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Alternative vs. Canonical Discourses on
Military Service in Israel
By Shira Rivnai Bahir & Meidad Avidar
In recent decades, the Western World has seen more and more countries abandon
conscription. Whereas in 1968 78% of them had mandatory military service, by 2005 only
46% maintained it (Tishler & Hadad, 2011). When NATO was ratified in 1949, all member-
States except Canada had conscription ; in the years that have passed since, most of them
have cancelled or suspended it (Poutvarra & Wagner, 2011). Today, less than 40% of the
States throughout the globe retain such a policy.1 Most of these countries are not part of the
Western world – they are in Africa or Asia (ibid.) –, and most offer alternative national
service options, or have selective draft systems.
The Israeli case diverges from this trend by holding fast to its conscription policy,
while refraining from offering most of the population any formal alternative. Furthermore,
at this point in time there is no meaningful public or political discussion questioning it.
Hence many believe a tension exists between the current conscription model and the shifts
in values and in social and cultural orientations of the past few decades.
The present article wishes to address this tension by focusing on perceptions held
by teenagers regarding their future tour of duty in uniform, specifically in relation to the
changes that characterize Israeli society today. Both in-depth interviews and opinion
surveys were conducted on pre-conscription teens, in order to assess the role and place
military service has for them, as well as how it is incorporated into their daily lives. These
authors hope that this will help shed new light on the conditions that keep in place this
unique state of affairs.
The argument raised addresses the changes in common values that a majority of the
youths surveyed voice as part of a dual discourse, made up of apparently contradictory
elements – collectivist and individualistic. This simultaneity plays out differently on two
distinct dimensions : conscription on the one hand, and military assignments on the other.
Today’s Israeli youth indeed expect the military to be a fertile ground for personal growth,
realization and fulfilment, as well as job security after discharge. At the same time, often
S. Rivnai Bahir and M. Avidar contributed equally to this work.
1 According to the Knesset Research and Information Centre (Tzadok, 2010), over the past two decades 20
countries cancelled conscription : Belgium (1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2006), Croatia (2010), the Czech
Republic (2005), France (2001), Hungary (2005), Italy (2005), Latvia (2007), Montenegro (2006),
Macedonia (2008), the Netherlands (1997), Poland (2009), Portugal (2004), Serbia (2010), Slovakia (2006-
2007), Slovenia (2003), Spain (2002), and Romania (2006-2007). Since the publication of the report,
Germany opted for an all-volunteer force in 2011. Today, of the countries making up the European Union,
only Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, and Greece still have conscription, albeit less than
universal and egalitarian in most cases.
Published/ publié in Res Militaris (http://resmilitaris.net), ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 2
expressed in the very same sentence, a collectivist discourse resonates in a way that
intertwines their fate with that of society and/or the State, motivating them to view military
service as emblematic of the collective efforts to protect the State. Thus, service under
arms constitutes them as part of the dominant normative life trajectory in Israel. In light of
its prevalence among our interviewees, such a discourse can aptly be termed “canonical”.
Alongside this canonical discourse, we also identified alternative discourses. In
comparison to the former’s duality and complexity, these alternative discourses are more
coherent. One derives from a neoliberal worldview and is articulated as a utilitarian
discourse that emphasizes teens’ motivation to enlist as stemming from a desire to be
rewarded for their service. Another, expressing a liberal worldview, is couched in the
republican discourse typical of teens who indicated that their motivation to serve Israeli
society does not place a premium on the “security track” – i.e. on service in the Israel
Defence Force (IDF). At the margins of this perception one could find voices taking their
inspiration from a pacifist worldview, and articulating a clear opposition to the use of any
form of violence.
Civil-Military Relations in Israel
One of the fundamental principles of the Israeli people’s army model was the
universality of its conscription system. This became reality in 1949 when the Defence
Service Law was passed, designating the entire population between the ages of 18 and 49
as the conscription pool for both active and reserve duty (Ben-Eliezer, 1995, 1998). Even
though Israeli conscription was selective from the very start – not all of the nation’s social
groups actually served –, it nevertheless included a large portion of the population. Thus,
top priority was granted to the greater good. The individual was legally required to
contribute to the protection of the State, defined and understood as the most noble and
significant common goal (Lebel, 2007). The IDF was entrusted with the central role of
creating equality and fashioning a unified identity, and thus constructed as an official State
institution belonging to the people and representing its values and collective interests
(Lomsky-Feder & Ben-Ari, 1999 ; Horowitz & Lissak, 1990). These social perspectives
supported conscription and constituted the foundation for a republican approach to
citizenship (Shafir & Peled, 2002). Yet, despite this wide-ranging citizen obligation,
individuals were still considered to have a choice as to whether or not to serve of their own
free will, and Israel’s comprehensive draft model necessitated a complementary social
arrangement that would encourage them to enlist. As a result, there has always been vast
academic and military interest in the various perceptions that can be observed as regards
mandatory military service and the motivations to enlist for lengthy and demanding tours
of duty which do not offer immediate monetary compensation.
A common argument in the academic literature claims that Israel has seen a change
in its moral values from a national-collectivist and militaristic worldview (i.e. placing the
State and its institutions at the centre of social life) to a liberal and individualistic one
(Moore & Kimmerling, 1995). The liberal ideology’s central values include competitiveness,
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 3
ambitiousness, efficiency, and an emphasis on the individual’s inherent rights. These
orientations, it is argued, weaken collective solidarity and emphasize personal gain at the
expense of the IDF’s standing in society (Cohen, 2000 ; Sasson-Levy, 2006 ; Levy, 2009).
Analyses based on this perspective claim that these processes have created a
tension between the perception of military service as a necessary condition for enjoying
civil rights and the notion that rights are an a priori condition for citizenship (Cohen, 1997 ;
Levy, 2009 ; Lomsky-Feder & Ben-Ari 2003). This “republican” argument considers that
military service plays a central role in defining citizenship and its boundaries, and that the
IDF is a State apparatus for social inclusion and exclusion, as well as for distribution of
resources.2 Key to this approach is the recognition of the individual’s anxiety to translate
military service into material advantages and rewards in civilian settings. Beyond
symbolizing ‘belongingness to the collective’, one’s assignment in the military serves as an
assessment of one’s patriotism (Sasson-Levy, 2006). Therefore, a hierarchy based on the
degree of commitment and allegiance influences the accessibility to material and social
resources in civilian society (Sasson-Levy, 2002, 2006). Loyalty and one’s willingness to
serve are weighed not solely in terms of whether one has actually served or not, but also as
a function of the type of formation or specialty to which he or she has been assigned.
Yagil Levy (2008) argued that the middle class in Israel has slowly distanced itself
from the republican approach to civil society, which ties together military service and the
social standing of individuals and groups. Levy uses a structural-historical lens to examine
the exchange between the ability of social groups to gain rewards from their military
participation and their willingness to invest human and material resources to maintain the
quality of their military contribution. The Israeli middle class (especially secular
Ashkenazim), Levy claims, are retreating from the republican approach, since they believe
that due to the relative devaluation of the military in society, they no longer enjoy the same
social, material or symbolic advantages as previous generations (ibid.). While it has not
translated into a fall in the rate of enlistment, the retreat from the republican model has
gradually led over time to a social contract approach, one which considers conscription in
light of individual or group interests. These processes, he explains, indicate a motivational
crisis which manifests itself in the adoption of negotiation practices by the general public
in dealing with the military. Such a crisis sometimes erupts into collective protests, tied to
social movements against various other military- and security-related policies (such as
“Four Mothers”, “Breaking the Silence”, and “Peace Now”). It also manifests itself, vis-à-
vis the military organization, in the behaviour of youths who negotiate throughout their
enlistment process and subsequent service (ibid.).
In addition, scholars claim that the social perception of soldiers and combatants has
shifted over time from a collective to an individual point of view (Rosman-Stollman &
Israeli, 2015 ; Cohen, 2000). Yet, according to Sasson-Levy (2006), the incorporation of
individualistic values into the construction of the combatant identity has preserved its
2 Helman 1999; Levy, Lomsky-Feder & Harel 2007; Peled 1992; Sasson-Levy 2006.
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 4
hegemonic status. This is because serving as a combatant is now conceptualized in
individualistic terms as allowing for self-fulfilment, control and thrill, and no longer in
collectivist terms as a sacrifice for the greater good.
In contrast with the approach claiming that the change in values influences teens’
perceptions of service in the military, a minority of scholars maintain that both sets of
values can coexist. This approach views teens as growing up in the complex reality of
globalization, where national territorial boundaries have lost the power to determine social
and cultural identities, while at the same time the in-group identity is riddled with
insecurities and uncertainties (Schneider, 2010). This state of affairs, they argue, leads to
the blurring of the traditional dichotomous categories in the perceptions held by youth. In
such a process, these “either/ or” categories – left/right, religious/secular – turn into “and”
categories (ibid.).
Roniger & Fayge (1993) describe this trajectory of change by using the Hebrew
slang drow ‘frayer’ as an antithesis to the Israeli pioneer (‘chalutz’) archetype, representing
the aspiration of limitless sacrifice. According to them, this term was coined during the
1970s due to an overall disappointment with the political leadership. It represented an
unwillingness to completely devote oneself to the State, reflecting the wear and tear of the
constant demand for sacrifice. They view the rise of the “frayer culture” as a form of
protest and not as indifference towards society writ large or a repudiation of Zionist values.
Roniger (1994) argues that the Israeli model of individualism, as opposed to the Liberal-
European model, does not see the individual as occupying centre stage alone, but rather as
sharing it with a significant collective element. Moore & Kimmerling (1995) concur that
collectivism and individualism do not exclude each other, but rather constitute together the
new complex identity of Israel’s Jewish society. They recognize four central identities :
familial, Jewish, Israeli and professional. The Jewish and Israeli identities designate the
extreme points on the collective continuum, while the familial and professional
orientations are poles apart on the individual continuum. For Moore & Kimmerling (ibid.)
these two continua are not mutually exclusive, hence the individual’s identity can comprise
supposedly contradictory elements. All Israeli individuals define themselves in terms of
these two axes and the orthogonal construct they are apt to form.
Through the years, more studies have indeed confirmed that a contradiction between
the two approaches does not necessarily exist. Ploom and colleagues (1980) examined pre-
enlistment teens’ expectations vis-à-vis military service and the way they understand their
parents’ and friends’ expectations. Their findings showed that teens held dedicating one’s
military service to social-collective goals in highest regard (contributing to the greater
good by helping others, helping protect the State, performing one’s national civic duty),
though personal growth (boosting one’s self-esteem, independence, reliability, and a sense
of fulfilment) does not lag far behind. Similarly, a recent study that followed the discourse
used by Israeli teens on various Internet forums found that individual motives were voiced
alongside ideological ones (Betzalel, 2015).
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 5
The present study offers an in-depth account of the perceptions held by teens in
light of the above-mentioned changes in Israeli society. Beyond adding to the under-
standing that individual and collective values do not contradict each other, it seeks to
explore the relations between the two sets of values. The findings touch upon the delicate
balance the interviewees maintain between these two perspectives. We argue that such a
balance reveals the conceptual inconsistency that exists between various social institutions,
consequently sustaining the resilience of the conscription system regardless of the shift in
values affecting Israeli society.
Method
Most teens in Israel, except for Palestinian-Israeli citizens and ultra-orthodox Jews,
access the military at around 18, after graduating from high school. In addition, 25% of
women from National-Religious backgrounds, who are legally exempted from conscript
service, voluntarily join the IDF. Rather than those groups, however, the present study
examined the perception held by Jewish youths between the ages of 17-18, prior to their
induction into the military. Since the “encounter” with the IDF carries a lot of weight in the
shaping of youth’s worldviews, the vast majority of the interviews were conducted with
teens who, while they had completed the very first stages of the accession process (basic
physical and psycho-social assessments), had not had any meaningful military experiences
such as secondary screening processes and pre-enlistment physical trials for special units.
The study uses mixed, quantitative and qualitative, methods. The quantitative part
relies on a telephone survey, which has been conducted annually on pre-enlistment teens
since the year 2000.3 Each round of the survey includes randomly chosen samples of
1,000-2,000 respondents. The latest round used in the study was conducted during
December 2014, and involved upwards of 1,600 teens, divided evenly between males and
females. The qualitative part relies on 65 semi-structured interviews, with 46 males and 19
females. Assuming that personal narratives are socially constructed, the interviewees were
chosen to reflect the various social groups that make up Israeli society, thus offering a
broad spectrum of approaches and perceptions relating to military service. In order to
reflect this variance, the study used the socio-economic decile-classification of cities and
towns supplied by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics. In addition, schools were chosen to
reflect the diversity of categories, including geographic location (periphery vs. metropolis)
and religiosity.
Findings
Two parallel worldviews were reflected in the analysis. On the one hand Israel’s
shift in values, and on the other the hegemonic worldview, specifically the centrality of
national security issues and the relative social prestige the IDF still enjoys in Israeli society.
The findings offer a firm basis for the argument that the combination of both sets of values,
commonly seen as excluding each other, actually coexist and allow for the maintenance of
3 The telephone survey has been conducted annually by the IDF’s Behavioural Sciences Centre.
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 6
the Israeli social structure and the centrality of the republican element in the hegemonic
“canonical” discourse. We maintain that the internalization of these two sets of values
helps preserve the conscription model, despite and perhaps even due to the shifts that
prompted Western countries to abandon it.
Alongside it, we identified two alternative discourses: first, a utilitarian discourse
emphasizing teens’ main motivation to enlist as the desire to gain advantages ; second, a
republican-liberal discourse that broadens the notion of contribution to the nation’s greater
good as a precondition for belonging by taking it beyond military service. Teens espousing
the second discourse maintain that contributing to society is possible (at times even
preferred) in alternative civil contexts. These discourses, as will be shown below, to a
certain extent challenge the social structure on which Israel’s conscription model rests.
The Canonical Discourse
The teens interviewed for this study belong to various social sectors of the Jewish
population in Israel. They are diverse in their religiosity, gender, ethnic background, class
and probably in their political views.4 Nevertheless, the interviews show that there are
many shared elements in the ways they understand military service. This includes many
aspects that emphasize the importance of national security and the moral and normative
significance of serving in the IDF.
The majority of the interviewees who gave voice to the canonical discourse saw
military service as essential and central to their lives, and to Israeli society. Figure 1 (next
page) shows that 90% of teens express a high willingness to enlist, a proportion that has
been steadily rising since the early 2000s. Similar findings were recorded regarding the
sense of pride they derive from the idea of serving in the military : 84% of the male
subjects and 94% of the females reported very high levels of such pride.
In light of these findings, we are compelled to ask : what are the factors that foster
the centrality of the service ? As mentioned, a fundamental aspect of military participation
in Israel is its mandatory status under the Defence Service Law.5 All able-bodied citizens
and permanent residents must at some point report to the IDF under pain of severe
sanctions. Yet, while this legal imperative looms large in the background, only a minority
of teens refer to it to justify their future participation or general motivation.
Instead, the interviewees expressed alternative mechanisms obliging them to serve
– first and foremost, the weight of the constant threat to Israeli society, and the moral
imperative. This much was expressed by Alex from Jerusalem :
[…] to be in a combat unit and feel part of the defence of the State. […] Not
sitting at home and crying when bombings happen but to feel I am doing
something. […] It’s something that needs to come from within […], it’s not
mandatory because of them, it’s mandatory because of me. […] I can’t think
about not enlisting.
4 As mentioned, the survey excluded teens from social groups under no obligation to serve in the military.
5 Defense Service Law – Consolidated Version 5746-1986.
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 7
Figure 1 : “To What Extent Do You Want to Enlist the IDF ?”
Alex ties together a sense of moral obligation and responsibility and his under-
standing of the threats to Israel’s national security. This position represents a prevalent
argument in the literature that the security agenda is central to all facets of Israeli society
(Ben-Eliezer, 1998).
As opposed to many other considerations, we maintain that the sheer weight of the
legal imperative as an internalized and naturalized given diminishes the need for any
explicit discourse around it. This is to say that among the considerations at the back of pre-
enlistment teens’ minds, the legal imperative is not meaningless or unimportant, but it
leaves room for voicing other elements.
Military participation as a normative act of decency was an additional element that
stood out in the interviewees’ articulation of the canonical discourse, which also reflected
the centrality of the people’s army ethos. The normative status of military service was
expressed as self-evident and commonly accepted. The interviewees expressed time and
time again that they never envisaged the possibility of not serving in the IDF. Limor, living
in the south of Israel, expressed it thus :
I want to enlist, I am not sure why but I am looking forward to it […]. Since we
were little we knew there is high school, and after high school there is the
military, and after the military there is the trip abroad and then university, it’s a
template. […] Straight after high school, there is the military : you don’t have
much time to think.
This decency factor, among other things, reflects the common perception (as can be
seen in Figure 2, next page) that participation in the military must be universal regardless
of the concrete needs of the IDF or Israel’s security. Miri, from Haifa, expresses this
sentiment :
What, you will sit at home and do nothing ? Make money and travel while your
friends, not necessarily those you are close with, will go and sacrifice […] and
put their lives at risk so you can sleep with ease ?
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 8
Figure 2 : To What Extent Do You Agree with the Statement that the Military Should
Enlist Everyone at the Same Age (18), Regardless of Necessity ?
Accordingly, many teens expressed their fear of the social consequences of not
participating : later hiring problems, a feeling of social detachment sensed and looked down
upon by others, and finally not being considered a full citizen of the State. These
sensitivities give voice to their perceptions regarding the military’s role in defining the
collective boundaries of Israeli society. As Golan, from a Kibbutz in the south of Israel, put
it : “There isn’t that option [not to serve]. […] You either live in this country and enlist and
feel that you belong or you don’t”.
This reflects a republican approach to citizenship. The majority of the participants
expressed this approach and based the justification for their future participation on being a
citizen of the State of Israel, and vice versa stipulated military service as one of the
foundations of their citizen status. Figure 3 (below) offers a visual representation of the
significance of this perception among the participants in the study. Only a minority of the
teens surveyed, approximately 20%, believed someone who did not serve in the military
could be as good a citizen as someone who did.
Teens, as can be seen in Figure 3, view military service through collectivist-
national values emphasizing the importance of volunteering, contributing to the nation’s
security, and mutual trust. In addition, there is tacit consent to and internalization of the
republican approach wherein individual rights are premised on contribution to the greater
good. Emphasizing choice in the context of conscription as an inherent obligation,
resonates with liberal individual perspectives that also make up the canonical discourse.
Figure 3 : To What Extent Do You Agree with the Statement That Those Who Do Not
Serve in the IDF Are as Good Citizens as Those Who Serve ?
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 9
While there are not many uncertainties tied to the decision to enlist, the choice of
individual assignments in the IDF is often guided by a lot of deliberations. This emphasizes
the individual’s ability to shape his or her actions according to his or her preferences and
understanding of the difference this or that military assignment can make. This process of
selecting an assignment of choice was seen through meritocratic lenses tying it to
ambitiousness and competitiveness.
Many of the interviewees expressed their desire to serve in a “significant” posting,
which would be both interesting and pleasurable. That is to say, in that process teens
understand themselves as social agents that possess the right to choose and navigate their
trajectory. These findings support Levy’s (2009) view that teens negotiate with the military
for better and more desirable assignments. These aspects represent a liberal set of values,
one that places individual and instrumental motivations at the centre of discussion, and
which includes personal gain (accumulating social, symbolic and material capital),
personal satisfaction and accomplishment.
This points to a double-pronged understanding of military service : participation on
the one hand, assignment on the other. Enlistment is a transparent category, internalized
and taken for granted, based on a republican, collectivist and national set of values.
Assignment evokes teens’ sense of agency and the centrality of a liberal worldview
prioritizing self-fulfilment. Nevertheless, the latter is not devoid of collectivist elements.
Along with a universal approach to military participation through emphasizing the people’s
army ethos, the interviewees manifest the centrality of combat. A good example is
articulated by Yaniv, from a city in the south of Israel :
It seems to me that everyone does the same thing, from the jobnik6 in the
kitchen to the combatant. Because if the jobnik in the kitchen would give food
to the one who goes to battle then he would go to battle as he does, that’s what I
think, the fact that people see it this way so to say that here comes a jobnik for
several hours. […] there will always be those who matter more and those who
matter less, that’s how it is, but if you look at the entire system, then if those at
the bottom who matter less weren’t there, then those on top would fall.
From the interviews, it is clear that the canonical discourse has contradictory
complexities and tensions, and clearly does not rely on a single set of values. Thus, Yaniv
expresses in tandem two distinct worldviews – collectivist and individualistic – in support
of participation.
Alternative Discourses
In contrast to the canonical discourse described above, a minority of the teens
surveyed presented a different view of military service, one that we will call an “alternative
discourse”. We identified two alternative discourses, one utilitarian in orientation, the other
liberal-republican. They differ from the canonical discourse in two central aspects. First, in
their degree of coherence : as opposed to the canonical discourse offering a complex image
6 A derogatory term for non-combat assignments or roles.
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 10
made up of contradictory elements, the alternative discourses are far more homogeneous in
their respective orientations. Second, in their critical outlook : whereas the canonical
discourse holds dear values that support the persistence of a people’s army, the alternative
discourses oppose these values and principles.
The Utilitarian Discourse
Tens who voiced this discourse were concerned with the possibility of earning
added benefits from their military service. While also expressing a Republican moral
worldview that characterizes Israeli society and ties citizenship to military service, some of
them viewed military service as an opportunity for social and occupational mobilization.
As in Danit’s words :
A woman who did military service and one that didn’t go to the same
workplace, she’ll be told that the other one was in the military, she knows what
it means […] because it’s important for later, I see my mom who didn’t go to
the military and didn’t complete K-through-12 and didn’t get a diploma, and
now is working with elders, I don’t want to work with elders, you get it, the
difference between me and her ? She didn’t acquire a skill, didn’t do anything, I
do want to do something with myself, that’s why I am learning a profession and
completing K-through-12 and enlisting in the military, I do want a profession.
Others like Shimon from Tel-Aviv, see military service as an experience that might
promote their personal notion of human capital : “At the beginning I thought not to go, but
later I said if they place me in hairdressing and I’ll be a hairdresser then OK, I’ll be cool
with it for three years, but if not then no way in hell”.
Seeking material benefits sometimes paves the way not only to negotiations for
specific assignments based on personal preferences, but also to the temptation to dodge the
draft altogether. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that some of the interviewees voice
sentiments akin to advocacy of an all-volunteer force. This is precisely what Johnny, from
the centre of Israel, expressed :
But again I say, it’s like if you transform the military into a job life in other
countries more people will do it just for the money, but they’ll still do it,
regardless the reasons people will still do it. […] It needs to be done, people
don’t get it, the US has a bigger military because it’s a job, so people tell
themselves, so I’ll go for a military career, if that’s the last option, sometimes it
can pay off, it’s a lot of money.
Johnny is clearly suggesting a paid-voluntary military model, one which is now
widespread throughout the world. Though most did not undermine the existing model in
Israel as he did, those who did express alternative positions to the canonical discourse
admitted that they were not interested in enlisting.
The Liberal-Republican Discourse
As opposed to the republican discourse described above, the liberal-republican
discourse distinguishes between civil duties and rights, by defining social rewards as
naturally given human rights. According to this perspective, the State is obligated to
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 11
acknowledge that all its citizens enjoy civil rights, regardless of whether or not they fulfil
certain duties. Citizens are free to choose their battles in accordance with their personal
guiding values. Such a liberal discourse might undermine the existing conscription model
by defining contribution to the greater good as voluntary and not obligatory. Several
participants presented a complex discourse made up of elements from both the republican
and the liberal discourses. On the one hand, they do not view military service as a civic
duty, nor do they premise citizenship on a contribution to the greater good. On the other,
they maintain that contributing to the greater good is a civil necessity, though one which
goes far beyond military service, as Sholomi from Jerusalem clarifies :
There is a country I live in as a citizen, so I want to serve against the enemies,
against anything else, to contribute to the State I live in.
Q. : Are there other ways one can contribute to the State ?
A. : There is national service,7 there are other things.
Q. : Where does military service stand in relation to these other options ?
A. : It’s the same thing, a person that can’t serve in the military should do
national service, and a person that can’t do either, shouldn’t do any.
Though this discourse has the potential to completely undermine the principle of
mandatory participation in the military, the study’s respondents did not go so far : they
broadened the republican discourse but held on to its fundamental principles.
The Socio-Economic Background of Respondents
Israeli society is diverse and made up of multiple social groups with deep
inequalities separating them (Smooha, 1978). The canonical discourse, as mentioned above,
traces the social boundaries of the Israeli collective by tying together military service,
contribution to the State, and citizenship. In other words, doing military service denotes
belonging to the Israeli society. Mere belonging thus constitutes a satisfying form of
symbolic capital, which is granted when joining the military and is calibrated to one’s
personal investment and risk. The alternative discourses challenge this view. The utilitarian
discourse places at the centre of it all material rewards and not symbolic capital, while the
liberal-republican discourse undermines the affinity between serving in the military and
enjoying civil rights.
An attempt to understand the collective boundaries that to some extent govern the
outlook and behaviour of the participants and to take into account their position in a
delineated community is bound to shed new light on the subject. First, though many
expressed disdain towards those individuals who do not do military service, there were
groups that were barely mentioned – e.g. Palestinian citizens of Israel. To paraphrase
Anderson (1999), this group lies outside the imagined community, and is not expected to
take part in the defence efforts of the State.
7 National service is a governmental programme that offers post-high school teens non-military volunteering
options (mainly in education- and health-oriented organizations) of one or two years.
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 12
Another aspect of the social profiles and collective belonging of survey respondents
we examined was that of class. This line of inquiry reaffirmed the discourse classification
presented above : canonical, utilitarian, and liberal-republican.
Examining socio-economic backgrounds reveals how pervasive the canonical
discourse is – it cuts across all social groups. On the other hand, those interviewees who
articulated alternative discourses came, to a certain extent, from the social margins –
immigrants, low socio-economic status, the geographical periphery, and from educational
institutions for disconnected youth. Thus, those relegated to the margins are also the ones
who undermine the hegemonic discourse.
The survey results uncover a correlation between class and views regarding the
military : the lower the socio-economic background, the lower the motivation to serve in
the military. Most teens who during the semi-structured interviews expressed views and
values belonging to a utilitarian discourse were also more likely to have indicators of
socially marginalized backgrounds. Most indicated that their family’s income was less than
average. In addition, the description of their social group suggested social marginality.
Shimon represents well this kind of articulation: “Not too successful but still I make an
effort”. Danit tells of her friends :
Those are all my people, all HaTikva,8 and many who hear Ha’Tikva imme-
diately diss it, but I don’t think it’s right.
It would be possible to assume that the teens who are on the social margins feel
they do not have the opportunity to enjoy the symbolic and material goods available in
society. A good example of this is offered by Johnny :
My father is familiar with one of the Commander-in-Chiefs of the IDF, who was
supposed to take care of me. And I spoke to her and she has the military
attitude, that you have to do for the State all that it needs from you. That she
defends it and what a State and what BS ! Look at how we live, we live OK,
there are people much worse off.
Johnny claimed that there was no reason for him to enlist, since he in particular was
not getting anything from the State. He believes that were he to enlist the service would not
serve as a tool for social and economic mobility, which leads him to critically question the
sheer idea of enlisting. For some teens from underprivileged or peripheral social groups
with fewer opportunities than average, the question of whether or not military service leads
to occupational mobility becomes a fundamental consideration.
The population group that articulates the liberal-republican discourse is constituted
by participants from affluent backgrounds from the social-cultural mainstream. The
majority went to relatively good schools, participated in extra-curricular activities in various
youth movements, and some chose to postpone their enlistment for a pre-military service
year. In addition, they all come from households with average or above-average incomes.
8 HaTikva is the emblematic socially and economically marginalized neighbourhood of Israel, located in the
south of Tel-Aviv.
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 13
The liberal-republican discourse stands in diametric opposition to the utilitarian discourse.
Whereas the latter is concerned with material needs tied to everyday subsistence and
securing an economic future for teens, the former can be viewed as an attempt to fulfil
one’s potential. This aligns with a common argument in the literature that values related to
post-material needs are more prevalent with social groups whose material needs are
satisfied (Mohamed, 2011). It would be fair to assume that these teens do not have to rely
on the military as an occupational mobilizer, nor as a guarantor of social belonging.
Rather, it seems they view it as an opportunity for self-realization, and for some even a
constriction on their time, one that prevents them from contributing where in their view
they are “truly” needed.
Discussion and Conclusion
The present study sought to identify the various discourses adopted by teens today,
specifically in regards to their perception of the IDF and military service. The analysis of
the data compiled from existing surveys and 65 semi-structured interviews with pre-
enlistment teens allowed us to identify three prominent discourses : the dominant canonical
discourse and two competing alternative discourses. The canonical discourse emphasizes
the moral, normative and security-oriented significance of military service. In contra-
distinction, the utilitarian discourse emphasizes the desire to gain material and social
benefits as a central motivation for military participation. The liberal-republican discourse
is characterized by broadening the notion of contribution to the greater good while
denouncing the centrality of the military in defining the boundaries of belonging. These
distinctions can be arranged in terms of three axes : hegemonic9 vs. undermining, composite
vs. coherent, and voluntary vs. mandatory military service. These three axes deserve to be
elaborated upon.
Hegemonic vs. Undermining
The canonical discourse discussed above is associated with perceptions of the IDF
as having significant moral value, consent to the security agenda, emphasis on the
combatant ethos, and acceptance of military service as a key social norm. It is the
worldview that preserves and reproduces the fundamental tenets of the people’s army, as
well as the perceptions and values that come with it. Shared by most of the interviewees,
the preconception of the moral security imperative of enlisting all citizens of the State
establishes the legitimacy of conscription. In addition, these normative elements – mutual
trust and considering military service as the key to belonging to Israeli society – support
the tacit sense of obligation to serve under arms.
In contrast, the assumptions grounding the alternative discourses to some extent
undermine the premises of the conscription model. The utilitarian discourse is founded on
9 Hegemony is a phrase and concept coined by Antonio Gramsci (1971) addressing the cultural dynamics
through which a certain group claims for itself, and maintains, dominance in the social world. Hegemony is
related to cultural dominance writ large.
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 14
the idea that military service may serve as fertile ground for personal growth. This goes
against the hegemonic model’s fundamental assumption that the nation’s greater good is
the top priority, and accordingly that individuals are legitimately expected to participate
and contribute. It is contrary to the notion that participation in the military is governed by
the system’s needs, and not those of the individual. Unsurprisingly, teens who articulated
this discourse clearly stated that the people’s army model should be replaced with an all-
volunteer force.
The liberal-republican discourse also undermines the premises of the current
organizational format. Teens who voiced it see military service as but one of many options
when it comes to contributing to the greater good, in direct opposition to the Israeli
people’s army model which defines it as the ultimate contribution to Israeli society, as well
as a civic obligation. However, the liberal-republican approach does not contradict the
“contributing discourse”, but rather broadens it to include civilian activities and loci (i.e.
civil or national service). Indeed, many among the teens adopting this discourse attested to
their motivation to contribute to the commonweal.
Composite vs. Coherent
While the alternative discourses convey coherent messages, the canonical discourse
is rife with seeming internal contradictions. As argued above, it is composite and relies on
more than one set of values. Accordingly, some of the interviewed teens believe that all
military assignments are of equal value, while at the same time they recognize they are
arranged hierarchically, with combat assignments being of most importance. The fact that
most of them do not feel the tension inherent in their narrative points to tacit conflicts
between multiple value sets in Israeli society and its military. These teens seem to have
internalized the wsrdoid messages delivered by diverse social institutions, which allows
them to cope with the apparent complexity. On the one hand, the people’s army ethos
highlights the importance of military service regardless of assignment, and defines the
boundaries of belonging. On the other hand, the military, the State, and society offer
substantially more significant material, social, and symbolic benefits to combatant soldiers.
Thus, the dominance of the service ethos is undeniable, however contradictory it may be –
with the caveat that perhaps, once this ethos begins to subside, these contradictions will
have a stronger impact.
Another example concerning the conflicted aspects voiced by these teens is the
contradiction between collectivist and individualistic arguments. On the one hand, these
teens express, alongside the significance of contribution and volunteering for the greater
good, a collectivist set of values while emphasizing solidarity and mutual trust between
members of the Jewish Israeli community. On the other hand, the interviews reveal
perceptions based on an individualistic worldview that prioritizes the social capital one can
gain from military service and emphasizes the element of choice in military participation
as well as the importance of the assignment secured. National-collectivist and liberal-
individualistic sets of values are often presented as being dichotomous. A common
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 15
argument raised in the literature claims that Israeli society went through radical shifts in its
moral perceptions, from national-collectivist to liberal values. The findings of the present
article clearly indicate that in most cases teens have not abandoned motivations to enlist
grounded in a desire for sacrifice and contribution. Indeed, the interviews conducted with
these teens serve to confirm the coexistence of these two separate sets of values. Many of
them voiced a complex set of motivations guiding their choice to enlist and the process of
choosing their assignment. They manage to hold together these two contradictory categories
without having to exclude one set of values, and for some of them without a trace of any
awareness of a possible discordance between the two. These findings support the conclusions
of previous studies that also claimed that these positions are not necessarily contra-
dictory.10
This study expands this claim by including pre-enlistment teens and the way they
perceive the IDF and military service.
The present findings also show that teens include these elements in their under-
standing of their identity, as when, along with their desire to defend the State and thus to
belong to Israeli society as a whole, they assert the need to belong to a community and/or
family. Following Roniger (1993), one can argue that they follow collective drives and a
desire to be part of and contribute to the collective, while at the same time earnestly
concerned with not being “frayers”. They are compelled to prove to themselves and to their
surroundings that they benefit from their efforts and sacrifice. Their compulsion to view
service in the IDF as a part of their personal identity is thus made clear ; it is based on their
civic contribution, seen as a vehicle for their sense of belonging to the nation and as a
resource that can be used to augment their symbolic, human and social capital. Hence, we
argue that they represent the mainstream trend in Secular-Jewish-Israeli society, simul-
taneously carrying both collective and individual sets of values.
In contrast to those voicing the canonical discourse, teens who propound one of the
alternative discourses articulate a more coherent message. For instance, those holding
liberal-republican orientations contended that all military assignments are of equal value.
This is clearly aligned with the way they perceive contribution writ large. For them, a civic
contribution is equivalent to a military contribution. Another example would be the homo-
geneous individualistic approach assumed by interviewees who adhere to the utilitarian
discourse.
Voluntary vs. Mandatory Military Service
The final axis distinguishing the canonical from the alternative discourses is their
approach to conscription. Teens who go for the canonical discourse hardly ever mention
the legal imperative to serve in the IDF, but rather highlight other motivations – for
example, a moral obligation rooted in the existential threat constantly looming over Israel,
tied to the inherent moral and social need to contribute to society. In contrast, teens who
hold either the utilitarian or the liberal-republican discourse do refer to the legal obligation
since it constrains them. In other words, those who want to enlist have internalized the law
10
Moore & Kimmerling, 1995 ; Ploom et al., 1980 ; Roniger & Feige, 1993.
Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 16
and view it as second nature, while those who do not take enlisting for granted do not
regard the legal mandate as transparent and actively question it.
This study may serve as an analytical tool to examine the relationship between
different sets of values and their implications for civil-military relations. Our research
concerns two sets of values – one rooted in the Israeli State’s early history, the other a
recent, gradually emerging by-product of globalization. The simultaneous coexistence of
these two sets without the formation of conflict or tension may more broadly shed light on
the process of social change. It seems as if the absence of any sign that the traditional
conceptions are on their way out has stifled opposition to the new set of values or the
perception that it undermines or threatens the established order. Moreover, it seems that at
this time, Israeli society’s main socializing agents, even when negotiating with the IDF on
civilian aspects, are still supportive of the hegemonic set of values. In other words, agents
of change are not marginal or underground groups but rather, due the internal tension of
their discourse on military participation, hegemonic groups from the social centre. These
insights may enable analysis of civil-military relations in additional countries where value
changes are taking place.
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