Alligator Rivers Region Advisory Committee meeting 41 ......9 April 2014 ARRAC41 Meeting Summary Page 2 of 20 Agenda Agenda Item Meeting Start 0930 1 Welcome 2 Apologies/Observers

Alligator Rivers Region Advisory Committee

Meeting 41

Meeting Summary

9 April 2014

ARRAC41 Meeting Summary Page 2 of 20

Agenda

Agenda Item

Meeting Start 0930

1 Welcome

2 Apologies/Observers

3 ARRAC40 Meeting Summary and Actions

4 Governance/Appointments

5 Supervising Scientist Report

6 Energy Resources of Australia Ltd Report

7 NT Department of Mines and Energy Report

8 Ranger Uranium Mine Leach Tank Incident Taskforce - Update

9 Presentation: Causal factors influencing snail egg production at upstream and downstream monitoring sites in Magela and Gulungul Creeks (Dr Chris Humphrey SSD)

10 Member Reports

10.1 Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation

10.2 Northern Land Council

10.3 Environment Centre NT

10.4 Cameco Australia Pty Ltd

10.5 NT Environment Protection Authority

10.6 NT Department of Health

10.7 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency

10.8 Australian Government - Department of Industry

10.9 Australian Government - Parks Australia

10.10 Uranium Equities Ltd

10.11 Afmeco Mining and Exploration Pty Ltd / Areva Group

11 Other Business

12 Next Meeting

Meeting Close 1500


1 WELCOME The Chair welcomed members and observers to the meeting. Mr McAllister provided a facilities and safety briefing. The Chair noted Ms Kimberley Dripps (Deputy Secretary, Department of the Environment) and Mr Dave Sweeny (Australian Conservation Foundation) are attending the meeting as observers.

2 APOLOGIES AND ATTENDANCE Apologies from the following members were noted. Members Position Organisation

Peter Johnston Member Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency

Richard O’Brien Deputy member Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency

Xavier Schobben Member Northern Territory Government - Department of Health

Russell Ball Member Northern Territory Government - Department of Mines and Energy

Scott Perkins Member Representing the Office of the Administrator of the Northern Territory

Gillian Jan Deputy member Representing the Office of the Administrator of the Northern Territory

Melissa Taylor Member Uranium Equities Limited

Sally Barnes Member Australian Government – Parks Australia

Anna Morgan Deputy member Australian Government – Parks Australia

The attendance of the following members and observers was noted. Members/Deputy members Organisation

Charles Webb Independent Chairperson

Damien Ewington Cameco Australia Pty Ltd

Tim Eckersley Energy Resources of Australia Ltd

Joe Potter AREVA NC

Lauren Mellor Environment Centre Northern Territory

Justin O’Brien Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation

Melanie Impey Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation

Adam Thompson Northern Land Council

Russell Robinson Northern Territory Government – Department of Health

Bill Freeland Northern Territory Government – Environment Protection Authority

Virginia Leitch Australian Government – Department of Industry (by phone)

Peter Waggitt Northern Territory Government - Department of Mines and Energy

Michael Sheldrick Australian Government - Department of Industry (by phone)

Jean-Pierre Issaverdis Australian Government – Parks Australia

Richard McAllister Supervising Scientist Division

Observers Organisation

Kimberley Dripps Australian Government – Department of the Environment

Rick Tinker Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency

Dave Sweeny Australian Conservation Foundation per ECNT

Sally Strohmayr Northern Territory Government - Department of Mines and Energy

Todd Simms Energy Resources of Australia Ltd

Sharon Paulka Energy Resources of Australia Ltd

Keith Tayler Supervising Scientist Division

Ally Sinclair Supervising Scientist Division

John Miller Supervising Scientist Division

Wayne Erskine Supervising Scientist Division (eriss)

Rick van Dam Supervising Scientist Division (eriss)

Chris Humphrey Supervising Scientist Division (eriss)

ARRAC Secretariat

Scott Parker Supervising Scientist Division

Shannon Traut Supervising Scientist Division


3 DRAFT ARRAC40 MEETING SUMMARY AND ACTIONS ARISING The draft ARRAC40 meeting summary was approved as tabled with the following change requested by Mr Thompson on page 10:

“...“He advised that, since last ARRAC, NLC had convened an initial meeting with Cameco Australia Pty Ltd to discuss mining tenements in the Northern Territory. on the East Alligator River. “

The status of the following ARRAC40 actions was noted. Action Status

ARRAC40: 1 ARRAC requested that Dr Humphrey provide a presentation to next meeting on the possible causal factors influencing egg production at the upstream and downstream monitoring sites in Magela and Gulungul Creeks.

Presentation to be provided by Dr Humphrey this meeting.

ARRAC40: 2 ARRAC requested NTDME to report back on the outcomes of current investigations into potential factors contributing to the ongoing lack of conformity between ERA and NTDME surface and groundwater monitoring results.

NTDME to provide update this meeting.

4 GOVERNANCE/APPOINTMENTS (MR PARKER)

Mr Parker noted the following status of the following actual/anticipated ARRAC vacancies.

Stakeholder Organisation Vacancy (actual/anticipated) Status

Environment Centre NT Member Request from ECNT (25/3/14) to replace Rob Law with Lauren Mellor as member and appoint Dave Sweeny (ACF) as deputy member.

Cameco Australia Pty Ltd Deputy member Request from Cameco Australia Pty Ltd that their deputy member position remain vacant pending nomination.

Australian Government - Department of Industry

Deputy member Awaiting nomination.

ARPANSA Member and Deputy member Awaiting nomination.

West Arnhem Regional Council

Member Awaiting nomination.

SSD Member Richard McAllister is acting Supervising Scientist.

5 SUPERVISING SCIENTIST DIVISION REPORT (MR TAYLER/MS SINCLAIR)

Mr Tayler presented the SSD ARRAC41 Supervision and Assessment report. Key points are summarised below.

INSPECTIONS AND AUDITS

During the period since last meeting, Routine Periodic Inspections (RPI) were conducted at Ranger (7) and Jabiluka (4). Audits were also conducted in September 2013 at King River Camp (Cameco) and Myra Camp (Alligator Energy) sites and an inspection was undertaken at the former UXA exploration site in West Arnhem. The focus of the RPIs at Ranger and Jabiluka varied over time depending on the status of site specific developments and the need to follow up issues arising from previous RPI and Audit findings.

The annual audit of Alligator Energy exploration activities assessed compliance with 22 commitments from the 2013 Mining Management Plan and included inspections of the Myra Camp, Two Rocks and Caramel prospect sites. SSD was generally impressed with the audit findings which included 3 observations.

The audit of Cameco exploration activities assessed compliance with 42 commitments from the 2013 Mining Management Plan and included inspections of King River Camp and exploration activities within King River and Wellington Range tenements. Audit findings included two minor non conformances (few uncapped drill holes and weed wash down) and one conditional finding (pump bunding).


The inspection of the UXA exploration activities and rehabilitation works confirmed that all drill pads have been rehabilitated and rehabilitation of the creek crossing between areas 1 and 2 may be required in the future.

LEACH TANK FAILURE INCIDENT

Mr Tayler outlined the range of chemical, biological and radiological sampling and monitoring undertaken by SSD on and off the Ranger mine site as part of the Supervising Scientist’s ongoing independent investigation into the environmental consequences of the leach tank failure incident. ERA data for EC and pH in RP2, and SSD data for EC and uranium in Magela Creek, in the period prior to and following the incident were presented. Mr Tayler noted that, while an amount of the acidic slurry had entered RP2, pH levels in RP2 had not increased and had remained in historical range. This was expected given the significant dilution factor involved. He also noted that trace elements in Magela Creek all remained below limits post incident. Mr Tayler advised that all relevant sampling and monitoring results would be included in the final report which will be publically released.

DISCUSSION - Prof Web asked when the Supervising Scientist’s final report would be available. Mr Tayler advised the investigation has been slightly delayed but should be completed by the end of May 2014 and the report would be released after this. Mr McAllister noted the actual timing for the release of the report would be determined taking account of the requirements of the Leach Tank Incident Taskforce. Mr O’Brien asked if the charts presented this meeting were also in the SSD ARRAC41 report and Mr Tayler advised they weren’t. Mr O’Brien asked what level of flow was in Magela Creek at the downstream monitoring station when the incident occurred and Mr Tayler advised flow was about 28 cumecs. He noted that water levels were low as the incident had occurred at the commencement of the flow period. Mr Robinson asked if Mg measured in the creek is a signature of mine input. Mr Tayler advised that the concentration of Mg in the creek generally depends on the geochemistry of the host rock in the catchment. Mr McAllister advised that Mg in Magela Creek is typically considered to be a signal of Ranger mine site discharge due to runoff from the waste rock stockpiles. He also noted that Mg is linked to EC (i.e. Mg SO4). Ms Mellor asked if SSD specifically examines maintenance records as part of the RPIs undertaken with stakeholders and, if so, how often this occurs and when was the last time the leach tank maintenance records were reviewed. Mr Tayler advised that, while SSD may request to sight documentary evidence during RPIs, a RPI would not usually address this level of detail due to time constraints. He advised that a detailed review of maintenance records to confirm the operator is complying with relevant standards and regulatory conditions was something that might be included in the annual Audit of the site which usually occurs over several days. Ms Mellor asked if SSD therefore relies on assurance from ERA that all maintenance systems are up to date. Mr Tayler advised that SSD is concerned to ensure the operator is managing the site in a safe and appropriate way which ensures all potential risks to the offsite environment are being effectively mitigated. He noted SSD does not routinely assess the condition of plant and equipment on the site. Ms Mellor noted that the report recently released by ERA on the outcomes of its own investigations into the root cause of the tank failure had identified 35 other pieces of infrastructure assets on the mine site that will need to be assessed before processing can restart. She asked if SSD would be looking at these assets as well. Mr Waggitt indicated this was not the responsibility of SSD and noted these matters are being already being considered as part of the investigation and review commissioned by the Taskforce. Ms Mellor noted the ERA report clearly identified separate assets on the mine site that may be on the brink of failure and asked why this wouldn’t be of prime interest and concern to SSD. Mr Tayler advised that the focus of the current SSD investigation is on confirming there has been no impact on the environment as a result of the incident. SSD is not looking at the root cause of the tank failure or the condition of other plant and equipment on the mine site as this is the responsibility of the relevant regulatory agencies. Mr Sweeny asked if the findings of the investigation and review commissioned by the Taskforce will also be released as discrete and public reports. Mr McAllister advised the content and timing of other reports in relation to the incident are matters for the Taskforce members and NTDME to determine. Mr Sweeny asked what role SSD has in relation to the removal of remnant mining infrastructure from the former Koongarra lease. Mr McAllister advised this is primarily a matter for Parks Australia and AREVA NC, however, SSD has provided technical advice in the past. Mr Issaverdis advised that dialogue between Parks Australia and AREVA in relation to this matter is ongoing. Mr Sweeny asked about the rock fall that apparently occurred in the Ranger 3 Deeps decline in February. Mr Tayler advised that SSD was aware that there had been a minor rock


fall within the decline and the alignment of the decline had been modified in order to avoid less competent rock conditions but, as far as the Supervising Scientist was aware, there had been no mine “collapse” as had been suggested. Mr Sweeny advised he would take the matter up with ERA later in the meeting.

Mr Sweeny noted the specific recommendation contained in the report by the UN Secretary General on the outcomes of the Fukushima incident that countries that mine fissionable material should undertake an in-depth assessment of the environmental costs and human health implications of uranium mining had been raised again at Senate Estimates1. Mr Sweeny stated the fact that there has been no formal response by the Australian Government to this recommendation to date was of significant concern to non-government environment groups and the broader community. He suggested this was of even more significance given the fact that Australian uranium was being used in the Fukushima reactor at the time. Mr O’Brien asked which government agencies have responsibility for managing the rehabilitation bond for Ranger mine paid by ERA. Ms Leitch advised the Department of Industry has responsibility for the Ranger security bond on behalf of the Commonwealth Government. Mr O’Brien asked if the Department of Industry is aware of the statement on page 17 of the ERA 2013 Annual Report suggesting ERA’s possible inability to fund the rehabilitation of the Ranger Project Area and conditionally linking this to the approval of the Ranger 3 Deeps project. Mr O’Brien asked how the Australian Government plans to respond given this uncertainty. Ms Leitch advised there are two different rehabilitation amounts being discussed. The rehabilitation provision mentioned in the ERA annual Report is calculated by ERA in accordance with accounting standards on the basis of mining continuing to 2021. The separate security bond held by the Commonwealth is calculated on the basis of estimated costs involved in rehabilitating the site in the event ERA was to immediately cease operating for any reason. Mr O’Brien asked what the current value of the security bond held by the Commonwealth for Ranger is and Ms Leitch advised this information is confidential.

MONITORING

Ms Sinclair presented monitoring results for the period since last meeting. Key points are summarised below.

Current monitoring program activities for Ranger and Jabiluka include continuous data collection in Magela, Gulungul and Swift Creeks, event based auto-sampling in Magela and Gulungul Creeks, field toxicity measurements (snail egg production) in Magela and Gulungul Creeks, community studies on bioaccumulation (freshwater mussels) and atmospheric radiation monitoring (Radon and dust). SSD maintains upstream and downstream sampling sites for Ranger on Magela and Gulungul Creeks and a downstream site for Jabiluka on Swift Creek.

Magela Creek

There were a number of EC peaks during the period coinciding with rainfall events and subsequent drops in water levels allowing backflow billabongs to flow out (which generally have higher EC waters). There was generally good conformance between ERA and SSD data from upstream monitoring sites, especially from January onwards when flow was higher. A similar situation was observed at the SSD and ERA downstream sites. There were a number of peaks in turbidity in the early wet season associated with first flush effects. The pH results were consistent with general trend of being lower downstream at the beginning of the wet season and then increasing and being higher downstream as the season progresses. There were a number of peaks in pH both upstream and downstream that were above action limits. It was noted the limits for pH are based on weekly grab samples. Uranium levels remained below the focus limit for the period. It was noted that SSD had increased the frequency of sampling following the tank failure incident. Manganese concentrations remained below focus limits, except for one downstream result in late November which was below the action limit. Magnesium concentrations also remained below the focus limit. Sulfate levels during the period remained below 1.5 mg/L except for a peak in late December which coincided with an EC spike. Total Ammonia Nitrogen was added to the water quality objectives due to the operation of the brine concentrator. Concentrations of

1 “...To help countries to evaluate the potential contribution of nuclear energy to sustainable development, an in-depth

assessment of the net cost impact of the following is needed: Local impacts of mining. There are concerns regarding the impact of mining fissionable material on local communities and ecosystems. “ (United Nations system-wide study on the implications of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant - Report of the Secretary-General, 22 September 2011, Page 14)


TAN were just above detection limits. Radium-226 activity concentrations from monthly composites remained well below the limit of 10 mBq/L consistent with a natural background source.

Gulungul Creek

Wet season EC levels in Gulungul fluctuated more and exceeded the action level on a higher frequency compared to previous years where peaks were associated with late wet season rainfall events. There were a number of rainfall related EC peaks upstream early in the wet season (i.e. not mine derived). Conformance between SSD and ERA EC data at the upstream site was good. However, conformance at the downstream site was poor which prompted further investigation. The SSD and ERA downstream sites are located approximately 1 km apart. The investigation looked at stratification across the channels and the effects of possible dilution occurring from inflow from the west (left) bank tributary. Sondes were installed on the East bank on 23 January 2014 and results indicated that the EC peak measured at the ERA site had been diluted to just over action level by the time it reached the SSD monitoring location on the east bank and over focus levels on the west bank. SSD also looked at EC at the upstream at the Radon Springs track coming from GCT2. A number of Diver EC loggers were deployed on the confluence with Gulungul Creek and water samples were taken at the same time. SSD data for U, Mg, Mn and SO4 were low compared to ERA data from GCT2. Radium-226 activity concentration was higher at the upstream site.

Ngarradj (Swift Creek)

Due to low water levels and high evapo-concentration, EC levels were higher during early wet season. EC levels below 20 µS/cm are typical of this site. EC levels are slightly higher for rainfall events than previous years. There were a number of turbidity spikes this season with one exceeding 56NTU.

Bioaccumulation monitoring (Freshwater mussel - Velesunio angasi)

The mean uranium concentration in soft mussel parts is compared to previous 14 years results. Still waiting for results of this year’s water quality analyses but there appears to be a slight increase in 226Ra and 228Ra this year compared to the average of previous years. However, the results are generally within a few standard deviations of the long term mean. The 228Ra/226Ra ratio indicates there has been no change to the 226Ra load per mussel. The slight increase observed may be due to the increased dry weight of the mussels (i.e. extracting more water from the sample results in a slight increase in concentration). The annual committed effective dose 228Ra + 226Ra was higher than last year but was still below the median. So despite the apparent increase in Radium concentration, the actual cohort comprises smaller and younger age classes, so there hasn’t been an increase overall. Heavy metal concentration levels remained considerably below food safety guidelines as in previous years.

Atmospheric monitoring Atmospheric monitoring was conducted in Jabiru Town and at Mudginberri (Four Gates Road). Potential Alpha Energy Concentration (PAEC) and Long Lived Alpha Activity (LLAA) data were presented. Levels of radon gas and radon decay products (RDP) in the atmosphere are generally higher during the dry season (due to increased dust) than the wet season (due to the soil being saturated). As a result of higher gamma contribution, the average doses across site were elevated this year, but remain very low compared to the limit of 20 mSv per annum. Most work groups showed a reduction in average and maximum LLAA and RDP. The maximum dose this year was 6.5 mSv (Processing Production Operator) and is higher than that observed in 2012.

DISCUSSION - Prof Webb asked if the higher ERA EC readings downstream in Gulungul Creek relate to local detection of input from Radon Springs. Ms Sinclair advised the higher levels were from the GCT2 tributary where it crosses the Radon Springs track. Prof Web asked what the likely source of the EC is and Ms Sinclair indicated the EC is believed to be mine related and probably MgSO4 coming from the TSF wall. Mr McAllister noted that it is likely that run-off from the additional rock placed as part of the TSF lift has entered the shallow groundwater. He advised that SSD is currently in discussions with ERA regarding possible mitigation measures. Mr Eckersley advised that ERA had engaged GHD to undertake some investigations into the source of solutes which had come up with similar results. He noted that by the time the EC moves downstream it has been diluted. Mr Thompson suggested the decision to locate the current SSD Gulungul Creek sampling site on the west bank was unfortunate, especially when it is known the mine water discharge tends to track the east


bank. Mr McAllister noted this and advised SSD may need to install additional instrumentation further into the creek. Mr Thompson asked why it has taken so long for the elevated EC events to finally be pin pointed to this tributary. Ms Sinclair advised that it was known previously that the TSF wall was a source term for solutes and this was why surface runoff from the wall had previously been intercepted using sumps. Mr Tayler noted that based on work undertaken by Dr Alan Puhalovich a few years ago, it was thought that once the surface water pathway was cut off, EC would start to decline over a number of years. However, as EC levels have continued to be high, it appears that some other process is involved. Ms Impey noted that the transport of solutes from the TSF wall into Gulungul Creek has been occurring for a significant period of time and asked why something to mitigate this wasn’t done earlier. Mr Tayler noted that the placement of additional rock on the TSF wall is probably a key causal factor. Mr McAllister noted that SSD has asked ERA to address the current situation. Mr O’Brien noted that GAC had raised a number of specific concerns with SSD and other agencies regarding this issue quite a few years ago. He noted, in particular, Mr Geoff Kyle had raised serious concerns about the issue which had led to the establishment of a Parliamentary inquiry, but had been subjected to public criticism and ridicule by the then Supervising Scientist and others at that time. Mr O’Brien suggested that, given the current situation, Mr Kyle is owned a formal apology. He noted that, while there has been some fine tuning around surface water management, he was still to be convinced that the solutes are due to top down contamination of the shallow groundwater. Mr O’Brien noted it is remarkable that the issue still has not been resolved after such a long period of time.

6 ERA REPORT (MR ECKERSLEY)

Mr Eckersley provided the ERA report for ARRAC41. Key points raised are summarised below. Mr Eckersley acknowledged the Mirrar as the Traditional Owners of the land on which Ranger is located and provided the ERA update report covering Ranger operations, developments and safety performance.

Safety, People and Diversity - ERA had an All Injury Frequency Rate of 0.91 for 2013 with 7 reportable injuries and a record 188 injury free days. This is down on previous year performance. ERA continues to be the major employer in the West Arnhem region with (at March 2014) 570 employees of which 16 % are indigenous and 18 % are female. ERA has taken on 4 school based apprentices and 2 trainees through the Education Partnership with the West Arnhem College.

Finance - ERA reported a net loss last year of $136 million which was in line with market projections. The operating loss was affected by a significant degree by non-cash costs which not unexpected in a mine like Ranger with declining reserves. Cash costs and capital expenditure were lower than in 2012.

Operations - The total amount of ore treated in 2013 was third highest on record over the life of Ranger. The majority of high grade ore mined in 2012 was processed in the first half of 2013. A total of 2,960 tonnes of uranium oxide was produced which was within the guidance range of (2,800-3,200 tonnes). The installation of the Brine Concentrator was completed in September 2013 and commissioning is ongoing. Ranger processing operations were suspended on 7 December 2013 following the leach tank failure. Rehabilitation activities are ongoing and significant progress is being made. About 27 million tonnes, out of a total 30 million tonnes of backfill, had been placed in Pit #3 by the end of March 2014. Rehabilitation of Pit#1 is progressing with 70% of the preload now in place. So far there has been an additional 600 mm of tailings consolidation over past 6 months. Over 3000 native seedlings have been planted as part of Jabiluka revegetation.

Water management – Rainfall during the first half of the wet season was average and increased above average in the second half so overall expected to be an average wet season. Water level in the TSF increased due to rainfall but has tapered off due to brine concentrator operation. Currently the TSF is 1m below the maximum operating limit and 2.5m below the top of the clay core. Pit #1 is 1.5m below the maximum operating level. Pond water inventory has increased significantly with total of 2.7GL currently. All water treatment plants on the site are operating.

Recovery from leach tank failure – The failure of the leach tank on 7 December 2013 resulted in no injuries. This reflects well on the professionalism and performance of the ERA personal involved. The tank failure resulted in the spill of an amount of ore slurry. While the slurry did reach RP2 it was contained on the mine site. Plant processing was suspended voluntarily and clean up commenced. ERA has undertaken its own root cause investigation which identified the tank failure was due to corrosion of the tank wall following a breach


of the inner rubber lining as a result of movement of a detached internal agitating baffle. Work to dismantle the leach tank has been completed. ERA has drawn on its inventory of uranium oxide to meet sales commitments in first half of 2014 and will need to look at stock purchasing if required. Estimated clean up costs of $1.7M including $1.3M provision for demolition were included in the 2013 financial statements. The full financial impact for 2014 is currently being assessed. ERA has undertaken planning for restarting processing subject to regulatory approvals. A review of site processing infrastructure integrity made 35 pre-start recommendations and identified 1138 items as critical assets and systems requiring consideration prior to re-start. These included 7 recommendations to inspect and verify the integrity of key processing tanks. This report was provided to the taskforce.

DISCUSSION - Mr O’Brien asked if the report ERA provided to the Department of Industry team of Noetic and HRL is different to the report ERA provided to the Department of the Environment. Mr Eckersley advised that Intersafe did the root cause investigation and this was appended with the ERA report submitted to NTDME. Mr Waggitt advised NTDME would be submitting this report to the Taskforce. Mr O’Brien asked if the Intersafe report had informed ERA’s public statements and Mr Eckersley confirmed this. Mr O’Brien asked who is ALS and Mr Eckersley advised ALS is the integrity consultant commissioned by ERA. Mr O’Brien asked if ALS has had communications with Noetic and HRL. Mr Eckersley confirmed this and noted ALS and HRL are comparable entities in terms of their expertise. Mr O’Brien asked if Noetic has sighted the scope of work for these firms. Mr Eckersley indicated he would need to follow this up but noted the purchase orders including the scope of work had been provided to the Taskforce. Mr O’Brien asked if SSD has been shown the inspection plans and Mr Eckersley advised SSD hadn’t seen them. Ms Mellor asked when the failed leach tank had last been inspected prior to the failure. Mr Eckersley advised there are 7 leach tanks on site and each tank is inspected annually and more frequently if required. Ms Mellor asked if anything had been detected when the tank was last inspected. Mr Eckersley confirmed there hadn’t been any issues indentified with the tank at its last inspection however he clarified that these inspections are visual and not structural. He noted that all maintenance records for the tanks had been provided to Noetic. Ms Mellor asked if the ERA review recommended that maintenance systems on the mine site be upgraded. Mr Eckersley advised that ERA has specified that future inspections be on a monthly level. Mr Sweeny noted that ERA made a statement to the ASX putting the cost of cleaning up the tank incident at $1.7M and asked if this figure has changed as a result of the report commissioned by ERA. Mr Eckersley advised the estimated costing was for the immediate clean up not the flow on effects. Mr Sweeny asked what mine assets have to be fixed prior to restart versus those which may be able to be addressed following restart. Mr Eckersley advised there are a range of items which will need to be addressed within the next 6 – 12 months (e.g. access points) and some that have to be done prior to restart (e.g. the tank inspections). Mr Sweeny asked, as ERA has already come out with its findings, where is the Taskforce sourcing its primary analysis from that is not reliant on ERA information. Mr Waggitt advised the work of the Taskforce is confidential but he can confirm that Noetic has been onsite and supervising the inspections. Mr Sweeney questioned the future options regarding prosecution but Mr Waggitt advised that NTDME has received legal advice in relation to the rules of evidence which constrains what can be discussed. Mr Sweeny noted that environmental NGOs and other interested community groups will have a keen interest in this and this will be a judgement point. Mr O’Brien noted that ERA stated the area of impact from the tank failure included hard stand and roadway and asked what grassed areas were also impacted. Mr Eckersley advised that the roadway adjoins various grassed areas and some splash back on these areas occurred during the spill. Mr O’Brien asked if Mr Eckersley was aware that the original ERA media release stated that no grassed areas were impacted and this was only subsequently changed when raised by a journalist from the ABC. Mr O’Brien asked how this sits with ERA’s obligations and commitments under the current agreement with GAC. Mr Eckersley advised that he understands the concerns of stakeholders regarding potential impacts on groundwater due to the incident. He noted that only a very small portion of grassed area was affected by the spill. ARRAC41: 1 - Mr Eckersley agreed to provide GAC with further details on the grassed area affected by the spill of slurry following the leach tank failure. Mr Thompson asked if the equipment used to test the tanks is able to measure the thickness and condition of the rubber lining. Mr Eckersley advised it can’t but noted the rubber lining is tested at the time the tank is


installed. Ms Mellor asked if the details of 35 assets to be checked will be made public to stakeholders, especially if it is shown the leach tank failed due to poor maintenance. Mr Eckersley noted that further details of the assets to be inspected may be released as the work of the Taskforce progresses. Ms Mellor asked why these details can’t be released now. Mr Eckersley responded that the report was prepared principally for the ERA board and is commercial-in-confidence. Mr O’Brien asked when the asset integrity report is due to be finalised. Mr Eckersley advised the report is already finalised. Mr O’Brien asked when work to follow up on the recommendations in the report will be finalised. Mr Eckersley indicated over the next few months. Mr O’Brien asked what the media release from ERA today covered. Mr Eckersley advised the media release today covered the ERA Board’s approval of a plan for restarting processing subject to regulatory approvals. Mr O’Brien noted this means that ERA could effectively restart production in May this year. Mr Robinson noted there was a link to an ERA report on the ABC News website and asked if he could obtain a copy. Mr Eckersley advised there was no report but rather a number of fact sheets. Mr Sweeny acknowledged that Mr Eckersley can’t speak on behalf of the Taskforce but urged ERA to publically release their report to inform stakeholders. Mr Sweeny noted that a very similar tank failure had occurred at another RioTinto mine at Rossing around the same time as Ranger. He asked Mr Eckersley his sense of the reasons why the Rossing mine is still up and running and Ranger is not. Mr Eckersley noted the two mines operate subject to fundamentally different environmental conditions and regulatory regimes, and obviously the location of Ranger is a key factor. He also noted the incident at Rossing had involved a different mode of failure to the Ranger tank failure. Mr Eckersley advised that remedial and investigative actions undertaken by ERA in relation to the leach tank failure at Ranger would have been done regardless of any regulatory requirements. Ms Mellor asked if the other government agencies involved have been advised which assets at Ranger are in need of further inspection. Mr Eckersley advised this information has only been provided to the individual independent assessors not the members of the Taskforce. Mr O’Brien asked if the scope of works approved by the ERA Board will be made public. Mr Eckersley advised the scope of works addressing the three recommendations has been provided to the members of the Taskforce but it is up to the ERA Board as to whether these are released publically. Mr O’Brien asked where the failed tank is currently located and Mr Eckersley advised the dismantled tank has been stored in a sea container for the past two weeks. Mr O’Brien asked where the tank was prior to this and for how long. Mr Eckersley advised the dismantled tank was moved from the plant area and held in a lay down yard before being transferred to the sea container. Mr O’Brien asked if the tank had been transported in such a way that some parts of the tank could be damaged to an extent that would prevent someone determining the root cause of the failure – and is HRL sufficiently expert to do this. Mr Eckersley indicated that as far as he was aware no testing on the tank has been done as yet. He also noted that ERA was not subject to any preservation order from NT Worksafe or NTDME. Ms Impey asked if all 35 recommendations deal with assets or do they also include corporate governance arrangements. Mr Eckersley advised the recommendations also deal with systems and procedures, and the recommended system checks relate to documentation and process control elements etc. Unauthorised vehicle incident – Mr Eckersley advised the hire vehicle had been used in the controlled area by contractors and had been cleaned in preparedness for departure. The vehicle had been driven off site through a hole in the perimeter fence and subsequently detected and apprehended by the mine security team. The incident highlighted a significant failure in ERA systems and stakeholder notification processes. Following a detailed investigation the two people involved were removed from site. ERA has developed and implemented a range of improvement measures including changes to the ERA radiation management system which have been signed off by ARPANSA. An upgrade of the perimeter fence has also been scheduled.

DISCUSSION - Mr Sweeney asked if any criminal proceedings arose from the incident. Mr Eckersley advised that no criminal action was taken by the NT Police as it was considered such action was not justified. Mr Tayler noted there is a provision for criminal action under the NT Mining Management Act. Mr Waggitt advised that it was really up to the NT Police as to whether charges would be preferred. Mr Sweeny asked if prosecutions didn’t proceed because the NT Police didn’t want to pursue the matter or because ERA did not seek to press charges. Mr Eckersley suggested probably a bit of both, although he noted ERA did go back to the Police in response to stakeholder concerns, but there was no interest in pursuing the matter.


Progressive rehabilitation – Mr Eckersley noted that despite the significant disruption to processing due to the tank incident, progressive rehabilitation work has continued on the site. The backfilling of Pit #3 is ahead of schedule and rehabilitation of Pit #1 is also well advanced. The Integrated Tailings Water and Closure Study is complete and has identified the optimal rehabilitation plan for Ranger Project Area. There has been no change in the rehabilitation provision which currently stands at $603 million (at 31 December 2013). Mr Eckersley noted that ERA has positive cash flow and has sufficient cash to meet rehabilitation obligations. The Jabiluka Interim Water Management Pond has been removed and rehabilitation is well advanced. Ranger 3 Deeps – The Ranger 3 Deeps exploration decline is currently 2026m lineal distance from the surface or approximately 300m deep. Exploration drilling is about 50% complete. Decline drilling should be finalised by the end of 2014 and ERA will then need to assess the economic feasibility of the underground mine. The decline tunnel has been realigned to avoid unstable ground. Despite various reports, there was no major collapse in the decline tunnel. There was a minor rock fall in an underground sump which was reported to NT Worksafe. This combined with the realignment of the tunnel and a mine safety exercise conducted around the same time may have been the basis of the rumours. The Ranger 3 Deeps underground mine EIS is scheduled to be submitted in the second half of 2014, slightly behind schedule. Subject to regulatory and ERA Board approvals, underground mining would commence in late 2015. Brine concentrator – The Brine Concentrator is a significant component of the rehabilitation process and will be used to reduce the process water inventory to zero. The Brine Concentrator is still in the commissioning phase and current focus is on resolving ongoing scaling problems in the heat exchanger. ERA is considering a range of options including chemical and operational changes to optimise operational efficiency. Mr Eckersley advised that arrangements are in place for operations to restart subject to regulatory approvals. ERA continues to have a very strong focus on cash management, including production efficiencies. Key rehabilitation projects continue to progress well and are on budget and ahead of schedule. The Ranger 3 Deeps Exploration Decline and Ranger 3 Deeps Mine Prefeasibility Study are progressing on budget and on schedule.

DISCUSSION - Mr O’Brien advised that GAC and NLC are comfortable with the progress and status of work on Pit #1 rehabilitation. Mr Thompson noted that NLC awaits the full application and associated details. Mr O’Brien asked to whom ERA reported the minor rock fall in the decline to and Mr Eckersley advised it was reported to NT Worksafe. Mr O’Brien asked when the rock fall occurred and Mr Eckersley advised in November 2013. Mr O’Brien asked if there is a requirement to report all minor incidents to NT Worksafe and how often do these occur. Mr Eckersley advised the incident was minor but was reported. Mr Simms advised all minor injuries also need to be reported to NT Worksafe. Mr O’Brien asked why the Manager of Safety at Ranger wasn’t aware of the rock fall. Mr Simms advised this was due to the underground decline being managed by a contractor under a separate business area within ERA. Mr Sweeny advised he was very concerned that the Supervising Scientist wasn’t notified of the incident given the importance of the project. Mr McAllister advised he wouldn’t necessarily need to know or be notified about such a minor incident. Mr Tayler noted that there was probably no need for SSD to be notified as there were no environmental implications associated with the incident. Mr Sweeny advised that given the high level of stakeholder concern about the exploration decline that it would not be unreasonable to expect that the Supervising Scientist would have an interest in such an incident and thus be required to be notified. Mr Robinson asked if there was any update on the issue of the higher than usual background radiation levels on personal monitors. Mr Simms advised that the issue arose as a result of changes in the methodology used for analysis of TLDs which meant that the total personal dose for each worker included the dose from air travel and security scanning which are normally excluded. Mr Robinson requested further information and Mr Simms offered to forward a copy of the report that ERA provided to regulators on the matter. ARRAC41: 2 - Mr Simms to provide Mr Robinson the report provided to regulatory agencies regarding the higher than usual radiation dose recorded for ERA workers.


Mr Sweeny asked if the statement in the ERA 2013 Annual Report to the effect that “...if the R3Deeps mine is not approved ERA would require additional source of funds for rehabilitation...” was linking approval of Ranger 3 Deeps as a prerequisite for rehabilitation of Ranger Project Area. Mr Eckersley advised he was unable to clarify the wording in the Annual Report. Mr Sweeny advised he is seriously concerned that ERA is unable or unwilling to clarify that the company or RioTinto has the capacity to fulfil their Ranger rehabilitation obligations. Mr Sweeny asked where the $603M provision is held. Mr Eckersley advised that the provision is exactly that, a provision within an accounting framework. Mr Sweeny asked if the provision is separate to the rehabilitation bond and Mr Eckersley confirmed this. Mr Eckersley noted that accounting standards require that a provision be specified separately from cash flow. Mr O’Brien noted it was stated in the ERA Annual Report last year that if the R3 Deeps project was delayed or rejected under unfavourable circumstances, there would be an impact on the provision. Mr Eckersley noted that, if the R3 Deeps project does not proceed, the value of the mine would obviously decline. Mr Sweeny asked when the ERA Board will make the investment decision for Ranger 3 Deeps. Mr Eckersley advised the Pre-feasibility and Feasibility work would need to be completed before the Board could consider it. He noted that R3 Deeps exploration drilling is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2014 and this would also inform any decision. Mr Sweeny asked about the current status of seepage from beneath the TSF. Mr Eckersley noted an additional 80 bores had been installed adjacent to the TSF consistent with the recommendations of the Weaver report. A few of these bores show elevated levels of solutes particularly in the area between the TSF and Gulungul Creek. Mr Sweeny asked if NTDME has done any modelling of head pressures in relation to the movement of solutes from the TSF. Mr Eckersley advised he was not aware of any work in this area. Mr Sweeny referred to the recent scientific paper on the movement of uranium in sediments and asked what ERA is doing about this especially in relation to the existing wetlands on the mine lease. Mr Tayler noted the paper looked at the movement of uranium into pore water. He noted that SSD analyses use total uranium so any movement of uranium attached to organic material would be detected. It was noted that both the Acting Supervising Scientist and the Director

eriss were at the technical workshop when the paper was presented. Mr Tayler agreed further research on this was probably warranted. ARRAC41: 3- Mr Eckersley agreed to provide advice on what actions (if any) ERA has or is planning to take in relation to the issues raised in the paper on uranium and sediment transport from onsite wetlands. Mr Sweeny noted recent allegations of collusion and corrupt behaviour involving the operators of the Fukushima nuclear power plant and senior officials in the Japanese Government regulatory agency. Mr Sweeny asked, in light of this and as ERA is the first Australian producer to supply uranium to Russia, what measures has ERA and/or RioTinto taken post Fukushima to assess existing safeguards arrangements and to improve community confidence. Mr Eckersley noted the export of uranium oxide to Russia was a trial shipment only. He advised that ERA only supplies to countries that are signatories to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Mr Sweeny asked about sales of uranium to India which is not a signatory state. Mr Eckersley advised that ERA is committed to full lifecycle and supply chain stewardship and product security is a prime concern as part of these arrangements. Mr Eckersley advised that ERA also does not supply product to unethical consumers. Mr O’Brien asked where ERA has stated this publically and Mr Eckersley advised this information is on the ERA website. Mr Sweeny asked if ERA would have any issues with complying with the recommendations contained in the UN Secretary General’s report mentioned previously and Mr Eckersley advised that ERA would assist with any process if requested by government. Ms Mellor asked about the recent incident regarding the unsecured transport of uranium product to Ranger. Mr Eckersley noted statements by NT Worksafe that the drums were secured in accordance with the transport code. Ms Mellor noted the acting Supervising Scientist at Senate Estimates also relied on evidence or advice from NT Worksafe that the drums were secured in accordance with relevant codes. She asked if transporting uranium via this method to and from the mine standard practice. Mr Eckersley noted his comments were based on advice provided by the transport company involved. He also advised that the drums actually contained geological samples not uranium product.

7 NT DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND ENERGY REPORT (MS STROHMAYR)

Ms Strohmayr provided an update report on behalf of NTDME. Key points are summarised below.


Minesite Technical Committee (MTC) meetings – there were five meetings of the Ranger and Jabiluka MTCs held during the period. A special Ranger MTC was held in December 2013 following the leach tank failure incident. There were no changes to the Ranger, Jabiluka and Nabarlek Authorisations during the period.

Ranger Uranium Mine – Rainfall at Ranger is slightly above average. Status of key minesite developments include the preload in Pit#1 to enhance consolidation, Ranger 3 Deeps exploration decline is approximately 2000m length from surface; commissioning of the brine concentrator is well underway with an aim to be running at full production in the coming months and Pit #3 continues to be backfilled with 27 out of the total of 30 million tonnes of low grade rock being shifted.

Proposal and approvals – Applications for Ranger covered modifications to the R3D ventilation shaft, the long-term disposal of Brine Concentrator distillate, additional drilling targets for the 2013 Ranger surface exploration program, use of RP1 water during vent shaft earthworks, increasing the TSF Wet Season MOL from 57.9m to 58.7m and the TSF dredge ramp preload. The single application for Jabiluka covered the decommissioning and removal of the Interim Water Management Pond and associated infrastructure, construction and revegetation of the rehabilitated landform.

Environmental Incidents – There were 25 environmental incidents reported for Ranger. Most were minor and three were investigated (controlled vehicle, product drums and the leach tank failure). There were 4 incidents reported for Jabiluka and nil for Nabarlek.

Statutory Reporting – Reports for Ranger included the Quarterly water quality data submission, Ranger Water Management Plan 2013-14, Ranger Mining Management Plan 2013, 2013-14 Ranger Wet Season Reports - Surface Water and Groundwater, Ranger Annual Environment Report 2012-13, Annual Plan of Rehabilitation #39 and the Tailings Annual Inspection Report. Reports for Jabiluka included the Quarterly water quality data submission and the Jabiluka Interpretative Report 2012-2013.

Surface water check monitoring – The NTDME surface water monitoring program includes five statutory surface water monitoring sites at Ranger and Jabiluka. NTDME conducted joint sampling at all five monitoring sites with ERA in the period 13-14 January 2014. There was reasonable conformity (5 - 15%) between NTDME and ERA results but some discrepancies with filtered elements.

Groundwater check monitoring – The NTDME groundwater monitoring program includes 21 bores including 4 statutory bores (Authorisation) and 17 operational bores. NTDME monitoring was conducted in September 2013 and no bores were monitored within 1-2 days of ERA sampling as required for check monitoring. ERA sampling was conducted in August and November. This issue has been raised with the NT monitoring unit. Ms Strohmayr presented data from three bores: RN23931 (Coonjimba), RN21030 (Gulungul/TSF) and RN23010 (Pit #3/Magela Creek Area).

RN23931 – This is a 37m deep bore located north of Ranger Project Area in the Coonjimba catchment. There was generally good conformance between the ERA and NTDME results with the exception of Mn and SO4. EC and pH were consistent with historical trends for both NTDME and ERA data. The NTDME Mn and SO4 results were the highest on record while ERA were within recent trends.

RN21030 – This is a 79.2m deep bore located west of the TSF in the Gulungul catchment. During the reporting period, sampling of this bore was undertaken by NTDME (12 September 2013) and ERA (8 August 2013 and 21 November 2013). There was generally good conformance between the NTDME and ERA results with stable trends in EC and pH. NTDME EC results were slightly higher than ERA’s and NTDME U results were significantly higher. NTDME sulfate results were lower than ERA’s. It was noted that comparison between results is hampered by the different sampling times.

RN23010 – This is a 90m bore located to the north-east of Pit #3, close to Magela Creek. The bore was sampled by NTDME on 11/09/2013 and ERA on 13/08/2013. There was good conformance between ERA and NTDME EC and pH results. It was noted that EC results have an upwards trend. NTDME U results were higher than ERA as has previously been the case. Both ERA and NTDME sulfate results indicate a rising trend.

Comparison of results from the Aug/Sep 2013 sampling event for groundwater monitoring have less discrepancies between NTDME and ERA than the previous March 2013 sampling event - despite bores sampled more than 1-2 days apart. NTDME is currently reviewing groundwater procedures and will be


requesting copies of ERA’s Standard Operating Procedures for comparison. Groundwater results for statutory bores sampled during the reporting period generally show parameters to be within historical ranges.

DISCUSSION - Prof Webb advised he was disappointed to not have the opportunity to review the NTDME report prior to this meeting. He noted that this is the second time the report has been submitted late and asked NTDME for assurance the report for next meeting will be provided in a more timely way. Mr Waggitt apologised for the late submittal of the report which was unavoidable due to the absence of a critical staff member due to sick leave. Prof Webb noted it had been agreed last meeting that NTDME would include the relevant focus and action limits on graphs to indicate the relative environmental significance of data being presented. He suggested that without this information it is difficult to know if there are any issues of concern which may warrant further investigation. Mr Waggitt advised it is difficult to apply the surface water approach when presenting the groundwater data. Dr van Dam noted that the levels of some variables in groundwater are routinely above the levels stipulated in surface water guidelines. Prof Webb asked if ARRAC members can be assured that none of the data presented by NTDME this meeting are of concern. Dr van Dam noted he could not see anything presented this meeting that was of significant concern. Mr Thompson asked if RN9329 is a shallow bore and if it was sampled this time round. Ms Strohmayr advised the bore was included in the report but not the meeting presentation. Mr Tayler advised RN9329 is a shallow bore and is still showing elevated EC. Dr van Dam noted this was consistent with surface contamination and Mr Tayler noted the bore is located within a saturated sand plain. Mr Thompson suggested it would’ve been useful if details on this bore had been presented to the meeting. Ms Mellor asked how the recent report to the NT Minister regarding legacy contaminated minesites in the NT would affect the remediation fund for Ranger and the assessment of risks associated with the R3Deeps proposal. Mr Waggitt noted the provision of rehabilitation security bonds don’t apply to legacy mines. He noted that there is a rehabilitation security bond for Ranger which is held by the Commonwealth Department of Industry as required under the Atomic Energy Act (Cwth). Ms Mellor suggested there are issues to do with what specific rehabilitation activities are covered by the ERA provision and the rehabilitation bond held by the Commonwealth. Ms Mellor asked if NTDME has a view as to the adequacy of the adequacy of the provision and the bond. Mr Waggitt advised that NTDME believes the current bond is adequate to cover the cost of rehabilitating the Ranger Project Area in the event that ERA was to cease mining operations immediately. Ms Mellor asked what about the other social and economic costs associated with rehabilitation. Mr Waggitt advised that the social costs are not the prime concern of NTDME. Mr Sweeny asked if the current NT rehabilitation levy applies to Ranger and Mr Waggitt confirmed that it doesn’t. Mr Sweeny noted that rehabilitation and closure are obviously different processes in a regulatory sense. He asked how stakeholders can have confidence in the process if the company itself has expressed concerns about its ability to meet its rehabilitation obligations and the amount of the bond set aside to fund this is confidential. Mr Waggitt advised the bond amount is considered appropriate and is assessed each year by NTDME, the Commonwealth and an independent expert. Mr Sweeny advised if the governments are that confident then some indication of the bond amount should be provided to stakeholders. He noted this is particularly important given the recent concerns raised by the NT EPA and Queensland Auditor General in relation to unfunded liabilities associated with legacy minesites. Mr Waggitt noted that legacy minesites have been a concern for a long time and the NT government was the first jurisdiction to establish a legacy mine unit. Mr Sweeny noted the comments made earlier by SSD that its focus is on environmental protection and this raises the question why the 35 issues identified though the ERA report weren’t picked up by the RPI process. He asked, as the mine continues to age, what will NTDME be doing post incident to ensure that other potential infrastructure failures will be detected before they occur. Mr Waggitt advised that the investigations into the incident are still ongoing and any changes in the regulatory system will be identified based on the findings. Mr Sweeny asked if NTDME has carriage of mine safety and Mr Waggitt advised this is not NTDME’s responsibility. Mr Sweeny asked if NTDME’s focus is on prevention or responding to incidents. Ms Mellor asked if NTDME is considering any changes to the current inspection regime given the issues identified in the ERA report. Mr Waggitt advised that NTDME is not able to monitor everything on the minesite on an ongoing basis and ultimately has to rely on ERA meeting and hopefully exceeding its regulatory obligations. He noted that NTDME has not yet determined what additional actions may be required. Mr Sweeny asked about the investigation by NTDME under the NT Mining Management Act and Mr Waggitt confirmed it was underway. Mr Sweeny asked about the status of the drums incident. Mr Waggitt advised the drums of a type previously


used at Ranger had been found in bushland near Darwin and reported to the NT government pollution hotline or emergency services. He noted that subsequent testing indicated the drums had not at any time contained radioactive material and did not pose any risk to the environment or human health. He noted that no further action was required. Mr Sweeny asked if the controlled vehicle incident had been concluded as well and Mr Waggitt confirmed this. Mr Sweeny asked if further information could be provided in relation to the interaction between the seepage from the TSF and the deeper groundwater systems. Mr Tayler advised that ERA has presented modelling data which indicates that deep groundwater systems flow generally to the NE across the minesite. He noted that any effects on deeper groundwater would be greatest closer to the TSF. Mr Sweeny asked if the current rate of seepage from the TSF is still 100000 L/day. Mr Tayler indicated he didn’t want to put a figure on this but this would have been estimated in the groundwater modelling by CSIRO and Intera for ERA. Mr Sweeny expressed surprise that the executive summary of NTDME report does not include any mention of the leach tank failure or any remedial actions which is either an oversight or a disturbing reflection of the level of significance NTDME places on the matter.

8 RANGER LEACH TANK INCIDENT TASKFORCE UPDATE (MR WAGGITT)

Mr Waggitt provided a brief update on the joint Taskforce. The taskforce comprises representation from the Australian Government (Department of Industry, Supervising Scientist), the NT Government (Department of Mines and Energy, NT Worksafe), the Northern Land Council and the Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation. The Taskforce has met on five occasions and there is ongoing information exchange between the members. The independent experts (Noetic/HRL) have been on site a number of times. NT Worksafe is undertaking a separate investigation, as is SSD and NTDME. The Taskforce has recently reached agreement on the on the risk assessment criteria that have to be fulfilled in order for ERA to be allowed to recommence processing. DISCUSSION - Ms Mellor asked if the contracted experts would present their reports separately and Mr Waggitt advised the Taskforce will have its own report. Mr Sweeny asked if the NTDME report would be made public and Mr Waggitt advised this would be a decision by the Chief Executive. Mr Sweeny asked which is the lead agency in the Taskforce and Mr Waggitt advised this is NTDME. Mr Sweeny asked if the results of the ERA investigation into critical assets would be considered by the Taskforce given its Terms of Reference include assessing the integrity of processing plant and associated systems. Mr Waggitt advised he was not able to discuss what information would or wouldn’t be considered by the Taskforce. Ms Mellor asked how stakeholders would know then whether decisions by the Taskforce were based on ERA commissioned information. Mr Waggitt advised that members of the Taskforce are operating subject to confidentiality agreements which limit the amount and type of information that can be publically divulged. Mr Sheldrick advised that the extent to which the Taskforce may consider information commissioned for or provided by ERA is not relevant to the outcomes of the current investigations. He noted the appointed experts will present their respective findings to the relevant Ministers based on their independent professional assessment of all relevant information.

9 PRESENTATION: CAUSAL FACTORS INFLUENCING SNAIL EGG PRODUCTION AT UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM MONITORING SITES IN MAGELA AND GULUNGUL CREEKS (DR HUMPHREY)

Dr Humphrey provided a presentation on the causal factors influencing snail egg production at upstream and downstream monitoring sites in Magela and Gulungul Creeks as requested by ARRAC last meeting. Key points presented are summarised below.

Field toxicity monitoring using snail egg production in Magela and Gulungul Creeks forms part of the monitoring framework used by SSD for early detection of mine related impacts. SSD employs an integrated approach comprising both early detection and broader scale biodiversity assessments using a collective multiple lines of evidence approach. The current method involves four-day snail reproduction tests which have been conducted each wet season since 1991. The method uses a Before, After, Control, Impact Paired difference (BACIP) design to assess the effects on snail egg production of chronic exposure to U and Mg with alternating weekly tests in Magela and Gulungul Creeks. SSD has time series data back to the 1991-92 wet season. A creek side method was initially used which was replaced by the current in situ method in 2006-7 (with two year overlap). The test measures the difference between egg production at the upstream and


downstream monitoring sites compared to previous years. So the key issue is the level of variance not the actual magnitude of difference between each site. A two-factor ANOVA, with a Before/After can be applied to before and after the wet season and also to the operational (before) and rehabilitation (after) phases. A second factor is season which is useful in detecting subtle responses (e.g. Gulungul Creek can be quite “flashy” and there is some evidence that changes in flow can also impact egg production). Limitations of the experimental design include that the test can’t be done on a continuous basis, it’s not strictly an early detection approach as the assessment is done at the end of the wet season not after each test, only one organism used (did try fish but they were not as sensitive) and the controls are not replicated. The key strengths of the approach are that it provides a good integration of chemical and biological factors and it supports weight of evidence assessment. In 2009-10, the wet season difference values were significantly different to previous years with egg production being higher downstream than upstream. As a result further investigations were conducted to better understand the various factors which influence snail egg production including husbandry techniques and ambient creek water quality. This work found that factors influencing egg production included flow rates of creek water through containers, the culturing method used (younger snails have higher egg production) and water quality variables (water temp and EC).

Analysis of the 2012-13 wet season data indicates that egg production was lower at the downstream site in Magela Creek and was associated with higher water temperatures and higher (mostly natural) EC levels. The higher egg production at the downstream site in Gulungul Creek was associated with higher EC but lower water temperatures. The results for the current wet season are consistent with these water temperature and EC relationships.

Dr Humphrey advised the key finding from this work was that mine waters extend an existing natural relationship in relation to EC and egg production. He noted that the 100 tests conducted since 2006-07 show that snail reproduction is responsive to increases in EC, including that arising from mine wastewaters. Also, under some rare circumstances (temp >30ºC), especially in Magela Creek, the response has been negative. Dr Humphrey noted there has been a reduction in the sustained high EC events in Magela Creek in recent years. It was noted that the work highlights the value of having a sound ecotoxicological and physiological understanding of test organisms.

DISCUSSION Prof Webb noted the current approach involves looking at the difference in egg production between the upstream and downstream sites against the average of previous wet seasons. He asked what the environmental significance of observing a positive or negative in a single year is. Dr Humphrey advised the approach is used as a means of early detection of mine related impact and has limited environmental significance on its own. He noted the test forms part of a broader multiple lines of evidence framework which includes assessing community and ecosystem level biodiversity change. Prof Webb asked whether a potential trend over time could be masked by the averaging technique used. Dr Humphrey advised that a CUSUM method is used to enable any trend to be detected. He noted in previous years trends had been observed but current plotting of CUSUM indicates a relatively neutral position. Mr Robinson asked why snails were used instead of other biota. Dr Humphrey advised that snails were used as they are relatively robust and easier to handle than other biota such as macroinvertebrates. Mr Robinson noted a number of other species are very good indicators of mine pollution and Dr Humphrey noted snails are particularly good biological indicators, especially for heavy metals.

10 STAKEHOLDER REPORTS

10.1 GUNDJEIHMI ABORIGINAL CORPORATION (MR O’BRIEN)

Mr O’Brien noted that GAC is a member of the joint Taskforce and is hoping for a positive outcome from the process.

10.2 NORTHERN LAND COUNCIL (MR THOMPSON)

Mr Thompson advised NLC has nothing to report.


10.3 ENVIRONMENT CENTRE NORTHERN TERRITORY (MS MELLOR)

Ms Mellor advised that ECNT is continuing to track developments in relation to the various incidents at Ranger including the leach tank failure. She advised ECNT is particularly concerned in relation to ERA’s ability to meet its rehabilitation obligations. Ms Mellor tabled a report prepared by ECNT titled “Reconsidering Ranger – a brief on the social, environmental and economic cost of uranium mining in Kakadu”. Ms Mellor advised that ECNT had made a submission as part of the review of the ARPANSA transport codes.

10.4 CAMECO AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (MR EWINGTON)

Mr Ewington provided an update report on behalf of Cameco Australia Ltd. Key points are summarised below.

Safety performance - Cameco Australia (Australia-wide) had 7 near misses in 2013, 4 incidents where first aid was required (e.g. Geophysical contractor stumbled into wasp nest) and no medical treatment incidents (MTI) or lost-time injuries (LTI). Cameco global exploration recorded 0 reportable incidents in 2013

2013 activities - King River project – total of 4422.6 m drilled (24 RC holes, 1 diamond drillhole), termite mound (termitaria) sampling. Exploration and demobilisation was completed in October 2013. Wellington Range project – total of 2233.4 m drilled (6 diamond drillholes), Termitaria sampling, ground geophysics

2014 Activities - Proposed activities on both King River and Wellington Range projects include drilling (RAB, RC and diamond), ground geophysics and Termitaria sampling Culture and Heritage - Three work clearance meetings are scheduled, one in May and two in June. Following work clearance approval and heritage surveys, exploration is likely to commence in July 2014.

DISCUSSION - Mr Sweeny noted Cameco’s 2013 market results are consistent with a stagnant uranium market and the expected 40% decrease in Cameco’s exploration activities in Australia. Mr Ewington advised that Cameco is continuing to review its cost structure and look for opportunities to improve efficiencies and reduce expenditure. Mr Sweeny asked if that included the Kintyre project. Mr Ewington noted the Kintyre project is actually not within ARRAC’s remit, but confirmed the project has been shelved while Cameco continues to pursue a range of other projects globally.

10.5 NT ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AUTHORITY (DR FREELAND)

Nothing to report.

10.6 NT DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (MR ROBINSON)

Ms Robinson tabled the NT Department of Health report. He noted that two incidents had been reported to the Australian Radiation Incident Register (ARIR) administered by the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency in late 2013. These were the industrial transport of drums for radioactive material as identified by signage (16 November 2013) and the failure of the leach tank (9 December 2013).

10.7 AUSTRALIAN RADIATION PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AGENCY (DR TINKER)

Dr Tinker tabled a brief report on behalf of ARPANSA. Key points are summarised below.

Fundamentals for Protection Against Ionising Radiation (F1) - January 2014 – This is a new addition to the Radiation Protection Series and is the top tier document in the Australian national framework to manage risks from ionising radiation as laid out in the Radiation Protection Series.

National Directory for Radiation Protection (NDRP) - February 2014 - ARPANSA has published amendment 6 to the National Directory for Radiation Protection. This amendment incorporates combined issues, including amendments to Schedules 5, 6, 9 and 13 and to the Glossary. Of direct relevance is Schedule 13, changes to the national incident reporting framework.

Safety Guide for the Protection of the Environment - March 2014 - ARPANSA submitted a draft of the Safety Guide to the Radiation Health Council at its March 2014 meeting. The draft was approved to seek stakeholder comment this year.

Australian National Radiation Dose Register (ANRDR) - ARPANSA maintains the ANRDR which involves the collection, storage and auditing of radiological dose histories for uranium industry workers in Australia. In


March 2014, the ANRDR holds dose history records for more than 31300 workers from the uranium mining and milling industry. In the first quarter of 2014, Honeymoon uranium mine dose records were included. The Dose Register has now been successfully implemented to all three operating uranium mines in Australia: Olympic Dam and Beverley in South Australia, and Ranger in the Northern Territory. To ensure the ANRDR is consistent with international best practice of the more established international dose registers, ARPANSA is investigating the expansion of the ANRDR to cover occupationally exposed workers in other industries. ARPANSA completed a review of the radiation dose record management practices in the mineral sands mining and processing industry. In February 2014, a technical report outlining the key findings and recommendations of the review was published.

DISCUSSION – Mr Sweeny asked what the time period is for public comment on proposed changes to guidance documents. Dr Tinker advised the comment period is usually about 6 weeks. Mr Sweeny welcomed the inclusion of the records of 31,000 former uranium mine workers into the National Dose Register and noted this was long overdue. He asked how far back the historical records go and how does a former worker go about accessing their records. Dr Tinker advised that ARPANSA widely advertises the existence of the Register in relevant forums and provides an online application process. He noted that the length of records held varies for each mine (e.g. records for Olympic Dam go back a further 10 years). Mr Sweeny suggested a package of information on how workers can access this information would be useful as organisations such as ACF and unions often receive enquiries from former mine workers seeking further information. He suggested ARPANSA might consider expanding the current advertising campaign as well. He also suggested that ARPANSA update its information to reflect the fact that Honeymoon mine is not operational.

10.8 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT - DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY (MS LEITCH)

Nothing to report.

DISCUSSION - Mr Sweeny asked if the Department of Industry has made any response to the recommendations contained in the UN Secretary General’s report on Fukushima and offered to provide a copy. He stated he didn’t think it was too much to ask that the Australian Government address this. Mr Sheldrick advised that the Department already has a copy of the report and noted there is no specific recommendation that the Australian Government undertake any such assessment. Ms Sweeny noted the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties had also recommended the Australian Government report to Parliament what actions it has taken to respond to the recommendations in the report. He noted the Committee had also made this a prerequisite for endorsing the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Mr Sheldrick advised the Australian Government would respond to the JSCOT recommendations through the appropriate process in due course.

10.9 PARKS AUSTRALIA (MR ISSAVERDIS)

Mr Issaverdis tabled a report on behalf of Parks Australia. Key points are summarised below. He confirmed that there has been correspondence between AREVA and Parks Australia regarding the removal of remaining infrastructure on the Koongarra site.

ARPANSA - The annual report was submitted to ARPANSA on 23 July 2013. ARPANSA completed an inspection of the site on 10th October 2013 which confirmed the site continues to comply with the Act, the ARPANS Regulations and the licence conditions. Following discussion with SSD and ARPANSA staff it was agreed that the proposed dose constraint level of 30 μSv per annum was appropriate for the site.

Erosion Management - Erosion remediation was completed in July 2013. Some minor works were completed after some early rain events in November 2013 aimed at directing water from the plateau into the drainage channels. It is anticipated that the area will be revegetated in the future. Erosion of the containment cap and edges remains a potential integrity issue for the containment facility and will continue to be monitored and assessed on an annual basis until the site is stable.

Groundwater monitoring - Groundwater monitoring of the containment facility is continuing. A total of 11 bores were sampled in March 2014 and samples are currently being analysed for metal and radionuclide concentrations. The results are due by the end of April 2014 and will be compared with previous ground


water results, however, previous comparisons indicate that levels of analytes have not increased and are within pre-containment measurements.

Cover Performance monitoring - O’Kanes undertook a site visit in November 2013. The data collected along with historical data collected from the sensor since their installation in 2009 is currently being analysed by O’Kanes and a report is due in April 2014. Gully and rill erosion on the site appears to be stabilising, however still requires continued monitoring. Vegetation surveys completed in November 2013 show the containment is well vegetated with Acacia and Eucalypt species and leaf litter covers much of the plateau area with exception of the recently cleared areas. Permeability testing was undertaken on the containment cover.

Facility Management – NLC has been approached formally to assist with TO consultations to confirm they are satisfied with the rehabilitation process, as per the requirements of the lease between the Director of National Parks and the Gunlom Land Trust. These consultations will be commenced first week of July 2014. KNP has begun formal discussions with the SSD to ascertain capacity for additional assistance in the long term monitoring of the containment. Ongoing Weed Management has been undertaken by KNP staff to prevent the weed infestations in the area.

10.10 URANIUM EQUITIES LTD (MS TAYLOR - APOLOGY)

Ms Taylor tabled a report on behalf of UEL. Key points are summarised below.

Nabarlek ML

Exploration - There was no on-site exploration fieldwork in 2013. UEL anticipates undertaking an exploration program of RC drilling in 2014 and is currently working on the associated Mining Management Plan for submission to the NTDME. Hired infrastructure items from the Nabarlek Camp were demobilised during the year.

Monitoring - The annual groundwater and surface water monitoring program was undertaken in mid 2013. Results were within historical ranges from previous sampling programs, with the one exception for the filtered uranium result from OB19. Past results range between 13-35µg/L, however the result from the 2013 program was 56.4µg/L. All of the results for groundwater and surface water were below the ANZECC guidelines and Drinking Water Guidelines with the one exception of sulphate in OB19. OB19 is immediately adjacent to the former Nabarlek Pit.

Rehabilitation - The effectiveness of the 2012/2013 planting program was assessed in mid 2013. Good survival rates were observed at the Plant Run-off Pond and at the Old Sewage Works. At the Waste Rock Dump and Old Camp Area there were survival rates of only 15% and 5% respectively. Only one episode of weed spraying was achieved in February 2014 due to the theft of fuel and damage of camp, vehicles and equipment while the site was unattended – possibly late in 2013. Further campaigns before the 2014 dry season are not anticipated due to the logistical challenges posed by the break in. Observations on the ground indicate a significant reduction in the overall density of weeds. A site inspection was held with the Traditional Owners (TOs), Howard Smith (ex-NLC) and Adam Thompson (NLC) to inspect and discuss rehabilitation and closure progress. Comments from the TO’s included a preference for the Plant Run-off Pond to be re-contoured and the tanks removed, but they were satisfied with breaking-up concrete pads and burial in-situ. The TO’s would also like to see a progression towards fire management techniques for weed control. There was a general belief that UEL is well on its way to meeting rehabilitation expectations at the Tailings Dam and Sewage Treatment Works which has provided a level of confidence for the successful rehabilitation of the site.

West Arnhem Land JV Exploration - There was no on-site exploration fieldwork in 2013. UEL anticipates undertaking an exploration program of RC drilling in 2014 and is currently working on the associated Mining Management Plan for submission to the NTDME.

10.11 AFMECO MINING AND EXPLORATION PTY LTD / AREVA GROUP (MR POTTER)

Nothing to report.


11 OTHER BUSINESS

The Chair thanked members and observers for their contribution and the ARRAC Secretariat for arranging the meeting.

12 NEXT MEETING

It was noted the next meeting of ARRAC would be held in Jabiru and the Secretariat will contact members to find a suitable date. The meeting concluded at 3.00 pm.

ARRAC Secretariat 9 April 2014

ARRAC41 ACTIONS

No. Action Responsibility

ARRAC41: 1 Mr Eckersley agreed to provide GAC with further details on the grassed area affected by the spill of slurry following the leach tank failure.

ARRAC41: 2 Mr Simms to provide Mr Robinson the report provided to regulatory agencies regarding the higher than usual radiation dose recorded for ERA workers.

ARRAC41: 3 Mr Eckersley agreed to provide advice on what actions (if any) ERA has or is planning to take in relation to the issues raised in the paper on uranium and sediment transport from onsite wetlands.

Documents

Alligator Rivers Region Advisory Committee meeting 41 ......9 April 2014 ARRAC41 Meeting Summary Page 2 of 20 Agenda Agenda Item Meeting Start 0930 1 Welcome 2 Apologies/Observers