its relationships withGovernment, Parliament and the media.

Education and research

The drinks industry has supported educationand research as a means of preventing alcohol-related harm. Education initiatives haveexpanded beyond the problems of drink-drivingand under-age drinking to issues such asdrunkenness, binge drinking and responsibledrinking. The provision of education has alsoextended beyond public campaigns and theprovision of school-based materials to web-based sources and information on products andin marketing. Critics of the industry believe thateducation can work as part of a broaderstrategy, but is relatively ineffective on its own.Some respondents were critical about the drinkindustry’s role in education and believed that itcould do more to promote responsible drinking.

The alcohol industry’s support for alcoholresearch takes a variety of forms includingdirect funding and indirect funding throughresearch boards on which the industry isrepresented. Critics are concerned about thepossible manipulation of research agendas andproject findings by the industry. They saw it asimportant that research, particularly whenindustry-funded, is governed in a way thatexplicitly protects the independence ofresearchers.

Further research is needed in the followingareas.

• The impact of alcohol educationcampaigns, including those that are partof a broader programme of action onalcohol problems, must becomprehensively studied. This evidencemust be used to inform future campaigns.

• An investigation of different models ofresearch governance in the alcohol field isneeded with a view to producing clearercriteria for future research activities,including those funded by the industry,government and non-governmentalorganisations.

Self-regulation

Many observers, including those outside theindustry, accept that self-regulation has somerole to play in preventing alcohol misuse. Anelement of self-regulation can support statutoryregulation and respond flexibly with problemsas they arise. However, despite some goodpractice, several shortcomings have beenidentified. There are weaknesses in enforcementand implementation, limited independent inputand public accountability, and a lack ofcomprehensive coverage, leaving importantareas under-regulated. Moreover, someoperators – often the least responsible – lieoutside self-regulatory schemes, underminingtheir effectiveness. The schemes rely heavily on‘name and shame’ or bad publicity. There is abewildering array of self-regulatory systems.Moreover, there is confusion about how thevarious codes relate to each other,notwithstanding recent efforts to create a singleset of standards for the industry. There areemerging areas of co-regulation but these

44


require a stronger framework in England, wherethe self-regulatory elements are weaklyunderpinned by statutory law and officialguidance. There are possible lessons to belearned from Scotland where new statutoryprovisions will give stronger support to self-regulatory activities (on training, for example).Statutory regulation could also bolster self-regulation by clarifying the position oncompetition law with regard to sociallyresponsible practice in areas such as point ofsale promotions and other efforts to improvestandards down the supply chain.

Further research in this area should includethe following.

• An assessment of the overall impact ofself-regulation, particularly with regard toadvertising, marketing and promotion,the drinking environment, under-agedrinking and training. The effect of thedifferent approaches to regulating pointof sale promotions in England and Walescompared with Scotland (and the IrishRepublic) is worthy of analysis. It wouldalso be interesting to compare theoutcomes of different regulatory systemsfor marketing and promotion that havean element of self-regulation, such asthose operating in the UK, Australia, theUSA and New Zealand.

• Given the potential for training schemesto underpin self-regulation and statutoryregulation, more research is needed intothe impact of different training schemesand how they support self-regulation andlaw enforcement.

• As one of the potential barriers toeffective self-regulation is the competitivenature of the drinks businessenvironment, there must be furtheranalysis of the relationship betweenmarket conditions and competition,management strategies and processes,and regulatory compliance with both self-regulation and statutory regimes.Furthermore, the impact of contractualarrangements to promote socialresponsibility within the industryrequires evaluation. There should also bea closer examination of the practices ofthe so-called ‘rogues and cowboys’ in theindustry, how they operate and how theycould be more effectively regulated.

Partnership

There is clearly scope for partnership working inthis field. But partnerships must be inclusive andaccountable, and must operate within a clearframework. At national and local level, a muchmore robust framework for partnerships isneeded. Government has a lead role to play insetting this framework, and in protecting weakerorganisations and the wider public interest. Thismight include a national alcohol forum involvingall stakeholders, including the industry. Thedrinks industry has a legitimate role to play inpartnerships given its knowledge, resources andexpertise. It can also help to secure industry-wideco-operation with various interventions andinitiatives. To exclude it as a matter of principlewould be short-sighted. However, there aredangers of allowing the industry to lead ordominate partnerships. The profit motive isstrong and not necessarily in the public interest.

45

Conclusions

There needs to be a full, open and public debateon the role of the alcoholic drinks industry in thegovernance of alcohol, including partnerships.This must cover issues such as the industry’s rolein education and information campaigns,research and other activities.

Further research in this area should includethe following.

• Flagship partnership projects receivemuch attention and many have beenshown to be effective, at least in the shortterm. What is needed is a comprehensivereview of partnership working to confirmwhat works and where more action isneeded. This could then be reflected inthe dissemination of the lessons ofpartnership, and in future guidance andmonitoring of partnership arrangements.

46

(The) Academy of Medical Sciences (2004)Calling Time: The Nation’s Drinking as a Major

Health Issue. London: AMS

Agostinelli, G. and Grube, J. (2002) ‘Alcoholcounter-advertising and the media: a review ofrecent research’, Alcohol Research and Health,Vol. 25, pp.15–21

Alcohol Concern (2005) Health Select Committee

on the Public Health White Paper: A Response from

Alcohol Concern. London: Alcohol Concern

Andrews, J. (1995) ‘Effectiveness of alcoholwarning labels: a review and extension’,American Behavioural Scientist, Vol. 38, pp. 622–32

Association of Convenience Stores, British RetailConsortium and Wine and Spirit Association(2004) Responsible Retailing of Alcohol: Guidance

for the Off Trade. Available at: http://www.thelocalshop.com/Documents/WSA-ACSBRC%20Joint%20Guide%20to%20Responsible%20Retailing%20of%20Alcohol_FINAL.pdf

Babor, T. (2000) ‘Partnership, profits and publichealth’, Addiction, Vol. 95, pp. 193–5

Babor, T. et al. (2003) Alcohol: No Ordinary

Commodity. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Baggott, R. (1989) ‘Regulatory reform in Britain:the changing face of self regulation’, Public

Administration,Vol. 67, pp. 435–54

Baggott, R. (1990) Alcohol, Politics and Social

Policy. Aldershot: Avebury

Bakan, J. (2005) The Corporation: The Pathological

Pursuit of Profit and Power. London: Constableand Robinson

BBPA (British Beer and Pub Association) (2001)Point of Sale Promotions: A Good Practice Guide for

Licensees. London: BBPA

BBPA (2005) Point of Sale Promotions: Standards

for the Management of Responsible Drinks

Promotion, including Happy Hours. London: BBPA

Berridge, V. (2005) Temperance: Its History and

Impact on Current and Future Alcohol Policy. York:Joseph Rowntree Foundation

Better Regulation Task Force (1999) Self

Regulation: Interim Report. London: BRTF

Brown, J. and Greenacre, S. (2005) ‘ManchesterCity Centre Safe: a demonstration project’, inP. Kolvin (ed.) Licensed Premises: Law and

Practice. Haywards Heath: Tottel, pp. 702–30

Cabinet Office (2004) Alcohol Harm Reduction

Strategy for England. London: Cabinet Office,Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit

Carroll, T. and Donovan, R. (2002) ‘Alcoholmarketing on the internet: new challenges forharm reduction’, Drug and Alcohol Review,Vol. 21, pp. 83–91

Caswell, S. and Maxwell, S. (2005) ‘Regulationof alcohol marketing: a global view’, Journal of

Public Health Policy, Vol. 26, pp. 343–58

Cm. 6374 (2004) Choosing Health: Making

Healthier Choices Easier. London: The StationeryOffice

Coussins, J. (2004) ‘The Portman Group does notrepresent alcohol industry’, British Medical

Journal, Vol. 329, 14 August, p. 404

References

47

References

Cragg Ross Dawson (2004) Alcohol Advertising

and Young People. Available at: http://www.asa.org.uk/NR/rdonlyres/9D4A533A-2977-4B12-95DA-20426F8741EE/0/Alcohol_and_Young_People_10july04.pdf

DCMS (Department for Culture, Media andSport) (2004) Guidance Issued under S182 of the

Licensing Act 2003 and Guidance to Police Officers

on the Operation of Closure Powers in Part 8 of the

Licensing Act 2003. London: DCMS

DCMS (2006) Report of the Independent Review

into the Purpose and Function of the AERC.London: DCMS

DCMS, Home Office and ODPM (2005) Drinking

Responsibly: The Government’s Proposals. London:DCMS, Home Office and ODPM

Doyle, L. (1994) ‘Drinks companies pay dons torubbish alcohol report’, Independent on Sunday,4 December, p. 1

Dring, C. and Hope, A. (2001) The Impact of

Alcohol Advertising on Teenagers in Ireland.Dublin: Health Promotion Unit, Department ofHealth and Children

Drummond, C. (2004) ‘An alcohol strategy forEngland: the good, the bad and the ugly’,Alcohol and Alcoholism, Vol. 39, No. 5, pp. 377–79

Edwards, G., West, R., Barbor, T., Hall, W. andMarsden, J. (2004) ‘An invitation to the alcoholindustry lobby to help decide public funding ofalcohol research and professional training: adecision that should be reversed’, Addiction,Vol. 99, pp. 1235–6

Ellickson, P., Collins, R., Hambarsoomians, K.and McCaffrey, D. (2005) ‘Does alcoholadvertising promote adolescent drinking?’,Addiction, Vol. 100, pp. 235–46

Eurocare (2003) The Beverage Industry’s Social

Aspects Organisations: A Public Health Warning.Paris: Eurocare

EPC (European Policy Centre) (2006) Roundtable

on Alcohol-related Harm: Ways Forward Suggested

Items for Further Discussion. Brussels: EPC

Federal Trade Commission (1999) Self-regulation

in the Alcohol Industry. Washington DC: FTC

Finch, J. (2004) ‘Drink firm’s shock for bingers’The Guardian, 9 October, p. 31

Grabosky, P. and Braithwaite, J. (1986) Of

Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of

Australian Business Regulatory Agencies.Melbourne: Oxford University Press

Grant, M. and O’Connor, J. (2005) Corporate

Social Responsibility and Alcohol. New York:Routledge

Grayson, D. and Hodges, A. (2004) Corporate

Social Opportunity: Seven Steps to Make Corporate

Social Responsibility Work for Your Business.Sheffield: Greenleaf

Grube, J. and Nygaard, P. (2001) ‘Adolescentdrinking and alcohol policy’, Contemporary Drug

Problems, Vol. 28, pp. 87–131

Hastings, G., Anderson, S., Cooke, E. andGordon, R. (2005) ‘Alcohol marketing andyoung people’s drinking: a review of theresearch’, Journal of Public Health Policy, Vol. 26,pp. 296–311

48


Hill, L. (2004) ‘Alcohol advertisement in NewZealand: time for second thoughts on self-regulation’, The Globe, Nos 1/2, pp. 43–5

Hinsliff, G. and Asthana, A. (2005) ‘Drink giant’splans to fuel binge Britain’, The Observer,23 October, pp. 1–2

Home Affairs Committee (2005) Anti-social

Behaviour Fifth Report of Session 2004–5, Vol. I,22 March, HC 80-I

Home Office (2006) ‘Violent crime fallsfollowing blitz on alcohol related disorder’,press release, 8 February

ICAP (International Centre for Alcohol Policies)(2000) The Geneva Partnership on Alcohol; Towards

a Global Charter. Geneva: ICAP

ICAP (2004) ‘Sharing best practice on self-regulation: an international workshop’, report ofmeeting, London, 28–9 October

Jackson, M., Hastings, G., Wheeler, C., Eadie, D.and Mackintosh, A. (2000) ‘Marketing alcohol toyoung people: implications for industryregulation and research policy’, Addiction,Vol. 95, Nos 4–5, pp. 5597–608

Jernigan, D., Ostroff, J. and Ross, C. (2005)‘Alcohol advertising and youth: a measuredapproach’, Journal of Public Health Policy, Vol. 26,pp. 312–25

Jones, S. (2000) ‘The decline of ethics or thefailure of self-regulation? The case of alcoholadvertising’, in A. O’Cass (ed.) Proceedings of the

Australian and New Zealand Marketing Academy

Conference 2000, Visionary Marketing for the 21st

century: Facing the Challenge. Brisbane: School ofMarketing and Management, GriffithUniversity, pp. 595–99

Key Note (2005) Drinks Market – Overview.Hampton: Key Note

Kolvin, P. (2005) Licensed Premises: Law and

Practice. Haywards Heath: Tottel

Labour Party (2005) Britain Forward not Back: The

Labour Party Manifesto 2005. London: LabourParty

Levi-Faur, D. and Gilad, S. (2004) ‘Reviewarticle: the rise of the British regulatory state:transcending the privatisation debate’,Comparative Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 105–24

McCreanor, T., Casswell, S. and Hill, L. (2000)‘ICAP and the perils of partnership’, Addiction,Vol. 95, pp. 179–95

Maguire, M. and Nettleton, H. (2003) Reducing

Alcohol-related Violence and Disorder: An

Evaluation of the TASC Project. Research Study265. London: Home Office

Mayor, S. (2004) ‘Researcher objects to drinkindustry representative sitting on alcoholresearch body’, British Medical Journal, Vol. 329,10 July, p. 71

Mistral, W., Velleman, R., Templeton, L.,Mastache, C. (2006) ‘Local action to preventalcohol problems: is the UK CommunityAlcohol Prevention Programme the bestsolution?’ International Journal of Drug Policy,Vol. 17, pp. 278–84

Moran, M. (2003) The British Regulatory State:

High Modernism and Hyper Innovation. Oxford:Oxford University Press

Mosher, J. and Johnson, D. (2005) ‘Flavouredalcohol beverages: an international marketingcampaign that targets youth’, Journal of Public

Health Policy, Vol. 26, pp. 326–42

49

References

Mulvihill, C., Taylor, L., Waller, S., Naidoo, B.and Thom, B. (2005) Prevention and Reduction of

Alcohol Misuse: Evidence Briefing. London: HealthDevelopment Agency

National College of Ireland (1997) The Dublin

Principles. Dublin: National College of Ireland

National Consumer Council (2000) Models of

Self-regulation. London: NCC

National Consumer Council (2005) Three Steps to

Credible Self Regulation: A Checklist of Good

Practice in Self Regulation. Available at:www.nccdev.keymedia.info/regulation/selfreg_three_steps.websiteaddress.pdf

Orley, J. and Logan, D. (2005) ‘Perspectives onpartnerships for corporate social responsibilityin the beverage alcohol industry’, in M. Grantand J. O’Connor (eds) Corporate Social

Responsibility and Alcohol. New York: Routledge

Portman Group (2003) Code of Practice on the

Naming, Packaging and Promotion of Alcoholic

Drinks. London: Portman Group

Portman Group (2005a) Members’ Commitment to

Action Agreement. London: Portman Group

Portman Group (2005b) Audit of Commitment to

Action Agreement. London: Portman Group

Room, R. (2005) ‘Disabling the public interest:alcohol strategies and policies for England’,Addiction, Vol. 99, pp. 1083–9

Room, R., Babor, T. and Rehm, J. (2005) ‘Alcoholand public health’, The Lancet, Vol. 365, 5February, pp. 519–30

Scotch Whisky Association (no date) Code of

Practice for the Responsible Marketing and

Promotion of Scotch Whisky. Edinburgh: SWA

Shults, R., Elder, R., Sleet, D., Nichols, J., Alas,M., Grande-Kulis, V., Zaza, S., Sosin, D. andThompson, R. (2001) ‘Reviews of evidenceregarding interventions to reduce alcoholimpaired driving’, American Journal of Preventive

Medicine, Vol. 21, No. 4S, pp. 66–88

Snyder, L., Milici, F., Slater, M., Sun, H. andStrizhakova, Y. (2006) ‘Effect of alcoholadvertising exposure on drinking amongyouth’, American Journal of Paediatric and

Adolescent Medicine, Vol. 160, pp. 18–24

Social Market Foundation (2006) The National

Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy: What Are the

‘Next Steps’ for the Industry? Proceedings from a

Social Market Foundation Seminar. London: SMF

Social Responsibility Standards for the Production

and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks in the UK. Availableat: www.scotch-whisky.org.uk/AlcoholHealth_Docs/documents/Social%20Responsibility%20Standards%20Final.pdf

STAP National Foundation for AlcoholPrevention (2003) Don’t Ask a Bird to Clip its Own

Wings. Utrecht: STAP

Stockwell, T., Lang, E. and Rydon, P. (1993)‘High risk drink settings: the association ofserving and promotional practices with harmfuldrinking’, Addiction, Vol. 88, pp. 1519–26

Toomey, T., Wagenaar, A., Gehan, J., Kilian, C.,Murray, D. and Perry, C. (2001) ‘Project ARM:alcohol risk management to prevent sales tounderage and intoxicated patrons’, Health

Education and Behaviour, Vol. 28 (2), pp. 186–99

50


Victoria Parliament Drugs and CrimePrevention Committee (2006) Final Report:

Inquiries into Strategies to Reduce Harmful Alcohol

Consumption. Melbourne: Government Printerfor the State of Victoria

Warburton, A. and Shepherd, J. (2000)‘Effectiveness of toughened glassware in termsof reducing injury in bars: a randomisedcontrolled trial’, Injury Prevention, Vol. 6,pp. 36–40

Warner, J. (2006) ‘Jeremy Warner’s outlook: asWetherspoon shows, good citizenry costsmoney, but it may be worth it in the end’, The

Independent, 3 September, p. 51