UFPPC ( www.ufppc.org ) Digging Deeper CXLVIII: January 24 & 31, 2011, 7:00 p.m.

Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).

[Thesis. The preponderance of the evidence is that geostrategic motives (specifically vis-à-vis the Soviet Union—usually referred to as "Russia" both in the text and by the officials dealing with that country in 1945) promoted by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, and not military necessity, was behind President Harry S. Truman's decision to use the atomic bomb, though "a full and unqualified answer as to why the atomic bomb was used is neither essential nor possible. What is important is whether, when the bomb was used, the president and his top advisers understood that it was not required to avoid a long and costly invasion, as they later claimed and as most Americans still believe" (317).]

Epigraph. Judith Lewis Herman on trauma.

Preface. This history neglects "non-essential details" to focus on "major issues . . . most important . . . whether it was understood before the atomic bomb was used that the war with Japan could be ended by other means without significant loss of life" (xiii; xiii-xiv).

Introduction: A Personal Note. Leahy and Eisenhower believed use of the bomb was unnecessary and undesirable (3-4). The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded in 1946 it was unnecessary (4). Alperovitz's reading of Henry Stimson's diary led him to raise the issue in passing in his Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (1965) (5-6). An official U.S. historian concluded in 1990 that "the hoary claim that the bomb prevented one-half million American combat deaths is unsupportable" (7; 6-7). Yet most Americans believe the opposite (7). The focus in Part I is on documents and

illustrates how 'official' versions of reality are produced (8-9). Part II explores the complex way a myth of necessity developed (9-13). "None of the officials involved in this tale had evil intentions. What can be said of them, I believe, is that some of them became so taken by the power the atomic bomb seemed to give them to do good (as they defined it) that they seem to have gotten carried away" (13). (Alluding to a remark by Henry L. Stimson, "a man of great integrity" [13]): "We are all fine Americans who should have known better about our own silent refusal to confront the enormity of nuclear weapons" (14).

BOOK ONE: THE DECISION

Ch. 1: The Trajectory of Japan's Decline. "Among historians of World War II it is now a commonplace that Japanese power disintegrated rapidly in the spring and summer of 1945—that from the early months of the year, their defeat was certain"; the U.S. government was well informed of this (17; 17-22).

Ch. 2: General Efforts to End the War. Because the U.S. had broken Japanese codes (the "MAGIC" intercepts), Americans were well informed that Japan was putting out peace feelers from July 1944 on; in fact, this had been reported in the Kiplinger Washington Letter in May 1945 (23-29). History of the publicizing of knowledge of the MAGIC intercept, and the intercepts themselves, 1951-1995 (29-30).

PART I: UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

Ch. 3: April-May 1945. "[A]s the summer of 1945 progressed, most U.S. leaders fully realized that the only serious condition Japan's leaders sought was an assurance that the Emperor would not be eliminated" (34; 33-35). The Japanese belief in the emperor's divine nature was understood by American officials (35-36). The demand for "unconditional surrender" was adopted "almost accidentally by Roosevelt at the January 1943 Casablanca conference," and there was widespread support for its modification (36; 36-45). Truman appears to have continued to be willing to confine the demand for "unconditional surrender" to the military as opposed to the Emperor, as his May 8 statement indicated (45-46).

Ch. 4: To June 18, 1945. The reasons for Truman's decision on Jun. 18 to postpone clarification of the meaning of the U.S. demand for "unconditional surrender," when he appeared to be leaning toward making such a statement before leaving for the Potsdam conference, remain uncertain; not all documents have been declassified (47-61).

Ch. 5: June 18, 1945. Given all the evidence, it "seems reasonable to surmise that it was [James F.] Byrnes[, then Truman's adviser, on July 3 to be his secretary of state] who influenced Truman to reverse the thrust of his May 8 softening of the surrender formula" (70-71; 62-72).

Ch. 6: From June 18 to July 2, 1945. In this period it appears that "only Byrnes, who formally took office on July 3, was opposed to modifying the surrender formula" (79; 73-79).

PART II: THE RUSSIAN OPTION

Ch. 7: Phase I: From Pearl Harbor to the Death of Roosevelt. "By

midsummer of 1945 intelligence experts, military and other officials, and the president himself, seem clearly to have recognized that the impact of a Red Army attack on the isolated and rapidly deteriorating Japanese would almost certainly precipitate a surrender either on its own or when combined with assurances for the Emperor" (84; 83-85). Throughout the war, U.S. leaders wanted a Soviet entry into the war "the sooner, the better" (85; 85-95).

Ch. 8: Phase II: April 1945. But after FDR's death on Apr. 12, in an undetermined and "odd" way the U.S. "appeared to lose interest in a Soviet declaration of war"; Averill Harriman's disenchantment with the Soviets played an important role (99; 96-110).

Ch. 9: Phase III: The New Reality. In this period, which has been assessed only superficially by historians, Truman underwent a "double shift in his attitude during a period of less than four weeks" (111; 111-24).

PART III: ATOMIC DIPLOMACY

Ch. 10: Preliminaries: April and May 1945. That strategy vis-à-vis Russia was at the heart of U.S. actions toward Japan at the end of the war is not known to the general public (127-29). Truman first heard about the bomb from Byrnes, who expressed then (acc. to Truman) his belief that it "might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war" [134]) and then in detail from Stimson and Groves on Apr. 25 (130-34). In April, the U.S. tried and failed to dictate to Stalin about the Polish government (135-37).

Ch. 11: Postponing a Confrontation with Stalin. There is abundant evidence the U.S. wanted to wait until the bomb had been proven to meet with Stalin, though the evolution of Truman's thinking is hard to trace in detail; the

Hopkins mission was probably also related to bomb development (138-54).

Ch. 12: The Interim Committee. The Interim Committee was set up "to focus specifically on issues connected with the new weapon," was formed by Secretary of War Henry Stimson and which included, at Stimson's suggestion, James F. Byrnes as Truman's representative, (155-57). Its deliberations were strongly influenced by tensions with the Soviet Union over Europe (157-58). The Combined Development Trust had been pursuing a worldwide monopoly of uranium supplies (159-63). Deliberations of the Interim Committee (163-72).

Ch. 13: The "Second Track" and Asia. Strategizing in May 1945 was greatly influenced by playing off the possible need for Soviet participation in fighting Japan with concern about Soviet ambitions in East Asia, and there was intense interest in the timing of the availability of the bomb: 'The available evidence suggests that U.S. policy form late May to mid-July sought simultaneously to insure that the Soviet Union would enter the war if needed and to delay a final decision on Soviet entry until the results of the atomic test were known" (182, emphasis in original; 173-84).

Ch. 14: The Concerned Scientists. "[The scientists] had virtually no impact on government decisions," but an effort was made to placate them in order to avoid PR problems later (185; 185-88). Leo Szilard's Jul. 19 petition was delayed by Gen. Groves; Truman seems never to have seen it (189-91).

PART IV: JAMES F. BYRNES

Ch. 15: "A Very Machiavellian Character"; "An Operator." Byrnes's historical role has been obscured by subsequent events (195-96). Truman

regarded Byrnes as a mentor; Byrnes regarded Truman as a nonentity (196-97). Truman informed Byrnes immediately upon becoming president that he intended to make him secretary of state, the most important post in government and next in line of succession in the absence of a vice president (197-98). Byrnes had already served as congressman, senator, Supreme Court justice, director of the Office of War Mobilization, and Franklin D. Roosevelt's "'Assistant President for the homefront,' essentially in charge of running the entire domestic economy with unprecedented authority" (198). Byrnes, rather than Truman, had been expected to be nominated vice president in 1944 (199). That Truman regarded him as his chief advisor and, indeed, agent, was well known, but the informality of his position until he became secretary of state on Jul. 3 (delayed to avoid embarrassing Secretary of State Edward Stettinius on the eve of the first U.N. conference) limited the documentary record of his influence (200). They were drinking and poker-playing buddies (201). Byrnes was compulsively secretive, with a "passion for anonymity," in the words of his assistant and friend Walter Brown, even inventing his own "private stenographic note-taking code which to this day has only partially been deciphered" (202). "To put it bluntly, by virtually all accounts Byrnes was a very devious politician" (202). Arthur Schlesinger Jr. said: "He was a kind of prior Lyndon Johnson" (203). His concern for spin control extended to editing and fabricating evidence (204). He did not keep those around him abreast of his activities (205).

Ch. 16: Sly and Able Policies. There are "reasons to believe" that in a private capacity Byrnes advised and influenced Truman on a host of issues in the spring and early summer of 1945 (206-13). "It seems obvious that Byrnes saw the

atomic bomb as important bargaining leverage, potentially useful in all manner of international negotiations" (213-14).

Ch. 17: The Shadow of Yalta. Byrnes had emerged as the "foremost spokesman for (and defender of) Yalta," which made him more interested in wringing from the USSR respect for the promise of democracy and free elections in Eastern Europe (215-19).

PART V: POTSDAM

Ch. 18: To the Big Three Meeting. News of the successful Trinity confirmed at Potsdam the ideas of Truman, Byrnes, et al. about the bomb's effect on diplomacy and this became "embedded" in their "basic approach and specific negotiating positions," leading to "a conscious decision not to provide Japan with the specific assurances that had been sought for the Emperor" and "a conscious decision not to encourage Soviet participation in the war" (225; 223-25) Ralph Bard, the Navy representative on the Interim Committee, was the only person formally to dissent from the use of the bomb without advance warning (225-27). Public pressure to clarify what "unconditional surrender" meant for the Japanese (227-32). A MAGIC intercept of July 15: the Emperor has caused a peace feeler to be made to Russia (232-38).

Ch. 19: Clear Alternatives; First Decisions. Truman learned of the successful Trinity test at 7:30 p.m. on July 16, hours before his first meeting with Stalin at noon on July 17 (239-41). Stalin committed to entering the war against Japan on Aug. 15, which was Truman's chief objective at Potsdam (241-47). Byrnes ruled out giving Japan advance warning (247-48).

Ch. 20: Removing the Soviet Blackout from Europe. "[T]he arrival

of Groves' full report by special courier on July 21 was the psychological turning point of the conference" (250; 249-51). There was stalling in Potsdam on the European issues (e.g. recognition of Soviet satellite countries) that were central, because "top policy-makers were thinking ahead to the time when the force of the new weapon would be displayed" (264; 251-65).

Ch. 21: Second Decision. The view that the U.S. worked to delay Russian entry into the war by prolonging Russian-Chinese negotiations was long resisted but is now well documented (266-75).

Ch. 22: The Bomb and Germany. German reparations were a crucial issue for the Soviet Union; the U.S. toughened its stance and effected an "open break with Yalta" between July 21 & 23 because of Byrnes's new confidence about the bomb (286; 276-89). "An entry in the diary of General Henry H. Arnold, Commander of the U.S. Army Air Forces, in the midst of this period (after a dinner on July 22, 1945) is also suggestive: 'Byrnes—what we must do now is not make the world safe for democracy, but make the world safe for the U.S.A.'" (287). "The ongoing consequences of the long-forgotten dispute over 'reparations' at Potsdam are difficult to overstate" (290). U.S. leaders regarded the bomb as solving the "German problem" (restraint of future German aggression) (289-91).

Ch. 23: Third Decision. Byrnes was the only adviser against clarifying to the Japanese the meaning of "unconditional surrender" (292-301).

Ch. 24: Theories and Choices. Some have speculated that Byrnes's position was due to fear of political criticism of softness toward Japan or fears expressed by Archibald MacLeish and Dean Acheson that the Emperor would be

useful to future Japanese militarists, but there is little to support such views (302-11).

Ch. 25: Unanswerable Questions. Ultimately it is not possible to know why the bomb was used, but it is possible to know that leaders knew it was not needed to avoid a costly invasion (312-17).

PART VI: "MILITARY NECESSITY"

Ch. 26: Navy Leaders. Even given the demand for unconditional surrender, "many military leaders seem . . . to have felt the use of the atomic bomb was not dictated by military necessity" (321). Margaret Truman claimed in her biography of her father that Truman consulted military leaders on use of the bomb in a meeting near Potsdam on July 22, but there is no contemporaneous evidence of such a meeting (322-24). Navy leaders Leahy, King, Bieri, Nimitz, Dennison, and Byrd thought use of the bomb unnecessary (324-33).

Ch. 27: Air Force Leaders. Hap Arnold, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, thought use of the bomb unnecessary (334-35). Likewise Chennault, LeMay (though he later expressed different views), Kenney, Eaker, and Spaatz (who refused to drop the bomb without written orders, which Lt. Gen. Thomas Handy gave him on July 25; he later, in 1965, said: "That was purely a political decision, wasn't a military decision" [345]) (335-45). There is some evidence Truman decided to use the bomb at a June 18 meeting, but documentary corroboration has not been found (346-47). Though Arnold did not think the use of the bomb necessary, he had bound himself to support Marshall in all votes of the Joint Chiefs (347-49).

Ch. 28: Army Leaders. MacArthur regarded the use of the bomb as unnecessary (350-52). Gen. Eisenhower

opposed using the bomb (352-58). Gen. George Marshall, the Army chief of staff, did not regard the use of the bomb as necessary at the time, but took that position later, probably for political reasons (358-65).

Ch. 29: Additional Perspectives. Given all this evidence, the ignorance of the American people on this matter is something extraordinary: "Something about the way we have been willing to think about this issue, it appears, has led to avoidance and oversimplification" (367; 366-67). Military leaders did not expect there would be a final invasion, though there was planning for it (367-68). Both internal military reviews (the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey and the 1946 War Department Military Intelligence Division study) concluded the use of the bomb was unnecessary, and so did contemporary journalists: Hanson Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (1950); Carl W. Borklund, Men of the Pentagon (1966) (368-70). So did British military leaders (370-71). Neither did Churchill—though within a week after the use of the bomb he had changed his position (371).

PART VII: ENDGAME

Ch. 30: Relations of Frankness. At Potsdam, Byrnes made major decisions without consulting expert staff and limited access to the president (375-77). Planning for Potsdam involved preparing for both eventualities: Russia in the war, and not in the war; once news of the Trinity test was absorbed, Truman and Byrnes stopped pushing for Russian entry and tried to delay it (377-83). The Interim Committee recommended sharing a trust-building communication with the Russians, but Truman limited himself to telling Stalin, on July 24, vaguely about the bomb, calling it "a new weapon of unusual destructive force"; Stalin asked no questions about it (383-89).

Ch. 31: Navy Initiatives. There were three navy initiatives to get Truman to clarify the surrender formula, including a possibly unauthorized declaration by then Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias's July 21 public radio broadcast stating that Japan would have guarantees under the Atlantic Charter after unconditionally surrendering (390-99).

Ch. 32: "Mokusatsu." Signals coming from the U.S. were extraordinarily complex and were confusing to the Japanese; on July 27-28 Prime Minister Suzuki announced that Japan would mokusatsu the Potsdam Proclamation; this neutral term meaning could mean 'withhold comment' but was taken to mean 'treat as unworthy of notice' (400-09).

Ch. 33: Race to the Finish. It is dubious that U.S. leaders really "misunderstood" what the Japanese were saying (410-14). Walter Brown's contemporaneous diary entry of Aug. 3, as Truman was abroad the Augusta returning from Potsdam, shows he knew Japan was "looking for peace" (415; 414-15).

Ch. 34: The End of the War. "Hiroshima was destroyed at 8:15 a.m., on August 6, 1945"; on Aug. 7 Japan tried to find out what Russia intended to do; at 5:00 p.m. Moscow time on Aug. 8 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan; at 12:10 a.m. Manchurian time Aug. 9 Red Army troops crossed the Manchurian border; "shortly after 11:00 a.m., Nagasaki was bombed" (416). On Aug. 10, Truman told his Cabinet he had "given order to stop atomic bombing. He said the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible. He didn't like the idea of killing as he said, 'all those kids'" (416-17; Henry Wallace's diary). On the morning of Aug. 10, after the Emperor acceded to it, the Japanese Foreign

Ministry "sent a surrender offer to its representatives in Stockholm and Berne" (417). On Aug. 11 Truman was inclined to accept, but Byrnes persuaded him to take a harder position, which was sent; on Aug. 12-13 MAGIC intercepts show Japan struggling with what to do and discussing Russian entry into the war but not the atomic attacks; on Aug. 14 at 2:49 p.m. local time (1:49 a.m. Washington, D.C., time) "Radio Tokyo announced that Japan's surrender would shortly be forthcoming in accord with the new U.S. terms implicitly assuring the position of the emperor" (419; 418-19). At 6:00 p.m. Washington time the formal surrender reply was received from Tokyo through Switzerland (419-20).

BOOK TWO: THE MYTH

Introductory Note. Americans were naturally inclined to accept the bomb's use due to the risk to U.S. lives (423-24).

PART I: HENRY L. STIMSON

Ch. 35: A Direct Approach to Russia. U.S. public opinion massively supported the bomb's use (427-28). Racism played a role (428). The aging secretary of war, Henry Stimson, grew increasingly concerned at Byrnes's approach to the bomb as diplomatic leverage, and on Sept. 12 wrote a memo to Truman proposing an "arrangement with the Russians" to avoid an arms race (428-34). Truman rejected his advice (434-35). With McGeorge Bundy's help, Stimson began work on his memoirs in the late spring of 1946 (435-36).

Ch. 36: A Thin Line of Criticism. Early religious and journalistic critics (437-41). Strong moral critiques were published in early 1946 (441-43). Atomic tests on the Bikini atoll were widely publicized (443). Einstein deplored use of the bomb on Aug. 19 (N.Y. Times front page) (444). John

Hersey's Hiroshima was published in the New Yorker on Aug. 31 and as a book in the early fall of 1946 (444-45). Norman Cousins denounced the "crime of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" in the Saturday Review of Literature (Sept. 14) (445). Concerned, Harvard President James B. Conant protested privately Reinhold Niebuhr's signing the Federal Council of Churches report criticizing the bombing (445-47).

Ch. 37: "A Mere Recital of the Facts." The story of how Stimson's 1947 Harper's article was written was published only in 1989 and 1993 (448). Conant's motives were political and ideological (449). Stimson acceded to requests he write, Harvey Bundy drafted an outline of arguments, and his son McGeorge Bundy produced a draft delivered to Conant on Nov. 29, 1946 (450-53). Conant made extensive suggestions and deleted all mention of the "unconditional surrender" issue and the Emperor's status (453-54). Published in the Feb. 1947 Harper's, the groundwork for the article's success was thoroughly prepared (455-57).

Ch. 38: "An Exact Description." Success of the article (458-60). The article (460-63). But it was at variance with the facts, the most important "obfuscation" being the claim that Stimson was told that "over a million casualties" were averted, which "became the essential source for a myth which has been repeated with only occasional challenge for much of the last half century" (466; 462-68). "We do not know" where Stimson and Bundy got their "over a million" estimate (467). Possible explanations; "[i]t is impossible to know precisely what mix of conscious and unconscious motives produced the Harper's article" (471; 468-71).

Ch. 39: "We Have Followed the Record." A number of insiders (esp. William Castle and Joseph Grew) were

dismayed by the inaccuracy of Stimson's article (472-76). Stimson's correspondence with Grew implicitly acknowledged that the bomb had probably delayed, rather than hastened the end of the war (476-79). Stimson's memoirs were edited to satisfy Marshall's and Kennan's objections and to disguise the fact that Byrnes had conducted a diplomacy of coercion (479-80).

Ch. 40: "Omissions Merely for Brevity." Stimson's Bundy-written memoirs systematically neglect his diary when writing about the bomb, facilitating an inaccurate account (486-92). Subsequent historiography on Stimson (492-94). Bundy has slowly come to acknowledge the role of strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the decision to use the bomb (494-97).

PART II: PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN

Ch. 41: The Man from Missouri. John J. McCloy believed Truman succumbed to Byrnes in deciding to use the bomb (501-04). In recent years Truman has been idolized as an honest politician (504-07). But Truman was also petty, conniving, insincere, lacking in principle, and intent on crafting his historical image (507-14).

Ch. 42: Main Elements of the Official Rationale. From 1945 to 1959 Truman's estimate of the lives saved by using the bomb rose from "thousands" to "millions" (515-20). David McCullough's adulatory popular biography of Truman falsely attributed "500,000 to 1 million lives" to a June 4, 1944, memo by Gen. Thomas Hardy of Marshall's staff—in fact, the memo says that 500,000 is "entirely too high" (520-21). Truman's claim that Hiroshima was selected as a military target was "simply false" (528; 521-28). There is no evidence that legal issues were considered at the time,

though Truman claimed that they were in his memoirs (528-30).

Ch. 43: Nagasaki and "Year of Decisions." Truman was disingenuous about Nagasaki (531-39). On ten important points, the first volume of Truman's memoir, entitled Year of Decisions, is inaccurate about the decision to use the bomb (535-40). Though written by ghostwriters, Truman worked on the text paragraph by paragraph, and changed one ghostwriter when he raised objections to Truman's account (540-42).

Ch. 44: Certain Classes of Papers. Truman was "loose with the facts" on the question of when the order to use the bomb was given (548; 543-48). He did not allow access to "certain classes of papers" (Cabell Phillips's phrase) (551; 548-52). Truman kept tight control over his Potsdam journals (552-59). The journal text was used as the basis for other texts at a time Truman denied it even existed (559-61).

Ch. 45: "The Most Terrible Bomb," "The Most Terrible Thing." Truman was conscious of the horror of the bomb, but justified its use by appealing to Pearl Harbor (562-69). His subsequent efforts to justify his decision, sometimes to near strangers, were so frequent as to suggest "personal doubts" (569-70).

PART III: JAMES F. BYRNES

Ch. 46: Disappearing From—and Revising—History. Byrnes was "not much discussed in most early postwar accounts" (573-74). This is due to 1) his dismissal in Jan. 1947; 2) the success of the Stimson Harper's article; 3) lack of documentation; 4) Byrnes's own evasiveness (574-79). His 1958 autobiography, All in One Lifetime (579-81). 1960 interviews (581-85). The full 1945 diary of Walter Brown (Byrnes's friend and assistant) has not been made

public (586). In an Aug. 29, 1945, press conference, Byrnes acknowledged the Japanese were seeking a negotiated peace before Hiroshima (586-87). In 1965 George Kennan privately criticized Byrnes's approach (587-88).

PART IV: MANAGING HISTORY

Ch. 47: Leslie R. Groves. Gen. Groves played little role in the decision to use the bomb, though he did "desperately" want it used (591-93). He was important in organizing the drafting of press releases (593-96). Stimson's post-Hiroshima release was edited with political intent (596-97). The strategy of emphasizing and dominating reporting about technical issues was successful (597-600). Groves repeatedly used the figure one half-million in "losses" avoided (600-02). Groves minimized documentation and kept some of it under his personal control until 1963 (602-07). Groves appears to have believed that the Japan's surrender was imminent in 1945 (607-08).

Ch. 48: Censorship and Secrecy: Rules and Exceptions. Strict press censorship in Japan about Hiroshima and Nagasaki (609-11). The presence of U.S. POWs (and some 3,000 American citizens) in Hiroshima became public only in the 1970s (612-13). "Atomic energy related information is 'born secret'; the Dept. of Energy in 1993 had 32 million pages of classified documents = 32 Washington monuments (614; 613-15). Privileged insiders were given access, notably Herbert Feis; Feis was remarkably "objective" given his close association with those he wrote about (615-22).

Ch. 49: Final Perspectives. The official postwar evaluations were also edited for political reasons (623-26).

Conclusion: The Complicity of Silence. American's have been

complicit in the myth, and with time have become more so (627-29). "Quite simply, it is not true that the atomic bomb was used because it was the only way to save the 'hundreds of thousands' or 'millions' of lives as was subsequently claimed" (629). "[T]he president and his advisers were aware of [the alternatives]" (629). The argument that conventional bombing was just as bad is weak (630). The argument that the bomb was used because of "momentum" is false (631-33). Saving the most possible lives was never a priority (633-36). What happened in the atomic bombings is very hard to grasp; perhaps "military men" did so best (636-37). Moral questions of the gravest sort are raised for "our nation" by the use of the bomb (637-38). Questions for the future (639-41). "Hiroshima teaches that even the best leaders will lie to their people about the most fundamental issues if they are not constrained by effective checks and balances" (640). "The lesson to learn from men like Leahy and Eisenhower is that the place to begin is with personal choice" (641).

Afterword: Questions, Issues, and Major Theories Concerning the Use of the Atomic Bomb. Evidentiary access explains many differences among historians (643-44). Expert judgment that Japan would have soon surrendered even without use of the bomb (644-46). Much Japanese evidence supports this (646-48). Though the question is often framed as one of whether the U.S. could risk not using the bomb, "[t]he real risk—as the Joint Chiefs urged—was in not telling Japan they could keep the Emperor" (648; 648-52). The low-level attempt by some Japanese officers to block the surrender broadcast did not amount to much (652-53). Explorations of tactical use of atomic weapons were of little significance (653). Arguments that the decision was driven by considerations of money and racism are "suspect" (653-56). Various versions of

the momentum theory are weak (656-61). Roosevelt would have been less likely to use the bomb (661-63). Evidence that the bomb was viewed as a diplomatic weapon is now overwhelming (663-68).

Appendix: Byrnes' Activities: April to July 1945. Byrnes was in dozens of policy-related meetings between FDR's death and swearing-in as secretary of state (669-70).

Notes. 114 pp.

Selected Bibliography. 182 archival files; 25 government publications; 281 books; 202 articles; 7 dissertations; 3 films; 42 interviews or unpublished papers (785-811).

Acknowledgments. Family (813). Support (813-14). Genesis of work (814-15). Research team: Sanho Tree, Ted Winstead, Katie Morris, Dave Williams, Leo Maley, Thad Williamson, Miranda Grieder (815-17). Other scholars (817-18). Archivists (818). Volunteer researchers (818-19). Historians (819). "[T]he writing of history is a deeply social—and continually evolving—project" (819).

Index. 23 pp.

About the Author. Gar Alperovitz is a historian and economist, president of the National Center for Economic Alternatives, with, in 1995, academic appointments at the Univ. of Maryland; King's College, Cambridge; and Harvard. He as also worked as staff at the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. He is also the author of Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (1965; 2nd ed. 1985; 3rd ed. 1994) and has published in prominent newspapers and magazines.

[Additional information. Gar Alperovitz was born on May 5, 1936, in

Racine, Wisconsin. He is married, has two children, and lives in Washington, D.C. He holds a 1959 B.S. in American history from the Univ. of Wisconsin (Phi Beta Kappa), a 1960 M.A. in Economics from UC Berkeley, and a 1964 Ph.D. in Political Economy from Cambridge University (U.K.). Alperovitz's Atomic Diplomacy (1965) is credited with beginning the "revisionist" controversy over Hiroshima. Since 1999 he has been Lionel R. Bauman Professor of Political Economy at the University of Maryland. Alperovitz is also the author of America Beyond Capitalism (2004) and Building Wealth: The New Asset-Based Approach to Solving Social and Economic Problems (2005), and the co-author of Cold War Essays (1970, with Christopher Lasch), Strategy and Program (1973, with Staughton Lynd), Rebuilding America (1984, with J. Faux), Making a Place for Community (2002, with D. Imbroscio and T. Williamson), and co-editor of American Economic Policy (1984; with R. Skurski), as well as the author of hundreds of articles and public lectures. Alperovitz has received major grants from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (2004-2006), the Knight Foundation (2005-2007), and the Ford Foundation (2006-2008). — The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb was the basis of ABC's July 27, 1995, special, "Hiroshima: Why the Bomb Was Dropped," which took issue with the Air Force Association-mounted campaign that had led to the abandonment of an interpretive exhibition at the Smithsonian (which Alperovitz judged "balanced") and the resignation of Director of the National Air and Space Museum Martin Harwit. See, by the AFA's John Correll, "The Activists and the Enola

Gay"(http://www.afa.org/media/enolagay/03-03.html). — Alperovitz revisited "the continuing controversy" in "Enola Gay: Was Using the Bomb Necessary?" (Miami Herald, Dec. 14, 2003), protesting the display of the Enola Gay "with no mention of the huge number of civilians killed at Hiroshima (and subsequently at Nagasaki), and no acknowledgment of the ongoing domestic and worldwide controversy over the use of the atomic bomb." — The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb has also been published in German, Japanese, Korean, and British editions.]

[Critique. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb is considered controversial by some, tendentious by others, and a classic by many. Gar Alperovitz has been charged by historians like Alonzo L. Hambly with neglecting relevant material and misrepresenting the atmosphere in wartime policy-making circles, and ideologically motivated critics like Robert James Maddox and Jeff Riggenbach dismiss him as a "New Left revisionist," but in general their accounts give no sense of the amount of evidence Alperovitz has amassed to support his views and ignore the fascinating 260-page account of how the myth of a military decision that aimed to minimize U.S. casualties developed. — The non-specialist reader will find this work to be—in contrast to most writing on the subject—judicious, careful, and measured. It remains an essential work, the longest and most thorough exploration of the subject. — For insights into the documentary record and views of those who disagree with Alperovitz, see http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/index.htm]