American Occupation of Sulu (1)

7/30/2019 American Occupation of Sulu (1)

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THE INITIAL AMERICAN OCCUPATION IN SULU

~by Peter B. Gowing

American rule in Moroland began with the arrival of troops at Jolo in May of1899. The troops could hardly be spared from the war in the north, but there was concernthat the Sulu Sultanate would make common cause with the Filipino insurgents againstthe United States. General Otis felt obliged to establish the American presence in Sulubefore the Spanish troops had been completely withdrawn. The concern was justified ontwo counts: 1) the Spaniards, giving up all hope of being relieved by the Americans, hadalready turned over Siasi to the government of the Sultan and were preparing to turn overJolo as well;12 and 2) the Filipino insurgents had actually initiated correspondence withthe Sultan of Sulu looking toward some sort of alliance.13 On January 18, 1899,President Aguinaldo addressed a letter to his great and powerful brother, the Sultan ofJolo, pledging that the Philippine Republic would respect absolutely the beliefs andtraditions of each island in order to establish on solid bases the bonds of fraternal unitydemanded by our mutual interests. Aguinaldo gave the Sultan the highest assurance offriendship, consideration and esteem.

At the end of May, the Presidents cousin, Baldomero Aguinaldo, whocommanded the Southern Region of the Philippine Republic, wrote the Sultanauthorizing him to establish in all the rancherias (the territorial domain of a datu orsultan) of Mindanao and Sulu a government in accordance with decrees of the Republic.The Sultan was requested to report the number of his forces and the results of his efforts.He was advised that if in this war we secure our independence and are successfulin preventing the enemy from gaining foothold, the grateful country will always render atribute of homage and gratitude to your memory. The Sultan gave no response to theseappeals possibly because neither he nor his advisers could see any real gain in allyingthemselves with their traditional enemies, the Christian Filipinos.

Since the Americans could not risk the eventuality of a Moro alliance with theinsurgents, they moved to occupy Sulu. An eye-witness account of the transfer of Jolofrom Spanish to American hands was penned by Pvt. Needom N. Freeman of HCompany, 23rd Infantry:

I learned that the commanding officer, who was an old man had been theretwenty-eight years. In the evening at two oclock [sic] the Spanish flag on theblock-house was hauled down by the Spanish soldiers and the Americans

unfurled to the breeze the Stars and Stripes. The Spanish seemed to be verymuch grieved, the officers wept; the Americans were jubilant. Everything passedinto our hands, and the various responsibilities of the place with all its dangers

12 Otis inARWD (1899), I, Part 4, p. 133.13 See Worcester, I, pp. 227, 229-230 from which the quotations from the Aguinaldo letters below aretaken. The letters are found in thePhilippine Insurgent Records.

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also passed to us. The natives, who belong to the Moro [sic] tribe, are

treacherous. Guards were put on duty at once 14

Orders for the occupation of Sulu were logical and plain: relieve the Spanishforces; gradually extend American jurisdiction over the Sultanate; and do this in such amanner as to cause a minimum of friction with the people, for no reinforcements could beexpected for a long time. Soon after the arrival of the troops, detachments were sent toman the abandoned Spanish posts at Siasi and Bongao. In command of the latter postwas Capt. Sydney A. Cloman who early decided that the rules of the game were goingto be changed for the American soldiers in Bongao:

I had learned something of the Spanish regime at Jolo, and my first thought on

seeing Bongao was that we would have no use for the block house, except as astore house. We would not shut ourselves within its walls and permit the Morosto yell nightly about the place and fire at it, accustomed as they were to thisinnocent diversion. Furthermore, we were not going to be shut up even onBongao Island. While we were on the subject of changing the rules of the game,they might as well understand that we were going about the group as we pleasedand that we would have to be protected from their present idea that the white manwas fair game wherever found. Carrying out this principle afterward causedsome loss of life, but before I left there the new rules were fairly understood 15

The American occupation of Sulu raised certain questions of international import.It was discovered that the territorial limits of the cession delineated in the Treaty of Paris

included the bulk of the Sulu Sultanate but did not include the islands of the Cagayan deSulu group, the island of Sibutu and certain other smaller islands which in Spanish timeswere considered part of the Sultanate. In an additional treaty with Spain, signed inWashington on November 7, 1900, the United States acquired title to any and all islandsbelonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside the lines described in Article IIIof the Treaty of Paris. Spain received a payment of $100,000 for relinquishing her claimson these islands.16

There were other islands, considered part of Sulu, where Dutch and British flagsflew, which necessitated diplomatic negotiations between the United States and thesenations. The island of Miangas (Palmas) at the southern extremity of Sulu, for example,

14 Quoted in Horace P. Hobbs,Kris and Krag: Adventures Among the Moros of the Southern Philippines(1962), p. 43. The Spanish commanding officer could not have been in Jolo 28 years the Spaniards had agovernment in Jolo for only 22 years (since 1876) and according to Vic Hurley (p.282) the last militarygovernor was Col. Luis Huerta who served from 1896 to 1899.15 Sydney A. Cloman,Myself and a Few Moros (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1923), p.9.16 The text of the Treaty for Cession of Outlying Islands of the Philippines, November 7, 1900 is foundin Forbes, II, Appendix VIII.

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was visited by Gen. Leonard Wood, first Governor of the Moro Province, in January

1906. He was surprised to find that island under the de facto government of the DutchEast Indies authorities. The United States and Holland disputed the island until April1928, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled in favor of Holland.17

Moreover, the Protocol signed in 1885 by Germany, Great Britain and Spain gave thefirst two powers certain commercial privileges and preference in the Sulu Archipelago (aswell as on Balanguingi Island and in the port of Sandakan). After Spain ceded thePhilippines to the United States, Germany and Great Britain asserted that theircommercial rights in Sulu remained in effect. But Charles A. Magoon, Law Officer ofthe U.S. War Departments Division of Insular Affairs, advised those powers that uponthe cession of the Sulu Archipelago by Spain to the United States the treaties of Spainrespecting trade with the islands ceased to exist.18

The arrival of the Americans was an unpleasant surprise to 30-year old SultanJamal-ul Kiram II, who had recently returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca. At the time,he was in Siasi whence he had gone to receive the place officially from the Spaniards.He had expected to have Jolo surrendered to him as well. It appears, however, that someof the datus on Jolo Island were not an amicable terms with him so they virtuallywelcomed the American troops. A few datus called on Captain Pratt, expressed theirfriendly intentions and pledged loyalty to the United States. When Captain Pratt returnedthe calls, he and his officers were hospitably entertained and the Sultans mother,Pangyan Inchy Jamila, also graciously received them at her residence at Maimbung.19

The Sultan, disappointed at the turn of events, lingered at Siasi where he had establisheda police force and garrison. He did not respond to an invitation to call on the Americanofficers. He did nothing actively to oppose the new occupation, but neither was he

17 Forbes, I, pp. 79-80. See alsoReport of the Governor of the Moro Province, 1906, p.31.18 U.S. War Department, Division of Insular Affairs,Reports on the Law of Civil Government in TerritorySubject to Military Occupation by the Military Forces of the United States, by Charles A. Magoon(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), p.302. See also S.K. Tan, Sulu Under AmericanMilitary Rule, 1899-1913 (M.A. thesis, University of the Philippines, 1966), pp. 58-60. (The thesis hasbeen published in thePhilippine Social Science and Humanities Preview, XXXII/1, 1967, but all referencesto it in the present study cite the original typescript.) This was a strong ruling indeed considering that itwas (and is) a principle of international law that succeeding governments honor the international

agreements entered into by preceding governments.19 The American authorities seemed determined to reciprocate and maintain the friendship of theinfluential Sultana. Thus in 1901 we find General W.A. Kobbe presenting her with a large, silkenAmerican flag on behalf of the U.S. Government as a mark of our personal esteem and the highappreciation in which you are held by the American people. See letter of Major O.J. Sweet to SultanaInchy Jamila, June 20, 1901, inHugh Lenox Scott Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress),Container 55. (Henceforth this collection is referred to as Scott Papers.) That same year, Major Sweetwrote to the Sulu dowager that the new government steam launch in use at Jolo had been named Sultanain her honor and I express the hope that she may render us as good service as ever as the Sultana of Jolo.SeeARWD (1901), I, Part A, p.341.

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friendly.20 Possibly persuaded by the good behavior of the Americans and their promises

not to interfere with the religion of the Moros, the Sultan issued a cautiously wordedwarning in a proclamation to his subjects, the substance of which was as follows:

The Americans have come here in exchange for the Spaniards, they are adifferent people from the Spaniards, and it will not be good to juramentadoagainst them. They did not come to take our lands, religion or customs. Theyleave us our laws, and if you love yourselves and your country avoid coming toblows with the Americans, because they are like a matchbox you strike one andthey all go off.21

It is possible, though by no means certain, that later the Sultan was furtherinfluenced to acquiesce in the presence of the Americans by a communication from

Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, who was recognized as the Caliph of Sunni Islam. NathanStraus, the American Minister to Turkey, reported in September of 1899 that he had anaudience at the Sublime Porte regarding the possible Moro resistance to the Americanoccupation of Moroland:

Having referred to this subject, he (the Sultan of Turkey) said immediatelyfollowing my audience with him he had telegraphed to Mecca, it being thetime of the annual pilgrimage, his wishes that the Moslems in the Philippinesshould not war with the Americans, nor side with the insurgents, but should bewith our army, and that, as I assured him (the Sultan), the Americans would notinterfere with their religion and would be as tolerant toward them as he wastoward the Christians in his Empire. He added that he was glad that there had

been no conflict between our army and the Moslems, and that he certainly hopedtheir religion would in no manner be interfered with. I replied of this he couldcertainly feel satisfied, that religious liberty was the chief corner stone of ourpolitical institutions.22

In June the President of the First Philippine Commission, Dr. Jacob Schurman,visited Sulu to study local conditions. Dr. Schurman succeeded in interviewing theSultan and sought to get him to agree to a renewal of the agreement made with Spain in1878. The sovereignty of the United States would be substituted for that of Spain. TheCommission apparently was seeking to accomplish by diplomacy what the United Stateswas not prepared to impose by military means. The Sultan hesitated. He wanted better

terms, but Dr. Schurman refused to consider anything beyond the limits of the Treaty of

20 General Otis inARWD (1899), I, Part 4, p. 133.21 The Sulu Treaty and Other Domestic Relations (Washington: Insular Division, May 24, 1901,typescript), p. 6. A copy of this paper is deposited in the Bureau of Insular Affairs Division of theNational Archives in Washington, D.C.,BIA Records file No. 980.22 Quoted in Clifford N. Smith, A History of the Moros: A Study in Conquest and Colonial Government(Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1948), p. 64.

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1878. In the end, the Sultan reportedly made a verbal agreement to acknowledgeAmerican sovereignty according to the same terms provided in the 1878 treaty.

Schurman cabled Washington recommending a plan for making similar agreements withother Moro chieftains. President McKinley, who had entertained doubts as to thesovereignty of Spain over the Sulu Sultanate, promptly directed that a formal agreementbe made with the Sultan.23

The tactful behavior of Captain Pratt and his officers together with the diplomaticspade-work of the Schurman Commission did much to prepare the way for thenegotiations with Sultan Jamal-ul Kiram II conducted by Brig. Gen. John C. Bates,U.S.V., during July and August of 1899.24

THE BATES AGREEMENT

Arriving in Jolo about mid-July, General Bates carried with him rather explicitinstructions form General Otis, the Military Governor of the Philippines:

The United States has succeeded to all the rights which Spain held in theArchipelago, and its sovereignty over the same is an established fact. But theinquiry arises as to the extent to which that sovereignty can be applied under theagreement of 1878 with the Moros The Moros acknowledged, through their

23 J.G. Schurman,Philippine Affairs: A Retrospect and Outlook(New York: Scribners, 1902), pp.15-18.See also Dorothy Rogers, A History of the American Occupation and Administration of the SuluArchipelago, 1899-1920, (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of San Francisco, 1959), pp. 12-14,22.Dr. Schurmans role in the shaping of initial U.S. policy towards the Sulu Sultanate is by no meansuniversally recognized and, in most accounts of the American occupation of Sulu, is completely ignored.He claimed that the Bates Agreement was based on his recommendation (Report of the PhilippineCommission, 1900, I, p.101), but James A. LeRoy says: It [Schurmans role] also is now quite uniformlyrecognized to have constituted a hindrance rather than a help toward consistent governmental policy.Schurmans personal efforts in the Philippines were frequently denigrated by many of his contemporariesbecause of his strong anti-imperialist convictions. James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines, II(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), p.118.24 Perhaps this is the place to mention that Thomas H. Haynes, an Englishman who lived briefly in Jolo in

the 1880s and who was a friend of Sultan Badar-ud Din II claims to have drafted, on behalf of the SuluSultanate, an Appeal to the President of the United States for a formal accord of protection. The draftwas prepared in 1899 in both English and Malay and sent out to the Sultan for signature from the authorshome in Great Britain. According to Haynes the Appeal was adopted and dispatched by the Sultan. Thiswriter has found no mention of such a document anywhere else but in Haynes pamphlet, The Philippinesand the Sulu Sultanate (London: Baines & Scarsbrook Ltd., 1927), p. 8. However, the pamphlet is so filledwith historical inaccuracies (including the authors obvious ignorance of the fact that Jamal-ul Kiram II wasthe ruler on whose behalf he drafted the Appeal, and that he was still the Sultan in 1927 see p. 17) thatdoubt is cast on the credibility of many of its allegations. The pamphlet is in general criticism of Americanpolicy in Sulu.

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accepted chiefs, Spanish sovereignty and their subjection thereto, and that nationin turn conferred upon their chiefs powers of supervision over them and theiraffairs. The kingly prerogatives of Spain, thus abridged by solemn concession,

have descended to the United States, and conditions existing at the time oftransfer should remain. The Moros are entitled to enjoy the identical privilegeswhich they possessed at the time of transfer, and to continue to enjoy them untilabridged or modified by future mutual agreement between them and the UnitedStates to which they owe loyalty, unless it becomes necessary to invoke theexercise of supreme powers of sovereignty to meet emergencies. You willtherefore acquaint yourselves thoroughly with the terms of the agreement of 1878and take them as a basis for your directed negotiations.

Probably you will discover that the Sultan and datos are laboring under themistaken impression that Spain, upon withdrawing recently her military forcesfrom the islands, reconveyed sovereignty to them. This claim on their part is

mentioned in the memorandum citing the action of the United States troops atJolo, and may be seriously entertained by them because of the reported Spanishaction in placing them in possession of Siasi accompanied by promises tolikewise turn over Jolo.

If they seriously entertain such an illusion it will require tact and adroitness todispel it, and a discussion of the United States benevolent intentions, and itswish to establish friendly relations with them in order to carry out thoseintentions, should precede any decided attempt at correction.

It is greatly desired by the United States for the welfare of both the UnitedStates and the Moros, that mutual friendly and well-defined relations be

established The United States will accept the obligations of Spain under theagreement of 1878 in the matter of money annuities, and in proof of sincerity,you will offer as a present to the Sultan and datos ten thousand dollars, Mexican,with which you will be supplied.25

The American authorities in 1899 seemed to be unaware of the significance oftheir seeking to step directly into the shoes of the Spaniards in Moroland. What they hadin mind was to get Moro acknowledgement of the fact that the United States hadsucceeded to the status of sovereign in Moroland. But the Americans did not seem tounderstand that the Treaty of 1878 had been, from the view point of the Sulu Moros,nothing more than a modus vivendi with Spain, the limits of which the Moros were

constantly testing. The emoluments paid by Spain to the Sultan were regarded by him assomething in the nature of tribute in exchange for his co-operation in keeping the Suluspeaceful. Again from the Moro viewpoint, the United States in 1899 was seeking tooccupy exactly the same irritating position that Spain had held in Sulu but which the

25 Treaty with the Sultan of Sulu, Senate Document 136, 56th Congress, 1st session (Washington: 1900), pp.3-5.

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Moros had learned to live with and to circumvent as conditions permitted. TheAmericans little realized that in seeking to step into Spanish shoes they were likely also

to inherit Spains problems with the Moros.

Whatever the Sultan may have said to Dr. Schurman in June, a month later hedragged his feet in negotiations with General Bates. It was difficult indeed for the Sultanand his followers to understand how the Americans had any claim to sovereignty overSulu or how it was possible for Spain to sell or cede their territory without theirknowledge. The situation was delicate and the American authorities were apprehensivethat the Sultan might yet ally himself with the rebellious Filipinos in the northern islandsand might even inspire the Moros of Mindanao to do likewise. The Americans wished toget the signatures of the Sultan and his more powerful datus on a paper which expressedtheir acknowledgment of United States sovereignty. They sought to do this without soantagonizing the Moros as to drive them into an alliance with Filipino insurgents or risingin rebellion on their own volition.

For over a month General Bates coaxed and cajoled. The Sultan tried variousdelaying tactics, including feigning illness. Some of his followers made threateningnoises to frighten the American troops in Jolo. But the discipline of well-armed soldiers,the sight of modern naval vessels and the earnest and tactful manner of General Bateseventually won out. On August 9, the Sultan presented a draft of an agreement in whichhe promised to do what he could to prevent piracy, to surrender runaway Americans toAmerican authorities, to fly the American flag with his own in Sulu, and so forth. Inexchange, the Americans were to pay the Sultan and his chief datus monthly stipends(ranging from $50 to $700 per month): occupy no territory in Sulu without permission;desist from interfering in Sulu region, law and commerce; surrender runaway Sulus toSulu jurisdiction; and protect Sulu against European aggression, etc.26 This documentwas unacceptable to the American authorities for it nowhere explicitly stated Sulusacknowledgment of United States sovereignty. The United States was determined tohave nothing less than sovereignty over the entire territory ceded by Spain in the Treatyof Paris. More negotiation followed. Finally, General Bates presented a draft agreementwhich proved acceptable to all parties and was duly signed in triplicate (in English andTausug texts) on August 20, 1899.27

26

In effect, the Sultan of Sulu was suggesting an arrangement similar to that worked out between theBritish and various Sultanates in Malaya. It was also akin to the subsidiary system which the Britishemployed in India with respect to buying the good behavior of the hostile Bhutanese and others.27 Cf. The Sulu Treaty and Other Domestic Relations, pp. 2-7. See also, Hurley, pp. 153-159; Tan,pp. 42-43; and A. Savage Landor, Gems of the East(New York: Harper & Bros., 1904), pp. 176-184. TheAgreement was sometimes called a treaty though that was somewhat of a misnomer since it was not,from the American viewpoint, an internationalagreement requiring approval by the Senate. During thenegotiations General Bates himself corrected the Sulu representatives who used the word treaty, bysaying I would not call it a treaty, but an agreement. (Senate Document 136, 56th Congress, 1st session,p. 37.) Cf. Forbes, II, p. 15.

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The Bates Agreement (see Appendix B for the text) was composed of some 15

articles which provided that the United States was to be recognized as the sovereignpower over the Sulu Archipelago, though the American authorities were to fully respectthe rights and dignities of the Sultan and the datus. The Moros were assured that theirreligion and customs would not be interfered with. The United States was permitted tooccupy such places in Sulu as the public interest demanded, but with due compensationto the owners whose property was taken. The Sultan and his datus agreed to co-operatein the suppression of piracy. The people of Sulu were to have free, unlimited andundutiable trade in domestic products with any part of the Philippine Islands. Crimes ofMoros against Moros were to be tried under the Sultans jurisdiction but all the othercases were to be tried by United States authorities. The importation of firearms and otherwar materiel was forbidden except by license of the Governor General of the PhilippineIslands.

Article X, which was to raise many eyebrows in the United States, provided thatAny slave in the Archipelago of Sulu shall have the right to purchase freedom by payingto the master the usual market price.28 The salient article of the Agreement was numberXIII, which stated that The United States will give full protection to the Sultan and hissubjects in case any foreign nation should attempt to impose upon them. This article,for all intents and purposes, established the Sulu Sultanate as an American protectoraterather than a territorial possession. The fourteenth article stated specifically that theUnited States would not sell any part of the Sulu Archipelago to any foreign nationwithout the Sultans consent. And Article XV provided from the payment of monthlysalaries (in Mexican dollars) to the Sultan ($250) and members of his Ruma Bichara(from $15 to $75).

The document was duly forwarded through channels to President McKinley whoconditionally confirmed and approved the Agreement on October 27, 1899.

subject to the action of Congress provided for in that clause of the treaty ofbetween the United States and Spain which provides, `The civil rights and thepolitical status of the native inhabitants of the territory hereby ceded to theUnited States shall be determined by Congress, and with the understanding andreservation, which should be distinctly communicated to the Sultan of Jolo, thatthis agreement is not to be deemed in any way to authorize or give consent of the

United States to the existence of slavery in the Sulu Archipelago, a thing which is

28 This provision was not something new to the Sulu Moros it incorporated a practice long observed bythem and which was embodied in the Shariah of Islam.

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made impossible by the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the UnitedStates.29

The action of Congress (i.e., the U.S. Senate) referred to meant one of threethings: amendment of the Agreement, total rejection of it, or no action at all. The Senatechose the latter course and simply requested a copy of the Agreement and allaccompanying reports, mainly to satisfy itself that the President was not giving approvalto slavery. President McKinley forwarded the requested documents on February 1, 1900,explaining that he was doing so at the Senates request. This action was in conformitywith the general practice of the Government in submitting its agreements with the Indiannations occupying or governing portions of the territory subject to the sovereignty of theUnited States.30

On April 9, 1900, General Bates notified the Sultan and the datus that the

Agreement had been confirmed by the President except for Article X regarding thepractice of slavery. This subject would be reserved for a future conference. No mentionwas made to the Sultan of the fact that the U.S. Congress could amend or reject theAgreement. Congress tacitly (though not explicitly) approved the Agreement in thePhilippine Government Act of 1902, when it adopted a policy of governing the Morosalong lines similar to the American government of the Indian tribes.

The U.S. Army was not sure how the Sultan would react to the disavowal ofArticle X and on April 13, Maj. Owen J. Sweet, the Military Governor of Sulu, told theSultan not to worry. The U.S. Government was just, but opposed to slavery. The U.S.would not ignore the pecuniary interests of the Sultan and his slaves. And some method

would be found in the future to end slavery without a financial loss to the Sultan. InApril 1900, the Sultan accepted the Agreement in good faith. It was inviolable as far ashe was concerned and capable of being changed only through mutual consent of theparties in interest. He was unaware that from the American viewpoint it could bebrushed aside and ignored by the law-making power of the United States without hisknowledge or consent.31

The Bates Agreement governed the relations between the United States and Sulu

from 1899 through the formation of the Moro Province in 1903. From the beginning the29 Secretary of War to General Otis, October 27, 1899, in Senate Document 136, 56th Congress, 1st session,p. 109. Despite this condition, President McKinley was charged in Congress and by his Democraticopponent (William Jennings Bryan) in the 1900 Presidential Campaign, of upholding slavery in Sulu. Seeletter of George W. Honey to Elihu Root (Secretary of War), September 22, 1900, in National Archives,

BIA Records, file No. 980-13. See also Congressional Record, 56th Congress, 1st session, pp. 1114-1116.30 Ibid., p. 1395.31 Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903, Part I (Washington: Government Printing Office,1904), p. 492; and Brig. Gen. George W. Davis inARWD (1902), IX, pp. 495-496.

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American authorities were unhappy with the Agreement though it seemed to serve its realpurpose in neutralizing Sulu with respect to the Philippine-American War.32 As far as the

Sultan of Sulu was concerned he probably felt in the beginning that he was under nogreater restraint from the Americans by virtue of the Bates Agreement than he had beenunder the Treaty of 1878. His monthly income (increased by $50) continued, and he mayhave imagined that conditions would remain much as Captain Pratt had described themon May 20, 1899, the day after the U.S. troops landed:

The situation, in so far as determined from our limited experience is as follows:Spain possesses the small walled town known as Jolo. The governor hascomplete control within the walls. There are no civil courts, no civil officers.Outside the walls the Sultan of Jolo and Borneo is the ruler. Spain pays him$200, Mexican, per month. At present he is not on the island, but is visiting oneof the neighboring islands about 30 miles south. He has recently retuned from

Mecca, and now dresses in European costume. Spanish soldiers seldom gobeyond the range of the outlying blockhouses. The relation between the natives(Moros) and Spain is not altogether harmonious.33

The Sultan was due for a rude awakening. In time he would discover that theAmericans took their sovereignty in dead earnestness, and would call Moros who ignoredit to bloody account. The Americans were also in for a surprise. They were to learn thatan Agreement with the Sultan and some members of his Ruma Bichara was not ipsofacto an agreement with all of the powerful datus of Sulu, some of whom pursued apersonal foreign policy.

32 See Brig. Gen. W. A. Kobbe inARWD (1900), I, Part 3, pp. 256-257 for a thinly veiled critique of theBates Agreement.33 Quoted in the report of General Otis,ARWD (1899), I, Part 4, p. 133.

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Documents

American Occupation of Sulu (1)