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The Biafra Secession Author(s): Omoniyi Adewoye Source: Africa Today, Vol. 14, No. 5, American Policy in Southern Africa (Oct., 1967), pp. 35- 36 Published by: Indiana University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184836 . Accessed: 15/06/2014 07:51 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Africa Today. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 188.72.126.41 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 07:51:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

American Policy in Southern Africa || The Biafra Secession

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Page 1: American Policy in Southern Africa || The Biafra Secession

The Biafra SecessionAuthor(s): Omoniyi AdewoyeSource: Africa Today, Vol. 14, No. 5, American Policy in Southern Africa (Oct., 1967), pp. 35-36Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184836 .

Accessed: 15/06/2014 07:51

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Africa Today.

http://www.jstor.org

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Page 2: American Policy in Southern Africa || The Biafra Secession

termines "to give the intelligent reader a map of themes and styles of African writing in the metropolitan languages." For many decades, the physical maps of Africa marked only the costal fringes-the vast unex- plored interior was mysteriously blank. In our present knowledge of the African arts we are similarly ig- norant. No anthology so well explores, what for too many readers are the un- known hinterlands of literature. As a guide Mr. Mphahlele's collection is warmly recommended.

J. Povey

Africa, A New Geographic Survey. By Alan B. Moutjoy and Clifford Embleton. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967)

According to the title page "the original edition of this book was pub- lished in 1966 by Hitchinson Educa- tional, London as Africa: A Geograph. ical Study. It has been greatly re- vised and brought up to date by the authors."

Apparently the authors have writ- ten this book with a two-fold purpose in mind: (1) as a college text, and (2) as a reference for African scholars.

It is this- reviewer's opinion that the book is better adapted to the first purpose than the second.

The first three chapters, covering 156 pages are devoted to a general survey of Africa as a whole: the physi- cal basis, historical and political evo- lution, and the human geography. The remainder of the book is organ- ized along regional and national lines: ten chapters for ten regions. Each chapter is followed by what appears to be a rather good list of references and a bibliography of books and ar- ticles from geographic journals and official sources. The student should find these references invaluable as they cover a wide range of subject matter and a time span of about 65 years, from about 1900 to 1967.

The writing style is fairly interest- ing, but I do feel that the authors could have improved the readability of the book by an even more region- al approach. In some cases separate treatment of each country became somewhat tedious. I felt that the first three chapters were done the best even though parts were too technical to suit a non-geographer like myself.

The book impressed me by its fa-

cile handling of technical matter on geology, monphology and climatology, and for the reader who needs infor- mation on the hydrology of the Nile, this book provides an answer.

For social and economic data, how- ever, I would have liked a book with more factual data, presented in tabu- lar and graphic form.

I did find soane glaring errors in the section on Liberia, the country with which this reviewer has some first-hand acquaintance. To find the probable population given as 2 mil- lion when its census reports slightly over 1 million is quite a discrepancy. (Hance reported the 1961 estimate of 1.32 million "may be exaggerat- ed.") Other errors: iron ore has for several years been by far the largest export of Liberia, not rubber, and I don't understand the basis for the statement that "a small rice import (is) necessary to feed plantation and mine laborer." I'm sure any Liberian would emphasize the necessity of in- creasing rice imports, and the con- cern of government officials over this phenomenon.

James E. Dugani

Letter to the Editor

THE BIAFRA SECESSION Sirs:

Have we failed in Nigeria? Judging from the title of his Occasional Paper and from his commentary on the Bi- afra secewsion, Mr. Diamond seems to think so. Theoretically, Mr. Diamond welcomes "the idea of a unified Ni- geria". But it is obvious from his writing that he is not enthusiastic about the idea. For one thing, Nigeria has "lost the potential for integrity in any form thus far devised". For another, Nigeria, after all, is "a col- onially conceived entity". Most ser- ious of all: Not only is Nigeria a sym- bol of the colonial past, it is also, in Mr. Diamond's view, "an enormous brake on West African and Pan Af- rican growth".

Having implicitly written off Ni- geria as a failure, Mr. Diamond saw in the Biafra secession "a symbol of . . . the emerging hope of the African revolution". Apparently he would like to see more "Biafras" along the West African coast: ethnic groups of people "releasing" themselves from the old administrative strait jackets into which they were forced, presum- ably, by the colonial masters. After the ethnic groups should have suc- ceeded in establishing themselves

anew within "natural" boundaries, new alignmnents would emerge to the benefit of all. This is why Biafra, in Mr. Diamond's view, "could well be the first move in a more unified West African thrust toward freedom and economic development".

It is doubtful whether Mr. Dia- mond's thesis would help the African cause. The political situation in most African countries is such that one should be wary to recommend or en- courage secessions. The new nations of Africa are congeries of ethnic groups, in some cases, as in Nigeria, number- ing over sixty. Once the process of secession begins it is not easy to see when it will end. There are usually minorities within an area dominated by a major ethnic group that decide to stay otut of a hitherto existing po- litical arrangement. They too might consider themselves viable entities that ought to be independent. At- tempts at secession would always result in civil wars. We shall per- haps have to wait for centuries before the various ethnic groups establish their "independence" within proper boundaries awd enter into viable "new alignments".

There is yet one more serious ob-

jection to Mr. Diamond's thesis. If the program he implicitly suggested would be followed, the "new align- ments" would probably never emerge. We know already how African coun- tries continue to guard jealously their sovereignties and find it dif- ficult to enter into any meaningful alliances. In the attempt to disman- tle the old "colonial" political set- ups, the continent could be thrown into utter chaos. The prospect is too grim to contemplate of struggling na- tions perpetually in the process of becoming.

Again, it is hard to see how Ni- geria, "as historically constituted" is an obstacle to West African or Afri- can growth. The failure hitherto of African countries to achieve unity cannot be blamed on any one single factor. The obstacles to African unity are many: the jealousy with which the countries are guarding their in- dependence; conflict of personalities among African leaders; and the un- derstandable preoccupation of the in- dividual African countries with the social and economic problems within their borders-to name just three fac- tors. A large political entity like Ni- geria, if weli integrated and econ--

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Page 3: American Policy in Southern Africa || The Biafra Secession

omically well developed, could, in fact, be a rallying point for unity.

The underlying explanation for Mr. Diamond's conclusions on the Niger- ian crisis is his assumption that Ni- geria is an artificial creation of the British, "a ghost of a polity conjured out of company trading". The assump- tion is only half true. Of course, the British literally carved out the pres- ent boundaries of what is now Ni- geria. The name "Nigeria" itself em- anated from them.

But Nigeria is not as artificial a creation as Mr. Diamond would like to believe. Most of the various ethnic groups occupying Nigeria today are products of waves of migrations com- ing from the same source or proxi- mate sources in the dim historical past. A proiof of this statement is the afinity of culture and language between a number of them. There is such an affinity, for example, be- tween the Yoruba and the Nupe and Galla people beyond the Niger-Benue confluence. A similar affinity of cul- ture exists between the Yoruba and and the Edo. The Ibo people east of the Niger had much in common with the Ijo and the Edo west of the Niger. There is evidence to show that even before the advent of the British, they used the Niger for trading purposes. Indeed considerable numbers of Ibo people continually migrated west of the river. There are today "Western Ibos" in the Mid-west region of Ni- geria. The Fulani Jihad which took place at the beginning of the last century went a long way to unify a large proportion of what is today Northern Nigeria. This was long be-

fore Colonialism began. Tfhe Hausa and the Fulani are today so mixed up that it is hard to distinguish one from another. Finally there is the fact of internal trade between north and south even in pre-European days. There were few direct, long-distance, trade routes; but there were chains of local markets making possible the exchange of goods over fairly long distances.

The argument about th.e "artifi- ciality" of Nigeria cannot be pressed far for another reason. Certainly Ni- geria is not artificial in the sense that the "creation" lacks symmetry or sense. There are two parts, one southern and one northern, basically complimentary to each other. Part of the geographical North contains, the rich agricultural land of the Mid- dle Belt. Nigeria has all the mak- ings of a viable unit, its component parts mutually interdependent.

The present crisis has served to bring hom.e the fact of our interde- pendence. I was in Nigeria for some time during the crisis and at one point it became clear that no one region was self-sufficient. A.s a result of the Ibo exodus from the North, following the sad, regrettable inci- dents of last year, the North became poorer in a very real sense. It be- came clear that the Eastern region had been much dependent on the North for her supplies of cotton and beef. The Yoruba in the West felt the diminution of the supplies of a num- ber of things that used to come from the East, particularly from the fa- mous Onitsha market. The traditional

trade between the Ibo in the East and the people of what is now the Mid- west region is probably still going on in spite of the blockade. It was re- ported at one time that the Military Governor of the Mid-west was having difficulty in enforcing the blockade.

Nigeria, though "colonially con- ceived" is a viable political entity and therefore a good frame of reference for nation building. We do not need to pull down the house the colonial rulers began to build. All we need to do is to learn to live happily to- gether within it. The problem of Ni- geria is basically a human problem. It is essentially the same type of prob- lem older nations have had to face in the course of their histories. It is the problem of nation-building, the problem of finding a modus vivendi that would accommodate frictions among the competent ethnic groups and work to the benefit of all. Even if we dismantle the "colonial" boun- daries all along West Africa and let the various ethnic groups find their "natural" affinities, so to speak, the same problem would arise as long as we think it desirable that two or more ethnic groups should come together in "new alignments".

I have made these comments im- bued with a large measure of opti- mism about the future of Nigeria and convinced that our efforts at na- tion building have not failed. Ni- geria as a struggling nation is sick. She needs prescriptions for healing, not the scalpel for dismemberment.

Omoniyi Adewoye

36 AFRICA TODAY

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