AMNESTYINTERNATIONALGLOBALETHICSSERIES

GeneralEditor:KwameAnthonyAppiah

In December 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the United NationsDeclaration ofHumanRights and thereby created the fundamental frameworkwithinwhich the human rightsmovement operates. That declaration—and thevarioushumanrights treaties,declarations,andconventions thathavefollowed—are given life by those citizens of all nations who struggle to make realitymatchthosenobleideals.The work of defending our human rights is carried on not only by formal

national and international courts and commissions but also by the vibranttransnationalcommunityofhumanrightsorganizations,amongwhichAmnestyInternational has a leading place. Fifty years on,Amnesty hasmore than twomillion members, supporters, and subscribers in 150 countries, committed tocampaigningforthebettermentofpeoplesacrosstheglobe.Effectiveadvocacyrequiresustouseourmindsaswellasourhearts;andboth

our minds and our hearts require a global discussion. We need thoughtful,cosmopolitanconversationabout themanychallenges facingourspecies, fromclimatecontroltocorporatesocialresponsibility.ItisthatconversationthattheAmnesty International Global Ethics Series aims to advance. Written bydistinguished scholars and writers, these short books distill some of themostvexingissuesofourtimedowntotheirclearestandmostcompellingessences.Ourhopeisthatthisserieswillbroadenthesetofissuestakenupbythehumanrights community while offering readers fresh new ways of thinking andproblem-solving,leadingultimatelytocreativenewformsofadvocacy.

FORTHCOMINGAUTHORS:PhilipPettit

SheilaJasanoffMarthaMinow

JUSTBUSINESSMultinationalCorporationsandHumanRights

JohnGerardRuggie

DEDICATION

DedicatedtoKofiA.Annan—

sonofGhana,citizenoftheworld,andmyfavoriteboss

CONTENTS

CoverTitlePageDedication

PrefaceIntroduction:WhyBusinessandHumanRights?

Chapter1:TheChallengeChapter2:NoSilverBullet

Chapter3:Protect,RespectandRemedyChapter4:StrategicPathsChapter5:NextSteps

NotesIndex

Copyright

PREFACE

This book is a reflection on an unusual global policy process. In 2005whatwasthentheUnitedNationsCommissiononHumanRights(nowHumanRightsCouncil)createdamandateforanindividualexperttolookanewintothesubjectofbusinessandhumanrights,followingyearsoffailingtofindcommongroundbetweenopposingsides.TheUnitedKingdominitiatedtheideaandsecureditsadoption. To give the position greater visibility, the Council asked the UNSecretaryGeneral toappoint themandate-holderashisSpecialRepresentative.KofiAnnan,whowas Secretary-General at the time, askedme to take on theassignment. The task Iwas initially givenwas largely descriptive: identifyingwhatinternationalhumanrightsstandardscurrentlyregulatecorporateconduct,asopposedtotheconductofstatesandindividuals;andclarifyingtherespectiveroles of states and businesses in safeguarding these rights. In principle, themandateincludedalltypesofbusinesses,largeandsmall,althoughinpracticeitwas intended to shed particular light on multinational corporations.Multinationalsoperateasglobally integratedentitiesbutarenot subject toanysingleglobalregulator, thuscreatinggovernancechallengesnotposedby largenationalfirmsletalonecornergrocers.Themandatekeptexpandinguntil,sixyears later, theHumanRightsCouncil

unanimously endorsed a set of Guiding Principles on Business and HumanRights that I had developed, with the support of business associations andindividual firms as well as civil society and workers organizations. Otherinternationalandnationalstandard-settingbodieshaveincorporatedtheGuidingPrinciples, companies have begun to align their practices with them, andadvocacygroupsuse them in their campaigningwork.TheGuidingPrincipleshave even featured in a crucial case before the United States Supreme Courtconcerningwhetherandunderwhatcircumstancesthe1789AlienTortStatute,originallyintendedtocombatpiracyamongotherthings,appliestotheoverseasconductofcorporationsirrespectiveofwheretheirhomebasemaybe.Myaiminthisbookistoexplainhowthemandategotfromtheretohere,whatitmeansfor the protection of human rights against corporate-related harm, and what

lessons it might hold for responding to evermounting global governancechallenges.Once Imanaged to raise sufficient funds from interestedgovernments, Iwas

abletorecruitasuperbteamofprofessionalswithoutwhomitwouldhavebeenimpossible to construct the building blocks for the Guiding Principles:conducting intensive research and extensive consultations; organizing globalnetworks of volunteers in law firms, universities, NGOs, and businesses;initiatingpilot projects; andproducing several thousandpagesof documentarymaterials. The eightwho crossed the finish linewithme are ChristineBader,Rachel Davis, Gerald Pachoud, Caroline Rees, Andrea Shemberg, JohnSherman, Lene Wendland, and Vanessa Zimmerman. Although we werephysically scattered across time zones we worked together seamlessly as oneteam,withgoodhumormakingusforgetinsaneworkloadsandtravelitineraries.No mere words of thanks can do justice to their immense contributions. TheGuidingPrinciplesareasmuchtheirachievementasmine.AmyLehr,MichaelWright,andDavidVermijswerewithus forpartsof the journeyandJonathanKaufmanhelpedgetmestarted.Thepoliticalprocessofmovingthemandate’sworkthroughtheHumanRights

Council, a quasi-legislative body, was managed by five countries: Argentina,India, Nigeria, Norway, and Russia. Each played key roles within theirrespective regional groups. Norway had the overall lead. Ambassador BenteAngell-Hansen, together with her colleagues in Geneva and Oslo includingForeignMinister JonasGahr Støre,made gainingCouncil endorsement of theGuiding Principles a personal and national priority. On the business side, themandatebenefitedgreatly fromcooperativerelationshipswith theInternationalChamber of Commerce, the International Organisation of Employers, and theBusiness and IndustryAdvisoryCommittee to theOrganisation for EconomicCooperation and Development. Civil society organizations participated in allforty-sevenmandate consultations, and several, including GlobalWitness andOxfam, worked particularly closely with us. It isn’t possible to list all of theother institutions and individuals that became part of our extended team—forexample, themore than twodozen law firms around theworld that conductedprobonoresearchforus,onwhichIdrawinsubsequentchapters.ButIdowanttosingleoutthreelegalanalystswhofollowedthemandatecloselyandprovidedreal-time big-picture assessments when I was struggling through the weeds:Larry Catá Backer, AndrewClapham, andMark Taylor. I am also grateful toMary Robinson, former President of Ireland and UN High Commissioner for

HumanRights,forsharingherwisdomonhumanrightsandspeakingupformewhensomequestionedmine.I dedicate this book to Kofi Annan, for whom I had the honor to work in

severalcapacitiesformorethanadecade.Heisaninspirationalleader,eagertotry out-of-the-box approaches to seemingly insoluble problems, and aprofoundlyhumaneperson, caringdeeply about the individuals aroundhimaswell as about our common fate on this planet. He has been a great boss,wonderfulmentor,anddearfriend.Mydeepestdebt is tomywife,MaryRuggie,whosehumanrights thesepast

sevenyearshavenotbenefitedfrommyendeavorstoadvancethemforothers.Mynextprojectistotryandmakethatuptoher.

Introduction

WHYBUSINESSANDHUMANRIGHTS?

Historiansmaylookbackat the1990sasa“goldenage”for themostrecentwaveofcorporateglobalization.Multinationalfirmsemergedrobustly,inlargernumbers and greater scale than ever before. They weaved together integratedspheres of transnational economic activity, subject to a single global strategicvision, operating in real time, connected to and yet also transcending merely“national”economiesandtheir“inter-national”transactions.Soonhalfofworldtrade comprised “internal” transactions within networks of related corporateentities, not the traditional arms-length “external” exchange among countries.Multinationalsdidwell,andso,too,didpeopleandcountriesthatwereabletotakeadvantageoftheopportunitiescreatedbythistransformativeprocess.Butotherswerelessfortunate.Evidencemountedofsweatshopconditionsand

evenbonded labor in factoriessupplyingprestigiousglobalbrands; indigenouspeoples’communitiesdisplacedwithoutadequateconsultationorcompensationtomakeway foroil andgascompany installations; foodsandbeverages firmsfoundwith seven-year-old children toiling on their plantations; security forcesguardingmining-companyoperationsaccusedofshootingandsometimesrapingorkillingtrespassersanddemonstrators;andInternetserviceprovidersaswellasinformationtechnologycompaniesturningoveruserinformationtogovernmentagencies trackingpolitical dissidents in order to imprison them, andotherwisehelpingthosegovernmentstopracticecensorship.How,inaworldofprofit-maximizingfirmsandstatesjealouslyguardingtheir

sovereign prerogatives, can multinational corporate conduct be regulated toprevent or mitigate such human costs? How can companies that continueimposing thembeheld to account?Globally operating firms are not regulatedglobally. Instead, each of their individual component entities is subject to thejurisdictioninwhichitoperates.Yetevenwherenationallawsexistproscribingabusiveconduct,whichcannotalwaysbetakenforgranted,statesinmanycasesfail to implement them—because they lack the capacity, fear the competitiveconsequencesofdoingso,orbecausetheirleaderssubordinatethepublicgood

forprivategain.Asifbysomedialecticalforce,individualsandcommunitiesadverselyaffected

by corporate globalization began to invoke the language of human rights toexpress theirgrievances, resistance, andaspirations.Human rightsdiscourse—affirmingtheintrinsicworthanddignityofeveryperson,everywhere—becameacommonground fromwhich they began to challenge and seek redress for thehumancostsofcorporateglobalization.Ofcourse,sucheffortslackthematerialpowerofmultinationalsor states.Whathasemerged,asa result, isacomplexand dynamic interplay between “the power of norms versus the norms ofpower.”1 But this raises two further questions: How can human rights normsmosteffectivelybeembeddedinstateandcorporatepracticetochangebusinessconduct?More challenging still, how can this be fostered and achieved in theglobalspherewheremultinationalcorporationsoperatebutwhichlacksacentralregulator? On these questions human rights proponents and global businesseshave been locked in a stalemate. Themain global public arena in which thisclash has occurred has been the United Nations, which first attempted,unsuccessfully,tonegotiateacodeofconductformultinationalcorporationsasfarbackasthe1970s.2Inthelate1990s,theUNSub-CommissiononthePromotionandProtectionof

Human Rights began drafting a treaty-like document called “Norms on theResponsibilities of Transnational Corporations andOther Business Enterpriseswith Regard to Human Rights” (“Norms”). In 2003 it presented the text forapproval to the Commission on Human Rights, its intergovernmental parentbody(whichlaterbecametheHumanRightsCouncil).TheNormswouldhaveimposed on companies, within their “sphere of influence,” the same humanrights duties that states have accepted for themselves under treaties they haveratified: “to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of andprotecthumanrights.”3TheNorms triggeredadeeplydivisivedebatebetweenhuman rights advocacy organizations and the business community. Advocateswere fervently in favor because theNormsproposedmaking theseobligationsbinding on companies directly under international law. Business vehementlyopposedwhatitdescribedas“theprivatizationofhumanrights,”transferringtocompaniesobligationsthattheybelievedbelongedtostates.TheproposalfoundnochampionsontheCommission,whichdeclinedtoactonit.Butenoughgovernments fromvarious regionsof theworldbelieved that the

subject of business and human rights required further attention even if thisparticular instrument was unacceptable to them. Facing escalating advocacy

campaignsand lawsuits,business itself feltaneedforgreaterclarity regardingtheir human rights responsibilities from some reasonably objective andauthoritative source. The governments also realized, however, that anintergovernmental process was unlikely to achievemuch progress on so new,complex, and politically charged an issuewithout first finding some commonterrainonwhichtomoveforward.HencetheCommissionestablishedaspecialmandate foran individualexpert,whichwas intended tosignal itsconcernbutremainmodestinscope:mainlyto“identifyandclarify”existingstandardsfor,and best practices by, businesses, and for the role of states in regulatingbusinessesinrelationtohumanrights;andtoresearchandclarifythemeaningofthemosthotlycontestedconceptsinthedebate,suchas“corporatecomplicity”inthecommissionofhumanrightsabusesand“corporatespheresofinfluence”withinwhichcompaniesmightbeexpected tohavespecial responsibilities.Toadd a degree of visibility to the mandate on the international stage, theCommission requested that the UN Secretary-General appoint the mandate-holder as his “Special Representative on the issue of human rights andtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusinessenterprises.”AndsoitcametobethatinJuly2005Ireceivedacallfromthen–Secretary-

General Kofi Annan, asking me to serve in this post. I had been Annan’sAssistantSecretary-General forStrategicPlanningduringhishighlysuccessfulfirstterm,from1997to2001.MymainrolewastohelpdevelopinitiativesandmessagingthatadvancedhisvisionoftheUnitedNationsinthenewcentury—pushingtheUN’sconcernsbeyondtheprecinctsofgovernmentstowardWethePeoples,thetitleofhiscelebratedreporttothe2000MillenniumSummit.Thisincluded more effective engagement with civil society and the businesscommunity; devising the Millennium Development Goals, a global set ofpoverty reduction benchmarks; a more intense focus on universal rights,includingpromotingtheideathatsovereigntyshouldnolongerbepermittedtoserve as a shield behind which governments feel free to butcher their ownpeople;andseveralroundsofinstitutionalreforms.In2001,AnnanwasawardedtheNobelPeacePrizefor,amongotherachievements,“bringingnewlifetotheorganization.”Ithenreturnedtomypreviouslifeasanacademic.The new assignment, Annan explained in his call, required someone with

knowledge of business and human rights issues but, in light of their politicalsensitivity, did not represent any of the major stakeholder groups involved—governments,businesses,andcivilsociety—whilebeingabletoworkwiththemall.Itwouldbeatwo-year,part-timeprojectthatIcouldconductwithoutleaving

Harvard.Iwouldsubmitareporteachyearsummarizingmywork,conductoneor two consultations around the reports, and then recommend next steps. Itseemedboth interestinganddoable, so I accepted.Littledid Iknow thenhowchallenging, how consuming, and how consequential this assignment wouldbecome.Isoonfoundmyselfatthecenterofastorm,asTheEconomistmagazinelater

described it.4 The prior polarized debate continued, barely stopping for abreather, because the main international human rights organizations did notacceptthatthe“Norms”initiativehadcometoanend,havinginvestedheavilyinit.AmnestyInternationalUSA,forexample,hailedtheNormsas“representingamajorsteptowardagloballegalframeworkforcorporateaccountability.”5TheAmnestyInternationalSecretariathadpublisheda“glossy”(booklet)and linedupitsnationalchaptersforaglobalcampaigninsupportoftheNorms’ultimateadoption. The International Federation for Human Rights, comprised of morethan150organizations inover100countries, sentmea letter stating that they“insistonthecentralroleinthecurrentdebateoftheNorms.. . .Thequestionnowishowtobuildon[them]andhowtofurtherimplementtheseNorms;itisnot whether to repeat this exercise all over.”6 But on the other side, businessinsistedonpreciselytheopposite.InajointlettertheSecretaries-GeneraloftheInternational Chamber of Commerce and the International Organisation ofEmployers, the largest global business associations, stated that I should“explicitlyrecognizethatthereisnoneedforanewinternationalframework.”7Instead,theyurgedmetofocusonidentifyingandpromotinggoodpracticesandproviding companies with tools to enable them to deal voluntarily with thecomplex cluster of business and human rights challenges. When I askedrepresentativesofgovernmentsinaninformalGenevameetingshortlyaftermyappointmentwhatadvicetheyhadforme,Igotonlyonedirectanswer:“Avoidatrainwreck.”Itwasaninauspiciousbeginning.Now fast-forward to June 2011—after six years, nearly fifty international

consultations on five continents, numerous site visits and pilot projects, andseveral thousand pages of research reports. The UN Human Rights Councilunanimously endorsed a set of “Guiding Principles” on business and humanrightsthatIdeveloped,withthesupportofallstakeholdergroups—eventhoughtheCouncil had not requested any such thing.This alsomarked the first timethateithertheCounciloritspredecessor, theCommission,had“endorsed”anynormative text that governments did not negotiate themselves. The GuidingPrinciples layout insomedetail thestepsrequiredforstatesandbusinesses to

implementthe“Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework”IhadproposedtotheCouncilin2008andwhichithadwelcomed.Itrestsonthreepillars:

1. the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties,includingbusinessenterprises, throughappropriatepolicies, regulation,andadjudication;

2. an independent corporate responsibility to respect human rights, whichmeans that business enterprises should act with due diligence to avoidinfringing on the rights of others and address adverse impactswithwhichtheyareinvolved;

3.theneedforgreateraccessbyvictimstoeffectiveremedy,bothjudicialandnonjudicial.

Simply put: states must protect; companies must respect; and those who areharmedmusthaveredress.At the conclusion of my mandate, the Council established an interregional

working group of experts to oversee the UN’s follow-up, focused ondisseminating and implementing the Guiding Principles, supporting efforts toassistunderresourcedcountriesandsmaller firms,andadvising theCouncilonadditional steps thatmaybe required.Moreover, coreelementsof theGuidingPrincipleshavealsobeenadoptedbyotherinternationalstandard-settingbodies,including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, theInternationalStandardsOrganization,theInternationalFinanceCorporation,andtheEuropeanUnion.Thishascreatedanunprecedentedinternationalalignmentcoupledwithabroadportfolioofmeansforsecuringimplementation.Numerouscompanies and industry associations as well as governments have announcedplansorhavealreadybeguntoaligntheirpracticeswiththeGuidingPrinciples.NGOsandworkers’organizationsareusingthemasatoolintheiradvocacy.Thus,inarelativelyshortperiodoftimetheglobalbusinessandhumanrights

agenda shifted from a highly polarized and stalemated debate to significantconvergence.Thishardlymeansthatbusinessandhumanrightschallengeshavecome to an end. Nor does itmean that everyonewas equally happywith theoutcome.ButasIstatedinmyfinalpresentationtotheHumanRightsCouncil,itdoesmarktheendofthebeginning:byprovidingacommonglobalplatformofnormativestandardsandauthoritativepolicyguidanceforstates,businesses,andcivilsociety.Thisbookhastwoaims.Oneis to tell thestoryofhowwegotfromthereto

hereinthecaseofmyparticularbusinessandhumanrightsmandate.Thatstory

is interesting in itself because success hinged on taking themain protagonistsbeyond their comfort zones, in which they had failed to achieve progress.Humanrightsadvocatestraditionallyhavefavoredgoingtheinternationaltreatyroute—what they call the “mandatory” approach. The business communitytraditionally has favored the combination of compliance with national lawswherecompaniesoperate,coupledwiththeadoptionofvoluntarymeasuresandpromotion of best practices by business, arguing that the market then woulddrivetheprocessofchange.Asforstates,evenwhenrecognizinganeedtoact,they have also been conflicted. States that host multinationals compete forforeigninvestments;homestatesareconcernedthattheirfirmsmightloseoutoninvestment opportunities abroad to less scrupulous competitors; and both arepressured by their respective business communities to favor voluntary overmandatorymeans.Butbindinginternationalstandardsrequireaninternationaltreaty—ortheslow

andgradual accretionof customary international law standards.What ismore,the leading human rights NGOs were demanding some overarching andcomprehensivelegalframework,notmerelycorporateaccountabilityinrelationto a specific set of rights, and a framework that would impose duties oncompanies directly under international, not national, law.Apart from issues ofeffectivenessandenforcement,whichIaddressinalaterchapter,majortreatiesoncomplexandcontroversialhumanrightssubjectsrequiretimeforthesubjecttoripenandnegotiationstoconclude.Tocitebutoneexample,in2007theUNGeneralAssemblyadopteda“softlaw”declaration,whichisnotlegallybinding,ontherightsofindigenouspeoples—oneofascoreofsubjectsthatwouldhaveto be included in a business and human rights treaty—and it was twenty-sixyearsinthemaking.Atminimum,then,eventhetreatyapproachwouldrequireinterimmeasures to respond tocurrentneeds.Asformarket-basedsolutions,apuremodelofself-regulationforsosystemicachallengeasbusinessandhumanrights lacks prima facie credibility, and it is difficult to imagine how theidentificationofbestpracticesalonewouldgetmarketstoatippingpointunlessit was coupled with some authoritative way of determining what constitutes“best” as well as some means of dealing with those who act otherwise.Achieving significant progress, I believed, would require moving beyond themandatory-vs.-voluntarydichotomytodeviseasmartmixofreinforcingpolicymeasures that are capable over time of generating cumulative change andachieving large-scale success—including in the law.Thisbook recountshow Idevelopedthatheterodoxapproachandtheresultsitisproducing.

Mysecondaimis to tell thatstory insuchawaythatbroader lessonscanbelearnedfromit.Multinationalcorporationsbecamethecentralfocusofbusinessandhumanrightsconcernsbecausetheirscopeandpowerexpandedbeyondthereach of effective public governance systems, thereby creating permissiveenvironments for wrongful acts by companies without adequate sanctions orreparations.Thus,businessandhumanrightsisamicrocosmofalargercrisisincontemporarygovernance: thewideninggapsbetweenthescopeandimpactofeconomicforcesandactors,andthecapacityofsocietiestomanagetheiradverseconsequences.Yethumanrightsarenotmerelytheproverbialcanaryinthecoalminesignalingthatallisnotwell;respectforhumandignityalsocanandshouldbeoneof thefoundationsonwhich tobridge thosegovernancegaps, fromthelocal level to the global, and in the private sector no less than the public.Creatingamorejustbusinessinrelationtohumanrightsinvolvesfindingwaystomake respecting rights an integral part of business—that is, just making itstandard business practice.However, there is no singleArchimedean leveragepoint from which this can be achieved; success depends on identifying andleveraging a multiplicity of such points, but within the same normative andstrategicframing.This isalsotrue,Ibelieve,ofbridgingotherhighlycomplexandcontroversial instancesofglobalgovernancegaps,suchasclimatechange,whereneithercentralizedcommand-and-controlregulationnorbusinessasusualoffersaviablesolution.This book comprises five chapters. The first summarizes some of the

emblematiccasesthatputbusinessandhumanrightsontheinternationalpolicyagenda, from the first global campaign against Nike for its overseas laborpractices to the scathing criticism the CEO of Yahoo! faced in a U.S.congressionalhearingforturninguserinformationovertoChineseauthorities.Italsooutlinesmorebroadlythecountryandsectorattributesinwhichcorporate-related human rights abuses have tended to occur with greatest frequency.Chapter 2 explains why neither mandatory nor voluntary responses to thesechallenges by themselves provide a fix, and it outlines the contours of theheterodox approach I developed. Chapter 3 presents the Protect, Respect andRemedy Framework and the Guiding Principles for implementing it, whichembody thatapproach.Chapter4 laysout thestrategicpaths that led frommymandate’s modest beginnings in “identifying and clarifying” things to thewidespreadendorsementanduptakeoftheGuidingPrinciples,whichalsomayhelp inform similar efforts at closing global governance gaps. Chapter 5addressesnext steps indriving thebusinessandhuman rightsagenda forward.

TheremainderofthisIntroductionsketchesinthecontextforthediscussiontofollow.

I.ECONOMICTRANSFORMATION

Humanrightstraditionallyhavebeenconceivedasasetofnormsandpracticestoprotectindividualsfromthreatsbythestate,attributingtothestatethedutytosecuretheconditionsnecessaryforpeopletolivealifeofdignity.Thepostwarinternationalhumanrightsregime,aremarkableachievementinaworldofself-regulating states, was premised on this conception. The idea that businessenterprises might have human rights responsibilities independent of legalrequirements in their countries of operation is relatively new and still notuniversallyaccepted.Business and human rights became an increasingly prominent feature on the

international agenda in the 1990s. The liberalization of trade, domesticderegulation, and privatization throughout the world extended the scope anddeepened the impact of markets. The rights of multinational corporations tooperate globally increased greatly through, for example, more robust andenforceable rules protecting foreign investors as well as intellectual property.AccordingtooneUNstudy,some94percentofallnationalregulationsrelatedtoforeigndirectinvestmentthatweremodifiedinthedecadefrom1991to2001were intended to further facilitate it.8 At the same time, innovations intransportation and communication technology made those global operationscost-effective and near-seamless. But standards protecting people and theenvironmentfromtheadverseeffectsofthesedevelopmentsdidnotkeeppace.Manufacturing companies in the industrialized world adopted new businessmodels sourcing their products in low-cost and weakly regulated overseasjurisdictions. Extractive companies, such as oil, gas, andmining, have alwayshadtogowheretheresourceswerefound,butbythe1990stheywerepushingintoever-more-remoteareas,ofteninhabitedbyindigenouspeopleswhoresistedtheir incursion, or operating in host countries engulfed by the civil wars andotherseriousformsofsocialstrifethatmarredthatdecade,particularlyinAfricaandparts ofLatinAmerica. Financial and professional services followed theirclientsabroad.In relation to business and human rights, two features stood out on this

transformedeconomic landscape: itbecameclear thatmanygovernmentswereunable or unwilling to enforce their domestic laws in relation to business and

human rights, where such laws existed at all; and multinational firms wereunpreparedfor theneed tomanage therisksof theircausingorcontributing tohuman rights harm through their own activities and business relationships.Advocacy groups organized campaigns against multinationals. Localcommunitiesbegantopushback,particularlyagainstextractivecompanieswiththeirlargephysicalandsocialfootprints.Thelanguageofhumanrightsbecamepart of the vernacular of affected individuals and groups around the world,emerging as an increasingly prevalent narrative challenging harmful corporatepractices.For their part, some businesses on the frontlines of globalization responded

with policies and practices pledging to follow responsible business conduct—what became known as corporate social responsibility, or CSR for short.CompaniesbegantoestablishCSRunitstomonitorworkplacestandardsintheirglobalsupplychains,whetherinconsumerelectronicsorapparelandfootwear.So-called fair trade labeling and other certification schemes extended similarpromises, ranging fromcoffeebeans to toys and forest products.Anumberofcollaborative initiatives were established with industry partners, sometimesincludingNGOsandgovernmentsaswell—theKimberleyProcess tostem theflowofconflictdiamondsbeinganotableexample.ThepoliticalethosoftheeraalsocontributedtotherapidexpansionofCSR.

To oversimplify only slightly, as governments moved toward greaterderegulationandprivatization,theypromotedCSRinitiativesandprivate-publicpartnershipsinplaceofmoredirectgovernanceroles.ThiswasastrueofTonyBlair’s “Third Way” and Bill Clinton’s “New Democrats” as it was of theChinese government’s privatization of state-owned enterprises and whateverobligations they had to workers and communities. A growing number ofgovernments,includinginemergingmarketcountries,adoptednationalpoliciespromoting voluntary CSR practices, such as having companies issue reportsdescribingsocialandenvironmentalpolicies though rarelyactualperformance.AttheUN,IwasachiefarchitectoftheGlobalCompact,launchedin2000andnow theworld’s largest CSR initiativewith some 7,000 company participantsand national networks in more than 50 countries. It was not conceived as aregulatoryinstrument,however,forwhichithadnomandatefromgovernments.Itwasdesignedasalearningforumtopromotesociallyresponsiblepracticesinthe areas of human rights, workplace standards, the environment, andanticorruption;sharebestpracticesanddeveloptools;recruitnewactorsintotheCSR world, ranging from emerging market firms and their governments to

investors and business schools; and to disseminate the CSR message to newmarketsegments,suchasmainstreaminvestors.TheCompactisthearchetypeofvoluntarism,andmanygovernments,includingintheso-calledBRICcountries(Brazil,Russia,India,andChina),encouragedtheirfirmstojoin.CSR initiativesevolved rapidly, though less so inhuman rights than inother

social and environmental domains. But they also exhibit built-in limitations:mostdonotaddresstherolethatgovernmentsmustplayinbridginggovernancegaps;theytendtobeweakintermsofaccountabilityprovisionsandremedyforharm;andbydefinitiontheyinvolveonlycompaniesthatvoluntarilyadoptsuchmeasures, in a form and at a pace of their own choosing.When I beganmymandate,ofthe80,000orsomultinationalcorporationsintheworld,fewerthan100wereknowntohaveanypoliciesorpracticesinplacethataddressedtheriskof their involvement in human rights harm—beyond whatever specific andhighly variable legal requirementsmight exist in their countries of operation.9Hence thedrivebyadvocacygroups,affected individualsandcommunities,aswell as other stakeholders to strengthen the international human rights regimedirectly by expanding its scope and provisions to encompass businessenterprises.

II.THEHUMANRIGHTSREGIME

The idea of human rights is both simple and powerful. The operation of theglobalhumanrightsregimeisneither.Thesimplicityandpowerofhumanrightsreside in the idea that every person is endowed with “inherent dignity” and“equalandinalienablerights.”Theessenceofrightsisthattheyareconsideredentitlements, not granted by the grace or at the discretion of others. Hence,international human rights instruments speak of “recognizing” rights, notcreatingthem.Theinternationalhumanrightsregimewasbuiltonthisprecept,beginningwiththeUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,adoptedbytheUNGeneral Assembly in 1948 “as a common standard of achievement for allpeoplesandallnations.”10TwoUnitedNations Covenants adopted in 1966,which entered into force a

decade later, turned many of the Declaration’s aspirational commitments intolegalobligations, for states that ratified them, to respect the enumerated rightsandensure their enjoymentby individualswithin their territoryor jurisdiction.One covenant addresses such civil and political rights as life, liberty, andsecurityoftheperson;fairtrialandequalprotectionofthelaw;therightnotto

besubjectedtotortureorotherformsofcruel,inhuman,ordegradingtreatment;nottobesubjectedtoslavery,servitude,orforcedlabor;freedomofmovement,thought,andconscience;therighttopeacefulassembly,family,andprivacy;andthe right to participate in the public affairs of one’s country.11 The othercovenant addresses economic, social and cultural rights, including the right toworkandtojustandfavorableconditionsofwork;toformandjointradeunions;to social security, adequate standards of living, health, education, rest, andleisure;andtotakepartinculturallifeandcreativeactivity.12TheDeclaration and the twoCovenants together constitute the “International

BillofHumanRights.”TheyhavebeensupplementedbysevenadditionalUNtreaties, further elaborating upon prohibitions against racial discrimination,discrimination against women, and torture; affirming the rights of the child,migrant workers, and persons with disabilities; and prescribing nationalprosecution or extradition for the crime of forced disappearance. TheInternational Labour Organization (ILO) has adopted a series of conventionsregardingworkplacerights,againwithratifyingstatesastheduty-bearerswithintheir respective jurisdictions. Its Declaration on Fundamental Principles andRightsatWork,representingwhatmightbedescribedas“thecoreofthecore”internationallyrecognizedworkplacerights,includesfreedomofassociationandthe effective recognition of collective bargaining; elimination of all forms offorcedorcompulsorylabor;effectiveabolitionofchildlabor;andeliminationofdiscriminationinrespecttoemploymentandoccupation.13Separate regional human rights regimes exist in Europe, Africa, and the

Americas. In2002 theRomeStatuteof theInternationalCriminalCourt (ICC)came into force. The Court can prosecute individuals for genocide, crimesagainsthumanity,andwarcrimesinanumberofcircumstances:wherenationalcourtsofstatespartiesareunwillingorunabletoinvestigateandprosecutesuchcrimes;wheretheaccusedisanationalofastateparty,ortheallegedcrimetookplace on the territory of a state party irrespective of the nationality of theaccused; or where a situation is referred to the Court by the UN SecurityCouncil, inwhichcasenoneof theothercriterianeed tobemet.TheSecurityCouncil did so, for example, in the case of Sudan’s President Omar HassanAhmadAlBashirwhowas indictedon tensuchcounts;Saifal-IslamGaddafi,sonofColonelMuammarGaddafi,alsostandsindicted.ButtheCourtlacksthepoweronitsowntobringthemtoTheHaguefortrial.Thecombinationoftheseinstitutional innovations—theUNand regional human rights systems, coupledwiththeILOcoreconventionsandtheICC—constitutewhatisoftenreferredto

asthetwentieth-century“humanrightsrevolution.”However, the UN-based human rights regime is neither designed nor is it

capableofactingasacentralizedlegalregulativesystem.Tobeginwith,statesadoptandratifytreatiesvoluntarily;nonecanbeforcedtodoso.Notallstateshave ratified all human rights treaties, and not all implement those they haveratified.Evenwherelegalobligationsdoexist,theregimelacksadjudicativeandenforcement powers. Expert committees (called treaty bodies) are establishedundereachtreatytoreceive,andmakeobservationson,reportsthatstatespartiesare required to submit periodically regarding their adherence to treatyobligations, and to offer recommendations and commentaries on treatyprovisionsinlightofevolvingcircumstances.Butmostcountriesdonotaccepttreatybodies’viewsasasourceoflaw.Inaddition,manyeconomic,social,andculturalrights—therightstoadequatestandardsofliving,health,andeducation,forexample—aresubjectto“progressiverealization,”thatis,achievementtothemaximumextentpermittedbyavailableresources.Thisaddstothedifficultyofassessing compliance, especially in relation to third parties such as businessenterprises. In any case, implementation falls to the individual state—itsdomesticjudicialandpoliticalprocesses—andtosuchassistanceorleverageasotheractors,whetherstates,internationalagencies,oractivistgroups,arewillingandabletobringtobearonthosewhoseperformancefallsshort.These challenges are magnified where the conduct of multinational

corporations is involved. By multinational corporations I simply meancompaniesthatconductbusinessinmorethanonecountry,whetherasverticallyintegrated firms, joint ventures, corporate groups, cross-border productionnetworks, alliances, trading companies, or through ongoing contractualrelationships with off-shore suppliers of goods and services; and whetherpubliclylisted,privatelyheld,orstate-owned.Internationalhumanrightstreatiesimposedutiesonstatesthatratifythem.In

turn,companiesaresubject towhateverstandardsstatesapply to themin theirhome and host countries. For example, the United States has not ratified theeconomic, social, and cultural rights covenant, nor has China ratified thecovenant on civil and political rights. Thus, variations exist as to whichinternational human rights standards apply in different countries, andmultinational corporations are likely to be subject to different, sometimescontradictory, standards in their countries of operation. Advocates have urgedthat companies should simplyadhere to international standardswhere theyaremore protective of human rights than national laws. But that can be tricky to

satisfywhenthetwoareinconflict.Aninternationallyrecognizedrightmaybelegallyprohibitedbythehostcountry—therighttoformunions,forexample,orgenderequality.Therearenoauthoritative internationalmeans to resolve suchconflictsofstandards,andrequiringdivestmentinallsuchcasesmightdomoreharmthangoodandwouldberesistedbymultinationalsandstatesalike.Only in limited instances has international human rights law reached

companies directly—for instance, if they commit or are complicit in thecommission of egregious violations, such as genocide, war crimes, torture,extrajudicialkillings,forceddisappearances,andslavery-likepractices.Buteventhen, the lawcanbe enforcedonly in jurisdictionswhere such charges canbebrought against companies. The most prominent venue has been the UnitedStatesundertheAlienTortStatute.Thiswasadoptedin1789tocombatpiracy,protect ambassadors, and ensure safe conducts. It was discovered by humanrights lawyers more than two hundred years later as a means for foreignplaintiffs to bring civil suit in federal courts, first against individuals and thenagainstmultinational corporations as “legalpersons,” forviolating “the lawofnationsoratreatyoftheUnitedStates.”ThepathbreakingcaseagainstamajorcorporationwasDoev.Unocal,inwhichBurmesevillagerssuedtheCalifornia-basedoil company (subsequentlyboughtbyChevron) forcomplicity in forcedlabor, rape, and murder allegedly committed by Burmese military unitsconstructing and securing Unocal’s pipeline route through that country toThailand.Thatcasewassettled, reportedlyfor$30million.Someonehundredsuch cases have been brought against multinationals in U.S. courts, but thestatute’s applicability to legal as opposed to natural persons is currently underreviewbytheU.S.SupremeCourt.Furthermore, while the layperson’s image ofmultinational corporationsmay

reflect their actual day-to-day practices, that image does not conform toprevailing legal doctrine. Multinational corporations operate as globallyintegrated entities or “groups.” But legally, the parent company and eachsubsidiary are construed as a “separate legal personality,” subject to theindividual jurisdictions in which they are incorporated. Therefore, the parentcompany is generally not liable for wrongs committed by a subsidiary, evenwhereitisthesoleshareholder,unlessthesubsidiaryisundersuchcloseday-to-dayoperationalcontrolbytheparentthatitcanbeseenasbeingitsmereagent.This makes it extremely difficult for any jurisdiction to regulate the overallactivities of multinationals, and it can prevent victims of corporate-relatedhumanrightsabusesfromobtainingadequateremedy.

Yettheglobalcorporategrouphasnumerouswaysofinfluencinggovernments.Itmaythreatentowithdrawitsinvestmentfromahostcountry.Itmaybeabletosuethehostgovernmentunderbindinginternationalarbitrationifitsinvestmenthasbeennegativelyaffectedby legislativeoradministrativemeasures.Adhocpanelsofarbitratorsmayconstruesuchmeasuresasbreachingan internationalinvestment agreement, even if the host country is merely enacting itsinternationalhumanrightsobligationsinanondiscriminatorymannerasbetweendomestic and foreign investors. Additionally, the subsidiary has access to itshome country as a potential source of political leverage, and through it to theinternational financial institutions, such as theWorldBank, onwhich the hostcountry may depend for support.14 Multinationals have also been known tothreatentorelocatetheirhomebaseinordertoavoidrobustdomesticregulation:forexample,therearemoreminingcompanieslistedinCanadathaninanyothercountry,andthethreatofsettingupheadquarterssomewhereelsehungoveranultimatelyunsuccessfuleffort throughaprivatemember’sbill inParliament toimposeregulationson thosecompanies’overseasoperations.15Thus,under theexistingrulesofthegame,multinationalcorporationsposeregulatorychallengesnotposedbynationalfirms,whiletheabsenceofaglobalregulatormakesthoseruleshardtochange.Havingsaidallthat,multinationalcorporationsarealsosubjecttoavarietyof

pressurepointstowhichstatesandnationalcompaniesmaybelessvulnerable.Each link in the distributed network of amultinational increases the availableentrypoints throughwhichother social actorscan seek to leverage theoverallcompany brand, its operations and resources, with the aim of improving thefirm’s social performance—by investors, consumers, and home countryregulatoryagencies;localcommunitiesandcivilsocietyactors,oftensupportedthrough transnational links; and a company’s own personnel concerned aboutdifferentialtreatmentofhumanrightsinoverseas-vs.-home-countryworkplacesand communities. In short, the conduct of multinational corporations may besusceptibletoadiversesetofeconomicandsocialcompliancemechanismsthatdifferfromthoseaffectingstatesandnationalcompanies—sothatlessonsfromthe experienceof the lattermaynot fully capture theopportunities fordrivingchangethroughmultinationals.Internationallawmustandwillcontinuetoevolveinordertoguideandgovern

aspectsofthebusinessandhumanrightsagenda.Butthedesiretoachievethatgoal through negotiating an all-encompassing legally binding framework is atbest a long-term proposition. Even if one were to start down that road,

responding to existing needs requires identifying and undertaking shorter-termmeasures as well. And great caremust be takenwhen promoting longer-termsolutions to avoid having an idealized image of the end point—the perfectlyconceived and perfectly enforced international legal regime—trumpconsideration of effective measures in the here and now. Amartya Sen,philosopher and Nobel laureate in economics, takes to task those who viewhumanrightsasmere“proto-legalcommands”or“lawsinwaiting.”16Hisviewis that human rights are “strong ethical pronouncements as towhat should bedone. They demand acknowledgement of imperatives and indicate thatsomethingneedstobedonefor[their]realization....”17Buthedoesnotbelievethattheveryideaofhumanrightsisorshouldbeconfinedtotheirroleaseitherlaws’antecedentsoreffects.Todosowouldundulyconstrict—Senactuallyusestheterm“incarcerate”—thesociallogicsandprocessesotherthanlawthatdriveevolvingpublicrecognitionofrights.18IshareSen’sview.Inshort, thisiswhatIfoundwhenIsurveyedtheglobalbusinessandhuman

rightspictureat theoutsetofmymandate:adeeplydividedarenaofdiscourseand contestation lacking shared knowledge, clear standards and boundaries;fragmentary and often weak governance systems concerning business andhuman rights in states and companies alike; civil society raising awarenessthroughcampaigningagainstcompanies,andsometimesalsocollaboratingwiththe most willing among them to improve their social performance; andoccasional lawsuits against companies brought mainly through the innovativeuseof legalprovisions thatwereoriginally intended fordifferentpurposes.Togainamoregranularunderstandingof these issues inoneparticularly troubledindustry sector, I arranged a visit to the Peruvian highlands in January 2006,where conflicts betweenmining companies and communities had been in thenews—andcontinuetobetothisday.

III.CAJAMARCA

TheprovinceofCajamarca,roughlythesizeoftheU.S.stateofRhodeIsland,lies in northwestern Peru. It is a region of pastures and peasants, largelyindigenous,whofarmandgrazecattle.OneofthemostheavilyminedareasinPeru, a country where mining accounts for more than 60 percent of exportearnings,itisalsooneofthepoorest.NotfarfromtheprovincialcapitalofthesamenameisSouthAmerica’slargestgoldmine,MineraYanacocha.Itisajointventure betweenDenver-basedNewmontMining (just over half of the shares)

andCompañíadeMinasBuenaventura,Peru’s largest publicly tradedpreciousmetalscompany.TheInternationalFinanceCorporation(IFC),theWorldBank’sprivate sector arm, holds a 5 percent stake as part of its program to promoteeconomicgrowththroughprivateinvestmentinthenaturalresourcessector.InOctober2005theminewas thesubjectof lengthyinvestigative journalism

coverageintheNewYorkTimesandaprogramintheFrontlineseriesoftheU.S.PublicBroadcastingSystem.19Newmontinvitedmetovisittheoperationtoseefirsthandtheireffortstorespondtotheirchallenges.ThroughOxfamAmerica,Ialso arranged to meet with community leaders and NGOs in Cajamarca andLima.Imakenoattemptheretofullyassessthesituationatthattime,butmerelyprovideabriefsketchofthemainfactorsandactorsasIsawthem,andofhowtheyinformedmyframingoftheUNassignmentIhadbeengiven.Yanacocha rises from approximately 10,000 to nearly 14,000 feet, with the

operation spread across 600 square miles.20 Constructing the site involvedblastingmountaintops,andminingitconsistsofprogressivelycarvingoutapitroughly 60 square miles in size, carting off boulders and leaching them in adiluted cyanide solution. This process allows small deposits of gold to beseparatedfromtherockandthensmelted—30tonsormoreofrockandearthforeveryounceofgold—whileconsuminglargequantitiesofwaterandreleasingavarietyofmineralsandheavymetals,includingmercury.Thewaterthenneedstobetreatedandtheby-productscontainedanddisposedofsafely.Therearefewifanyissuesrelatedtotheoperationthatdidnotgeneratesome

level of community objection and opposition from the start: allegations ofinadequateconsultationandcompensationfortheresettlementofpeople;lackofjob opportunities for locals (mining is capital-intensive andmany jobs requireskillsthatlocalsdonothaveandwouldneedtobetrainedfor);inwardmigrationofpeople lookingforwork,bringingovercrowdingandrisingcrime, includingprostitution,tothecity;largenumbersofdeadfishfloatingbelly-upinlakesandstreamsaroundthemine.In2000,acompany-contractedtruckspilledmorethan300poundsofmercuryover25milesofroad,reportedlypoisoning900people.In2004,Newmontsought toexpanditsoperation toanearbymountain,CerroQuilish,whichissaidtohavespiritualsignificancefortheindigenouspopulationandsuppliesCajamarcawithwater. In response,more than10,000people laidsiegetothemine.Policeandspecialforcesfiredteargas;someonefiredbullets.Newmontgaveinandhaltedtheproject.BythetimeIarrivedinearly2006,thecompany had identified another site nearby,Minas Conga, where it hoped toapply the lessons learned atYanacocha to bettermanage its relationswith the

community. Newmont did develop far more extensive and sophisticated CSRpoliciesandpracticesovertime.Nevertheless,inNovember2011,operationsattheCongasite,at$4.8billionthebiggestsingleinvestmentinPeru’shistory,hadto be suspended when the government imposed a state of emergency, citingpublicsafetyconcernsraisedbymassiveprotests thathadbecomeinextricablyentwinedwithnationalandlocalpoliticalrivalries.21Atthetimeofmyvisit,Newmontwasnotaloneamongminingcompaniesin

lacking effective systems to assess its potentially adverse impacts on theenvironment and community before operations or expansions began; or forengagingstakeholdersinongoingconsultationsthereafter,addressinggrievancesabout any harm done. In the wake of Cerro Quilish, Yanacocha’s generalmanager told a reporter that he spent 70 to 80 percent of his working hoursdealing with social issues—which suggested to me that he, personally, wasattempting to be themissing system.Duringmy visits to themine I saw thatNewmont had established water treatment facilities and a lab to sample theoutflow, and I was taken to a small and well-stocked fishing pond fed byrecycled water. The company also supported the development of local crafts,including textiles and jewelry; helped transport teachers to rural schools;improved some roads; and hooked up a nearby part of the city to its ownelectricalgrid.ItsCSRandcommunityrelationsteamsweregrowinginnumbersand expertise. But their approach seemed largely reactive to external pressureandadhocinnature.Itlackedmetricsformeasuringthecostsofconflictswiththe community or the benefits of getting the relationship right. And thecompany’s operations division continued to dictate time lines based onproduction and cost targets. It was evident that the company did not enjoy astrong “social license to operate”—broad acceptance of the company’soperations by the community. And still, as if deliberately to reinforce thatvulnerability, Roque Benavides, the CEO of Buenaventura, Newmont’s localjoint venturepartner, famously said in a2005 television interview: “I hate thetermsociallicense.Idonotunderstandwhatsociallicensemeans...Iexpectalicense from the authorities . . . I don’t expect a license from the wholecommunity.”22Buttheauthoritiesinsomerespectswerepartoftheproblem.Peruhadratified

numerousUNhumanrightstreaties,butasinmanycountriesthenandnow,theirrelevanceforbusinessandhumanrightswaspoorlyunderstoodletaloneactedupon.Moreover,aMaoistinsurgencyandeconomicmismanagementhaddrivenout foreign investment in the 1980s, so successor governments felt obliged to

extendextremelyfavorabletermsforitsreturn.Corruptionandcronycapitalismwere endemic. The prevailing social structure pitted better-off Peruvians ofSpanish descent against the far poorer indigenous populations in miningcommunities. Effective public sector capacitywas lacking: Iwas told that theentire Cajamarca province had only three environmental inspectors, and theyworkedoutoftheMinistryofMines.Bythetimeofmyvisitanewregulationhadbeenadoptedthatreturnedashareofminingrevenuestolocalcommunities,but I saw little evidence of it. More than 60 percent of the population livedbelow the poverty line, infrastructure was lacking, housing dilapidated, andschooling scarce.Local authorities (Imetwith themayor) seemed content forthecompany tobe the focusofcommunitypressure forbetterpublic services.Indeed, as recently as January 2012 the country’s PrimeMinister complainedthatmuchoftheresourcessent totheCajamarcaregionhadnotbeenspentonprogramsbenefitinglocalresidents.23Othergovernmentalactorswerealsoconnectedtotheoperation.TheIFCisa

coinvestorandmadesomeeffortstoimproverelationsbetweenthecommunityandthemine.Followingthemercuryspillin2000,theOfficeoftheComplianceAdvisor/Ombudsman (CAO), which is empowered to respond to complaintsagainstIFCprojects,offeredtocommissionanindependenthealthstudy,but itcouldnotbecarriedout,accordingtoanofficialreport, inpart“duetolackofcooperationfromgovernmentauthorities.”24ButCAOdidfacilitateafive-yearprocess intended“to improvedialogueand resolve issuesofconcern”betweenthecompanyandcommunity.Atthetimeofmyvisit theIFChadjustadoptedsocialandenvironmentalperformancestandardsthatitwouldrequireclientstomeet, in part triggered by its experience with projects like Yanacocha, but ofcoursetheycouldnotbeimposedretroactively.Foritspart,theU.S.governmentinthe1990shadbeendeeplyinvolvedinpersuadingthePeruvianauthoritiestograntNewmontthemajorityholdinginYanacocha,fromhighlevelsintheStateDepartment to theCIA station chief inLima.But even today theU.S. has nopolicy to guide or assist American-based multinationals with managing theenvironmentalandhumanrightsrisksoftheiroverseasoperations,nortoadviseorsupportlocalgovernmentsincopingwiththemassiveimpactsofanoperationsuchasYanacocha.Communityresistanceandprotestscanarisespontaneously.InCajamarcathey

havealsohada leader, a formerCatholicpriestby thenameofMarcoArana,knownasFatherMarcotohissupportersand“theredpriest”tohisadversaries.(Hewas defrocked in 2010when he became a candidate for electoral office).

AranarunsanNGOcalledGRUFIDES(GroupforTrainingandInterventionforSustainableDevelopment). Ina longmeetingwithhimin2006, IaskedAranahowitcametobethatblockingaccesstotheminewassucharoutinepracticeinCajamarca.He responded: “Theydon’t listen to uswhenwe comewith smallproblems, so we have to create big ones.” It was Arana who negotiated withNewmont to halt their plans to mine the Quilish site after the intense 2004blockade.Helaterreportedthathismovementswerebeingfollowedandhislifethreatened, alleging that individuals in Forza,Yanacocha’s security contractor,wereinvolved.25IwasintroducedtoAranathroughOxfamAmerica,whichhasalocalaffiliateinLimaandatthattimealsoprovidedfundingtoGRUFIDES,asdid aGermanCatholic developmentNGO,Misereor. Both organizations havefollowed UN business and human rights discussions closely, including mymandate.Thus,inadditiontoprovidingoperatingsupporttocommunitygroups,theseinternationalNGOsserveasabridgebetweentheglobalandlocallevels:communicating developments in global debates to local communities, and inturnmakingitpossibleforlocalcivilsocietytogetitsmessageoutandconnectwithothersontheglobalstage.Forinstance,in2005,OxfamarrangedforAranatoattendNewmont’sannualgeneralmeeting inDenver,whereheattracted theattentionofshareholdersand thepress,andalsohadabriefexchangewith theCEO. Misereor funded the participation of a number of civil societyrepresentatives from developing countries in several of my mandateconsultations. Through such networks, civil society actors track and seek toinfluencethepoliticalandcorporatespheres.Ihaveentitledchapter2“NoSilverBullet.”Thereisnosingleorsimpleway

toresolveenormouslycomplexsituationssuchasIfoundinCajamarca.Besides,a Peruvianmining operation is not a representative sample of the universe ofglobal business and human rights challenges that my mandate was meant toaddress.However,Yanacochadidbring intoreliefmanyof theelements thatasystematicglobaleffort toachievestrongerprotectionagainstcorporate-relatedhuman rights harmwouldhave to address: specifying the respective roles andresponsibilities of governments and business enterprises, and how thoseresponsibilities should be discharged; the need for greater access to effectiveremedy for those whose human rights are harmed by corporate conduct; andproviding clear benchmarks by means of which other social actors—forexample, civil society, workers’ organizations, investors, and consumers—canhold both to account. Contrary to the preferences expressed by internationalbusiness at the outset of my mandate, such an effort would require the

development of an authoritative international framework that could serve as acommon platform for the different actors. But contrary to the aspirationsexpressedbythemajorinternationalhumanrightsorganizations,thiscouldnotplausibly be achieved through some single overarching international legalinstrument.

IV.PRINCIPLEDPRAGMATISM

Thesuccessfulexpansionoftheinternationalhumanrightsregimetoencompassmultinational corporationsmust activate andmobilize all of the rationales andorganizational means that can affect corporate conduct. Thus, I made it clearfromtheoutsetthatIwouldfollowacourseIcalledprincipledpragmatism:“anunflinching commitment to the principle of strengthening the promotion andprotection of human rights as it relates to business, coupledwith a pragmaticattachmenttowhatworksbestincreatingchangewhereitmattersmost—inthedaily lives of people.”26 Columbia University historian Samuel Moyn’s keeninsight, that “human rights are not so much an inheritance to preserve as aninvention to remake,” is particularly appropriate in the business and humanrights context.27 I envisioned a model of widely distributed efforts andcumulative change. But for such efforts to cohere and become mutuallyreinforcing,theyrequireanauthoritativefocalpointthattherelevantactorscanrallyaround.Providingthatfocalpointbecamemystrategicaim.DevelopingtheGuidingPrinciplesthatwerethemandate’sfinalproductitself

was subject to several guiding principles. I briefly flag them here; they areelaborated throughout subsequent chapters. The most fundamental was torecognize and build on a core feature of the governance of multinationalcorporations that we saw very clearly in the Cajamarca case. Three distinctgovernancesystemsaffecttheirconductinrelationtohumanrights:thesystemof public law and policy; a civil governance system involving externalstakeholdersthatareaffectedbyorotherwisehaveaninterestinmultinationals;andcorporategovernance,which internalizeselementsof theother two. In theacademicliteraturethis institutionalfeatureof theglobaleconomyisdescribedas polycentric governance.28 Each governance system constitutes a complexclusterofitsown.Thesystemofpubliclawandpolicy,stipulatingformalrulesfor corporate conduct, operates at two levels: the individual home and hostcountries of multinationals, and the international sphere wherein states actcollectively and international institutions operate. The system of civil

governance, expressing social expectations of corporate conduct, operateslocally in host and home countries, and it is increasingly connectedtransnationally. Corporate governance also comprises two dimensions. Onereflects the integrated strategic vision, institutional design, and managementsystems that these companies require to function as globally operatingbusinesses, including enterprise-wide risk management. The other reflects theseparatelegalpersonalityofcorporateparentsandtheiraffiliates,bywhichtheypartition their assets and limit their liabilities. In order to achieve betterprotection for individuals and communities against corporate-related humanrightsharm,eachofthesegovernancesystemsneedstobemobilizedandpullincompatibledirections.To foster that mobilization the Guiding Principles draw on the different

discoursesthatreflecttherespectivesocialrolesthesegovernancesystemsplayinregulatingcorporateconduct.Forstates thefocus ison the legalobligationsthey have under the international human rights regime as well as policyrationales that are consistent with, and supportive of, those obligations. Forbusinesses,beyondcompliancewithlegalobligationsthatmayvarysubstantiallyacross countries in their applicability or enforcement, the framing centers onhowtomanagetheriskofinvolvementinadversehumanrightsimpactsthrougheffective human rights due diligence and alternative dispute resolutionmechanisms.Forpeoplewhosehumanrightsareharmedbycorporateconductand civil society generally, theGuidingPrinciples constitute a basis of furtherempowerment through provisions for engagement with business, and byproviding authoritative benchmarks by which to judge the conduct ofgovernmentsandbusinesses—andalsobywhichgovernmentsandbusinesscanjudge one another. Within the human rights community, this unorthodoxformulationinitiallywasthemostcontroversialconceptualmoveImadebecauseitwasnotconsideredtobefully“rights-based.”Butforreasonsthatwillbecomecleareraswegoalong,more thananyotherstep, itaccountedfor theGuidingPrinciples’success.Moreover, human rights advocacy groups and lawyers have focused their

efforts on legalmeans to hold companies to account for human rights abusesafter they have been committed, in the hope and expectation that this wouldserve as a deterrent to future violations. The Guiding Principles also makerecommendations for strengthening judicial remedy. But I sought equally toexpandthepreventativesideoftheequationdirectly:identifyinganddevelopingenabling rules for states and companies alike to avoid or at least reduce the

incidenceofcorporate-relatedhumanrightsabuses.Ididsofortworeasons.Forone, as Father Arana noted and my subsequent research confirmed, manyinstancesofwhat turnedout tobemajor corporate-relatedhuman rights crisesbegan as lesser grievances that companies ignored and which then escalated.Better to catch those early. For another, preventative measures can beimplemented more readily—in terms of time, resource requirements, andovercomingpoliticalresistance—thanjudicialsystemscanbebuiltorreformed.Finally,Iwantedatallcosttoavoidhavingmymandatebecomeentrappedin

orsidetrackedbylengthyintergovernmentalnegotiationsoveralegaltext,whichI judgedwouldbe inconclusiveatbestandpossiblyevencounterproductive. Itwastooimportant toget theparametersandperimetersofbusinessandhumanrights locked down in authoritative policy terms, which could be acted onimmediatelyandonwhichfutureprogresscouldbebuilt.Therefore,Itookgreatcare to base the mandatory elements of the Guiding Principles on theimplicationsofexistinglegalstandardsforstatesandbusinesses;tosupplementthosewithpolicyrationalesintendedtospeaktotheinterestsandvaluesofbothsets of actors; and in addition to Human Rights Council endorsement, I alsosought to have core elements of the Guiding Principles adopted as policyrequirementsbyotherentitieswiththeauthorityandresponsibilitytodothat.Inshort, I aimed for a formula that was politically authoritative, not a legallybindinginstrument.Ina2007lawjournalarticlesummarizingmandateworktodate,Istatedmyexpectationthatlegaldevelopmentswouldfollowfromsuchaneffort,butas“precisiontools”onspecificmattersthatalreadyenjoyedadegreeofinternationalconsensus.29Asweshallsee,thishasbeguntohappen.

V.THEUNMANDATE

One additional set of introductory remarks is necessary to explain theinstitutional and procedural conditions under whichmymandate operated. Toput it very simply: I had no power but persuasion, and virtually no materialresourcestoconductthemandateotherthanthoseIwasabletoraisemyself.ToborrowmyKennedySchool colleague JosephNye’s celebrated term, thiswas“softpower”initssoftestform.30“Special Procedures” is the name given to independent experts appointed by

theUNHumanRightsCouncil toexamineeitherspecificcountrysituationsorthematic issues. My mandate fell into the latter category. According to theofficial description, thematic mandates address “major phenomena of human

rightsviolationsworldwide.”Itcontinues:“TheMandate-holdersofthespecialprocedures serve in their personal capacity, and do not receive salaries or anyother financial compensation for their work.” What it does not say is that,beyondlimitedstaffsupportandminimalallowancesfortravel,thesemandatesareprovidedwithnoresourcesfortheir implementation.Ibeganwiththepart-time assistance of a professional in the Office of the High Commissioner forHumanRightsandthreeround-tripticketsbetweenBoston,myhomebase,andGeneva,wheretheHumanRightsCouncilmeetsandtheHighCommissionerislocated. I then assembled a team of outstanding professionals who conductedresearch and managed the process—lawyers, policy analysts, anM.B.A., andtwodiplomatsonleavefromtheirforeignministries.Weworkedwithnetworksofvolunteersinnumerouscountries,benefitedfromprobonoresearchprovidedbymorethantwodozenlawfirms,andconvenedextensiveconsultationsaroundtheworld.Iviewedthemandatenotmerelyasaresearchanddraftingexercise,but as a global campaign of sorts, to reframe a stalemated policy debate andestablishglobal standards andauthoritativepolicyguidance.Funding for theseactivities came in the form of voluntary contributions from governmentsstructured as research grants to Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government,which administered the entire project.Chapter 4 explains how I deployed andamplifiedthissoft-powerresourcebasetoachievethemandate’saim.SuchmandatesarecreatedbyaHumanRightsCouncilresolution(previously

by the Commission). The Council comprises forty-seven UN member stateselectedonaregionalbasisforthree-yearterms;allotherstatesmayparticipatefully as observers but cannot vote. Resolutions require a lead sponsor fromamong Council members. The United Kingdom led the creation of the initialmandate,workingwithfourothercoresponsors:Argentina,India,Nigeria,andthe Russian Federation. This cross-regional grouping—one core sponsor fromeach of the five regional groups (African, Asian, Eastern European, LatinAmerican and Caribbean, Western European and “Others”)—reflected theimportanceofworkingacrossnorth-southandeast-westpoliticaldivides,whichis essential to achieving progress in this field. Norway took over the lead in2006,whentheCouncilreplacedtheCommission.My formal role was to submit annual reports to the Council for its

consideration, and to the UN General Assembly for informational purposes.Reports are submitted in written form and then presented in a brief oralstatementtotherespectivebodies.Thisisfollowedbyan“interactivedialogue”inwhichdelegationsmakestatementsandaskquestions,andthemandate-holder

is given a brief opportunity to respond. At Human Rights Council sessions,accreditednonstateobservers,includinginternationalorganizations,NGOs,andbusinessassociations,alsohavetheopportunitytospeak.TheCouncil’sformalresponse to recommendationsproposedbyamandate-holderalsocomes in theformofaresolution,negotiatedbydelegations.My mandate evolved in three phases. Neither of the latter two was

foreordained; each required specific Council renewal. The first, from 2005 to2007,wasthe“identifyingandclarifying”phase.TheCouncilcommendedthatworkforprovidingabetterunderstandingoftheissuesatstakeandinvitedmetotake another year to develop recommendations on how best to advance theagenda. I returned in 2008 with only one recommendation: that the CouncilrespondfavorablytotheProtect,RespectandRemedyFrameworkIelaboratedin that year’s report, on the premise that the most urgent need was not for ashopping listof itemsbutforafoundationonwhich thinkingandactioncouldbuild.TheCouncilunanimously“welcomed” theFrameworkandextendedmymandate another three years, asking me to “operationalize” it: to provideconcrete andpractical guidance for its implementation.That is how I came topresent theGuidingPrinciples in2011—comprising thirty-oneprinciples, eachwith a Commentary elaborating its meaning and implications. The CouncilendorsedtheGuidingPrinciples,againunanimously.AtthatpointIhadreachedthesix-yearmaximumtermlimitforanymandate-holder,andanexpertworkinggroupwasappointedtooverseethenextphase.Thereadermaybeforgivenforthinkingthatthisisanunusualwaytoadvance

the global protection of human rights. But that is how governments in theirwisdom have structured the process. And it can have advantages. When Iformally presented the Guiding Principles to the Human Rights Council andasked for its endorsement, theAlgerian ambassador took the floor to say thatgovernments could not endorse a normative text that they did not negotiatethemselves. Instead, he proposed submitting the Guiding Principles to anintergovernmentalprocessfor“furtherexaminationandenrichment”—diplomat-speakforkillingtheinitiative.Iresponded,withuncharacteristicpassion,thatIwas old enough to have witnessed the collapse of repeated efforts bygovernments to negotiateUN codes of conduct formultinational corporationsgoing back to the 1970s, some of which I knew the ambassador had beeninvolvedinearlierinhiscareer.Allhadfailed,IremindedtheCouncil,becausegovernments could not reach consensus.Here, I said, you have an instrumentthat you could never have negotiated yourselves, given the diverse and

conflicting interests at stake. All stakeholder groups support it. So seize theopportunity,Iurged.Endorseit,andthenmoveon.Theydid.Subsequentchapterselaborateonhowandwhythishappened,beginningwith

amoredetailed look at specific instances andoverall patterns of business andhumanrightschallenges thatput this issueonto the internationalagenda in thefirstplace.IendthisIntroductiononaconfessionalnote.ThemostdifficultpuzzleIfaced

at the outset of this projectwas existential.My taskwas to identifyways forgetting business enterprises to address their adverse human rights impacts,especiallyincountriesthatlackthecapacityorsometimesthewilltostanduptolargemultinationalfirms.ButwhowasItobe?WasIadvocateordiplomat?Theindependent scholar I had been before or a mediator between companies andpeoplewithgrievancesagainst them?Whoweremyallies,andwhomight theadversariesbe?BywhatmeanscouldIovercomethepredictableobstaclesandperhaps even turn one or two into an advantage? There was no road map oruser’smanualtoguideme.One of the early consultations I convened brought together leaders of

indigenouspeoplesgroupsfromacrossLatinAmerica.Iaskedthemtobriefmeabouttheissuesthatmatteredmosttothem.ThenIsharedmytentativeplansforhow I intended to pursue my assignment. At the end one of the participants,dressed in traditional attire, pulledme aside. She thankedme for bringing thegrouptogetherandlisteningtotheirconcerns.Thensheadded:“Butyouspeaktoo much from your head, and not enough from your heart. If you want tosucceed,youhavetoletyourheartspeak.”Ittookmeafewsecondstocomeupwitharesponse.ButwhenIdid,myexistentialcrisiswasresolved.Isaidwordstothiseffect:“Iwillletmyheartdrivemycommitmenttohumanrights.ButI’llneedmyheadtosteertheheartthroughtheverydifficultglobalterrainonwhichwearetraveling.”Thatisalsothespiritinwhichthisbookiswritten.

ChapterOne

THECHALLENGE

Inmid-2010, theNew York Times reported a rash of suicides by workers atFoxconn Technology in Shenzhen, China.1 The article included allegations ofabusive workplace conditions and practices, underage workers on assemblylines,severehealthandsafetyrisksthatturnedintodeadlyindustrialaccidents,falsificationofovertimerecords,andimproperdisposaloftoxicwastes.Foxconnis the world’s largest contract electronics supplier. Among other products, itmanufacturesiPhonesandiPadsforApple.Thereportswereshockingtoloversof Apple products. But what was most surprising was how long Apple hadmanaged to avoid close international scrutiny and criticism, not only for itsapparentfailuretoaddress theseproblemsinamajorsupplier,butcontributingtosomeofthemthroughitsownpracticesasabuyer—suchaswhenCEOSteveJobssuddenlydecidedtorevampthescreenonanewiPhonemodelalittlemorethan a month before it was due in stores, thereby imposing an assembly-lineoverhaulandproductionscheduleonthesupplier thatsimplycouldnotbemetwithoutviolating alreadyweakworkplace standards.2NotuntilFebruary2012didAppleannouncethatitwouldpermitathirdparty,theFairLaborAssociation(FLA), to audit its supplier facilities in China. The FLA, aWashington-basednonprofit, has been conducting factory monitoring for upscale brands since1999.There isnocomprehensiveandauthoritativeglobal repositoryof information

on the involvement ofmultinational corporations in human rights abuses. Butthereareintuitiveaswellasanecdotalgroundsforsuspectinganactualincreasestarting in the 1990s. In part, it is amatter of sheer numbers: there aremanymorecompaniesoperating inmorecountries around theworld, increasingly insociopolitical contexts that pose novel challenges for corporate leadership,especiallywithregardtohumanrights.Inaddition,formanycompanies,goingglobal hasmeant adoptingnetwork-basedoperatingmodels involvingmultiplelayersofcorporateentitiesanddifferentformsofcorporaterelationshipsspreadacrossnumerouscountries.Networks,by theirverynature, involvedivestinga

certain degree of control over significant operations, substituting negotiatedrelationships forhierarchicalstructures.While this formofextendedenterprisemay enhance the economic efficiency of the overall enterprise, it also hasincreased thechallengesfirmsface inmanaging theirglobalvaluechains—thefullrangeofactivitiesrequiredtobringaproductorservicefromitsconceptiontoenduse.Asthenumberofconnectionsinvaluechainsincreases,sotoodothevulnerabilities for the global enterprise as a whole posed by each link in thechain.Thus, quite apart from acts of malfeasance or bad judgments by corporate

officials, these structural shifts, if left unattended, increase theprobability that“thecompany”insomemanifestationorotherwillrunafoulofprevailingsocialnorms,itsowncorporateprinciples,andinsomecasesthelawaswell.Thecorebusinessandhumanrightschallengeliesindevisinginstrumentsofpublic,civil,andcorporategovernancetoreducethesetendenciesandtoprovideremedyforharmwhere itdoesoccur.The first step in thisendeavor is todevelopamoresystematicpictureoftheproblemitself.Inthepresentchapter,Idescribeasamplingofcasesthatbecameemblematic

of the array of business-related human rights challenges, and tease out fromthem some of the key dimensions they illustrate about globalization andgovernance in relation to human rights. I also present broader patterns andcorrelates of alleged corporate abuse, so as to widen and deepen ourunderstandingofthechallenges.

I.EMBLEMATICCASES

Nike

In a 2004Harvard Business Review article, Simon Zadek, then the CEO ofAccountAbility, a cutting-edge niche consultancy, described Nike, a premiumbrand in athletic shoes and sportswear, as being “a leader in progressivepractices,”exemplifyingthesuccessfulcompletionofafive-stepprogressionon“the path to corporate responsibility.”3 It wasn’t always so. Only a few yearsearlierNikewastheposterchildforwhatcriticsdescribedasaglobalracetothebottom,ofallthatwaswrongwithcorporateglobalization.Nikewas one of the firstmanufacturing companies to completely outsource

production:startinginJapaninthe1970s,shiftingtoSouthKoreaandTaiwanintheearly1980s,and,whenthecostmodeltherecameunderpressure,convincingownersofitsKoreanandTaiwanesesupplierfactoriestosetupshopelsewhere

in Asia, especially China and Indonesia. By 1990, Nike’s overseas sourcingfactories employedmore than 24,000workers, supplyingmore than 6millionpairsofshoes,amongotheritems.4SerioustroubleforNikebeganinIndonesiaintheearly1990s,whenAmericanlaborrightsactivistsinpartnershipwithlocalinstitutionsbegantointerviewworkers,issuenewsletters,andlaythebasesforcampaigns.Initially,theissuewaslowwagesandabusiveworkingconditions—19cents(U.S.)anhour,accordingtoworkersinterviewedonaCBSnewsreport,while basketball superstar Michael Jordan received $20 million a year forendorsing theproduct.5Workersalsoclaimed that theycouldnot leavefactorypremises except on Sundays and even then needed a permission letter frommanagement.Childlaborwasaddedtothelistofparticularswhenaphotographofa twelve-year-oldPakistaniboystitchingNikesoccerballsappeared inLifemagazine.6LaterinthedecadeNikesuppliersinVietnamwerefoundtobeusinganadhesivecontainingachemicalknown tocause respiratory illness, indosesthatexceededevenweakVietnamesestandards.7

A perfect storm of bad publicity enveloped Nike throughout the 1990s.8 ItincludedviolentstrikesatseveralIndonesianfactories;union-organizedsummerinternshipprogramsforAmericancollegestudentsonhowtocampaignagainstlarge corporations, out of which emerged a national coalition to put on alertcampus stores selling, and athletic teamswearing,Nike and similarly sourcedproducts;an“InternationalNikeDayofProtest”intwenty-eightU.S.statesandtwelvecountries;plushighlyunflatteringfeaturerolesintheacerbicDoonesburycartoon strip, a Michael Moore documentary, two CBS news programs, the“Battle of Seattle,” as the demonstrations that shut down the World TradeOrganization1999ministerialmeetingcametobeknown,aswellas inNaomiKlein’sbook,NoLogo,oftenreferred toas the“bible”of theantiglobalizationmovement.9Withthecompanyanditsstockpricebattered,PhilKnight,founderandCEO,

concededina1998speechattheNationalPressClubinWashington,D.C.:“TheNike product has become synonymouswith slavewages, forced overtime andarbitraryabuse.ItrulybelievethattheAmericanconsumerdoesnotwanttobuyproductsmadeinabusiveconditions.”10NikebecameafoundingmemberoftheUNGlobal Compact, a multistakeholder forum for promoting good corporatepractices.Attheinauguralpressconferencein2000,areporteraskedSecretary-General Kofi Annan if being on the same stage as Phil Knight wasn’t likesuppingwith thedevil.Annan’squick riposte: the angelsdon’t needourhelp.

Still,theactivistsweren’tquitedone.AfterNikehadtakeninitialstepsdownthepathdescribedbyZadek andbegun to issueprogress reports on itsworkplacepractices,aCaliforniaresidentbroughtsuitagainstthecompanyallegingthatthereportsviolatedastatestatuteprohibitingfalseandmisleadingadvertising.Nikeclaimedthereportsconstitutedfreespeechand,therefore,wereprotectedbytheFirst Amendment. But the California Supreme Court ruled them commercialspeech and the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case without ruling. Nikesettled.11Likemanycompaniesinsimilarsituations,Nikeinitiallyhadrespondedtothe

barrageofcriticismbysaying, inessence:“Wedon’townthisproblem.Thesearenotourfactories.Wehavenoequityrelationshipwiththem.Wesimplybuytheirproducts.”Nikewasrightinstrictlylegalterms,butwrongtoinferthatthisanswerwouldsuffice.TransnationallyconnectedsocialactorsclusteredaroundNike’s global supply chain, linking abusive conditions in supplier factories toreceptiveaudiences inNike’shomemarket,andpressuring thebrandtoacceptanownershipshareintheproblem.GlobalbrandsthatoutsourceallproductionarefarmorecommonplacetodaythanwhenNikegotstarted.Andwellbeyondsuch “virtual companies,” far-flung and complex supply chains are nowubiquitous in the global economy, found in every industry, and on everycontinent.Much has been learned aboutmanaging human rights challenges insupplychains,andNikehasbeenasignificantinnovatorintheprocess.12Butthecorequestionsofpreciselywhoisresponsibleforwhat,forhowmuchofit,andthemost effectiveways to respond remained unresolved as amatter of policyandlaw.

Bhopal

ThemassiveleakofmethylisocyanategasatUnionCarbide’spesticideplantinBhopal,India,not longaftermidnightonDecember3,1984,remainsthemostdeadlyindustrialdisasterinhistory.Newsweekdescribedthemorning-afterscenein these words: “It looked like a neutron bomb had struck. Buildings wereundamaged. But humans and animals littered the low ground, turning hillyBhopalintoacityofcorpses.”13Thousandsofpeoplelivingintheshantytownsnear the facility died immediately andmore succumbed in subsequentweeks,months,andyears;tensofthousandsweredisabled,andchildrenwerebornwithdisabilities.Morethanaquarter-centurylater,closurestillhasnotbeenattained.AsrecentlyasMarch2008,agroupofsurvivorsandsupportersmarchedthe800

kilometers (500 miles) from Bhopal to Delhi to stage a sit-in at the PrimeMinister’s office, others chaining themselves to his official residence’s gate,campaigning forpromisedhealthcare, safedrinkingwater, andother formsofsocialandenvironmentalsupport.14Alongtheway,thetragedygeneratedscoresoflawsuitsatstateandfederallevelsinIndiaandtheUnitedStates,anda$470-million Union Carbide compensation payment approved by the Indiangovernmentin1989thatvictimsfeltwasinadequateandrepresented“surrenderbeforethemultinational”15—andwhichittookthegovernmentseventeenyearsfullytodisburse.16Unlike the Nike case, there seemed little question about who “owned” this

problem:UnionCarbide (UC)did.Butwho,exactly,wasUnionCarbide?TheAmerican parent company owned 50 percent of UCIL (Union Carbide IndiaLimited),withthegovernmentofIndiaandprivateshareholdersowningtherest;the stock traded on the Calcutta exchange. UCIL was operated largely as anindependentsubsidiary.ByIndiangovernmentpolicy,managementandworkerswere almost entirely Indian nationals, and Indian courts had jurisdiction overUCIL. Within days of the disaster the government of India filed criminalnegligencechargesagainstUCILandseizeditsassets.17American lawyerswithpower-of-attorney forms inhandarrived inBhopalat

roughly thesame time,andsoonafter filedmore than145suits inU.S.courtsagainst theparentcompanyUConbehalfofBhopalvictims, inamountsup to$20billionpercase.18InApril1985,thegovernmentofIndiaalsosuedUCandUCILinU.S.federalcourt,foranunspecifiedamount.19Whybringsuitagainsttheparentcompany?Onereasonisthatitmighthavebeenatfault,despitetherelative independence of its subsidiary. For example, claimsweremade aboutdefectsintheplant’soriginaldesign,whichprecededUCIL’sexistence,andthatsafetyfeatureswerelowerthanforsimilarplantsintheUnitedStates.Anotherreasonisthatparentcompanieshavedeeperpocketsthantheirsubsidiaries;thecombinedannualrevenuesofUCIL’sfourteenplantsinIndiaatthetimeofthedisasterwere$200million.ButwhybringthesecasesinU.S.courts?Becauseofthesimplefactthatasarulecourtsinthehostcountrydonothavejurisdictionover parent companies located in other countries, only the locally operatingsubsidiaries.AllU.S.courtcaseswereconsolidatedintoone,intheFederalDistrictCourtof

SouthernNewYork(thesewerecommon-lawtortcases; theAlienTortStatutewasnotyet inplay in relation tocorporations).UnionCarbideargued that theplaintiffshadnostandinginU.S.courts,thereforethecaseshouldbedismissed

basedontheforumnonconveniensdoctrine:essentiallymeaningthatthiscourtisnottheappropriatevenueforthisparticularcase—itshouldbeinIndia’sowncourts.Thepresiding judge agreed, adding,with gratuitous rhetorical flourish:“TodeprivetheIndianjudiciaryofthisopportunitytostandtallbeforetheworldandtopassjudgmentonbehalfofitsownpeoplewouldbetoreviveahistoryofsubservienceandsubjugationfromwhichIndiahasemerged.”20Thegovernmentof India did not see it that way and appealed, but the U.S. Court of Appealsupheld the ruling on twogrounds.21 First, that itwas easier to try the case inIndia because the witnesses were there, many spoke no English, and thedocumentsweremostly inHindi, thus “Indiahasgreater easeof access to theproof than does the United States.” Second, the court concluded that therelationship betweenUC andUCILwas arms-length, and although the parentcompanywasresponsiblefortheinitialdesign,UCILengineershadmademanychangestoit.Itwastwenty-sixyearsbeforeanyformermembersoftheseniormanagement

ofUCILwereconvictedbyan Indiancourt; theywere sentenced to twoyearsand fined the equivalent of US$2,100.22 Warren Anderson, UC’s CEO at thetime,wasdeclaredafugitivefromjusticebyaBhopalcourtwhenhefailed toappear for a hearing, and it subsequently issued a warrant for his arrest. TheUnited States declined to have Anderson extradited. In part inspired by theBhopalcase,theplaintiffs’barinseveralcountriesbegantosearchfordifferentwaysthatcorporateparentsmightbeheldlegallyaccountablefortheactionsoftheirsubsidiaries.TheywouldsoondiscoveroneintheAlienTortStatute.

ShellinNigeria

By now there is a substantial literature explaining “the paradox of plenty” or“the resource curse,” of how an abundance of natural resources in countrieslacking good governance can end up being a curse for their people.23Multinationalcorporations in theextractive sector—mining,oil andgas—haveplayedkeyroles in thisdetrimentaldynamic,whetherunwittinglyorwillingly.NocasehasattractedmoreattentionorhadabiggerimpactonthebusinessandhumanrightsagendathanRoyalDutchShellinwhatisknownasOgoniland,atribalareaof400squaremilesand500,000inhabitantsinRiversState,Nigeria,whereShellstartedpumpingoilinthe1950s.Nigeria is one of the world’s largest oil producers. Oil is its single largest

source of revenue, foreign exchange, and GDP. Nigeria nationalized the oil

industry in the 1970s and engages in joint ventures with foreign operatingcompanies,actingthroughsubsidiaries.TheNigerianstatesinwhichoperationsarecarriedoutreceiveonlyasmallfractionoftheoilrevenues.Itwasraisedto13percentbythecountry’s1999constitution,butindependentstudiesconcludethattoolittleofitreachestheareasandpeoplewhoaremostadverselyaffectedbytheoperations.24Themisuseofpublicfundsbystategovernments,aswellascorruption and outright theft at all levels, take their toll. A teacher in a localRiversStateschoolwithnodesksforitsstudentsisquotedinaHumanRightsWatch report: “The important things we need are textbooks, instructionalmaterials,andatoilet.”25Publichealthfacilitiesandinfrastructurefarenobetter.Indeed,accordingtotheWorldBank,morethanhalfofallNigeriansliveonlessthan$2aday.26OfallthecriticalissuesraisedbytheShellexperience,Ifocusontwo.Thefirst

relatestothefact,whichisstillpoorlyunderstoodbymanycompanies,thattheyrequirenotonlyalegalbutalsoasociallicensetooperate.Theirlegallicenseisissuedbystateagencies;theirsociallicensecanbegrantedonlybycommunities—which,as in theNikecase,mayhavea transnationaldimension.Thesecondissueconcernscorporatecomplicityinhumanrightsabusescommittedbyotherparties that are connected to a company. Both are key dimensions of today’sglobalizationandgovernancenexus.ShellhelditsOgonilandconcession—itslegallicensetooperate—throughthe

Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), an unincorporated jointventure between Royal Dutch Shell and the Nigerian National PetroleumCorporation. From the outset there were harmful environmental effects of oilexploration and production in Ogoni territory. Land and water pollution fromspillsunderminedlivelihoodsthatdependedonfarmingandfishing.Inaddition,“[v]illagerslivedwithgasflaresburning24hoursaday(someforover30years)and air pollution that produced acid rain and respiratory problems. Above-groundpipelinescutthroughmanyvillagesandformerfarmland.”27Asearlyasthe1970s,OgonichiefswrotetotheSPDCandthemilitarygovernorofRiversState complaining about the environmental degradation, to little effect. Shelleither dismissed or discounted the extent of its operations’ environmentalimpact.28 Moreover, oil production, like mining, being capital intensive,providedfewjobstolocals.Inshort,localcommunitieswerepayingthecostbutenjoyingfewifanybenefits,whilebillionsofdollarsworthofoilwaspumpedout of the ground around them: $5.2 billion for the life of the concession,accordingtoShell;severalmultiplesofthat,accordingtotheOgoni.29

Gradually but steadily, civil unrestmounted. Shell began attempts to reducetensions by investing in community development projects, such as buildingschoolsandclinics,diggingwells, andconstructingwater storage facilities.Attimes these efforts actually made the problem worse because they benefitedsomegroupsbutnotrivalgroups,alienatingthelatter.30In1992theMovementfortheSurvivaloftheOgoniPeoplewasestablished.OneofitsleaderswasKenSaro-Wiwa, awriter andenvironmental activist.ThemovementproclaimedanOgoni Bill of Rights, including environmental restoration, more favorablerevenue sharing, andgreaterpolitical autonomy.31Neither thegovernment northe company responded. Instances of sabotage against pipelines and othercompany property increased. In 1993, 300,000 Ogoni, more than half of theregion’spopulation,tooktothestreetstoprotestagainstShell.Shortlythereafter,in response to thebeatingofanSPDCworker, thecompanywithdrew its stafffromOgonilandandsuspendeditsoperationthere.32Inshort,Shellhadlostitssociallicensetooperate—thecommunitynolonger

tolerateditspresence.Fifteenyearslater,withShellstillunabletoreturnbecausethe security situation had deteriorated further in the interval, the Nigeriangovernment revoked the company’s legal license to operate the concession aswell, although it remains amajorproducer elsewhere in the country.Nigeria’sdemocraticallyelectedPresidentYar’Aduaconcludedthat“thereisatotallossof confidence between Shell and the Ogoni people. So, another operatoracceptabletotheOgoniwilltakeover.”33Nowturntotheissueofcomplicity.Inthecontextunderdiscussion,complicity

refers to involvement by companies in human rights abuses committed byanotherparty, includinggovernmentagents. Its legalmeaninghasbeenspelledoutmostclearlyintheareaofaidingandabettinginternationalcrimes,whereitmeans knowingly providing practical assistance or encouragement that has asubstantialeffectonthecommissionofacrimebyanother.34In2009,aftermorethanadecadeofproceduralwranglinginU.S.courts,ShellfacedaciviltrialonchargesbroughtbyplaintiffsthatincludedKenSaro-Wiwa’sson,accusingShellof contributing to a campaign of terror and murderous repression against theOgoniregion,culminatinginwhatwaswidelyagreedtohavebeenashamtrialunderNigeria’smilitarydictatorshipandSaro-Wiwa’ssubsequentexecutionbyhanging.35The case against Shell might never have been possible if not for the once-

obscureAlien Tort Statute, adopted by the First Congress in 1789 to provideredressforsuchviolationsofcustomaryinternationallawaspiracy,mistreatment

ofambassadors,andviolationofsafeconducts.36Thestatute,whichlaylargelydormantuntilitwasrediscoveredbyhumanrightslawyersinthe1980s,makesitpossible for foreignplaintiffs tobringcivil claims inU.S. federal courts if thealleged acts rise to the level of gravity and universal condemnation of theoriginally recognized offenses. The pathbreaking case against a majorcorporation wasDoe v. Unocal in 1997. Companies against which cases arebrought need not be U.S. nationals but merely have a substantial businesspresenceinthecountry.37The charges against Shell take us back towherewe left off above.As civil

unrest in Ogoniland turned to vandalism and outright violence, governmenttroops increasingly were called upon to protect Shell installations, includingabovegroundpipelinesrunningthroughtheterritorythatwereoftendeliberatelydamaged or tapped—“bunkered” is the slang term—and the diverted oil sold.After Shell suspended its operation in 1993, the government began amassivecrackdownontheOgoni.Villageswereburned,womenraped,andsome2,000people killed between then and 1995.38 Shell denied any collusion with thegovernment at the time, although it later admitted to at least one instance ofproviding limited assistance to the military.39 Amid growing intra-Ogonifactionalism, fourmoderate chiefswere brutally hacked to death by amob in1994. Saro-Wiwa and fourteen others were arrested and charged with theirmurder. Saro-Wiwa was not present at the scene of the killings, but he wasaccusedofhaving incited themobelsewhere.40Nineof theaccused, includingSaro-Wiwa,wereconvictedinaspecialmilitarytribunalandsentencedtohang.Aworldwidecampaigntopreventtheexecutionswaslaunched,whichincludedappeals from otherAfrican leaders. ButNigeria’smilitary ruler, General SaniAbacha,paidnoheed.EnormouspressurewasputonShelltospeakoutanduseits influence for clemency, but on the day the verdictswere announced, Shellissuedastatementthatmeeklysaid,“AcommercialenterpriselikeShellcannotandmustneverinterferewiththelegalprocessofanysovereignstate.”41The public outcry and condemnations following the execution of the Ogoni

NinepromptedShelltoundertakeconsiderablereflection.Itrevisedits“GeneralBusinessPrinciples,”developednewcorporatesocialresponsibilitypoliciesandtools, and set out tobecomea leaderonbusiness andhuman rights.42But thesituation in the oil-rich Niger Delta continued to worsen. Violence andcriminalitynowextendwellintotheGulfofGuinea,whichisexceededforactsof piracy only by the coast off Somalia. Crude oil exports fromNigeria have

continuedtodecline.JustastheWiwav.ShelltrialwassettobegininNewYorkinJune2009,Shell

andtheOgoniplaintiffsagreedtoa$15.5millionsettlement.Neithersidegottotellitsstorytoajury,nofactswereestablished,andbothsidesclaimedvictory.43

YahooinChina

The generation of business and human rights advocacy that emerged in the1990sdevelopedboththecontentandformsofitscampaignslargelyaroundtheexperiences of the extractive sector and working conditions in global supplychains. Bhopal continued to occupy an honored place in deference to theenormityof the tragedy, the inabilityofvictims tohold theparentcompany toaccount, and in solidarity with the strong ongoing domestic civil societycommitment in India to right thewrongs. Then suddenly, as if by a lightningbolt,asectorwasstruckthathadbeenviewedasafriendtothecause,theveryplatforms that allowed civil society actors around theworld to connect, shareinformation,andcoordinatestrategies:Internetserviceproviders.Internet censorship is practiced in one form or another by numerous

governments.44 None has a system as sophisticated as China’s. It comprisesmultiple layers: carefully controlled gateways—called the “Great Firewall” bythecognoscenti—separatingChina’sInternetfromtheglobalnetwork;powerfulnetwork control tools sold to China by such companies as Cisco; and “netnannies,” or Chinese bureaucrats that scan emails, blogging sites, and instantmessagingservicesusingelectronicfilterstolookforpoliticallysensitivewords.“But themainburdenofroutinecensorship is left toInternetserviceproviders[ISPs] and suppliers of content.”45 ISPs have their own watch lists, andfrequentlyreceiveadditionalguidancefromtheauthoritiesonwhatisandisnotpermissible.Moreover,theyarecalledupontoidentifyuserswhomstateagentsregardwithsuspicion.Yahooisonesuchserviceprovider.In April 2004, Shi Tao, a Beijing journalist, used his Yahoo China email

account,whichdidnotcontainhisname,tosendanarticle,forwhichheusedapseudonym, toapro-democracypublicationandWebsite inNewYork.46 Thearticle included a summary of a classified document containing governmentinstructionsabouthowthemediashouldacttohelppreventsocialunrestintherun-uptothefifteenthanniversaryofthe1989Tiananmencrackdown.Twodayslater the authorities requested information linked to Shi’s email account fromYahoo. The company complied. Shi was arrested not long thereafter and in

March2005wassentencedtotenyearsinprisonforrevealingstatesecrets.The reputationalhit toYahoo in theUnitedStatesandelsewherewassevere,

butaslateas2006,JerryYang,Yahoo’sCEO,said“Ifyouwanttodobusiness[in China] you have to comply.”47 This earned Yang andMichael Callaghan,Yahoo’s general counsel, a memorable reprimand at a 2007 Congressionalhearing from Tom Lantos, then chairman of the House Foreign AffairsCommitteeandaHolocaust survivor:despitebeinga technologyand financialgiant,Lantosthundered,“Morallyyouarepigmies.”48A“GlobalOnlineFreedomAct”made it throughthecommitteestages in the

House of Representatives. Among other things, it would have required thePresident to designate a list of “Internet-restricting countries,” and if a U.S.-based companywas asked by the authorities of a designated country to handoverpersonal-identifyingdata,theU.S.JusticeDepartmentwoulddecideiftherequestconstituted“legitimatelawenforcementpurposes.”49Nocomparablebillwas introduced in the Senate and the effort went no further. As for Yahoo,perhaps chastened by Yang’s widely publicized and enormously embarrassingencounterwithLantos,itsettledalegalclaimfiledbyShiTao’sfamilyandsetup a “Yahoo!HumanRights Fund” to provide assistance to persons in ChinawhohavebeenimprisonedforexpressingtheirviewsusingtheInternet.In2008,Yahoowent on to form theGlobalNetwork Initiative, alongwithGoogle andMicrosoft,civilsocietyorganizations,universitycenters,andasmallnumberofsociallyresponsibleinvestmentfirms.Itsaimistodevelopcommonapproachesregarding how to respond to government policies and practices that violatefreedomofexpressionandprivacy.50Thisstory,liketheothersrecountedabove,isinterestinginandofitself.ButI

also tell it to identify a genuine dilemmaposed formultinational corporationswherenationallawsignificantlycontradicts,anddoesnotofferthesamelevelofprotection,asinternationalhumanrightsstandards.Nationalauthoritiestypicallydemandcompliancewiththeirlaw,whileotherstakeholdersadvocateadherencetointernationalstandards—asmightthecompanyitself,forreasonsofprincipleor simple consistency of corporate policy. The issue of Internet privacy andfreedomofexpression isanewmanifestationof thisdilemma.But ithas longexistedoverthequestionoffreedomofassociationandcollectivebargainingaswellinrelationtogenderequality.Unilaterallegislationalone,aswasproposedin the U.S. Congress, would not resolve the dilemma; it might make it evenmessier.51But therearenoauthoritative international rules for companies, andnointernationalsupremecourttodecidewhat’sright.

TheGooglestoryinChinaplayedoutsomewhatdifferently.Whetherdrivenbyconscienceorstagnantmarketshare,afteraseriesofsophisticatedonlineattacksthat Google said originated in China, the company announced it would stopcensoring search results on its China site. Initially, Google automaticallyredirected itsusers to itsHongKongsite,which isuncensored.But thatmovethreatenedtolosethecompanyitslegallicensetooperateinChina.SoGooglereached a compromise with the Chinese government whereby the companyprovidedalinktogoogle.com.hkthatuserscouldclicktoconductsearches—anextrastepthatriskedmarketsharebutwouldallowGoogletoavoidparticipatingin censorship.52 Itsmarket share continued to plummet, and in January 2012,Google announced plans to expand its presence in China through mobileapplications, product search tools, and other services that do not requirecensorship.53Ihavecalledthesecasesemblematicbecausethey,andahandfulofotherslike

them,put the issueofbusiness andhuman rights firmlyon theglobal agenda.Eachraisedquestionsforwhich therewerenogenerallyagreedanswersat thetime,eitherintermsofwell-establishedsocialnormsorinternationallaw.Thus,eachposedachallengeformymandateaswell.TheNikecasewasthefirstofmanytoraisethequestionofwhatresponsibilitiesabrandhastowardworkersinlow-costandpoorlyregulatedjurisdictionswhomanufacturetheirproducts—thesupply-chainissue,inshort.Bhopalwasanextremelycomplexcaseonthebasisofwhichonecoulddrawmanydifferent lessons,but themostdecisive for thevictimssurelywastheirinabilityto“piercethecorporateveil,”asitisknown—thatis, toreachbehindtheseparatelegalpersonalitiesofparentandsubsidiarycompanies.Shell in theOgoni territory is thequintessentialcaseofunattendedsociallicenseissuesescalatingintoallegedcorporatecomplicityingrosshumanrights abuses. The failure to obtain or sustain a social license to operate onnumerousoccasionshasledcompaniestorelyongovernmentorprivatesecurityforces to protect their assets from demonstrators or even to try to imposeacquiescence on local communities, including by the illegal use of force andother forms of coercion. Finally, Yahoo illustrates the dilemma created forcompanieswhen legaldemands in thehostcountrycontradictwidelyacceptedinternationalstandards,possiblythecompany’sownvalues,andtheexpectationsof vast numbers of peoplewhom journalist and activist,RebeccaMacKinnon,describesas“netizens”—“citizens”ofonlinecommunities.54I note one final point before proceeding: all of these cases involvedWestern

multinationals.Thisisunexceptionableinsofarastheywereinthevanguardof

corporateglobalization—andtheyweremostlikelytobesusceptibletolocalandtransnational civic pressures, and occasionally to being hauled into a court oflaw. But what about the growing numbers of multinationals from emerging-economycountries?Aretheynotsituateddifferentlyinbothrespects?Anddoesthisnot change thepicturegoing forward?To the extent that a firmanswer ispossible at this point, the picture remains mixed. Generally, non-WesternmultinationalslagbehindtheirWesterncounterpartsinadoptinggoodpractices.Buttheyarenotimmunetosomeofthedynamicsthatwesawintheemblematiccases, particularly pushback by communities inwhich the companies operate.For example, Chinese multinationals are discovering what “social license tooperate” means in places ranging from Africa to the Andes, where theiroperations have triggered protests and even riots. In Wasit province, Iraq,activitiesby theChinaNationalPetroleumCorporation led to thecreationofalocal human rights movement.55 And one of the mining operations thegovernmentofPerususpendedunderastateofemergencydecreeinDecember2011 is owned by China’s Zijin Mining Group.56 Brazilian companies haveencounteredsimilarproblemsinMozambique.Suchfirmshaveawaytogo tocatch up with their Western counterparts on better managing communityrelations,butreportssuggestthatsomearetrying.57Having now looked at a handful of individual cases to familiarize ourselves

withthis terrain,I turntoexaminebroaderpatterns incorporate-relatedhumanrightschallengesandthecontextsinwhichtheytendtooccur.

II.PATTERNSANDCORRELATES

In the absence of any official data, the most reliable inventory of publicallegationsagainstcompaniesaroundtheworldistheBusiness&HumanRightsResourceCentre(BHRRC),asmallLondon-basednonprofit.58Itsonlinelibraryincludes information about company policies and practices in more than 180countries and its Web site gets more than 1.5 million hits per month. If theCentre determines that an allegation against a company is serious enough tomerit being included in its regular weekly updates, it invites the company torespond.AspartofthepreparatoryworkfordevelopingtheProtect,RespectandRemedy Framework, I examined this subset of allegations between February2005 and December 2007. Eliminating duplicates (including ongoing newsreportsoflegalproceedings)yielded320distinctcases.Typically, complaints against companies did not come neatly packaged in

humanrightslanguage,andtheyoftenincludedmultipleclaims.Althoughsomewereexpressedinpreciseterminology,theresthadtobecoded.Theuniverseofrights I used as the benchmark for this purpose are those recognized in theInternational Bill of Human Rights (IBHR), which consists of the UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and CulturalRights. To this I added the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles andRights at Work. As indicated in the Introduction, with only rare exceptionscompanies are not directly subject to international law but to domestic lawswherevertheyoperate.Therefore,myuseoftheIBHRandtheILOdeclarationfor coding purposes is intended to indicate which internationally recognizedrightscompaniesareallegedtohaveviolated,notwhichlaws.Withthesepreliminariesestablished,wecanturntothematterathand.Iasked

four questions: what, who, where, and how?What internationally recognizedhuman rights was the company alleged to have adversely impacted? Whoserights?Wheredid theaction takeplace—inwhatregionandwhatsector?Andhowwasthecompanyinvolved:directly,orindirectly?Thefollowingdiscussionsummarizesthemainfindings.59

WhichRights?

Tables1and2showthatcompaniescanhaveadverseimpacts—orareallegedtohave had such impacts—not only on a variety of labor rights, as one wouldexpect,butalsoonthebroadrangeofhumanrightsgenerally.Table1listsallthelabor-relatedrightsviolationsthatwerereflectedinthe320

allegations. Those citedmost frequentlywere the right towork (for example,arbitrary or retaliatory terminations of employment, mass layoffs withoutcompensation, hiring large numbers of casual workers with limited or noguaranteesofemployment); theright to justandfavorable remuneration(oftenpay below legal minimums and inaccurate computation of overtime); and therighttoasafeworkenvironment(healthandsafetyissues).Althoughtherewerenumerous allegations about companies frustrating workers’ rights to organize,freedomof associationdid not rank in the top three—whichmay tell usmoreaboutworkers’ low expectations than about companies’ high adherence to thestandard.Therewerealsonumerousclaimsthatcompaniesfalsifiedordestroyedrecords prior to factory inspections or audits. Other allegations includedtolerating routine sexual harassment as well as physical and sexual abuse of

female workers; employing child labor; and seizing workers’ identity papers,which can amount to forced labor. At the “egregious” abuses end of thespectrum,thecasesincludedallegationsofcompaniescontractingsecurityforcesand collaborating with paramilitary forces that beat, tortured, and even killedlabororganizersordemonstrators.60

Table1:LaborRightsImpacted

Table2listsall thenonlaborrightsreflectedintheallegations.Health-relatedrightsdominatedthiscategoryandinvolvedsuchissuesascommunityexposuretopollutantsandothertoxins.Rightsrelatedtothesecurityofthepersonwereinvolvedinnearlyhalfofallcases(recalltheNigerianmilitary’sactionsagainsttheOgoniasanextremeexample).Theright toanadequatestandardof livingwas next; examples include the degradation of farmland or fishing sites as aresult of corporate activity. Numerous cases concerned the displacement ofcommunitiesforthebenefitofextractiveorinfrastructureprojects:thefailuretoobtaininformedconsentfromcommunity,inadequatecompensation,makingnoprovisions for relocating and rehousing displaced people, and benefiting fromforcible displacement. Financial services firms were cited for funding suchprojects. Classic civil rights issues also came up, though in smaller numbers,includingequalrecognitionandprotectionunderthelawaswellastherighttoafairtrial,stemmingfromallegedcompanyinterferencewithjudicialprocesses.

Table2:NonlaborRightsImpacted

In sum, perhaps the biggest surprise in these results lies not in any specificranking but in the broad range of internationally recognized rights thatcompanieshavebeenallegedtoinfringeuponorabuse.

WhoseRights?

Figure1isalargelyself-explanatorygraphicshowingthecategoryofclaimantsor victims of alleged corporate human rights abuse. In this sample of cases,workersandcommunitieswereequallyaffected,althoughdifferentsectorsaffectpeople in the two categories differently. Not surprisingly, the footwear andapparelindustrytendstohaveagreaterimpactonworkersthanoncommunities,while the extractive industryhas a large impacton communities aswell.End-user cases in this sample largely concerned the issue of access to essentialmedicines, such as HIV/AIDS treatment drugs, due to prohibitive costs orintellectualpropertyrightsrestrictions.

Figure1:PersonsAffected

Where?

Idividedthewherequestionintotwo:regions(Figure2),andsectors(Figure3).Careisrequiredininterpretingtheregionalresults.Thekindsofcomplaintsorallegations thatmake it onto theCentre’sWeb site aremore likely to concerngrievances that are not already being dealt with in other forums, such as anationallaborrelationsboard,nondiscriminationbody,orsomeotherregulatoryinstitution. Also, as noted earlier, I did not include reports of ongoing courtproceedingsinthesamplebecausetheoriginalallegationwouldlikelyhavebeenincluded in earlier BHRRC listings. Thus, Figure 2 cannot be taken asconclusiveevidencethattherearefewercasesofcorporate-relatedhumanrightsabuseinEuropeandNorthAmericathanelsewhere.Whatitdoesindicateisthatthere are farmore cases in theAsia-Pacific region,Africa, andLatinAmericathat are not being dealtwith effectively through existing forums, or that suchforumsdon’texistthereinthefirstplace.

Figure2:Region

Figure3:Sector

Theterm“global”inthefigurereferstooverallcompanies’policiesthatwouldhave an impact wherever they operate—access to essential medicines, onceagain, or enterprise-wide efforts to deny workers’ rights to freedom ofassociation.In terms of sectors, the extractive industry accounts for the largest share of

allegations.Ithasalargelocalfootprintintermsofthescaleofitsimpact,oftenin areas inhabited by minority populations, and its main issues includeinadequate procedures for (and sometimes forced) resettlement of populations,securityoftheperson,andadverseimpactsonlivelihoods.Retailandconsumerproductswerenot far behind (long and complex supply chains). Infrastructureandutilitycompaniesoftenpose issues similar to theextractive industry,as tosomeextentdoesthefoodsandbeveragesindustry(thinklargebananaorsugarplantations, for example, or the impact on human rights of heavy water andfertilizeruse).Thepharmaceutical andchemical industries’ third-place rankingreflects a combination of access to essential medicines and environmentalhazardsthatcanimpacttherighttohealth.Allegationsagainstfinancialservicesfirmsalmostinvariablyconcernprojectlendingbybankstocompaniesaccusedofabusingrights.

How?

Ialsowantedtoknowwhetheracompanywasaccusedofabusingrightsdirectly

ortohavebeencomplicitinactsbyothers.Figure4providestheanswer.Nearly60percentof thecasesconcerndirectcompanyacts; justover40percent,actsby other parties to which the company was closely connected (“complicity”).With only one exception, all reports of complicity took place in developingcountries.Asfortheidentityofthethirdparty,inroughlyfouroutoftencasesitwasoneof thecompany’s supply-chainpartners—forwhich,aswesaw in theNike case, the global buyer is expected to assume some responsibility. Themajority of the other six out of ten complicity cases concerned a company’srelationship to a state or state agencies, where the firm was viewed ascontributingtoorbenefitingfromdirectviolationsbystateactors.

Figure4:DirectorIndirectInvolvement

CorrelatesofEgregiousAbuses

Itisacardinalprincipleinthehumanrightscanonthatthereisnohierarchyofrights, that all rights are “universal, indivisible and interdependent andinterrelated.”61 This does not mean, however, that some abuses do not haveworseconsequences thanothers for rights-holders.To supplement the regionaldistributionreportedinFigure2,Iwasinterestedinidentifyingtheattributesofcountriesinwhichthemostegregiouscorporate-relatedabusesoccurred.Idrewthesedata fromadifferentsource.Forhumanrightsorganizations, researchingand issuing a full report leveling charges against one ormore companies is amajorinvestmentoflimitedresources.Therefore,itseemsreasonabletoassumethat when they undertake such a project they pick a target they believe hasengaged in particularly egregious conduct—and which also serves theircampaigningpurposes.AspartofmyfirstreporttotheUN,Ianalyzed65suchpublicationsbyadvocacygroupsissuedbetween2000and2005.62HereiswhatIfound.The65reportsallegedabusesbycompaniesin27countries.Theyweremainly

low-income countries, or on the low side of the middle-income category.Moreover,nearly two-thirdsof themhadeitherrecentlyemergedfromorwerestill in conflict. Finally, the countrieswere characterizedbyweakgovernance.On-a-rule of law index developed by theWorldBank, all but 2 of the 27 fellbelowtheaveragescoreforallcountries;oneofthetwoexceptionswasslightlyabove the global average, the other right at it.63 On the TransparencyInternationalCorruptionPerceptionsIndex—where0indicates“highlycorrupt”and10isdescribedas“mostclean”—theiraveragescorewas2.6.64AndontheFreedom House index of political systems—where “not free” is ranked as 1,“partiallyfree”2,and“free”3—theiraveragewas1.9.65The International Council on Mining and Metals, an industry association

comprising more than twenty of the world’s leading mining companies,subsequentlycommissionedastudytoseeiftheseresultsheldupintheirsector.Theirfindingswerebroadlysimilar.However,intheirsurvey70percentofthecases fell into the complicity category: where the actual violation of humanrights was committed by another actor, more often than not a state body orarmedfaction,“in thevicinityof themine,allegedlyonbehalfof themine,orwithallegeddirectbenefittothemine.”66Insum,anegativesymbiosisexistsbetweentheworstcorporate-relatedhuman

rights abuses and host countries that are characterized by combinations ofrelativelylownationalincome,currentorrecentconflictexposure,andweakorcorruptgovernance.

ConflictZones

This negative symbiosis is seen most clearly in conflict zones: countries orregions within them that the central authorities do not control and in whicharmedfactionsfightoverterritoryandresources;orwherethegovernmentitselfisinvolvedinegregiousconductagainstitsownpopulationthatmayrisetothelevelof internationalcrimes. In relation tobusinessandhuman rights, conflictzones attract illicit andborderline enterprisesbecause, despite the existenceofinternational human rights and humanitarian law standards, in practice theyessentially function as “law-free” zones in which even outright looting andpillagingarepossiblewithoutfearofbeingsanctioned.Butlarge,legitimate,andotherwisewell-governedcompaniesalsocangetdrawnintobecoming,wittinglyorunwittingly,apartytoegregioushumanrightsabusesinthesecontexts.One case in point involves Chiquita Brands (bananas), indicted by the U.S.

JusticeDepartment in 2007 formaking payments to a right-wing paramilitaryorganizationinColombiawithahistoryofextensivemassacresandpopulationdisplacements, andwhich theUnitedStateshaddesignatedaForeignTerroristOrganization (FTO).67 It turned out that Chiquita earlier had been payingColombia’stwomainleft-wingguerrillagroupsforanevenlongerperiod;they,too, were on the State Department FTO list.68 Fernando Aguirre, Chiquita’sCEO, said in a statement: “The paymentsmade by the companywere alwaysmotivatedbyourgoodfaithconcernforthesafetyofouremployees.”69Inotherwords,theywereprotectionpaymentsinanareaofthecountrythatgovernmentforces did not fully control. Notwithstanding that good-faith concern, thepayments posed twoproblems forChiquita: first, theywere illegal underU.S.lawbecausetheyweremadetoterroristorganizations;second,thepaymentstothe right-wing group, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), allegedlyfinanced an offensive against leftist guerilla forces, trade unionists, and socialactiviststhatwasintendedtoforcethemoutofChiquita’sregionofoperation,acampaignthatmayhavekilledhundreds.UnderapleaagreementChiquitapaida $25-million fine to settle the FTO complaint and promised to implement aneffectivecomplianceandethicsprogram.But itnowfinds itself inU.S.courtsunder the Alien Tort Statute on charges brought by the Colombian victims’familiesthatChiquitawascomplicitintheAUC’sextrajudicialkillings,torture,forceddisappearances,crimesagainsthumanity,andwarcrimes.70Therearealsonumerousinstancesofcompaniesbeingaccusedofcollaborating

withthegovernmentsideinacivilwar.TalismanEnergy’soperationinSudanisallegedtohavebeenone.71NGOs,churchgroups,andsomesociallyresponsibleinvestmentfundspressuredthisCanadiancompanytoleaveSudan,arguingthatrevenuesfromtheoilflowallowedtheSudanesegovernmenttonearlydoubleitsmilitary spending in a three-year period.72Butwhat drew themost concern—including from the Canadian government—was the revelation that Sudan’sarmed forces used the company’s airstrips to refuel helicopter gunships andbombers on more than a hundred occasions as they were on their way tobombingraidsinthesouthofthecountry.73Thisledtoamajorcampaignagainstthe company, the battering of its stock prices, and forced its subsequentwithdrawalfromthecountry.Still,ittoofacedchargesinU.S.courtsundertheAlienTortStatuteforaidingandabettingtheSudaneseforces’attacks.But the2ndCircuitCourtofAppealsinanopinionIcriticizedpubliclyatthetime,heldthat for the purposes of this statute the proper test for establishing corporate

complicity was not that a company knowingly contributed to the violation ofinternational law by another party, but that it did so “with the purpose toadvance” the violation. The Court found that Talisman’s actions did notmeetthattest.74If itwere possible to posit aworst-of-the-worst situation, in recent history it

undoubtedlywouldbetheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(DRC).Morethan4millionpeoplearereportedtohavebeenkilledinconflictsravagingthatvastcountry since the1990s, andcountlessnumbers raped, tortured, andotherwiseabused. In June 2000 the UN Security Council requested that the Secretary-General establish a panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of naturalresourcesandother formsofwealth in theDRC.75 Itsprimarymissionwas todocument how this illegal exploitation—of gold, diamonds, niobium (an alloystrengthener), coltan (used to control current flow in cell phones and laptops),cassiterite(usedincircuitry),andtimber,amongothernaturalresources—fueledthe conflict by financing thewarring factions andkeeping them suppliedwitharms andmatériel, aswell as personally enriching thosewho controlled theseenterprises.Aregionalwarwastriggeredwhen,inOctober1996,Rwandantroopsinvaded

theDRCinresponsetoattacksonRwandafromHuturefugeecampsineasternDRC.TheRwandanarmyformedacoalitionwithLaurentKabila,leaderofaneastern-based rebel force aiming to overthrow the central government of thenotoriouslykleptocraticPresident,MobutuSeseSeko.Mobutufledthecountryand Kabila declared himself President. After a falling out, Kabila orderedforeign troops to leave theDRC in 1998, but Rwanda andUganda sent freshtroopsinstead.Angolan,Zimbabwean,andNamibiantroopsthenintervenedonbehalfoftheKabilagovernment,alsosupportedbySudanandChad.Essentially,thesearmies“paid” themselvesby takingoverorotherwisecontrollingminingandothernaturalresourceoperationsinthepartsofthecountrytheyoccupied.Foreign forceswithdrew in 2002, but not before leaving in place networks ofentities, particularly in the eastern part of the country, to maintain themechanismsforrevenuegenerationtheyhadestablished.The connection to business and human rights is twofold. First, the Security

Councilpanelidentifiedcompaniesandtheirsecurityproviderswhoweresaidtobe directly involved in human rights abuses—in forced labor, for example:“forcing farmers and their families to leave their agricultural land, or chasingpeopleoff landwhere coltanwas found and forcing them towork in artisanalmines. As a result, the widespread destruction of agriculture and devastating

socialeffectsoccurred,whichinanumberofinstanceswereakintoslavery.”76Second,thepanelalsoidentifiedwhatitbelievedtohavebeenthewidercircleofcommercialenablersofthiswareconomy:companiesthatbought,traded,andtransported illicit rawmaterials; businesses that processed them; and financialinstitutionsthatprovidedlendingandpaymentfacilities.WhiletheirlinkstotheDRCconflictmay have been only indirect, the panel stated, they “still bore aresponsibilitytoensurethatthoselinksdidnot,albeitinadvertently,contributetofundingandperpetuatingtheconflict.”77The most contentious concept in the DRC panel’s mandate was the term

“illegal” in regard to the exploitation of natural resources. The panel sodesignatedanyactivity that itdetermined tohavebeenundertakenwithout theconsentoftherecognizedgovernment;inviolationofexistingnationallawsandregulations,whetherenforcedornot;sustainedbytheabuseofpoweroroutrightforce;orinviolationofinternationallaw.78SomepartiesidentifiedbythepanelcomplainedbitterlythatthisdefinitionrenderedmuchofthecommercialactivityinlargepartsoftheDRCillegal.79Indeed,thatseemstohavebeenpreciselythemessagethepanelwantedtoconvey.Ontheground,asthetragedyoftheCongomakesalltooclear,conflictzones

currently can function as essentially law-free zones where corporate-relatedhumanrightsabusesaresubjectonlytoself-restraintandtheoccasionallawsuitinanothercountrybasedonstatuteswithextraterritorialreach.Thisconstitutesthebiggestgapofallbetweenglobalizationandgovernance.

III.CONCLUSION

The1990sintroducedanewphaseinthehistoryofglobalmarketsandmarketactors, exemplified by the expanding reach and role of multinationalcorporations.Thereweremoreofthemthaneverbefore;theyoperatedinmorecountriesaroundtheworld,includinghighlychallengingsociopoliticalcontexts;andtheydevelopednovelandfar-flungcross-bordermanufacturingandoffshoresourcingnetworks,oftenrelyingoncontractualrelationshipswithotherbusinessentitiesorjointventuresratherthanonverticallyintegratedforms.Thischaptersetouttointroducesomeoftheemblematiccasesthatputbusinessandhumanrights on the global agenda and to provide an overall mapping of actual andallegedcorporate-relatedhumanrightsabuses.When it came to business and human rights, neither governments nor

companies were prepared for this wave of globalization. In the cases we

surveyed, the companies initially took a strictly legalistic approach to thechallenges they encountered: we don’t own this problem, they said, these areindependentsuppliers,orthisisalegallyseparatesubsidiary;weareabusinessand therefore should not interfere in the domestic affairs of our host countryevenwhen themilitarydictatorshipengages inwhatarewidelybelieved tobeextrajudicialkillingsofprotestersagainstouroperations;wemustobeythelawofthelandevenifthatforcesustoviolateinternationallyrecognizedstandardsand our own business values. Movement away from these initial positions,where it occurred, was drivenmainly by advocacy campaigns and occasionallawsuits, for the most part utilizing the newly rediscovered U.S. Alien TortStatute.Zadek’srenderingofNike’sevolutionillustrateshowsomefirmsbegantointernalizenewsocialexpectationsascorporateresponsibilities.Buttherewasnocommonunderstandingofpreciselywhattheseshouldbeandwhatpracticestheyshouldentail.AlthoughnumerousCSRinitiativeswouldbelaunchedoverthe next decade, they existed largely as disconnected fragments incorporatingdifferent commitments, with few focused specifically on human rights. Mymandatewasintendedtoaddressthesegaps.We learned that companies can affect virtually the entire spectrum of

internationallyrecognizedhumanrightsandnot,ashadbeengenerallyassumed,merely some limited subset. In addition to the gamut ofworkplace issues,wesawthatcompanieswereallegedtohaveharmedhealth-relatedrights;rightstoland, housing, and access to safe drinking water; the physical security of theperson; the rights of indigenous peoples; and even such classic civil rights asfree speech, privacy, peaceful assembly, and a fair trial. Of course, thismademore difficult the task of devising a systematic framework for business andhumanrights.Furthermore, we saw that the incidence of reported corporate-related human

rights abuses is significantly higher in countrieswithweak governancewherelocallawsdonotexist,orwherelawsarenotenforcedevenifthehostcountryhas ratified the relevant international human rights conventions. Thisunderscorestheneedtodefineabasisforthecorporateresponsibilitytorespecthumanrightsthatdoesnothingeonwhetherornotthehoststateisfulfillingitsduty.Thedilemmacompaniesfacewherehoststatelawcontradictsinternationalstandards, as in the caseofYahooandChina, requiresdevisingmorenuancedresponses.Finally,we saw that theworst cases of corporate-related human rights abuse

have occurred in areas of armed conflict. Conflict zones attract marginal and

illicit enterprises.But evenwell-recognizedmultinational corporations can getdrawn into involvement in human rights abuses in conflict zones, typicallycommittedbygovernmentagentsorarmedfactionsprotectingcompanyassets,orexploitingthemfortheirownpurposes.Individualcompaniescanreducetheirrisk of involvement in such abuses, and national and international agencies aswellascivilsocietyorganizationscanhelpthemdoso.Butattheendofthedaythis situation is the prime candidate formore robust legalmeasures involvinghomestates.However, asweshall see in thenextchapter, this remainshighlycontroversialamongbusinessesandgovernments.Ultimately, the challengeof business andhuman rights involves nothing less

thantheworkingsoftheglobalpoliticaleconomytogetherwiththestructureofthe world political and legal orders. That the UN would establish a single“SpecialProcedure” toaddress these issues indicateshowunderdeveloped thisareawas,intellectuallyandinstitutionally.AsIsetoutonmyjourney,Irecalledtheadvice the taciturnhighlanderScotwassaid tohavegivenwhenasked fordirectionsbyahikerfromthecity:“Iwouldn’tstartfromhereifIwereyou.”

ChapterTwo

NOSILVERBULLET

A knowledgeable observer at the 2005 annual conference of Business forSocialResponsibilitysummeduptheimpasseinwhichIseemedtrappedatthestartofmymandate:“Ontheonehand,youhaveNGOswithambitiousagendasfor a ‘treaty’oncorporate responsibility andhuman rights.On theotherhand,you have companies saying ‘no, anything but that!’ Cooler heads are notprevailingand in factarehard to findat all.”1Thisdebatehad ragedon since2003,whenanexpertsubsidiarybodyoftheUNCommissiononHumanRightspresented a treaty-like text it had drafted, called the “Norms on theResponsibilities of Transnational Corporations andOther Business EnterpriseswithRegardtoHumanRights.”2AsnotedintheIntroduction,theCommission,the intergovernmentalparentbody,declined toacton theproposedNormsandestablishedmymandateinstead.ThesameimpassedominatedthefirstconsultationIconvenedlaterin2005,in

Geneva,focusedonhumanrightschallengesintheextractivesector.Therefrainfromthe twosetsofprotagonistswas that Imust/mustnotsupport theNorms;and that I must/must not support voluntary initiatives. Business often resistsbinding regulations, and this particular instrument was seen to transfer tocompanies responsibilities forhuman rights thatbusinessbelievedbelonged togovernments.Manyadvocacygroupsdiscountvoluntaryinitiativesbecausetheybelievetheyprovidelittlemorethanwhitewashforcompanies—orbluewashforthosewhowant towork theUN color into the criticism—and some hold thattheydivertattentionfromtheneedfor legalaccountability.Theonlyquestionsanyonewantedme to answer at the consultationwere:Whichway do I lean?WhichsidewillIendupsupporting?IrespondedthatIintendedtoconductanevidence-basedmandate,andthatIwouldsubjectthealternativestoasrigorousanassessmentastimeandcircumstancespermitted.Afterdoingso,Ifoundbothpositionswanting.These debates still provide an invaluable point of entry to understanding the

core conceptual, policy, and legal issues involved in adapting the international

human rights regime to provide more effective protection against corporate-related human rights harm. Therefore, I draw on them to frame my ownapproachtothischallenge.Forcontext,Ibeginbydescribingbrieflythecurrentstructureof international lawas itconcernsbusinessandhumanrights.Next,Isummarizetheanalysisof theNormsIundertookat theoutsetofmymandate,and explain why I rejected the idea of building on that particular instrument.Then I addresswhy I decided against devoting themandate to advocatingmyownversionofanoverarchingbusinessandhumanrightstreaty.Next,Iassessboththeachievementsbutalsothelimitsofvoluntaryinitiativesinbusinessandhumanrights.Finally,IdrawkeylessonsfromtheanalysisthatbecamebuildingblocksforthemoreheterodoxapproachIdeveloped.

I.THECURRENTSTRUCTURE

International law does not ignore the fact that multinational corporations andotherbusinessenterprisesabusehumanrights.Butwithfewexceptions,itdoesnot impose duties directly on them to refrain from such abuses, nor does itcurrently possess the means that could enforce any such provisions. Instead,internationallawgenerallyimposesdutiesonstatestoensurethatnonstateactorswithintheirjurisdiction,includingcompanies,donotabuserecognizedrightsbymeans of appropriate policies, legislation, regulations, and adjudication. ThisstructureisreflectedinUnitedNationsdeclarations,humanrightstreaties,andinthe commentaries of the treaty bodies charged with providing authoritativeinterpretations.Theonepartialexceptionconcernsthemostegregiousconduct,including involvement in genocide, war crimes, and some crimes againsthumanity, where customary international law standards may apply directly tocorporate entities under certain circumstances, though enforcement occursthroughdomesticcourts.Abriefsummaryfollows.

TheUniversalDeclaration

TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR)occupiesauniqueplaceintheinternationalnormativeorder.Itspreambleproclaimsthat“everyindividualandeveryorganofsociety...shallstrivebyteachingandeducationtopromoterespectfortheserightsandfreedomsandbyprogressivemeasures,nationalandinternational,tosecuretheiruniversalandeffectiverecognitionandobservance.”In Columbia Law School Professor Louis Henkin’s oft-cited words: “Everyindividual includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of

societyexcludesnoone,nocompany,nomarket,nocyberspace.TheUniversalDeclarationappliestothemall.”3HenkinsurelyiscorrectthattheDeclaration’saspirationsandmoralclaimsareaddressed,andapply,toallhumanity—andasweshall seebelow,manycompanies themselves invoke it in theirownhumanrightspolicies.Butthatdoesnotequatetolegallybindingeffect.AsaDeclaration,theUDHRwasnotintendedtobelegallybinding.Itsdrafters

expected that legal duties subsequentlywould be elaborated in treaties, as thetwoUNCovenants—onCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR),andonEconomic,Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—ultimately did. Whatever UDHRprovisionsmaybesaidtohaveenteredcustomaryinternationallaw,theywouldnot include the call in its preamble to “every organ of society” becausepreambles,eventobindinginternationalinstruments,arenotthemselveslegallybinding.

TheUNTreaties

The early generation of UN human rights treaties, such as the InternationalConventionon theEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination and thetwoCovenants,donotspecificallyaddressstatedutiesregardingbusiness.Theyimpose generalized obligations on states parties to ensure the enjoyment ofrights and prevent nonstate abuse. For example, the convention on racialdiscriminationrequireseachstatepartytoprohibitsuchdiscriminationby“anypersons, group or organization.” Some treaties recognize rights that areparticularly relevant in business contexts, including rights related toemployment, health, and indigenous communities, but the correlative dutiesinvariablyareassignedtostates.Beginning with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

DiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW),adopted in1979,UNhumanrightstreatiesbegantoaddressbusinessmoredirectly.CEDAW,forinstance,requiresstatespartiestotakeallappropriatemeasurestoeliminatediscriminationagainstwomen by, among other entities, any “enterprise” and, in even greater detail,includinginthecontextof“bankloans,mortgagesandotherformsoffinancialcredit.”But the duty to ensure that these rights are enjoyed is assigned to thestate. The treaties generally give states discretion regarding themodalities forregulating and adjudicating nonstate abuses, but emphasize legislation andjudicialremedies.Because the treaties say that stateshaveaduty to“ensure theenjoyment”of

rights,somecommentatorshavearguedthatthisimpliesadirectlegalobligationfor all social actors, including corporations, to respect those rights in the firstplace. How can this claim be tested? One means is by examining the treatybodies’commentariesandconcludingobservations—whichIdidforeachtreatybody, sampling them over a ten-year period.4 The claim is not borne out. AGeneral Comment on the right to work by the treaty body monitoring theICESCR is typical: it recognizes that various private actors, includingmultinational enterprises, “haveaparticular role toplay in jobcreation,hiringpoliciesandnon-discriminatoryaccesstowork.”5Butitthengoesontosaythatbusinessenterprisesare“notbound”bytheCovenant.Similarly,thecommitteeoncivilandpoliticalrightshassaidthatthetreatyobligations“donot...havedirecthorizontaleffectasamatterofinternationallaw”—thatis,theytakeeffectbetweennonstateactorsonlyunderdomesticlaw.6

InternationalLaborConventions

Onpurelylogicalgroundsonemightexpectthatdirectcorporateresponsibilitieswould feature more strongly under the International Labour Organization’sconventions.TheILOisatripartiteorganization,comprisingrepresentativesofgovernments,businessassociations,andworkersorganizations.Theconventionsaddress all types of employers, including corporations; business enterprisesgenerallyacknowledgegreaterresponsibilityfortheiremployeesthanforotherstakeholders; and the ILO’s supervisorymechanism and complaints procedurespecifyrolesforemployerorganizationsandtradeunions.Butlogicalonedoesnotmakelaw,andcorporations’legalresponsibilitiesundertheILOconventionsremainindirect,whilestatesremainthedirectdutybearer.

EgregiousConduct

TheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyhas recognized the categoryof “gross”violations of international human rights law and “serious” violations ofinternational humanitarian law, alsoknownas the lawof armed conflict.7 Theactsinquestionarecommonlydescribedas“egregious.”Whilenoall-inclusivedefinitionexists, it is generally agreed that they includegenocide,war crimes,and such crimes against humanity as torture, extrajudicial killings, forceddisappearances, enslavement, slaverylike practices, and apartheid. Fewlegitimatebusinessesmayevercommitsuchacts,butthereisgreaterriskoftheir

facingallegationsofcomplicity—aidingandabetting—intheircommissionby,for example, security forcesprotectingcompanyassets and facilities, as in thecaseofShellandtheNigerianmilitaryorChiquitaBrandsandtheparamilitaryinColombia.Theenforcementofthedutyofcompaniesnottocommitsuchactsislefttonationalcourts,butinsomeinstancestheyhavedrawnoninternationalstandardsindoingso.Themainlegalmechanismunderwhichthisincorporationhasoccurredisthe

already-discussedU.S.AlienTortStatute(ATS),underwhichforeignplaintiffshavebroughtcivilclaims(monetarycompensationforharms)againstcompanieswithabusinesspresenceintheUnitedStatesforhumanrightsviolationsabroad.Under the statute, U.S. courts have looked to international standards—bothtreaty-based and customary law standards as developed by the internationalcriminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for example—toinform theirowndeliberationwhether“the lawofnations”wasbreached.Thepresumption has been that, provided theymeet certain criteria, such standardsdeveloped for natural persons also apply to legal persons. But in September2010, theU.S.2ndCircuitCourtofAppeals, the firstever inmodern times toupholdarulingpermittingacasetobebroughtagainstanindividualundertheATS, decided that the statute did not apply to corporations as legal persons.8Subsequent rulings by other circuit courts in different cases contradicted thisview.ThequestioniscurrentlyunderreviewbytheSupremeCourt,andItakeitupinchapter5.A second route through which international standards could enter domestic

legal systems and be applied to corporate entities involves the InternationalCriminalCourt’sRomeStatute.The ICC itselfdoesnothave jurisdictionoverbusiness entities—the issuewasdiscussed in thedrafting stage, but agreementcouldnotbe reachedbecauseanumberofcountriesdonot recognizecriminalliability of corporations.Nevertheless,where a country has ratified the statuteand incorporated itsstandardsfor individualcriminal liability into itsdomesticcriminal law, and where the national legal system does provide for criminalpunishment of companies, it is possible that the standards for natural personsmaygetextendedtocorporateentitiesaslegalpersons.9Noactualcasehasyetbeenbroughtagainstacompanyunderthisscenario,buttherehavebeenreportsofpreliminaryinvestigationsbyauthoritiesinAustraliaandCanada.

Extraterritoriality

Throughcombinationsofunilateralandmultilateralmeasures, theextensionofnational jurisdiction abroad has evolved in a number of international policydomains—antiterrorism, money laundering, anticorruption, aspects ofenvironmental protection, and child sex tourism, for example. But with thepartialexceptionof the typesofegregiousconductdiscussedabove, it remainslimitedinotherareasofhumanrights.10The various UN human rights treaties differ in their possible extraterritorial

implications.TheGenocideConvention,forexample,includesnojurisdictionallimit, therefore in principle none apply. In contrast, state duties to respect andensuretheenjoymentofrightsundertheCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsare explicitly limited to individuals “within its territory and subject to itsjurisdiction.” Finally, the ICESCR includes a provision that each state party“take steps, individually and through international assistance andco-operation,especially economic and technical, to themaximumof its available resources,with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rightsrecognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means”—whichgovernments generally view as a call to provide financial and other forms ofassistancetodevelopingcountries.TheUN treaty bodies traditionally paid relatively little attention to business-

relatedissues.Theirgeneralguidancesuggestedthat thetreatiesdonotrequirestates to exercise extraterritorial jurisdictionoverbusiness abuse, but that theyarenotgenerallyprohibitedfromdoingsoeither,providedthereisarecognizedjurisdictionalbasis:forexample,wheretheactororvictimisanational,wherethe acts have substantial adverse effects on the state, or where specificinternationalcrimesare involved.Morerecently, thecommitteemonitoringtheeconomic, social, and cultural rights covenant began to recommend that statesparties“should”takestepsto“preventtheirowncitizensandcompanies”fromviolating rights inothercountries,particularly in relation to the rights to food,water,andhealth.11Forthemostpart,statesdonotconsiderthetreatybodiestoconstitute a source of law. But the committees’ increased attention to thequestion of extraterritorial obligations signals a growing concern with theinadequacyofthestatusquo.

SoftLaw

States have addressed the human rights responsibilities of business enterprisesmostdirectlyinsoft-lawinstruments.Softlawis“soft”inthesensethatitdoes

not by itself create legally binding obligations. It derives its normative forcethroughrecognitionofsocialexpectationsbystatesandotherkeyactors.Statesmayturntosoft lawforseveralreasons: tochartpossiblefuturedirectionsfor,andfillgapsin,theinternationallegalorderwhentheyarenotyetableorwillingto take firmermeasures;where theyconclude that legallybindingmechanismsare not the best tool to address a particular issue; or to avoid having morebindingmeasuresgainpoliticalmomentum.Apart from the foundationalUniversalDeclaration, themost prominent soft-

law instruments in the business and human rights space originate with theInternational Labour Organization (ILO) and the Organization for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD). The ILO Tripartite Declaration ofPrinciplesConcerningMultinationalEnterprisesandSocialPolicy,firstadoptedin 1977, was endorsed by states as well as global employers’ and workers’organizations,throughtheILO’stripartitedecision-makingsystem.Itproclaimsthatallparties,includingmultinationalenterprises,“shouldrespecttheUniversalDeclaration ofHumanRights and the corresponding internationalCovenants.”The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work wasadoptedbytheInternationalLabourConference(theILO’s tripartiteassembly)in 1998. It commits its member states to respect and promote principles andrights in four categories, whether or not they have ratified the relevant ILOconventions:freedomofassociationandtheeffectiverecognitionoftherighttocollective bargaining, the elimination of forced or compulsory labor, theabolition of child labor, and the elimination of discrimination in respect toemploymentandoccupation.TheOECDGuidelinesforMultinationalEnterpriseswerefirstadoptedin1976

and revised in 2000 (their 2011 update is discussed in chapters 3 and 4). The2000 text recommended as a general principle that firms “respect the humanrightsofthoseaffectedbytheiractivitiesconsistentwiththehostgovernment’sobligationsandcommitments,”whichruledoutinternationalstandardsthehoststate did not recognize. The Guidelines also require the adhering states toestablishagovernmentofficecalledtheNationalContactPointtowhichanyonecan bring a “specific instance” (i.e., complaint) of noncompliance by amultinational corporation domiciled or operating in an adhering country,althoughnegativefindingshavenoautomaticofficialconsequences.Tosumup,thestructureofcurrentinternationallawissuchthathumanrights

duties for themost part are imposed on states, not on companies directly. Ofcourse,thehumanrightstreatiesapplyonlytostatesthathaveratifiedthem.The

mostconsequentialhard-lawdevelopment in recentyearshasbeen thegradualextensionofpotentialliabilitytocompaniesforegregiousactsthatmayamountto international crimes, under domestic law but reflecting internationalstandards. But this trend is largely an unanticipated by-product of states’strengthening the legal regime for natural persons, not legal persons, and itsactual operation reflects wide variations in national practice. There have alsobeenahandfulofcasesintheUnitedKingdom,TheNetherlands,andCanadainwhichchargeshavebeenbroughtagainstaparentcompanyundernational lawfor its contribution to or negligence in permitting harmful acts by overseasaffiliates,sometimesdescribedas“directforeignliability”cases.Butoverall,interms of the law, a large governance gap exists in business and human rights.Thecentralquestionishowmosteffectivelytonarroworbridgeit.

II.THENORMS

The Norms were the first international effort to develop legally bindinginternationalhumanrightsstandardsforcompanies.TheCommissiononHumanRightshadnotrequestedtheSub-Commission(agroupofexpertsnominatedbygovernmentsbutacting in theirpersonalcapacity) toproduceadraft,andonlytheCommissionhadtheauthoritytoadopttheproduct,whichitdeclinedtodo.ThecasefortheNormswentlikethis.TheUniversalDeclarationisaddressed

toallorgansofsociety.Multinationalcorporations,beingamong thoseorgans,havegreaterpowerthanmanystatestoaffecttherealizationofrights,and“withpower should come responsibility.”12 Therefore, these corporations must bearresponsibilityforthehumanrightsaffectedbybusinessactivities.Andbecausesome states are unwilling or unable tomake them do so under domestic law,international lawmust impose uniform standards not only on states, as in theexisting human rights regime, but on corporations directly. To determineviolations, the Norms recommended that companies be monitored by the UNhumanrightsmachineryevenbeforefurtherlegalizationand,whereabuseswerefound,thatreparationsbemade.Itwouldbesurprisingifgovernmentsandbusinessesdidnotreactnegatively

totheNorms,basedatleastinpartontheirperceivedinterests.Thoseinterestswere not my primary concern, however. If the proposal was sound, I wasprepared to back it. My assessment of the Norms focused on five questions:WhichhumanrightsdidtheNormsinclude?Whathumanrightsdutiesdidtheyattributetobusinessenterprises?Onwhatbasisweretheyattributed?Withwhat

consequences?Andwithwhat legal justification? I found the effort flawedoneverycount.The Norms enumerated rights that their authors believed to be particularly

relevant for business, including nondiscrimination, the security of the person,labor standards, and indigenous peoples’ rights. But they also would haveimposed on companies responsibilities for rights that states had not yetrecognizedat theglobal level, includinga“livingwage,”consumerprotection,and the precautionary principle for environmental impacts.Moreover, the textstated thatnotall internationally recognized rightspertained tobusiness,but itprovidednoprincipledbasisfordeterminingwhatwasinandwhatwasout.Inresponsetocriticismthat thelistwasoverlyinclusive,someNorms’advocatessuggested a shorter list of “core” rights said to enjoy the most widespreadsupport and which business could easily grasp.13 But that idea triggered theriposte that theconceptofcore rights is“averysignificantdeparture fromtheinsistencewithintheinternationalhumanrightsregimeontheequalimportanceofallhumanrights.”14Inanyevent,wesawinchapter1thatbusinesscanaffectvirtually theentire spectrumof internationally recognized rights, therefore anydelimitedlistofrightsinwhatpurportstobeacomprehensiveandfoundationallegalframeworkwillprovideinadequateguidanceinpractice.A far more serious problem concerned the Norms’ proposed formula for

attributing duties to corporations. After acknowledging that states are theprimary duty-bearers under international human rights law, the GeneralObligations article added: “Within their respective spheres of activity andinfluence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises have theobligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of andprotect”nationallyandinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights.15Buttheseareexactly the same duties states have. The distinction between primary andsecondary duty-holders was not defined. And as a basis for attributing legaldutiestocompanies,“spheresofinfluence”provedproblematic.TheUNGlobalCompacthadintroducedtheconceptof“corporatespheresof

influence”asaspatialmetaphor tohelpcompanies thinkabout theireffectsonhuman rights beyond the workplace and to identify opportunities for them tosupporthumanrights,whichistheCompact’sobjective.TheOfficeoftheHighCommissioner for Human Rights subsequently published a paper graphicallydepictingthe“sphere”asasetofconcentriccircles:companyoperationsatthecore, moving outward to suppliers, the community, and society as a whole—premisedonthelogicthatasacompany’sinfluencedeclinesfromonecircleto

thenext,sotoo,byimplication,woulditsresponsibility.16In a legal context, there are three problems with the sphere-of-influence

concept.First,theemphasisonproximitycanbeseriouslymisleading.Ofcoursecompanies shouldbeconcernedwith their impactonworkers and surroundingcommunities.Buttheiractivitiescanequallyaffecttherightsofpeoplefarawayfromthesource—as,forexample,violationsoftherighttoprivacybyInternetserviceproviderscanendangerdispersedend-users.Interestingly,theNormsdidnotspecificallyenumeratethisright;theYahoocase,describedinchapter1,hadnotyetoccurred.Second,attributingresponsibilityforhumanrightstocompaniesbasedontheir

influencerequirestheassumption,inmoralphilosophyterms,that“canimpliesought.” But companies should not be held responsible for the human rightsimpactsofeveryentityinsocietyoverwhichtheymayhaveinfluencebecausethiswouldincludesourcesofharmtowhichtheyareentirelyunrelated.Atthesametime,suchanattributioncouldabsolvecompaniesfromresponsibilityforadverseimpactswhentheycouldshowtheylackedinfluenceeveniftheywereconnectedtotheharm.Itisonethingtoaskcompaniestosupporthumanrightsvoluntarily where they have influence, as the Global Compact does; butattributing legalobligations to themon thatbasis formeeting the full rangeofhumanrightsdutiesisquiteanother.Third,“influence”isarelationaltermandthusissubject tostrategicgaming.

BythisImeanthatagovernmentcandeliberatelyfailtoperformitsduties—aswe saw in the discussions of Cajamarca and Nigeria—in the hope that thecompanywillyieldtosocialpressurestopromoteorfulfillcertainrights.Foritspart,acompanycanminimizeitsapparentinfluencebycreatinganynumberofhollow subsidiary entities, and thereby seek to diminish or duck itsresponsibilities.In short, the boundaries within which corporations’ duties would take effect

under theNormswere indeterminate, and thedistinctionbetweenprimary andsecondary duties undefined. With scope and threshold conditions bothunderspecified, it seemed highly likely that corporate duties in practicewouldhave come to hinge on the respective capacities of states and corporations inparticularsituations—sothatwhereastatewasunableorunwillingtodoitsjob,thepressurewouldbeoncompaniestostepin.Butwithwhatconsequences?PhilipAlston, a leading academic authority on human rights law and former

chairoftheUNCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights,identifiesoneresultingdilemma:

If the only difference is that governments have a comprehensive set ofobligations, while those of corporations are limited to their “spheres ofinfluence”...howarethelatter[obligations]tobedelineated?DoesShell’ssphereofinfluenceintheNigerDeltanotcovereverythingrangingfromtheright to health, through the right to free speech, to the rights to physicalintegrityanddueprocess?17

Alstonraisestheconcernthatthisformulacouldunderminecorporateautonomy,risk-taking, and entrepreneurship, and asks, “What are the consequences ofsaddling[corporations]withalloftheconstraints,restrictions,andevenpositiveobligations which apply to governments?”18 Corporations may be “organs ofsociety,” in short, but they are specialized organs, established to performspecialized economic functions, and the obligations imposed on them mustrecognizethatfact.The impact the Norms would have had on the roles and obligations of

governments is equally troubling. The international human rights regimerecognizes the legitimate need of governments, within the constraint of“progressive realization,” to exercise discretion for making trade-offs andbalancing decisions, and especially for determining how best to “secure thefulfillment” of, precisely those economic, social, and cultural rights onwhichcorporationshavethegreatestimpact.Imposingtheentirerangeofhumanrightsduties onmultinational corporationsdirectly under international law, includingfulfilling rights, by definition reduces individual governments’ discretion inmakingthosebalancingdecisions.TheNormsattemptedtosquarethecirclebyrequiringcompaniesalso to follownational lawsandpolicypriorities,but thismerelyaddedalayerofconflictingprescriptionsforfirmstofollow.Anditwascontradicted outright by yet another requirement that firms adopt “the mostprotective standards” wherever those may be found. Furthermore, wheregovernance is weak to begin with, shifting obligations onto corporations toprotect and even fulfill the broad spectrum of human rights may underminedomestic political incentives to make governments more responsive andresponsible to their own citizenry, which surely is the most effective way torealizehumanrights.Finally,thelegalclaimsandjustificationsmadefortheNormswerepuzzlingto

many observers, including mainstream international lawyers, further fuelingcontroversy. Their chief author described the Norms as “a restatement ofinternational legal principles applicable to companies.”19Yet theywould have

imposedthefullrangeofhumanrightsdutiesoncompanies,includingfulfillingrights,anddonesodirectlyunderinternationallaw.Moreover,theywouldhaverequiredasignificantrestructuringofdomesticcorporatelawregimes,ineffectreplacingthe“shareholder”modeloffiduciarydutiesthat isdominantinmanycountriesinfavorofabroad“stakeholder”model.Whatevertheintrinsicmeritsof those moves, they would have amounted to fundamental revolutions inexisting law,not amere restatement.As lawprofessor JohnKnox laterwrote,“the proponents of the Norms sometimes seemed oblivious to the size of therevolutionininternationallawthattheywereseekingtorealize.”20Similarly, the Norms were described as the first such initiative at the

international level thatwas “non-voluntary” in nature, and thus in some senseautomatically binding on companies. This pleased human rights NGOs butsurprised governments and business because no intergovernmental body hadapproved them, nor had any government ratified them. It turned outsubsequently that the authorsmerelymeant that if theNorms ever took effectthrough treaty law or customary international law, then companies would beboundbythemeveniftheydidn’tsignuptothem,astheywouldtoavoluntaryinitiative.TheUNHumanRightsCommissionresolvedanypossibleconfusionbystatinginaformalresolutionthattheNormshadnolegalstanding.Thus, even leaving aside the contentious proposal for some unknown and

unspecifiedentitytoensurereparationtovictimsworldwide,andapartfromthenear-universalpoliticaloppositionbeyondNGOcircles,IfoundtheNormstobedeeply flawed. In December 2005, I signaled these reservations in a Londonspeechand inaprivatemeetingwithhumanrightsNGOs.Not long thereafter,havingbeenpressuredpreviously that Imust“buildon” theNorms, I receivedthis email message from one of those organizations: “We . . . would beconcerned if you felt it necessary in your report to take a position on theUNNorms....Wefeelthatdoingsomayunnecessarilycompromisetheoutcomeofyourwork.”21BynowithadbecomeclearthatonlyacleanbreakwouldfreemymandatefromtheshadowcastoveritbytheNorms.Andso,inthewordsofEdward Mortimer, Kofi Annan’s speechwriter at the time, I committed“Normicide.”InmyfirstreporttotheHumanRightsCommission,Iconcluded,in deliberately undiplomatic language, that the Norms suffered from“exaggerated legal claims and conceptual ambiguities,” and that they were“engulfed by [their] own doctrinal excesses.” Therefore, I added, theyconstituted “a distraction from rather than a basis for moving [my] mandateforward.”22YettheNorms’flawsaswellasthevisceralresponsestheinitiative

triggered on all sides provided both substantive and political insight that wasveryusefulindevelopingmyownapproach.Not surprisingly, the human rights NGOs that had strongly supported the

Normswereunhappy.“‘PrincipledPragmatism’orMereAntagonism?”readtheheadlineinonenewsletter.23TheInternationalCommissionofJurists(aGeneva-basedNGOpromotingtheruleoflaw)subsequentlyconvenedseveralmeetingswith leading human rights organizations, including Human RightsWatch andAmnesty,todiscusspossiblewaysofderailingmymandatewhenitcameupforrenewalin2007andforNGOsthemselves,withthehelpofsupportiveacademichumanrightslawyers,todraftanewinstrumentthatwouldtrytofixtheNorms’flawsandthenpromoteit to“friendly”governments.ButtheseeffortscametonaughtandpublicreferencestotheNormsdeclinedthereafter.ThebusinesscommunityandmostgovernmentswererelievedthattheNorms

would not feature in my work. Both began to take seriously my claim that Iwould take a rigorous evidence-based approach and search for practicalsolutions, not be driven by doctrinal preferences. This opened the door toconstructive engagement with the business community—individual companiesaswell as business associations. At the same time, a number of governmentsbegantorespondfavorablytomyrequestsforvoluntarilyfundingthemandateata level that would enable me to recruit a team of professionals, conduct thenecessary research, and consult widely with affected individuals andcommunities,otherstakeholdergroupsandexperts.With theNorms issue settled, the attention ofmy interlocutors turned to the

moregeneralquestionofwhetherIwouldadvocate“mandatory”or“voluntary”measures.Thisputthecartbeforethehorse,Iexplained;let’sfirstfocusonthesubstanceofwhatshouldbedoneandthenaddressform.Nevertheless,aspartoftheinitialmappingphaseofmymandate,Iturnednexttoanassessmentoftherelative feasibility and utility of my proposing a comprehensive treatynegotiationorpromotingvoluntaryinitiatives.

III.THETREATYROUTE

Aperfectlyunderstandablereactiontotheemblematiccasesdescribedinchapter1istosaythereoughttobealaw,oneinternationallaw,thatbindsallbusinessenterprises everywhereunder a common set of standardsprotecting all humanrights. Internationalstandardsbecomelegallybindingforadheringstateswhentherequisitenumberofcountrieshaveratifiedatreatyorwhentheybecomepart

ofcustomaryinternationallaw—establishedpatternsofstatepracticebasedonasenseof legalobligation, notmerely self-interest or etiquette.Because customcannotbecreatedatwill,seekingtoestablishbindingstandardsforbusinessandhumanrightsmeans launchinganinternational treatynegotiation—whether thetreatyseekstoimposeobligationsonstatesoroncompaniesdirectly.AdvancingthisparadigmisacoreaimoftheUNhumanrightssystem:identifyingtheneedfornewstandards,drafting instruments,creatingprocedures intended tosecuretheir adoption, and then providing commentary on and recommendations forstatecompliance.Itisalsoacoreobjectiveofmanyinternationalhumanrightsorganizations,representingboththeirmoralandinstitutionalcommitments.But advocacy groups made no specific proposals for an international legal

instrumentaftertheNorms’demise.Amnesty’snewposition,forexample,wasconveyed to me in a letter from Irene Khan, then AI’s Secretary-General. Itcalled generically for “the creation of international legal standards and ofcorporate legal accountability for human rights.”24 Should this include someinternationally recognized rights, or all? If the latter, was it plausible thatuniformgloballegalliabilitystandardscouldbecreatedforcorporateviolationsof every single internationally recognized human right, where the conduct inquestion can range from failure to pay overtime to complicity in extrajudicialkillings? Or should some be prioritized? Would corporate accountability beimposed under national law or directly under international law? If the latter,would this require the creationof an international tribunal for corporations, orwould it be enforcedby states, not all ofwhichhave ratified all human rightstreatiesaddressingstateabusesof thosesamerights?Advocacygroupsdidnotaddresstheseandrelatedfoundationalquestions,neitherthennorthroughouttherestofmymandate.Ifeltobligedtodoso.After assessing the prospects, I judged that the foundations for any treaty

negotiations simply did not exist at that time, least of all for somecomprehensive legal framework. Moreover, not only would such an effortachieve little for current victims of corporate-related human rights harm, butforcingtheissueofinternationallegalizationprematurelywouldsettheagendabackratherthanadvanceit.Finally,evenifthehighlyimprobableweretooccurandatreatywasadopted,itwouldnotdeliverallthatitsadvocateshopedforandexpected, suggesting the need for complementary approaches from the start. Iexplainmyreasoningintheparagraphsthatfollow.

Foundations

Human rights treaties can take a long time to negotiate and enter into force:generally, the broader their scope and the more controversial the subject, thelonger the duration. This is true even of soft-law instruments focused onrelatively circumscribed subjects such as the Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenousPeopleswhich,asalreadynoted, tooktwenty-sixyears tonegotiateandyetincludesonlyoneofthescoresofissuesthatacomprehensivebusinessand human rights treaty would need to encompass. Thus, even if treatynegotiationsweretohavebegunthenextday,moreimmediatesolutionswouldbe needed to dealwith existing challenges. LouiseArbour, the thenUNHighCommissionerforHumanRights,putitsuccinctlyin2008:“Itwouldbefranklyveryambitioustopromoteonlybindingnormsconsideringhowlongthiswouldtakeandhowmuchdamage[tovictims]couldbedoneinthemeantime.”25Butwhynotstartsuchatreaty-makingprocesswhilesimultaneouslytakingshorter-term practical steps? Four impediments stood out when I considered thisquestion.First,theissueofbusinessandhumanrightsisstillarelativelynewconcernfor

governments, and therewas little agreement among thembeyond “weneed toconsiderdoingsomethingabouttheproblem.”Asacaseinpoint,governmentsinitiallylimitedmymandatetotwoyears,asopposedtothenormalthree.Andinitially theygaveme the taskmerelyof“identifying”and“clarifying” things:applicable international standards, best practices, and the meaning of keyconcepts such as corporate complicity in human rights abuses committed byothersandcorporatespheresofinfluence.Notmuchofasharedknowledgebaseexisted, let alone consensus on desirable international responses. In the past,politicalcoalitionsmighthaveformedaroundthenorth-southoreast-westaxis,although this had never yielded significant concrete results in relation tomultinationalcorporations.26Buteventhatpossibilitynolongerexisted,thanksto the rapidly rising number of multinationals based in emerging marketcountries,suchasBrazil,China, India, Indonesia,Malaysia,Russia,andSouthAfrica,whichareatleastasprotectiveof“their”multinationalsasWesternhomestates are of theirs.Greater shared understanding and consensus needed to bebuiltfromthebottomup.Second,prevailinginstitutionalarrangementsandpracticeswithingovernments

concerningbusinessandhuman rightswerealsoa factormilitatingagainst theinitiationofabusinessandhumanrightstreatyprocess.Myresearch,includingaquestionnairesenttoallUNmemberstates,indicatedthattheresponsibilityforthisissuetypicallyislodgedinsmall,mid-levelunits,usuallyinforeignoffices,

occasionally in economics ministries. In contrast, the numerous governmententitieswhose job it is topromoteandprotectbusiness interests invariablyarelargerandhaveconsiderablygreaterinstitutionalclout.Typically, thetwoexistinisolationfromoneanother.Businessandhumanrightsissueshaverisentothetop of a government’s agenda only momentarily in the wake of some majoreventorcrisis.Forexample,SouthAfricawasshockedtolearnthatithadsignedbilateral investment treaties that enabled mining interests from Italy andLuxembourg to sue the government for monetary damages under bindinginternational arbitration because of certain provisions in the Black EconomicEmpowerment Act, perhaps the singlemost significant piece of human rightslegislation adopted by the postapartheid government. An official inquiry intohowthegovernmentgotitself intothatsituationconcludedthat“theExecutivehad not been fully apprised” of the possibility—the connection betweeninvestmenttreatiesandhumanrightseitherwasnotconsideredorwasignored.27In light of such realities it seemed highly likely that a business-and-human-rights-treaty negotiating process would lock in commercial interests at theexpense of human rights. Ways needed to be found to address what I called“horizontalpolicyincoherence”withingovernmentsaroundbusinessandhumanrights.Third, where states are reluctant to domuch in the first place, they tend to

invokeongoing treatynegotiations as apretext fornot takingother significantsteps,includingchangingnationallawsunderpressurefromdomesticgroups—arguing that they would not want to preempt the ultimate treaty outcome.Moreover,whilenegotiationsareongoing,proposals forother steps tend tobeviewed through the lens of what they ultimately might mean for treaty-negotiating tactics and commitments, thus reducing the scope forexperimentation and innovation—which is precisely what this policy domaindemands. The counterargument is sometimes made that bargaining “in theshadowof the law”canyieldproductiveoutcomes,but thatonlyworkswherethereisarealisticprospectofmeaningfullegalmeasuresbeingadopted.Fourth,evensomeof themostprogressivecountriesonthesubjectofhuman

rights, such as Sweden, expressed concern about imposing the broad range ofinternationalhumanrightsobligationsoncompaniesdirectlyunderinternationallaw, fearing that this would diminish states’ essential roles and duties. Thissuggested the need to establish a clear differentiation between the respectiveobligationsofstatesandbusinesses,onethatrecognizedthedifferentsocialrolesthey play, not intermingling the two as theNorms had done.Thatwould take

considerableeffortinitself.In short, these would have been inauspicious starting points for any treaty

negotiation,consumingsubstantial timeandenergytolittlepositiveeffect.Butbecausethismaynotalwaysbeso,itisalsoimportanttobecomeawareofanddevelop adequate responses to even more fundamental issues related to theimplementationofanybusinessandhumanrightstreaty.Itakeupthreebelow:theeffectivenessofhumanrightstreatiesgenerally,howabusinessandhumanrightstreatywouldbeenforced,andtheneedforgovernmentstoavoid,orfigureout how to reconcile, conflicting obligations under different bodies ofinternationallaw.

Effectiveness

Howeffective arehuman rights treaties at changingactualbehavior?Howaretheyeffective?Andcantheybemademoreso?Thesearebigquestions,difficulttoanswerdefinitivelyandbrieflyatthesametime.HereIsimplysummarizekeyfindings from systematic empirical studies conducted over the past decade toassess whether and how the ratification of international human rights treatieschanges the conduct of states that ratify them. These studies have focused onpolitical, civil, and personal integrity rights (the prohibitions against genocideandtorture,forexample),aswellaswomen’srightsandtherightsofthechild.Differences inmethodologycanaffect theresults,but thestudiesagreeononefact:humanrightstreatiesareleasteffectiveinthecaseofthosecountrieswherethey are neededmost.28Moreover, strong positive correlations between treatyratificationandimprovedstatebehavioraretheexception,nottherule.Statistically,thepositiveeffectsoftreatyratificationtendtobeassociatedwith

oneormoreofthefollowingcountryattributes:it isatleastpartlydemocratic;has strong civil society institutions; is relatively secular; has an existingcommitment to the ruleof lawand reasonablywell-functioningdomestic legalinstitutions;and theprotectionofaparticular right (prohibitingchild labor, forexample) is promoted by some external incentive mechanism, such asdevelopmentassistanceorapreferentialtradeagreementtowhichthecountryisa party. Effects within the same category of rights can vary. For example,ratificationof therelevant treatiesappears tohaveagreatereffectonwomen’spoliticalrightsthanontheirsocialrights,andonreducingchildlabormorethanon improving basic health care for children. Moreover, the most recentassessmentbyagroupofleadingscholarsonthissubjectconcludesthatlimited

capacity on the part of states to live up to their commitments “ismuchmorewidespread in the contemporary international system than is usuallyacknowledged.”29Whenallissaidanddone,theindirectroleoftreatyratification—whatitmay

make possible by way of mobilizing internal and external pressure againsthuman rights violators—may be as important as the formal processes oftranslatingcommitmentsintocompliance.Inthecaseofmultinationalsthisdoesraise the question of whether functional equivalents to such leverage pointsmightexistwhentreatynegotiationsseemproblematicinthefirstplace.Isoughttoidentifywhatsuchequivalentsmightbe,aselaboratedinlaterchapters.

Enforcement

We have already seen that UN human rights treaties lack an internationalenforcementmechanismassuch.Whatadditionalenforcementchallengesmightexist in the case of business, especially transnationally operating enterprises?Few observers believe that establishing a world court for multinationals is arealistic prospect in the foreseeable future. For the time being, therefore, thatleavesnationalenforcementbyhostand/orhomestates,UN“monitoring,”andwhateversocialcompliancemechanismsexist.Hoststatesarestatesinwhichcompaniesoperate.Asdiscussedearlier,ifthey

have ratified existing human rights treaties, they already have obligationsflowingfromthemtoprotectindividualsagainsthumanrightsabusescommittedwithin their jurisdiction, not only by state agents but also by third parties,includingbusinessenterprises.Arobustandwidelyadoptedmultilateralbusinessand human rights treaty might give those states greater incentives to enforcetheir obligationsby reducing collective actionproblems.But in the immediatecontext I found thatmany governments understood poorly both the substanceand the extent of their existing international human rights duties vis-à-visbusiness,soasafirststepIsoughttospellthemoutinsomedetail.Ofcourse,host states that have not ratified existing human rights treaties do not havecorrelativedutiesunderthosetreaties—anditisnotself-evidentwhytheywouldsignon toanew treaty requiring them toenforce suchduties.Essentially, thismeans that adding yet another enforcement obligation on host states could beeitherredundantorirrelevant.Home states are those in which companies are “domiciled”—meaning

incorporated or headquartered. To date, in the business and human rights

domain, home states generally still tend toworrymore about the competitiveposition of “their” companies, and business remains strongly opposed toextraterritorial jurisdiction. Moreover, even developing countries that expressconcern about the power ofmultinationals typically also resist interference byothercountriesintheirdomesticaffairs.Asdiscussedinlaterchapters,Isoughttoidentifywaysinwhichandcircumstancesunderwhichhomestatescouldtakecertain actions to regulate overseas human rights harm by corporationsdomiciled in their jurisdictionwithout arousing serioushost state ire.But as ageneral solution to theoverallhuman rights challengesposedbymultinationalcorporations, extraterritorial jurisdiction remains unacceptable to governments.Therefore,pushingitaggressivelycouldbackfirebyreducingthealreadylimitedwillingnesstotakestepswithinthecurrentlypermissiblescopeofsuchactions.AUNbusiness and human rights treaty presumablywould establish a treaty

bodytomonitorandguideimplementation,asisthecasewithallsuchtreaties.Dependingonthetreaty’sprovisions,eitherthestatespartieswouldberequiredto report periodically to that committee on their progress in dealing withcorporate-relatedhuman rights abuseswithin their jurisdictions, or theywouldhavetorequirebusinessestodosodirectly.Ineithercase,thecommitteewouldissue comments and recommendations, as they do in relation to other humanrights treaties. If thereportingwas thedutyof thestates,manywould lack thecapacitytodosoadequately,asisalreadythecasetodaywithreportingontheircurrent state-related obligations. And if the reporting was to be done bycompaniesdirectly,thenpresumablystateswouldhavetoenforcetheobligationupon them—whichwould takeusback to someof theenforcementchallengesdiscussed in previous paragraphs. In addition, the overall arithmetic for thetreaty body would be daunting. These committees cannot keep up withmonitoringthelimiteduniverseofstatesparties today,andyeteachcommitteedealsonlywithaspecificsetofrightsoroneaffectedgroup.Howatreatybodywouldcopewiththeincalculablylargeruniverseofbusinesses,whileaddressingall rights of all persons affected by them, is unclear. What is clear is thatadditionalmeansofauthoritative“monitoring”wouldberequired.Finally,thereisariskthatatreatywouldestablishtoolowaceiling.Consider

this scenario. In theunlikelyevent that someoverarchingbusinessandhumanrightstreatyemergedfromtheinauspiciouscircumstancesunderwhichIbeganmymandate,itwouldhavebeenbasedonaverylowcommondenominatorwithpotentially adverse consequences for social compliance mechanisms. In thewakeofatreatywithlowstandards,externalpressureoncompaniesthatarenot

inthecorporatesocial-responsibilityvanguardtoaspiretothehighestvoluntarylevels—pressure fromNGOcampaigns, socially responsible investment funds,consumer groups, and so on—mightwell become less effective because thosecompanies could reasonably respond that they are dutifully following newlyenacted international law. The loss of social leverage would be even moreconsequentialifatreatywithlowstandardswasnotratifiedbyenoughstatestoenterintoforceaslaw,orifitwasratifiedbythebareminimumrequiredbutbyfewornomajorhomestatesofmultinationals.Raising theseconcernsdoesnot imply thatweshouldgiveupon thecurrent

international human rightsmachinery. On the contrary, it ismeant to identifyadditionalwaysinwhichpreventingharmandprovidingremedyarenecessary.ThesameistrueofonefinalfeatureoftheinternationaltreatysystemIwanttoaddressandwhichhasreceivedfartoolittleattentioninrelationtohumanrights:apronouncedtrendtowardfragmentationintheinternationallegalorderitself.

LegalFragmentation

Statesaresimultaneouslysubjecttonumerousbodiesofinternationallaw,suchas investment law, trade law, and environmental law, alongwith human rightslaw.Howareconflictinginternational legalobligationstoberesolved?Humanrightsdiscourseisinfusedwiththeassumptionofarights-basedhierarchy—theidea that human rights trump not only in a moral sense but, if enoughinternationallegalinstrumentswereadded,thattheywoulddosointermsofthelawaswell.Thisbeliefisonedriverbehindthequestforadditionallegalization.Butthecurrentpracticeofinternationallawreflectsthishierarchyonlyinpart,discussed below. More generally, the authoritative International LawCommission (ILC) and a bourgeoning academic literature find that thepredominant trend in international legalization in recent decades is toward the“fragmentation of international law” into separate and autonomous spheres oflaw.InaninfluentialreporttotheUNGeneralAssembly,theILCconcludedthat“no homogenous hierarchical metasystem is realistically available” within theinternational legal order to resolve the problem of incompatible provisions,including when different tribunals that have overlapping jurisdictions addressexactlythesamesetoffactsandyetreachdifferentconclusions.30Thisoutcomehasbeendescribedas“regimecollision.”Illustratingthephenomenon,inthe1990sArgentinaprivatizedthedeliveryof

water to households and entered into a contract with a consortium of

international water companies to provide the service. Subsequently, thegovernmentdeniedarequestbythecompaniestoincreasethetariffstheycouldcharge, made necessary, the companies said, by additional costs as well as asevere devaluation of the peso. The companies sued Argentina under bindinginternational arbitration, as permitted by bilateral investment treaties thatArgentinahadsigned.In thehearing,Argentinaamongotherdefenses invokeditsobligationtofulfill thehumanright towaterasjustificationfordenyingtherate increase. The international tribunal hearing the case agreed with thecompaniesandconcluded:

Argentina and the amicus curiae submissions received by the TribunalsuggestthatArgentina’shumanrightsobligationstoassureitspopulationtheright to water somehow trumps its obligations under the BITs [bilateralinvestment treaties] and that the existenceof thehuman right towater alsoimplicitlygivesArgentinatheauthoritytotakeactionsindisregardofitsBITobligations.TheTribunaldoesnotfindabasisforsuchaconclusioneitherinthe BITs or international law. Argentina is subject to both internationalobligations, i.e. human rights and [investment] treaty obligation, and mustrespectbothofthemequally.31

Inotherwords, thecountry itselfhas tofigureouthowtoreconcile itsvariousinternational legal obligations—several of which may have implications forhumanrights.One exception to the fragmentation challenge, conceptually if not always in

practice,isthecategoryofnormscalled“juscogens,”or“peremptory.”This isthenamegiventonormsofgeneralinternationallawthatpermitnoexemptionunder any circumstances, and which are said to trump any contrary norm,includingtreatyprovisions.32Nodefinitivelistexists,butitisgenerallybelievedto include the prohibition of such egregious conduct as genocide,war crimes,and some crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, at an everyday level “juscogens does not dispose of most ‘ordinary’ value conflicts” among differentbodies of law—for example, between the promotion of free trade and theprotectionof theenvironment—becausemost suchconflictsdonot rise to thatlevel of severity.33 Similarly, the category of jus cogens norms does notencompass the broad spectrum of “ordinary” human rights harms with whichcompaniesmaybeinvolved,andthereforeitdoesn’ttakeusfarenough.In short, at the global level no hierarchy of legal norms can be taken for

grantedbeyondjuscogensnorms.Therefore,abusinessandhumanrightstreaty

would not resolve the type of “regime collision” illustrated by the Argentinewatercase.“Legalfragmentationcannotitselfbecombated,”writetwoleadinglegaltheorists.“Atbest,aweaknormativecompatibilityofthefragmentsmightbe achieved. However, this is dependent upon the ability . . . to establish aspecificnetworklogic,whichcaneffectaloosecouplingofcollidingunits.”34Inother words, the heavy lifting in attempting to reconcile different stateobligations under international law has to take place in the realm of practice,where objectives are defined and can be aligned so as to achieve greater“normative compatibility.” The Guiding Principles begin to address thischallenge.To sumup: International lawhas an important role to play in constructing a

better-functioningglobalregimetogovernbusinessandhumanrights.ButIdidnot believe that promoting some overarching global legal framework forcorporate accountability was a productive objective for my mandate; thefoundationswere lacking, the issues too complex, and states too conflicted; itoffered no short-term benefitswhile posing long-term risks; andwhatever theultimate outcome might be, it would take a long time to get there. Thus,“interim”measureswouldberequiredinanyevent.Thisbringsmetothepolaroppositeofthejuridicalparadigm:voluntarism.

IV.VOLUNTARYINITIATIVES

By the1990s, corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives had emerged inmany sectors of business. Illustrating the trend, eachof the cases discussed inchapter 1—Nike, Bhopal, Shell, and Yahoo—generated campaigns and/orlawsuits against the companies involved, and they, in turn, adopted businessprinciples or codes of conduct pledging to follow responsible practices.Moreover,asnotedintheIntroduction,ageneralpolicyshiftinthe1990stowardgreater reliance on market mechanisms provided government support forvoluntary CSR initiatives rather than mandatory regulations in such areas asbusinessandhumanrights.

Origins

CSRmorphed out of corporate philanthropy. Philanthropy itself becamemorestrategicover timeascompaniesbegan tomakesocial investmentswhere theyoperate.Dependingon industry sector, thismight includebuildinghousing forworkers, community health clinics, schools, and roads, or hooking up nearby

townsandvillagestothecompany’selectricalgridorfreshwatersupplies.Overtime, this practice extended to increasing local procurement and training localsuppliers. From there, two distinct strands emerge, focused on businessopportunity and risk respectively.With regard to the first, social entrepreneursbegantoexperimentwithmicroenterprisessuchasconsumerlendingandmobiletelephonesorotherformsofwhatcametobeknownas“bottomofthepyramidmarketing” or “socially inclusive business models.”35 Most recently, HarvardbusinessguruMichaelPorterhasadvocatedagrandstrategyof“creatingsharedvalue”—companiescreatingeconomicvalueforthemselves“inawaythatalsocreatesvalueforsocietybyaddressingitsneedsandchallenges.”36MymandatewasmeanttoencompassthesecondandlessglamorousCSRstrand:theriskthatcompaniescauseorcontributetoadversesocialimpacts.In response to such risks, companiesbegan to adopt voluntary standards and

verificationschemes.Thesegobeyondmeetinglocallegalrequirements—andinfact they can conflict with them. The antiapartheid campaign against SouthAfrica gave rise to a precursor. The Reverend Leon Sullivan, an African-AmericanpastorinPhiladelphia’sZionBaptistChurchandlongtimecivilrightsadvocate, was appointed to the General Motors Board in 1971. GM was thelargestemployerofblacksinSouthAfricaat thetime.Asanalternativetothepush for divestment from the country, Sullivan developed a code of conductknown as the Sullivan Principles, adopted by more than one hundred U.S.companies operating in South Africa. It demanded nonsegregation in thosecompanies’ workplace facilities, equal treatment and equal pay for equivalentworkregardlessofrace,trainingnonwhitesforbetterjobs,andincreasingtheirnumbersinmanagementpositions.Unilateral company codes for offshore vendors were introduced in the early

1990s; Gap and Nike adopted theirs in 1992. Internal audit teams wereestablished to verify that contractors were complying, and gradually a socialaudit industry emerged. Unilateral efforts were soon followed by collectiveinitiativesinvolvingotherfirmsinthesamesector;thechemicalindustrymovedearly,largelyinresponsetoBhopal.Multistakeholderinitiativeswerepioneeredinthelate1990s.ProminentexamplesincludetheFairLaborAssociation(FLA)to monitor and improve factory conditions in suppliers for certain premiumbrands in the athletic footwear and apparel industry, including Nike, Puma,PhillipsVanHeusen,andPatagonia;andanaccreditationsystemdevelopedbySocial Accountability International (SAI) that allows for compliancecertificationofentirefacilitiesinanyindustry.Fairtradeschemespromisedthat

products were manufactured or grown in accordance with certain social andenvironmental standards. Companies also began to develop more systematicmeans for engaging external stakeholders at global and local levels, enablingthemtobetterunderstandoperatingcontexts,buildtrust,andavoidsurprises.Public-private initiatives came along in the early 2000s. In areas related to

businessandhumanrights,thebestknownaretheKimberleyProcess,intendedto stem the flowof conflict diamonds through a certification and tamperproofpackagingsystem;theExtractiveIndustryTransparencyInitiative,wherebyoil,gas,andminingcompaniesagreetopublishwhattheypaytoparticipatinghostgovernments and those governments commit to certain transparency standardsforthecorrespondingrevenue,inthehopethatthiswillreducecorruption;andthe Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, prescribing vetting,training, and reporting practices for the private and public security forcesextractive companies use to protect their assets. The UN Global Compactbecame a leadingCSRadvocacy and learning forum, aswell as a provider oftoolsforcompaniestomanagesocialandenvironmentalchallenges.Todayitisrareformultinationalcorporationsandmanyotherbusinessesnotto

haveorparticipateinoneormoreCSRinitiatives.Asnotedattheoutsetofthischapter, the business community, led by the major international businessassociations,urged that Idevotemymandate toadvocatingandsupporting thefurther development of voluntary initiatives in the business and human rightsarea, and to identifying and disseminating best practices. In contrast, manyhuman rights organizations were and remain skeptical of such initiativesprecisely because they are voluntary, not legally binding, believing that theypermitcompaniesmerelytoburnishtheirimagewithoutchangingtheirbehavior.

AProfile

AsIdidwiththetreatyroute,IsetoutasbestIcouldtoassessvoluntarismasageneral strategy for advancing the business and human rights agenda. Theempirical literature was (and largely remains) spotty; even today nocomprehensivestudiesexist.Therefore, Iundertook threeprojects in2006and2007.OnewasaquestionnairesurveyoftheFortuneGlobal500firms(FG500);the secondwas aWeb-based surveyof actualCSRpoliciesof abroader crosssectionofmorethan300firmsfromallregions;andthethirdwasaWeb-basedsurvey of the policies of 25majorChinese companies, including inMandarinwherenoinformationinEnglishwasavailable.37Iwantedtoknowwhatifany

humanrightsprovisionscompanieshadadopted,andwhatifanypatternsexistedacross regions and industries. The surveys were hardly exhaustive and thesewerenot“average”firms,buttheresultsdidprovideusefulgrounding.Veryfewcompaniesat thetimehadwhatcouldbedescribedasfullyfledged

human rights policies. But nearly all of the 102 firms that responded to theFG500surveystatedthattheyhadincorporatedsomeelementsofhumanrightsinto their policies and practices. Workplace issues dominated the list. Allrespondents referenced nondiscrimination as a core corporate responsibility, atminimummeaningrecruitmentandpromotionbasedonmerit.Workplacehealthandsafetystandardswerecitedalmostas frequently.Almost three-fourthssaidtheyrecognizedfreedomofassociationandtherighttobargaincollectively;theprohibition against child and forced labor; and the right to privacy. Notsurprisingly,workplaceissuesdominatedinmanufacturingandissuesrelatedtocommunitiesintheextractivesector.Invirtuallyallrespectsthebroadercross-sectionof300companiesroughlytrackedtheFG500patternbutatconsiderablylowerlevelsofadoption—socompanysizeclearlyseemedtomatter.Wheredidthestandardscomefromthatcompaniesreferencedintheircodes?

ILO declarations and conventions topped the list, followed by the UniversalDeclaration.TheGlobalCompactwasalsocited,butbeyondrecapitulatingILOlabor standards, its human rights principles are very general, simply askingcompaniesto“supportandrespecttheprotectionofhumanrights”andtonotbecomplicit inhuman rights abuses committedbyothers.TheOECDGuidelineswerereferencedaswell,butatthatpointtheGuidelinesmerelylinkedcorporatehuman rights responsibilities to thehost country’s human rights commitments,not to any international standards. In any event, companies did not “adopt”international standards in any literal sense; they reported “support” for theprinciplesofthevariousinstrumentstheyinvokedandofbeing“influencedby”them. This couldmake for elastic interpretations: I learned in one admittedlyextreme case that what a company’s code described as “engaging in dialoguewithemployeesaboutissuesofmutualinterest”wasintendedtobeitsversionoffreedomofassociationandcollectivebargaining.PremierinitiativessuchastheFLA and SAI meet or exceed ILO standards, but the number of companiesparticipatinginthemissmall.Despite theproclaimeduniversalityofhumanrights, thepoliticalcultureofa

company’shomecountryseemedtoaffectwhichrightsitrecognized.Europeanmultinationalsweremore likely than theirAmerican counterparts to referencetherightstohealthandtoanadequatestandardofliving.Theywerealsomore

likelytostatethattheirhumanrightspoliciesextendedbeyondtheworkplacetoincludetheirimpactonthecommunitieswheretheyoperate.U.S.andJapanesefirmstendedtorecognizeanarrowerspectrumofrightsandrightsholders.ThemostwidelycitedrightbyChinesecompaniesatthetime—andthatwasbyonly5 in the sample of 25—was the right to development, which few Westerngovernments or companies recognize.38 Moreover, even among companiesdomiciled in the samecountry andoperating in the same sector, theparticularhome market segment also seemed to shape their human rights policies. Forexample,theFG500surveyindicatedthatsomeformofsupply-chainmonitoringwascommon.Anecdotally,itwasknownthatpremiumbrandslikeNike,tradingoncachet,tendedtohavemoreambitioussupply-chainstandardsandprotocolsthanvaluebrandssuchasWalmart,wherepricepointsdominate.Because it isnot uncommon for the same supplier to manufacture for different brands,differentworkers in the same factory, say inChina,Bangladesh, orHonduras,thereforemightbecoveredbydifferentstandards.Howdidthesecompaniesassessandreportontheirhumanrightsimpact?One-

third of theFG500 stated that they routinely included human rights criteria intheirsocialandenvironmentalimpactassessments—althoughIknewofonlyonecompanyat the time that had ever conducted a full-scalehuman rights impactassessmentofamajorproject(BP,ofaplannedliquefiednaturalgasfacilityinthe Indonesian province of Papua). Most FG500 respondents said they hadinternalreportingsystemsinplacetotrackperformance.Three-fourthsindicatedthattheyalsoreportedexternally;ofthose,fewerthanhalfutilizedathird-partymediumliketheGlobalReportingInitiative,whichprovidesdetailedtemplates,orthefarlessdemandingGlobalCompactCommunicationonProgress.Therestissuedvaryingformsofnarrativereports,oftenadornedwithphotosofsmilingchildren,ontheirowncompany-basedWebsitesandperiodicpublications.Here,too, national differences appeared: European companies were more likely toengage in external reporting thanU.S. firms; Japanese companies laggedwellbehindboth; and therewereonly two references to reporting in the sampleofChinesecompanies.I also inquired about stakeholder engagement. Most FG500 respondents

indicated that they worked with external stakeholders in developing andimplementing their human rights policies and practices. U.S. firms weresomewhat less likely to do so than their European orAustralian counterparts,perhaps reflecting the stronger “shareholder”model inU.S. corporate law andculture. Japanese firms lagged behind both. NGOs were the most frequently

mentioned external partner, except by Chinese and Japanese firms. Industryassociationsalsofeaturedprominently.InternationalinstitutionssuchastheUNwere next except forU.S. firms,which ranked them last, behind labor unionsand governments, reflecting the standoffish posture of America’s politicalculturetowardsuchinstitutionsmoregenerally.

Assessment

So what did these surveys indicate about the state of play at the time? Forstarters, they suggested a number of encouraging trends.Most notably, such amapping scarcely would have been possible a decade earlier because therewouldhavebeentoofewdatapoints.Notonlyhaduptakeincreasedrapidly;thescopeofinitiativeswasalsoexpanding.Forexample,whentheleadingbrandsinthe apparel industry first began supply-chainmonitoring, they focused on thefactorieswhere itemsarecutandsewn; then theydiscovered theneed topushfurtherdowntofabricandtextilemills,andtomakersofbuttonsandsuch;mostrecently they have begun to address working conditions on cotton farms.Voluntary initiatives also expanded into the financial sector, initially throughproject lending banks that demand certain assurances with regard to projects’socialandenvironmentalimpacts.YetanotherencouragingfindingintheFG500surveywasthatfewerthanhalf

ofthefirmsthatreportedhavingadoptedelementsofahumanrightspolicysaidthey had themselves experienced what the questionnaire described as “asignificanthumanrights issue.”Thissuggests thatnormdiffusionand learningfromothers’mistakeswastakingplace.NodoubtthiswasfacilitatedbyrapidlyexpandingCSRstaffswithincompanies,anincreaseinnonprofitandfor-profitserviceproviderstoadviseandassistfirms,thedemandsofsociallyresponsibleinvestorsandlargepublicsectorpensionfunds,andthedisseminationactivitiesofentitiesliketheGlobalCompactanditsnationalnetworks,especiallyinkeyemergingmarkets.Clearly, voluntary initiatives were a significant force to build on. But the

surveysalsoindicatedthatintheareaofbusinessandhumanrightstheoveralluniverse of company-based initiatives fell short as a stand-alone approach.Although growing rapidly, the numbers remained small.With few exceptions,managingtheriskofadversehumanrightsimpactswasnotstrategicforfirms;most were still in a reactivemode, responding to external developments theyexperienced or witnessed. Moreover, companies typically determined for

themselvesnotonlywhichhumanrightsstandardstheywouldaddressbutalsohowtodefinethem,andthesecouldreflectthepreferencesofhomemarketsandmarket segments asmuch as the needs of affected people in the host country.External accountability mechanisms for ensuring adherence to voluntarystandards were weak or did not exist at all. From extensive discussions withcompanypersonnel,IalsofoundthatCSRactivitiesasawholetendednottobewell integrated with firms’ core business functions. Finally, business-basedinitiativesrarelyprovidedaffectedindividualsandcommunitieswithanymeansofrecourse.In supply-chain contexts, the fact that different workers in the same factory

couldbecoveredbydifferent codes is inherentlyodd—thougheachcodemaywellexceedlocallyprevailingstandards.Italsocreatedenormousduplicationoffactoryaudits,generating“auditfatigue”onthepartofsuppliers,whichisonereasontheyengageincheatingbykeepingdifferentsetsofbooksandcoachingworkersandmanagershowtorespondtoauditinterviews.AsIwasconductingthis research, groups of companies—including large retailers like Walmart,Tesco, Carrefour, and Migros—were beginning to collaborate on codeconsolidation as a response. But at the same time, leading initiatives like theFLAwerediscoveringthatsupply-chainmonitoringbyitselfdidnotappreciablyimproveperformanceon thefactoryfloor—thatgreater investments in trainingmanagersinbasichumanresourcesskills,letalonehumanrights,wouldalsoberequired. Indeed, they found that thecapacity shortfall thataffectedshop floorperformance included theneed tohavemore andbetter-resourcedpublic laborinspectors.Moreover,thefurthertheleadingbrandsmovedtoexpandtheirCSRscopeand

deepenitsreach—beyondsupplierstothousandsofcottonfarmsandmillionsoffarmers, forexample—themoredaunting their taskbecame.Atminimum, thisrequiredextensivecooperationwithotherbrands,which isnevereasybecausethecompaniesarecompetitors,andalsowithpublicauthorities.Atthattimetheextractivesectorasawholelaggedwellbehindonthelearningcurve.To sum up: Voluntary initiatives emerged relatively quickly and evolved to

includeaspectsofhumanrights.Likeinternationallaw,theyprovideanessentialbuildingblock in anyoverall strategy for adapting thehuman rights regime toprovide more effective protection to individuals and communities againstcorporate-related human rights harm.Butmy research also indicated that theyhad significant and systematic limits, and therefore were not likely bythemselvestobridgebusinessandhumanrightsgovernancegaps.Andyethere,

too,aswith the treatyroute, theanalysisofshortcomingsprovided insightsonhowtoproceed:simplyput, findingways todrivemoreauthoritativeguidanceintomarketpractices.In drawingmy foundational considerations to a close, I advised the Human

RightsCouncilin2007that“nosinglesilverbulletcanresolvethebusinessandhuman rights challenge.Abroadarrayofmeasures is required,byall relevantactors.”39 But, I added, those measures must cohere and generate cumulativeprogressover time.TheCouncil rolledovermymandate for anotheryear andaskedmetocomebackwithspecificrecommendations.

V.CONCLUSION

The debate that pitted “mandatory” approaches against “voluntary” ones hadinducedpolicy stalemate at the international level.Yet neitherwas capable byitselfofnarrowingglobalgovernancegapsinbusinessandhumanrightsanytimesoon.NowIhadanofficialinvitationtoidentifyapathforward.Theoverridinglesson I drew from the assessment of the two approaches was that a newregulatory dynamic was required under which public and private governancesystems—corporate as well as civil—each come to add distinct value,compensateforoneanother’sweaknesses,andplaymutuallyreinforcingroles—outofwhichamorecomprehensiveandeffectiveglobal regimemightevolve,including specific legal measures. International relations scholars call this“polycentric governance.” But practical guidance, not merely a new concept,was needed to persuade governments, the business community, and otherstakeholderstomoveinthisdirection.Onereasonthatexistinginitiatives,publicandprivate,donotadduptoamore

coherentsystemcapableoftrulymovingmarketsisthelackofanauthoritativefocalpointaroundwhichtheexpectationsandbehavioroftherelevantactorscanconverge.Thus,my immediateobjectivewas todevelopandobtainagreementonanormative frameworkandcorrespondingpolicyguidance for thebusinessandhumanrightsdomain,establishingbothitsparametersanditsperimeters.For starters, such a framework needed to spell out the respective

responsibilities of states and business in relation to human rights, and equallyimportant, what actions those responsibilities entailed. Of course, states knewthat their legal duties and policy requirements under the international humanrightsregimeextendedbeyondabusesbystateagents.Butactualstatepracticeindicated that even the most committed had not addressed the full range of

actionstheseimpliedinrelationtobusiness.Foritspart,businessacknowledgedsomeresponsibilityforhumanrights,ifnothingelsebyvirtueofadoptingCSRinitiatives.Buthere, too,actualpractice indicatedconsiderabledivergenceandshortcomings in the understanding of what those responsibilities were andimplied. To avoid ambiguity and strategic gaming on the ground, it also wascriticalthatthetwosetsofobligationsbeclearlydifferentiatedfromoneanother,andthattheyreflectedthedifferentsocialrolesoftheactorswhoareexpectedtomeetthoseresponsibilities.Inaddition,thescopeoftheframeworkhadtocoincidewiththescopeofthe

businessandhumanrightsdomain in tworespects.First,becausebusinesscanaffect virtually all internationally recognized rights, the framework needed toencompass all such rights, not only some arbitrary subset. Second, theframeworkneededtoreachbeyondtherelativelysmallandoftenweakunitsingovernments and business enterprises that currently have responsibility formanagingbusinessandhumanrights: in thecaseofstates, to includeagenciesthat promote trade and investment, or that deal with securities regulation, tomention but a few; and in the case of businesses, to the different businessfunctions that impact directly on workers and communities, companies’ owninternal oversight and compliance systems, as well as closer engagementbetweenbusinessesandtheirinternalandexternalstakeholders.For similar reasons, business andhuman rightswas far toobig for theUN’s

human rights machinery alone. Many other international organizations haddeveloped corporate responsibility standards over time, addressed to theirparticularmissionsandmandates.Ideally,thehumanrightsdimensionsoftheseeffortswouldbecomealignedwiththeUNframework,creatingconvergenceandcumulative effects. This required establishing relationships with thoseorganizationsandconstructing the frameworkasaplatformofcorenormsandpolicy guidance that others could build on in their particular institutionalcontexts.Inaddition,asaninitialpriority,Ideliberatelystressedpreventativemeasures

and alternative dispute resolution techniques, as a complement to, not asubstitutefor,judicialmeasures.Theycanbeestablishedmorereadilythanlegalregimescanbebuiltandjudicialsystemsreformed,andifsuccessfultheyshouldhave the effect of reducing the incidence of harm directly. Moreover, states,firms,andcivilsocietyorganizationscanplayimportantrolesinestablishingandsupportingnonjudicialgrievancemechanismsevenasthelonger-termprojectofjudicialreformandcapacitybuildingcontinues.Iconsideredcloserengagement

between companies and the individuals and communities they impact to be acentralelementinthisstrategy.Therewasoneother requirement: tomove thisagenda forward,governments

wouldhavetoendorsesuchaframework,andgovernmentsweremorelikelytoendorseitifitenjoyedbroadstakeholderbuy-in.ThesewerethekeyaimsbehindtheProtect,RespectandRemedyFramework

andtheGuidingPrinciplesforitsimplementation,towhichIturnnext.

ChapterThree

PROTECT,RESPECTANDREMEDY

Theinternationalcommunityisstillintheearlystagesofadaptingthehumanrights regime to provide more effective protection to individuals andcommunitiesagainstcorporate-relatedhumanrightsharm.Chapter1illustratedhow governance gaps provide permissive environments for wrongful acts bycompanies, even where none may be intended, without adequate sanction orremedy.Inchapter2,Iexplainedwhyneitherthetreatyroutenorthevoluntarycorporate social responsibility approachby itself is likely tobridge thesegapssufficiently anytime soon. A successful way forward, I concluded, needs torecognize,better interconnect,andleveragethemultiplespheresofgovernancethatshapetheconductofmultinationalcorporations.The Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework (Framework) and Guiding

Principles (GPs) for its implementation aim to establish a common globalnormative platform and authoritative policy guidance as a basis for makingcumulative step-by-step, progress without foreclosing any other promisinglonger-termdevelopments.TheFrameworkaddresseswhatshouldbedone;theGuidingPrincipleshowtodoit.Thepresentchapteroutlinestheirkeyfeatures,the thinkingbehindthem,andtheir receptionby themajorstakeholdergroups:states,businesses,andcivilsociety.AlthoughtheGPsincorporateandbuildonthe Framework, for the sake of clarity this chapter separates the Framework’sfoundational considerations from the additional operational guidance providedby theGPs. Chapter 4 provides an analytical reprise of the strategic paths bywhich they were produced, endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council,incorporatedbyotherstandard-settingbodies,andtakenupdirectlybyotherkeyactors.To remind:TheFrameworkand theGPs reston threepillars.The first is the

state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, includingbusinessenterprises, throughappropriatepolicies, regulation, andadjudication.Thesecondisthecorporateresponsibilitytorespecthumanrights,whichmeansthatbusinessenterprisesshouldactwithduediligencetoavoidinfringingonthe

rights of others and to address adverse impactswithwhich they are involved.The third is the need for greater access by victims to effective remedy, bothjudicialandnonjudicial.Eachpillarisanessentialcomponentinaninterrelatedand dynamic system of preventative and remedialmeasures: the state duty toprotectbecauseitliesattheverycoreoftheinternationalhumanrightsregime;thecorporateresponsibilitytorespectbecauseitisthebasicexpectationsocietyhasofbusinessinrelationtohumanrights;andaccesstoremedybecauseeventhemostconcertedeffortscannotpreventallabuse.Forreasonsdiscussedinthepreviouschapter,mystipulationofwhatshouldbe

donewasintendedtobebroadlyconsistentwithexistinginternationallawratherthan to advocate for new legal standards that would either trigger aninconclusivedebateorbeignoredaltogether—andinmyjudgment,thosewouldhavebeentheinevitableoutcomes.ThenormativenoveltywasthewayinwhichtheFramework’scomponentsweredefinedand linked togetherwithina singleandcoherenthuman-rights–compatibletemplate.TheGPsmovemoredirectlyinaprescriptivedirectionbyelaboratinghowexistingcommitmentsmust,should,orcanbemet.

I.THEFRAMEWORK

TheFrameworkidentifiesthelegaldutiesandrelatedpolicyrationalesofstateswithregardtobusinessandhumanrights;theindependentsocialresponsibilitiesofcompanies,particularlymultinationalcorporations,inrelationtohumanrights—where“independent”means that theyexist irrespectiveofwhetherstatesareliving up to their commitments; and the remedialmechanisms associatedwithboth. The Framework establishes foundational principles and also lays downmarkersforanarrayofcomplexandrelativelynewissuesforthehumanrightsfield that would require further development and consideration—several ofwhichwerelatertakenupintheGPs.

TheStateDutytoProtect

In international human rights discourse, states’ legal duties typically aredifferentiated according to the typology of “respect, protect, and fulfill,” withsomeusageadding“promote”betweenthelattertwo.Thecategoryof“protect”referstoprotectionbythestateagainsthumanrightsabusebythirdparties—thatis, by private actors.Much of the early thinking concerning third parties hadfocused on the likes of armed rebel groups. But by definition, third parties

include business enterprises. Thus, the state duty to protect against business-related human rights abuse became the point of departure for the Framework.Thefirststepwastomakeitsmeaningclear,andthentoidentifywaysforstatestodischargethisdutymoreeffectively.The state duty to protect against third-party abuse, including business, is

grounded in international human rights law, both treaty-based and customarylaw. The specific language employed in the main UN human rights treatiesvaries, but all include two sets of obligations. First, the treaties commit statesparties themselves to refrain from violating the enumerated rights of personswithin their jurisdiction (“respect”). Second, the treaties require states to“ensure”(orsomefunctionallyequivalentverb)theenjoymentorrealizationofthoserightsbyrights-holders.1Ensuringthatrights-holdersenjoythoserights,inturn, requires protection by states against other social actors, includingbusinesses,whoseactionsimpedeornegatetherights.Itisgenerallyagreedthatthestatedutytoprotectisastandardofconduct,not

result. What this means in relation to business is that states are not per seresponsiblewhenabusinessenterprisecommitsahumanrightsabuse.Butstatesmaybreach their internationalhumanrights lawobligations if theyfail to takeappropriatestepstopreventsuchabuseandtoinvestigate,punish,andredressitwhenitoccurs;orwhentheactsofanenterprisemaybedirectlyattributabletothestate,forexamplebecauseitmerelyservesasthestate’sagent.Inthissense,states themselves may bear some responsibility for the acts of state-ownedenterprises. Within these parameters, international law gives states broaddiscretionas tohow todischarge theirduty toprotect.Themainhuman rightstreatiesgenerallycontemplatelegislative,administrative,andjudicialmeasures.CurrentguidancefromUNhumanrightstreatybodiesgenerallysuggeststhat

states are not required to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businessesincorporated in their jurisdiction, but nor are they generally prohibited fromdoingsoprovidedthereisarecognizedjurisdictionalbasis—forexample,whereabuses are committed by or against their nationals.We saw in chapter 2 thatsometreatybodiesareincreasinglyrecommendingthatstatesshouldtakestepsto prevent abuse abroad by multinational corporations domiciled in theirjurisdiction. In addition, there are strong policy rationales for home states toencouragesuchcompaniestorespectrightsabroad.Thisisparticularlythecasewhere the state itself is involved in the business venture—whether as owner,investor,insurer,procurer,orsimplypromoter.Doingsogetshomestatesoutofbeing in theuntenablepositionof indirectlycontributing tooverseascorporate

abusethroughitssupportforafirmthatisinvolvedinsuchabuse.Moreover,itcan provide much-needed support to host states that lack the capacity toimplementfullyaneffectiveregulatoryenvironmentontheirown.Inmy2008reportpresenting theFramework, I stipulated this formulationof

the state duty to protect as a foundational element of the international humanrightsregimeasitappliestobusinessenterprises.Thereportwentontosay:

Thegeneralnatureofthedutytoprotectiswellunderstoodbyhumanrightsexpertswithingovernmentsandbeyond.Whatseemslesswellinternalizedisthediversearrayofpolicydomainsthroughwhichstatesmayfulfillthisdutywithregardtobusinessactivities,includinghowtofosteracorporateculturerespectfulofhumanrightsathomeandabroad.Thisshouldbeviewedasanurgentpolicypriorityforgovernments.2

Iidentifiedfoursuchpolicyclustersfocusedonbroadlypreventativemeasures;adjudicationandpunitivemeasuresareaddressed in the“remedy”pillar,alongwithnon-state-basedformsofremediation.The first policy cluster concerns international investment agreements—the

pointofentryforamultinationalcorporation intoahostcountrymarket.Theyinclude state-to-state bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that spell out theprotections accorded by the capital-importing country to investors from thecapital-exporting country, as well as investor-state contracts for specificinvestment projects, such as the delivery of water services or oil and miningconcessions. These agreements protect foreign investors against arbitrarytreatmentbyhostgovernments.Buttheyalsopotentiallyposetwoproblemsforhostgovernments’regulatorypolicyspace.Oneisthattheagreementscanlockinexistingdomestic regulatory requirements for thedurationofaproject, thusallowing the foreign investor to seek exemption fromor compensation for thehostgovernmentadopting,say,anewlaborlaw,evenifitraisescostsequallyonallenterprisesinthecountry,domesticaswellasforeign.Ifthegovernmentdoesnot comply, the investor may be able to sue under binding internationalarbitration, inwhichanadhocpanelofarbitratorsconsidersonly the treatyorcontract text (“the law applicable”), not any broader public interestconsiderationsthatmaybeatstake.Researchconductedbymyteamandothersshowedthatprovisionsprotectingforeigninvestors’interestsandtherulingsofarbitration panels had become increasingly expansive over time, particularlywherehostgovernments lackedbargainingpower.3 In some instanceseven thedefinition of “investor” and “investment” expanded to extend protections to

would-be investors (preestablishment rights), intermediate holding companies,andminorityshareholders—andbyextensionpotentiallytovariousotherformsof economic transactions: “sales presence; market share through trade; loanagreements and construction contracts; promissory notes and other bankinginstruments;andevenestablishinglawfirms.”4Evenwherenoclaimisbroughtagainstthestate, thepossibilityofasuit itselfmayhavechillingeffectsonthewillingness of the host government to adopt adequate regulations in the bestinterestsof itsownpopulation.Thesecondproblemresults fromtheextensivefragmentation within governments, and the greater bureaucratic clout ofinvestmentpromotionpolicyandagenciescomparedtoentitiesconcernedwiththe protection of human rights. This is what the government of South AfricadiscoveredintheBlackEconomicEmpowermentcaseIreferredtoinchapter2.More balanced investment agreements and better alignment among hostgovernmentagenciesandpoliciesarerequiredtoredressbothproblems.The second policy cluster requiring greater attention concerns corporate law

and securities regulation—incorporation and listing requirements, directors’duties, reporting requirements, and related policies. This body of law andregulation directly shapes what companies do and how they do it. Yet itsimplicationsforhumanrightsarepoorlyunderstood.Traditionally,thetwohavebeen viewed as distinct legal and policy spheres, populated by differentcommunities of practice. As a result, there is a lack of clarity in virtually alljurisdictions regarding not onlywhat companies or their directors and officersarerequiredtodoregardinghumanrights,butinmanycasesevenwhattheyarepermitted to do without running afoul of their fiduciary responsibilities toshareholders.Inaddition,thereislittleifanycoordinationbetweenagenciesthatregulate corporate conduct and agencies responsible for implementing humanrightsobligations.Priorto2008ahandfulofgovernmentsandstockexchangesencouraged, and in far fewer cases required, some form of CSR reporting.OtherspromulgatedvoluntaryCSRguidelines.Butrelativelyfewsuchpoliciesreferredspecificallytohumanrights.Forthemostpart,therefore,governmentswerenotprovidingcompanieswithmeaningfulguidanceonhowtododealwiththeirrapidlyescalatinghuman-rights-relatedrisks.ThethirdpolicyclusterIidentifiedasrequiringfurtherdevelopmentconcerns

businessoperations in areas affectedby conflict—over the control of territory,resources, or a government itself. Some of the most egregious human rightsabuses, including those related tobusinessenterprises,occur in suchareas.Aswe saw in chapter 1, people in theDemocraticRepublic ofCongo have been

cursed by awealth of natural resources coupledwith poor and in some areasnonexistent public governance. The international human rights regime cannotpossiblybeexpected to functionas intended insuchsituations.Here thehomestatesofmultinationalsneedtoplayagreaterrole.Buthomestatestypicallylackthe policies, and their embassies the capacity, to advise companies on how toensurethattheyavoidinvolvementinhumanrightsabuseinthosesituations—andtowarncompanieswhentheygettooclosetosuchinvolvement.Fourth, domesticpolicy fragmentation spills over into the international arena

when states participate in multilateral institutions. International human rightsnormsaredebatedintheUNHumanRightsCouncil,tradepolicyintheWorldTrade Organization, and development financing, including private sectorinvestment,intheWorldBankGroup.Thesamecountrymay—andoftendoes—pursue policies in those arenas that are inconsistentwith one another. I had apersonal encounter with this phenomenon in 2011, when some of the samegovernments that supported the GPs at the Human Rights Council in Genevapushed back on the International Finance Corporation moving too far in thesame direction in Washington, D.C. The simple explanation is that HumanRights Council policy is set largely by foreignministries and policies for theWorldBank/IFC by treasury departments. The twomay reflect quite differentinstitutionalinterestsandpriorities.I made no specific recommendations on any of these issues in 2008.Many

wereentirelynewterritoryfor theHumanRightsCouncil,andprogresswouldrequiremoreextensivediscussionsandgreaternationalpolicyalignment.ButIput themon the agenda for further considerationon thegrounds that effectiveresponses to business and human rights challenges required that they beaddressed.Thisbriefformulationofthecoreinternationalhumanrightslawprinciplesand

policyrationalesregardingthestatedutytoprotectwasnotmetentirelywithoutcontroversy. Representatives of several states, including the United Kingdom,questionedwhetherstatesinfacthadageneraldutytoprotectagainstcorporateabuseofhuman rights.5 Theymaintained that the duty is strictly treaty-based,and that thevarious treatiesdiffered in this regard.TheUnitedStates, in turn,challenged my use of the term “jurisdiction” to define the duty’s geographicscope, insisting on “territory.”6 I suspect they had precedents forGuantánamoprisoners in mind—which is not U.S. territory but arguably is under U.S.jurisdiction. Inboth instances Imodified the languageslightly (tightening it inresponse to the first, and using the clumsier formula “territory and/or

jurisdiction” in response to the latter), which sufficed to prevent formalobjectionswhilemaintainingtheessenceofwhatIsoughttoachieve.Fortheirpart, some advocacy groups contended that I understated the extent to whichextraterritorialobligationsonthehomestatesofmultinationalsalreadyexist.Butthatwasa toughsellwhenhomestates thataregenerallysupportiveofhumanrightswerepreparedtochallengeeventheextentoftheduty’sdomesticscope.Atthesametime,states,thebusinesscommunity,andtheadvocacycommunitysupported the emphasis on state duties as the bedrock of protection againstcorporatehumanrightsabuse.

TheCorporateResponsibilitytoRespect

Howdocorporationsfitintothepicture?Companieshavelegaldutiesinrelationtohumanrights.Theyknowtheymustcomplywithallapplicablelawstoobtainand sustain their legal license to operate. For multinationals this includes thelawsofbothhostandhomestates.Wehaveseenthatitmayalsoincludecertaininternational law standards proscribing egregious conduct, enforced in somenational courts. But the international law standards encompass only a narrowrange of conduct; not all states have ratified all international human rightstreaties;andstatesvaryintheirabilityandwillingnesstoenforcetheobligationstheyhaveundertaken.Thisiswheretheindependentcorporateresponsibilitytorespect human rights comes into play. Of the Framework’s three pillars, thisrequired themost significant conceptual departure from standardhuman rightsdiscourse,butitbecameacenterpieceoftheFrameworkandGPs.Prior efforts toestablish standardsgoverningcorporateconduct in relation to

human rights, suchas theNorms, sought to identifya limited listof rights forwhichbusinessenterprisesmightbearresponsibility.Typically,theycoupledthiswith an imprecise and expansive array of corporate duties (in the case of theNorms, “to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of andprotect”). In doing so theyoften blurred the distinctions between legal norms,social norms, and moral claims, seeking to make each equally binding underinternational law. The Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework differs on alldimensions.Ibeginwiththesecond.Within the Framework, the specification of the corporate responsibility to

respecthumanrightsbeginswiththeobservationthatthisresponsibilityalreadyexistsasawell-establishedsocialnorm.Myuseoftheterm“responsibility”wasintended tosignal that itdiffers fromlegalduties.Socialnormsexistoverand

abovecompliancewithlawsandregulations.Andofcoursesomesocialnormsbecomelawovertime;inmanycountriesthereweresocialnormsagainstracialbiasinemployment,forexample,oragainstsmokinginrestaurants,longbeforelawsprohibitedthepractice.Socialnormsexistindependentlyofstates’abilitiesorwillingnesstofulfilltheirownduties.Inthecaseofbusiness,noncompliancewithsocialnormscanaffectacompany’ssocial license tooperate: recall fromchapter 1 that Shell irretrievably lost its social license to operate in Nigeria’sOgoni territory more than a decade before the government revoked its legallicense. Thus, business enterprises are subject to two distinct externalgovernance systems: the system of public law and authority, and a nonstate-basedsocialorcivilsystemgroundedintherelationsbetweencorporationsandtheir external stakeholders. The system of corporate governance reflects therequirementsnotonlyoftheformerbutalsothelatter—invaryingdegrees,tobesure, depending upon circumstances. What was lacking, and what theFramework sought to provide, was a more precise and commonly accepteddefinitionof thecorporateresponsibility torespecthumanrights,whatspecificmeasures it entails, andhow itcanbe linkedmoreeffectivelywith thepublic-lawconstructionofinternationallyrecognizedrights.Butexactlywhatisasocialnorm,howdoweknowthatoneexists,andhow

doesitfunction?Asocialnormexpressesacollectivesenseof“oughtness”withregard to the expected conduct of social actors, distinguishing betweenpermissible and impermissible acts in given circumstances; and it isaccompaniedbysomeprobabilitythatdeviationsfromthenormwillbesociallysanctioned,evenifonlybywidespreadopprobrium.7Now,differentpeopleanddifferent countries may hold different expectations of corporate conduct inrelation to human rights. But one social norm has acquired near-universalrecognitionwithintheglobalsocialsphereinwhichmultinationalsoperate:thecorporateresponsibilitytorespecthumanrights.By “near-universal recognition” I mean two things. First, the corporate

responsibilitytorespecthumanrightsiswidelyacknowledgedbybusinessitself.At the outset of my mandate, I asked the three largest international businessassociations to consult their constituents on the question of what standardsshould apply to business operations in countrieswhere human rights laws arepoorly enforced or don’t exist at all. They submitted an official policy briefstatingthatcompanies“areexpectedtoobeythelaw,evenifitisnotenforced,andtorespecttheprinciplesofrelevantinternationalinstrumentswherenationallawisabsent.”8Moreover,virtuallyeverycompanyandindustryCSRinitiative

acknowledgesthecorporateresponsibilitytorespecthumanrights.Totakejustone example, on human rights day in 2008, the sixtieth anniversary of theadoption of the Universal Declaration, ExxonMobil published a quarter-pageinfomercial on the op-ed page of the New York Times highlighting theFrameworkandstatingthatrespectinghumanrights“isaresponsibilitythatthemore than 80,000 ExxonMobil employees around the world work to upholdeveryday.”9Thecorporate responsibility to respecthumanrights isoneof thecommitments companies undertake in joining the UN Global Compact,expressedinaletterfromtheCEOtotheUNSecretary-General.Itisenshrinedin soft-law instruments, including ILOdeclarations and theOECDGuidelinesforMultinational Enterprises.And it is increasingly reflected in nationalCSRguidelines, including in a growing number of emerging-market-economy anddevelopingcountries.Second,ofall thehuman-rights-relatedexpectations thatdiversepublicsmay

holdof business enterprises, in the global sphere deviation from the corporateresponsibility to respect human rights is the most likely to be sociallysanctioned,which ishowsocial normsare “enforced.”The allegations againstcompaniesmapped in chapter 1were about their not respecting human rights.Advocacycampaignsagainstcompaniesallege failure to respecthumanrights.Complaintsagainstmultinationalsfornotrespectinghumanrightsarebroughttothe National Contact Points under the OECD Guidelines. The $525-billionNorwegianGovernmentPensionFundhasdivested fromcompanies, includingWalmart, for not respecting human rights; for similar reasons the Dutch civilservice pension fund has divested from PetroChina. Socially responsibleinvestmentfundsscreencompaniesforevidencethattheyrespecthumanrights.Moreover,therapidincreaseinCSRinitiatives,whatevertheirlimits,reflects

recognition by companies of their need to develop the capacity to respond tothesesocialcompliancemechanisms. Indeed,mysurveyof theFortuneGlobal500,summarizedinchapter2,indicatedthatroughlyhalfoftherespondentsthathad incorporated human rights elements into their CSR policies did so evenwithout having faced a serious human rights event themselves, presumablylearningfromothers’mistakes.InsomecompaniesCSRstaffreporttothechiefcomplianceofficer.Anda smallnumberofcompanieshaveestablishedboard-levelCSRcommittees.Amongthemaremajorinternationalminingcompanies,none of which is a household name, so mere consumer-oriented brandburnishing cannot be the full explanation. Such steps pull internal oversightresponsibilityupintothehigherlevelsofcorporategovernance.

It is true that thesesocialcompliancemechanismsapplyunevenlyacrossandwithin countries and industry sectors—but that does not differentiate themradicallyfromlegalcompliancemechanismsinmanyjurisdictions.Yetitisalsothe case that their role is greatest precisely in relation to multinationalcorporations operating in countries with weak regulatory environments.Originally, this was due to the fact that transnational social compliancemechanisms—pressure by civil society organizations, organized labor, sociallyresponsibleinvestors,andothers—wererootedinthehomecountriesofWesternmultinationalswherebrand,reputation,andaccesstocapitalmightbeaffected.Butinrecentyears,Chinesecompaniesoperatingin,say,Peru,SouthAfrica,orZambia have begun to encounter resistance from local communities and otherstakeholders that are empowered andmobilized by the very social norms thathad built up around their European and North American counterparts, oftenassistedby transnationalnetworksofcommittedadvocatesandotheragentsofsocialcompliance.10Thus,certaincoresocialnormsregardingcorporateconductare taking root within the transnational economic sphere that multinationalsthemselveshavecreated.In short, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is a widely

recognized and relatively well-institutionalized social norm, particularly inrelation tomultinational corporations.But its implications forwhat companiesneedtodotomeetthisresponsibilityhadneverbeenspelledoutauthoritatively.Thatbecamemynext task.Buildingon thisfoundation, Iadapted thestandardhumanrightsdefinitionof“respect,”elaboratedon thesubstantivecontentandscope of the corporate responsibility to respect, and stipulated the means forcompaniestodischargethisresponsibility.Aswesawinrelation tostates, inhumanrightsdiscourse“respecting”rights

means to not violate them, to not facilitate or otherwise be involved in theirviolation. And it entails a correlative responsibility to address harms that doarise.TheFrameworkparaphrasesthisdefinitioninsimpleandintuitiveterms:asbusinessgoesaboutitsbusiness,itshouldnotinfringeonthehumanrightsofothers.Insomesituationscompaniesmaybeasked,ortheymayvolunteer,todomore than“respect”humanrights.Butnot infringingon the rightsofothers isthe baseline norm with the widest global recognition. Moreover, there is noequivalenttobuyingcarbonoffsetsinhumanrights:philanthropicgooddeedsdonotcompensateforinfringingonhumanrights.Thenextquestionis:towhichhumanrightsdoestheresponsibilitytorespect

rightsapply?Thequest todetermineadelimited listof rights thatare relevant

forbusinessenterpriseshadbeenamajorpreoccupationforsometime,includingby thedrafters of theNorms.But such efforts inevitably run into the fact thatcompaniescanaffectjustabouttheentirespectrumofinternationallyrecognizedrights—the thirty-plus that are so recognized—as we saw in chapter 1.Therefore, any such list will provide inadequate guidance, and as amatter ofprinciple the corporate responsibility to respect human rightsmust include allinternationallyrecognizedrights.Inpractice,somerightswillbeatgreaterriskthanothersinparticularindustriesoroperatingcontexts,andthusshouldbethefocus of heightened attention. Internet service providers are likely to pose agreater risk to privacy rights and freedom of expression than other lines ofbusiness; extractive companies agreater risk in relation to resettlement issues;and athletic footwear manufacturers to rights at work. Likewise, a companyoperatingintheeasternregionoftheDemocraticRepublicofCongoisfarmorelikely to be involved in a range of adverse impacts on human rights than oneoperatinginDenmark.Butbecausenosuchimpactscanberuledoutexantebyanybusinessanywhere,allrightsshouldbeconsidered.Moreover, an authoritative “list” of internationally recognized rights already

exists and does not need to be reinvented. Its core is contained in theInternational Bill of Human Rights (the Universal Declaration and the twoCovenants), coupledwith the ILODeclaration on Fundamental Principles andRights at Work, all of which are widely endorsed by the internationalcommunity. Depending on circumstances, business enterprises may need toconsider additional standards: for example, those found in internationalhumanitarianlawwhentheyoperateinconflictzones;ortherightsofindigenouspeoples where they are affected; or of migrant workers, women, or childrenwhere they require particular attention—all of which are elaborated ininternational instruments. In short, an authoritative list of human rights thatbusinessenterprisesshouldrespectalreadyexists.There had been a long-standing doctrinal debate whether these international

instruments,orwhichprovisionsinthem,applieddirectlytobusinessenterprisesaslegalobligations.Myspecificationof“thelist”circumventedthisdebate.Thepoint is moot when the question is where companies should look for anauthoritative enumeration, not of human rights laws thatmight apply to them,butofhumanrightstheyshouldrespect.Forthepurposesofsocialcompliance,“the list” provides authoritative benchmarks. Several useful efforts have“translated” the list of internationally recognized rights into businessterminologyandfunctions,includingonebyagroupofleadingmultinationalsin

theBusinessLeadersInitiativeonHumanRights.11Having established which human rights corporations must respect, it was

necessary to further clarify the scope of their responsibility. What acts orattributesofcompaniesdoesitencompass,andhowfardoesitextend?Herethedebateprecedingmymandatefocusedonwhetherornottheconcept“corporatesphere of influence” was an appropriate delimitation of scope; indeed, theresolution establishing my mandate specifically requested that I clarify themeaning of the term. In essence, the concept of corporate sphere of influencewas intended as a business analogue to the concept of national jurisdiction:whereas national jurisdiction is defined territorially, the corporate sphere ofinfluence was conceived functionally—the spatial extension over whichcompanies project influence. For reasons elaborated in chapter 2, I found thisformulation highly problematic. Among other things, it would have heldcompanies responsible for things unconnected to their business but which insomesensemightfallwithintheircapacitytoinfluence,whileatthesametimepossibly absolving them from responsibility for adverse impacts where theycouldshowtheylackedinfluence.Moreover,itwouldhaveencouragedendlessstrategicgamingby statesandcompaniesalikeaboutwhowas responsible forwhatinparticularsituations.Instead,Idrewthescopeofthecorporateresponsibilitytorespecthumanrights

from the definition of respect itself: noninfringement on the rights of others.Thus,theFrameworkdefinesscopeintermsoftheactualandpotentialadversehuman rights impacts arising from a business enterprise’s own activities andfrom the relationshipswith thirdpartiesassociatedwith thoseactivities. In thecaseofmultinationalcorporations the“enterprise” isunderstood to include theentirecorporategroup,however it isstructured.Andbusiness relationshipsareunderstood to includebusiness partners, other entities in the enterprise’s valuechain, and anyother nonstate or state entity directly linked to its business.Toadapt the warning sign in the pottery shop, YOU BREAK IT, OR CONTRIBUTE TOBREAKING IT, YOUOWN IT.We sawhowNike’s initial response to the campaignconcerning its Indonesian supplier factories—that it didn’t own the problembecauseitdidn’townthefactories—wassociallyunsustainable.Corporate complicity in human rights abuses can grow out of business

relationships.Thiswasanotherconceptmyoriginalmandateaskedmetoclarify,andonwhichIproducedareportin2008.12Complicityhaslegalandnonlegalpedigrees,andtheimplicationsofbothareimportantforcompanies.Itreferstoindirect involvement by companies in human rights abuse—where the actual

harmiscommittedbyanotherparty,whetherstateagentsornonstateactors,butthe company contributes to it. The legal meaning of “complicity” has beenspelledoutmostclearlyintheareaofaidingandabettingactsthatmayrisetothe level of internationally recognized crimes: knowingly providing practicalassistanceorencouragementthathasasubstantialeffectonthecommissionofacrime—as,forexample,whenChiquitaBrandswasaccusedofrecruitingright-wingparamilitaryforcesinColombiatoprotectitsfacilities,whothenallegedlykilledleft-wingguerillasandlabororganizers.Butevenwherenolawisbroken,corporatecomplicity—contributingtohumanrightsharm,asAppledidwithitspurchasingpracticesfromFoxconn—isanimportantbenchmarkforothersocialactors. Itcan imposereputationalcostsandevenlead todivestment, illustratedbytheexamplesofpensionfundsthatInotedearlier.NowwecometowhatIconsideredtobethemostimportantquestion.Howcan

companies ensure that theymeet their responsibility to respect human rights?Claimsthattheyrespectrightsareallwellandgood.Myquestionstothem:Doyouhavesystemsinplacethatenableyoutosupporttheclaimwithanydegreeof confidence? Can you demonstrate to yourselves that you do, let alone toanyoneelse?Infact,mostcompaniesdidnotandstilldonothavesuchsystems.Andeventhosethatdooftenexhibittheshortcomingsdescribedinthepreviouschapter. To discharge the responsibility to respect human rights requires thatcompaniesdeveloptheinstitutionalcapacitytoknowandshowthattheydonotinfringe on others’ rights. For guidance I looked at systems that companiesalreadyuse tosatisfy themselves inotherdomains that theyareaccountingforrisks.Companieshavelongconductedtransactionalduediligence,toensurethata contemplatedmerger or acquisition, say, has nohidden risks.Starting in the1990s,theybegantoaddinternalcontrolsfortheongoingmanagementofriskstoboththecompanyandtostakeholderswhocouldbeharmedbythecompany’sconduct—for example, to prevent employment discrimination, to complywithenvironmental commitments, or toprevent criminalmisconductbyemployees.Drawingontheseestablishedpractices,Iintroducedtheconceptofhumanrightsdue diligence as a means for companies to identify, prevent, mitigate, andaddressadverseimpactsonhumanrights.But human rights duediligencemust reflectwhat is unique to human rights.

Becausetheaimisforcompaniestoaddresstheirresponsibilitytorespectrights,itmustgobeyondidentifyingandmanagingmaterialriskstothecompanyitself,to include the risks the company’s activities and associated relationshipsmaypose to the rightsof affected individuals andcommunities.Moreover, because

humanrightsinvolverights-holders,humanrightsduediligenceisnotsimplyamatterofcalculatingprobabilities;itmustmeaningfullyengagerights-holdersorotherswho legitimately represent them.And because situations on the groundmay change—often by the sheer fact of a company’s presence—human rightsduediligenceisnotaone-offtask,butmustbeconductedperiodicallyoverthelifecycleoftheparticularproject.I acknowledged that the juxtaposition within the Framework of companies

complyingwith national legal requirements and the corporate responsibility torespecthumanrightsmayposedifficultdilemmasformultinationalcorporationsinsomesituations,becausethetwomayconflict.Theremaybesignificanthostcountry restrictions on freedom of association, gender equality, and privacyrights, for example. Where that occurs, the Framework recommends thatcompanieshonortheprinciplesofinternationallyrecognizedhumanrightstothegreatestextentpossible,andbeabletodemonstratetheireffortstodoso.Atthesametime,theyshouldtreattheriskofbecomingcomplicitinegregioushumanrightsabusescommittedbyanother, including thosehostgovernments’agents,asalegalcomplianceissueandconsiderseveringtherelationshipwheretheriskishigh.Let me sum up how I conceptualized the corporate responsibility to respect

humanrights. Itexists independentlyofandyetcomplements thestateduty toprotect. It is defined in terms of the classic human rightsmeaning of respect:noninfringementontherightsofothers,andaddressingharmsthatdooccur.Itssubstantivecontentconsistsofinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights.Anditsscope follows from its definition: actual or potential adverse human rightsimpacts by an enterprise’s own activities or through the business relationshipsconnected to those activities. This formulation provides greater clarity andpredictabilityforallconcerned,includingbusiness,thanusingeitherthegeneralidea of human rights as moral claims, companies’ own “homemade” humanrightsstandards,oranelusiveandelasticnotionofcorporate“influence”asthebasis for attributing human rights responsibilities to business enterprises. Thisformulation won broad approval, though some business associations andgovernment representatives expressed the concern that human rights duediligence should not increase corporate liability or impose undue burdens onsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises.The fact that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights did not

proposenew legal requirements for businesswas criticizedby some advocacygroups.Andyet it does have “bite”—indeed, it has several bites. First, itwas

precisely this feature thatmade it possible for states and businesses to acceptlinking the content of the responsibility to respect specifically to internationalhuman rights instruments—even thoughnot all stateshave ratifiedall relevanttreaties or voted in favor of all relevant declarations, and even though thoseinstruments generally do not apply legally to companies directly. Second, thisspecificationmade it clear that unless a company can know and show that itrespectshumanrightsitsclaimthatitdoesremainsjustthat—aclaim,notafact.Third,theconceptofhumanrightsduediligencebroughttheissueofidentifyingand addressing companies’ adverse human rights impacts into a familiar risk-basedframingforthem.Anditprovidedthebasisforaprocessstandardthatcanbe adoptedby companies themselves, advocatedby stakeholders, and requiredby governments—which, as discussed below, began to happen almostimmediately.Fourth,duediligencebycompaniescanbeexpectedtoreducetheincidenceof corporate-relatedhuman rightsharm, therebybenefiting impactedindividuals and communities while also lowering the burden on other, moredifficult to construct, regime components. Finally, endorsement of thisspecificationby theUNandother international standard-settingbodiesgave itofficialrecognitioninthesystemofpublicgovernance,thusbeginningtopullitbeyondtherealmof“socialexpectations”fromwhichithademerged.

AccesstoRemedy

Even under the most favorable circumstances, corporate-related human rightsharmwilloccur.Aspartoftheirdutytoprotectunderinternationalhumanrightslaw,statesarerequiredtotakestepstoinvestigate,punish,andredresscorporate-relatedabuseoftherightsofindividualswithintheirterritoryand/orjurisdiction—inshort,toprovideaccesstoremedy.Withoutsuchsteps,thedutytoprotectcouldberenderedweakorevenmeaningless.Thesestepsmaybetakenthroughjudicial,administrative,legislative,orothermeans.Equally,underthecorporateresponsibility to respect human rights, business enterprises should establish orparticipate in effectivegrievancemechanisms for individuals andcommunitiesthat may be adversely impacted, without prejudice to legal recourse. TheFrameworkdifferentiates among three typesof grievancemechanisms throughwhich remedy may be sought: judicial, state-based nonjudicial, and nonstate-based.States often point to the existence of their criminal and civil law systems to

demonstrate that theyaremeeting their internationalobligations in this regard.

But these systems often are weakest where they are most needed. TheFrameworkaffirmsthatstatesmustensureaccesstoeffectivejudicialremedyforhumanrightsabusescommittedwithintheirterritoryand/orjurisdiction,andthattheyshouldconsiderwaystoreducelegalandpracticalbarriersthatcouldleadto its denial. Although the ability of claimants to bring cases againstmultinationalcorporationsin thecourtsof thehomecountryhasexpanded, thepractice remains contested in thebusiness andhuman rights domain.Businessremainsstronglyopposed;homestatesfeardisadvantaging“their”corporations;andhoststatesoftenresistitontheprincipleofnoninterferenceintheirdomesticaffairs. Extraterritorial jurisdiction cases also routinely encounter obstacles oflegal principles, such as how liability is to be attributed amongmembers of acorporate group, which can be difficult to resolve even in purely domesticsituations;aswellasprocedure,suchaswhohasstandingtosue.Anditinvolvesseriousfinancialcostsforallconcerned,aboveallforclaimantsandtheagenciesinvestigating and prosecuting alleged acts that took place overseas. Chapter 4discusseshowIsoughttodealwithsomeoftheseimpediments.Intheareaofbusinessandhumanrightsthepotentialofstate-basednonjudicial

mechanisms,alongsidejudicial,isoftenoverlooked.Theycanplayacomplaint-handlingroleaswellasotherkeyfunctions,includingpromotinghumanrights,offeringguidanceandproviding support tocompaniesaswell as stakeholders.National human rights institutions are one promising vehicle. These areadministrativeentities,establishedconstitutionallyorbystatute,tomonitorandmakerecommendationsregardingthehumanrightssituationintheirrespectivecountries.SomeseventyarefullyaccreditedforcompliancewithUNstandardsfor their independence from,butaccess to,governmental institutions,and theyexist on all continents.Butmany lack themandate to addressbusiness-relatedhumanrightsgrievances,orarepermittedtodosoonlywhenbusinessperformspublicfunctionsorimpactscertainrights.Irecommendedthatthosemandatesbeexpanded.TheNationalContactPoints(NCPs)undertheOECDGuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprisesalsohavethepotentialofprovidingeffectiveremedy.Butpriorto2011theGuidelineshadnohumanrightschapter;theyrequiredthatan “investment nexus” exist, which some NCPs interpreted as ruling outcontractualrelationshipssuchasbetweenabrandanditssupply-chainpartners,as well as lending institutions; and findings against companies lack officialconsequences.AsIwilldiscusslater,IcollaboratedextensivelywiththeOECDonupdatingitsGuidelines.Themostunderdevelopedcomponentofremedialsystemsinthebusinessand

humanrightsdomainisgrievancemechanismsatacompany’soperationallevel.These can be provided directly by a company, through collaborativearrangementswithother stakeholders, orby facilitating recourse to amutuallyacceptedexternalexpertorbody.Asalreadynoted,myownresearchindicatedthat serious human-rights-related confrontations between companies andindividualsorcommunitiesfrequentlybeganaslessergrievancesthatcompaniesignoredordismissed,andwhichthenescalated.Thishasbeenparticularlytruein theextractive industry,aswesaw in thecaseofShell inNigeriaand in theCajamarca example. The same pattern is evident inmany workplace disputesand in other industry sectors. To make it possible for such grievances to beaddressed early and remediated directly, the Framework recommends thatcompanies establish or participate in operational-level grievance mechanisms,withtheprovisothattheymustbedialogue-basedorusethird-partymediationtoavoidhavingcompaniesbethesolejudgeoftheirownactions.

Reactions

The Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework was deliberately heterodoxbecausethestandardrepertoireofresponseshadnotsucceededinestablishingacommonbasisforthinkingaboutbusinessandhumanrightschallenges,letaloneacommonplatformforactingonthem.ProvidingthosewasthemainlegacyIhopedtoleavebehindevenifthemandatehadendedthenandthere.Asitturnedout, in June 2008 the Human Rights Council unanimously “welcomed” theFrameworkandextendedmymandatebyanother threeyears, taskingmewithdevelopingmore concreteguidance for its implementation.Howandwhywasthe Framework received as well as it was in 2008? Chapter 4 maps out thestrategicpathsIfollowedthroughoutthemandate;fornow,Iletrepresentativesofvariousstakeholdersexplaintheirreactions.UnitedNationsHighCommissioner forHumanRightsNaviPillay described

theFrameworkas“animportantmilestone.”13ANorwegiangovernmentwhitepapercalledit“groundbreaking”anddrewonitextensivelyinassessingitsownnational policy.14 In a joint statement the main international businessassociationssaiditprovides“aclear,practicalandobjectivewayofapproachinga very complex set of issues.”15 The Business Leaders Initiative on HumanRightsstatedthattheFramework“movesthebusinessandhumanrightsdebateforwardsignificantlybothbysettingoutthekeyresponsibilitiesofcompaniesinrelationtoallrightstheymayimpactandbystressingthatgovernmentsmustdo

moretofostercorporatecultureswhichrespectrightsandclosethegovernancegaps.”16 Forty socially responsible investment funds sent a joint letter to theHuman Rights Council stating that the Framework aided their work bypromotinggreaterdisclosureofadversecorporatehumanrightsimpactsaswellasappropriatestepstomitigatethem.AjointstatementbyleadinghumanrightsNGOsfoundtheFrameworktobe“valuableandmeritingfurtherattention.”17Aseparate statement by Amnesty International said the Framework “has thepotentialtomakeanimportantcontributiontotheprotectionofhumanrights.”18NGOsand internationalworkers organizationsbegan to use theFramework intheir advocacy, governments in policy reviews, and companies in internal gapanalyses. Not long thereafter, the United Kingdom’s National Contact Pointunder the OECD Guidelines issued a finding against Afrimex, a UK-basedminerals-trading company, for failing to exercise adequate human rights duediligenceinitssupplychainintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo,anddrewthecompany’s attention to the Framework for the core elements of a sociallyresponsiblecorporatepolicy.19TheGuidingPrinciplesbuiltonthisfoundation.

II.GUIDINGPRINCIPLES

These positive reactions to the Framework indicated that themajor players inbusiness and human rights found it to be new and useful. Though differencesamong them remained, the divisiveness and discourse disconnects of theprevious decade had yielded to a common conversation.My stressing that theFrameworkdidnotcreatenew legalobligationsundoubtedlycontributed to itsacceptancebygovernmentsand thebusinesscommunityevenas it limited theenthusiasm of some advocacy groups. The next phase would be trickier,however, because it was intended to bemore prescriptive. In developing it, Iimplicitlydrewonananalyticaldistinctionfromtheacademicstudyofnorms:between “the logic of consequences” and “the logic of appropriateness.” Theformerreferstoconductbasedonexpectedgainsandlosses.Incontrast,underthe logic of appropriateness “notions of duty, responsibility, identity andobligations[also]maydrivebehavior.”20Reflectingonthisdistinctionsuggestedthe following questions for the next phase: given the widely supportedcommitments embedded in the Framework, what are the “appropriate” stepsrequired to move toward their realization? What additional concrete acts dothesecommitmentsimply?TheGPsthenelaboratedonthoseimplications.

However,Ishouldaddthatthiswouldnotsimplybeanexerciseinpurelogic—which some of my friends in the academic world did not fully appreciatewhennotingmyfailuretoprovidearobustmoraltheoryorafullschemefortheattribution of legal liability to underpin the Framework. The reason isstraightforward: in order tomaximize the prospect that states, businesses, andotherrelevantactorsadoptandactontheGPs,IwouldhavetogorightbacktotheHumanRightsCouncilforitsup-or-downvoteonwhethertoendorsethem.Council members and others seeking to influence their decisions could beexpected toadherenotonly to“the logicofappropriateness”butalso toapply“the logic of consequences” in judgingmy proposals—calculations of how itwould affect them specifically. Accordingly, the GPs needed to be carefullycalibrated:pushingtheenvelope,butnotoutofreach.TheGPsand relatedCommentaries are lengthyandcomplex, and theycame

with a companion report plus four even longer addenda providing additionalinformationandguidanceonspecificelements.Thefollowingsummarycandonomorethanhighlightthekeyprovisionsundereachofthethreepillars.Iciteportionsof theGPs’ text to convey a senseof the actual language theHumanRights Council and other stakeholders had in front of them in reaching theirdecisions.

TheStateDutytoProtect

TheGuidingPrinciples reaffirm the foundational elements of the state duty toprotect, as described earlier in this chapter. Then they lay out a series ofregulatoryandpolicymeasuresforstatestoconsiderinmeetingthisduty;stressthe need to achieve better internal alignment among relevant national (andinternational) policy domains and institutions; and introduce the idea that insome circumstances states should require companies to exercise human rightsduediligence.This setofGPscanbedivided into twobroadcategories: thosethat are generally applicable in any situation, and additional provisions forparticulartypesofsituations.TheGPsremindstatesoftheneedtoenforceexistinglawsthatalreadyregulate

business respect for human rights (for example, labor, nondiscrimination, andcriminallaw),andtoreviewwhethertheselawsprovidethenecessarycoverageinlightofevolvingcircumstances(GP3a).Butweknowthatbusinessconductisdirectlyshapedbyareasoflawandpolicythatarelargelysilentonthesubjectofhumanrights.Therefore,theGPsalsostipulatethatstatesshould:

• Ensure that other laws and policies governing the creation and ongoingoperationofbusinessenterprises,suchascorporatelaw,donotconstrainbutenablebusinessrespectforhumanrights[GP3b].

Doing this, in turn, requiresbetter alignment among the relevant state entities.Thus:

• States should ensure that governmental departments, agencies and otherState-based institutions that shape business practices are aware of andobserve the state’s human rights obligationswhen fulfilling their respectivemandates, including by providing them with relevant information, trainingandsupport[GP8].

Better alignment also requires that “states shouldmaintain adequate domesticpolicy space to meet their human rights obligations when pursuing business-relatedobjectiveswithotherstatesorbusinessenterprises,forinstancethroughinvestment treatiesor contracts” (GP9).Thisprovisionaddresses theneed forhostgovernmentstoavoidsigningoverlyrestrictiveinvestmentagreementsthatconstrain their ability to adopt bona fide public interest legislation andregulation,includingforhumanrightsprotection,underthethreatofbeingsuedby foreign investors because the measures alter the economic equilibriumassumedunderaninvestmentagreement.In provisions that are applicable to all business enterprises but which are

particularlyrelevantformultinationalcorporations,theGPsstipulate:

• States should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprisesdomiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rightsthroughout their operations [GP 2]; [and they should] provide effectiveguidancetobusinessenterprisesonhowtorespecthumanrights throughouttheiroperations[GP3c].

The Commentary summarizes a distinction I drew in my 2010 report andelsewhere, betweendomestic policymeasures that have extraterritorial effects,and actually adjudicating conduct in one’s own courts that took place withinanother jurisdiction, pointing out that the former do not raise the samejurisdictionalchallengesasthelatter.Forexample,asecuritiesregulatoriswellwithin its authority in imposing disclosure rules on companies listed in itsjurisdiction, whether domestic or foreign, requiring them to report on certaintypesormagnitudesofriskintheirentireglobaloperations,onthegroundsthat

domestic investorsneedtobe informedaboutandprotectedagainstsuchrisks,no matter where they may be incurred. This section of the Commentary wasintended toencouragestates toexplore theuseofsuchmeasures in relation tosignificant human-rights-related risks posed by companies throughout theiroperations.In addition to these general provisions, the GPs also address two types of

situationalvariants:onewherethestateisitselfinvolvedinabusinessventure,andtheotherwherebusinessoperationstakeplaceinconflict-affectedareas.TheCommentaryobservesthatstatesindividuallyaretheprimaryduty-bearers

underinternationalhumanrightslaw,andcollectivelytheyarethetrusteesoftheinternational human rights regime. Moreover, where the acts of a businessenterprisecanbeattributedtothestate,ahumanrightsabusebytheenterprisemay also entail a violation of the state’s own international law obligations.Therefore:

•Statesshouldtakeadditionalstepstoprotectagainsthumanrightsabusesbybusinessenterprisesthatareownedorcontrolledbythestate,orthatreceivesubstantial support and services from state agencies such as export creditagenciesandofficial investment insuranceorguaranteeagencies, including,whereappropriate,byrequiringhumanrightsduediligence[GP4].

TheCommentarymakes itclear that thephrase“whereappropriate”applies tosituations “where the nature of business operations or operating contexts posesignificantrisktohumanrights.”TheGPsalsoaddthatstatesdonotrelinquishtheirinternationalhumanrightsobligationswhentheyoutsourcethedeliveryofservices that may impact upon the enjoyment of human rights (GP 5)—forexample,whentheyprivatizeprisonsorwaterdeliveryservices—butthatstatesare required to provide continued oversight; and that states “should promoterespect for human rights by business enterprises with which they conductcommercialrelations”(GP6),asingovernmentprocurement.From the outset of themandate I made the case that business operations in

conflict zones require special attention from states and businesses alike. AlengthyGuidingPrincipleaddressespreventativestepsstatesshouldtake(again,judicial recourse isaddressedunder“remedy”).Although theprovisionappliesto all states, it has particular relevance for home states of multinationalcorporations,bothatthelevelofthecapitalandthroughin-countryembassyorconsularservices:

• Because the risk of gross human rights abuses is heightened in conflict-affectedareas,statesshouldhelpensurethatbusinessenterprisesoperatinginthosecontextsarenotinvolvedwithsuchabuses,includingby:(a)Engaging at the earliest stagepossiblewithbusiness enterprises tohelpthemidentify,preventandmitigatethehumanrights-relatedrisksoftheiractivitiesandbusinessrelationships;

(b) Providing adequate assistance to business enterprises to assess andaddress the heightened risks of abuses, paying special attention to bothgender-basedandsexualviolence;

(c)Denying access to public support and services for a business enterprisethatisinvolvedwithgrosshumanrightsabusesandrefusestocooperateinaddressingthesituation;

(d) Ensuring that their current policies, legislation, regulations andenforcement measures are effective in addressing the risk of businessinvolvementingrosshumanrightsabuses[GP7].

As a supplement to the GPs, I appended a separate, more detailed report onbusinessandhumanrightsinconflict-affectedregions.

TheCorporateResponsibilitytoRespect

In the fall of 2010, not long before posting a discussion draft of theGuidingPrinciples, I previewed their core message for the corporate responsibility torespect in my annual remarks to the UN General Assembly: “The era ofdeclaratory CSR is over,” I stated. “The corporate responsibility to respecthuman rights cannot bemet bywords alone: it requires specificmeasures bymeansofwhichcompaniescan‘knowandshow’thattheyrespectrights.”21Inall,14ofthe31GPsareaddressedtobusiness.TheyreaffirmtheFramework’sfoundationalconceptsandelements,andlayoutspecificstepsentailedbythem.Thesecomprise threemainparts:apolicycommitmentbybusinessenterprisestomeettheresponsibilitytorespecthumanrights;ahumanrightsdue-diligenceprocesstoidentify,prevent,mitigate,andaccountforthewaytheyaddresstheirimpactsonhumanrights;andprocessestoenabletheremediationofanyadversehumanrights impact theycauseor towhich theycontribute (GP15).TheGPsstresstheneedtoengageaffectedindividualsandcommunitiesinameaningfulway at several stages throughout the process, thereby strengthening the linksbetweenbusinessesandtheirworkersaswellasbusinessesandthecommunitiesinwhichtheyoperate.

An explicit policy commitment is necessary in order to embed theresponsibilitytorespecthumanrightswithinacompany.TheGPsprovidethatitshouldsetout thecompany’sexpectationsofpersonnel,businesspartners, andotherpartiesdirectlylinkedtoitsoperations,products,orservices;beapprovedbyseniormanagement; informed by internal andexternal sourcesof expertise;communicatedtoallrelevantparties;andreflectedinthecompany’soperationalpoliciesandprocedures(GP16).Themeans for companies to “knowand show” that they respect rights is by

exercising human rights due diligence: “The process should include assessingactual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon thefindings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed”(GP17). Potential adverse impacts should be addressed through prevention ormitigation.Actualimpacts,thosethathavealreadyoccurred,shouldbeasubjectfor remediation. “Human rights due diligence can be included within broaderenterprise risk-management systems, provided that it goes beyond simplyidentifyingandmanagingmaterialriskstothecompanyitself,toincluderiskstorights-holders”(GP17,Commentary).Additionally,humanrightsduediligence:

(a)Shouldcoveradversehumanrightsimpactsthatthebusinessenterprisemaycauseorcontribute to through itsownactivities,orwhichmaybedirectlylinkedtoitsoperations,productsorservicesbyitsbusinessrelationships;

(b)Willvaryincomplexitywiththesizeofthebusinessenterprise,theriskofseverehumanrightsimpacts,andthenatureandcontextofitsoperations;

(c) Should be ongoing, recognizing that the human rights risks may changeover time as the business enterprise’s operations and operating contextevolve[GP17].

Thus, the due-diligence requirement applies not only to a company’s ownactivities,butalsotothebusinessrelationshipslinkedtothem—forexample,itssupply chain, security forces protecting company assets, and joint venturepartners. The Commentary elaborates that where a company causes orcontributes toanadverse impact, itshould take thenecessarysteps toceaseorprevent the impact. Where a company neither causes nor contributes to anadverseimpact,butitsoperations,products,orservicesaredirectlylinkedtotheimpactthroughanotherentityinitsvaluechain—forexample,asupplierusingbondedlabor,unknowntothecompanyandinviolationofcontractualterms—thecompanyshouldusewhatever leverage ithasover thatentity topreventor

mitigatetheimpact,andifitisunsuccessful,itshouldconsiderterminatingtherelationship(GP19,Commentary).22The Commentary also indicates that for small companies due diligence

typicallywillremaininformal.Attheotherendofthesizespectrum,whereanenterprise has large numbers of entities in its value chain that wouldmake itunreasonably difficult to conduct ongoing due diligence across them all, theprocessshouldidentifyareaswheretheriskofadversehumanrightsimpactsismost significant, whether due to the operating context or to the nature of theproductorservice,andprioritizethose.Each of the components of human rights due diligence—from assessing

impacts to communicating results—is spelled out in a separate GP andCommentary, which can only be telegraphed here. Assessment means “tounderstand the specific impacts on specific people, given a specific context ofoperations” (GP 18, Commentary.) Depending on the size of the businessenterprise and the nature and context of its operations, assessments shouldinvolvemeaningfulengagementwithpotentiallyaffectedindividualsandgroups(GP 18); where that is not possible, legally or logistically, other relevantstakeholdersorindependentexpertsshouldbeconsulted.Integratingandactinguponthefindingsofhumanrightsimpactassessmentsrequiresthatthecompanyassign specific responsibilities across business functions and within corporatereporting lines, and that these are enabled by adequate internal budgetallocations,incentivesystems,andoversightprocesses(GP19).Conducting appropriate human rights due diligence should help companies

address the risk of legal claims against themby showing that they took everyreasonable step to avoid involvement with an alleged human rights abuse.However,theyshouldnotassumethat,byitself,thiswillautomaticallyabsolvethemfromliability forcausingorcontributing tohumanrightsabuses (GP17,Commentary).Evenwith the best policies and practices in place, a companymay cause or

contributetoanadversehumanrightsimpactthatithasnotforeseenorbeenabletoprevent.Therefore:

•Wherebusinessenterprises identify that theyhavecausedorcontributed toadverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate in their remediationthroughlegitimateprocesses[GP22].

Moreover:

•Where it is necessary to prioritize actions to address actual and potentialadverse human rights impacts, business enterprises should first seek toprevent andmitigate those that aremost severe orwhere delayed responsewouldmakethemirremediable[GP24].

Severity is defined in terms of the scale, scope, and irremediable character ofimpacts(GP14,Commentary);anditisintendednotasanabsoluteconcept,butrelative toanyotherhumanrights impacts thecompanyhas identified (GP24,Commentary).Verifying that adverse impacts are being addressed should involve affected

stakeholders(GP20).Finally,companiesshoulddisclosesufficientinformationtomakeitpossibletoevaluatetheadequacyoftheirresponsetoadverseimpacts,particularlywhen concerns are raised by or on behalf of affected stakeholders(GP 21). Finally: “Formal reporting by enterprises is expectedwhere risks ofsevere human rights impacts exist, whether this is due to the nature of thebusinessoperationsoroperatingcontexts”(GP21,Commentary).

AccesstoRemedy

Intheidealworld,state-basedjudicialandnonjudicialmechanismswouldformthefoundationsofawidersystemofremedyforcorporate-relatedhumanrightsabuse. Within such a system, company-level grievance mechanisms wouldprovideearly-stage recourseandpossible resolution inat least some instances.Collaborative initiatives, whether industry-based or multistakeholder incharacter,would contribute in a similarmanner. But “reality falls far short ofconstitutingsuchasystem,”Iconcludedinmy2010reporttotheCouncil.Thestatedutytoprotectrequiresstatestoprovideforaccesstoremedy,andthe

GPs reaffirm thisobligation.TheGPsalsourge states to“not erectbarriers topreventlegitimatecasesfrombeingbroughtbeforethecourtsinsituationswherejudicialrecourseisanessentialpartofaccessingremedy”(GP26,Commentary).The text elaborates on several key legal and practical barriers I raised in theFramework, drawing on extensive research and also collaborative work withhuman rights organizations.23 The challengewas to identify barriers thatwerespecificto,orparticularlyproblematicin,thebusinessandhumanrightsdomain.Clearly, itwasnotpossible topromoteuniformanswers tocertainquestions—such as class action provisions—given the sheer diversity of national legalsystems,andtheimplicationsofanysuchrecommendationsinawholehostofotherareasofthelawapartfromhumanrights.Buttheexperienceofadvocates

andmyownresearchdididentifyseveralbarriersthatneededtobeaddressed.Forexample,Ihighlightedsituations“whereclaimantsfaceadenialofjustice

inahoststateandcannotaccesshomestatecourtsregardlessofthemeritsoftheclaim” (GP 26, Commentary) because of objections to extraterritorialadjudication.Nevertheless,havingexploredthischallengeextensivelyandwitha broad spectrum of governments, other stakeholders, and legal experts, Iconcludedthatitwasnotpossibletoreachaconsensusonitamonggovernmentsatthistime,andthatmyputtingforwardanoverlyprescriptiverecommendationintheGPscouldwelljeopardizetheentireinitiativebecausetheHumanRightsCouncilprocessdictatedthatstateseithersupportorrejecttheGPsasawhole.Therefore, in a separate note I was invited to submit to the Council offeringsuggestions for the follow-up process to my mandate, I proposed thatgovernments consider the possibility of “an intergovernmental process ofdrafting a new international legal instrument” to establish clearly “theapplicability tobusinessenterprisesof internationalstandardsprohibitinggrosshumanrightsabuses,potentiallyamountingtothelevelofinternationalcrimes,”and—importantly—clarity over who may take jurisdiction under whatconditions.24Ireturntothisinitiativeinchapter5.On thenonjudicial front Iwasable todrawon severalyearsof researchand

pilotprojectsconductedbythemandatetospecifyasetofeffectivenesscriteriafor grievance mechanisms. Whether state-based or nonstate-based, suchmechanismsshouldbe:

(a)Legitimate:enablingtrustfromthestakeholdergroupsforwhoseusetheyare intended, and being accountable for the fair conduct of grievanceprocesses;

(b)Accessible:beingknowntoallstakeholdergroupsforwhoseusetheyareintended, and providing adequate assistance for those who may faceparticularbarrierstoaccess;

(c) Predictable: providing a clear and known procedure with an indicativetimeframe foreach stage, andclarityon the typesofprocessandoutcomeavailableandmeansofmonitoringimplementation;

(d)Equitable:seekingtoensurethataggrievedpartieshavereasonableaccessto sources of information, advice and expertise necessary to engage in agrievanceprocessonfair,informedandrespectfulterms;

(e)Transparent:keepingpartiestoagrievanceinformedaboutitsprogress,andproviding sufficient information about the mechanism’s performance to

buildconfidenceinitseffectivenessandmeetanypublicinterestatstake;(f) Rights-compatible: ensuring that outcomes and remedies accord withinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights;

(g)Asourceofcontinuouslearning:drawingonrelevantmeasurestoidentifylessonsforimprovingthemechanismandpreventingfuturegrievancesandharms;

Operational-levelmechanismsshouldalsobe:

(h)Basedonengagementanddialogue:consulting thestakeholdergroupsforwhoseusetheyareintendedontheirdesignandperformance,andfocusingondialogueasthemeanstoaddressandresolvegrievances[GP31].

Reactions

Having conducted forty-seven formal consultations around the world, madenumerous visits to key capitals, and maintained close informal contacts withgovernments, their Human Rights Council representatives, and otherstakeholdersthroughoutthesixyearsofthemandate,IwasquiteconfidentthattheCouncilwouldsupport theGPs.Theoutstandingquestionswerewhether itwould be a divided vote—and if so, the number and relative importance ofnegative votes—and what verb the Council would use to express its support.Verbs in UN resolutions matter for legitimacy purposes. The Framework hadbeen“welcomed,”whichishighpraise.Arelativelygoodresponseis“takenotewith interest.”Merely to “take note”means that the effortmay have been fornaught. Anything less amounts to an outright rejection, as happened to theNormsinitiativediscussedinthepreviouschapter.Inordertoestablishthemostrobust foundation possible, I proposed “endorse” to my mandate’s sponsors,eventhoughithadneverbeenusedinrelationtoatextthatgovernmentsdidnotnegotiate themselves. Norway led the way in promoting the idea and thesponsors were persuasive: the Council decision was unanimous and the verbusedwas“endorse.”BythetimeoftheCouncilvoteinJune2011,statementsofsupporthadbeen

issued by business associations, individual companies, corporate law firms,sociallyresponsibleinvestmentfunds,pensionfunds,andworkersorganizations—fromtheUnitedStatesandCanada,numerousEuropeanandLatinAmericancountries, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Russia, and South Africa amongothers.25Forexample,GEwrote that theGuidingPrinciples“will furtherhelp

businessentitiesandgovernmentsoperationalize their respectiveapproaches tohumanrightsinabusinesscontext,aswellasrespondtotheneedforremedieswhere deprivations nevertheless occur.” Clifford Chance, the world’s largestcorporate law firm, said theGPs “provide immediately useful guidance to thebusinesscommunityand the legalprofessionon the stepswhichbusiness (andtheir professional advisors) should take in pursuit of their responsibility torespecthumanrights.”TheCEOofSakhalinEnergyinRussiawrote:“ItismysincerehopethattheHumanRightsCouncilwillendorsetheGuidingPrinciples. . . helping to establish them as the authoritative reference point for states,companies and civil society.” The International Trade Union Confederationadded: “The ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’ adopted in 2008changed theentirediscussiononhuman rights andbusiness in apositiveway.We see the Guiding Principles as the next important step at the internationallevel.”SomeoftheinternationalhumanrightsNGOswerelessenthusiastic.Inajoint

statement at the time ofmy final presentation to the Council, several leadingadvocacygroupsacknowledgedthattheGPs“doaddressarangeoftopicsinauseful manner; however some important issues that merit attention are notadequately reflected or addressed,” chief among them being an internationallegal instrumentcoveringbusinessandhuman rights.AnumberofNGOsalsofelt leery about operational-level grievance mechanisms, arguing that thesewould reflect the power imbalance between companies and rights-holders andfearing that theymightbecomesubstitutes for judicialprocesses—thoughbothof these issues are specifically addressed in theGPs’ provisions for how suchprocessesshouldbestructured.Agroupofanticorporate-antiglobalizationNGOsactually urged the Council to reject the GPs on grounds of their“insufficiencies.”TheuptakeoftheGPsbyotherinternationalstandard-settingbodieswasswift;

chapter4describesingreaterdetailhowthiscameabout.ISO,theInternationalOrganizationforStandardization,hadadoptedasocialresponsibilitystandardinlate 2010, approved by 93 percent of its national member bodies, includingChina. It explicitly drew upon, and is fully aligned with, the Framework’ssecond pillar, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights—using thesameconcepts,definitions,andrequiredstepsfordischargingtheresponsibility.The significance of ISO standards is that they have particular appeal in Asiabecauseof theirhistorical emphasisonqualitymanagement systems thatgrewout of Japan’s experience of becoming an industrial powerhouse; and they

engage an established global consulting industry that provides complianceadvicetocompanies.As already noted, the OECD updated its Guidelines for Multinational

EnterprisesinMay2011.Chairingtheministerialmeetingatwhichthedecisionwas taken,U.S.SecretaryofStateHillaryClintonsaid:“Thecurrentupdate isparticularlynotableforitsincorporationofanewhumanrightschapter,drawingon theGuidingPrinciples forbusinessandhumanrightsdevelopedby theUNSpecialRepresentative forHumanRights andBusiness, JohnRuggie, and theincorporationofguidanceonexercisingduediligence in thecontextof supplychainrelationships.”26TheOECD’suniquecontributionliesinthefactthattheforty-twoadheringgovernmentsarerequiredtomaintainadesignatedofficetowhich complaints of noncompliance may be brought against multinationalsdomiciled in thosecountries,wherever theymayoperate.TheGuidelines’newhuman rights chapter, due diligence requirement, and explicit extension toinclude supply chains, drawn from the GPs, expands the scope of thismechanism.TheInternationalFinanceCorporationadoptedanew“sustainabilitypolicy”in

mid-2011thatforthefirsttimerecognizesthebusinessresponsibilitytorespecthuman rights. Again, the core concepts are identical to the GPs: theresponsibility exists independently of states’ duties; “respect” means to avoidinfringingontherightsofothers;andthe“list”ofhumanrightsisprovidedbytheInternationalBillofHumanRightsandtheILO’seightcoreconventions.27Theperformance standards the IFC requires its clients tomeet includehavingadequate due-diligence systems for the assessment andmanagement of socialand environmental risks, and they are tracked by more than seventy privatesector financial institutions and by several regional development fundingagencies and national export credit agencies. Thus, the significance of thisdevelopmentliesinthefactthatitcanaffectcompanies’accesstocapital.InOctober2011, theEuropeanCommission issued“ARenewedEUStrategy

2011–2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility.”28 It abandons the EU’s priorbifurcation ofmandatory and voluntary approaches to corporate responsibility,whichIhadcriticizedinaspeechattheEuropeanParliament.29Anditproposes“risk-based due diligence” for business enterprises, “including through theirsupply chains,” referencing the updated OECD Guidelines, the UN GuidingPrinciples, and ISO 26000 among sources for “authoritative guidance.” Thestrategy document is intended to serve as the basis for EC work in this areaduringthenextphase,includinganypossiblenewregulatoryproposals.

Theconceptofhumanrightsduediligencehashadparticularresonance.MarkTaylor, of theNorwegian research institute Fafo, haswritten that “multilateralorganizations,businessassociations,governments,andNGOslatchedonto theconcept of due diligence as the solution to one of the more vexing issues ofcorporate responsibility, that of companies sourcingmetals andminerals fromwar zones where serious human rights abuses and armed conflicts wererampant.”30He traces apath from the concept’s introduction and specificationbymymandatetoOECDworkonresponsiblesupplychainsofminerals,whichwas subsequently endorsed by the eleven member states of the InternationalConferenceontheGreatLakesRegioninCentralAfrica;thenfounditswayintoUN Security Council Resolutions on minerals exploitation in the DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo;andultimatelyintoSection1502oftheDodd-FrankWallStreetReformAct,which includes a due-diligence requirement forU.S.-listedcompaniessourcingmineralsfromconflict-affectedareas in theCongo.GlobalWitness, a British NGO focused on the role of natural resources in fuelingconflict and corruption, played a key role in connecting these dots. Taylorconcludes:“Thus,evenbeforetheGuidingPrincipleswereaddressedbytheUNHumanRightsCouncilinJune2011,coreelementsofthebusinessresponsibilityto respect human rights were being integrated into national and internationallegislation.”31

III.CONCLUSION

Attheendoftheday,whataretheseGuidingPrinciples?Whatdotheydo?Andhowaretheyexpectedtoachievetheiraim?Clearly,theGuidingPrinciplesarenot an international treaty, although they include both hard- and soft-lawelements.Nor are they intended to be a tool kit, its components simply to betakenofftheshelfandpluggedin,althoughtheyaremeanttoguidepolicyandpractice.TheGuidingPrinciplesconstituteanormativeplatformandhigh-levelpolicy prescriptions for strengthening the protection of human rights againstcorporate-related harm. They provide a foundation for expanding theinternational human rights regime to encompass not only countries andindividuals,butalsocompanies.Indoingso,theyembracethemoralvalueandintrinsicpoweroftheideaofhumanrights,butalsorecognizethatinthecontextoftheglobaleconomyhumanrightscanberealizedinrelationtobusinessonlyby leveraging the multiple governance systems that shape the conduct ofmultinational corporations: public, civil, and corporate. Maximizing their

combined leverage, however, requires a common platform from whichreinforcing effects and cumulative change can be generated. TheGPs providethatcommonplatform.Andyetitisessentialthatthiscommonplatformrestonclearlydifferentiated

pillars—or bases of obligation. The corporate responsibility to respect humanrightsexistsindependentlyofthewillingnessorcapacityofthestatetoexerciseits duty to protect human rights. Likewise, the state duty to protect existsindependently of whatever influence corporations may choose or be able toexercise over the state. For similar reasons it is also important to differentiatebetween preventative measures and remedy, and on the remedy side betweenjudicialandnonjudicialforms.Providingjudicialremedyisastateduty.Accesstojudicialremedyisanentitlementofhuman-rights-holders.Beyondthat,states,businesses, and civil society all have roles to play in relation to preventativemeasures and nonjudicial remedy, including operational-level grievancemechanismsinwhichcompaniesmayparticipatetoprovideearly-stagerecourse.Theyallmayhavedifferentrationalesfordoingso,andthoserationalesneedtobemobilized if theoveralleffort is to succeed. In sum, theGuidingPrinciplesarebasedondistinctyetcomplementarypillars,forminganintegrated,logicallycoherent,andcomprehensiveplatformforaction.The Guiding Principles take us beyond the stalemate induced by the

mandatory-vs.-voluntary divide. They reaffirm that the state duty to protecthumanrightsincludesthecreationoflegallybindingrulesandtheprovisionofeffective judicial remedy. They frame the corporate responsibility to respecthumanrightsintermsofrisk-basedduediligence,whichisfamiliarterritoryforbusiness, but also embed both its content and scope in classic human rightsdefinitions established in the realm of international public governance. Theendorsementbystatesofthecorporateresponsibilitytorespecthumanrightsandhow to discharge it gives official recognition to a norm that was previouslygrounded only in the realm of social expectations. And its adoption bycompanies turns them into regulators through their own internal managementsystems and via contracts with suppliers and service providers. Internationallegal instruments must and will play a role in the continued evolution of thebusinessandhumanrightsregimebut,asInotedina2007article,“ascarefullycrafted precision tools complementing and augmenting existing institutionalcapacities.”32Therapidandwidespreaduptakebyotherinternationalstandard-settingbodies

of the core provisions of the corporate-responsibility-to-respect pillar—what it

means and how it should be discharged—has produced an unprecedentedinternationalconvergenceinthisdomain.Wearenolongerinasituationwheremultiplecompetingstandardsarevyingforattentionintheareaofbusinessandhuman rights. This contributes to creating a more level playing field forcompanies.Itclarifieswhatisexpectedoftheminrelationtohumanrightsandprovidespredictabilityonwhereandhowtofocustheirenergiesinresponse.Italso provides a greater role for, and more focused guidance to, affectedindividuals, communities, and other stakeholders in determining whethercompanies, especially those in difficult sectors and operating contexts, haveadequatesystemsinplacetomanagehuman-rights-relatedrisks.Anditprovidesagreed benchmarks by which business and civil society can assess theperformanceof states.The fact thatelementsof thecorporate responsibility torespect human rights have already been incorporated into policy requirementsand legislation adds weight to the standard. Moreover, with the GP’s uptakethere is now a built-in dynamic for cumulative change. Each entity that hasadoptedvariantsoftheGPshasitsownimplementationmechanismsandknock-on effects, and all will be pushed by their own internal deliberations and byexternalpressures for furtherspecificationof theserequirementsand improvedcorporateperformance.IclosedmyfinalpresentationtotheHumanRightsCouncilwiththesewords:

“Iamundernoillusionthattheconclusionofmymandatewillbringallbusinessandhumanrightschallengestoanend.ButCouncilendorsementoftheGuidingPrincipleswillmark the endof the beginning.”33What Imeantwas this. TheGPs,astheirnamesuggests,provideprincipledguidancetostatesandbusinessenterprises. More detailed work will be required in order for governments,businesses, and other stakeholders to turn the GPs into rules and tools forspecific industry sectors and operating contexts, different scales of operations,variousformsoffinancialintermediaries,andsoon.Butforthefirsttimethoseeffortswillhaveacommonplatformonwhichtobuild,andasetofauthoritativebenchmarksagainstwhichtheycanbeassessed.Before addressing further steps on this journey in the concluding chapter, I

offer some reflections on the waywe got “from there to here”—the strategicpaths that led to the adoption and uptake of the Framework and GuidingPrinciples, whichmay help inform comparable efforts to address other globalgovernancegaps.

ChapterFour

STRATEGICPATHS

My mandate began modestly with the initial task of “identifying andclarifying” things, amid contentious debates and deep divisions reflecting thedifferent interests andpreferencesof themajor players: states, businesses, andcivil society. It ended six years later with unanimous Human Rights Councilendorsementandwidespreaduptakeofwhatessentiallyisasoft-lawinstrumentthatenjoysstrongsupportfromthemall.Therewasnoscript,nouser’smanual,tofollowbecausetherehadneverbeenaUNmandatelikeit.Sohowdidwegetfrom there tohere?Andwhat if any lessonscanbedrawn frommyparticularjourneyforothereffortstonarrowgovernancegapscreatedbyglobalization?Every case has unique features, and this one is no exception. Itmay not be

possible—or necessary—for future initiatives of this kind to travel along thespecific paths I did. Nevertheless, retracing them may provide signposts forothersandhelpseparateouttheidiosyncraticfactorsfrommoregeneralfeaturesofhowinternationalnormsareestablishedandgetdisseminatedandactedupon.ThischapteroutlinessixstrategicpathsIidentifiedandfollowed.IconcludebylocatingtheGuidingPrinciplesinamoregeneraldiscussionofhownewnormsemergeanddisplacecompetingnorms;howtheycascadethroughrapiduptake;and,ifsuccessful,howtheythenareinternalizedbyrelevantactorsandbegintoassume a “taken-for-granted quality”—the ultimate measure of successfulnormativechange.1Thesixstrategicpathscomprisedthefollowing:

1. creating a minimum common knowledge base that permits a sharedconversationtotakeplace;

2.ensuringthelegitimacyof themandateprocess,quiteapartfromquestionsofsubstance;

3. bringing new players to the table whose insights and influence couldadvancetheagenda;

4.roadtestingcoreproposalstodemonstratethattheyactuallycanworkonthe

ground;5.havinganend-gamestrategyandeffectivepoliticalleadershiptoexecuteit;andwheretheopportunitiesexistorcanbecreated,

6. working toward convergence among standard-setting bodies in order toachieve scale and benefit from the broadest possible portfolio ofimplementingmechanisms.

I.CREATINGACOMMONKNOWLEDGEBASE

When I began in 2005, there was relatively little that counted as sharedunderstandingregardingbusinessandhumanrightsamongthemajorstakeholdergroupsinvolvedinUNnormsetting.Therebeingnoauthoritativerepositoryofinformation concerning corporate-related human rights abuse, anecdotalevidence ruled, coupled with evidentiary fragments from Alien Tort Statutecases,lessthanahandfulofwhichhadevergonebeyondproceduralquestionstoaddresstheactualmeritsofacase.Debatestendedtobedoctrinal,anddoctrinalpreferencestendedtoreflectinstitutionalinterests:businessstresseditspositivecontributionstotherealizationofhumanrightscoupledwiththerapidgrowthofvoluntaryinitiatives,whileactivistgroupsfocusedontheworstabusesand,withsome of their academic supporters, demanded that some overarching globalsystemof corporate liability be established. Sincemy initialmandate requiredmeto“identifyandclarify”theexistingstateofplay,asafirststepIconductedaset of baseline studies which I hoped might provide, if nothing else, someperspectiveforassessingproliferatingclaimsandcounterclaims.Overtime,theresearch took amore strategic direction intended to help inform if not resolvedifficultdilemmasencounteredalongtheway.

BaselineStudies

Mappingadescriptivebaselineforthemandateconsistedofthreemainresearchstreams. One was to identify prevailing patterns of corporate-related humanrights abuse. Chapter 1 draws on this research: surveying allegations againstcompanies over a two-year period; summarizing what abuses were alleged tohave been committed, where, by whom, and how; and demonstrating thatbusiness can have adverse impacts on virtually any internationally recognizedrightsothatattemptstocomeupwith“the”definitivelistisafool’serrand.Thesecondbodyofwork clarified existing legal standards and their application tostatesandbusinessenterprises, and is reflected inchapter2:documenting that

UN human rights treaties generally do not impose direct legal obligations oncompanies; that there is an expanding web of potential corporate liability foregregious abuse that can amount to international crimes, imposed throughnational courts but drawing on customary international law standards, andpotentially on the standards defined in the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourtasincorporatedintonationallaws;thatstateshaveinternationallaw obligations to protect against corporate-related human rights abusewithintheirterritoryorjurisdiction;andthatstatesasageneralruleareneitherrequiredto nor prohibited from exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in fulfilling thoseduties, while UN treaty bodies in a growing number of instances haveencouragedandevenurgedhomestatesofmultinationalstotakestepstopreventsuch firms from committing human rights abuses in their overseas operationsand hold them to account if they do. The third body of research, alsosummarizedinchapter2,mappedtheattributesandrapidexpansionofvoluntarycorporatesocialresponsibilityinitiatives,pointingouttheirstrengthsaswellastheirshortcomings.In addition, I benefited enormously from similar kinds of mapping research

that numerous academic and other volunteers undertook on behalf of themandate, including research on the workings of all regional human rightssystems in the world, the impact of the international trade regime on humanrights,andobstaclestoeffectivejudicialremedyspecificallyrelatedtobusinessand human rights, on which I also drew in my reports to the Human RightsCouncilandpostedonmyWebsite.2Morestrategically, theexistingstateofplayclearlyshowedthat thinkingand

action concerning business and human rights needed to be pushed beyond therelatively narrow conceptual and weak institutional boxes in which it wasframed and contained by governments, companies, and civil societyorganizations. In the first instance I sought to promote this development bymeans of empirical and conceptual work and by discussing its results withstakeholdergroups.Thecombinationof relevanceof subjectsandmycapacityconstraintstoaddressthemallinaseriousmannerledtoresearchinfourareas:corporate and securities law, international investment agreements, the costs tocompaniesofconflictswithlocalcommunities,andextraterritorialjurisdiction.

CorporateandSecuritiesLaw

Corporate and securities laws address what companies, their directors and

officers must do to comply with standards of corporate governance, riskmanagement,andmarketsafeguards. Istressedfromtheoutsetofmymandatethe need to have a systematic conversation at the global level regarding therelationshipofthesebodiesoflawandpolicytobusinessandhumanrights.Thistookona senseofurgency inMay2008when,onlyweeksbefore theHumanRights Council was to take its decision on the Protect, Respect and RemedyFramework,oneofWallStreet’s leading lawfirms issuedablisteringcritique.“Theframeworkcouldimposeonbusinessesanarrayofexpansiveobligations,”wrote a senior partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, in a five-pageadvisorymemotoitsclients.“TheReportbearssignificant,potentiallyharmfulimplications for global business and for meaningful accountability in varioussocial actors’ duties to fulfill the promises of international human rightsinstruments [and] will invite immense pressure on corporations and theirdirectors.”3 Needless to say, I feared the negative effects this missive mightgeneratewithin thebusiness community.Butbecause Ihadno standing in theworldofcorporatelawatthetime,Ididnotthinkthataresponsebymewouldbe sufficiently effective. Fortunately, through the good office ofOxfam Iwasintroduced to another leadingWall Street law firm,Weil, Gotshal&Manges,where a team led by senior partners studied the Framework, listened to myexplanationsof it, and then issued its own six-pagememo just in time for theCouncil meeting. “We believe the basic concepts embodied in the Report aresoundandshouldbesupportedbythebusinesscommunity,”theywrote.“Ratherthan being alarmed, U.S. corporations should welcome the SpecialRepresentative’sproposals....”4Andsotheconversationbegan.Inspiredbythisexperience,in2009Ilaunchedaresearchprojectthatinvolved

morethantwentycorporatelawfirmsfromaroundtheworldassistingonaprobonobasistoidentifywhetherandhowcorporateandsecuritieslawencouragesor impedescompanies’ respect forhuman rights in thirty-nine jurisdictions thefirmswereabletocover.Fullreportsoneachjurisdictionandasummaryreportare posted online; the latter is also appended to the Guiding Principles.5 Thesurveysconstitutethemostextensivecomparativestudyofthissubjectcurrentlyavailable.Theyindicatedthatforthemostpartcorporatelawandsecuritieslawintersectwithhumanrightsonlyindirectly.Inmostofthejurisdictionssurveyed,regulatory bodies do not provide effective guidance on how best to ensure oroverseecorporaterespectforhumanrightsortoreportonthecompany’shumanrightsprocessesorperformance.Noneof thesurveys identified lawsexpresslyrequiringcompanies,at incorporation, to recognizeaduty tosociety.Directors

are rarely expressly required to consider nonshareholders’ interests. In mostjurisdictions, companies must disclose all information that is “material” or“significant”totheiroperationsandfinancialcondition,andwhereacompany’shumanrightsimpactsreachthatthreshold,mostsurveyssuggestedthatitwouldberequiredtodisclosethem.Butagainthereislittleofficialguidanceonwhenahumanrightsimpactmightreachthatthreshold.Modestexceptionsmaybe found inanumberof jurisdictions. In thecaseof

director’sduties,UKlawprovidesthatinpromotingthesuccessofthecompany,directorsmusthavespecificregard to“the impactof thecompany’soperationson the community and the environment,” among other factors.A provision inBrazilian law similarly requires directors “to achieve the company’s corporatepurposes and to support its best interests, satisfying the requirements of thepublicat largeand thesocial roleof thecompany.”This typeofprovisionhasbeen described as reflecting an “enlightened shareholder”model: whereas thedirectors’ duty remains to the company, in exercising it they need to “haveregard” to broader social and environmental factors—although nowhere is itcrystalclearwhatthismeans.Somestockexchangeshavelistingrulesthattouchontheseissues(CSRinParisandtheBursaMalaysia,environmentalprotectionand community development in Shenzhen and Shanghai); others operatevoluntary socially responsible investment indexes (Johannesburg, Bovespa inBrazil, the Dow Jones Sustainability Index in New York, FTSE4Good inLondon,andsimilar indices in theNordiccountries).Severalcountries requiresome form of corporate social responsibility reporting for some types ofcompanies(China,Indonesia,Sweden);where theyexist, theseprovisions tendto focus on the reporting of policies rather than on impacts and how they aredealtwith,andthereportsarenotsubjecttothestandardization,verification,anddistributionrequirementsoffinancialreports.The direct consequences for the mandate of this research and related

consultations were to draw the subject of corporate and securities laws morecentrally into the business and human rights debate; to help inform thedevelopment of key elements of the Guiding Principles; and to engage anenormouslyimportantcommunityofpractice,whichIdiscussseparatelybelow.

InternationalInvestmentAgreements

History has witnessed successive waves of states expropriating foreigninvestments—and,inprioreras,the“gunboatdiplomacy”thatcouldbetriggered

inresponse.Themoderninvestmentregimeisbasedoninternationalinvestmenttreaties and contracts, often coupled with binding investor-state arbitration—some3,000bilateralandregionalinvestmenttreatiesarecurrentlyineffect.Suchagreementsarenecessarytoprotectforeigninvestorsagainstarbitrarytreatmentby host governments. However, in successive rounds of negotiations, capitalimportersthatlacksignificantmarketpowerhavefeltincreasinglypressuredtocompete with one another for foreign investments by accepting ever-more-expansiveprovisions,evenregardingsuchbasicissuesastowhatconstitutesaninvestment,an investor,andexpropriation.Asa result,under threatofbindinginternationalarbitration,foreigninvestorsmaybeabletoinsulatetheirbusinessventure from new laws and regulations, or seek compensation from the hostgovernment for the cost of compliance, even if the policy enacted legitimatepublic interest objectives such as new labor standards or environmental andhealth regulations, and even if it applied in a nondiscriminatory manner todomesticandforeign investorsalike. Isetout toanalyze thisphenomenonandits possible implications for the ability of host states to fulfill their duty toprotect human rights, with the aim of contributing to a broader dialogueconcerning theneed formorebalanced—andmorehuman-rights-compatible—investmentagreements.For large-scaleprojects, the formal relationshipbetween thehostgovernment

and a multinational corporation typically begins with a host governmentagreement: a contract between the two parties for specific projects,whether aminingoperation,atelecommunicationssystem,asugarplantation,ortoll-roadconstruction.Theinvestorislikelyalreadytobeprotectedunderaninternationalinvestment treaty that the home and host states will have concluded; indeed,foreigninvestorsarefreetoincorporateindividualprojectsinany“home”statethatoffers themostfavorabletreatyprotectionsfor“its” investorsvis-à-vis thetarget host state. In addition, project contracts often include provisions that“stabilize”thehostcountry’sexistingregulatorycontextasfurtherprotectionforthe foreign investor. Thanks to the cooperation of the International FinanceCorporation, I gained access to and examined some ninety such contracts.Among the key findings were: (1) no contract between a multinationalcorporation and an OECD country offered the investor exemptions from newlawsand,withminorexceptions, they tailoredstabilizationclauses topreservepublic interest considerations; (2) amajority of the contractswith non-OECDcountries did have provisions to insulate investors from compliancewith newenvironmental and social laws or facilitated compensation for compliance; (3)

themostsweepingstabilizationprovisionswerefoundincontractssignedwithSub-SaharanAfricancountries,wheresevenof theelevencontracts towhichIhadaccessspecifiedexemptionsfromorcompensationfortheeffectofallnewlawsforthedurationoftheproject—ahalf-centuryinonecase—irrespectiveoftheirrelevancetoprotectinghumanrightsoranyotherpublicinterest.6This research generated considerable interest, particularly among African

government contractnegotiators,withwhomweconvened severalmeetings todiscuss the results—which had the additional benefit of contributing to thestrongsupportthemandateenjoyedfromtheAfricangroupintheHumanRightsCouncil.The findingswere alsoof interest to leading law firms that negotiatecontracts on behalf of companies and governments, which discovered thatprovisions they believed had been abandoned some time ago because theirimpact on states was unacceptably onerous in fact were still being used. Thecombinationofthesetwofactorsencouragedmetodevelopasetof“PrinciplesforResponsibleContracts”withthehelpofgovernmentnegotiators,leadinglawfirms, and NGOs that have expertise in this area. It, too, was issued as anaddendumtotheGuidingPrinciples.7

CostsofConflict

Corporate-related human rights abuse harms people. That should be sufficientreasonforavoidingadverse impactsandmitigatingorremediating themwheretheyoccur.Butescalatingconflictswithlocalcommunitiesarenotcost-freeforcompanies either. I was curious about the magnitude of such costs and howcompaniesaccountforthem.TheWorldResourcesInstitutepublishedahandfulofcasestudiesonextractiveandinfrastructureprojectsin2007,whichindicatedthat financial risks to companies associated with pushback from communitiesandotherstakeholderscanincludedelaysindesign,siting,grantingofpermits,construction,operation,andexpectedrevenues;problematicrelationswithlocallabor markets; higher costs for financing, insurance, and security; reducedoutput;collateral impacts suchasdivertedstaff timeand reputationalhits; andpossibleprojectcancellation,forcingacompanytowriteoffitsentireinvestmentandforgothevalueofthelostreserves,revenues,andprofits,whichcouldruninto several billiondollars for large-scale operations.8A 2008GoldmanSachsstudyof190projectsoperatedby the internationaloilmajorsprovidedgreaterdetailson this sector.9 It found that the time it takes fornewprojects to comeonstream—topumpthefirstdropofoil—hadnearlydoubledovertheprevious

decade,causingsignificantcostinflation.Delayswereattributedtotheprojects’“technical and political complexity,” with the category “political” includingresistancefromcommunitiesandotherexternalstakeholders.Anindependentandconfidentialfollow-upanalysiscommissionedbyonesuch

company of a subset of the projects covered by theGoldman Sachs study, towhichIhadaccess,indicatedthatnontechnicalrisksaccountedfornearlyhalfofall risk factors faced by the oil majors, with “stakeholder-related risk”constitutingthesinglelargestcategoryofnontechnicalrisk.Itfurtherestimatedthatthisparticularcompanymayhaveaccrued$6.5billioninsuchcostsoveratwo-year period, amounting to a double-digit percentage of its annual profits.Those are big numbers. Did no one in the company notice? Looking into itfurther,Ilearnedthatsuchcoststendedtobeatomizedwithincompanies,rolledinto localoperatingcostsacrossdifferentbusinessunitsandfunctions,andnotaggregated into a single category that would trigger the attention of seniormanagement and boards. I undertook additional research in the miningindustry.10 This showed, for example, that a mining operation with start-upcapital expenditures in the $3–$5-billion range suffers losses of roughly $2millionperdayofdelayedproduction,innetpresentvalueterms.Thinkbacktothe frequent closures of Yanacocha, and nowMinas Conga, discussed in theIntroduction,which operate on that scale. Perhaps the singlemost overlookedcost is the staff time that has to be devoted to managing conflicts withcommunities.Theworkingassumptionintheminingsectorisabout5percentofan assetmanager’s time.Yet the research identified instanceswhere itwas ashigh as 50 and occasionally even 80 percent. If those conflicts are leftunattended,theymayescalate,whichcanleadtopropertydamageandinjury,orworse,tocommunitymembersandcompanyemployees.Thisisalose-losesituation:acompanyharmshumanrightsandincursserious

costs in turn. Adding to the perversity, the costs of avoiding conflicts withcommunities—bybuildingcloser links throughactivestakeholderengagement,adequate due diligence, and effective grievance procedures—do show up asdirect costs on the company’s balance sheet. This asymmetry disadvantagescompanies’ own CSR and community engagement efforts, which are seen aspurecostcenters,vis-à-vistheoperatingunitsthatbringinrevenue.I reported these findings to the Human Rights Council and havementioned

them in virtually every speech to business groups.Now that the fact of thesecostsisbetterknown,theyarealsobecomingbetteraggregatedandaredrawingthe attention they deserve from management, boards, shareholders, and

regulators.

ExtraterritorialJurisdiction

We come, finally, to the difficult issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ). Itwas the subject of one of the mandate’s first multistakeholder expertconsultations,andoneofthelast.Forreasonsalreadydiscussed,ETJinrelationtohumanrightsremainshighlycontentious.“Legitimateissuesareatstakeandtheyareunlikelytoberesolvedfullyanytimesoon,”Inotedinmy2010reporttotheHumanRightsCouncil.“However,thescaleofthecurrentimpassemustand can be reduced.”11 I took two steps in the attempt to move beyond theimpasse.First,IpointedoutinthatCouncilreportthatacriticaldistinctionbetweentwo

verydifferentphenomenaisusuallyobscuredintheheatedargumentsaboutETJinbusinessandhumanrights.Oneisjurisdictionexerciseddirectlyinrelationtoactorsoractivitiesthattakeplaceoverseas,suchascriminalregimesgoverningchildsextourismthatrelyonthenationalityoftheperpetratornomatterwherethe offence occurs.This literally involves onenational court, say inGermany,adjudicatingconductbyoneofitsnationalsthattookplaceinanothersovereignstate,sayThailand.TheotherformofETJinvolvesdomesticmeasuresthatmayhave extraterritorial implications: for example, requiring companies that arelistedondomesticstockexchanges,nomatterwhattheirnationality,toreportontheirworldwide risks, nomatterwhere theymay be incurred. To be sure, thelatter has extraterritorial implications, but it relies entirely on territory as thejurisdictionalbasis,anditsjustificationisprotectingdomesticinvestors.Indeed,Iarguedthattheissueofterritorialityandextraterritorialityshouldnotbeviewedin binary terms at all; it comprises a range ofmeasures, not all of which areequally subject to objections on jurisdictional grounds. I proposed ways ofdifferentiatingaspectrumofmeasuresinbusinessandhumanrights.Second, states clearly have agreed to certain instances of exercising

extraterritorial jurisdiction in policy domains other than business and humanrights. Inorder tounderstandbetterwhatfactorscontribute tovariations in theperceived reasonableness of ETJ, I commissioned a study of ETJ inanticorruption, securities law, antitrust, environmental regulation, as well ascriminal and civil jurisdiction generally.12 The main conclusions were thatmultilateral measures are likely to be seen asmore acceptable than unilateralmeasures; principles-based approaches are less problematic than prescriptive

rules-based approaches; the extent of international consensus on thewrongfulness of an act or activity plays a significant role; and the acts oractivitiesinquestiontendtoberelativelyspecificanddefinable—notanentirepolicydomain,suchasthewholebundleofbusinessandhumanrightsissues.Idrew on this conceptual and empirical work in formulating the GuidingPrinciples.TheEuropeanCommissionsubsequentlyconductedastudyexploringETJ issues in relation to the human rights and environmental impacts of EU-basedcompaniesandisconsideringfurtherCSRpolicydevelopments,discussedbelow.There surely are other areas of strategic researchmy team and I could have

pursued, and several other subjects were explored less intensely. But themandate’s capacitywas limited, evenwhenaugmentedbyprobonoassistancefrom law firms and universities, think tanks and committed individuals,throughout the world. Moreover, even six years are surprisingly short, andadditionalpathstowardachievingasuccessfuloutcomerequiredattention.

II.ENSURINGPROCESSLEGITIMACY

Building a common knowledge base is important in establishing a viablefoundationforpolicydevelopment.However,whetherproposalsbasedonitgainanytractionwithdecision-makersisalsoafunctionoftheperceivedlegitimacyoftheprocess.InUnitedNationscontexts—particularlyfortheindependentandinstitutionallyweak human rights “special procedures” such asmymandate—inclusiveness,inturn,canbeasignificantdeterminantofperceivedlegitimacy.Have victims been engaged? Have all stakeholder groups been given theopportunity tobeheard?Have thevaryingsituationsofdifferentcountriesandregionsbeen considered—including their levels of economicdevelopment, thecharacter of their legal systems, and the different ways business activity isorganizedandgoverned?ProfessorKarinBuhmannofCopenhagenUniversityrefers to this as “process legitimacy,” and she attributes at least part of themandate’ssuccesstohavingachievedit.13One aspect of process legitimacy is the sheer geographical and substantive

inclusiveness of the process I undertook. It included forty-seven formalconsultationsaroundtheworld.Somewerelargemultistakeholdermeetings—inBangkok, Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Johannesburg, Moscow, and New Delhi—involving participants from those countries and the surrounding region. Twoglobal consultations were held at the UN European Headquarters in Geneva.

SwedenconvenedanEU-wideconsultation inStockholmwhen itheld theEUpresidency. Expert meetings on the many technical subjects addressed by themandatewereconvenedinthecapitalsofcountrieswillingtofundthem,attheoffices of supportive law firms, or at universities includingmyHarvard homebase. Great care was taken in each case to strive for geographical balance ofparticipants. My team and I made site visits to the operations of firms andconsultedwithlocalstakeholdersinmorethantwentycountries.Iheldnumerousbilateralmeetingswithofficialsincapitals.AnannotatedoutlineoftheGuidingPrinciples was posted online for public comment and discussed at separateconsultationswithHumanRightsCouncildelegations,businessenterprisesandassociationsfromallcontinents,andwithcivilsocietygroups.Laterafulldraftof the GPs was posted online for public comment, attracting 3,576 uniquevisitorsfrom120countries.ThedraftwasalsodiscussedataninformalCouncilsession and at a multi-stakeholder retreat. The mandate’s work benefitedsignificantly from this diversity of views and experiences. And Councilresolutionspraised“thecomprehensive, transparentand inclusiveconsultationsconductedwithrelevantandinterestedactorsinallregions.”14Indeed,theonlycriticism any government ever made on “inclusiveness” grounds was when adelegate from France remarked at one Council session that I had referencedrelativelyfewFrenchsourcesinthatyear’sreport.Buhmannnotes thatwhile this levelofconsultation isquiteextensivebyUN

human-rights-mandate standards, the practice itself is not unusual. What isunusual, she continues,was “consultingwith prospective duty-holders that donothavedirect access to theconventionalprocessof international law-makingis.”15The“duty-holders”Buhmannisreferringtoarebusinessenterprises.Shepoints out that their involvement inmymandate was in sharp contrast to theearlierNormsprocess.ThattextwasdraftedbyasmallexpertworkinggroupinGeneva conference rooms in collaboration with human rights NGOs andacademic human rights lawyers, with only limited participation by businessassociations(orgovernments,forthatmatter),andthatonlycamelateintheday,bywhichtimebusinesswasinpuredamage-limitationmode.Inviting extensive business participation was not without its critics in civil

society.ButIconsidereditessentialforthreereasons.Thefirstwassubstantive.Before prescribing systems that companies should put in place to identify,prevent, mitigate, and remedy human rights harm in which they may beinvolved,Ifelttheneedtounderstandbetterhowcompaniesmanagetheirrisksofadverseimpactsinotherareas,suchashealthandsafety,anticorruption,and

environmental issues, or the risk of criminal activity by personnel. Havingbusinessparticipateinconsultationsandinvitemembersofmyteamandmetovisit their operationsweremeans to that end. I gained access to information Iwouldneverhavehadotherwise:forexample,thesourcesformyresearchonthecosts of conflict with communities came from businesses themselves. (Wetypically combined site visits to companies with independently organizedmeetingswithcommunitiesandcivilsocietyrepresentatives.)Thesecondreasonwasstrategic.Studentsof international lawandregulatory

policy have long maintained that the perceived legitimacy of a rule-makingprocessbythosetowhomtherulesapplyexertsa“compliancepull,”increasingthechances that theywilladhere to the rules.16This isparticularly truewheretherule-makingsystemlackspowerfulenforcementmechanisms,asisthecaseinthebusinessandhumanrightsdomain.Idonotmeantoimplythatbusinessrepresentativesalwaysagreedwithmyviewsandpositions.Thatwashardlythecase; indeed, some tried to be outright spoilers. The German businessassociation, BDA (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände),moreconservative-leaningthanothers,wasacaseinpoint, thoughmostof thetimewerepulledalongbyothersintheend.Butthroughout,businessknewthatitsviewsandpositionswereheardandhadbeentakenintoaccount.Moreover,because the company representatives involved typically had CSRresponsibilities,havingthemparticipateinmandateconsultationsgavethemandtheir mission greater visibility within their companies, advancing both of ouraims.Thethirdreasonwaspolitical.Excludingbusinessfromaninternationalrule-

making process that directly and significantly affects its interests will simplymean that itwill lobby national governments in the attempt to undermine theprocess—which iswhat happened to theNorms. In contrast,when theUnitedStatesthreatenedtomaketroubleattheHumanRightsCounciloverthescopeoftheFramework’s stipulationof the state duty to protect human rights in 2008,whichwouldhaveopenedthedoortoobjectionsbyothercountrieswithfarlesscongenial attitudes toward human rights, the U.S. Council for InternationalBusinesshelpedpersuadethegovernmenttobackdown.My engagement with NGOs was equally sustained but took two slightly

differentformsdependingonthetypeoforganization:onewithpureadvocacygroups,theotherwithNGOsthatalsohaveon-the-groundoperationalactivitiesthatinvolvebusiness.Theformer—forexample,AmnestyInternational,HumanRightsWatch,andtheInternationalCommissionofJurists—participatedactively

inmandateconsultationsandhelpedidentifyparticipantsfromtheglobalsouthwho could genuinely represent affected individuals and communities. But weagreedtodisagreeonseveralsubstantiveandmethodologicalmatters.Intermsofsubstance,althoughwewerebothdrivenbythedesiretopromote

and protect human rights, in one fundamental respect our objectives weredifferent. The animating vision for the legallyminded advocacy groups is thefurtherdevelopmentofinternationalhumanrightslaw.Myanimatingvisionwastogeneratearegulatorydynamicthatwouldreducetheincidenceofcorporate-related human rights harm to the maximum extent possible in the minimumamountoftime.Whiletheiraimsmayoverlap,thetwovisionsarenotidenticalintermsofwheretostartandhowtoproceed.Moreover,forreasonselaboratedinchapter2,Ifoundithardtoimagineevenconceptuallyhowtomaketheentirebundle of business and human rights the subject of some overarchinginternational legal framework—their preferred position—given the breadth,magnitude, and diversity of issues involved, let alone how to achieve itpolitically.Intermsofmethodologythesegroupsconsistentlysoughttopushmymandate

intoamore traditionalhuman rightsmold,basedon theway thingshavebeendoneinrelationtostate-basedabuses.Incontrast,Iwastryingtomovebeyondthe confined opportunity space afforded by thatmethodology for the businessandhuman rights context. For example,when theHumanRightsCouncilwasconsideringextendingmymandatein2008to“operationalize”theFramework,theheadsoftheleadingadvocacyorganizationswrotetotheforeignministersofthe resolution’s five cosponsors stating that I had done too little to representvictims of corporate-related human rights abuse, and urging them to includeinvestigations of specific allegations against companies inmy newmandate. Iunderstandandappreciatethatbearingwitnessandgivingvoicetovictimsisanessential component of human rights tactics to raise public awareness and innaming-and-shamingcampaigns.ButIdidnotbelievethatahighlysensitiveandcomplex effort to develop and secure the adoption of universally applicableprinciples would mix well with getting drawn into adjudicating specificadversarial situations. I feared that whatever positions I took on individualdisputeswouldbecomethelensthroughwhichmybroaderproposalswouldbeviewed by concerned companies and their governments alike. Besides, I metwith affected individuals and communities throughout theworld to learn fromtheir experiences, and some of my encounters were facilitated by those sameNGOs.ButonceIfeltthatIhadagraspoftheproblems,Iwantedtofocusall

energiesondevelopingeffectivewaysofaddressingthem,notidentifyingevenmore variations on their manifestations. The foreignministers agreed and themandateremainedunchanged.NGOs that have on-the-ground operations in business and human rights are

every bit as committed as the pure advocacy groups to holding companies toaccount. But they pursue a greater variety of routes toward that end and thusviewedmymandatemoreflexibly.Forexample,GlobalWitness,bestknownforitspathbreakingworkontheinternationalregulationofconflictdiamonds,wentsofarastoassign(andpaythesalaryof)oneofitsresearcherstoworkwiththemandate onhuman rights and conflict zones for severalmonths—and then, asnotedinchapter3,campaignedtopromotetheapplicationofhumanrightsdue-diligence requirements to companies sourcing minerals in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo. Oxfam cosponsored a workshop with the mandate ondeveloping operational-level grievance mechanisms, and the Clean ClothesCampaign on assessing the effectiveness of multistakeholder initiatives inimprovingworkplaceconditionsinglobalsupplychains.I maintained excellent relations with workers organizations through their

Geneva-based global federations and theTradeUnionAdvisoryCommittee totheOECD.Theirmain concernwith human rights initiatives is that theymayrewrite hard-won labor standards that have been extensively negotiatedwithinthe ILO’s tripartite system, involving states, business, and workers. This hadbeen amain source of friction betweenworkers’ organizations and theNormsprocess. I had no such aspirations and relied extensively on the ILO and theunionfederationstoinformthemandateonissuesrelatedtointernationallaborstandards.Transparency is another key factor in process legitimacy. The London-based

Business&HumanRightsResourceCentrekindlyagreedtohostaWebportalfor my mandate.17 Virtually everything produced by and for the mandate isposted there, as is all criticism ofmywork that anyone chose to post.Whensignificant issues were at stake, I responded to critics, thereby triggering anongoing public dialogue. Apparently, this had not been done before by UNhuman rights special procedures. Also breaking with precedent, and possiblyprotocol, I sent numerous research reports and occasionally my speeches andotherupdatesdirectlytoindividualHumanRightsCouncildelegates(forwhichIfirst had to construct my own email contact list). This made it possible toestablish informal relationships with delegates rather than relying solely ononce-a-yearappearancesattheCouncilortheoccasionalunofficialconsultations

withCouncilmembers,andtoconveyviewsandinformationtothemthatcouldnotbeincludedinannualreportsthathada10,700-wordlimit.Finally,toprovidestrategicguidanceaswellasgreatervisibilityandadditional

legitimacy, I established an advisory group for the mandate comprised ofrecognized leaders fromvarious sectorsand regions,cochairedbyKofiAnnanandMaryRobinson,theformerPresidentofIrelandandUNHighCommissionerforHumanRights.18

III.ENGAGINGNEWCOMMUNITIESOFPRACTICE

Having originally been created to deal with human rights violations by stateagents,itisstandardprocedureforUNhumanrightsmandate-holderstoengagewithcertaingroupsofactors:victimsandtheirrepresentatives,stateentitiesandinternational bodies involved in human rights protection, civil societyorganizationsandhumanrightslawyers,nationalhumanrightsinstitutions,andoccasionally legislative forums considering new standards. However, in thebusinessandhumanrightscontextthereareadditionalcommunitiesofpracticewhose actions can have powerful effects on business conduct in relation tohumanrights—butwhomayhavelittleornoawarenessofthisfact,andwhoseinstitutional mission is driven by very different interests and concerns.Therefore,itbecameoneofmykeyobjectivestoidentifywaystoengagesuchcommunitiesofpractice,learnfromthem,raisehumanrightsawarenessamongthem,andpossiblyfindwaysofleveragingtheirinfluence.In a previous section, I briefly described my project involving investment

contract negotiators representing states and companies. This project ultimatelyresulted in a ten-step guide for responsible contracting, incorporating humanrightsconcernsininvestmentprojectsfromtheinitialcontractingphase.Italsoprompted me to take a closer look at the international arbitration proceduresunderwhich foreign investorscansuestates forbreachesof theseagreements.Theseprocedurescanbeproblematicforstatesbecausetheydrawtheirrulesandpractitionerslargelyfromtheworldofprivatecommercialarbitration,andyetinmany cases they determine matters of profound public interest. Even fullyunderstandinghowtheprocessworksandsubjectingittopublicscrutinycanbedifficultbecauseofa lackof transparency: ifanarbitration isconductedunderthe rules of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),nothing may be known publicly about it—not even the existence of the caseitself.Asa result,neitherexpertsnor thepublicat largeare inanyposition to

assessdealsthegovernmenthassignedwithforeigninvestors.ICSID,theWorldBank’sInternationalCentreforSettlementofInvestmentDisputes,doeskeeparoster of cases andmakes known their outcome, but deliberations themselvesremain confidential unless both parties agree to public disclosure. At theinvitation of UNCITRAL officials, I made presentations on my mandate atseveral Commissionmeetings,where I took the opportunity to advocate for achangeofrulestoprovidegreatertransparencywhich,Icontended,isessentialwhenhumanrightsissuesareinvolved.UNCITRALeventuallysetupaworkinggrouptoreviewthoserulesinthecontextofinvestor-statearbitration.Mymostconsequentialengagementwithnontraditionalstakeholderswaswith

the corporate-law community, through the corporate-and-securities-law projectand other pro bonowork firms conducted for themandate over the course ofseveral years. This included law firms and other experts not only fromNorthAmerica and numerous European countries, but also Australia, Argentina,Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Kenya, Malaysia,Mexico,Morocco,SouthAfrica,andThailand.Iconvenedseveralmeetingswithparticipating law firms, in-house counsel as well as academic and advocacygroup attorneys. These relationships with the corporate-law communitygenerated at least four benefits for the mandate. The first was simply theextensivemappingofhow,ifatall,corporateandsecuritylawintersectedwithhumanrightsinthethirty-ninejurisdictionsthecollaboratingfirmswereabletoexamine.Second,thisgroupofexpertsbecameaninitialsoundingboardforthedevelopment of the due-diligence requirements under the corporateresponsibility to respecthuman rights.Theyhadextensiveexperiencewith theways companies conduct due diligence in other domains, what makes for asuccessful process, andwhat if any requirements regulators already impose indifferent jurisdictions.Third, their engagement began to generate publicity forthemandatewithin the legal profession: an article in theAmerican Lawyer, acover story in a Canadian magazine for corporate lawyers, a symposium ofarticles by corporate law experts in the Journal of Business Ethics, presscoverage in India, a blog in Singapore, among others. My favorite was apresentationbyacorporatelawfirmataninternationalminingconference.Oneof the PowerPoint bullets read: “Race by leading mining companies (AngloAmericanandBHPBilliton,forexample)todeterminewhethertheirpoliciesare‘Ruggie-Proof.’ ”19 (No doubt the law firm was prepared to help companiesbecome so.)This level of engagement and publicity led to a fourth benefit: itbumped the mandate’s visibility up within corporate hierarchies, beyond the

confines of corporate social responsibility departments, into general counsels’officesand“C-suites”—chiefcomplianceofficersandoccasionallytheCEOandboardsofdirectors.Gettingcompaniestointegratechangemanagementrequirescommitment from the top, andengagementwith the corporate lawcommunityhelped provide access. As a final bonus from lawyers, in February 2012 theHouseofDelegatesof theAmericanBarAssociation, theassociation’sofficialpolicy-making body, endorsed theGuiding Principles and urged governments,the private sector, and the legal community itself to integrate them into theirrespectiveoperationsandpractices.20

IV.ROADTESTING

Aroutineobjectionbythosewhowouldbeaffectedbynewrulesanddon’tlikethem is to claim that the rules won’t work in practice. The most effectiverejoinder is to be able to demonstrate that they already have worked.Accordingly,Ilookedforopportunitiestotestthepracticalfeasibilityofthetwomostnovelandpotentiallyfar-reachingelementsoftheGuidingPrinciples:thatcompanies should conduct human rights due diligence, and that they shouldestablish or participate in operational-level grievance mechanisms. Severalprojects involvingcompaniesassessed thecoreelementsofbothasoutlined inthe 2008 Framework document. Additionally, I convened a small butrepresentativegroupofstatestoexplorepracticalstepsthatstatesshouldtaketoaddress the riskofcorporate involvementwithhumanrightsabuses inconflictzones.

DueDiligence

TenDutch companies under theumbrella of theNetherlands’GlobalCompactNetworkagreedtoconductafeasibilitystudyofthevariouselementsinvolvedinthecorporateresponsibilitytorespecthumanrights,withaparticularfocusontheduediligencerequirement.Thecompaniesincludedsuchwell-knownnamesasAkzoNobel,ABNAMRO,Philips,Shell,andUnilever.Thegrouprecruitedaformer member of my team to manage the eighteen-month project, whichconsistedofthreeparts.Thefirstwasaconfidential“gapanalysis”thatmappedeach company’s systems and practices against the various elements of thecorporateresponsibilitytorespecthumanrightsasoutlinedintheFramework.Itexamined which corporate functions—human resources management,procurement, production, security, marketing, R&D, and so on—could affect

which internationally recognized right, and how well each company wascurrentlyequippedtomeetitsresponsibilitytorespectthoserights.Thesecondpartconsistedofaseriesofworkshopsandseminarswithmembersofmyteamandabroadrangeofstakeholdersinwhichthecompaniesexchangedviewsandexperiencesonsuchsubjectsascorporategovernanceandhumanrights,humanrightsriskandimpactassessments,andtheFramework’sgrievancemechanismsprovisions.Finally, theprojectpublishedaguidancetoolforbusinessbasedonlessons learned. It found that the companies had bits and pieces of relevantpoliciesandpracticesinplace,butoftentheywerenotfocusedonhumanrightsspecificallynorweretheyalwayssystematicallyconnected;anditalsoidentifiedgaps.Itconcludedthat“humanrightsduediligenceisapracticalandattainableapproachtoguidecompaniesinrespectinghumanrightsintheirbusiness.”21A follow-up study by the London-based Institute for Human Rights and

Businessexaminedtheeffortsoftwenty-fourleadingmultinationalcorporations,representing a broader geographical spread, to put human rights due-diligenceprocesses into practice. It concluded that none of the companies studied hadfully integrated concern for human rights into all aspects of its management.Although this was a challenging task for companies, the experience to dateindicatedthat“forbusinessescommittedtodoingso,humanrightsduediligenceispossible.”22

GrievanceMechanisms

Evenunderidealcircumstancesthingswillgowrong,andwhentheydo,remedyisrequired.Muchofthefocusinbusinessandhumanrightsunderstandablyhadbeen on judicial systems. I alsowanted to explore early-stage recourse in theform of grievance mechanisms that companies could establish themselves orparticipate in,but Icould find few instancesofsuchmechanisms.Therefore, Iinitiated a year-long study and a series of workshops.23 Operational-levelgrievancemechanismspotentiallycanperformtwokeyfunctions in relation tothe corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The first is as an earlywarning system,making it possible for grievances against the company to beaddressed and remediated before they escalate, thereby preventing harm fromcompounding.The second is as a feedback loop, providing the companywithinformation about its current or potential adverse human rights impacts. Byanalyzing trends and patterns in complaints, companies can identify systemicproblemsandadapttheirpracticesaccordingly.Atthesametime,however,such

grievance mechanisms face particular challenges given that companies arecloselyinvolvedintheirdesignandadministration,whichcanraisequestionsofbiasor thecritiquethat theyare illegitimatesourcesofremedy.Robustcriteriafor effectiveness and legitimacy are important in addressing this risk. OurresearchhadsuggestedasetofsuchcriteriathatIwantedtotest.InMarch2009,theInternationalOrganizationofEmployers,theInternational

ChamberofCommerce,andtheBusinessandIndustryAdvisoryCommitteetotheOECDagreed tocollaboratewith themandateonorganizingpilotprojectsfor this purpose. Four companies in four sectors volunteered to take part:CarbonesdelCerrejón,inColombia,alargecoal-miningjointventureofAngloAmerican, BHP Billiton, and Xstrata Coal; the Esquel Group in Hong Kong,piloting a mechanism at its apparel facility in Viet Nam; Sakhalin EnergyInvestmentCorporationintheRussianFederation,anoilandgasjointventureofGazprom, RoyalDutch Shell,Mitsui&Co., andMitsubishi Corporation; andTescoStores, amajorUKsupermarketchainworkingwithagroupof its fruitsuppliers in South Africa. In addition, an adjunct project was conducted incollaborationwiththetechnologycompanyHewlett-PackardtoreviewitsrecenteffortstohelptwoofitssuppliersinChinaenhancetheirgrievanceproceduresforworkers.The pilot projects involved collaborationwith the companies andwith their local stakeholders to design or amend grievance procedures in linewith the mandate’s draft effectiveness criteria. The purpose of the pilots wastwofold:totestthebenefitsthatmechanismsalignedwiththeGPscanhaveasameansofremedyforimpactedstakeholdersandasameansofriskmanagementandaccountabilityforcompanies;andtolearnhowtheprinciplescanbefurtherrefined to reflect operational realities and enable their practical application bycompanies. The pilot projects ran for approximately eighteen months. Teammembers conducted periodic site visits. The results are reflected in GuidingPrinciple31anditsCommentary—stipulatingeightcriteriafortheeffectivenessofgrievancemechanisms.Adetailedreport,whichincludesafrankdiscussionofchallenges,isappendedtotheGuidingPrinciples.24Giventheslowpaceoflegalreform,andinviewofthefactthatlegalrecourse

maynotalwaysbenecessaryoreventhepreferredcourseofactionbyvictims,Ialso sought to identify and promote effective alternative dispute resolutionmechanisms more generally. To that end, I established an online resource:BusinessandSocietyExploringSolutions.25BASESwikiisacollaborativeworkspaceforsharinginformationandlearningabouthowdisputeresolutionbetweenbusinessandsocietyworksaroundtheworld. Itoffers information, inmultiple

languages, about availablemechanisms at global, regional, national, and locallevels,and itcontinues toevolve tomeet theneedsof itsdiverseaudience. Itsvalueasa resourcederives from thewealthofexperiencesand information itsusers bring to the community. Launched in 2008, it currently describes 370dispute resolutionmechanisms,providesbusinessandhuman rightsprofilesofmore than 140 countries, and has had approximately 1,500 users.BASESwikialso hosts three documentary films, produced by my team, of successfulcommunity-company dialogue andmediation efforts in Nigeria, Peru, and thePhilippines.Workbegununder themandateon the feasibilityofestablishingaglobal network of national and local mediators in business and human rightsdisputescontinuesundertheauspicesoftheHarvardKennedySchoolCorporateSocialResponsibilityInitiative,incollaborationwiththeWorldLegalForum.A common thread running through the three initiatives—human rights due

diligence, operational-level grievance mechanisms, and alternative disputeresolutionmoregenerally—isthattheyexpandtheportfolioofavailablemeansforreducingtheincidenceofhumanrightsharminthefirstplace,andprovidetimelyandlocalremedyforsomeharmswheretheydooccur.

ConflictZones

Myinterest inandconcernwithbusinessoperationsinconflictzonesstemmedfromthefactthattheworstformsofhumanrightsabusesinvolvingcompaniestendtotakeplaceinsuchcontexts.Notonlydoesthisdemandspecialattention,butnogovernmentcanclaimcrediblythatthecurrentinternationalhumanrightsregimeisabletofunctionasintendedinsuchcontexts.To explore the possibility of developing more robust measures, I invited a

smallgroupof states toparticipate in threeoff-the-recordworkshopsataUN-dedicated conference facility on the outskirts ofNewYorkCity. I deliberatelydidnotwantparticipantsmerelytovoicetheircountry’sforeignpolicyviewsonspecificevents,sotheworkshopsdidnotaddressactualconflicts.Instead,eachwasstructuredasabrainstormingsessionbuiltaroundadifferentscenariothatIshared with participants beforehand—a simulated road test, as it were.Moreover, I invitedparticipantsnotonly fromforeignministriesbutalso fromagencieswith economic responsibilities, including development assistance andexportcreditagencies.Ateachsessionparticipantswereaskedtoworkthroughascenariowithaview

toidentifyingtherangeofpolicyoptionsthathome,host,andneighboringstates

have, or could develop, to prevent and deter corporate-related human rightsabusesinconflictcontexts.Thenatureofthebusinessactivitydifferedfromonescenariotothenext,andeachscenarioassumedescalatingandvariegatedformsofviolence.Stateswere invited toparticipatebasedon theirknown interest indealingwiththeissue;theirpreviousorcurrentexposuretoit;theirwillingnessto engage in such a process; as well as representation and balance betweenhome,host,andneighboringstates.Belgium,Brazil,Canada,China,Colombia,Ghana, Guatemala, Nigeria, Norway, Sierra Leone, Switzerland, the UnitedKingdom,and theUnitedStatesagreed toparticipate.GuidingPrinciple7andthe report on conflict-affected areas that I submitted to the Human RightsCouncilalongwiththeGPsweredirectlyinformedbythisproject.Insomecasesitalsoprovidedanexcellentbackchanneltonationalcapitalsonrelatedissues.Anditprovidedinformalguidanceonthequestionofapossiblelegalinstrumentinthisdomain.

V.GAININGENDORSEMENTS

StrongHumanRightsCouncilbackingfortheGuidingPrincipleswasnecessaryfor them to take root. Without it they would merely constitute yet anotherinitiativevying forattention inacrowded fieldwherenonehad reachedscale.ThemomentumbehindthemandatesuggestedthatapositiveCouncilresponsewashighlylikely.Buttheprospectsforoutrightendorsementwouldbeenhancedby two additional steps: expressions of support for such an endorsement bycredible external stakeholders, and effective internal politics to achieveconsensus.When the draft Norms were first presented to the Commission on Human

Rights,theCouncil’spredecessor,themajorinternationalhumanrightsadvocacyorganizationswerestronglyinfavor.Althoughweworkedtogetherextensivelythroughoutmymandate, these groupswere unlikely to be equally enthusiasticabout theGPs. I have already discussedwhy, beginningwith the fact thatmyfirstofficialactwastocommit“Normicide.”Thus,themostIcouldexpectfromthemwasacknowledgmentthattheGPshadutility,coupledwithstatementsthatthey don’t go far enough—which is precisely the position they took. Moreimportant, many NGOs, including themain human rights organizations, werealready using the Framework and the draft GPs in their own advocacy andoperationalwork,andthatfactspokelouderthanwords.That some advocacygroups lacked enthusiasmor voiced criticismmayhave

beenanadvantagewiththebusinesscommunity.Indeed,astheCouncilsessionapproached,Iencouragedbusinessassociations, individualcompanies,andlawfirms,particularly thosewehadworkedwith inourvarious researchandpilotprojects,tosendlettersofsupporttotheirgovernments,directlytotheCouncil,ortome,andtopostthemonline.Asignificantnumberfromdiverseregionsdidso,whichhelpedtosolidifybackingamongmanyCouncildelegations.The intergovernmental process of drafting and negotiating the resolution

endorsing the GPs and establishing a follow-up mechanism that is consistentwith the approach they embody was led by Norway, along with the othercosponsors: Argentina, India, Nigeria, and Russia. We began the processinformallymore than a year in advance, withNorway hosting events rangingfrom ambassadorial dinners inGeneva to aministerialmeeting inNewYork,preparing thegroundamonggovernments for the idea that themandate’s finalproductshouldbeasetofGuidingPrinciples,eventhoughtheCouncilhadnotspecificallyrequestedsuchaninstrument;andforthepossibilitythattheCouncilwouldendorsethem,eventhoughtheuseofthatverblackedprecedent.Eachofthe other cosponsors convened regular briefings for their respective regionalgroups.AtthefinalanddecisiveCouncilsession,Ecuador,initiallytheonelonevoiceagainst endorsing theGPsbecause theywerenot legallybinding, joinedthe consensus after some back-channel work involving the capital, out of“solidarity”withthecosponsors.

VI.ACHIEVINGCONVERGENCE

UnanimousendorsementbytheHumanRightsCouncilensuredthattheGuidingPrinciplesbecametheauthoritativeUNstandardforbusinessandhumanrights.But by itself thiswould not necessarilymean that other relevant internationalstandard-settingbodieswouldautomaticallydefertotheUNandaligntheirownstandardswiththeGPs.Differentinstitutionshavedifferentmissions,andtheseoftenreflectthesectoralorregionalinterestsandconcernsthatarerepresentedinthem. Therefore, achieving convergence around the GPs required an activeengagementeffort.Convergence is desirable for two reasons. First, reducing the number of

competing standards provides greater clarity and predictability for businessesandotherstakeholdersalike.Thus, itproduceslarger-scalechange,andchangethat ismorecumulative in its effectsover time.Second,othermajor standard-setting bodies active in this domain have implementation capacities the UN

lacks.TheOECDGuidelines involveacomplaintsmechanism; theIFCaffectsaccesstocapital;ISOstandardsenjoyparticularlyhighuptakeinAsiaandtheyfeed into a sizable consulting industry that advises companies on compliance.TheEuropeanUnionistheworld’ssecond-largesthomebaseofmultinationals,whileitscentralinstitutionshaveamandatetoestablishcommonpoliciesoverawiderangeofissues.Thus, once the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework was endorsed in

2008,Ibegantoworkwiththeseotherstandard-settingbodiestoseeifadegreeof convergence could be achieved.With success, and when coupled with theUN’sownfollow-upprocess,onecouldimaginethecontoursofamorecoherenteffort by these key institutions to promote essentially the same or at leastcomplementarybusinessandhumanrightsstandards.The OECD was a welcoming partner. Its own Guidelines for Multinational

Enterprises had come under heavy criticism from NGOs and workers’organizations—as well as from me, including in UN Human Rights Councilreports—for lacking a human rights chapter; because the admissibility criteriafor complaints required the existence of an “investment nexus,” allowingNationalContactPointsattheirdiscretiontodismisscasesinvolvingcontractualsupply-chain relationships and financial intermediaries; and because negativefindings byNCPs, the Guidelines’ complaintsmechanism, lacked any officialconsequences.First,theOECDSecretariatandthentheInvestmentCommittee,which comprises governments and oversees the Guidelines, invited me toaddress several officialmeetings, where I addedmy voice to those urging anupdate of the Guidelines. In 2010 the OECD Council agreed to do so,specificallynotingtheneedto includeahumanrightschapter. IwasinvitedtoparticipateintheOECDupdateprocessasa“FriendoftheGuidelines,”agroupofexternaladvisorsconvenedbythechairoftheInvestmentCommittee.Bythattimethedraftingof theGPswaswelladvanced.Facingthepossibility that theUNandtheOECDmightproducedifferentandpossiblyconflictingbusinessandhumanrightsstandards,businessassociationsbegantocallforconvergence.Forexample, the U.S. Council for International Business, the trade association ofU.S.multinationalcorporations,sentalettertoSecretaryofStateHillaryClintonmakingtheirsupportfortheOECDupdateconditional:

Atoppriorityintheupdateistoaddasectiononbusinessandhumanrights,which we will strongly support to the extent that it is consistent with andfollows from the UN framework on business and human rights being

developed by Prof. John Ruggie, the UN Special Representative of theSecretary-General.26

TheTradeUnionAdvisoryCommitteetotheOECDwasequallysupportiveofthe idea, as was OECD Watch, its civil society counterpart. My team and Iworked closelywith theOECD drafters, and the updatedGuidelines are fullyalignedwiththeGPs’corporate-responsibility-to-respect-human-rightspillar, inmanyinstancesverbatim.Onamoreinformalbasis,Ialsoengagedwithasimilarprocessundertakenby

theInternationalFinanceCorporation,theWorldBank’sprivatesectorarm.Herethepoliticalcontextwassomewhattougher.TheIFCwasscheduledtoupdateitsPolicyonEnvironmentalandSocialSustainability, spellingout itsapproach totheseissuesintheinvestmentsitmakesandtheadvisoryservicesitprovides,aswellastherelatedperformancestandardsthatclientsarerequiredtomeetduringaproject’slifecycle.Intheconsultationsleadinguptotherevision,civilsocietyorganizations exerted pressure on the IFC to include explicit references to thecorporate responsibility to respect human rights, as spelled out in the UNFramework, as I did inmeetingswithWorldBank and IFC senior leadership.Butnowthatemerging-market-economyanddevelopingcountrieshaveacquiredagreatervoiceintheWorldBank,addressinghumanrightsconcernshasbecometrickybecausesomemembersoftheBank’sboardviewthemasalegacyofthe“conditionality”requirementsthatWesterndonorgovernmentsimposedontheminthepast.Inthisparticularinstancesomeofthosegovernmentsalsofearedthataneffectivedue-diligenceprocessbyacompanymightidentifyagovernmentasposing human rights risks to the investment project. In a letter to RobertZoellick,whowasWorldBankpresidentatthetime,Istressedthatthecorporateresponsibility to respect human rights addresses the adverse human rightsimpactsofbusinessitself,includingthosesupportedbyIFCfunding.Ialsolistedthe many developing countries that had made statements and cosponsoredresolutions in support ofmymandate in the Human Rights Council. ZoellickseemedtoconfirmmybeliefthatsuchalettermightbeusefulforinternalBankpurposeswhenheresponded tomy lastpointbysaying:“Your lettergivesmeassurance that the global consensus you are building includes views of publicand private stakeholders from the global south. This is very important for theWorldBankGroup.”27A protracted political process ultimately reached the compromise that the

corporate responsibility to respect human rights would be referenced in the

revisedIFCpolicy,whereitiscloselyalignedwithallcorrespondingelementsintheGPs.ThisallowstheIFCtoassessproject-relatedhumanrightsrisks in itspreinvestment environmental and social due diligence. Human rights do notfeatureasaseparateperformancestandardforclients.Butseveralperformancestandards were strengthened, including those on indigenous peoples’ rights;Performance Standard 1 requires the client to assess the project’s social andenvironmental risks and to maintain an effective environmental and socialmanagementsystem;andtheintroductiontothatstandardnotesthatconductingduediligenceusingtheperformancestandards“willenabletheclienttoaddressmanyhumanrightsissuesinitsproject.”28ISO is the internationalassociationofnational standard-settingbodies in162

countries—forexample,theAmericanNationalStandardsInstituteinthecaseofthe United States. Best known for having developed certifiable managementsystems for firms (ISO 9000 for quality management, ISO 14000 forenvironmentalmanagement),itmovedintothesocialresponsibilityfieldin2002whenitannounceditsintentiontoestablishasocialresponsibilitystandard(ISO26000),althoughactualworkdidnotbeginuntil2005.Unusually,thisstandardisaimedatallorganizations,notonly firms,butarguably ISOwasdrawn intothe field by the perceived opportunity to leverage its past successes withcorporatemanagementsystems,itsreputationfortechnicalprofessionalism,anditsvastnetworksofusers—100,000strongforthequalitymanagementstandard—tocapture significantmarket share in thehighly fragmentedCSRdomain.29TheISOdecision-makingrulesrequireinternalconsensusamongallstakeholdergroupsineachnationalstandardsbody.Iassignedateammembertokeeptrackof the human rights elements of the standard being negotiated, and after theadoptionoftheUNFrameworktotrytoensureISO’salignmentwithit.TwoparticipantsintheISOprocesshavepostedshortaccountsoftheimpactof

mymandateonISO26000:SandraAtler,whorepresentedaSwedishNGO,andAlanFine,representingSouthAfricanbusiness.AccordingtoAtler:

[T]he UN Framework helped decisively to establish in ISO 26000 thebaselineresponsibility to respecthumanrights; to introduce theelementsofhuman rights due diligence as the appropriate means for organizations toknow and show that they respect rights; and in clarifying the concepts ofcomplicityandsphereofinfluence.Moreover,thesupportfortheFrameworkhelpedresolveanumberofdifferencesamongparticipantsintheISO26000process, and increased their overall level of support for the human rights

componentofthestandard.30

Finenotes that therewas initiallystrong resistancewithin thebusinessgroupandsomestatestosettinga“floor”ofbehaviorbelowwhichpracticeswouldbeconsiderednotsociallyresponsible.31Theyarguedthatnosinglesetofstandardscould be universally agreed upon. But the Framework’s formulation of thecorporateresponsibilitytorespecthumanrights,meaningtonotinfringeontherightsofothersandtoconductadequatehumanrightsduediligence,carriedtheday andwas accepted as an “international normof behavior.”There had beenequally strong resistance to any reference to “corporate complicity,” andalthoughthelanguagewashard-fought,ISOultimatelyacceptedmy2008reportonthissubjectasbeinganauthoritativesource.Perhapsthemostdifficultissueconcerned the concept of “sphere of influence,” which successive ISO draftsusedasthebasisfordefiningthescopeofthesocialresponsibilityofallactors.If that stood, ISO 26000would end up contradicting theUN Framework andGPs on a critical foundational issue: whether the attribution of corporateresponsibility should be impact-based or influence-based. Seeing littlemovement, I sent a note to the ISO leadership explaining why I found the“sphereofinfluence”formulaunworkable—muchthesameargumentsImadeinearlierchaptersofthisbook.ButNGOsinparticulardidnotwanttoletgoofthesphere-of-influenceconceptinthebeliefthatitprovidedastrongermoralbasisforsocialresponsibilitythantheimpact-basedformula.Intheend,IprevailedinthehumanrightssectionofISO26000,buttracesof“sphereofinfluence”canbe found elsewhere in the document.32 The new standard was adopted by 93percentofISOmemberbodies,includingChina.Turning to the European Union, I addressed a committee of the European

ParliamentinApril2009,promotingtheFrameworkandalsopolitelybutfirmlycriticizingtherigiddistinctionbetweenvoluntaryandmandatorymeasuresthathad paralyzed the CSR debate within the EU for years. Later that year, theSwedishpresidencyoftheEUconvenedanEU-wideconferenceonthemandateat which I first tried out my conceptual deconstruction of extraterritorialjurisdiction.Subsequently,amemberofmyteamwasinvitedtoparticipateinanEUprojecton this subject.And in the fallof2011, theEuropeanCommissionissuedanewEUCSRstrategyfortheperiod2011to2014.Itincludesaspecificaction item on “Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business andHumanRights,”statingthattheCommission“[e]xpectsallEuropeanenterprisestomeet the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, as defined in the

UNGuidingPrinciples”and“[i]nvitesEUMemberStatestodevelopbytheendof2012nationalplansfortheimplementationoftheUNGuidingPrinciples.”33Finally, in 2009, ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,

established an IntergovernmentalCommission onHumanRights. It is chargedwith,amongother tasks,draftinganASEANDeclarationofHumanRights. Inearly 2011 the Commission announced that it would also conduct a baselinestudy onCSR and human rights in theASEAN region.Members ofmy teambriefed the Commission twice, once during its visit to Washington and thesecond time in the region. According to a subsequent statement by oneCommissionrepresentative:

The target for this thematic study is an ASEAN Guideline that is fullycompliant with the UN frameworks, especially the Protect, Respect andRemedy Framework for Business and Human Rights and the GuidingPrinciples forBusinessandHumanRightswhichwereendorsedby theUNHumanRightsCouncilon16June2011.34

Forthesereasons,anend-of-yearblogontheWebsiteofLondon’sGuardiannewspaper called 2011 “a landmark year for business and human rights”35—althoughIamthefirsttoinsistthatmuchmoreremainstobedone.

VII.CONCLUSION

Sowherearewenow,alongthetrajectoryofestablishingtheGuidingPrinciplesasinternationalnormsofbehavior?Weare,asIstatedpreviously,attheendofthebeginning.Theviewsoftwoverydifferentstakeholdergroupsillustratethatanimportant

phase has ended—one group at the forefront of business and human rightsadvocacy,theotherabusinessassociationinaconservativeindustrysector.TheInternationalCorporateAccountabilityRoundtableisanewcoalitionofleadinghuman rights organizations that include Amnesty International, EarthRightsInternational,GlobalWitness,HumanRights First, andHumanRightsWatch.TheyheldtheirfirstannualmeetinginSeptember2011toassessthecurrentstateof play in business and human rights, and to develop a common approach to“building a movement for corporate accountability.” Under the heading of“ConcludingThemes” ina report summarizing thediscussions,oneparticipant(speakerswerenotidentifiedbyname)observed:

Ruggie’sGuidingPrincipleswill likely be the template for an internationalhuman rights framework for the next decade. There is a need for morediscussion of these principles and for debate regarding the expectations ofcompaniesinhigh-riskindustriestousetheseprinciples.Theprincipleshavesubstantive merit and campaigning utility, however, which was lackingbefore.36

Two months later IPIECA, the global oil and gas industry association forenvironmental and social issues, announced that it had convened its firstworkshop“furtheringcollaborativelearningaroundduediligenceandgrievancemechanisms.Dedicated teams have been formed to design and executemulti-yearworkprograms inbothareas.”37This followedastatementwhen theGPswere issued that expressed the hope that any UN follow-up to the mandatewould “help facilitate implementation of the Protect, Respect and Remedyframeworkandadoptionof theduediligence recommendations.”38 It is fair tosay that these twogroupsdonot agreeonmuch.Butbothexpect that theUNGuidingPrincipleswillconstitute thefoundationfor thenextphaseofwork inbusinessandhumanrights—therebyacknowledgingthatwenowdohavesuchacommonfoundation.That there is much more to be done can be illustrated through a simple

heuristic model of the life cycle of norms. Scholars who study how normsemerge,spread,andbecomeembeddedinpracticehaveidentifiedthreephases.They call the first “norm emergence.” Its main driver is said to be efforts atpersuasion by so-called norm entrepreneurs. In global governance contexts,these are individuals with organizational platforms who use information andexpertise,formulateorganizationalpriorities,andengageinpublicadvocacytopromote a particular norm or a set of norms. “The construction of cognitiveframes is an essential component of norm entrepreneurs’ political strategies,since when they are successful the new frames resonate with broader publicunderstandingsandareadoptedasnewwaysoftalkingaboutandunderstandingissues.”39Thesecondphase isdescribedas“normcascade.”Thisoccurswhenstates and international institutions embrace the emerging norm. Here normentrepreneurs and supporters persuade the relevant rule-makers of the norm’sappropriatenessandeffectivenesstotheirrespectiveorganizations’missionandeven legitimacy.The thirdphase is termed“norm internalization.”Thisoccurswhen a norm begins to take on a “taken-for-granted quality” and getsincorporated into organizational routines. Professions—in the business and

human rights context, lawyers and consultants, for example—often serve asimportantbridgingagentsbytranslatingnormsintoactionplans,implementationtools,andperformanceindicators.Thislife-cyclemodelisnotpredictiveinthesenseofbeingabletotellwhich

norms are likely to complete the path and which will fail to take off or getsidetrackedalongtheway.Norcanitpossiblybefullydescriptiveofthemanydiverse ways in which norms evolve in specific contexts. One reason is that“new norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highlycontested normative space where they must compete with other norms andperceptionsofinterest.”40Thereisnoexantewayofdeterminingifandhowthiscontestationwillberesolved.Butthemodeldoesprovideuswithbenchmarks.Amongthemaininternationalstandard-settingbodiesinvolvedinbusinessand

human rights, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights—itsdefinition,substantivecontent,scope,andwhatcompaniesmustdotomeetit—has “emerged” and in large measure “cascaded.” It remains to be seen howeffectivelyitgets“internalized”andimplemented.Intheworldofmultinationalcorporations it has gone through the first two phases among many leadingcompanies, but internalization has just begun. I suspect that the majority ofmultinationals and the larger universe of small and medium-sized enterprisesknowslittleifanythingyetabouttheGuidingPrinciples.Gettinggovernmentstoacceptthefullimplicationsoftheirdutytoprotecthumanrightsagainstabusesbybusinessenterprisesremainsasignificantchallenge—includinginrelationtotheever-more-prominentroleofstate-ownedenterprises.Andaccesstojudicialremedyremainsmostproblematicwhereitismostneeded.The concluding chapter picks up from this assessment and offers some

reflectionsonnextsteps.

ChapterFive

NEXTSTEPS

The most difficult part of any journey is often the beginning. That wascertainly true in the case of my mandate. I had an impressive title: “SpecialRepresentativeof theUnitedNationsSecretary-Generalon the issueofhumanrights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises.” But as IrecountedintheIntroduction,thatwaslargelyit.Mytaskinitiallywaslimitedtoidentifying and clarifying things, and I had no budget or staff. Gradually, thematerial constraints became less pressing and the scope of the mandate wasexpanded. But even then the sheer intellectual challenge remained daunting.Adaptingtheinternationalhumanrightsregimetoencompassbusinessconductrunssmackintosomeofthemostprominentfeaturesofthecurrentworldpolityand economy: national sovereignty; competition among states for markets,investments,andaccesstoresources;theemergenceofnewglobalpowerswiththeir own views about both business and human rights; weak or corruptgovernments inmanycountries; thecorporate-lawprincipleof legalseparationbetween parent company and affiliates, asymmetries of capacity and influencebetweenlargecompaniesandmanygovernments;largeswathsofconflictzones;fewandhighlycontestedbasesofextraterritorialjurisdiction—thelistgoeson.Howdoesoneframeanagendathatrecognizestheseconstraintsandyetavoids

beingoverwhelmedbythem?Inthisalreadydifficultcontext,twoillusionshadaddedtothechallengeofprovidingmoreeffectiveprotectiontoindividualsandcommunitiesagainstcorporate-relatedhumanrightsharm:that thisobjectiveisbest achieved by seeking to subject the entire bundle of business and humanrightsissuestoabindinginternationallegalinstrument;orthatthecombinationof voluntary initiatives, newmanagement tools, and the dissemination of bestpracticesonitsownwillgenerateenoughmomentumforcompaniesthemselvestotrulymovemarkets.Butneithercandowhatitpromises:thefirstbecauseitexpects toomuch from the systemof international public governance, and thesecondbecauseitpermitstoolittle.The previous chapters of this book describe and explain themore heterodox

approach I developed. It combines in one single template the three distinctgovernance systems that shape corporate conduct in the global sphere: public,corporate, and civil. The Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework addresseswhat shouldbedone: the stateduty toprotect against human rights abusesbythird parties, including business enterprises, through appropriate policies,regulation,andadjudication;an independentcorporate responsibility to respecthuman rights, which means that business enterprises should act with duediligencetoavoidinfringingontherightsofothersandaddressadverseimpactswith which they are involved; and the need for greater access by affectedindividualsandcommunitiestoeffectiveremedy,bothjudicialandnonjudicial.TheGuidingPrinciplesstipulatehowthesethingsshouldbedone,layingoutthenecessarypoliciesandpractices,includingtheengagementofaffectedpeopleindue-diligenceprocessesandgrievancemechanismsaswellasinmonitoringtheperformanceof theother twomainactors against thebenchmarks theGuidingPrinciplesprovide.The three pillars are intended to be mutually reinforcing. Starting with

businesses, theirownresponsibilities includeduediligencetoidentify,prevent,mitigate, and account for how they address their adverse impacts on humanrights;andparticipationinprocessesthatenabletheremediationofanyadversehuman rights impact they cause or contribute to. Even if no other pillarwereadded, this formulation of the corporate responsibility to respect human rightsspells out in greater detail than ever before how companies should meet thatbaseline responsibility. But the corporate responsibility to respect is not afreestandingpillar.It isreinforcedbythestatedutytoprotectononeside,andjudicialaswellasnonjudicialremedyontheother.Finally,inthisconstructionstatesandbusinessesare joinedbyactors fromthesphereofcivilgovernance.The GPs also differ from other efforts to provide guidance for business andhumanrights:theirendorsementbyaunanimousUNHumanRightsCouncilandthe adoption of core elements by other international standard-setting bodiesmakeit,inthewordsofUNSecretary-GeneralBanKi-moon,“theauthoritativeglobalstandardforpreventingandaddressingadverseimpactsonhumanrightsarisingfrombusiness-relatedactivity.”1Only timewill tell if theGuiding Principles actually generate their intended

regulatorydynamic.Thisfinalchapterreportssomeofthestepsthatarealreadybeing taken in that direction, aswell as further steps that I believe should betaken,forthejourneytocontinue.

I.IMPLEMENTATION

Thefirst“next”stepisforthevariousstandard-settingbodiesandotherentitiesthathaveadoptedorotherwiseincorporatedtheGPstobeginimplementingtheircommitments. This section briefly surveys some of the ongoing activity,beginningwiththeUNitself.The UN Human Rights Council has established a five-person inter-regional

working group of experts to follow up on the mandate. The group issued itsworkplaninApril2012.2ItsmaintasksaretopromotetheGPs’implementationand dissemination, identify and exchange good practices, help build theinstitutionalcapacityofdevelopingcountriesaswellassmallandmedium-sizedenterprises, andprovide further recommendations to theCouncil.Theworkinggroupwillconducttwoofficialcountryvisitsayear,andalsoconveneanannualglobal forum on business and human rights to examine overall trends andaddresschallengesencounteredinimplementingtheGPs.AlongwiththeOfficeof the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the working group is alsoexpected to play a role as the GPs’ guardian, tracking how they are beinginterpretedbyvariousactors.Theworkinggroup,likethemandatebeforeit,hasadoptedamultistakeholderapproachandplanstoworkwithdiversepartnersindifferent regions of the world. Beyond the scope of the working group,Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has issued a detailed report withrecommendationsonhowtheUNsystemasawholecancontributetotheGPs’disseminationandimplementation.3TheEuropeanCommissionhascalledonallEuropeanUnionmemberstatesto

submit national action plans on the implementation of theGPs by the end of2012;atthetimeofwriting,nationalconsultationshadtakenplaceinDenmark,Germany,theNetherlands,andtheUnitedKingdom.TheEUhasalsolaunchedworktofurtherelaboratetheGPsspecificallyforthreedifferentindustrysectors,andforsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises.Thefirstsectorselectedcomprisesemployment and recruitment agencies, an industry that has undergoneexponential growth in recent years. Adverse human rights impacts that havebeen identified in this sector includehuman trafficking, slavery, and forcedorbonded labor; denial of just and favorable conditions of work; and risks tofreedomofassociationandcollectivebargaining.Thesecondsectorcomprisesinformation and communication technology companies. Here the focus is onfreedom of expression and privacy, as well as workplace standards in supplychains. The third sector is the oil and gas industry. The main issues to beaddressedincludelandrights;adverseimpactsonhealth,cleanwaterandfood;on freedom of expression and assembly; and on the physical security of the

person.“TheguidancedevelopedthroughthisprojectwillbebasedontheUNGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRights.”4TheresultsareintendedtoinformfutureEUpolicyandpossiblylegislationonbusinessandhumanrights,andcorporatesocialresponsibilitymorebroadly.Recall that theupdate of theOECDGuidelines forMultinationalEnterprises

includedahumanrightschapterfor thefirst time,whichdrawsonandisfullyaligned with the GPs’ provisions on the corporate responsibility to respecthuman rights. Several important developments are under way here. First, theOECD has selected the financial services sector for the development ofmoredetailed guidance. Previously, the Guidelines required that an “investmentnexus”existinorderforacomplaintagainstacompanytofallwithintheirscopeand be considered by an OECD National Contact Point (NCP)—the officialcomplaints mechanisms in each of the forty-two adhering governments. Thatrequirementwasloosenedin2011.Nowlendinginstitutionsandothertypesoffinancial intermediaries will have some due-diligence requirements under theGuidelines,whichthisexercisewillhelpspecify.5Second, complaints are beginning to be submitted to NCPs under the

Guidelines’ new human rights chapter. One that was resolved quickly wasbroughtagainstaDutchagriculturalmultinational,NideraHoldings,byagroupofArgentineandDutchNGOs,regardingthetreatmentoftemporaryagriculturalworkers in Argentine corn fields. The company agreed to upgrade its humanrightspolicy,toadopthumanrightsduediligenceprocedures,andtopermittheNGOstomonitortheparticularoperationbymeansofsitevisits.6ThroughsuchNCPdeliberations,thefunctionalequivalentof“jurisprudence”inhumanrightscases will emerge across the forty-two adhering governments—officialinterpretations of the meaning of the OECDGuidelines’ requirements for thecorporateresponsibilitytorespecthumanrightsinspecificcontexts,fleshingoutthehigher-levelguidancetheGPsprovide.NewrulesalsorequireNCPstomakepublic the results of every case they consider.7 The combination of these twomeasures will enhance peer learning, and social learning more broadly. TheOECDisalsomakingefforts toreachbeyondthecurrentstatesadhering to itsGuidelines;forexample,China,India,Indonesia,theRussianFederation,SaudiArabia,andSouthAfricawereinvitedtoparticipateintheirupdate.What still needs to happen here is for governments to agree that lack of

cooperationbyacompanyinanNCPprocess,eitherbyfailingtoengageinitorignoring its negative findings, will have official consequences—including thewithdrawal of such public support as export credit and investment insurance,

until the company can demonstrate compliance. Indeed, this reflects a moregeneralshortcominginthesystemthroughwhichgovernmentsprovidethistypeof support to companies: it does not uniformly include due-diligencerequirementsevenwhen theproposedproject isdestined foranareaknown toposehighhumanrightsrisks.IhadurgedtheOECDExportCreditGroup,whichdevelops minimum standards among the national agencies, to adopt suchrequirements. It appears that the Group will endorse modest steps in thisdirection. A forthcoming version of the Group’s “Common ApproachesRecommendation” is expected to reference the corporate responsibility torespecthumanrightsasstipulatedintheGPsandtoincludesomeformofimpactassessment.8 Of course, individual national export credit agencies are free tomoveforwardontheirowntoincludesuchrequirements.Non-OECDmembers,includingChina,shoulddevelopparallelpolicies.As discussed in earlier chapters, ISO 26000 also includes a human rights

chapter that is closelyalignedwith theGPs. It isofficiallydesignateda socialresponsibility “guidance,” not a certifiable standard like ISO 14000 onenvironmentalmanagementsystems.Butapparentlythemarketingopportunitiesfor a certifiable standard were too great to resist. Swiss-based IQNet, anassociationofmorethanthirty-fivenationalcertificationbodies,haslauncheditsown version of ISO 26000, calling it IQNet SR 10.According to IQNet, thisstandard “establishes the requirements of social responsibility managementsystems,” enabling companies and other organizations to “gain credibilitythroughglobalcertification.”9It is too soon to see changes resulting from the International Finance

Corporation’s new sustainability policy and performance standards, given thelead time required formajor investment projects.However, the IFC’sgrowingcollaborationwithprivateequityfirmshasbroughtanentirelynewsetofactorsinto the arena that until recently had exhibited little concern with social,environmental,andgovernanceissues.Severalsuchfirms,includingtheCarlyleGroup, one of the largest, are establishing significant investment funds foremergingmarketsinwhichtheylackpriorexperienceandthereforelooktoIFCinvolvement as much for its institutional knowledge and relationships as forfinancing.ButinreturnthesefirmsarerequiredtocomplywithIFCstandards—includingcarryingoutsocial-andenvironmental-impactassessments.Itisdifficulttokeeptrackofindividualcountryandcompanyinitiatives,there

beingnoglobalregistryofsuchthings.Companiestendnottoannouncemajordevelopments, such as adopting a newhuman rights policy, until they already

havethemainelementsinplace,includingtrainingtheirpersonnel.Experiencesuggests that it may take as long as two years for a large corporation toimplement such shifts.Changes in government policies can take longer. Fromtheavailableinformation,itseemsthatindividualgovernmentsarestillmostlyinthe planning stage, organizingworkshops and parliamentary hearings onwhattheGPsmeanforthemandfortheirbusinesses.Majorcorporationsaremovingmore rapidly, focused inparticularonhowto

puteffectivedue-diligenceprocessesintoplace,andinsomesectors(mining,inparticular) developing site-level grievancemechanisms. In February 2012, theglobal audit and advisory firm,Mazars, surveyedmining companies listed oneight different stock exchanges; among its findings was that “65% ofrespondents were actively working towards compliance with the [Guiding]Principles.”10 Numerous companieswith complex supply chains are assessingtheadequacyof theirdue-diligencesystemsforaddressingmultitieredsupplierchallenges. In addition, the information technology sector has become moreengaged than in the past, no doubt due to user backlashwhen companiesmetdemandsfromsomegovernments,includingduringtheArabspring,toturnoveruser information or censor their services.The first-everSiliconValleyHumanRightsConferencewasheld inOctober2011 sponsoredbyGoogle,Facebook,Yahoo, Mozilla, and Skype, among others. It adopted the “Silicon ValleyStandard,” which includes a human rights commitment: “In both policy andpractice, technology companies should apply human rights frameworks indeveloping best practices and standard operating procedures. This includesadheringtoJohnRuggie’sProtect,RespectandRemedyframeworkoutlinedintheUNGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRights.”11TheInternationalOrganisationofEmployers,theworld’slargestrepresentative

business association, with national chapters in 143 countries, has issued an“Employers’Guide”totheGPs.12TheInternationalTradeUnionConfederationhas done the same for unionists.13 Both describe in some detail how theirrespectiveconstituentmemberorganizationscanusetheGPs.AsreportedbytheUNworkinggroup,civilsocietyorganizations“areactivelyworkingtopromoteenhancedaccountabilityofStatesandbusinessenterprisesforthehumanrightsimpact of business activity, with numerous examples referencing the ‘Protect,RespectandRemedy’FrameworkandGuidingPrinciples.”14Otherinternationalinitiativesarebuildingon,orotherwisereferencing,theFrameworkandtheGPs,ranging from UNICEF’s “Children’s Rights and Business Principles” to the“InternationalCodeofConductforPrivateSecurityProviders,”orchestratedby

theSwissgovernmentandtheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross.15Forits part, the UN Global Compact has stated officially that the GPs “providefurtherconceptualandoperationalclarity”forthehumanrightscommitmentsitchampions, and it convenes workshops and provides tools to promote theirunderstanding.16TheprocessoffurtherimplementinganddisseminatingtheGPswilltaketime.

But they are already being called upon inmore immediate situations aswell.One important instance concerns Myanmar/Burma. Recent politicaldevelopments,symbolizedbytheelectiontoparliamentofAungSanSuuKyi,haveledtothesuspensionofeconomicsanctionsimposedonthatcountry.TheEUwasthefirsttodoso.OnApril26,2012,theEUforeignministersissuedastatementthatincludedthefollowingparagraph:

TheEUrecognizesthevitalcontributiontheprivatesectorhastomaketothedevelopment ofMyanmar/Burma andwouldwelcomeEuropean companiesexploring trade and investment opportunities. This should be done bypromoting the practice of the highest standards of integrity and corporatesocial responsibility. These are laid out in the OECD Guidelines forMultinational Enterprises, UN guiding principles on business and humanrightsandtheEU’sownCSRstrategy2011–2014.TheEUwillworkwiththeauthorities,theprivatesectorandthepeopleofMyanmar/Burmatocreatethebestpossibleregulatoryenvironment.17

WhentheUnitedStatesfollowedsuit,expressingsimilarexpectationsregardingcorporate responsibility, the government went a step further and imposed areporting requirement on U.S. entities investing in Burma, which includes ahumanrightscomponentthatspecificallyreferencestheGuidingPrinciples.18Myanmarposesaparticularchallengeforbusinessandhumanrights.Itisrich

innaturalresources,yetpovertypersists.Concernsovercorruptionremainhigh,as can be seen in theTransparency InternationalCorruptionPerception Index,whichranksthecountrythirdfromthebottomintheworld.Theruleof lawisweak and the judiciary is far from independent. The government and localbusinesseshavebeencloselyintertwined.Themilitaryhasasignificantstakeinmanysectorsoftheeconomy,andhumanrightsgroupshaveshownconclusivelythat abusive practices such as forced labor are still widespread. In such anenvironment international investors will need to undertake enhanced duediligence, including exercising caution aboutwhom theyobtain access to land

from, how they gain that access, and how they conduct consultations withaffected communities. It also means ensuring that workers are able to formunions, are paid a fair, legal, livingwage, and that no force is used in hiringworkersorintheirconditionsatwork.Companieswillalsohavetotakeconcretesteps to see to it that their partners, local or regional, adhere to internationalstandardsandarenotimplicatedinanypastconductthatmayexposeinvestorsto complicity risks, and that they take effective steps to conduct activitieswithout discrimination, particularlywhile operating in regions riven by ethnictensionandconflict.To achieve real progress in Myanmar, governments, businesses, and civil

societywillneedtoworktogethertofindaresponsiblewayforward;thatmeanscompaniesconsultingwith localactorsaswellasassessingpotentiallyadversehumanrightsimpactsofbusinessactivitiesandrelationships.AsrecommendedbytheGPs,thehomestatesofforeigninvestorsshouldprovidethemwithclearguidanceaboutthecontextinwhichcompanieswilloperate,includingitshumanrights risks. Equally important, home governments shouldmake export creditand investment insurance conditional upon companies undertaking such duediligenceanddevelopingmitigatingstepsincaseofpotentialharm.Finally,thegovernment of Myanmar should be encouraged to demonstrate its owncommitment to more accountable governance, including by participating inmultistakeholder initiatives such as the Extractive Industry TransparencyInitiative, making public the payments it receives from petroleum, gas, andminingcompanies, aswell as adhering to theVoluntaryPrinciplesonSecurityandHumanRights,which provide ground rules for the conduct of public andprivatesecurityproviderswhoprotectcompanyinstallations.Individually, these steps would be significant; collectively, they offer the

potentialofmakingMyanmaranexampleofhowtheGPscanhelpbusinessesoperate responsibly even invery challengingenvironments—thoughwhether aMyanmarversionofProtect,Respect andRemedycanbeput inplace rapidlyenoughtoshapetheoncominginvestmentfloodremainsanopenquestion.Tosumup,thelifeoftheGPsdidnotendwiththeiradoption;insomewaysit

hasonlyjustbegun.Theimplementationphasehasgottenunderway,andfurtherdisseminationisaprimarytaskoftheUNworkinggroup.Follow-upinitiativesby governments and businesses are drilling down in specific industry sectors.WorkersorganizationsandcivilsocietyactorsareusingtheGPsasabenchmarkfor advocacy and assessment in relation to both.Moreover, while the GPs inthemselvesdonotestablishnewinternationallawnorms,byadoptingthemthe

governmentsendorsedthepropositionthatifacompanycannotknowandshowthat it respectshumanrights, itsclaimthat itdoes remainsonly that—aclaim,nota fact.This soft-law formulacoupledwith theirownbusiness rationales ishelping to drive leading companies to develop human rights due-diligencesystems.Inshort,wearewitnessinganexpandingsetofeffortsatembeddingtheGPs, reflecting the different characteristics of sectors, regions, and scale ofoperationsbutbaseduponacommonnormativeplatformandpolicyguidance.

II.BUILDINGONTHEGPS

DuringthecourseofmyUNmandateIaddressedseveralareasoflawandpolicythatdirectlyshapebusinesspracticesbutoperateinisolationfromhumanrights,and are largely uninformed by their implications for them. Among the mostimportant are international investment agreements and corporate law. Theprevailingunderstandingoftheirhumanrightslinkageswastoounderdeveloped,however,and thediversityofpoliciesandpracticesacross states toogreat, formetohaveputforwardspecificrecommendations.ButbothareareasthatshouldbetargetedforfurtherpolicydevelopmentbuildingontheGPs.

InvestmentAgreements

Bilateralinvestmenttreaties(BITs)areconcludedbetweengovernments.Nearly3,000BITs are in place today, following an exponential increase in the 1990sreflectingthatdecade’swaveofglobalizationandprivatization.Underthetermsofthesetreatiesthecapital-importingcountryprovidesenforceableguaranteestoinvestorsfromthecapital-exportingcountry.Theguaranteesincludestandardsoftreatmenttobeappliedtoinvestors,andprovisionsforcompensationincaseofexpropriation.Theseagreementsarenecessarytoprotectforeigninvestorsfromarbitrary treatment by host governments.But, as discussed in earlier chapters,theyalsohavefeaturesthatcanconstrainhostgovernments’regulatoryspaceinother, less desirableways. JoséAlvarez is a leading professor of internationallawwhoservedasaninvestmenttreatynegotiatorintheReaganadministration.HeexplainsthattheprincipalaimofU.S.BITsatthetimewas“toentrench...the underlying private law legal regimes necessary to support markettransactions—andenableinternationallawtobecomeaforcetodismantlepubliclaw regulations inimical to the market.”19 In case of an investment disputebetweenthehoststateandaforeigninvestor,typicallyaBITpermitstheinvestorto initiate compulsory international arbitration claims against the state. The

arbitration process draws its rules and practitioners largely from theworld ofcommercial arbitration, and yet inmany cases they are required to determinemattersofprofoundpublic interest.Over time,whatAlvarezcalled“inimical”regulations has been construed to include labor standards, environmentalimprovements, and human rights protections. In addition, unlike the field oftradelaw,thereisnoappellateprocedureforarbitralrulings;inconsistentorevencontradictoryrulingssimplyareallowedtostand.Accordingtooneexpertstudy,because few if any institutionalized checks and balances exist in investmentdisputesettlementthereisafarhigherdegreeofspeculativeformsoflitigationinthisarea—ofinvestorstryingtopushtheenvelopeintheirfavor—thanintheWorldTradeOrganization.20ProfessorThomasWalde,aninvestmentlawandarbitrationexpert,chidedme

inhisresponsetoaspeechIgaveinLondonin2007,inwhichIraisedtheneedfor states to be able tomeet their human rights commitmentswithout fear ofrunningafouloftheirinvestmenttreatyobligations.Hefollowedupinanemail:

The problem with many of the human rights claims now made is thatinvestment tribunals have to operate with the “law applicable.” That isdefinedbythe[bilateralinvestment]treaty....Ifarbitratorsapplysomethingoutsidetheclearjurisdiction/mandateofthetreatybecausetheysympathize,they’ll exceed their jurisdiction, risk annulment/setting-aside and theirreputation.Itislawtheyhavetoapplynotairy-fairywishy-washyconceptsofdesirabilitywithavaguesoft-lawclaim.21

But in thealready-mentionedcasebroughtagainstSouthAfricabyEuropeaninvestors who claimed that certain provisions of the Black EconomicEmpowermentActwereunfair,inequitable,andtantamounttoexpropriation,thegovernmentwasnotdefending“wishy-washy”or“airy-fairy”concepts,but itsownconstitutionand legislativeacts that sought toestablish restorative justiceafter decades of apartheid rule. Argentina may have botched its waterprivatizationprogram,butthereisnothing“vague”abouttheneedofitspeopleto have access to clean and affordable drinkingwater. Protecting the rights ofindigenous peoples when a mining company wishes to expand into ancestralburialgroundsisnota“soft-law”issuetothemortothehostgovernmentwithwhichtheindigenousgroupmayhavealong-standingtreaty.Inshort,therulesand tools of BITs and arbitration proceduresmay inappropriately constrain orpunish governments for taking bona fide public interest measures, includingmeeting their human rights obligations, and even where the measures affect

foreign and domestic investors equally. Nevertheless, Walde is absolutelycorrect:bettercraftedtreatiesarenecessary.Butuntilrecentlytheyhavebeeninshort supply, in part due to a lack of knowledge, in part to the powerasymmetriesbetweenthepartiesinvolved.This situation is beginning to change as a result of several factors: emerging

economies,includingChinaandBrazil,refusetoacceptrestrictiveprovisionsofthis sort; Western countries, including the United States, are becoming morefrequent targets of suits by foreign investors; and the recognition is setting inmore widely that governments require adequate domestic policy space tomanage competing policy objectives and legal obligations in an ever-more-interconnectedglobaleconomy.22A2007NorwegiandraftmodelBITsignaledthechange.Thecommentarynoted thatcertain featuresofBITsposepotentialrisks toNorway’s ownhighlydeveloped systemof regulations andprotection,includingenvironmentalandsocialpolicies.Italsostressedthevulnerabilityofdevelopingcountries toagreements“that tieuppolitical freedomofactionandthe exercise of authority.” Accordingly, the draft sought to “ensure that theState’s right to make legitimate regulations of the actions of investors is notrestrictedby an investment agreement.However, the right to regulatemust bebalanced against the investors’ wish for predictability, legal safeguards,minimumrequirementsregardingtheactionsof theState,andcompensationinthe event of expropriation.”23 In April 2012 the United States issued its newmodel BIT. As in all such treaties, the language is complex. But I found itinteresting that the State Department’s “fact sheet” describing it chose tohighlight “its carefully calibrated balance between providing strong investorprotections and preserving the government’s ability to regulate in the publicinterest”; the obligation on parties to not “waive or derogate from” domesticlaborandenvironmentallawsasaluretoforeigninvestment,andto“effectivelyenforce”suchlaws;newprovisionswherebytheparties“reaffirmandrecognizeinternational commitments” under the ILO core rights at work; and thepossibility of a future multilateral appellate procedure.24 But even this latestmodel agreement does not explicitly address business-related human rightschallengesbeyondtheconfinesoftheworkplace.Corresponding changes are required in host government agreements—the

contracts governments and companies enter into for specific projects. Thesecontracts generally are not made public, but the ninety or so that I saw on aconfidential basis exhibited little awarenessof the fact thatmajorprojects canpose significant human rights risks. Therefore, they include few if any

provisions forhow those risksshouldbemanagedwhen theyarise.Aboveall,contracts fail to delineate the respective roles and obligations of governmentsandcompaniesforsituationswhenthingsgowrong.That’snotgoodforpeopleorcompaniesbecauseitcanleadtoconfusionandlackofdirectionintimesofcrisis, especially if military units untrained in community policing are calledupon to control large-scale demonstrations.Moreover, because companies aresubjecttocommunitypressuresevenwheregovernmentsarenot,intheabsenceofaclearexantespecificationofroles,thosepressurescanpushcompaniesintoprovidingwhatareessentiallypublicgoodsandservices, forwhichcompaniesare ill equipped, which is unsustainable once companies leave, and whichdiminishestheincentivesforgovernmentstodotheirjob.Moreover, as with BITs, some of the regulatory stabilization provisions that

companies insist on including in investor-state contracts unduly constraingovernmentsevenwhen theyactonbonafidepublic interestgroundsand inanondiscriminatorymanner.Relativebargainingpowercanbeasmuchinplayasfinancial risk in determining the scope of stabilization provisions—orwhetherthey’reinacontractatall.JustasinthecaseofBITs,governmentsneedtobeabletoconstructapropernondiscriminatoryregulatoryframeworkwithoutfearofbeingsuedbyforeigninvestors.Finally,physicalharmtopeopleincommunities—includinglossoflife—atthe

handsofsecurityprovidersremainsamajorchallengefortheextractiveindustry.Therefore, when such companies operate in difficult environments, it isimperative that investor-state contracts includemore explicit references to theneed for public and private security providers to be subject to internationalhuman rights standards. This can be done, for example, by incorporating theVoluntaryPrinciplesonSecurity andHumanRights intocontractprovisions—holdingboth the state and the company responsible for ensuring that adequatevetting and training of security providers as well as honest incident reportingtakesplace.There isnocentral location in the internationalcommunity fromwhich these

changes can be driven. The new generation of bilateral investment treaties isbeing hammered out in national capitals and bilateral negotiations, undercompeting political pressures. And investor-state contracts are generated byindividual government agencies, companies, and large numbers of law firmsscatteredacross theworld.Continuedadvocacyandsupportformorebalancedapproaches are necessary.UNagencies shoulddomore to providenegotiationtraining and skills building for governments that have limited capacity. These

concernsalsoneedtoberaisedwithlawfirms,whichhavebeenurgedtosupportandpromotetheGuidingPrinciplesbyboththeAmericanandtheInternationalbar associations—andwhich, as businesses, have their own responsibilities torespecthumanrights.25Theinternationalandregionalfollow-upprocessestomymandatealsoprovidevisiblevenuesfromwhichtoexpandawarenessaboutthehumanrightsdimensionsofinternationalinvestmentagreements.

CorporateLaw

At the very foundation of modern corporate law lies the principle of legalseparation between a company’s owners (the shareholders) and the companyitself, coupled with its correlative principle of limited liability, under whichshareholders are held financially liable only to the extent of the value of theirownership shares. Thismodel of the joint stock companywas inventedwhenonlypeople—“naturalpersons”—wereowners,anditwasintendedtofacilitatetheformationofcapitalamongthemforinvestmentpurposes.Today,themodelhasbeenstretchedtoapplytomultinationalcorporategroupswithsubsidiaries,joint ventures, contractors, and other types of affiliates in up to two hundredstatesand territoriesaround theworld, eachofwhich is legallyconstruedasaseparate and independent entity even where the parent company is the soleshareholder.Thisraisesafundamentalquestionforbusinessandhumanrights:howdowegetamultinationalcorporationtoassumetheresponsibilitytorespecthumanrights for theentirecorporategroup,notatomize itdown to itsvariousconstituentunits?26TheattemptbytheUNSub-CommissiononHumanRightstoimposebinding

Norms on multinational corporations, which preceded my mandate, aimed asilverbulletattheproblem.Butitturnedouttobeadud.LarryCatáBacker,alegalscholarwhohaswrittenextensivelyonthissubject,observedatthetime:

The Norms internationalize and adopt an enterprise liability model as thebasis fordetermining thescopeof liability forgroupsof relatedcompanies.This approach does, in a very simple way, eliminate one of the greatcomplaints about globalization through large webs of interconnected butlegallyindependentcorporationsformingonelargeeconomicenterprise.Theproblem, of course, is that, as amatter of domestic law inmost states, theautonomous legal personality of a corporation matters. Most states havedevelopedverystrongpublicpoliciesinfavoroflegalautonomy.27

Indeed,mysurveyoftherelationshipbetweencorporatelawandhumanrightsinthirty-nine jurisdictions around the world indicated that some form of legalseparationandlimitedliabilityexistsinallofthem.Someexceptionsaremadein different jurisdictions, though few with extraterritorial reach. Reform ofcorporateandsecuritieslawandpolicyisunderconsiderationinmanycountriesas a result of the 2008 financial sector meltdown and its impact on the realeconomy.But theabandonmentof thefoundational tenetsofmoderncorporatelawisnotontheagenda.Dealingwiththeconstraintstheyimposeintheglobalbusinessandhumanrightscontextwillremainamorecomplexaffair.Underthecorporate-responsibility-to-respect-human-rightspillar,Ididnotset

outtoestablishaglobalenterpriselegalliabilitymodel.Thatwouldhavebeenapurely theoretical exercise. My aim was to prescribe practical ways ofintegrating human rights concernswithin enterprise risk-management systems.Multinationalcorporationsroutinelyassessandaddressenterprise-widerisks,inadditiontotherisksfacedbylocaloperatingunits.Andwhentheydoso, theyaggregate,notatomize,risksacrossthecorporategroupandfunctions.Separatelegalpersonalityisrarelyinvokedinrelationtoenterpriseriskmanagement.Buttherehadbeennoauthoritativeguidanceforhowtomanagetherisksofadversehumanrightsimpacts.Theconceptandcomponentelementsofhumanrightsduediligenceprovidethatguidance.Ongoingeffortsatreformingcorporatelawcanhelp build on the GPs’ foundation.28 I suggest two broad approaches, onerelating to the internal dimension of corporate governance, the second to itsexternaldimension.We learned from our pilot projects that integrating systems for conducting

human rights due diligence and managing the resulting information flowsconstitutecomplexchallengesforbusinesses,especially for largeandfar-flungcompanies.Oneproblemisthattheindividualorteamresponsibleforassessinghumanrightsimpactsonthegroundoftensitsapartfromthoseconductingandoverseeing the activities and relationships that generate negative impacts. Sothoseassessingtheimpactsdonotdirectlycontrolthedecisionsandactionsthatcan prevent,mitigate, or remediate impacts.And yet the speed and easewithwhich an enterprise can respond to its potential human rights impacts can bedecisive for the effectiveness of managing those risks. Therefore, companiesneed to institute fully linked-up chains of responsibility across the appropriatelevels and functions within the business, and budget allocations as well asincentivestructuresneedtoreinforcethatresponsibilitychain.Amongthewaysthatcorporatelawandpolicycansupport thisintegrationisbyrecognizingthe

conceptof“corporateculture”—inthisinstance,acorporateculturerespectfulofhumanrights.Thereareprecedents indomestic law thatcanbedrawnon.Forexample, under the Australian criminal code a firm itself may be held liablewhen its corporate culture directed, encouraged, tolerated, or led tononcompliance with the relevant provisions. But only the individual whocommitted the illegal act may be prosecuted if the company has in placeeffective systems of control and supervision.29 The U.S. Federal SentencingGuidelines require judicial consideration of whether a corporation has an“organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment tocompliance with the law” in assessing criminal penalties.30 Analogousprovisions could be constructed in corporate and securities law, incentivizingcompaniestoinstitutemoreintegratedcorporateculturesdirectedtowardethicalconduct,whichinturnwouldfacilitatemorecoherentapproachestorespectinghumanrightsacrossacompany.A second development in corporate law and policy thatwould reinforce and

buildonthisdimensionoftheGPsconcernscorporateboards.TheGPsprovidethat companies should undertake meaningful consultations with stakeholderswhenconductinghumanrightsimpactassessments,evaluatingtheeffectivenessofmitigationmeasures, andconstructingandoperatinggrievancemechanisms.Thiswould be strengthened by corporate law provisions that explicitly permitcompanydirectors,infulfillingtheirfiduciaryresponsibilitytothecompany,toconsideritsimpactonotherstakeholdersandonsocietyasawhole.Thatcouldencourage boards to establishmore extensive oversight of company programsintended tomanage social risks, includinghuman rights,while alsoprotectingdirectorsfrompossibleshareholderclaimsthattheyarebreachingtheirdutytothecompanybystrayingtoofarfromshort-termprofitmaximization.Examplesexist in several jurisdictions, as noted in earlier chapters. In theUnited Statesdirectors are given discretion to determine what is in the best interest of thecompanyundertheso-calledbusinessjudgmentrule,butitsscopeisnotdefined.An importantnext stepwouldbe tomake itexplicit that taking intoaccountacompany’s impact on society is in keeping with directors’ duties to theircompanies.Thishasbeenvariouslydescribedas the“enlightenedshareholder”or “enlightened management” approach, permitting “consideration ofstakeholder interests as being broadly aligned with long-term shareholderinterests,withoutriskinglegalliabilityforbreachofduty.”31Asisthecasewithinvestmentagreements,reformsincorporatelawandpolicy

are largely domestic affairs—and regional in the case of theEuropeanUnion.

Therefore, similar kinds of research, capacity building, and advocacy fromhuman rightsplatformscanhelp advance the agenda. In addition, the typesofreforms discussed in this section should be a high priority of institutionalinvestors, which have their own fiduciary responsibility to ensure long-termsustainablereturns.

III.BEYONDTHEGPS

IhaveexplainedatsomelengththroughoutthisbookwhyIthoughtitillusorytoaimat establishing some single, overarching international legal framework forthe entire bundle of business and human rights issues,while at the same timebelieving that specific legal instruments would and should be developed thataddress someof its specificdimensions. Ihavealsoacknowledged the tacticaljudgmentImadethatproposinganynewinternationallawnormsaspartoftheGPsmight risk their endorsement as awhole.Nevertheless, in a separatenotesenttoallUNmemberstatesonfollow-upstepstomymandate,Irecommendedthat they consider drafting an international legal instrument to address onespecific challenge. It was not acted upon, so I reiterate that proposal here,drawingonrecentdevelopmentsinU.S.courtstoillustratewhyitisessential.OnFebruary28,2012,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtheardoralarguments

inKiobel v. RoyalDutchPetroleumCo. (Shell), brought under theAlien TortStatute(ATS).ThecasewassimilartotheWiwacasediscussedinchapter1butinvolved different plaintiffs.These plaintiffs also charged that Shell aided andabettedegregioushumanrightsabusesconductedbytheNigerianmilitaryintheearly1990s,includingasystematiccampaignoftorture,extrajudicialexecutions,prolongedarbitrarydetention,andindiscriminatekillingsthatconstitutedcrimesagainst humanity, in an effort to violently suppress the Movement for theSurvival of the Ogoni People.32 Shell and the plaintiffs had agreed to settleWiwa.Butthistimeasharplydivided2ndCircuitCourtofAppealsheldthattheATS does not apply to corporations, as legal persons, only to natural persons.Withother circuit courtshaving reached theopposite conclusion, theSupremeCourtagreedtohearthecase.RecallthattheATSwasenactedin1789.Itsimplysays,“Thedistrictcourtsshallhaveoriginaljurisdictionofanycivilactionbyanalienforatortonly,committedinviolationofthelawofnationsoratreatyoftheUnitedStates.”33Thestatutewasintendedtoestablishfederaljurisdictionforcivil redress against violations of customary international law norms, such asacts of piracy,mistreatment of ambassadors, andviolationof safe conducts. It

lay largelydormantuntilhuman rights lawyersdiscovered it in the1980sasameans for foreign plaintiffs to bring civil suit in U.S. federal courts againstindividualsofanynationality,iftheyarepresentintheUnitedStates,forcertainegregious human rights abuses they committed abroad and, a decade later, forsuchsuitsagainstcorporations.TheissuebeforetheSupremeCourtinKiobelwaswhethertheATSappliesto

corporations.34Theargumentsonthispointhingedonanarcanebutfundamentalpoint: does international law need to state specifically that prohibitions ofegregious human rights violations extend to particular types of actors, such ascorporations?Theargumentontheplaintiffs’side,presentedbyveteranhumanrights lawyer Paul Hoffman, was that international law frequently goes nofurther than to proscribe acts without specifying the actors to which theprohibitionisintendedtoapply,leavingthatquestiontobedecidedbyindividualnationaljurisdictions.Accordingtothisview,onelookstointernationallawonlyto determine the content of the international law norm that is alleged to havebeen violated, while in this instance U.S. federal common law provides theappropriate basis for attributing liability to corporations. On Shell’s side, thecounterargument,madebyKathleenSullivan,formerStanfordLawSchooldeanand highly regarded constitutional lawyer, was that the ATS requiresinternationallawnotonlytoproscribetheactsbutalsotospecifytheactorthatcanbeheldliablefortheviolation.Thereisnointernationallaw,shecontended,“thatholdscorporationsliableforthehumanrightsoffensesallegedhere,”onlynaturalpersons.Inthecourseofmakingthatcaseinheroralargument,Sullivanmischaracterized a conclusion I had reached in one ofmy officialUN reportssurveying this subject and used it to support Shell’s position that there is nocorporateliabilityunderinternationallaw.35AnumberofjusticesseemedunconvincedbyHoffman’sargumentthatwhere

international law is silenton thesubjectofwhichactorscanbeheld liable forconductprohibitedunderinternationallawonelookstodomesticlawtogovernliability—although several justices did see it that way, as did the Obamaadministration,whichfiledanamicusbriefinsupportoftheplaintiffs.36Inanyevent, the skeptical justices quickly moved on to the broader question ofextraterritorialjurisdiction.Hoffmanhadonlyjustfinishedthesecondsentenceof his oral argument when Justice Anthony M. Kennedy interrupted him.QuotingfromanamicusbriefinsupportofShellsubmittedonbehalfofseveralU.S.companies,Kennedyquestionedwhetheranyotherjurisdictionintheworld“permits its courts to exercise universal civil jurisdiction over alleged

extraterritorial human rights abuses to which the nation has no connection.”JusticeSamuelA.Alito,Jr.,added“there’snoparticularconnectionbetweentheeventshereandtheUnitedStates....Whatbusinessdoesacaselikethathavein the courtsof theUnitedStates?”Chief Justice JohnG.Robertspushed thislineofquestioningtoitslimits:“Ifthereisnoothercountrywherethissuitcouldhavebeenbrought,regardlessofwhatAmericandomesticlawprovides,isn’titalegitimateconcernthatthesuititselfcontravenesinternationallaw?”37But extraterritoriality was not the issue before the Court; corporate liability

was.Extraterritorialityhadnotbeenbriefed.Thus,shortlyafterthehearingtheCourtissuedanorderdirectingthepartiestorearguethecaseduringits2012–13term,andtofilesupplementalbriefsonthisquestion:“WhetherandunderwhatcircumstancestheAlienTortStatuteallowscourtstorecognizeacauseofactionforviolationsofthelawofnationsoccurringwithintheterritoryofasovereignotherthantheUnitedStates.”Itookthatopportunitytosubmitanamicusbriefto the Court setting the record straight on the official UN mandate findingsregarding corporate liability under international law as well as extraterritorialjurisdiction: that domestic courtsmay hold companies liable for human rightsviolations that rise to the level of international crimes, and that states aregenerally neither required to, nor prohibited from, exercising extraterritorialjurisdiction over corporations domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdictionprovided that there is a recognized jurisdictional basis.38 Shell’s supplementalbrief arguing against extraterritoriality is far-reaching. It seeks not only todismisstheclaimsagainstitbutalsotonegatetheentirestatutorybasismakingit possible to useU.S. courts as a forum to adjudicate civil liability for grosshuman rights violations committed abroad—even when those violations arecommittedbyU.S.nationals,andeven if theAmericansarenaturalpersons. ItcontendsthattheATSdoesnotapplytocorporations,includingU.S.firms;thatas itcurrentlystands, theATSviolates international lawbecause itadjudicatesconduct in other jurisdictions; and that, therefore, even for natural persons itsreach should be pulled back to cover only violations committed within thejurisdiction of the United States and “possibly” on the high seas.39 If thesearguments were to prevail, there would be little if anything left of the ATS,whichformanyvictimsofhumanrightsabuses,rangingfromBurmesepeasantstoHolocaustsurvivors,hasbeenacriticallyimportantmeansofgainingaccesstojudicialremedy.ThisledmetoposeseveralfundamentalquestionsabouttherelationshipbetweencorporatesocialresponsibilityandcorporatelitigationinawidelydistributedInternetposting:

[W]hatwould thecorporateresponsibility torespecthumanrights involveinacaselikeKiobel?Whatwoulditimplyforacorporationthatproclaimsand aspires to socially responsible conduct? My professional encounterswithShellsuggestthat ithassuchcommitmentsandtakesthemseriously.Ofcourse,thecompanymustbefreetoargue,inthecourtsandelsewhere,that it met both the law and its wider responsibilities to respect humanrightswheneveritbelievesthattobethecase.Yetquestionsremain.Shouldthe corporate responsibility to respect human rights remain entirelydivorced from litigation strategy and tactics, particularly where thecompanyhaschoicesaboutthegroundsonwhichtodefenditself?Shouldthe litigation strategy aim to destroy an entire juridical edifice forredressinggrossviolationsofhumanrights,particularlywhereother legalgroundsexisttoprotectthecompany’sinterests?Orwouldthecommitmentto socially responsible conduct include an obligation by the company toinstructitsattorneystoavoidsuchfar-reachingconsequenceswherethatispossible? And what about the responsibilities of the company’s legalrepresentatives?Wouldtheyencompasslayingoutfortheirclienttheentirerange of risks entailed by the litigation strategy and tactics, includingconcern for their client’s commitments, reputation, and the collateraldamagetoawiderangeofthirdparties?Idon’tknowwhatthecorrectanswerstothesequestionsare,butbecause

the stakes are so high Kiobel may be the ideal case for starting theconversation.40

Thereisnotellingatthetimeofwritingwhattheoutcomeinthiscasewillbe.Human rights litigants and corporate lawyers around the world are watchingclosely to see how this Supreme Court, which has expanded corporate rightssubstantially,willruleoncorporateliability.ItcouldeffectivelyshutdownATSjurisprudence altogether. It could decide that the statute does not apply tocorporationsbutremainsavailableforuseagainstindividualcorporateofficers,whichishowthe2ndCircuitCourtofAppealsruled.Moreover,itisnotoutofthe question that a closely divided Supreme Court might restrict, but noteliminate, the ATS’s extraterritorial application by requiring a closer nexusbetweendefendants, includingcorporations,and theUnitedStates—nationalitybeinganestablishedjurisdictionalbasisinseveralotherareasofthelaw,aswehave seen. That would likelymean a short-term loss for business and humanrights,butpossiblyalsoproducealonger-termgain.Letmeexplain.

TheATShasbeenasignificantfactordriving theglobalbusinessandhumanrights agenda. As in the case ofKiobel, charges under the statute have beenbroughtagainstcompaniesbased inothercountriesaswellasU.S. firms.AndtheATS’seffectshavebeenfeltwellbeyondthestrictlylegalrealm.Ithasmorebroadlyreinforcedthenecessityforcompanieseverywheretodevelopeffectivesystemstomanagetheactualandpotentialadversehumanrightsimpactsoftheiroperationsandbusinessrelationships.Thegeographicalscopeofthisparticulardriving factor would be reduced by restricting the ATS’s application to U.S.nationals.At the same time, on several occasions during the course of my mandate I

expressed concern about having so large a fraction of theworld’s court casesagainst multinational corporations for involvement in human rights abusesabroadhingeonsoquirky—and,astheSupremeCourthearingdemonstrated,sopoorly understood—a statute in one single country. No other country has astatutelikeit.AllalongithasbeenvulnerabletobeingrepealedbyCongress,asthebusinesscommunityhasrepeatedlyurged;orrestrictedandeventhrownoutbytheSupremeCourt,asisnowunderconsideration.Also,becausetheATSissubject to somany procedural obstacles, such cases are also extremely costly,especially for plaintiffs in developing countries. Moreover, it also caught myattention thatevenprogressivecountriesonhuman rights, suchasCanada, theNetherlands, and theUnitedKingdom,haveundertakenonly limited efforts tohold their own multinationals liable for such overseas violations in theirdomestic jurisdictions.This raised thequestion inmymindwhether theATS’sexpansive jurisdictional provision, encompassing theoverseas conduct of non-American corporations, has made it easier for such governments to resistdomesticpoliticalpressure to takemorerobustmeasures themselves—whileatthe same time giving them the opportunity to file amicus briefs inATS casesinvolving their companies inwhich theyobject to the fact thatU.S.courtsaredeciding the cases so they get to have it both ways. A Supreme Court’srequirementofaclosernationalitylinkforcorporatedefendantsmightalterthatpoliticaldynamic.SomeAmericancompaniesandbusinessassociationsliketheU.S.Chamberof

Commercemightprotest thata ruling requiringaclosernationality linkwouldput U.S. business at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors basedelsewhere—althoughitmightbedifficultforthemtomanagetheopticsofdoingso in relation to acts that rise to the level of crimes against humanity. In anyevent, there is a precedent of U.S. law in a related area creating such an

asymmetry, and it tells an interesting story.41 Congress adopted the ForeignCorrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977, making it a criminal offense forAmerican citizens and firms to bribe officials in foreign countries. The U.S.businesscommunitysoughttohavetheFCPArepealedbutfailed.Subsequently,companies and business associations gradually became advocates for theadoptionofamultilateralconvention thatwouldcreatea levelplayingfield. Ittook time, but in 1997 the OECD adopted the “Convention on CombatingBriberyofForeignPublicOfficialsinInternationalBusinessTransactions,”andthe United Nations followed suit in 2003 with the “UN Convention AgainstCorruption.” Because not all countries recognize criminal responsibility ofcorporations, the conventions also provide for comparable noncriminalsanctions.As my UN mandate drew to a close, governments invited me to make

recommendations regarding priority issues for any follow-up process. InFebruary2011,ayearbefore theSupremeCourtKiobelhearing, IsubmittedamemorandumtoallUNmemberstatesandposteditonmyWebsite,outliningtwo main bundles of issues. One was “embedding the Guiding Principles”—focusedondissemination,implementation,andcapacitybuilding,whichtheUNworkinggroupthathassucceededmymandateistaskedwith.TheotherIcalled“clarifyingcertaininternationallegalstandards.”42Thefollowingwasbecomingclear,Ireported:

National jurisdictions have divergent interpretations of the applicability tobusinessenterprisesofinternationalstandardsprohibitinggrosshumanrightsabuses,potentiallyamountingtointernationalcrimes.Thesetypicallyariseinareas where the human rights regime cannot be expected to function asintended,suchasarmedconflictorotherareasofheightenedrisk....Greaterlegalclarityisneededforvictimsandbusinessenterprisesalike.

Onewaytoresolvetheissueofdivergentinterpretations,Isuggested,isthroughan international legal instrument modeled on the UN Convention AgainstCorruption.

Any such effort should help clarify standards relating to appropriateinvestigation, punishment and redress where business enterprises cause orcontributetosuchabuses,aswellaswhatconstituteseffective,proportionateand dissuasive sanctions. It would also address when the extension ofjurisdiction abroad may be appropriate, and the acceptable bases for the

exerciseofsuchjurisdiction.

The UN working group that has succeeded my mandate is empowered to“make recommendations at the national, regional and international levels forenhancing access to effective remedies available to thosewhose human rightsare affectedby corporate activities, including those in conflict areas.”43 Inmyview,irrespectiveofhowtheU.S.SupremeCourtrulesinKiobel,proposingthatgovernments consider negotiating a carefully crafted legal instrument thatclarifies the steps that need tobe takenwhen international lawprohibitionsoftheworsthumanrightsabusesareviolatedbylegalpersonsshouldbealeadingcandidate.Theinternationalcommunitynolongerregardsstatesovereigntyasalegitimate shield behindwhich such abuses can take placewith impunity; thesamesurelymustbetrueofthecorporateform.

IV.CONCLUSION

Businessisaprimarysourceofinvestmentandjobcreation,andmarketscanbehighlyefficientmeansforallocatingscarceresources.Theyconstitutepowerfulforcescapableofgeneratingeconomicgrowth,reducingpoverty,andincreasingdemand for the rule of law, thereby contributing to the realization of a broadspectrum of human rights. But markets work optimally only if they areembedded within broader social and legal norms, rules, and institutionalpractices.Marketsthemselvesrequirethesetosurviveandthrive,whilesocietyneedsthemtomanagetheadverseeffectsofmarketdynamicsandproducethepublicgoods thatmarketsundersupply. Indeed,history teachesus thatmarketsposethegreatestrisks—tosocietyandtobusinessitself—whentheirscopeandpowerfarexceedthereachoftheinstitutionalunderpinningsthatallowthemtofunctionsmoothlyandensure theirpoliticalsustainability.Ours issucha time,andhowtoadaptthehumanrightsregimetoprovidemoreeffectiveprotectionto individualsandcommunitiesagainst corporate-relatedhuman rightsharm isoneofourcoregovernancechallenges.Multinational corporations operate globally. Political authority remains

fragmentedandanchoredinterritorialstates.Internationalorganizationscannotadequately compensate for the resulting governance gaps because theysimultaneously lack theglobal reachofmarkets, firms,andcivilsocietyactorsononeside,whileremainingtightlyconstrainedbyterritorialstatesontheotherside. Thus, the elements of any solution must involve not only states andcooperation among them but also draw upon the interests, capacities, and

engagementofmarketactors,civilsociety,andtheintrinsicpoweroftheideaofhumanrightsitself.TheUNGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRights,atoneandthesametime,expressthepotentialofthis“polycentric”approachtoaddressing business and human rights governance gaps, and constitute anormativeplatformandpolicyguidancefordrivingitintothepoliciesofstates,corporations,andothersocialactors.Mymandate ended on June 16, 2011,when theUNHumanRights Council

endorsed the Guiding Principles. The fact that other standard-setting bodies,national and international, have also adopted core elements of the GuidingPrinciples,andthateachisproceedingwithitsownimplementationprocess,hasadded to the prospects for positive and cumulative change. Equally importanthasbeentheuptakebythosewhoaredirectlyinvolvedwiththesechallengesona daily basis: affected individuals, communities, companies, civil societyorganizations,andgovernments.Inthisfinalchapter,Ihavesuggestedadditionalstepstobuildon,andinsomeinstancestakeusbeyond,theGuidingPrinciples.My working hypothesis when I set out on this journey was that it might bepossible for such aUNmandate to generate anunfoldingdynamic thatwouldlead to greater protection against corporate-related human rights harm andcontribute,thereby,toasociallysustainableglobalization.Icannotforeseehowtransformativetheseeffortswillbeinthelongrun.ButlookingbacknowalittlemorethanayearaftertheHumanRightsCouncildecision,thatpossibilityseemsconsiderablylesshypotheticalthanevenIhaddaredimagine.

NOTES

Introduction:WhyBusinessandHumanRights?

1 I borrow this phrase fromThomasRisse, “ThePower ofNormsversus theNormsofPower:TransnationalCivilSocietyandHumanRights,”inAnnM.Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society(Washington,DC:CarnegieEndowment,2000).

2Tagi Sagafi-nejad,TheUNandTransnationalCorporations:FromCodeofConducttoGlobalCompact(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2008).

3“DraftNormsontheResponsibilitiesofTransnationalCorporationsandOtherBusiness Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,” UN DocumentE/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2(2003).

4“DoingtheWrongThing:Human-RightsActivistsFalloutOverHowtoDealwithCompanies,”TheEconomist,October27,2007.

5Statementonfilewiththeauthor.6 “The FIDH welcomes the dialogue with the Special Representative of theSecretary General on human rights and transnational corporations,”September15,2005(letteronfilewithauthor).

7GuySebbanandAntonioPenalosa,“Initial IOE-ICCViewsontheMandateoftheUNSpecialRepresentativeon‘BusinessandHumanRights,’”October14,2005(letteronfilewithauthor).

8UNCTAD,WorldInvestmentReport2002(NewYork:UNCTAD,2002),p.7.9TheLondon-BasedBusinessandHumanRightsResourceCentrekeepstrackofcompanies’humanrightspolicies.http://www.business-humanrights.org/.

10http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.11http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html.12http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm.13http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm.

14Foranextensiveempiricalstudy,seeL.T.WellsandRafiqAhmed,MakingForeignInvestmentSafe(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2007).

15LiezelHill,“CanadianLawmakersVoteDownControversialBillC-300,”http://www.miningweekly.com/article/canadian-mps-vote-against-bill-c-300-

2010-10-28.16 Amartya Sen, “Human Rights and the Limits of the Law,”Cardozo LawReview27,no.6(2006).

17 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress,2009),pp.357–58.

18 Amartya Sen, “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights,” Philosophy andPublicAffairs,32(Autumn2004),p.319.

19JanePerlezandLowellBergman,“TangledStrandsinFightoverPeruGoldMine,”NewYorkTimes,October25,2005.

20http://www.infomine.com/minesite/minesite.asp?site=yanacocha.21OmarMariluz,“PeruProtestersDiginHeelsAfterNewmontMineHalted,”http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/30/peru-newmont-conga-idUSL4E7MU10820111130,storyfiledonNovember30,2011.

22http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/peru404/.23 “Peru PrimeMinister: Stalled CongaMine’s Review to Focus onWater,”DowJonesNewswires,January24,2012.

24 CAO Exit Report: “Regarding Two Complains Filed with the CAO inRelation toMineraYanacocha,Cajamarca,Peru,”Officeof theComplianceAdvisor/Ombudsman, International Finance Corporation, MultilateralInvestmentAgency,p.3.

25AngelPaez,“UNMissionProbesPrivateSecurity,” IPSNews,February7,2007,http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36478.

26InterimReportoftheSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-GeneralontheIssueofHumanRightsandTransnationalCorporationsandOtherBusinessEnterprises,UNDocumentE/CN.4/2006/97(February22,2006).

27SamuelMoyn,TheLastUtopia:HumanRightsinHistory(Cambridge,MA:BelknapPress,2010),p.9.

28Fordiscussionsrelevanttoourconcernshere,seeLarryCatáBacker,“FromInstitutionalMisalignmentstoSociallySustainableGovernance:TheGuidingPrinciplesfortheImplementationoftheUnitedNations’‘Protect,RespectandRemedy’ Framework and the Construction of Inter-Systemic Governance,”electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1922953; and KennethW. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Strengthening International RegulationThrough Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the OrchestrationDeficit,”VanderbiltJournalofTransnationalLaw42(March2009).AlsoseeJohn Gerard Ruggie, “Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues,Actors, and Processes,” European Journal of International Relations 10

(December2004).29 John Gerard Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: The EvolvingInternationalAgenda,”AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw101(October2007).

30JosephS.Nye,TheFutureofPower(NewYork:PerseusBooks,2011).

Chapter1:TheChallenge

1DavidBarboza, “After Suicides, Scrutiny ofChina’sGrim Factories,”NewYorkTimes,June6,2010.

2 Charles Duhigg and Keith Bradsher, “How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhoneWork,”NewYorkTimes,January21,2012.

3 Simon Zadek, “The Path to Corporate Responsibility,” Harvard BusinessReview82(December2004).

4 Jennifer Burns andDebora Spar, “Hitting theWall: Nike and InternationalLabor Practices,” HBS Case 9-700-047 (Boston: Harvard BusinessPublishing,2002).

5 Ibid.; and CBS Street Stories, “Just Do it; Nike Cheap-Labor Factories inIndonesia,”CBSNewsTranscripts,July2,1993.

6SydneySchanbergandMarieDorigny,“SixCentsanHour,”Life,June1996.7BurnsandSpar,“HittingtheWall.”8Thefollowing,basedonnewsaccounts,isnotanexhaustiverendering.9KleincleverlycalledNike“unswooshworthy.”NaomiKlein,NoLogo (NewYork:Picador,2002),p.203.

10 John Cushman, “Nike Pledges to End Child Labor and Apply U.S. RulesAbroad,”NewYorkTimes,May13,1998.

11http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedcases/NikelawsuitKaskyvNikeredenialoflabourabuses?&batch_start=51.

12Nikenotonlybecameapioneerinsupply-chainmonitoring,butitalsoturnedoveritsowninternalmonitoringdatatoProfessorRichardLockeoftheMITSloanSchoolofManagementforanalysisandpublication,whichhasdeepenedourunderstandingoftheprocessanditslimits.SeeRichardLocke,FeiQin,andAlbertoBrause,“DoesMonitoringImproveLaborStandards?LessonsfromNike,”http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Does-Monitoring-Improve-Labor-Standards-July-2006.pdf.

13 Mark Whitaker, “It Was Like Breathing Fire,” Newsweek, December 17,1984.

14http://bhopal.net/.15 Sanjoy Hazarika, “Bhopal Details Remain Unresolved,” New York Times,February16,1989.

16BhopalInformationCenter(UnionCarbideWebsite),“Chronology,”www.bhopal.com/chrono.htm.

17AjoyBose,“GasLeakStartsCriminalAction:USCompanyUnionCarbideFacesLegalActionoverGasLeakatBhopal,India,”TheGuardian(London),December7,1984.

18 William Claiborne, “American Lawyers Flock to Bhopal: ‘Get UnionCarbide’istheirSlogan,”WashingtonPost,December12,1984.

19JuliaKhouandDeboraSpar,“UnionCarbide’sBhopalPlant,”HBSCase,9-796-035(Boston:HarvardBusinessPublishing,1996).

20InreUnionCarbide634F.Supp842(1986),866.21U.S.CourtofAppeals,case809F.2d195(2ndCir.1987).22“BhopalTrial:EightConvictedoverIndiaGasDisaster,”BBCNews,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8725140.stm.WarrenAnderson,theAmericanthen-chairmanoftheU.S.parentcompany,hasbeenthesubjectofanIndianarrestwarrantsinceshortlyafterthedisasterstruck.

23TheseminalworkwasTerryLynnKarl,TheParadoxofPlenty:OilBoomsandPetro-States(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1997);seealsoKarl,“UnderstandingtheResourceCurse,”inCoveringOil:AReporter’sGuidetoEnergyandDevelopment(NewYork:OpenSocietyInstitute,2005),availableathttp://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/osicoveringoil_20050803.pdf.

24See, forexample, tworecent reports fromthe respected InternationalCrisisGroup (ICG): “Nigeria: Ogoni Land After Shell,” Africa Briefing No. 54(September18,2008),and“Nigeria:SeizingtheMomentintheNigerDelta,”AfricaBriefingno.60(April30,2009);alsoLynnSharpPaineandMihneaC.Moldoveanu,“RoyalDutch/Shell inNigeria (A),”HBSCaseNo.9-399-126(Boston:HarvardBusinessPublishing,2000).

25“ChopFine”:TheHumanRights Impact of LocalGovernmentCorruptionandMismanagementinRiversState,Nigeria,HumanRightsWatch,January31,2007.

26http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/NIGERIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:368906~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:368896,00.html.

27ICG,AfricaBriefingno.54.28Ibid.

29Ibid.30LucZandvlietandMaryB.Anderson,GettingItRight:MakingCorporate-CommunityRelationsWork(Sheffield,UK:Greenleaf,2009).

31http://www.waado.org/nigerdelta/RightsDeclaration/Ogoni.html.32ICG,AfricaBriefingno.54.33Quotedinibid,p.6.34Seemy“ClarifyingtheConceptsof‘SphereofInfluence’and‘Complicity’,”ReportoftheSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-GeneralontheIssueofHuman Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other BusinessEnterprises,JohnRuggie,UNDocumentA/HRC/8/16,May15,2008.

35MatthewGreen andMichael Peel, “Shell Faces Saro-WiwaDeathClaim,”FinancialTimes,April3,2009.

36TheStatutereadsinfull:“Thedistrictcourtsshallhaveoriginaljurisdictionofanycivil actionbyanalien fora tortonly,committed inviolationof thelawofnationsoratreatyoftheUnitedStates.”(U.S.Code,Title28,Section1350.)

37Most have been dismissed on various procedural grounds, which inmanycasesareunderappeal.Severalhavebeensettled.Intheonlymajorcorporatecasetogotoajurytrialthusfar,Bowotov.Chevron,thecompanywon.

38 Paul Lewis, “Blood and Oil: After Nigeria Represses, Shell Defends ItsRecord,”New York Times, February 13, 1996; Chris McGreal, “A TaintedHero,” The Guardian (London), March 23, 1996; Steve Kretzman, “HiredGuns: ShellingOut forMurder,” InTheseTimes 21, no. 6 (February 3–16,1997).

39“Nigeria:DeltaBlues,”TheEconomist,February13,1999;Kretzman,“HiredGuns”;ICG,AfricaBriefingno.54.

40McGreal,“ATaintedHero.”41SPDCPressStatement,October 31, 1995, quoted inBronwenManby,ThePrice of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations inNigeria’s Oil Producing Communities (New York: Human Rights Watch,1999).

42 Several former Shell and BP executives had already formed the AmnestyInternational UK Business Group, but according to the group’s founder,“Shell’sexperienceinNigeriaand,later,BP’sinColombiaprovideduswithaplatform and breakthrough.” See Sir Geoffrey Chandler, “The AmnestyInternational UK Business Group: Putting Human Rights on the CorporateAgenda,”JournalofCorporateCitizenship33(Spring2009),p.31.

43 Michael D. Goldhaber, “A Win for Wiwa, a Win for Shell, a Win forCorporateHumanRights,”AmericanLawyer,June11,2009.

44Foramappingofcountriesandtools,see“InternetCensorshipWorldwide,”availableathttp://opennet.net.

45MureDickie,“ChinaTrapsOnlineDissent,”FinancialTimes,November12,2007.

46RebeccaMacKinnon,“Asia’sFightforWebRights,”FarEasternEconomicReview,April2008,availableathttp://www.feer.com/essays/2008/april/asias-fight-for-web-rights.

47Quotedinibid.48“U.S.RebukesYahoooverChinaCase,”http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7081458.stm.

49 Summarized in Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: TheWorldwideStruggleforInternetFreedom(NewYork:Perseus,2012).

50http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/.51Forexample,YahoowasconvictedandfinedinaBelgiancourt—acountryinwhichithasnophysicalpresence,unlikeinChina—forrefusingtoreleaseuserinformationtoBelgianauthoritiesinconnectionwithacriminalinvestigationintocreditcardfraudusingYahooemailaccounts.Therulingcouldsetaprecedentforanycountrydemandingthereleaseofuseridentityofanyone,anywhere.Thecaseisonappeal.http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/03/02/yahoo-fined-by-belgian-court-for-refusing-to-give-up-e-mail-account-info/.

52DavidBarboza andMiguelHelft, “ACompromiseAllowsBothChina andGoogletoClaimaVictory,”NewYorkTimes,July10,2010;LorettaChaoandAmirEfrati,“ChinaRenewsGoogle’sLicense,”WallStreetJournal,July11,2010.

53WallStreetJournal,January12,2012.54MacKinnon,ConsentoftheNetworked.55TimothyWilliams,“ChinaOilDealIsNewSourceofIraqiStrife,”NewYorkTimes,September6,2009.SeealsoMaryFitzgerald,“ZambiaBecomesShorthandforWhatCanGoWrong,”IrishTimes,August25,2008;IanEvans,“Dockers’ProtestForcesArmsCargoAwayfromDurbanport,”http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr19a_2008.html.“China’sAfricanDilemma,”TheStraitsTimes(Singapore),April28,2007;“RevoltintheAndes,”TheEconomist,September20,2007.Inanunprecedentedstep,theGlobalCompactBoardagreedtodiscussthecaseofPetroChina,aftera

protestagainstitsmembershipbymorethaneightycivilsocietygroups:“GroupsAsktheUNInitiativetoRemovePetroChinaasaParticipantUnlessitActstoHelpEndHumanRightsViolationsinSudan,”http://www.corporatejustice.org/Over-80-organizations-ask-Global,431.html.

56“ConcernGrowsoverPeruvianProtests,”E&MJEngineeringandMiningJournal22(December2011),availableathttp://www.e-mj.com/index.php/news/leading-developments/1478-concern-grows-over-peruvian-protests.html.

57TaniaBranigan and JulianBorger, “ChinaLooks toBritishExperience forAfrican Expansion,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/21/chinese-companies-investment-africa. On the development of standards for Chinesecompanies in Africa, see Simon Zadek et al., “Responsible Business inAfrica: Chinese Business Leaders’ Perspectives on Performance andEnhancement Opportunities,” Working Paper #54, Corporate SocialResponsibility Initiative, John F. Kennedy School of Government, HarvardUniversity(November2009).

58 http://www.business-humanrights.org/. TheCentre also hostsmymandate’sportal.

59Forthefullreport,includingcapsulecasedescriptions,see“CorporationsandHumanRights:ASurveyoftheScopeandPatternsofAllegedCorporate-RelatedHumanRightsAbuse,”ReportoftheSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-GeneralontheIssueofHumanRightsandTransnationalCorporationsandOtherBusinessEnterprises,JohnRuggie,UNDocumentA/HRC/8/5/Add.2,availableathttp://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-2-addendum-23-May-2008.pdf.

60 While there is no agreed definition or list of “gross” or “egregious”violations, thereisgeneralconsensusthat thecategoryincludesextrajudicialkillings.SeeUnitedNationsBasicPrinciplesandGuidelinesontheRighttoaRemedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of InternationalHumanRightsLawandSeriousViolationsofInternationalHumanitarianLaw(GeneralAssemblyResolution60/147).

61 “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,” UN DocumentA/CONF.157/23(July12,1993).

62InterimReportoftheSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-GeneralontheIssueofHumanRightsandTransnationalCorporationsandOtherBusinessEnterprises,UNDocumentE/CN.4/2006/97(February2006),paragraphs24–32.

63Theindexmeasurestheextenttowhichpeoplehaveconfidenceinandabidebytherulesintheirsocieties.Seehttp://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/.

64Theindexranksmorethan150countriesintermsofperceivedlevelsofcorruption,asdeterminedbyexpertassessmentsandopinionsurveys.Seehttp://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi.

65Seehttp://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005.66ICMM,“SecondSubmissiontotheUNSecretary-General’sSpecialRepresentativeonHumanRightsandBusiness,”October2006,http://www.icmm.com/document/216.

67Chiquitadisclosedthesepaymentstothegovernment.68MichaelEvans,“‘Para-Politics’GoesBananas,”TheNation,April4,2007.69Quoted inGaryMarx,“ColombianOfficialSeeksUSPapersonChiquita,”ChicagoTribune,March22,2007.

70AsuithasalsobeenbroughtagainstChiquitabythesurvivorsofmenkilledbyoneoftheguerillagroups, theRevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia(FARC).

71Talisman held a 25 percent share in theGreaterNile PetroleumCompany,which also included the China National Petroleum Company, Petronas ofMalaysia,andtheSudanNationalPetroleumCorporation.

72IanFischer,“OilFlowinginSudan,RaisingtheStakesinitsCivilWar,”NewYorkTimes,October17,1999.

73“HumanSecurityinSudan:TheReportofaCanadianAssessmentMission.”PreparedfortheMinisterofForeignAffairs,January2000,availableathttp://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/cansudan2.pdf.Talisman’soperation,whichincludedtheairstrip,wasajointventurewithSudan.

74ThecasewasPresbyterianChurchofSudanv.TalismanEnergy,Inc.,No.07-0016,decidedOctober2,2009.InanaddresstotheInternationalCommissionofJurists“AccesstoJusticeWorkshop”inJohannesburg,SouthAfrica(October29,2009),Inotedthatthistest“wentagainsttheweightofinternationallegalopinion,”andadded:“AslongasanI.G.Farbenintendedonlytomakemoney,nottoexterminateJews,[theTalismanstandard]wouldmakeitpermissibleforsuchacompanytokeepsupplyingagovernmentwithmassiveamountsofZyklonB.poisongasknowingpreciselywhatitisusedfor.”http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Speechesinterviews/2009.

75UNDocumentS/PRST/2000/20,June2,2000.

76UNDocumentS/2003/1027,October23,2003,paragraph10.77Ibid.,paragraph9.78S/2001/357,paragraph15.79See,forexample,thecommentstothiseffectbyPatrickMazimhaka,specialenvoyofRwandanPresidentPaulKagame,quotedinCharlesCobb,Jr.,“Congo-Kinshasa:DisputeoverUNCongoReportCloudsPeaceEffort,”allAfrica.com,May4,2001,availableathttp://allafrica.com/stories/200105040437.html.

Chapter2:NoSilverBullet

1 Elliott Schrage, now a senior executive at Facebook, speaking at the 2005AnnualConferenceofBusinessforSocialResponsibility.

2UNDocumentE/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2,August26,2003.3LouisHenkin,“TheUniversalDeclarationat50andtheChallengeofGlobalMarkets,”BrooklynJournalofInternationalLaw17(April1999),p.25.

4“StateResponsibilitiestoRegulateandAdjudicateCorporateActivitiesUnderthe United Nations Core Human Rights Treaties: An Overview of TreatyBodyCommentaries,”ReportoftheSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-Generalon the IssueofHumanRightsandTransnationalCorporationsandOtherBusinessEnterprises,UNDocumentA/HRC/4/35/Add.1(February13,2007).

5CESCR,GeneralComment18,paragraph52.6HRC,GeneralComment31,paragraph8.7“BasicPrinciplesandGuidelinesontheRighttoaRemedyandReparationforVictimsofGrossViolationsofInternationalHumanRightsLawandSeriousViolations of International Humanitarian Law,” A/RES/60/147, March 21,2006.“Gross”and“egregious”meanthesamething;inU.S.courtstheterm“atrocities”or“heinous”isoftenusedtorefertothesamecategoryofacts.

8Kiobelv.RoyalDutchPetroleumCo.,UnitedStatesCourtofAppealsforthe2ndCircuit,05-4800-cv,04-4876-cv,decidedSeptember17,2010.

9AnitaRamasastryandRobertC.Thompson,Commerce,Crime,andConflict:Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches ofInternationalLaw(Oslo:Fafo,2006).

10Icommissionedacomparativestudyofextraterritorialityindifferentareasoflaw(seeJenniferA.Zerk,“ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:LessonsfortheBusinessandHumanRightsSpherefromSixRegulatoryAreas,”availableathttp://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-

rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_59_zerk.pdf)andconvenedtwointernationalexpertconsultationsonthesubject.

11See,forexample,GeneralComment15,paragraph33.12 David Weissbrodt and Muria Kruger, “Norms on the Responsibilities ofTransnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard toHumanRights,”AmericanJournalof InternationalLaw97(October2003),p.901.

13 David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence ofHumanRightsResponsibilitiesforCorporationsatInternationalLaw,44Va.J.Int’lL.931(2004).

14 Philip Alston, “ ‘Core Labor Standards’ and the Transformation of theInternationalLabourRightsRegime,”EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw15, no. 3 (2004), rejecting even the ILO’s core labor standards on thesegrounds.

15“DraftNorms,”paragraph1.16Office of theHighCommissioner forHumanRights,TheGlobalCompactand Human Rights: Understanding Sphere of Influence and Complicity(Geneva:OHCHR,2004).

17 Philip Alston, “The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International HumanRightsRegimeAccommodateNon-StateActors?” inAlston, ed.,Non-StateActorsandHumanRights(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2005)3,13–14.

18Ibid.19 David Weissbrodt and Muria Kruger, “Human Rights Responsibilities ofBusinessesasNon-StateActors,”inAlston,Non-StateActors,p.340.

20 John H. Knox, “The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law toCorporations,” inRaduMares,ed.,TheUNGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessand Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation (Leiden: MartinusNijhoff,2010),p.54.

21UnlikeotherNGOstatementsIquote,thisemailwasnotmadepublicbyitsauthor.Therefore, Ihavedeleted thenameof theorganizationafter the first“we.”TheemailwasdatedJanuary17,2006.

22InterimReportoftheSpecialRepresentative,paragraphs59and69.23 “ ‘Principled Pragmatism’ or Mere Antagonism? How Professor Ruggie’sCensure of the Norms on TNCs has Affected the Stakeholder Initiative,”HumanRightsFeatures,September18–24,2006.

24Lettertoauthor,datedApril27,2006.

25“Interview:LouiseArbour,”FinancialTimes,January8,2008.26Foradetailedhistoryofthefailedattempttonegotiateacodeofconductontransnationalcorporations,whichbeganin1977andwassuspendedin1992,seeTagiSagafi-nejad,TheUNandTransnationalCorporations:FromCodeof Conduct to Global Compact (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,2008).

27SouthAfrica,DepartmentofTradeandIndustry,“BilateralInvestmentTreatyPolicyFrameworkReview,”June2009,p.5.

28See, amongothers,ThomasRisse,StephenC.Ropp, andKathrynSikkink,ThePowerofHumanRights(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999);OonaHathaway,“DoHumanRightsTreatiesMakeaDifference?”YaleLawJournal 111 (June2002);EmilieHafner-Burtonand JamesR.Ron, “SeeingDouble:HumanRights ImpactThroughQualitativeandQuantitativeEyes,”World Politics 61 (April 2009); and Beth Simmons,Mobilizing forHumanRights(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009).

29ThomasRisseandStephenRopp,Introductiontoaforthcomingbook,FromCommitment to Compliance: The Persistent Power of Human Rights, ed.ThomasRisse,StephenRopp,andKathrynSikkink,manuscript,p.7.

30 International Law Commission, “Fragmentation of International Law:DifficultiesArising from theDiversification andExpansion of InternationalLaw,”UNDocumentA/CN.4/L.682(April13,2006).

31http://italaw.com/documents/SuezVivendiAWGDecisiononLiability.pdf,paragraph262.

32 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN TreatySeries1155,331.

33Andreas L. Paulus, “FromTerritoriality to Functionality? Towards a LegalMethodology of Globalization,” in Ige F. Dekker and Wouter G. Werner,Governance and International Legal Theory (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff,2004), p. 73. The same is true of the overlapping category of erga omnesobligations,whichstatesaresaidtoowetotheinternationalcommunityasawhole.

34 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, “Regime-Collisions: TheVainSearchforLegalUnityintheFragmentationofGlobalLaw,”MichiganJournalofInternationalLaw25(2003–4),p.1004.

35SeeC.K.PrahaladandStuartL.Hart,TheFortuneattheBottomofthePyramid:EradicatingPovertyThroughProfits(UpperSaddleRiver,NJ:PrenticeHall,2005);andBethJenkinsandErikoIshikawa,ScalingUp

InclusiveBusiness:AdvancingtheKnowledgeandActionAgenda(InternationalFinanceCorporationandHarvardKennedySchoolofGovernmentWorkingPaper,April2010),http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/other_scaling_up_inclusive_business_4-10.pdf.

36MichaelE.Porter andMarkR.Kramer, “CreatingSharedValue,”HarvardBusinessReview89(January-February2011).

37Thesearepostedathttp://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home.

38This is the subjectofanonbindingdeclarationadoptedby theUNGeneralAssembly, article 1 of which states: “The right to development is aninalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and allpeoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic,social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights andfundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” A/RES/41/128 (December 4,1986).

39 “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and HumanRights,”ReportoftheSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-GeneralontheIssueofHumanRightsandTransnationalCorporationsandOtherBusinessEnterprises, John Ruggie, UN document A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008),paragraph7.

Chapter3:Protect,RespectandRemedy

1Forexample,theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsandtheConvention on the Rights of the Child use “respect and ensure,” with“respect” in the state context meaning that the state must refrain fromviolatingtherights.TheConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilitiesrequires states parties to “ensure and promote,” and to take appropriatemeasures to “eliminate” abuse by private “enterprises.” The InternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscriminationrequiresthat each state party “shall prohibit and bring to an end . . . racialdiscriminationbyanypersons,groupororganization.”TheConventionontheElimination ofAll Forms ofDiscriminationAgainstWomen requires statesparties “to take all appropriatemeasures to eliminate discrimination againstwomen by any person, organization or enterprise.” In the InternationalCovenantonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights,statespartiesundertake“totakesteps...achievingprogressivelythefullrealizationofrights,”whileitsrights-specificprovisions,suchasthosedealingwithlabor,refertostates

“ensuring”thoserights.2 “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and HumanRights,”ReportoftheSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-GeneralontheIssueofHumanRightsandTransnationalCorporationsandOtherBusinessEnterprises, John Ruggie, UN Document A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008),paragraph27.

3http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_StabilizationClausesandHumanRights/$FILE/Stabilization+Paper.pdf.

4 Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy andPrinciple(Oxford:Hart,2008)p.60.

5SeeletterfromDanielBethlehem,QC,LegalAdviser,UKForeignandCommonwealthOffice,andmyresponsetoBethlehem,bothavailableathttp://www.business-humanrights.org/Search/SearchResults?SearchableText=daniel+bethlehem.

6InphonecallsfromOfficeoftheLegalAdviser,U.S.DepartmentofState.7 K. D. Opp, “Norms,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social andBehavioral Sciences, vol. 10, ed. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes(Amsterdam:Elsevier,2001).

8InternationalOrganizationofEmployers,InternationalChamberofCommerce,BusinessandIndustryAdvisoryCommitteetotheOECD,“BusinessandHumanRights:TheRoleofBusinessinWeakGovernanceZones,”December2006,paragraph15,availableathttp://www.ioe-emp.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents_pdf/policy_area/esr/csr_eng_governancezones.pdf.

9NewYorkTimes,December18,2008,p.A35.10“ConcernGrowsoverPeruvianProtests,”E&MJEngineeringandMiningJournal22(December2011),availableathttp://www.e-mj.com/index.php/news/leading-developments/1478-concern-grows-over-peruvian-protests.html.

11BusinessLeadersInitiativeonHumanRights,“AGuideforIntegratingHumanRightsintoBusinessManagement,”http://www.integrating-humanrights.org/.

12“ClarifyingtheConceptsof‘Sphereofinfluence’and‘Complicity,’”ReportoftheSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-GeneralontheIssueofHumanRightsandTransnationalCorporationsandotherBusinessEnterprises,JohnRuggie,UNDocumentA/HRC/8/16(May15,2008).

13http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/AMilestoneforBusinessandHumanRights.aspx.

14http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/News/2009/social_responsibility_abroad.html?id=543620,p.78.

15http://www.biac.org/statements/investment/08-05_IOE-ICC-BIAC_letter_on_Human_Rights.pdf.

16http://www.reports-and-materials.org/BLIHR-statement-Ruggie-report-2008.pdf.

17http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/05/19/joint-ngo-statement-eighth-session-human-rights-council.

18http://ebookbrowse.com/amnesty-submission-to-ruggie-jul-2008-doc-d11711003.

19FinalStatementbyUKNationalContactPointfortheOECDGuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprises:Afrimex(UK)Ltd.,August28,2008,paragraphs41,64,77,http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file47555.doc.

20MarthaFinnemoreandKathrynSikkink,“InternationalNormDynamicsandPoliticalChange,”InternationalOrganization52(Autumn1998),p.913.

21Availableathttp://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/2010GA65Remarks.pdf.

22 The Commentary on supply-chain issues is more complex—it takesadditional factors into account, including the severity of the abuse and thehumanrightsimpactofterminatingtherelationship.Afullerexpositionmaybe found in an interpretive guide produced by my team, The CorporateResponsibility to Respect Human Rights (Geneva: Office of the HighCommissionerforHumanRights,2011).

23Foranexampleofthelatter,seeMarkB.Taylor,RobertC.Thompson,andAnitaRamasastry,“OvercomingObstaclestoJustice,”thereportofaworkshopcosponsoredbyAmnestyInternational,Fafo(NorwegianInstituteforAppliedInternationalStudies),andtheNorwegianPeacebuildingCentre,availableathttp://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/20165/20165.pdf;andTheCorporateResponsibilityCoalition(CORE),“TheRealityofRights,BarrierstoAccessingRemediesWhenBusinessOperatesBeyondBorders,”http://corporate-responsibility.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/reality_of_rights.pdf.

24Recommendationsonfollow-uptothemandate,”http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-special-mandate-follow-up-11-feb-2011.pdf.

25Allofthecommentsquotedbelowareavailableathttp://www.business-

humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Protect-Respect-Remedy-Framework/GuidingPrinciples.

26http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164453.htm.27“InternationalFinanceCorporation’sPolicyonEnvironmentalandSocialSustainability,”http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Updated_IFC_SFCompounded_August1-2011/$FILE/Updated_IFC_SustainabilityFrameworkCompounded_August1-2011.pdf.

28“CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliament,TheCouncil,theEuropeanEconomic,andSocialCommittee,andtheCommitteeoftheRegions,”http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=7010.

29http://www.corporatejustice.org/IMG/pdf/EP_April_2009Ruggie.pdf.30MarkTaylor,“TheRuggieFramework:PolycentricRegulationandtheImplicationsforCorporateSocialResponsibility,”NordicJournalofAppliedEthics5,no.1(2011),http://tapir.pdc.no/pdf/EIP/2011/2011-01-2.pdf.

31Ibid.,p.24.32 John Gerard Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: The EvolvingInternationalAgenda,”AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw101(October2007),p.839.

33http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/TransCorporations/HRC%202011_Remarks_Final_JR.pdf.

Chapter4:StrategicPaths

1MarthaFinnemoreandKathrynSikkink,“InternationalNormDynamicsandPoliticalChange,”InternationalOrganization52(Autumn1998).

2Allpapersarepostedathttp://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/BriefingDiscussionReferencepapers.

3http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/files/wachtell_lipton_memo_on_global_business_human_rights.pdf.

4http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/files/weil_gotshal_response_to_un_report_on_human_rights_and_business_final.pdf.

5http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-corporate-law-project-Jul-2010.pdf.

6“StabilizationClausesandHumanRights,”ReportofResearchConductedfortheIFCandtheUnitedNationsSpecialRepresentativetotheSecretary-GeneralonBusinessandHumanRights,March11,2008,

http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_StabilizationClausesandHumanRights/$FILE/Stabilization+Paper.pdf.7“PrinciplesforResponsibleContracts:IntegratingtheManagementofHumanRights Risks into State-Investor Contract Negotiations: Guidance forNegotiators,”UNDocumentA/HRC/17/31/Add.3(May25,2011).

8WorldResourcesInstitute,“DevelopmentWithoutConflict:TheBusinessCaseforCommunityConsent,”availableathttp://pdf.wri.org/development_without_conflict_fpic.pdf.

9GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,“Top190ProjectstoChangetheWorld,”April25,2008.

10SomeofthisresearchisreportedinRachelDavisandDanielM.Franks,“TheCostsofConflictwithCommunities,”http://www.csrandthelaw.com/uploads/file/Costs%20of%20Conflict.pdf.

11“BusinessandHumanRights:FurtherStepsTowardtheOperationalizationofthe ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework,” Report of the SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General on the Issue ofHumanRights andTransnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie,UNDocumentA/HRC/14/27(April9,2010),paragraph47.

12JenniferA.Zerk,“ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:LessonsfortheBusinessandHumanRightsSpherefromSixRegulatoryAreas,”availableathttp://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_59_zerk.pdf.

13 Karin Buhman, “The Development of the ‘UN Framework’: A PragmaticProcessTowardsaPragmaticOutput,”inRaduMares,ed.,TheUNGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRights:FoundationsandImplementation(Leiden:MartinusNijhoff,2012).

14A/HRC/Res.8/7(15June2008),paragraph3.15Buhman,“TheDevelopmentofthe‘UNFramework,’”p.86.16The termoriginatedwithThomasFranck,ThePowerofLegitimacyAmongNations(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1990).

17http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home.18 The group includedKofi Annan (Ghana), former Secretary-General of theUnited Nations; Souhayr Belhassen (Tunisia), President, FédérationInternationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme; John Browne (UK),Managing Director of Riverstone Holdings LLC, former Group ChiefExecutive of BP plc; Maria Livanos Cattaui (Switzerland), member of theBoardofDirectors,PetroplusHoldingsAG,formerSecretaryGeneraloftheInternational Chamber of Commerce; Stuart Eizenstat (USA), Partner,

Covington & Burling LLP, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury,UnderSecretaryofState,UnderSecretaryofCommerce,AmbassadortotheEuropean Union; Luis Gallegos (Ecuador), Ambassador of Ecuador to theUnited States, former Vice-Chair, UN Commission on Human Rights;Member of the UN Committee Against Torture; Neville Isdell (USA),Chairman of the Board ofDirectors, The Coca-Cola Company;Hina Jilani(Pakistan), Member of the Council, Pakistan Human Rights Commission,former UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Human RightsDefenders;KishoreMahbubani(Singapore),Dean,LeeKuanYewSchoolofPublic Policy, National University of Singapore, former Ambassador ofSingaporetotheUnitedNations;NarayanaMurthy(India),Chairman,InfosysTechnologies Limited; Sonia Picado (Costa Rica), Chair, Inter-AmericanInstitute of Human Rights, former Judge and Vice-Chair of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa),Executive Chairman, Shanduka Group, former Secretary General of theAfricanNationalCongress;MaryRobinson(Ireland),Chair,RealizingRights:TheEthicalGlobalization Initiative, formerPresident of Ireland andUnitedNations High Commissioner for Human Rights; Guy Ryder (UK), GeneralSecretaryoftheInternationalTradeUnionConfederation;andMarjorieYang(China),ChairmanofEsquelGroup.

19http://www.mineafrica.com/documents/A3%20-%20Macleod%20Dixon1.pdf.20http://www.abanow.org/2012/01/2012mm109/.21GlobalCompactNetworkNetherlands,“HowtoConductBusinesswithRespectforHumanRights,”p.12,availableathttp://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/Resources/how_to_business_with_respect_for_human_rights_gcn_netherlands_june2010.pdf.

22Availableathttp://www.ihrb.org/pdf/The_State_of_Play_of_Human_Rights_Due_Diligence.pdf.

23SeeCarolineReesandDavidVermijs,“MappingGrievanceMechanismsintheBusinessandHumanRightsArena,”CorporateSocialResponsibilityInitiativeReport#28,KennedySchoolofGovernment,HarvardUniversity(January2008),availableathttp://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/Report_28_Mapping.pdf.

24 “Piloting Principles for Effective Company/Stakeholder GrievanceMechanisms: A Report of Lessons Learned,” Report of the SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General on the Issue ofHumanRights andTransnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie,UNDocumentA/HRC/17/31/Add.1(May24,2011).

25www.baseswiki.org.26http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/05/164340.htm.27Letteronfilewithauthor.28http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/115482804a0255db96fbffd1a5d13d27/PS_English_2012_Full-Document.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.

29 Craig N. Murphy and JoAnne Yates, The International Organization forStandardization (ISO): Global Governance Through Voluntary Consensus(NewYork:Routledge,2009).

30SandraAtler,“TheImpactoftheUnitedNationsSecretary-General’sSpecialRepresentativeandtheFrameworkontheDevelopmentofHumanRightsComponentsofISO26000,”availableathttp://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/impact-un-special-representative-on-iso-26000-sandra-atler-24-may-2011.pdf.

31AlanFine,“ImpactoftheWorkoftheUNSG’sSpecialRepresentativeonBusinessandHumanRightsonDeliberationsintheIndustryStakeholderGroupinISO’sWorkingGrouponSocialResponsibility,”availableathttp://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/impact-un-special-representative-on-iso-26000-alan-fine-24-may-2011.doc.

32http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_standards/social_responsibility.htm.

33“CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliament,theCouncil,theEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommittee,andtheCommitteeoftheRegions,”http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=7010.

34RemarksbyRafendiDjamin,IndonesianRepresentativetoASEANIntergovernmentalCommissiononHumanRights,atAsiaPacificForumofNationalHumanRightsInstitutionsRegionalConferenceonBusinessandHumanRights,October11–13,2011,Seoul,SouthKorea.Also,theAfricanUnionisdevelopingaplanofactioncalledAfricanMiningVision2050.Itwillbebasedonapreparatoryreportthatstates:“TheUNProtect,RespectandRemedyFrameworkoffersausefulandcomprehensivesetofprincipleswhichcanbeappliedtothedutiesofstatesandtheresponsibilitiesofminingfirmsinrespectofthehumanrightsimpactsofmineraloperations.”http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Overview%20of%20the%20ISG%20Report.pdf

35AlisonBraybrooks,“Why2011WasaLandmarkYearforBusinessandHumanRights,”(December16,2011),availableat

www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business/human-rights-business.36 ICAR, “Building aMovement for CorporateAccountability,” FirstAnnualInternational Corporate Accountability Roundtable Meeting, Washington,D.C.,September8–9,2011.

37http://www.ipieca.org/news/20111114/business-and-human-rights-collaborative-learning-projects-underway.

38http://www.ipieca.org/news/20110131/ipieca-provides-input-professor-ruggies-draft-final-report-un-human-rights-council.

39FinnemoreandSikkink,“InternationalNormDynamics,”p.897.40Ibid.

Chapter5:NextSteps

1“DraftReportoftheSecretary-GeneralonHowtheUnitedNationsSystemasaWhole Can Contribute to the Advancement of the Business and HumanRights Agenda and the Dissemination and Implementation of the GuidingPrinciples,”p.3.

2http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness.aspx.

3“DraftReportoftheSecretary-General.”4 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=5752&lang=en.

5OECD,“DraftTermsofReferenceforFutureWorkonDueDiligenceintheFinancialSector,”NotebytheChairoftheWorkingPartyoftheInvestmentCommittee,DAF/INV/WP/RD(2012)1.

6“AgreementBetweenNideraHoldingsB.V.andCEDHA,SOMO,OxfamNovib,andINCASUR,http://wp.cedha.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/CEDHA-et-al-vs-Nidera-joint-public-agreement-25112011.pdf.

7 OECD, “Implementation of the 2011 Update of the OECD Guidelines forMultinational Enterprises,” Note by the Chair of theWorking Party of theInvestmentCommittee,DAF/INV/WP(2012)4.

8BasedoninterviewswithparticipantsinMarch2012.9http://www.iqnet-certification.com/.10http://www.mazars.co.uk/Home/News/Latest-news/Survey-Results-Mining-companies-UN-Human-Rights.

11http://www.rightscon.org/2011/10/silicon-valley-human-rights-standards/.12InternationalOrganizationofEmployers,“GuidingPrinciplesonBusiness

andHumanRights:Employers’Guide,”http://bclc.uschamber.com/article/employers-guide-un-guiding-principles-business-and-human-rights.

13InternationalTradeUnionConfederation,“TheUnitedNations‘Protect,Respect,Remedy’FrameworkforBusinessandHumanRightsandtheUnitedNationsGuidingPrinciplesforBusinessandHumanRights:BriefingNotefortradeunionists,”http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/12-04-12_ruggie_briefing_note.pdf.

14 Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights andTransnationalCorporationsandOtherBusinessEnterprises,UNDocumentA/HRC/20/29(April10,2012).

15See,respectively,http://www.unicef.org.uk/Documents/Publications/PRINCIPLES_23%2002%2012_FINAL.pdf;andhttp://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names.pdf.

16http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/Resources/GPs_GC%20note.pdf.

17http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129739.pdf.

18http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/05/190260.htm.19J.E.Alvarez,“TheEvolvingBIT,”TransnationalDisputeManagement(June2009).

20 Jürgen Kurtz, “The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-StateArbitration: Competition and Its Discontents,” European Journal ofInternationalLaw20no.3(2009).

21 Email from Thomas Walde to the author, May 21, 2008. Subject line:International human rights treaties justiciable-relevant-applicable ininvestmentdisputes.Onfilewiththeauthor.TheemailwasalsopostedontheOGEMID (oil gas energy infrastructure and investment disputes) internet-based discussion group, which Prof. Walde moderated, so it was notconsideredprivate.

22Onthislastpoint,seeDaniRodrik,TheGlobalizationParadox (NewYork:W.W.Norton,2011).

23 “Comments on the Model for Future Investment Agreements (EnglishTranslation),”December19,2007(copyonfilewiththeauthor),p.27.

24http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188199.htm.Thefulltextofthemodeltreatyisavailableathttp://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/index.htm.

25SeeAdvocatesforInternationalDevelopment,“LawFirms’ImplementationoftheGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRights,”availableathttp://www.shiftproject.org/publication/law-firms-implementation-guiding-principles-business-and-human-rights.

26 The presumption of atomization drives the analysis of Radu Mares,“Responsibility to Respect: Why the Core Company Should Act WhenAffiliatesInfringeHumanRights,”inMares,ed.,TheUNGuidingPrincipleson Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation (Leiden:MartinusNijhoff,2011).

27 Larry Catá Backer, “Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: TheUnitedNations’NormsontheResponsibilitiesofTransnationalCorporationsas a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law,”ColumbiaHumanRightsReview37,no.2(2005),pp.169–70.

28 PeterMuchlinski explores potential long-term implications of the GPs forcorporate law, in “Implementing the New UN Corporate Human RightsFramework: Implications for Corporate Law, Governance and Regulation,JournalofBusinessEthics,22(January2012).

29Section12.3ofAustralia’sCriminalCodeAct1995;http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A04868.

30 Chapter 8 of the U.S. 2006 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual,§8C2.5(b)(1).

31Muchlinksi,“Implementing.”32http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/10-1491_petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf.

3328U.S.C.§1350.34Forthetranscriptoftheentirehearing,seehttp://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1491.pdf.

35Asdiscussedinearlierchapters,in2007Iproducedareportmappinginternationalhumanrightsstandardsapplicabletocompanies.Istressedthat“themostconsequentiallegaldevelopment”inbusinessandhumanrightsis“thegradualextensionofliabilitytocompaniesforinternationalcrimes,underdomesticjurisdictionbutreflectinginternationalstandards.”HereiswhatSullivansaidaboutthisinheroralargument:“WecitetheU.N.specialrepresentative,saying‘Ihavelookedattheinternationalhumanrightsinstrumentsthatareoutthere,andIfindnobasisforcorporateliability.’

That’stheU.N.[speaking],notCongress.”Technicallythestatementisnotincorrect.Butonewouldneverknowfromitthatmyuseoftheterm“instruments”referredspecificallytoUNhumanrightstreaties,whichhardlycomprisetheentiretyofrelevantinternationallaw,andthatIdididentifyabasisforcorporateliabilityinotherareasoflaw.Shell’swrittenbriefcontainsthesameclaim.(ForSullivan’sstatement,see“TranscriptofOralArgument,”p.49,availableathttp://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1491.pdf/.)

36Kiobelv.RoyalDutchPetroleum,No.10-1491(U.S.SupremeCourt),“Brieffor the United Sates as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,” December2011.

37See“TranscriptofOralArgument.”38Kiobelv.RoyalDutchPetroleum,No.10-1491(U.S.SupremeCourt),“BriefAmiciCuriaeofFormerUNSpecialRepresentativeforBusinessandHumanRights, Professor John Ruggie; Professor Philip Alston; and the GlobalJusticeClinicatNYUSchoolofLawinSupportofNeitherParty,”June12,2012.

39 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-1491 (U.S. Supreme Court),“SupplementalBriefforRespondents,”August1,2012.

40“KiobelandCorporateSocialResponsibility,”IssuesBrief,HarvardKennedySchoolofGovernment,September4,2012,availableathttp://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie-kiobel-and-corp-social-resonsibility-sep-2012.pdf.

41ThestoryiswelltoldbyKennethW.AbbottandDuncanSnidal,“ValuesandInterests:InternationalLegalizationintheFightAgainstCorruption,”JournalofLegalStudies31(January2002).

42http://harvardhumanrights.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/mandate-follow-up-final.pdf.

43A/HRC/RES/17/4,paragraph6(e).

INDEX

Pagenumbersinitalicsrefertofiguresandtables.

Abacha,Sani,13ABNAMRO,152AccountAbility,3advocacygroups,xvi,28,64,161–62antiglobalizationeffortsof,xvi,xxvi,4campaignsby,xxxv,xli,4,5,16,30,31,34,68,93,146Framework’sacceptanceby,90,105–6Framework’squestioningby,89,101,106mandatoryapparatusfavoredby,xvii,xix–xx,xxii,xlii,xliv–xlv,37–38,53–54,56,71,101,106,121,130,145,158

innormativeevolution,168transnationallinksamong,xli,4,5,10,94seealsoNGOs;stakeholders;workers’organizations

Africa,xxvi,xxxhumanrightsviolationsin,25internationalinvestmentagreementsin,136,137

AfricanUnion,221Afrimex,106Aguirre,Fernando,30AkzoNobel,152Algeria,xlixAlienTortStatute(ATS),xxxii,xxxiii,9,12,30,31,34,43,129,192,193,194,195,196,197,198,207

Alito,SamuelA.,Jr.,195Alston,Philip,51Alvarez,José,183AmericanBarAssociation,151,187AmericanLawyer,150AmericanNationalStandardsInstitute,163

Americas:humanrightsregimein,xxxseealsoLatinAmerica;NorthAmerica

AmnestyInternational,54,56,105,145,166UKBusinessGroupof,208

AmnestyInternationalUSA,xixAnderson,Warren,8,206AngloAmerican,154Annan,Kofi,xviii,xix,5,148apparelindustry,154CSRinitiativesin,70,75labor-relatedviolationsin,xxiv,4–5,17,24,96

Apple,laborpracticesof,1,98Arabspring,178Arana,Marco,xl–xli,xlvArbour,Louise,57Argentina:laborpracticesin,175UNmandate’ssupportby,xlvii,158waterprivatizationin,66,184

Asia:humanrightsviolationsin,25ISOstandardsin,121,160

AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN),GuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,165–66

Atler,Sandra,163AungSanSuuKyi,179Australia,74corporatecriminalprosectionsin,44,190

AutodefensasUnidasdeColombia(AUC),30

Backer,LarryCatá,188–89BanKi-moon,172,173banks,projectlendingby,75Bashir,OmarHassanAhmadAl,xxxBDA,144Belgium:

Internetregulationin,208UNmandateinvolvementof,157

Benavides,Roque,xxxixBhopal,India,industrialdisasterin,6–9,14,17,70BHPBilliton,154bilateralinvestmenttreaties(BITs),59,66,86,182–84,185,187BlackEconomicEmpowermentAct,59,87,184Blair,Tony,xxviiBovespa,134Bowotov.Chevron,207BP,74,208Brazil,xxviiicorporatelawin,134investmentagreementswith,184multinationalsbasedin,18UNmandateinvolvementof,157

Buenaventura,CompaníadeMinas,xxxvi,xxxixBuhmann,Karin,142,143Burma,seeMyanmarBursaMalaysia,134business:capitalaccessof,122,160communityconflictcoststo,137–39;seealsosociallicense,lossofcriminalliabilityof,44,47,130–31,190–91,224enlightenedshareholdermodelof,134,191governancesystemsin,xxxv,79,87,91,94,99,101,108,113,115,125,126,133–34,138,143–44,151,152,153,155,181,182,189,190,191,198;seealsocorporatelaw

governmentfocuson,58–59,63,79,87,108humanrightsnorms’applicationto,xvi,xvii–xviii,61,64,75,78,91–94,95,96, 102, 107, 125, 168–69; see also Protect, Respect and RemedyFramework

humanrightsresponsibilitiesof,xxi,xxv,xlii,xliv,xlv,35,38,41–42,48,49–52,60,79,82,83,87,90–102,112–16,121,122,123,124,125,126,152,161, 162, 164, 168–69, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176, 186, 189, 202; see alsohumanrightsduediligence

ILOinvolvementof,42,46

legalrequirementsfor,87–88,90,91,96,100,101,109–10,117–18,170;seealsocorporatelaw

Norms’oppositionby,54–55philanthropyby,68,95profitmotiveof,xvi,87Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’s acceptance by, 82, 90, 92, 101,105,106

risk management by, 69–70, 143–44, 189; see also multinationals, humanrightsriskmanagementby

socialresponsibilitystandardfor,163,164spheresofinfluenceof,xviii,49–51,97,101,164–65state-owned,84,110–11,169SupremeCourtrulingson,197UNGuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,xxi,107,120,125,169,177,181,202UNmandateinvolvementof,55,142,143–45,151,158voluntarycompliancepreferenceof,xvii,xx,xxii,xlii,37–38,64,71,130;seealsocorporatesocialresponsibility

seealsobusiness/humanrightsagenda;multinationalsBusiness&HumanRightsResourceCentre(BHRRC),19,24,25,147BusinessandSocietyExploringSolutions,155businessassociations,105,199inCSRinitiatives,71,74inGuidelines’revision,161UNGuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,120,178UNmandateinvolvementof,71,92

business/humanrightsagenda,xv–l,129activismin,xvi,xxvi,xxxv,xli;seealsoadvocacygroupsadventof,xvi,xxv–xxvi,14baselinestudieson,130–32benchmarksin,xlii,xliv,96,98,99,101,126,127,154,172,181challengesin,1–36,170–71convergencein,xviii,xxi,106,126,159–66,167corporate law’s relationship to,87–88,108,109–10,132–35,150,182,187,188–92

emblematiccasesin,xxiv,3–19,34furtheringof,105–6,121–23,131–32,166globalmediationnetworkfor,155–56

governmentprioritiesaffecting,58–59,63,79,87,108heterodoxapproachto,xxiii,xxiv,xxxiv,xlii–xlvi,2–3,36,38,55,57,60,77,78,80,81,82,83,100,101,104–5,124,125,145,171,172,202

international investment agreements’ effect on, xxxiii, 59, 66, 86–87, 109,135–37,149–50,182–87

internationallegalinstrumentsin,xxxv,xlv,xlvi,17,67–68,78,80,82,101,125, 145, 157, 171, 189, 192, 199–201; see also human rights, legalapparatusaddressing

legalbarriersin,117–18,131lessonsfrom,xxiii–xxvnextstepsin,xxv,126–27,167,170–202nonjudicial mechanisms in, 103–4; see also multinationals, grievancemechanismswithin

normativecompatibilityin,67,108–9,124,126,127,129,182,202policy approach to, xliv, xlv, xlvi, 85–89, 108–12, 113, 124, 126, 172, 182,202

regionalviewpointson,142,143shortfallsin,xxvi,xxviii,xxxi–xxxiv,xxxv,2,6,7,10,17–18,34,35,40–42,72,78,81,83–84,85–89,108,182–92

soft-lawinstrumentsin,45–47,124,181stalematein,xvii,xix–xx,xxii,xxiii,xxxv,78,122,125,130,165,171strategicpathsin,xxiv,128–69transparency’simportanceto,149,150,175,181see also Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations andOtherBusinessEnterpriseswithRegardtoHumanRights;Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework;UnitedNationsspecialmandate

BusinessLeadersInitiativeonHumanRights,97,105Cajamarca,xxxvi–xlii,xliii,104CaliforniaSupremeCourt,5Callaghan,Michael,15Canada,xxxcorporatecriminalprosectionsin,44,47,198UNmandateinvolvementof,157

CarbonesdelCerrejón,154CarlyleGroup,177CBS,4chemicalindustry,70

humanrightsviolationsby,26seealsoBhopal,India,industrialdisasterin

Chevron,xxxii–xxxiiichildlabor,4,21,46children,internationalstandardspertainingto,96“Children’sRightsandBusinessPrinciples,”178China,165,184CSRinitiativesin,xxviii,71,73,74,134Internetcensorshipin,14–17laborpracticesin,1,154multinationalsbasedin,18,94OECDguidelinesin,175,176outsourcingin,3privacyviolationsin,xxiv,14–17privatizationin,xxviirightsrecognizedby,xxxiisocialresponsibilitystandardin,121UNmandateinvolvementof,157

ChinaNationalPetroleumCorporation,18,210ChiquitaBrands,29–30,43,98,210Cisco,14CleanClothesCampaign,147CliffordChance,120Clinton,Bill,xxviiClinton,Hillary,121–22,161collectivebargaining,xxxii,16,46,174Colombia,157humanrightsviolationsin,29–30,43,98,210

conflictdiamonds,xxvii,70,147conflictzones,xxvi,171humanrightsviolationsin,xxvi,28,29–33,35,88internationalstandardspertainingto,96policydevelopmentfor,88,111–12UNGuidingPrinciples’applicationto,123,147,152,156–57

Conga,Minas,xxxviii,138Congress,U.S.:AlienTortStatutein,198

ForeignCorruptPracticesActin,199consultingindustry,121,160corporatecomplicity,xviii,10,11–13,17,21,26–27,27,29,30,31,32–33,35,43,98,100,164inminingindustry,28–29

corporatelaw,87–88,108,109–10,132–35,150,182,187,188–92corporatelawfirms,137UNGuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,120,187UNmandateinvolvementof,133,150–51

corporatesocialresponsibility(CSR):assessmentof,75–78businessopportunityaspectof,69inChina,xxviii,71,73,74collaborativeinitiativesin,xxvii,xxxv,70,74correlationofcompanysizewith,72elasticinterpretationsof,72–73inemerging-marketstates,xxvii,18,76,93extraterritoriality’sincorporationin,141,165governmentsupportof,xxvii,68growthof,xxvi–xxviii,xxxviii,13,34,68,75–76,77,79,93–94,131integrationof,76,139limitationsof,xxviii,xxxviii,34,76–77,79,81,88,131litigationand,196–97originsof,68–71policiesin,71–75,92,93,112,113Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework’susein,106,174regionaldifferencesin,73,74,76reportingon,xxvii,73–74,87,134risk-managementaspectof,69–70staffingof,75,93statesupportof,xxvii,68,74,93stockexchangelistingruleson,134UNmandate’sinvolvementwith,144voluntarystandardsfor,69–70,73,100

DeclarationonFundamentalPrinciplesandRightsatWork,xxx,19–20,46,96DeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples,xxiii,57

DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(DRC):humanrightsduediligencein,147humanrightsviolationsin,31–33,88,96,106SecurityCouncilresolutionon,123

Denmark,GuidingPrinciples’implementationin,174developingworld,63bilateralinvestmenttreatiesin,185corporateliabilityin,198CSRguidelinesin,93humanrightsviolationsin,26,28IFCconditionson,162UNmandate’ssupportin,162

directforeignliabilitycases,47discrimination,40,46seealsogenderequality

Dodd-FrankWallStreetReformAct,123Doev.Unocal,xxxii–xxxiiiDoonesbury,4DowJonesSustainabilityIndex,134

EarthRightsInternational,166Economist,xixEcuador,UNmandate’ssupportby,159employment,xxxvii,10,20seealsolaborpractices

employmentindustry,174environment,multinationals’impacton,xxxvii,xxxviii,xxxix,xl,6,10,21,22,26

EsquelGroup,154Europe,xxxCSRinitiativesin,73,74humanrightsviolationsin,25

EuropeanUnion(EU):corporatelawreformsin,192extraterritorialitymeasuresin,141,165Myanmarinvestmentstandardsin,179UNGuidingPrinciples’implementationin,173–74

UNGuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,xxi,122–23,160,165UNmandateinvolvementof,142

ExtractiveIndustryTransparencyInitiative,70,181extractivesector,37communityconflictswith,xxvi,xxxvii,xxxviii,xxxix–xli,24,26,72,95–96,104,137,138–39,184,187

CSRinitiativesin,70,72,77andresourcecurse,9seealsominingindustry;oilandgasindustry

extraterritoriality,44–45,63,85,89,103,109–10,117,131,139–41,165,171,189,195,197

ExxonMobil,92Facebook,178FairLaborAssociation(FLA),1–2,70,73,77fairtradelabeling,xxviifairtradeschemes,70financialcrisisof2008,189financialsector,xxvi,23,26,75,174,175Fine,Alan,163,164foodindustry,humanrightsviolationsby,26forcedlabor,21,32,46,174,180ForeignCorruptPracticesAct(FCPA),199ForeignTerroristOrganizations(FTOs),29FortuneGlobal500,71,72,73,74,75,93FoxconnTechnology,1,98France,UNmandateinvolvementof,143FreedomHouse,28freedomofassociation,16,21,46,174freedomofexpression,16,95,174seealsoprivacyrights

Frontline,xxxviFTSE4Good,134

Gaddafi,Saifal-Islam,xxxGap,69Gazprom,154GE,120

genderequality,xxxii,16,41GeneralMotors,69Germany,UNGuidingPrinciples’implementationin,174Ghana,UNmandateinvolvementof,157GlobalCompactCommunicationonProgress,74globalization,xxvii1990sincreasein,xv,xxv–xxvi,2,33–34,182oppositionto,xvi,xxvi,3,4sociallysustainable,202seealsomultinationals

GlobalNetworkInitiative,16GlobalReportingInitiative,74GlobalWitness,123,147,166GoldmanSachs,138Google,16–17,178governancegaps,81bridgingof,xxiii–xxiv,xxv,34,78,127,128,202inconflictzones,33,88seealsointernationallaw,limitationsof

GreaterNilePetroleumCompany,210GRUFIDES(GroupforTrainingandInterventionforSustainableDevelopment),xl–xli

Guantánamo,89Guardian,166Guatemala,157GuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprises,46–47,72,93,103–4,106,121–22,123,160–61,174–76

HarvardBusinessReview,3HarvardKennedySchoolCorporateSocialResponsibilityInitiative,156HarvardUniversity,xlvii,142health:humanrightsand,20,21,24,26seealsoenvironment

Henkin,Louis,40Hewlett-Packard,154Hoffman,Paul,193,194homestates:

CSRpolicies’reflectionof,73,76extraterritorialpowersof,44–45,63,85,89,103,109–10,117,131,139–41,165,171,189,195,197

governancesystemsin,xliii,5,90,94humanrightsregulationsin,xxxiv,35,45,63,85,89–90,108,131judicialremediesin,102–3,109;seealsoAlienTortStatutemultinationals’supportby,xxii,xxxiv,63,103,136,175–76policymeasuresfor,85–89,108,109–10,111–12,180

HongKong,Internetfreedomin,17hoststates,xxxiv,76bindinginternationalarbitrationagainst,xxxiii,59,66,86,109,135,149,150,183–84

egregiousabusesin,xxxii–xxxiii,12,13,17,21,27–29,34,100governancesystemsin,xliii,90,94,181humanrightsregulationsin,xxxiii,52,59,66,72,86,87,109,135,136,182,184,186

investmentagreementsby,136,186,187;seealsobilateralinvestmenttreatiesinvestmentcompetitionamong,xxii,xxxiii,xxxix,135,170jurisdictionallimitationsof,7–8,17resourcecursein,9,31,32,33,88,179rights’denialin,xxxii,18,47,69,100sovereigntyconcernsof,xvi,63,103,170,201treatyenforcementin,62–63,64weakgovernancein,xxvi,xxxix,9,17,28,33,35,50–51,52,85,87,88,94,170,179–80

seealsoconflictzonesHouseofRepresentatives,U.S.,15humanrights:corporateresponsibilitiesrelatedto,xxi,xxv,xlii,xliv,xlv,35,38,41–42,48,49–52,60,79,82,83,87,90–102,112–16,121,122,123,124,125,126,152,161,162,164,168–69,171,172,174,175,176,186,189,202

corporateviolationsof,xv–xvi,xxiii,xxiv,xxvi,xlv,1,2,3–33,34–35,49,50, 81, 82, 88, 95–96, 106, 130, 137, 146, 156, 174, 192–201, 206, 207,208,209–10

egregiousviolatorsof,27–29;seealsointernationallaw,egregiousviolationsof

globalization’slinkageto,xvi,xxv–xxvi,2

globalprotectionof,xvi–xvii,xxv,xlii,xliii,xlix,35,36,78;seealsohumanrightsregime;Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework

inherentnatureof,xxviii,xxxv,xliii,27,40,65,124,202labor-related,20–21,21legal apparatus addressing,xvi,xxii–xxiii, xxv,xxix,xxx–xxxi,xxxii, xxxv,xliii,xliv,16,20,23,34,35,38,39,41–42,43–44,46,50,52,53,65,82,83–85,90,91,96,100,101,106,108,110–11,117–18,121,124,125,126,130–31, 145, 171; see also business, legal requirements for;business/human rights agenda, international legal instruments in;internationallaw;multinationals,lawsuitsagainst;remedies,judicial

market-drivenapproachto,xxii,xxiii,68,77nonlabor,21–23,22patternsandcorrelatesconcerning,19–33,34–35,130preventative measures supporting, xlv, 2, 80, 84, 85–89, 101, 111–12, 113,114,115–16,124,125,145,153,156;seealsohumanrightsduediligence

progressiverealizationof,xxxi,52protectionof,83–84regionaldataon,24–26,24respectingof,84,95,97,100,214–15;seealsohumanrightsduediligencesectoraldataon,25,26short-termmeasuresaddressing,xxxv,xlv,57,145socialnorms related to,17,45,61,64,82,90,91–94,95,96,102,125;seealsosociallicense

spectrumof,20–23,21,22,27,34–35,49,67,95,96,125,130statedutiesrelatedto,xx,xxv,xxix,xxx–xxxii,xxxiii,xlii,xliv,xlv,38,39,40–42,43,47,49,51,52,58,60,62–63,79,82,83–90,102,107–12,116–17,124,125,126,131,169,171,172,186,202

stateviolationsof,12,13,15,16,17,27,29,30,31,34,35,84,110–11,146,162,193

voluntary measures addressing, xvii, xx, xxii, xlii, 37–38, 64, 68–78, 130,171;seealsocorporatesocialresponsibility

seealsobusiness/humanrightsagendahumanrightsduediligence,74,82,99–100,101,106,108,112,113–16,122,123,125,139,147,150,151,152–53,156,162,163,171,172,176,177,180,181,189,190,198

HumanRightsFirst,166humanrightsregime,xxviii–xxxvi,56

componentsof,xxix–xxxmoralassumptionsin,50,90–91,124,165multinationals’ regulation under, xxxi–xxxiv, 39, 47, 48–52, 56, 57–60, 61,63,64,67–68,124,170,201,224;seealsobusiness/humanrightsagenda

premisesof,xxv,xxviii–xxixregionalsystemsin,xxx,131strategicgamingof,50–51weaknessesof,xxxi,xxxiii,xxxiv,80,88,101,156,201–2seealsointernationallaw

HumanRightsWatch,9,54,145,166

India,xxxiiiOECDeffortsin,175UnionCarbidecasein,6,7,8,14UNmandate’ssupportby,xlvii,158

indigenouspeoples,163extractivesector’sconflictswith,xxvi,xxxvii,xxxviii,xxxix–xli,26,184internationalstandardspertainingto,96UNdeclarationon,xxiii,57seealsoresettlement

Indonesia:CSRreportingin,134OECDeffortsin,175outsourcingin,3,4,98

infrastructureindustry,26communityconflictwith,137

InstituteforHumanRightsandBusiness,153institutionalinvestors,192seealsosociallyresponsibleinvestors

InternationalBarAssociation,187InternationalBillofHumanRights(IBHR),xxix,19,20,96,122InternationalChamberofCommerce,xx,154“InternationalCodeofConductforPrivateSecurityProviders,”178InternationalCommissionofJurists,54,145InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,178InternationalConferenceontheGreatLakesRegion,123InternationalCorporateAccountabilityRoundtable,166–67

InternationalCouncilonMiningandMetals,28InternationalCriminalCourt(ICC),xxx,43–44,131InternationalFederationforHumanRights,xix–xxInternationalFinanceCorporation(IFC):capitalaccessthrough,122,160ComplianceAdvisor/Ombudsman(CAO)Officeof,xlEnvironmentalandSocialSustainabilitypolicyof,161,176–77investmentcontractaccessthrough,136mininginterestsof,xxxvi,xlpolicyprioritiesin,88,89UNGuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,xxi,88,122,160,161–63

InternationalLabourOrganization(ILO):conventionsof,xxix–xxx,42,46,72,73,93,122,147;seealsoDeclarationonFundamentalPrinciplesandRightsatWork

TripartiteDeclarationofPrinciplesConcerningMultinationalEnterprisesandSocialPolicyof,46

internationallaw,52–53creationof,55,56currentstructureof,38,39–47,55disagreementon,xxxii,17,89,200egregiousviolationsof,xxxii–xxxiii,12,13,17,21,27–33,34,39,42–44,47,67,98,100,130–31,192–201,209,212,224

fragmentationin,65–68,88–89limitationsof,xxii,xxxii,17,20,39,40,44,46,47,90,193–94,201–2long-termevolutionof,xxxiv–xxxv,xlviperemptorynormsin,66–67,214Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework’scompatibilitywith,82,96,101soft-lawinstrumentsin,45–47,57,93statedutiesunder,84,131see also human rights, legal apparatus addressing; human rights regime;treaties

InternationalLawCommission(ILC),65InternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO),UNGuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,xxi,121,123,160,163–65,176

InternationalOrganisationofEmployers,xx,154,178internationaltraderegime,131seealsoinvestment,internationalagreementson;WorldTradeOrganization

InternationalTradeUnionConfederation,120,178Internet,18humanrightsviolationson,xxiv,14–17,50,95,178,208

investment:hoststatecompetitionfor,xxii,xxxiii,xxxix,135,170international agreements on, 86–87, 109, 135–37, 149–50, 182–87; see alsobilateralinvestmenttreaties

innon-OECDcountries,136policyprioritizationof,87;seealsobusiness,governmentfocusonseealsosociallyresponsibleinvestors

IPIECA,167IQNet,176Iraq,corporatehumanrightsviolationsin,18Italy,mininginterestsin,59Japan,3CSRinitiativesin,73,74managementsystemsin,121

Jobs,Steve,1Johannesburg,SouthAfrica,134Jordan,Michael,4JournalofBusinessEthics,150JusticeDepartment,U.S.,29

Kabila,Laurent,32Kennedy,AnthonyM.,194Khan,Irene,56KimberleyProcess,xxvii,70Kiobelv.RoyalDutchPetroleumCo.,192–97,199,200Klein,Naomi,4Knight,Phil,4–5Knox,John,53

laborpractices,77inChina,1CSRpolicieson,72humanrightsviolationsrelatedto,xxiv,1,3–6,17,20–21,21,24,32,96,174inMyanmar,180

see also collective bargaining; employment; International LabourOrganization;supplychains

Lantos,Tom,15,16LatinAmerica:conflictzonesin,xxvihumanrightsviolationsin,25

Life,4Locke,Richard,206Luxembourg,mininginterestsin,59

MacKinnon,Rebecca,18manufacturingsector,72humanrightsviolationsin,xxvi,4,26outsourcingin,xxvi,3,5seealsoapparelindustry;technologyindustry

markets,benefitsof,201Mazars,177microenterprises,69Microsoft,16Migros,76miningindustry:Canadianregulationof,xxxivcorporatecomplicityin,28–29CSRinitiativesin,94,106grievancemechanismsin,177OECDguidelinesfor,123processesin,xxxviiinSouthAfrica,59UNGuidingPrinciples’receptionby,151,154,177seealsoCajamarca;extractivesector

Misereor,xliMitsubishiCorporation,154Mitsui&Co.,154MobutuSeseSeko,32Moody-Stuart,Mark,208Moore,Michael,4Mortimer,Edward,54

MovementfortheSurvivaloftheOgoniPeople,11,193Moyn,Samuel,xliiiMozambique,corporatehumanrightsviolationsin,18Mozilla,178multinationals:binding international arbitration by, xxxiii, 59, 66, 86, 109, 135, 149, 150,183–84

Chinese,18,94communityobjectionto,xxxvii,xxxviii,xl–xli,11,12,17,18,186,209;seealsoextractivesector,communityconflictswith;sociallicense

complaintsagainst,seeNationalContactPointscontradictory standards affecting, xxxii, xliv, 16, 18, 34, 35, 46–47, 52, 69,100,161,164,183

inemerging-marketstates,xxvii,18,58environmentalimpactsof,xxxvii,xxxviii,xxxix,xl,6,10,21,22,26,70,74,75,134,163,174

global human rights proposals aimed at, xvii, xlix, 67–68, 213; see alsoNorms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and OtherBusinessEnterpriseswithRegard toHumanRights; Protect,Respect andRemedyFramework

globalvaluechainsof,2,98,114;seealsosupplychainsgovernancesystemsaffecting,xxxiv,xliii–xliv,2,78,80,81,91,101–2,124,171,172,186,201–2

grievancemechanismswithin, xliv, 104, 112, 113, 115, 116, 119, 121, 125,139,147,151,152,153–56,172,177,180–81

homestatesupportof,xxii,xxxiv,63,103,136,175–76human rights regime’sapplication to,xxxi–xxxiv,39,47,48–52,56,57–60,61,63,64,67–68,124,170,201,224

humanrightsriskmanagementby,xxvi,xxviii,xxxviii,xliv,99,111–12;seealsohumanrightsduediligence

human rightsviolationsby,xv–xvi,xxiii,xxiv,xxvi,xlv,1,2,3–33,34–35,49,50,81,82,88,95–96,106,130,137,146,156,174,192–201,206,207,208,209–10;seealsocorporatecomplicity

jurisdictional regulation of, xvi, xvii, xxii, xxv, xxvi, xxviii, xxxi–xxxii,xxxiii,xxxiv,xliii,xliv,7–8,20,34,39,45,47,63,85,89,103,109,118,131,189,194;seealsohomestates,extraterritorialpowersof

lawsuitsagainst,xxxii–xxxiii,xxxv–xxxvi,6,7,8,9,12,13–14,17,29,30,

31, 34, 43, 44, 68, 115, 192–97, 198, 207; see also human rights, legalapparatusaddressing

“legalpersons”statusof,xxxii,xxxiii,43,44,47,193,200operationalemphasisof,xxxviii–xxxix,79,139powerof,xxiii,xxv,xxxiii–xxxiv,48,124,170,201preventativemeasuresby,xlv,2,101,111–12,113,114,115–16,125,153;seealsohumanrightsduediligence

proliferationof,2,33–34scopeof,50,97–98,100,201socialimpactsof,xxxvii,xxxviii,xxxix–xl,6,9,10,22–23,24,26,32,68,69,70,74,75,134,163,174;seealsosociallicense

stakeholderengagementwith,70,74,79,80,91,99–100,104,112–13,115,116,118,119,121,139,152,154,155,172,180,191

structuresof,xv,xxiii,xxv,xxxiii,xliii–xliv,2,7,8,9,33–34,51,97–98,100,103,104,113,114,125,180,188,189,190;seealsosupplychains

victimcompensationby,6–7Western,18,94seealsobusiness;globalization;specificsectors

Myanmar,179–81

NationalContactPoints(NCPs),47,93,103,104,106,122,160,174–75Netherlands,174civilservicepensionfundof,93corporatecriminalprosectionsin,47,198

Netherlands’GlobalCompactNetwork,152NewmontMining,xxxvi,xxxvii–xxxviii,xliNewsweek,6NewYorkTimes,xxxvi,1,92NGOs,xli,160,175CSRinitiativesinvolving,xxvii,74ISOsocialresponsibilitystandard’squestioningby,164–65operationalactivitiesof,145,146–47,158Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework’sacceptanceby,105,158UNGuidingPrinciples’receptionby,xxi,120–21,158UNmandateinvolvementof,145–47seealsoadvocacygroups

NideraHoldings,175

Nigeria:humanrightsviolationsin,12–13,43,91,104,193oilindustryin,9–13UNmandateinvolvementof,xlvii,157,158

Nike,xxiv,3–6,17,34,69,70,73,98,206NobelPeacePrize,xixNoLogo(Klein),4norms:commonknowledgebasesfor,129definitionof,91–92enforcementof,93,144evolutionof,91,128–29,167–68logicof,106peremptory,66–67unevenapplicationof,94see also business, human rights norms’ application to; human rights, socialnormsrelatedto;states,humanrightsnorms’applicationto

NormsontheResponsibilitiesofTransnationalCorporationsandOtherBusinessEnterpriseswithRegardtoHumanRights:advocacygroups’favoringof,xix–xx,37,53–54,158analysisof,38,47–55,90–91businessinvolvementin,143failureof,xvii,37,47–48,145,188–89legalclaimsabout,52–53politicaloppositionto,53,54–55rightsrecognizedby,48–49,90workers’organizationsconcernsabout,147

NorthAmerica,humanrightsviolationsin,25Norway:BITmodelin,185UNmandate’ssupportby,xlvii,105,119–20,157,158,159

NorwegianGovernmentPensionFund,93Nye,Joseph,xlviObamaadministration,194OECDWatch,161Ogoniland,Nigeria,9,10,11,12,13,14,91oilandgasindustry,9–14,30,138,154,167,174,210

OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD),123,136BusinessandIndustryAdvisoryCommitteeto,154ConventiononCombatingBriberyofForeignPublicOfficialsinInternationalBusinessTransacationsof,199

ExportCreditGroupof,176GuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,xxi,160–61,174–76InvestmentCommitteeof,160,161TradeUnionAdvisoryCommitteeto,147,161seealsoGuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprises

outsourcing,xxvi,3,4,5,98,110Oxfam,133OxfamAmerica,xxxvi,xli

Pakistan,childlaborin,4Paris,France,corporatelistingrulesin,134Patagonia,70Peru,xxxixminingindustryin,xxxvi,xxxviii,18;seealsoCajamarca

PetroChina,93,209Petronas,210pharmaceuticalindustry,humanrightsviolationsby,24,26Philips,152PhillipsVanHeusen,70Pillay,Navi,105polycentricgovernance,78Porter,Michael,69PresbyterianChurchofSudanv.TalismanEnergy,Inc.,210–11privacyrights,Internetserviceproviders’violationsof,xxiv,14–17,50,95,178,208

privatization,xxvii,66,110–11,182,184professionalservicessector,xxviProtect,RespectandRemedyFramework,xxiv,83–106,171businessacceptanceof,82,90,92,101,105,106controversialaspectsof,89–90,101,107,145corporateresponsibilitiesunder,xxi,82,83,90–102,152,164,171goalsof,34,78–79,81HumanRightsCouncil’swelcomingof,xx,xlviii,105,132,133

legalcomponentof,82,91,96,101,106,107moralclaims’avoidancein,90–91,100,107normativebasisof,78,81,82–83,91–94,95,96pillarsof,xx–xxi,82,84,90;seealsobusiness,humanrightsresponsibilitiesof;remedies;states,humanrightsdutiesof

reactionsto,104–6remediesincorporatedin,xxi,82,83,102–4rightsrecognizedby,19,20–23,35,79,95–96,100scopeof,79,95–98,100stakeholderacceptanceof,80,82,90,105–6,158stateacceptanceof,80,82,90,101,106statedutiesunder,xx,82,83–90,171seealsoUNGuidingPrinciples

Puma,70

Quilish,Cerro,xxxvii,xli

Reaganadministration,183regimecollision,65,67remedies:accessto,xxi,xlii,2,82,102–4,118,169,171CSRinitiativeweaknessin,xxviii,xxxviii,76impedimentsto,xxxiii,23,102,103,117,131,169judicial, xxi, xlv, 23, 80, 82, 102–3, 109, 116, 117–18, 121, 125, 155, 169,171, 172, 196; see also Alien Tort Statute; home states, extraterritorialpowersof

nonjudicial,xxi,xliv,25,80,82,102,103–4,112,113,115,116,118–19,121,125,155–56,171,172,175

Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework’sincorporationof,xxi,82,83,102–4,171

stateprovisionof,84,102,116–17,125inUNGuidingPrinciples,116–19

resettlement,xxxvii,22–23,26,96resourcecurse,9,31,32,33,88,179RevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia(FARC),210Roberts,JohnG.,195Robinson,Mary,148

RomeStatute,xxx,43,131RoyalDutchShell,seeShellRussianFederation,xxviiiOECDeffortsin,175UNmandate’ssupportby,xlvii,158

Rwanda,DRCwarwith,31–32

SakhalinEnergy,120,154Saro-Wiwa,Ken,11,12,13SaudiArabia,OECDeffortsin,175Schrage,Elliott,2112ndCircuitCourtofAppeals,U.S.,31,43,193,197securityforces,17,21,32,43,70,178,181,186,187securityoftheperson,21–22,26,174,187Sen,Amartya,xxxvsexualabuse,21Shanghai,China,134Shell,9–14,17,43,91,104,152,154,192–97,208,224Shenzhen,China,134ShiTao,15,16SierraLeone,UNmandateinvolvementof,157SiliconValleyHumanRightsConference,178Skype,178SocialAccountabilityInternational(SAI),70,73sociallicense:importanceof,xxxix,10,17,18,94,138lossof,11,17,91,93,98

sociallyresponsibleinvestors,16,75,93,105,120,134SouthAfrica,69humanrightslegislationin,59,87,184OECDeffortsin,175

SouthKorea,outsourcingin,3stakeholders,xlii,xliii,xliv,23–24,23,125,126CSRinitiativesand,70multinationals’ engagement with, 70, 74, 79, 80, 91, 99–100, 104, 112–13,115,116,118,119,121,139,152,154,155,172,180,191

Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework’sacceptanceby,80,82,90,105–6,

158socialexpectationsof,45,94,98UNGuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,107,158,178,181,202UNmandateinvolvementof,xli,132,142,143,146,148–51,152,158,173see also advocacy groups; indigenous peoples; multinationals, communityobjectionto

StateDepartment,U.S.,185states:bilateralinvestmenttreatiesbetween,59,66,86,182–84,185,187businessesownedby,84,110–11,169business-focusedinstitutionalarrangementsin,58–59,79,87,108businessinfluenceon,144–45;seealsomultinationals,powerofconflictinglegalobligationsof,65–68,109,185conflictingpolicyobligationsof,88–89,108,109,185,187corporate criminal prosecutions by, 44, 47, 190, 198; see also Alien TortStatute

corporatelawreformsin,192criminallawin,44,47,131CSRsupportfrom,xxvii,68,74,93humanrightsdutiesof,xx,xxv,xxix,xxx–xxxii,xxxiii,xlii,xliv,xlv,38,39,40–42,43,47,49,51,52,58,60,62–63,79,82,83–90,102,107–12,116–17,124,125,126,131,169,171,172,186,202

humanrightsinstitutionsin,103humanrightsnorms’application to,xvi,xvii,xviii,61,64;seealso Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework

humanrightsviolationsby,12,13,15,16,17,27,29,30,31,34,35,84,110–11,146,162,193

ILOinvolvementof,42,46individualinterestsof,xviii,xxiiNormsopposedby,54–55preventativemeasuresby,xlv,2,84,85–89,111–12Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework’squestioningby,89Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework’sreceptionby,80,82,90,101,106socialexpectationsof,45treatieseffectivenessin,61,63,64UNGuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,xxi,88,107,125,126,169,177,181,202UNmandate’ssupportby,xlvii,55,58,152,156–57,158,162

weakgovernanceby,xvi,xxiii,xxvi,xxxi,xxxv,xxxix,9,28,48,61,63,91,170;seealsoconflictzones;governancegaps

Western,lawsuitsagainst,185seealsohomestates;hoststates

states,emerging-market:CSRpracticesin,xxvii,18,76,93IFCconditionson,162internationalinvestmentin,177investmentagreementswith,184–85multinationalsin,xxvii,18,58viewsof,170

subsidiaries,51legalstatusof,xxxiii,xliv,7,8,9,17,34,170,188

Sudan,humanrightsviolationsin,xxx,30–31SudanNationalPetroleumCorporation,210Sullivan,Kathleen,194,224Sullivan,Leon,69supplychains:humanrightsviolationsin,5,6,17,26,27,34,98,106,174,216inminingindustry,123monitoringof,xxvi,6,17,69–70,73,75,76–77,122,147,177,206proliferationof,6varyingstandardsin,73,76

SupremeCourt,U.S.,xxxiii,5,43,192,193,194–95,197,198,200Sweden:CSRreportingin,134humanrightsprotectionin,60UNmandateinvolvementof,142

Switzerland,157UNGuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,178

Taiwan,outsourcingin,3TalismanEnergy,30–31,210Taylor,Mark,123technologyindustry:laborpracticesin,1,174UNGuidingPrinciples’uptakein,154,174,177–78

seealsoInternetTesco,76,154TransparencyInternationalCorruptionPerceptionsIndex,28,180treaties,55–68advocacygroups’favoringof,xxii,56effectivenessof,60–62enforcementof,xxxi–xxxii,xxxix,39,41–42,43,44–45,57,62–65functionof,55,56limitationsof,xxii–xxiii,xxxi–xxxii,xxxix,38,40–42,47,57–60,67,81,130UKviewon,89seealsobilateral investment treaties;UnitedNations,InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsof;UnitedNations,InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsof;internationallaw;UnitedNations,humanrightstreatiesin

treatybodies,xxxi,39,45,63–64,84,85,131

UNGuidingPrinciples,xxiv,106–26,173buildingon,182–92,199conflictzoneapplicationof,123,147,152,156–57consultationson,142,143corporate responsibilitiesunder, 112–16,124,125,126,161,162,169,172,174,175,176,202

extraterritorialityconceptsin,141framingof,xliii–xlvi,124–25goalsof,78,79,81,83grievancemechanismsreportin,155HumanRightsCouncil’s endorsementof, xx,xxi, xlv,xlviii, xlix,107,117,119,120,128,157–59,172,202

implementationof,173–82,199,202investmentcontractguidelinesin,137normativecompatibilityin,67,108–9,124,126,127,167,202Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework’sincorporationin,82,83reactionsto,119–23remediesincorporatedin,116–19,125,126,172roadtestingof,151–57statedutiesunder,107–12,116–17,124,125,126,169,172,202uptakeof,xxi–xxii,xxiv,xlv–xlvi,88,107,120,121–23,125–26,151,154–

55,158,159–67,169,172,173–82,187,199,202,221UNICEF,178Unilever,152UnionCarbide,6,7,8UnitedKingdom:corporatecriminalprosectionsin,47,198corporatelawin,134internationallawviewpointof,89Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework’sacceptanceby,106UNGuidingPrinciples’implementationin,174UNmandateinvolvementof,xlvii,157

UnitedNations,74,119,142,187Annan’svisionof,xviii–xixConventionAgainstCorruptionof,199,200Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination AgainstWomen(CEDAW)of,41,215

ConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilitiesof,215ConventionontheRightsoftheChildof,214GenocideConventionof,44humanrightsmachineryof,80,148;seealsohumanrightsregimehumanrightstreatiesin,xxix,xxxix,39,44,56,84,224International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of RacialDiscriminationof,40,215

InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)of,xxix,19,40,44,214

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)of,xxix,19,40,41,44–45,215

multinationalconductregulationeffortsby,xvii,xlix;seealsoNormson theResponsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other BusinessEnterprises with Regard to Human Rights; Protect, Respect and RemedyFramework

nationalhumanrightsinstitutionsstandardsin,103OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRightsof,50,173processlegitimacyin,141–42,143,148Sub-CommissiononthePromotionandProtectionofHumanRightsof,xvii,48,188

UNGuidingPrinciples’disseminationthrough,173

UnitedNationsCommissiononHumanRights:Normspositionof,xvii,47–48,53specialmandatein,xviii,xix,36,37,54,97,98;seealsoProtect,RespectandRemedyFramework

seealsoUnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncilUnitedNationsCommissiononInternationalTradeLaw(UNCITRAL),149,150

UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly:developmentdeclarationin,214egregiousconductcategoriesin,42ILCreportto,65indigenouspeoplesdeclarationin,xxiiimandatereportsin,xlviii,112UniversalDeclaration’sadoptionby,xxix

UnitedNationsGlobalCompact,xxvii–xxviii,5,49–50,70,72,76,92,178–79,209

UnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncil:policyprioritiesin,88,89Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’s welcoming by, xx, xlviii, 105,132,133

resourcesof,xlvi–xlviispecialmandatein,xlvi,xlvii,xlviii,77,78,89,126,128,131,137,140,142,143, 146, 148, 157–59, 162; see also Protect, Respect and RemedyFramework

UNGuiding Principles’ endorsement by, xx, xxi, xlv, xlviii, xlix, 107, 117,119,120,128,157–59,172,202

UNGuidingPrinciplesworkinggroupin,173,178,181,199,200seealsoUnitedNationsCommissiononHumanRights

UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil:DRCpanelin,31,32–33ICCprosecutionsreferredby,xxxmineralsexploitationresolutionin,123

UnitedNationsspecialmandate,xviii,xix,xlvi–l,36,37,97,98,105,129–41,170,199,202advisorygroupon,148,219businessinvolvementin,55,71,92,133,142,143–45,151,158inCommissiononHumanRights,xviii,xix,36,37,54,97,98

corporatelawfirmsinvolvedin,133,150–51inHumanRightsCouncil,xlvi,xlvii, xlviii, 77,78,89,126,128,131,137,140,142,143,146,148,157–59,162

processlegitimacyin,141–48roadtestingin,151–57stakeholderinvolvementin,xli,132,142,143,145–47,148–51,152,158,173stateinvolvementin,xlvii,55,58,105,119–20,142,143,152,156–57,158,162

strategicpathsof,xxiv,128–69see also business/human rights agenda; Protect, Respect and RemedyFramework

UnitedStates:bilateralinvestmenttreatieswith,183,185corporatecriminalliabilityin,190–91,199CSRinitiativesin,73,74,75humanrightslawsuitsin,xxxii,xxxiii,6,7,8,9,12,13–14,17,29,30,31,34,43,192–97

multinationalconductpolicyin,xlMyanmarinvestmentstandardsin,179Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework’squestioningby,89,145rightsrecognizedby,xxxi–xxxxii,73sociallyresponsibleinvestingin,134UNGuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,179UNmandateinvolvementof,157

UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals,8UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,xxix,19,39–40,46,48,72,92Unocal,xxxii–xxxiiiU.S.ChamberofCommerce,199U.S.CouncilforInternationalBusiness,145,161utilitiesindustry,humanrightsviolationsby,26,66

Vietnam,outsourcingin,4VoluntaryPrinciplesonSecurityandHumanRights,70,181,187Wachtell,Lipton,Rosen&Katz,132Walde,Thomas,183–84,223Walmart,73,76,93Weil,Gotshal&Manges,133

WethePeoples,xviii–xixWiwav.Shell,12,13–14,192,193women:internationalstandardson,96seealsogenderequality

workers’organizations:CSRinitiativesinvolving,74Guidelines’criticismby,160ILOinvolvementof,42,46Protect,RespectandRemedyFramework’sacceptanceby,106UNGuidingPrinciples’uptakeby,xxi,120,178,181UNmandateinvolvementof,147seealsoInternationalLabourOrganization

WorldBank,xxxiv,10,28,162InternationalCentreforSettlementofInvestmentDisputesof,149policyprioritiesin,88,89seealsoInternationalFinanceCorporation

WorldLegalForum,156WorldResourcesInstitute,137WorldTradeOrganization(WTO),4,183policyprioritiesin,88

XstrataCoal,154

Yahoo,xxiv,14–16,18,178,208Yanacocha,Minas,xxxvi,xxxvii,138Yang,Jerry,15,16Yar’Adua,Umaru,11

Zadek,Simon,3,5,34ZijinMiningGroup,18Zoellick,Robert,162

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