Amy Coplan Review

8/17/2019 Amy Coplan Review

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www.methodejournal.org

Review of:

Empathy. Philosophical and

Psychological Perspectives

A. COPLAN – P. GOLDIE ( EDS.)

[Oxford University Press, New York, 2011

pp. 382, ISBN 978-01-995-3995-6, $ 99,00.]

Sarah Songhorian

CeSEP, Center for Public Ethics Studies,Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan.

[email protected]

Invited Review

Keywords: Philosophy of Art,

Danto, Hegel, Arti-

facts

Pages: 217 – 230

1 Introduction

As the subtitle of the book edited in 2011 by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie

well expresses, the content of the collection is an attempt to provide a portrait of

the current debate both in the philosophical literature and in the psychological

one. The concept of empathy is actually at the center of different discussion

within the contemporary debate and the book is an excellent example of theinterdisciplinary research that it can entail. As Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie

underline in their bright Introduction:

[. . . ] empathy has, since at least the seminal work of David Hume and Adam Smith,

been seen as centrally important in at least two respects. First, it has been seen

important in relation to our capacity to gain a grasp of the content of other people’s

minds, and to predict and explain what they think, feel, and do. And, secondly, it

has been seen important in relation to our capacity to respond to other’s ethically –

enabling us not only to gain a grasp of the other’s suffering, but also to respond in

an ethically appropriate way. [. . . ] A third respect in which empathy has been seen

as important – one which owes less to the work of Hume and Smith – is in relationto our engagement with works of art (Coplan, Goldie, Introduction, p. IX).

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According to these three lines of investigation, they divide the collection into

three sections: Empathy and Mind , Empathy and Aesthetics, and Empathy and Moral-

ity. Each section contains six original essays by distinct contemporary researchers.

Before analyzing in more detail the three sections, I would like to give some

space to the Introduction itself. After defining the three areas of investigation,

Coplan and Goldie proceed to focus on the history of the concept of empathy.

First of all, they analyze the philosophical traditions that had dealt with the

empathy, sympathy, and their related phenomena. In the paragraph dedicated to

David Hume (1711-1776) and Adam Smith (1723-1790), Coplan and Goldie intro-

duce an internal distinction within the concept of empathy that would be used

throughout their Introduction and would be an useful tool to interpret the essays

too: the distinction between low-level empathy and high-level one.

[. . . ] Hume seems to have been describing a psychological mechanism that enables

the fast and instantaneous spread of emotion. And thus it seems that the process he

referred to as sympathy is the same or at least very similar to what we will call low-

level empathy or mirroring (Coplan, Goldie, Introduction, p. XI).

Regardless of whether sympathy for Smith is self- or other-oriented, it is usually de-

scribed as a high-level process involving an imaginative component (Coplan, Goldie,

Introduction, p. XI).

The difference between low-level empathy and high-level one lies in the engage-

ment of imaginative and cognitive processing. Low-level empathy, or mirroring,is an automatic mechanism that enables us to mirror other’s emotional reactions,

while high-level empathy engages an imaginative component and some more com-

plex cognitive processes. The other distinction that Coplan and Goldie introduce

is that between self-oriented and other-oriented perspective-taking, that is deeply

discussed in the first essay of Empathy and Mind by Coplan.

The historical account continues with the discussion of the work of Theodor

Lipps (1851-1914). The main focus, concerning Lipps work and its criticisms, re-

gards the relevance of the processes of inner imitation (simulation) of movements

and expressions that entail certain emotional reaction and of projection of one’sown emotional reactions onto the other. Lipps work is particularly relevant also as

far as empathy’s contribution in the perception of aesthetic objects is concerned.

In Phenomenology and Hermeneutics the editors start underlining in particular

the criticisms moved by the phenomenological tradition – Edmund Husserl (1859-

1938), Edith Stein (1891-1942), and Max Scheler (1974-1928) – to Theodor Lipps,

providing just a reference to the idea that:

[. . . ] empathy is a unique mode of consciousness through which we directly expe-

rience other’s thoughts, emotions and desires; it enables us to experience others as

‘minded’ (Coplan, Goldie, Introduction, p. XIII).

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A first criticism to the volume deals with the little space that had been reserved,

both in the Introduction and in the essays, to an account of embodied empathy

that considers the empathic reaction as a sui generis perception (Scheler 1923), or a

“special kind of perception” (Ingarden 1994).

In the paragraph about Clinical Psychology the focus is on the relevance of em-

pathy within a therapeutic relationship, in particular in the work of Heinz Kohut

(1913-1981).

The last two paragraphs of the historical reconnaissance concern two research

fields of recent born: Developmental and Social Psychology started to be interested

in this topic around the 1960s and Care Ethics was developed in the 1980s.

For what regards the first research field, different research programs were estab-

lished.

Some of the most influential focused on (1) constructing objective scales to study

empathy, (2) the development of empathy and related processes in the individual, (3)

empathy’s role in pro-social and altruistic behavior, (4) empathic accuracy, and (5)

gender differences in emphatic responding (Coplan, Goldie, Introduction, p. XXII).

References for this field are extensive. For the second, the work of Michael

Slote is widely considered.

The last two sections regard the development of the studies of empathy within

neuroscience and ethology (with particular reference to the works of Frans de

Waal). The studies of neuroscience focus on the discovery of the mirror neuron

system – leading to a simulationist’s interpretation of empathy.

2 Empathy and Mind

Focusing now on the essays themselves, the first section – namely, Empathy and

Mind – contains six original essays. The first one – “Understanding Empathy: Its

Features and Effects” by Amy Coplan – aims at proposing:

A narrow conceptualization of empathy informed by recent psychological and neuro-

scientific research. Although I am in favor of restricting the use of the term empathyto the high-level process I’ll describe, my concern is less with terminology than with

clarifying the essential features of the process.

[. . . ] Under my proposed conceptualization, empathy is a complex imaginative pro-

cess in which an observer simulates another person’s situated psychological states

while maintaining clear self-other differentiation (Coplan, p. 5).

So, in Coplan’s proposal, empathy is:

(a) a complex process;

(b ) imaginative;

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(c) entails the simulation of someone else’s states;

(d) regards any psychological state of a situated person;

(e) entails the self-other differentiation.

On the one hand, while I do agree with the aim of the article and I strongly

believe that, regarding empathy “we need more specificity, not more generality”

(Coplan, p. 5), I don’t agree with the high-level definition of empathy. I believe

we should start by analyzing the very minimal phenomena and not a complex one

that is likely to be confused with the concept of sympathy.

On the other hand, the article is particularly interesting for its aim, as I al-

ready said, for the amount of references, the interaction between psychological and

neuroscientific studies and conceptual analysis, and for the distinction betweenself-oriented and other-oriented perspective-taking we have mentioned above.

Derek Matravers in his “Empathy as a Route to Knowledge” focuses on the role

of empathy for what regards our capacity to know of other’s mental states and to

understand unfamiliar mental states. In order to achieve his goal, Matravers defines

empathy as:

An imaginative endeavour that results in us having the same type of feeling or emotion

as the other person [. . . ]. Hence, I draw a distinction between empathy and the

broader phenomenon of our ability to recognize other creatures as minded creatures

(Matravers, pp. 19-20).

The article aims at answering three different questions:

– whether empathy can provide us the right content;

– if it can entail the knowledge of feelings we haven’t previously experienced;

– and, what can empathy teach us.

In the third essay, “Two Routes to Empathy: Insights from Cognitive Neuro-

science”, Alvin Goldman discusses De Vignemont and Singer’s definition of empa-

thy:

There is empathy if: (i ) one is in an affective state; ( ii) this state is isomorphic to

another person’s affective state; (iii) this state is elicited by the observation or imagi-

nation of another person’s affective state (De Vignemont, Singer 2006, p. 435).

He raises some very interesting questions and objections to this first attempt of

definition stemming from recent psychological and neuroscientific results. And he

concludes his first paragraph saying that:

These preliminary comments should alert the reader to the fact that different writ-

ers and researchers exhibit different approaches to empathy. In addition, however,research findings can contribute to an understanding of how empathy is produced.

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Is there exactly one route to empathy, that is, one cognitive system – or one type of

cognitive system – that produces empathy, or is there more than one? How exactly

does this system, or these systems, work? What different consequences might ensue

as upshots of different modes of empathizing? (Goldman, pp. 32-33).

Goldman distinguishes two different routes of empathy: the mirroring one

and the reconstructive route. This distinction is the equivalent of the one between

low-level and high-level empathy. The entire article deals with this distinction and

with the different neural circuits that are involved in both phenomena, with par-

ticular attention for mirror neurons. The following chapter also deals with mirror

neurons and the physiological basis of empathy. Marco Iacoboni, in his “Within

Each Other: Neural Mechanisms for Empathy in the Primate Brain”, provides a

detailed account of the discoveries related to mirror neurons in the macaque brain

and in the human brain. Since mirror neurons are more widespread in humans

than previously thought, Iacoboni suggests:

[. . . ] a very sophisticated neural system that may support complex forms of min-

dreading and empathizing. Thus, while it has been proposed that mirror neurons and

mirroring may be critical for low-level forms of mindreading and empathy; but not

for high level forms (Goldman (2006a)), the new data make it entirely plausible that

high-level mindreading may also be based on neural mirroring (Iacoboni, pp. 55-56).

“Empathy, Imitation, and the Social Brain” by Jean Decety and Andrew N.

Meltzoff aims at bringing together:

findings from developmental science and cognitive neuroscience on imitation and em-

pathy. We place imitation within this larger framework, and it is also proposed to be

grounded in shared motor representations between self and other (Meltzoff & Decety

(2003)) as well as regulated by executive functions (Decety (2006a)) ( Decety, Meltzoff,

p. 58).

The authors claim that empathy and imitation are linked and they provide a

great amount of data in order to prove it.

The last contribution of the first section is “Empathy for Objects” by Gregory

Currie, that aims at providing a more inclusive account of empathy: not only for

co-specifics, but for objects too. This last essay constitutes a turning point from

the first section to the second one that considers the relations between empathy

and aesthetics.

Curries focuses on empathy and bodily simulation, takes the example of visual

arts and argues in favor of an aesthetics based on empathy.

3 Empathy and Aesthetics

The second part – Empathy and Aesthetics – deals with the role of empathy in our

understanding of works of art.

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Murray Smith in “Empathy, Expansionism, and the Extended Mind” defines

empathy as an high-level process and relates it to the extended mind hypothesis.

A number of points can be made in defence of the claim that empathy (along with itsrelatives) plays a significant role in our apprehension of fictions and other narratives

(Smith, p. 113).

In “An Empathic Eye” Dominic McIver Lopes investigates the role of empathy

in seeing pictures and the possibility of a development of empathy through that

kind of empathic response.

[. . . ] empathy also comes from what you see in pictures: many paintings, drawings,

prints, and photographs evoke empathy and are designed to do so. Going further,

it seems that episodes of empathy triggered by pictures can help build up a person’s

capacity for empathic response. Indeed, they do so by fortifying the link betweenseeing and empathy in a distinct way (Lopes, p. 118).

Lopes link empathy to sight and underlines the possibility to develop the em-

pathic skill through exercise and he focuses on the expressive power of pictures.

This link between empathy and sents a difference as compared with previous con-

tributions focusing more on simulation theory.

The third essay, by Stephen Davies, focuses on the emotional contagion en-

tailed by music.

So, in “Infectious Music: Music-Listener Emotional Contagion”, the author

underlines that:

those who are saddened by sad music are not sad about or for the music (Davies, p.

136).

The relevance of this contribution, at least from my perspective, is that of

considering emotional contagion as a basic form of empathic response.

Susan L. Feagin, in the next chapter – “Empathizing as Simulating” – focuses

on a simulation account of empathy for literary characters (Feagin, p. 149).

In “On Some Affective Relations between Audiences and the Characters in

Popular Fictions”, Noël Carroll considers different ways in which we engage withfictional characters’ emotional states. He avoids the term empathy, trying to pro-

vide further distinctions within emotional engagement. He distinguishes between

identification, coincident emotional state, vectorially converging states, sympathy,

solidarity, and mirror reflexes. The introduction of such different – yet related –

phenomena constitutes a very interesting point of view, not only for what regards

fictional characters’ emotional engagement, but also for the other two sections of

the collection, namely Empathy and Mind and Empathy and Morality.

The last essay of this section: “Empathy: Interpersonal vs Artistic?” by Gra-

ham McFee, focuses on the comparison between empathy for people and empathyfor works of art.

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I have followed a path from my own experience of what might seem a hyper-empathic

reading by considering whether a comparison with interpersonal empathy is likely to

be revealing in respect of the empathic reading of fictions [. . . ]. And, concluding that

(at least) empathic reading of fictions was not likely to be the norm, I have shownhow some of the material from psychology that might seem to support such a reading

cannot offer the promised help. Further, I have suggested that the peculiarities of the

artistic case (here, the novel) require an account all of its own, if at all (McFee, pp.

207-208).

4 Empathy and Morality

The last section of the volume – Empathy and Morality – deals with the relation

between empathy, sympathy, and moral theories. The difference between empathy

and sympathy, according to Coplan and Goldie’s Introduction, is the one between“feeling the suffering of another person, and feeling for that person’s suffering”

(Coplan, Goldie, p. XLIII). The general idea is that empathy is not sufficient for

morality, since it does not entail a moral motivation. The counterexample of the

empathic torturer reveals that fact. The first essay of the section, by Jesse Prinz,

asks the question: “Is Empathy Neccesary for Morality?”. The author avoids def-

initions of empathy that entail some degree of concern for others and normative

feelings, that is, those that tell us how the other should , or ought , to feel. These

definitions are too close to that of sympathy and do not allow for distinction. Jesse

Prinz defines empathy as:a kind of vicarious emotion: it’s feeling what one takes another person to be feeling

(Prinz, p. 213).

It seems that there is little role for empathy within morality as far as moral judg-

ment, moral development, moral conduct, and moral motivation are concerned.

He also underlines the limitations of empathy.

At this point, we can draw an initial conclusion: empathy probably isn’t necessary for

morality in any of the senses that I have been considering. But that does not mean em-

pathy plays no role in morality. Presumably it does. Presumably empathy can induce

moral judgment, factor into moral development, and facilitates moral motivation. Itprobably plays all these roles to some degree. I have tried to suggest that the degree

may be limited. That is a descriptive claim. One might think that this claim is un-

interesting from the perspective of ethical theory. The question that really matters is

normative, not descriptive. Even if empathy does not play a central role in morality,

perhaps it could. Should we, then, try to increase the role for empathy in morality?

Should we cultivate moral systems that are based on empathy? (Prinz, p. 221).

Martin L. Hoffman, in the second essay – “Empathy, Justice, and the Law” –

provides an overview of an empathy theory. He uses a broad sense of empathy and

underlines its role as a motive and in development, and the modes of its arousal. He

then proceeds by analyzing both empathy’s contribution to law and some examplesof cases in which individual’s empathy helped change laws.

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He also underlines empathy’s limitations and biases. Besides them, he con-

cludes that empathy certainly plays a role in law, in making and in changing them,

as well as in the practice of implementing laws in courtrooms.

“Empathy and Trauma Culture: Imaging Catastrophe” by E. Ann Kaplan fo-

cuses on the role of empathy in witnessing a traumatic event by means of media’s

interaction. Kaplan proposes three kind of empathic responses to catastrophic im-

ages:

(a) secondary or vicarious trauma [. . . ]; ( b) a response I call ‘empty empathy’ [. . . ];

and finally (c) what I call ‘witnessing’ – a response that may change the viewer in

a positive pro-social manner, and that, more than the first two types of response,

involves ethics (Kaplan, p. 256).

Heather D. Battaly asks “Is Empathy a Virtue?”. The answer to this question

depends on which concept of empathy and of virtue we adopt and on the com-

bination of the two. The author very precisely proceeds in providing different

conceptual analysis both of empathy and of virtue. For what regards empathy,

I identify four different concepts of empathy: (1) empathy as caring, and/or sharing,

and/or knowing; (2) empathy as sharing by multiple means; (3) empathy as sharing

and knowing; and (4) empathy as knowing by multiple means (Battaly, p. 278).

After some very interesting pages, the author concludes:

[. . . ] I have argued that empathy as construed by concepts (2), ( 3), and (4) is neither a

moral nor an intellectual virtue. If it is voluntary (concepts (3 ) and (4)) and reliable, it

is a skill. If it is involuntary (concepts 2), it is a capacity. Briefly, does this demonstratethat we should reject our leading theoretical concepts of empathy? Not necessarily.

[. . . ] I have argued that empathy as construed by concepts (2), ( 3), and (4) is neither a

moral nor an intellectual virtue. If it is voluntary (concepts (3 ) and (4)) and reliable, it

is a skill. If it is involuntary (concepts 2), it is a capacity. Briefly, does this demonstrate

that we should reject our leading theoretical concepts of empathy? Not necessarily.

Peter Goldie’s “Anti-Empathy” focuses on a particular definition of high-level

empathy:

Very roughly speaking, what I am against is what I will call empathic perspective-

shifting : consciously and intentionally shifting your perspective in order to imagine

being the other person, and thereby sharing in his or her thoughts, feelings, decisions,

and other aspects of their psychology. I am not against what I will call in-his-shoes

perspective-shifting : consciously and intentionally shifting your perspective in order to

image what thoughts, feelings, decisions, and so on you would arrive at if you were in

the other’s circumstances (Goldie, p. 302).

He usefully distinguishes between empathy as outcome and empathy as process

(Goldie, p. 303) and, then, proceeds to the analysis of base cases of perspective-

shifting and more complex ones. The last essay by Adam Morton – “Empathy for

the Devil” – investigates the possibility and the extent of empathy for evil acts. The

author interprets morality as a possible barrier to empathic response towards evilagents.

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In conclusion, he leaves us with a nice dilemma. On the one hand, we want empathy

with evil-doers to be as easy as possible, exploiting the psychological continuities that

Morton discusses. And on the other hand, we want to ‘keep a distance between us

and those we despise’ (p. 330) (Coplan, Goldie, p. XLVII).

5 Conclusions

In conclusion, the work done by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie is particularly

relevant because they were able to draw together different perspectives and original

and relevant essays in a growing field.

The amount of literature quoted and the different aspects of the matter ana-

lyzed make it a touchstone for everyone interested in the concept or the applica-

tions of empathy. As I have tried to show throughout this review, there are justa few little flaws − that are unfortunately link to the topic itself. The first one is

that there is not a clear and common definition of the concept of empathy. Dif-

ferent essays and different authors keep using terminology in idiosyncratic ways,

thus not allowing true comparison between different theories or approaches. It is

certainly true that this defect is strongly linked with all the history of the concept,

but an attempt to provide some common ground, particularly in such a precise and

interesting volume, would have been useful to the research itself.

The second, and more limited, defect regards the little space that had been

granted to a perceptual account of empathy. It is mentioned in the essay by Lopesand in the Introduction when treating Theodor Lipps and the phenomenological

tradition, but it has not been at the center of a proper discussion. Simulation

theory is generally taken almost for granted, as if empathy can only be a matter of

simulation and no further explanation is needed.

So, besides the relevancy and the interest of the volume edited by Amy Coplan

and Peter Goldie, there is still much work to do as far as empathy is concerned.

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