Amici PRO - Equal Rights Advocates

8/14/2019 Amici PRO - Equal Rights Advocates

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Case No. S168047

IN TH ES U P R E M E C O U R TO F T H ES TAT EO FC A L I F O R N I A

KARE N L.STRAUSS et al.,

Petitionersv.

MARKB. HORTON, as State Registrar of Vital Statistics, etc., et al.,

Respondents.

CORRECTED APPLICATION TO FILE AMICICURIAE BRIEF INSUPPORT OF PETITIONERS AND [PROPOSED] AMICI CURIAE BRIEF

OF AMICI CONCERNED WITH GENDER EQUALITY:

EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES, CALD7ORNIA WOMEN'S LAWCENTER, WOMEN LAWYERS OF SANTA CRUZ COUNTY, LAWYERSCLUB OF SAN DIEGO, LEGAL MOMENTUM AND NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN LAWYERS

I R E L L& M A N E L L AL L PL A U R AW .B R I L L(BARNo. 195889)M O E ZM .K A B A(BARNo. 257456)R I C H A R DM. S IM O N ( B A RNo. 240530)M A R KA .K R E S S E L ( B A RN o .254933)1800AV E N U EO F T H ES TA R S ,S U I T E9 0 0Los A N G E L E S ,CA 90067P H O N E :(310)277-1010FA X :(310)203-7199

E Q U A L R I G H T S A D V O C A T E SI R M AD . H ERRERA (BARNo. 98658)LISAJ. LEEBOVE(BARNO.186705)1663 MISSIONST., SUITE250SAN FRANCISCO ,C A94103PHONE:(415) 621-0672 E X T.384FAX: (415)621-6744

C A L I F O R N I AW O M E N 'S L A W C E N T E RV I C K YB A R K E R (B A RN o . 119520)6300W I L S H IR E B O U L E VA R D , S U I T E9 8 0Los A N G E L E S ,CA90048P H O N E :(323)951-1041FA X : (323)951-9870

N AT I O N A L A S S O C IAT I O NO FW O M E N L A W Y E R SO fCounselL I S AH O R O W I T Z ,ESQ.M A R G A R E TB .D R E W,ESQ.3 2 1N O RT H C L A R KS T .C H I C A G O ,IL 60654P H O N E :(312)988-6186FA X : (312)988-5491

W O M E N L A W Y E R SO FS A N TAC R U Z C O U N T YR E B E C CA C O N N O L LY (B A RN o . 145482)S A R A S T U RT E VA N T (B A RN o . 250323)E M I LYT R E X E L ( B A RN o . 254910)P.O.Box 737S A N TA C R U Z ,C A 95061PHONE:(831)722-2444FA X : (831)722-6153

L A W Y E R SC L U BO F S A ND I E G O

N A D I AP. B E R M U D E Z (B A RNo. 216555)7 0 1 BS T R E E T, S U I T E3 7 4S A N D I E G O ,C A 92101P H O N E :(619)595-0650FA X : (619)595-0657

L E G A L M O M E N T U MO f C o u n s e lJULIEF . KAY, ESQ.395 HUDSO N STREETNEW YORK,NY 10014PHONE:(212)925-6635FA X : (212)226-1066

AT T O R N E Y SF O RA M I C IC U R I A E


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CORRECTED APPLICATION TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICI CURIAE

Pursuantto Rule 8.520(f)of theC alifornia R ulesof Court,and the

C ourt's November2 0 ,20 08 orderin Equal Rights Advocates ,et al. v.

Hortonet al. (SI68302), E qual Rights Advocates, C alifornia W omen 's

Law C enter, W omen Lawyersof Santa Cruz, Lawyers Clubof SanDiego,

Legal Momentum, and the National Association of W omen Lawyers

(collectively, "amid") respectfullyrequest leave to file the attached brief,

in supportof Petitioners,to beconsideredin theabove-captioned cases.

This applicationis timely made pursuantto thebriefing schedulese t forth

in the Court's November19 ,2008 scheduling order.

A. Equal R ights A dvocates

Amicus Equal Rights Advocates("ERA") is a SanFrancisco-based

women's rights organization whose mission is to protect and secure equal

rightsand economic opportunitiesfor allC alifornia womenand girls

through litigationand advocacy. Foundedin 1974,E RA haslitigated

historicallyimportant gender-based discrimination casesin both stateand

federalcourtsfor thepast thirty-three years.E RA hasbeen dedicatedto the

empowerment of women through the establishment of women's economic,

social, and political equality. E RA recognizes that women have historically

been the target of invidious discrimination and unequal treatment under the

law, and E RA isespecially concerned thatif Proposition8 isallowedto

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stand, anybare majorityof voters wouldbe empoweredto deny equal

protection to a disfavored group on the basis of a suspect classification.

B. California W omen 's Law Center

Amicus C alifornia W omen's Law C enter("CWLC"), foundedin

1989,is dedicated to addressing the comprehensive and unique legal needs

of womenand girls. C W LC represents C alifornia womenwho are

committed to ensuring thatlife opportunities for women andgirls are free

from unjustsocial, economic, legal,and political constraints. C W LC 's

Issue Prioritieson behalfof itsmembersare gender discrimination,

wom en's health, reproductive justice, and violence against women. C W LC

and its membersare firmly committedto eradicating invidious

discriminationin allforms. C W LC recognizesthat women have

historicallybeen the targetof invidious discriminationand unequal

treatment underthe law, and C W L Cis especially concerned thatif

Proposition 8 isallowed to stand, anybare majorityof voters wouldbe

empoweredto deny equal protectionto adisfavoredgroup on thebasisof a

suspect classification.

C. W omen Lawyers of Santa Cruz County

Amicus W omen Lawyersof Santa Cruz County("WLSCC"),

organizedin 1975and incorporatedin 1995, promotesthe advancementof

wom en in thelegal professionand is anactive advocatefor theconcernsof

womenin society. W LS C C membership consistsof womenand men

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involvedin allaspectsof the legal profession, including lawyers, law

students, and legal workers. W LS C C lists amongst its purposes the desire

to study and implement appropriate means tofurther the welfare of women

in the community and to eliminate discrimination based on gender.

W LSC C and itsmembersare firmly committedto eradicating invidious

discrimination in all itsforms. W LS C C recognizes that women have

historically been thetargetof invidious discrimination and unequal

treatment under the law, and W LS C C is especially concerned that if

Proposition 8 is allowed to stand, any baremajorityof voterswould be

empowered to divest a currentlydisfavoredminority group of the right to

equalprotection underthe law.

D. Lawyers Club of San Diego

Since 1 972 , Lawyers C lub of San D iego("Lawyers Club")has

sought to advance the status of wom en in law and society. Lawyers C lub is

a voluntary bar association, comprised offemale and male attorneys, law

students and others in the San Diego community who share our interests

and goals. Lawyers Clubis committedto advocatingfor equal treatmen tof

all members of society, and recognizes that when one segment is

discriminatedagainst, all mem bers of society are negatively impacted.

Proposition8 separatesone groupof Californiansfrom anotherand

excludes themfrom enjoyingthe same rights as others. T herefore, Law yers

Clubcontinues to oppose Proposition 8. S hould Proposition 8 be permitted

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playeda significantrole in theevolution over the past four decades of

Californiaconstitutional decisions that have beenat the forefrontof

recognizingthat sex- based classifications are inherently suspect un der the

state equal protection clause and m erit strict judicial scrutiny.Amid are

deeplyconcerned and alarmed about the process used to promote the

discriminationembodiedin Proposition8. Theunprecedentedframework

established byProposition8, ifleft undisturbed, could preclude jud icial

enforcementof the suspect classification doctrine to protect these w omen,

and in time could lead to the unwinding of what has been achieved through

decades of civil rights struggles.

Amid support Petitioners'effort to prevent Respondentsfrom taking

any action basedon Proposition8 because Proposition8 was notlawfully

enacted. C alifornia voters are entitled to afair initiative process that

complies with the state C onstitution's p rocedural and substantive mandates

and that does not allow a baremajorityof voters to strip a politically

unpopulargroup of the rights guaranteed by the state C onstitution's equal

protection clause. Indeed, the issues disputed in this action are of such

significanceto amid that on November 18 , 20 08 , amicus E RA and amicus

C LW Cjointlyfiled their ow n original Petitionfor W ritof Mandate,

seekinga peremptory writ of mandate directing the Respondents torefrain

from implementing, enforcingor applying Proposition8 . (See Petitionfor

W ritof Mandate,Equal Rights Advocates,etal. v. MarkB. Norton,etal.,

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action deferred, Nov. 20, 20 08 , S 16 830 2.) O n November 2 0, 20 08 , the

Court issued an order deferring theamici's Petition for W rit of Mandate, as

well as petitionsfiled by other civil rights groups, pendingfurther

notification. In its order, the C ourt invited the petitioners tofile an

applicationto appearas amici curiaein this action.

H. Need For Further Briefing

Amici are familiar with the issuesbefore the C ourt and the scope of

their presentation.Amicibelieve thatfurtherbriefingis necessaryto

provide detailed discussion of certain authorities and arguments that the

partiesdid notfully address. In particular,as longtime legal advocatesfor

women's rights,amici offer a unique perspective on the dangerous

precedent embodiedby Proposition8 beyond Proposition8 's open

discriminationagainst homosexuals and grievousinjury to families headed

by same-sex couples, important issues that Petitioners have addressed in

theirbriefs with stirring eloquence.

W omen as a group have long been the target of sex discrimination,

and for much of C alifornia's history wom en were denied such basic rights

as the rightto vote, the right to serve on juriesand therightto betreated as

equalto menunder propertyand contract law. Moreover,as amici are well

aware, women have long faced,and still face, diminished economic

opportunities, sex-stereotyping,and restrictionson their reproductive

choices. At the same time,Californiahas a proud and storied history of

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protecting w om en's rights underthe state C onstitution's equal protection

clause,and this Courthas been called upon m any times beforeto enforce

the Constitution's promise of equality for women. Indeed, the Court held

that legal classifications basedon sexmerit strict scrutiny under

C alifornia's equal protection clausesix years beforethe federal courts

recognizedany level of heightened scrutinyfor sexclassifications. Even

today, the C alifornia Constitution provides greater protectionfrom sex

discrimination than that providedby federal courts construingthe U.S .

C onstitution, muchas this Courthas rightly recognized that sexual

orientation discriminationis prohibited un derthe state C onstitution even

wherethe federal courts largely have been silent.

F ull equalityfor women, likefull equalityfor same-sex couples,

remains vulnerableto theebbs and flows of popular antagonism. W hile

same-sex couplesare theimmediate targetsof Proposition8, the use of the

initiative processto enact Proposition8 threatensall minorityand

disadvantaged groups.If Proposition8 stands, women's basic rights, like

thoseof gays and lesbians, couldbe asephemeralas thenext electionand

subjectto unend ing attack. V otingmajoritiescould simply perpetuate

through the initiative process the very conditions that have led this court to

designate genderand sexual orientationas suspect classifications that merit

strict, rather than some lesser level of, scrutiny.

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TABLEO F C O N T E N T S

Page

I N T R O D U C T I O N 1

A RG U ME N T 8

I. Article X V III O f T he C alifornia C onstitution ProhibitsRevision O f T he C onstitution By Initiative 8

II. Equal ProtectionO f TheLawsIs FundamentalT oC alifornia'sC onstitutional S tructure 12

A. Proposition 8O ffendsThe Constitutional Scheme ByEnablingMajorityO ppressionO f AnUnpopularGroup 14

B. Proposition 8 Alters The Constitutional Scheme ByRem oving E qual Protection F rom Judicial Review 22

C . Proposition 8 D ramatically C hanges T he Plain T extO fT he C onstitution's E qual Protection C lause 2 6

III. A F undamental C hange In T he C onstitutional Scheme T hatE liminates Reasonable C hecks O n The O ppression O fPolitically V ulnerable Groups W ould Pose A T hreat, NotOnlyT o Lesbian And G ay Persons, But Also T o O therDisfavoredGroups 27

C O N C L U S I O N 35

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TABLEO F AUT HOR I T I E S

Page(s)

Cases

Amador ValleyJoint Un ion High School Dist .v. State Bd. ofEqualization(1978)22Cal .3d208 pass im

Arp v. Workers ' Compensat ion AppealsBd.(1977)19Cal.3d395 2, 18, 30

Bennet tv. Mu el l e r(9th Cir. 2003)322F.3d 573 32

Bixbyv. Pierno

(1971)4 Cal.3d130 23Bobbv. Munic ipa l Cour t

(1983) 143 C al.App.3d 860 31

Bo w en sv. Super io r Cour t(1991)1 Cal.4th36 16, 17

CatholicCharitieso f Sacramento , Inc.v. Super io r Cour t(2004) 32 C al.4th 527 30

Committeeto DefendReproductive Rightsv. Myers(1981)29 Cal.3d252 14, 33

Connerfyv. State PersonnelBd .(200 1) 92 C al.App.4th 16 30

Craig v. Boren(1976)429U.S. 190 29, 30

Crawford v. LosAngelesBd . ofEduc.(1982) 458U.S.527 19

Cruzanv. Director, Missouri Dept.of Health(1990)497U.S.2 6 1 2 4

Darces v. Wo o d(1984) 35 C al .3d 871 19

Darcy v. SanJose(1894)104Cal. 642 14

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Page(s)

Doughertyv. Austin(1892)94 Cal. 601 14

Eversonv. Board o f Ed. ofEwing Tp.(1947)330U.S . 1 22

Goesaer tv.Cleary(1948)335U.S.464 30

GoldenGateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway TenantsAssn(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1013 9

Gonzales v. Carhart(2007)550U.S. 124 33

Ho ward Jarvis Taxpayers' Ass n v. Fresn o M etro. Pro jects(1995)40 Cal.App.4th1359 22

In re Lance W.(1985)37 Cal.3d873 20, 21

In re Maguire(1881) 57 Cal. 604 29

In re Marriage C ases(2008)4 3 Cal.4th75 7 passim

Koire v. Metro C ar Wash(1985)40 Cal.3d24 30

Korematsuv. United States(1944)323U.S .214 33

Leagueo f Un ited Latin American C itizen sv. Perry(2006)548U.S .399 11

Ledbetterv. GoodyearTire & Rubber C o .(2007)550U.S.618 33

Legislaturev. Eu(1991)54 Cal.3d492 21

Livermorev. Waite(1894)102Cal. 113 9, 12, 26, 27

Loving v. Virginia(1968)3 8 8U.S . 1 6

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Page(s)

W . Va. State Ed. of Ed. v. Barnet t(1943)319U.S. 624 16

Woods v. Norton(2008)167Cal.App.4th658 19

Statutes

8 U .S.C. 1409 33

Constitutional Provisions

Cal.Const,of 1849, art. !,!& 11.1 13

Cal. Const, of1849, art. II , 1 3

Cal.Const, art. I , 14 &14.1 17

Cal.Const, art. I , 7 14

Cal.Const, art. I, 7(a) 2 6

Cal.Const, art. I, 7(b) 2 6

Cal.Const, art. IV, 1 8

Cal.Const, art. X V I I I 8, 27

Cal.Const, art. XVII I , 1-3 8

W .V a.Const, art. XII, 8 3

Articles

Carroll,Mos tAmericans Approveo f Interracial MarriagesGallup New s S ervices(Aug. 1 6 ,2007) 6

Garrison,Angrier Response to Prop. 8 Arises ,L.A.Times(Nov. 13,2 0 0 8 ) 4

Ingram,Measure to Ban GayMarriage O k'dfor Ballo t ,L.A. T imes(Nov. 18 ,1998) 16

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Page(s)

Other A uthorities

Browne,Reporto f the Debatesin the Co n v en t i o no f California on theFormationo f the State Const i tu t ion,in Septemberan d October,1849(1850) 13

Grodinet al,The California State Const i tu t ion:A ReferenceGuide(1993) 24

Karst,The Supreme C ou r t 1976Term, Foreword: Equal Ci t izenshipUnder the Fou r teen th Amendment91 H arv. L.Rev. 1

(1977) 15

Madison,FederalistNo. 10 11

Press Release, C alifornia Secretaryof State,Secretaryo f State DebraBow enCertifiesEighth Measurefo rNovember4, 2008, General Election(June 2, 2008 ) 16

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INTRODUCTION

By stripping rightsfrom anunpop ular minority through simple

popularvoterights thatare declaredin ourConstitutionand affirmed as

fundamentalby this CourtProposition8 would alterthe very natureof

our governmental plan.

The questionbeforethe Court could not be more clear: will the

Courtendorsea radical abuseof thePeople's initiative powerby validating

a scheme in which a slim majorityof voters may deny equalprotection to

any currently disfavored group?T he stakes for ourC onstitutional system

couldnot be higher: if allowed to stand, Proposition 8 provides a

mechanism forfuture voting majoritiesto "amend" the Constitutionso the

objectsof their disapprobation lose the right to equal treatment.

If that happens, women acrossCaliforniahave muchto fear, and

even more to lose. W omen have long struggled to achieve the equal

protection of the laws and rely on the principle that equal protection is not a

privilegein this state to be selectively revoked at will. It is a right that is

fundamentalto oursocial orderand that mustbe preserved. It wasonly

recentlythat women were given equal rights to employment.1 It was only

1 S eeSail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby(1971 )5 Cal.Sd1, 19 [95Cal.Rptr.329 ,485 P. 2d529] [enumerating severe legaland social disabilities, suchas the denial of the right to vote, the right to serve on juries, diminishedemployment andeconomic opportunities,and treatmentas "inferior personsin numerous laws relatingto propertyand independent business ownershipand the right to makecontracts"].

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recentlythat courts rejectedthe legitimacyof differingproperty rightsfor

women. And still women struggleto secure equalpay forequal work,to

pursueequal opportunity in education, to obtain equal access tohealth care,

and to live free of sexual violence and harassment. T hroughout these

struggles,women have turnedto C onstitution's promiseof equalityand the

constant guardianship of the courts, sometimes against the will of the

voting majority,for protection.2 F orequal protectionto have any meaning,

it cannotbe up forgrabs in thenext election (andin every following

election).

It is easy to seewhat harms will comefrom cedingto an

emboldened votingmajoritythe C ourt's power to interpret and apply the

Constitution.T he 19 40 's versionof Proposition8 would have

constitutionalized discrimination against the Japanese. T he1960's version

of Proposition8 would have extinguishedthe burgeoning women's rights

movement.T he 1980s versionof Proposition8 would have requiredthe

forced quarantineof people with AID S.3 T he20 01 versionof Proposition8

wouldhave constitutionalized anti-Muslimand anti-Arab sentiment

2 See, e.g.,Arp v. Workers 'Compensat ion AppealsBd. (1977)19C al.3d 3 95,405 [138 Cal.Rptr. 293,563P.2d 849]["Society is belated inits recognitionof thebaselessprejudicesinherentin long-standing notionsof woman's proper social and economicroles"].

3 See, eg.,CaliforniaProposition6 4 (1986).

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grippingthe state in theaftermathof September II.4 In the years to come,

the targets will change. S tepby step, the Constitution's guarantees will

narrow,and theequal protection clause will protect onlythose who can

muster 50% plus one votes on election day.5 Even if a politically

disadvantagedgroupis able to defenditself at thepolls from time to time,

unchecked recourseto theinitiative process empowersany person withthe

funds to gathersufficientsignaturesto divertthe resourcesand energiesof

the less powerfulto prevent their rightsfrom being stripped away.6

T he progressive dehum anization of segments of our society by a

state-sanctioned systemof C onstitutional "amendment"is intolerablein a

4 Petitioner'sfears are notunwarranted. Invidious discriminationagainstdisfavoredgroups has been written into constitutions in thepast.F or instance, C alifornia's C onstitutionof 1879 containeda provision thatforbade "native[s] of China"from voting. (Cal. Const,of 184 9, art.II, 1,

repealed 1926 ["Nonative of China,no idiot, no insane person, or personconvictedof anyinfamouscrime . . .shall ever exercisethe privilegesof anelector in thisState"].) S imilarly, until 199 4, W est V irginia's C onstitutioncontained a provision requiring segregated schools. (See W . V a. C onst.,art. XII , 8 ,repealed 19 94 ["W hiteand colored persons shallnot betaughtin the same school"]).

5 All Californiansshould vigilantly guard againstthe easydiminutionof basic rights that Proposition 8 portends. As Justice Kennedycautioned, equal protection rightsare "taken for grantedby most peopleeitherbecause they already have themor do notneed them; theseare

protections against exclusionfrom an almost limitless numberoftransactionsand endeavors that constitute ordinary civiclife in a freesociety." (Romerv. Evans (1996)517U .S. 620 ,631 [116 S.Ct. 1620,134L.Ed.2d855].)

6 Californiais amongthe most expensive media marketsin thecountry,and costs to oppose Proposition 8 reportedly reached nearly $40

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free societyand prohibitedby ourC onstitution. H ere, that dehum anization

materializesin theselective revocationof marital rightsthat this Court

recently heldto be "sointegralto an individual's libertyand personal

autonomy that they may not be eliminated by the Legislature or by the

electorate throughthe statutory initiativeprocess." In reMarriage C a s e s

(20 08 ) 43 C al.4th 75 7, 78 1 [76 C al.Rptr.3d 683 , 18 3 P.3d 38 4] (hereafter

Marriage Cases).) Further, the process of stigmatization and exclusion

occurs w ithoutany rational deliberative processand wouldbe substantively

beyond judicial review.T heequal protection clauseby itsnature

empowers courtsto protect minoritiesand other politically disenfranchised

groupsfrom unfair treatment by the votingmajority. Indeed, w hile the

otherbranchesof governmentand thePeople have rolesto play, our basic

governmental plan envisionsthe courtsas theultimate checkon injustice.

Proposition 8 purports to seize that unique and well-settled judicial power.

Interveners D ennis H ollingsworth, et al.("Interveners") argue for a

system where this C ourthas virtuallyno powerto right the wrongs

perpetrated byvoting majoritiesand m ust abdicate its historical and

foundationalrole to interpret andsafeguardthe C onstitution. Interveners

cast this caseas if itwere a dispute betweenthe People and theCourt. O f

courseit isnot. T hequestion presentedto this Courtis whetherthe voting

million. (Garrison,Angrier Response toProp. 8 Arises, L.A. Times (Nov.13,2 0 0 8 )p. Al.)

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majorityhas complied withthe required C onstitutional procedu rein

seeking tofundamentally changethe Constitution itself. This Courtis the

ultimate authority on the proper interpretation of theConstitution, including

provisions distinguishing between amendments and revisions, in cases

presented to it. IfProposition8 fails, it isbecausea voting majority(whom

Interveners term the"People") in 20 0 8 did not comply with the correct

procedurefor making sucha constitutional change.This is an important

issue for allC alifornians,and shouldnot beconsidereda battle betweenthe

Peopleand theCourt. Any decisionby this Court will solemnly weighthe

arguments on allsides in lightof existing caselaw and thehistoryof our

C onstitutionand ourState. F ulfilling that duty placesthis Courtfirmly on

the side of the People in every sense that matters.

This Courthas long beenthe ultimate defenderof the Constitution,

givingreliefto those who society would seekto oppress. (SeeNogues v.

Douglass(1857) 7 Cal.65 , 69("[The judiciary,from the very natureof its

powers and means given it by the Constitution, mustpossess the right to

construethe C onstitutionin thelast resort. . ."].) In Sail'er Inn, Inc. v.

Kirby (1971)5 Cal.Sd1, 19 [95C al.Rptr. 329 ,485P.2d 529] (hereafter

Sail 'er Inn ),the C ourt rejected institutionalized discrimination against

women and set up asystem of reviewing gender-based laws that servedas a

modelfor other courts. Likewise,in Perezv. Sharp (1948)3 2 Cal.2d7 1 1

[198P.2d 17], this C ourt held, nearly2 0 yearsbefore the United States

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SupremeC ourt did the same inLo ving v.Virginia (1968) 3 88 U .S. 1 [87

S.C t. 1817, 18 L.E d.2d 1010 ], that there is noplace for anti-miscegenation

laws in afree and equal society, and that such laws violate equal

protection.7 Most recently,in Marriage C a s e s ,the Court defendedthe

C onstitutional rights of same-sex couples and theirfamiliesby holding that

the C onstitution's prom ises of equal treatment and fundam ental rights

apply to them, too.If Proposition 8 canrepeal Marriage Cases,then

Sail'er Inncould have likewise been swept away by popular vote, and

Perezcould have been repealed by a resourceful majority, and every other

step this C ourt has taken to protect those whoface discrimination based on

a suspect classification couldbe undoneby bare majorityvote. T heCourt

now has an opportunity to headoff this danger. W hile the principle that

requires Proposition 8 to be characterized as a revision is easily confined

the votingmajoritymay not stripfundamentalrights from a disfavored

minority based upon membershipin a suspect classthe damage that will

be done if Proposition 8 is characterized as an amendment cannot be so

7 Only2 0 percentof Americans supported, while7 3 percentopposed, interracial marriage in 1968, a yearafter the Supreme Courtissued itsdecision in Loving. (Carroll,Mo stAmericans Approveo fInterracial Marriages (Aug. 1 6, 20 07 ) Gallup News Services[as ofJan. 10 ,2008].) Althougha vast majoritymay haveopposed the decision, it is hard to imagine that anyone would today arguethat Lovingmust be overturned or that anti-miscegenation laws areacceptable.

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confined. If theCourtaffirms Proposition8 as alegitimate amendment,it

will necessarily embolden those who would exploit misconceptions and

fears about disfavored groupsto subject themto second class status.A

judicially-sanctioned vehicle will have been established wherebymajorities

could attempt to strip the rights of anyone deemed, or portrayed as, an

outsider. In a state made of immigrants, of men and women, black and

white, Anglo, L atinoand Asian,gay andstraight,old andyoung,

Proposition8 threatens us all.

W ith the passage of Proposition 8 , this C ourt is called on again to

breathemeaning into the C onstitution's equalprotection guarantee, as it did

in 1948and 1971.If Proposition8 isallowedto stand,the status of the

equalprotection guarantee of our state C onstitution w ill be reduced to a

mere shadow, promising only that minorities will beprotected from unfair

majorityencroachment until themajorityvotes otherwise. A decision to

empowerthe votingmajorityto impose second-class status on a group of

citizenswho have suffereda historyof irrational prejud iceis so totally

contraryto the history and values underlying our government structure that

it cannotbe accomplished throughan initiative amendment like

Proposition8.

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ARGUMENT

I. Article XV III Of The C alifornia Constitution Proh ibits RevisionOf The Constitution By Initiative

In 1911,the Peoplespecifieda procedureto make certain limited

changes to the C alifornia C onstitution through the initiative process. (C al.

Const., art. IV, \\McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 Cal.2d 330,332-333,

196P.2d 78 7].) S ignificantly,"[although '[t]he electorsmay amendthe

C onstitution by initiative' [citation], a'revision' of the Constitution may be

accomplished onlyby conveninga constitutional conventionand obtainingpopularratification [citation],or by legislative submissionof themeasure

to the voters[citation]." (Raven v. De ukme jian(1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 349,

340 [276 Cal.Rptr. 326,801P.2d 1077](hereafterRaven)[quoting Cal.

C onst., art. X V III, 1 -3].) As this C ourt has explained, "because a

revision may not be achieved throughthe initiative process," were this

Courtto conclude that Proposition8 "constituteda revisionnot an

amendment,that woulden d [the C ourt's] inquiry;the initiative wouldbe

invalid for itsfailure to meet the constitutional requirementsof a revision."

(Amador ValleyJo in t UnionHigh Scho ol D ist.v. State Ed. of Equalization

(1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 221 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281] (hereafter

Amador Valley).) Because Proposition8 effects a revisionof the

Constitution bysubjectingthe C onstitution's fundam ental equal protection

guaranteesto simple majority nullification,it mustbe held invalid.

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W hile the C onstitution itself does notdefinea revision or an

amendment,this C ourt's cases haveclarified the distinction. As early as

1894,in Livermorev. Waite, the C ourt held that certain "underlying

principles"go to thecore of theC onstitutionand must be guardedas such:

T hevery term 'constitution' impliesan instrumentof apermanentand abiding nature,and theprovisions containedtherein for its revision indicate the will of the people that theunderlying principles upon w hichit rests, as well as thesubstantial entirety of the instrument, shallbe of a likepermanentand abiding nature.O n theother hand,thesignificanceof the term 'amendm ent' implies such anaddition or change withinthe lines of the original instrumentas will effect an improvement,or better carryout thepurposefor which it was framed.

(Livermorev. Waite ( 1 8 9 4 )102C al. 113, 118-119[36 P.424] (hereafterQ

Livermore) . )

In Amador Valley,th e Courtfurther distilledth e Livermore

principle,and explained thatthe "analysis in determining whether a

particular constitutional enactment is a revision or an amendment must be

both quantitativeand qualitativein nature." (2 2Cal.3dat p.2 2 3 ;see also

n

Intervenerswouldhave this C ourt ignoreLivermorebecause it is a"narrow" "11 4 year-old decision." (Interveners'Br. at pp. 19-20.)H owever, num erous subsequent cases in this C ourt havereaffirmedtheLivermoreprinciple. (E.g.,Raven, supra ,5 2 Cal.3dat p. 3 55[citingLivermore};Amador Valley,supra ,2 2 Cal.3dat p. 22 2[citing anddiscussingLivermore})ThatLivermorehas been an undisturbed part ofthis C ourt's jurisprudencefor over a century reinforces,not diminishes, thewisdomand force of itsanalysis. (SeeGolden GatewayCtr. v. GoldenGateway TenantsAs sn(20 01 ) 26 C al.4 th 10 13, 1022 [111 C al.Rptr.2d 33 6,29 P.3d 797][explaining that the doctrineof stare decisis carries significant

1992967 - 9 -


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Raven , supra ,52 Cal.Sdat p. 35 0["Substantial changesin either

[quantitative or qualitative ways] could amount to arevision"].) As

relevant here,the C ourt held"even a relatively simple enactmentmay

accomplish suchfar reaching changesin thenatureof ourbasic

governmentalplan as to amountto arevisionalso." (Amador Valley,

supra ,2 2 Cal.Sdat p.223.) F orexample,the C ourt explained,and the

parties agreed, that"an enactment which purportedto vest all judicial

power in the L egislature would amount to a revision without regard either

to thelengthor complexityof themeasureor thenumberof existing

articlesor sectionsaffectedby such change."(Ibid.; see also McFadden v.

Jordan,supra ,32 Cal.2d at p. 332 [holding that aninitiative that was

substantively"far reachingand multifarious,"was arevision rather thanan

amendment];Raven , supra ,5 2 Cal.3dat p. 35 1[holding thatan initiative

that limited the C alifornia courts' power to interpret certain criminal rights

differentlythan the U nited S tates S upreme C ourt's interpretation was a

revision];cf. P eop lev. Frierson(1979)2 5 Cal.Sd142[158 Cal.Rptr. 281,

599P.2d 58 7] [holding thata provision limitingthe reach of thecrueland

unusualpunishment clausewas anamendment].)

T hepurpose behindthe differingprocedural requirementsof

revisions andamendmentsis clear. Enactments that fundamentally alterthe

"persuasive force" and shouldnot be disturbed wherea prior decision is"embeddedin our.. .jurisprudence withno apparentill effects"].)

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a whole, rather thanany dominant faction within thatconstituency"] (cone.

& dis. opn.of Stevens, J.).)

Givingthe powerto strip basic equal protection rightsof a

historically disfavored groupto abare majorityof thevoting people, free

from the constraintsof judicial reviewto ensure equal protection,and

without safeguardingthe processof rational deliberation that legislative

approval promotes,is a "far reaching changein thenatureof [C alifornia's]

basic governmentalplan," and qualifiesas a revision.(Amador Valley,

supra ,22 Cal.Sdat p.223.) Alteringthe Constitution's promiseof equality

in this way would renderthe equal protection provision neither equalnor

protective. Moreover,it would underminethe powerof thecourts to

interpretand apply the C onstitution. Revocationsof theC ourt 's power,or

limitationson itsabilityto protectthe citizenry,are preciselythe sort of

changesto theC onstitution's "underlying principles" thatLivermoreand its

progeny holdcannotbe accomplishedby mere initiative.

II. Equ al Protection Of The Laws Is Fund amental To California'sConstitutional Structure

Proposition 8, if permitted to takeeffect, would subvert the

underlyingprincipleof equal protection that liesat theheart of C alifornia's

constitutional system.It would also divestthe courtof itstraditional power

to interpretand apply the fundamentalguaranteesof theequal protection

clause.

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T here is no right more basic to C alifornia's constitutional scheme

than equal protection. T he right to equal protection has been part of the

CaliforniaC onstitution from the inception of statehood. (C al. C onst, of

1849,art. I, 1 &11.1.)T he originaldraftersrecognizedthe need for

inalienablerightsto protectnot only individuals,but vulnerable m inorities,

from the tyranny ofmajoritypow er. (S ee Browne, Report of the D ebates in

the C onvention ofCaliforniaon the Formation of the State Constitution, in

Septemberand O ctober, 1849 (1850 )p. 409 ["My objectis toprovidefor

the protection of minoritiesa principle which is so generally recognized

underour system of government" (statementof Mr.Price)]; id. at 22 ["The

majorityof any com munity is the party to be governed; the restrictions of

law are interposed between them and the weaker party; they are to be

restrained frominfringingupon the rights of the minority" (statement of

Mr. Gwin)];id. at 30 9 ["T he object of the C onstitution was to protect the

minority" (statement of Mr. Botts)].)9

California'smodern Constitution maintains this emphasis on the

centrality of equal protection to our system of governance. T his C ourt has

9

Interveners suggest that equal protection has only sup erficial rootsin the C onstitution becausethe modern formulationof theequal protectionclause wasaddedin the 1970's, Interveners' Briefat p.22,fn. 6., andthus,the C ourt should sacrifice the integrity of equal protection when it conflictswith the People's power to amend the C onstitution.However, as isunmistakable from the text accompanying this note, the principle of equalprotection liesat thevery foundationof ouroriginal state C onstitutionfromthe birth of statehood. (S ee C al. C onst, of 1 84 9, art. I, 1 & 11 .1.)

1992967 - 1 3 -


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described these equal protection provisionsas "one featureof the

constitution more marked, [one] characteristic more pervasive thanall

others." (Darcy v. San Jose (18 94 ) 10 4 C al. 64 2, 64 5 [38 P. 500] [quoting

Doughertyv. Aus tin(18 92 ) 94 C al. 601 , 62 0 [29 P. 1 092] (cone. opn. of

Beatty, J.)].)

T heprincipleof equal p rotectionis thesinequa no nof this C ourt's

fundamentalrights and due process jurisprudence; that is, in this state,

equalprotection finds its significancenot only in Article I, section 7, but it

permeatesall rights conferredby theConstitution.(Marriage C ases , supra,

43 Cal.4th at p. 831 [holding that the constitutional right to marry

incorporatesa requirementof "equal dignityand respect"]; C ommittee to

DefendReproductive Rightsv. Myers (1981)2 9 C al.3d 25 2,276 & fn. 22

[172 Cal.Rptr. 866,625P.2d 779] [explaining that when determining

whethera lawrestrictsa fundamentalright in a"discriminatory manner,"

the C ourt's analysis "closely parallels"the requirementsof equal

protection];Pe op le v. Ramirez(1979) 25 C al.3d 260 , 267 [158 C al.Rptr.

316,599 P.2d 622] [holdingthe right to due process incorporates a

requirementthat every person must be treated "as an equal,fully

participatingand responsible memberof society"].)

A. Proposition 8 Offends The Constitutional Scheme ByEnabling Majority Oppression Of An Unpopular Group.

O ne primary purposeof equal protectionis toprotect groups that,

1 9 92967 - 1 4 -


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C a s e s ,supra ,43 Cal.4th at p. 852[citing W. Va.State Bd. of Ed. v.

Barnette(1943 ) 31 9 U .S. 624 , 638 [63 S.Ct . 1178, 87 L.E d. 1628] .)

Altering this foundational premiseis nothing shortof redefiningour "basic

governmentalplan," and therefore mustbe deemeda revision that cannot

be passedby abare voting majority.1 0 (Amador Valley,supra ,22 Cal.3dat

p. 223.)

T heAttorney General nonetheless claims that"[fjaken together,

Ravenand B ow ensappear to recognize that the voters may deny

fundamentalrights protectedby theequal protectionclause." (Atty. Gen.

Br. at p. 43 .) T his statement is perilously broad.Raven and Bowens v.

SuperiorC o u r t(1991)1 CaUth 36 [2C al.Rptr.2d 3 76 ,8 20P.2d 600],

10 If itwere true,as Interveners insist, that oncethe "People" speakthrougha voting majority, even wherethe will of themajoritystigmatizes

and eliminates equal protection rights for a suspect class, the Court mustdutifully enforce this will, then Proposition 22 would not (indeed, couldnot) have been overturnedby this Courtin Marriage C ases.Intervenersoffer no explanationfor why theCourthas thepowerto overturnan"initiativestatute" that violatesthe Constitution's core promisesbut nothave the powerto overturnan "amendment" that doesthe same. In ourrepublicanform of government, it cannot be that the C ourt is allowed todefendthe Constitutionif aballot measurequalifieswith 677,000signatures,but theCourt mustfall silent if thesame measure qualifies with1,1 00 ,00 0 signatures. (C ompare Ingram,Measureto Ban GayMarriageOk'dfo r Ballot,L.A. Times (Nov.18 ,1998)p. A-3 , availableat [explaining thatProposition 2 2qualified for the ballot with 6 7 7,0 0 0 signatures] w ith PressRelease, C alifornia Secretary ofState, Secretaryof State Debra BowenCertifiesEighth M easu refo r November4, 2008, Gen eral Election(June2 ,2008) ,available at [explaining that Proposition 8 qualifiedforthe ballot with 1,120,801 signatures].)

1992967 - 1 6 -


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establishedonly thatthe votingmajoritycan reserve powerto the

prosecutor to decide between methods of bringing criminal charges (where

one method , the information, includes a certain procedural package, while

the other method,the indictment, does not,and both methodsare expressly

providedin the C onstitution). T hese cases are best understood as

concerningprosecutorial discretion,not fundam ental rightsfor asuspect

class. (SeeB o w e n s ,at p. 42 ["Clearly, the system of prosecution

contemplatedby article I, sections14 and14.1of theCalifornia

Constitutiondoes not single out a suspect class within the meaning of [the

FederalC onstitution]"].)All C alifornians became potentially subjectto

such discretion, not jus t mem bers of a suspect class. No clear rule on the

distinctionbetween amendmentsand revisions em ergesfrom these cases,

and they certainly should not beread by theCourtas endorsing the power

of the bare votingmajorityto dramatically alter the equal protection clause

by eliminatingfundamentalrights for asuspect class. Moreover,the

underlyingjustificationfor thepropositionat issue in Ravenand B o w e n s

(Proposition115)may have been judicialefficiency or administrative

flexibility. As this C ourt heldin Marriage C a s e s ,no such legitimate

justificationexists w ith respect to Proposition 8 .

In theface of theunmistakableevidence that Proposition 8 effects a

devastating change to the C onstitution's equal protection guarantee,

Interveners seekto dismissthe significanceof Proposition8 's

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consequences. Interveners argue, "Proposition 8 does not in any manner

seek to repeal the equal protection clause. O n the contrary, it merely

modifiesone dim ension of its application, as established by a path-breaking

rulingof this Courtand to aparticularset offacts." (Interveners'Br. at p.

23.) But the claim that Proposition 8 does not repeal "in any manner" the

C onstitution's equal protection guaranteeis beliedby Interveners'own

brief, which admits that Proposition 8will preclude same-sex couples from

beingmarried (andenjoyingthe rights concomitant with that status).

(Interveners'Br. at p. 16 ; seealso id. at p. 17[asserting "The Initiative

PowerIncludes the Power toDefinethe S cope of E qual Protection . . . ."].)

Furthermore,equal protection jurisprudence, by its very nature, is"path

breaking." (SeeArpv. Workers ' Compensat ionAppealsBo ard (1911)1 9

Cal.Sd3 9 5 ,4 05 [138 C al.Rptr. 29 3,5 63P.2d 849] ["Societyis belatedin

its recognition of the baseless prejud ices inherent in long-standing notions

of wom an's proper social and econom ic roles . . . "].) If initiatives were

allowedto eliminate any "path-breaking" ru ling, this C ourt's civil rights

jurisprudence wouldbe amirage, appearingfor onemoment,and then

vanishingthe next.

Interveners next insist that the arguments demonstrating that

Proposition 8 is arevision becauseof itsdevastatingeffect on C alifornia's

basic governmental plan are "conjectural and speculative," and must,

therefore,fail. (Interveners' Br. at p. 8.) To the contrary, the consequences

19 92967 - 1 8 -


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for same sex couples couldnot beclearerand theneuteringof theequal

protection clause could not be more direct. F urthermore, history h as

demonstrated that,if left uncheckedby thecourts' enforcementof equal

protection guarantees,the votingmajoritywill oppressthe politically

unpopular ormarginalized. Indeed, thisstate's modern jurisprudenceis

replete w ith jud icial enforcement of the equal protection clause to protect

suspect classes against invidious discrimination. (E.g.,Darces v. Wood

(1984) 35Cal.Sd87 1 [201 C al.Rptr. 80 7, 6 79 P.2d 45 8] [holding that state

actiondiscriminating againstchild welfarerecipients merely becausethe

recipients lived with und ocumented imm igrant children violates equal

protection];Woodsv. Norton(2008)167Cal.App.4th658 [84Cal.Rptr.3d

332][invalidating on equal protection ground s certain dom estic violence

statutoryprograms that provided benefitsbased on gender].)

Because equal protectionis a foundational principleof our

constitutional scheme, the distinction between initiatives of general

applicationand those that targetspecificgroups is dispositive. Neither the

Intervenersnor theAttorney Generalidentify a single initiative enactedby

a bare votingmajorityof the peop le, without approval of two thirds o f the

legislature,and targetingonly membersof a suspect classfor disfavored

treatment thathas ever survivedto become partof ourConstitution. (See

Crawford v. Lo sAngelesBd. ofEduc. (1982)4 5 8U .S. 527 , 532 ,fn. 5 [102

S.C t. 32 11 , 73 L.E d.2d 94 8 [noting that an initiative of general application

1 99 2967 - 1 9 -


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affectingremedies for school segregation was approved by a two-thirds

vote of each house of the state legislaturebeforebeing submitted for

popularvote]; Reitman v.Mulkey(1967) 387 U .S. 369, 377-381 [87 S .C t.

16 27 , 18 L.E d.2d 8 30 [invalidating a constitutional initiative that would

have involved the state in private discrimination against mem bers of any

racial groupon federal equal protection grounds without addressing

whether initiative procedure was proper].)

In the face of this clear veneration for the equal protection clause

and protectionsfor suspect classes, Interveners relyon In reLance W .and

Frierson to claim that Proposition 8 is nodifferentthan the"right-

stripping" initiatives at issue in those cases. Interveners m iss the mark. In

In reLance W .(1985)37 Cal.Sd8 73[210 Cal.Rptr. 631,69 4P.2d 744],the

Court upheldan initiative that limitedthe exclusionary rem edy under

Californialaw forviolationsof thesearchand seizure rulesof theFederal

C onstitution.Significantly,the amendmentat issue in Lance W.was one of

neutral and general application. T hat is, its narroweffect was to limit a

remedyfor all whosuffered violations of the F ourth Am endment, not to

eliminate the rights o f only a certain, identifiable group. S imilarly, the

initiative deemed to be an amendment inPeo ple v. Fr ierso ninvolved a

provisionof general application,not a lawaimedat a suspect classand did

not require this C ourt to abdicate its authority to enforce the guarantee of

equalprotection. (People v. Frierson(1979) 25 Cal.3d 142 [158 Cal.Rptr.

1 9 9 2 967 - 2 0 -


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28 1, 5 99 P.2d 5 87] [addressingeffort to limit scope of the cruel and

unusualpunishment clauseas to alldefendants otherwise eligiblefor the

deathpenalty].) 11

Neitherthe Lance W.nor theFrierso n Courthad anopportunityto

consider whether an initiative prov iding that only men, or only the poor, or

only minorities, or only Jews, or only gays would be subject to the

narrower exclusionary rule or be eligible for the death penalty, w ould be an

alteration so"insubstantial" as to be permitted to come intoforce through

the initiative process, or whether such an initiative would so fundamentally

alter the basic principles of governance such that the deliberative processes

of a constitutional revision would have been required. T he revulsion we

necessarilyfeel at the thoughtof such an injustice answersthe question

before this C ourt today.And ifinsteadwe saythat our societyhas learned

from the past and wouldno longer relyon prejudiceto cast out onegroup

11 Notably,the scope of thecrueland unusual punishments clausenecessarily depends on evolving standards of decency prevalent in thecommunity. (E.g.,Rope r v. Simmon s(2005)5 43U.S. 551, 560-561 [125S.Ct.1183,161L.Ed.2d 1].)

Moreover, theFrierso n discussion of whether the initiative at issuewas an amendment or a revision appeared in a plurality opinion and may beconsidereddictum. (SeeLegislatu re v. Eu(1991)54 C al.Sd 4 92,54 1[286CaLRptr.283 ,816P.2d 1309](cone.& dis. opn.of Mosk, J.) ["Then, inPeoplev. Friers o n ... apluralityof thecourt consideredin dictum whethera 1972 initiative measure was amendatory orrevisory"].)

1992967 - 2 1 -


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of citizensor another,we arefaced with the reality that thisis precisely

whathas happened with Proposition8 .

B. Proposition 8 Alters The Constitutional Scheme ByRemoving Equal Protection From Judicial Review.

T he C onstitution requires the C ourt to guarantee equal protection

againstthe whimsof thevotingmajority. (SeeEversonv. Board of Ed. of

EwingTp. (1947) 33 0 U .S. 1 , 28 [67 S.C t. 504 , 91 L.E d. 711] (dis. opn. of

Jackson, J.)["[T]he great purposes of the Constitution do not depend on the

approvalor convenience of those theyrestrain"]; Ho ward Jarvis

Taxpayers' Assnv. F re sn oMetro. Projects(1995) 4 0 Cal.App.4th 1359,

1362[48 C al.Rptr.2d 26 9] ["[S]ometimes themajoritycannot impose its

view because the C onstitution restrains that action. T his is because the

C onstitution is the ultim ate social and legal contract. It allows themajority

to promote its view so long as it does notinterferewith the constitutionalprovisions guaranteed to the minority"].) U nless the jud iciary is vested

with the ultimate pow er and responsibility to protect the rights of the

minorityagainst encroachmentby thevotingmajority,equal protectionis

an empty concept. O f the various protections that theCalifornia

C onstitution entrusts to the judiciary to enforce, this C ourt has singled out

equalprotection: "O f such protections, probab ly the mostfundamentallies

in the pow er of the courts to test legislative and ex ecutive acts by the light

of constitutional mandateand inparticularto preserve constitutional rights,

1992967- 2 2 -


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40/57

ones what they impose on you and me."(Cru zan v. Director, M issou ri

Dept. of Health (1990)4 97U.S. 261,300 [110 S.Ct. 2841,111L.Ed.2d

224] (cone. opn. of Scalia, J.).)

Proposition8 isdangerousand unprecedentedin that it wouldin

additionto "[e]liminat[ing]the right of same-sex couplesto marry in

California"act toreviseand limit the Article 1 guarantee of equal

protection with respectto groupsdefinedby asuspectclassification.

Previous initiatives to amend the C onstitution wereexercisedwithout

disturbingthe pow er of the judic iary to require the equal protection of laws,

because previous initiatives had a universaleffect on voters. Such is not

the case whena majorityof voters, as with Proposition8 , seek to revoke

equalprotection rights of a distinct group. T he mem bers of the political

majoritydo not put themselves at risk, because they are singling out only

the unpopular minorityfor adverse treatment.

The 1911 amendment that addedthe initiative processto thestate

C onstitution could not itself remove the pow er to interpret Article Ifrom

the judiciary , where it was originally vested, and place such power in the

hands o f thevoting majority. T o accomplish somethingso bold would

itself have requireda constitutional revision.But the1911 amendmentwas

adoptedthroughthe amendment process,not therevision process. (S ee

Grodinet al., TheCaliforniaState Constitution: A Reference Guide (1993)

pp. 69, 303.) Therefore, the initiative power itself cannot be interpreted to

199296 7 - 2 4 -


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negate the pow er of the courts to declare and require correction of equal

protection violationsor tograntto thepeoplethe powerto remove equal

protectionfrom a suspect class. No m ere amendment could have stripped

the jud iciary of its most essential role in guaranteeing the equal p rotection

of the law.

Significantly,the A ttorney General agrees that Proposition 8 cannot

standbecause "the initiative power could never have been intended to give

the votersan unfettered prerogativeto amendthe Constitutionfor the

purpose of dep riving a disfavored group of rights determined by the

SupremeCourtto bepart of fundamentalhum an liberty." (Atty. Gen.Br.

at p. 7 6 .) As the Attorney G eneral states, there are certain"inalienable"

rights"inherent in human nature," and "not surrendered in the social

compact." (Id. at p. 8 0 .) "The protection of theserights," such as the right

to liberty and to equal d ignity, "was one of the very purposes of the

Constitution."(Id. at p. 81.) Regardlessof theprecise doctrine chosento

protect the C onstitution's core guarantees, theoffice of this Court is to

afford such p rotection.At abare minimum ,if drastic changes like

Proposition 8 are totake effect, they mustfirst be subjectto themore

rigorousrevision process."Mere majoritysupport alonefor themeasure

does not suffice."(Id. at p. 89.)

1 99 2967 - 2 5 -


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C. Proposition 8 Dram atically Changes T he P lain Text OfThe Constitution's Equal Protection Clause

Comparingthe text of Proposition8 to thetext of theConstitution's

equalprotection provisions renders inescapablethe conclusion that,as amatter

of simple textual analysis, Proposition 8 purports to revise those provisions.

Article I, S ection 7 (a) of the C alifornia C onstitution plainly states:

"A personmay n o tbe deprivedof life, liberty,or property withoutdue

processof law ordeniedequa lprotectionof thelaws; . . ." (Emphasis

added.)Article I, section 7(b) goes on to declare: "A citizen or class of

citizensmay n o tbe granted privilegesor immunitiesnot grantedon the

same termsto allcitizens." (Emphasis added.)

By mandatingdifferenttreatmentof certain C alifornians,

Proposition 8 , as to those C alifornians,effectivelydeletes the word"equal"

from the very clause that preventsthe governmentfrom denying"equal

protectionof its laws" to anyone. T henullificationof theequal protection

provisions can hardly be considered "an addition or change within the lines

of theoriginal instrument."(Livermore, su pra ,1 02Cal.at pp. 118-119.)If

coreprovisions of the C alifornia D eclaration of Rights can have their

operative words e ffectively deleted as to particular groups by m ere

"amendment,"it isdifficult to determine what would constitute a

"revision." W ould all of the words of the equal protection clause have to

change? W ould more than one group have to be excluded of its coverage?

1992967 - 2 6 -


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C ertainlyno group hopingto mobilizea majorityto strip the right to

equal p rotectionfrom a minority wo uld botherfirst to go through the more

cumbersome procedure requiredto pass a valid revision whena mere

amendment, passedby abaremajorityof voters, will affect the desired

change. (SeeLivermore, supra,10 2 C al. at p. 1 18 [holding that the text of

Article X V III "precludesthe idea thatit was theintentionof thepeople,by

the provision for amendments authorized in thefirst section of this article,

to afford the meansof effecting the same result whichin thenext section

has been guarded with so m uch care andprecision"]; cf McFadden v.

Jordan, supra ,32 Cal.2dat 347[explaining thatthe people of C alifornia

purposefully"made amendment relatively simplebut providedthe

formidablebulwark"of additional procedural gatewaysto prevent

improvident passageof arevision].) Accordingly, establishedlaw dictates

that Proposition8, and anymajority-vote ballot initiative havingthe effect

of strippingthe core of equal protection rightsfrom the Constitution,is a

revision and cannot come intoforce.

III. A Fundamental Change In The Constitutional Scheme ThatEliminates Reasonable Checks On The Oppression Of PoliticallyVulnerable G roups W ould Pose A Threat, Not Only To Lesbian

And G ay Persons, But Also To Other Disfavored G roups.If the initiative processcan beused to deny equal protection under

the law to gay andlesbian persons becauseof their sexual orientation, then

the same process couldbe used to depriveany numberof other disfavored

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discrimination based on sex. (C al. Const, of 187 9, art. X X , 18 ["No

person shall,on accountof sex, be disqualifiedfrom entering up onor

pursuing alawfulbusiness, vocationor profession"].)As early as 1881,

this Court sustained women's claims of sex discrimination under the

CaliforniaC onstitution.In In reMaguire (1881)5 7 C al. 604,the Court,

relying onsection 18 ,invalidateda SanFrancisco ordinance prohibiting

women from waiting on customers between the hours of 6 p.m. and 6 a.m.

in a place where liquorwas sold. T heC ourt held thatthe Constitution

admittedof noexceptions, and "neither [the C ourt]nor anyother powerin

the S tate havethe right or authorityto insert any, whetheron thegroundof

immoralityor anyother ground."(Id. at p. 608.)

Notwithstanding the Constitution's express guarantee and this

C ourt's established precedent, in the not so distant past, this C ourt was

required tointerveneto enforcethe C onstitution's promiseof equalityfor

women. In Sail 'er Inn, supra,5 Cal.3dat p. 1, theCourtinvalidated a

statewidelaw that prohibited wom enfrom tendingbar unless theyfit into

narrowexceptions, a law remarkably similar to the ordinance at issue in

Maguire. In so doing, the C ourt held that legal classifications based on sex

meritstrict scrutiny under C alifornia's equal protection clause six years

before the federalcourt recognized heightened scrutinyfor sex

classificationsalbeit in amore limitedfashion. (See Craig v. Boren

(1976)429U.S .190 [97S.Ct. 45 1,50L.Ed.2d 397] [holding gender

1992967 - 2 9 -


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discrimination claims under the U .S. C onstitution's equal protection clause

subjectto intermediate scrutiny].)12

SinceSail 'er Inn,this C ourt hasreaffirmedits central holding that

classificationsbased on sex are subject to strict scrutiny. (S eeKo ire v.

Metro C ar Wash (1985 )40 Cal.Sd24, 37[219 Cal.Rptr. 133,707P.2d 195]

["[Classifications based on sex are considered'suspect' for purposes of

equalprotection analysis under the C aliforniaConstitution"]; Arp v.

Workers 'C omp en sation Appeals Bo ard, su pra,19Cal.3dat p. 400["[T]he

strict scrutiny/compelling state interest test must governsex discrimination

challenges under ... the C alifornia C onstitution"];C atholic C harities of

Sacramento,Inc. v. S upe rio r C o u r t(2004) 32 C al.4th 527 ,564 [10

Cal.Rptr.3d28 3, 85 P.3d 67 ] ["W e long ago concluded that discrimination

based on gender violates the equal protection clause of the C alifornia

Constitution (art. I, 7(a)) and triggers the highest level ofscrutiny"].) T he

12 In fact, the U .S. S upreme C ourt had only 23 years earlier upheld aMichigan statute providing thatin cities witha population over 50,000,nofemalecould be licensed as a bartender unless she was thewife or daughterof themale owner. (SeeGoesaer tv. Cleary (1948)3 35U.S .464 [69S.Ct.198,93 L.E d. 1 63].)Sail'er Inndistinguished and criticized the holding inGoesaert ,see Sail 'er Inn, supra ,5 Cal.3dat pp.21-22, a position that wasvindicatedby theU .S. S upreme C ourt's subsequent decisionin Craig,whichoverruledGoesaert . (SeeCraig v. Boren , su pra ,429 U .S. at p . 210 ,fn. 23 .) C alifornia's C onstitutionmay still provide more robust protectionagainst gender discrimination than the U .S. C onstitution. (S eeC o n n e r lyv.State Person ne l Bd .(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 16, 31-32[112Cal.Rptr.2d 5 ][noting distinction betweenfederal intermediate scrutiny and C aliforniastrict scrutiny standards].)

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C onstitution's protections against gender discrimination extend to dignitary

harmsand official impositions of social stigma, not just financial interests.

(SeeBobbv. MunicipalC o u r t(1983)143C al.App.3d 860,866 [192

Cal.Rptr.270] [reversing contempt sanctions where only women were

asked,as potential jurors, to answer questions about marital status].) A

hallmarkof our equal protection clause is to guard against"second class

citizenship." (Id. at p. 865.)

But in the face of a proposition like Proposition 8 , even the C ourt's

constitutionally required protectionof equalityfor womenis called into

doubt. Just as strict scrutiny applies to gender-based discrimination, the

Courthas identified gays and lesbians as a suspect class entitled to

heightenedprotection. (Marriage C ases , su pra,4 3 Cal.4that p. 844.)

W hilesame-sex couples, rather than women, are the immediate targets of

Proposition 8 , the use of the initiative process to enact Proposition 8

threatensall minorityand disadvantaged groups.If Proposition8 stands,

simplemajorities could attempt to strip other minority groups of protection.

W om en's basic rights, like those of gays and lesbians, could be as

ephemeral as the next election and subject to unend ing attack. V oting

majoritiescould simply perpetuate through the initiative process the very

conditions that have led this court to designate gender and sexual

orientationas suspect classifications.

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If Proposition8 stands,no C alifornia constitutional barrier will ex ist

to preventthe next constitutional initiative mandating discrimination. W ill

we have a world in which yearafter year we go to the polls to vote on a

potentially endless array of propositions by whichpowerfulgroups seek to

limitthe fundamentalrights of the lesspowerful? Proposition 9 may

require that a woman be preventedfrom marrying if she has ever had an

abortionor been divorced. Proposition 10 may require thata woman

provide evidenceof herfertilitybeforebeing allowedto marry. Proposition

11may require that unm arried wom enor immigrant womenbe denied

social services available to others.

T he claim by Interveners that the U nited S tates C onstitution serves

as the lone bulwarkagainst, or the "complete answer," Interveners' Br. at p.

30 ,to invidious discriminationoffends longstandingprinciples of

federalismand this C ourt's well-established jurisprudence. U nder this

country's systemof federalism , statesare recognizedas separate

sovereigns, each with the pow er to grant and protect the rights of its

citizens. (SeeB enne t tv. Muel l e r(9 th C ir. 200 3) 322 F .3d 573, 58 2-583

["[T]he federal courts willnot encroachon the constitutional jurisdiction of

the states. ... It isfundamentalthat state courts beleft free and unfettered

by the federalcourts in interpreting their state constitutions. . . . T his is not

a mere technical rule nor a rule for our convenience. It touches the division

of authority between state courts andfederalcourts and is of equal

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importanceto each. ... flf ]Therefore,we respectth e C alifornia S upreme

C ourt's sovereign right to interpret its state constitution independent of

federal law" (internal alterations, citations and quotation marks omitted)].)

Althoughthe federal equal protection clausemay provide shelterfrom the

mostextreme abuses,federalprotectionis by nomeans assured. (See

Nguyenv. /M S(2001)5 33U.S .53 [121 S.Ct. 2053,1 50L.Ed.2d 115]

[holding that 8 U.S.C. 1409, which makesit more difficultfor a child

born out ofwedlock whosefather is acitizento prove U .S . citizenship than

for one whose motheris a citizen, doesnot violate equal protection];see

alsoLedbetterv. GoodyearTire & RubberC o .(2007)5 5 0U.S. 618,1 2 7

S.Ct. 21 62 , 218 8 [167 L.E d.2d 9 82] (dis. opn.of Ginsburg,J .) [stating that

imposinga strict statute of limitations is"totally at odds with the robust

protection against workplace discrimination C ongress intendedTitle V II to

secure"]; Gonzalesv. Carhart (2007)550U.S .124[127 S.Ct. 1610,167

L.Ed.2d 480] [upholdinga statute that restricted certain abortion procedures

withoutan exceptionfor maternal health];cf. Korematsuv. UnitedStates

(1944) 323U . S .214 [65S.Ct. 193,89L.Ed. 194] [holding that exclusion

ordersagainst Japanese-Americansdid notviolate equal protection].) T his

Courthas anindependent obligationto guard rights underthe California

Constitution.As this Court explainedin Committeeto Defend

ReproductiveRights v. Myers ,supra ,29 Cal.3dat p.261 ,the California

Constitution"is, and always has been, a document of independent force"

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and the C ourt "cannot p roperly relegate [its] taskto thejudicial guardians

of the federal C onstitution, but instead must recognize [its] personal

obligationto exercise independent legal judg ment in ascertaining the

meaningand applicationof state constitutionalprovisions." (Quotation

marks andcitations omitted.)

W oman m ust not once again be relegated to the status of "second

class citizen[]" that the Constitution expresslyprohibits. Sail 'er Inn, supra,

5 Cal.Sdat p. 1 9.Sustaining Proposition8 creates precisely this risk.

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CONCLUSION

Californiansof all stripes rely on the courts and the C onstitution as

guarantors of equal protection. If, however, a mobilizedmajoritycan

nullify such power, we have only equal protection politics, not equal

protection law.O urcommon understanding thatthe Constitutionand the

courts can protect m inorities will have been a naive fantasy. O ur history as

Californianstells adifferentstory. T he equal protection clause is part of

the found ation of our governance and it cannot be dim inished by

amendmentto deprivea suspect classof aconstitutional right.

F or the foregoing reasons,as well as those statedin thePetitioners'

Briefs, this Court should grantthe petitionfor writ of mandateand order

Respondentsto refrain from enforcingor effectuating P roposition8 .

DATED this 14th day of January, 2009.

Respectfullysubmitted,

IRELL& MANELLA,LLPLauraW .BrillMoez M. KabaRichardM. SimonMark A. Kressel

By. v;*X"}

Laura W .BrillAttorneysfor Petitioners

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I herebycertify that this brief has been prepared using

proportionately double-spaced1 3point TimesNew Roman typeface.

Pursuantto C alifornia Ruleof Court 8.204(c)(l) ,I hereby certify that the

number ofwords containedin theforegoingamicus curiaebrief, including

footnotesbut excluding the Table of Contents, Table of Authorities, the

Applicationfor Leaveto Brief as Amici Curiae,and this C ertificate,is

8 ,559words as calculated using the word count feature of the program used

to prepare this brief.

By:/ Richard ]V J/imon

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SERVICE LIST

S H A NN O N M IN T E RCATHERINE PUALANI SAKJMURAM E L AN IE S P E C K RO W E N

SHIN-MING W O N GC H R I S TO P H E R F R A N C I S S TO L LI L O N A M . T U R N E RNational CenterFor Lesbian Rights87 0 Market Street, S uite 370San Francisco,C A 94102T elephone: (415) 392 -625 7Facsimile: (415) 392-8442

RepresentingPet i tion ers K aren L. St raus s , RuthBoren tein , Brad Jackl in , Du st inHergert , EileenMa, Suyapa Port i l lo ,Gerardo M a n n , JayThomas,Sierra North,Cel i a Carter, D e s m u n d

Wu ,James To l e n ,an d Equali ty California

DENNISJ. HERRERA, City AttorneyT H E R E S EM. S T E WA RTD A N N Y C H O UKAT H L E E N S . M O R RI SS H E R R I S O K E L A N D K A I S E RV I N C E C H H A B R I AE R I N B E R NS T E I NTA R A M . S T E E L E YM O L LI E L E ED eputy C ity A ttorneyC ity H all, Room2 3 4O neD r. CarltonB. Goodlett PlaceS an Francisco, CA 94012-4682Telephone: (415)554-4708F acsimile: (415) 55 4-4 69 9

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerCity an d C o u n t yo f SanFrancisco ( S I 6 8 0 7 8 )

GLORIA ALLREDM IC H A E L M A RO K OJ O H N S T E V E N W E S TAllred,

Maroko&

Goldberg63 00 W ilshire Blvd, Suite 15 00Los Angeles, C A 90 04 8-52 17T elephone: (323 ) 65 3-1 66 0F acsimile: (323) 65 3-53 50

Attorney s forPet i tion ers Rob inTyler an d DianeO l s o n( S I 6 8 0 6 6 )

J E R OM EB. FALK, JR.S T E V E NL. M AY E RAMY E . MARGO LINAMY L. BOMSEADAM P OL AKOF FH oward Rice Nemerovski C anady F alk &

RabkinThree Embarcadero Center,7 th FloorS anFrancisco,CA 94111-4024Telephone: (415)434-1600Facsimile: ( 4 1 5 ) 2 1 7 - 5 9 1 0

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionersCity an d C o u n t yo fSan Francisco, He len Zia ,Lia Shigemura,Edward Sw an s o n , Pau l H e rman ,Zo eD u n n i n gPo m Grey, Marian Mart in a, Joan n aC u s e n z a ,BradleyAkin, Pau l Hi l l ,Emily G r i f f o n ,SageAndersen ,Suwan na Kerdkaewan d Tina M. Yu(S168078)

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ANN MILLER RAVEL, County CounselTAMARA LANGEJUNIPER LESNIKO fficeof T heCounty Counsel70 W est H edding S treetE ast W ing,Ninth FloorSan Jose , C A 95110-1770T elephone: (408) 29 9-5 90 0F acsimile: (408) 29 2-7 24 0

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerC o u n t yo f Santa Clara(S168078)

R AY M O N DG. FORTNER, JR.,County CounselL E E L AA. KAPURE L I Z AB E T H M . C ORT E ZJ U D Y W. W H I T E H U R S T

648 Kenneth H ahn H allof Administration500 W est Temple StreetLos Angeles,CA 90012-2713Telephone: (213)974-1845Facsimile: (213)617-7182

Attorn eys forPet i t ionerC o u n t yof Lo sA n g e l e s( S I 6 8 0 7 8 )

PATRICK K. FAULKNE R, C ounty C ounse lS H E ILA S H A H L IC H T B LA U3501 Civic Center Drive, Room 275San Rafael,C A 94903Telephone: (415)499-6117Facsimi le : (415)499-3796

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerC O U N T YO F MARIN(S168078)

DANA M C R AEC ounty Counsel, C ountyof Santa Cruz701 O cean Street, Room 50 5Santa C ruz, C A 95 06 0Telephone: (831)454-2040Facsimile: (831)454-2115

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerC O U N T YO F SANTACRUZ ( S I 6 8 0 7 8 )

R O C K A R DJ. DE LGADILLO , C ity AttornR I C HAR DH. L LE W E L LYN,JR.D AV I D J . M IC H A E L S O NO fficeof the Los A ngeles C ity Attorney200 N. Main StreetC ity H all E ast, Room800Los Angeles, C A 900 12T elephone: (213) 978 -810 0Facsimile: ( 2 1 3 ) 9 7 8 - 8 3 1 2

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerCity o f Lo sA n g e l e s( S I 6 8 0 7 8 )

RICHARDE. WINNIE, County CounselBRIANE. WA S H I N G T O NC L A U D E K O L MO fficeof County CounselCounty of Alameda

1221O akStreet, Suite450O akland , C A 9461 2Telephone: (510)272-6700

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerC o u n t yof Alameda(S168078)

M I C H A E LP. MU RPHY , C ounty C ounse lBRENDAB. C A R L S O NGLENN M. LEV YH all of Justice and Records40 0 C ounty C enter, 6th F loorRedwood City, CA 94063T elephone: (650) 363-196 5Facsimile: (650) 363-4034

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerC O U N T YO F S ANMATEO (SI 68078)

H ARVE Y E . LEV INE, C i ty Atto rneyNELLIER. A N C E L3300 Capitol AvenueFremont , CA 94538Telephone: (510)284-4030Facsimile: ( 5 1 0 ) 2 8 4 - 4 0 3 1

Attorneys forPet i t ionerCITYO F FREMONT(S168078)

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RU T A N & T U CK E R, L LPPHILIPD . K O H NCity Attorney, City of Laguna Beach61 1Anton Boulevard, Fourteenth FloorC osta Mesa,C A 92626-1931Telephone: (714) 641-5100F acsimile: (714) 54 6-9 03 5

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerCITYO F LAGUNABEACH (S168078)

MICH AEL J . AGUIRRECity AttorneyO fficeof theC ity Attorney, C ityof SanDiegoCivil Division1200 Third Avenue, Suite 1620San D iego,C A 92101-4178

T elephone: (619) 23 6-6 22 0Facsimile: (619)236-7215

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerCITYO F SAN D IEGO( S I 6 8 0 7 8 )

MA RS H A JO N E SMOUTRff i ,City AttorneyJ O S E P H L AW R E N C ESanta Monica City Attorney'sO fficeC ity H all1685Main Street, 3rd FloorS anta Monica,C A 90401Telephone: (310)458-8336Telephone: (310)395-6727

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerCITYO F SANTAMONICA( S I 6 8 0 7 8 )

JO H N RUSS O , C ity At torneyBARBARA PARKERO akland C ity AttorneyC ity H all,6tfi Floor1 F rank O gawa PlazaO akland, C A 946 12Telephone: (510)238-3601Facsimi le : (510)238-6500

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerCITYO F OAKLAND( S I 6 8 0 7 8 )

AT C H I SO N , BA RIS O N E , C O N D O T T IKOVACEVICHJO H N G. BARISO NE , C ity AttorneySanta C ruz C ity Attorney333 Church StreetSanta Cruz,C A 9 5 0 6 0

Telephone: (831)423-8383Facsimile: (831)423-9401

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerCITYO F SANTACRUZ ( S I 6 8 0 7 8 )

L AW R E NC E W . M C L AU G H L INCity AttorneyCityof Sebastopol712 0 Bodega AvenueSebastopol, C A 95 47 2T elephone: (707) 579-45 23F acsimile: (70 7) 57 7-0 16 9

Attorneysfo r Pet i t ionerCITYO FSEBASTOPOL( S I 6 8 0 7 8 )

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Amici PRO - Equal Rights Advocates