1. INTRODUCTIONThe rise of technology in India has brought into force many types of equipment that aim at more

customer satisfaction. ATM is one such machine which made money transactions easy for

customers to bank. The other side of this improvement is the enhancement of the culprit’s

probability to get his ‘unauthentic’ share. Traditionally, security is handled by requiring the

combination of a physical access card and a PIN or other password in order to access a

customer’s account. This model invites fraudulent attempts through stolen cards, badly-chosen or

automatically assigned PINs, cards with little or no encryption schemes, employees with access

to non-encrypted customer account information and other points of failure. Our paper proposes

an automatic teller machine security model that would combine a physical access card, a PIN,

and electronic facial recognition. By forcing the ATM to match a live image of a customer’s face

with an image stored in a bank database that is associated with the account number, the damage

to be caused by stolen cards and PINs is effectively neutralized. Only when the PIN matches the

account and the live image and stored image match would a user be considered fully verified. A

system can examine just the eyes, or the eyes nose and mouth, or ears, nose, mouth and

eyebrows, and so on. In this paper, we will also look into an automatic teller machine security

model providing the customers a cardless, password-free way to get their money out of an ATM.

Just step up to the camera while your eye is scanned. The iris -- the colored part of the eye the

camera will be checking -- is unique to every person, more so than fingerprints.

2. ATM SYSTEMSOur ATM system would only attempt to match two (and later, a few) discrete images, searching

through a large database of possible matching candidates would be unnecessary. The process

would effectively become an exercise in pattern matching, which would not require a great deal

of time. With appropriate lighting and robust learning software, slight variations could be

accounted for in most cases. Further, a positive visual match would cause the live image to be

stored in the database so that future transactions would have a broader base from which to

compare if the original account image fails to provide a match – thereby decreasing false

negatives. When a match is made with the PIN but not the images, the bank could limit

transactions in a manner agreed upon by the customer when the account was opened, and could

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store the image of the user for later examination by bank officials. In regards to bank employees

gaining access to customer PINs for use in fraudulent transactions, this system would likewise

reduce that threat to exposure to the low limit imposed by the bank and agreed to by the

customer on visually unverifiable transactions. In the case of credit card use at ATMs, such a

verification system would not currently be feasible without creating an overhaul for the entire

credit card issuing industry, but it is possible that positive results (read: significant fraud

reduction) achieved by this system might motivate such an overhaul.

The last consideration is that consumers may be wary of the privacy concerns raised by

maintaining images of customers in a bank database, encrypted or otherwise, due to possible

hacking attempts or employee misuse. However, one could argue that having the image

compromised by a third party would have far less dire consequences than the account

information itself. Furthermore, since nearly all ATMs videotape customers engaging in

transactions, it is no broad leap to realize that banks already build an archive of their customer

images, even if they are not necessarily grouped with account information.

3. HISTORYThe first ATMs were off-line machines, meaning money was not automatically withdrawn from

an account. The bank accounts were not (at that time) connected by a computer network to the

ATM. Therefore, banks were at first very exclusive about who they gave ATM privileges to.

Giving them only to credit card holders (credit cards were used before ATM cards) with good

banking records. In modern ATMs, customers authenticate themselves by using a plastic card

with a magnetic stripe, which encodes the customer's account number, and by entering a numeric

pass code called a PIN (personal identification number), which in some cases may be changed

using the machine. Typically, if the number is entered incorrectly several times in a row, most

ATMs will retain the card as a security precaution to prevent an unauthorized user from working

out the PIN by pure guesswork..

4. HARDWARE AND SOFTWAREATMs contain secure crypto processors, generally within an IBM PC compatible host computer

in a secure enclosure. The security of the machine relies mostly on the integrity of the secure

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crypto processor: the host software often runs on a commodity operating system.In-store ATMs

typically connect directly to their ATM Transaction Processor via a modem over a dedicated

telephone line, although the move towards Internet connections is under way.

In addition, ATMs are moving away from custom circuit boards (most of which are based on

Intel 8086 architecture) and into full-fledged PCs with commodity operating systems such as

Windows 2000 and Linux. An example of this is Banrisul, the largest bank in the South of

Brazil, which has replaced the MS-DOS operating systems in its automatic teller machines with

Linux. Other platforms include RMX 86, OS/2 and Windows 98 bundled with Java. The newest

ATMs use Windows XP or Windows XP embedded.

FIG. 4.1 CRYPTO PROCESSORS

5.RELIABILITYATMs are generally reliable, but if they do go wrong customers will be left without cash until the

following morning or whenever they can get to the bank during opening hours. Of course, not all

errors are to the detriment of customers; there have been cases of machines giving out money

without debiting the account, or giving out higher value notes as a result of incorrect

denomination of banknote being loaded in the money cassettes. Errors that can occur may be

mechanical (such as card transport mechanisms; keypads; hard disk failures); software (such as

operating system; device driver; application); communications; or purely down to operator error.

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FIG. ATM CAPTURE PRESSES

6. SECURITYEarly ATM security focused on making the ATMs invulnerable to physical attack; they were

effectively safes with dispenser mechanisms. ATMs are placed not only near banks, but also in

locations such as malls, grocery stores, and restaurants. The other side of this improvement is the

enhancement of the culprit’s probability to get his ‘unauthentic’ share.

ATMs are a quick and convenient way to get cash. They are also public and visible, so it pays to

be careful when you're making transactions. Follow these general tips for your personal safety.

Stay alert. If an ATM is housed in an enclosed area, shut the entry door completely behind you.

If you drive up to an ATM, keep your car doors locked and an eye on your surroundings. If you

feel uneasy or sense something may be wrong while you're at an ATM, particularly at night or

when you're alone, leave the area.

Keep you PIN confidential. Memorize your Personal Identification Number (PIN); don't write

it on your card or leave it in your wallet or purse. Keep your number to yourself. Never provide

your PIN over the telephone, even if a caller identifies himself as a bank employee or police

officer. Neither person would call you to obtain your number.

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Conduct transactions in private. Stay squarely in front of the ATM when completing your

transaction so people waiting behind you won't have an opportunity to see your PIN being

entered or to view any

account information. Similarly, fill out your deposit/withdrawal slips privately.

Don’t flash your cash . If you must count your money, do it at the ATM, and place your cash

into your wallet or purse before stepping away. Avoid making excessively large withdrawals. If

you think you're being followed as you leave the ATM, go to a public area near other people

and, if necessary, ask for help.

Save receipt. Your ATM receipts provide a record of your transactions that you can later

reconcile with your monthly bank statement. If you notice any discrepancies on your statement,

contact your bank as soon as possible. Leaving receipts at an ATM can also let others know how

much money you've withdrawn and how much you have in your account.

Guard your card. Don't lend your card or provide your PIN to others, or discuss your bank

account with friendly strangers. If your card is lost or stolen, contact your bank immediately.

Immediately report any crime to the police. Contact the Department Of Public Security or

your local police station for more personal safety information.

FIG. 6. ATM BANKING PROSSES

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7 .FACIAL RECOGNITIONThe main issues faced in developing such a model are keeping the time elapsed in the

verification process to a negligible amount, allowing for an appropriate level of variation in

a customer’s face when compared to the database image, and that credit cards which can be

used at ATMs to withdraw funds are generally issued by institutions that do not have in-

person contact with the customer, and hence no opportunity to acquire a photo.

Because the system would only attempt to match two (and later, a few) discrete images,

searching through a large database of possible matching candidates would be unnecessary.

The process would effectively become an exercise in pattern matching, which would not

require a great deal of time. With appropriate lighting and robust learning software, slight

variations could be accounted for in most cases. Further, a positive visual match would

cause the live image to be stored in the database so that future transactions would have a

broader base from which to compare if the original account image fails to provide a match –

thereby decreasing false negatives.

When a match is made with the PIN but not the images, the bank could limit transactions

in a manner agreed upon by the customer when the account was opened, and could store

the image of the user for later examination by bank officials. In regards to bank

employees gaining access to customer PINs for use in fraudulent transactions, this system

would likewise reduce that threat to exposure to the low limit imposed by the bank and

agreed to by the customer on visually unverifiable transactions.

In the case of credit card use at ATMs, such a verification system would not currently be

feasible without creating an overhaul for the entire credit card issuing industry, but it is

possible that positive results (read: significant fraud reduction) achieved by this system

might motivate such an overhaul

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FIG.7.1 FACIAL RECOGNITION

The last consideration is that consumers may be wary of the privacy concerns raised by

maintaining images of customers in a bank database, encrypted or otherwise, due to possible

hacking attempts or employee misuse. However, one could argue that having the image

compromised by a third party would have far less dire consequences than the account

information itself. Furthermore, since nearly all ATMs videotape customers engaging in

transactions, it is no broad leap to realize that banks already build an archive of their customer

images, even if they are not necessarily grouped with account information.

7.1 FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNIQUE:There are hundreds of proposed and actual implementations of facial recognition technology

from all manner of vendors for all manner of uses. However, for the model proposed in this

paper, we are interested only in the process of facial verification – matching a live image to a

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predefined image to verify a claim of identity – not in the process of facial evaluation – matching

a live image to any image in a database. Further, the environmental conditions under which the

verification takes place – the lighting, the imaging system, the image profile, and the processing

environment – would all be controlled within certain narrow limits, making hugely robust

software unnecessary .

One leading facial recognition algorithm class is called image template based. This

method attempts to capture global features of facial images into facial templates. What

must be taken into account, though, are certain key factors that may change across live

images: illumination, expression, and pose (profile.)

Fig. 7.1 FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNIQUE

The conclusion to be drawn for this project, then, is that facial verification software is

currently up to the task of providing high match The natural conclusion to draw, then, is to take a

frontal image for the bank database, and to provide a prompt to the user, verbal or otherwise, to

face the camera directly when the ATM verification process is to begin, so as to avoid the need

to account for profile changes.

With this and other accommodations, recognition rates for verification can rise above 90%.

A system can examine just the eyes, or the eyes nose and mouth, or ears, nose, mouth and

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eyebrows, and so on rates for use in ATM transactions. What remains is to find an appropriate

open-source local feature analysis facial verification program that can be used on a variety of

platforms, including embedded processors, and to determine behavior protocols for the match /

non-match cases

7.2 IRIS RECOGNITION:Inspite of all these security features, a new technology has been developed. Bank United of

Texas became the first in the United States to offer iris recognition technology at automatic teller

machines, providing the customers a cardless, password-free way to get their money out of an

ATM. There's no card to show, there's no fingers to ink, no customer inconvenience or

discomfort. It's just a photograph of a Bank United customer's eyes. Just step up to the camera

while your eye is scanned. The iris -- the colored part of the eye the camera will be checking -- is

unique to every person, more so than fingerprints. And, for the customers who can't remember

their personal identification number or password and scratch it on the back of their cards or

somewhere that a potential thief can find, no more fear of having an account cleaned out if the

card is lost or stolen.

FIG. 7.3 IRIS RECOGNITION

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7.3 HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS.

When a customer puts in a bankcard, a stereo camera locates the face, finds the eye and

takes a digital image of the iris at a distanceof up to three feet. The resulting

computerized "iris code" is compared with one the customer will initially provide the

bank. The ATM won't work if the two codes don't match. The entire process takes less

than two seconds.

The system works equally well with customers wearing glasses or contact lenses and at night.

No special lighting is needed. The camera also does not use any kind of beam. Instead, a special

lens has been developed that will not only blow up the image of the iris, but provide more detail

when it does. Iris scans are much more accurate than other high-tech ID systems available that

scan voices, faces and fingerprints.

FIG. ATM SYSTEM WORKS

compared with about 40 for fingerprints -- and it remains constant through a person's life, unlike

a voice or a face. Fingerprint and hand patterns can be changed through alteration or injury. The

iris is the best part of the eye to use as a identifier because there are no known diseases of the iris

and eye surgery is not performed on the iris. Iris identification is the most secure, robust and

stable form of identification known to man. It is far safer, faster, more secure and accurate than

DNA testing. Even identical twins do not have identical irises. The iris remains the same from

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18 months after birth until five minutes after death.

When the system is fully operational, a bank customer will have an iris record made for

comparison when an account is opened. The bank will have the option of identifying either the

left or right eye or both. It requires no intervention by the customer. They will simply get a letter

telling them they no longer have to use the PIN number. And, scam artists beware, a picture of

the card holder won't pass muster. The first thing the camera will check is whether the eye is

pulsating. If we don't see blood flowing through your eye, you're either dead or it's a picture.

8 SOFTWARE SPECIFICATIONFor most of the past ten years, the majority of ATMs used worldwide ran under IBM’s now-

defunct OS/2. However, IBM hasn’t issued a major update to the operating system in over six

years. Movement in the banking world is now going in two directions: Windows and Linux.

NCR, a leading world-wide ATM manufacturer, recently announced an agreement to use

Windows XP Embedded in its next generation of personalized ATMs Windows XP Embedded

allows OEMs to pick and choose from the thousands of components that make up Windows XP

Professional, including integrated multimedia, networking and database management

functionality. This makes the use of off-the-shelf facial recognition code more desirable

because it could easily be compiled for the Windows XP environment and the networking and

database tools will already be in place.

Many financial institutions are relying on Windows NT, because of its stability and maturity as

a platform. The ATMs send database requests to bank servers which do the bulk of transaction

processing (linux.org.) This model would also work well for the proposed system if the ATMs

processors were not powerful enough to quickly perform the facial recognition algorithms.

9 LITERATURE REVIEWFor most of the past ten years, the majority of ATMs used worldwide ran under IBM’s now-

defunct OS/2. However, IBM hasn’t issued a major update to the operating system in over six

years. Movement in the banking world is now going in two directions: Windows and Linux.

NCR, a leading world-wide ATM manufacturer, recently announced an agreement to use

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Windows XP Embedded in its next generation of personalized ATMs Windows XP Embedded

allows OEMs to pick and choose from the thousands of components that make up Windows XP

Professional, including integrated multimedia, networking and database management

functionality. This makes the use of off-the-shelf facial recognition code more desirable because

it could easily be compiled for the Windows XP environment and the networking and database

tools will already be in place. For less powerful ATMs, KAL, a software development company

based in Scotland, provides Kalignite CE, which is a modification of the Windows CE platform.

This allows developers that target older machines to more easily develop complex user-

interaction systems . Many financial institutions are relying on a third choice, Windows NT,

because of its stability and maturity as a platform. On an alternative front, the largest bank in the

south of Brazil, Banrisul, has installed a custom version of Linux in its set of two thousand

ATMs, replacing legacy MS-DOS systems. The ATMs send database requests to bank servers

which do the bulk of transaction processing (linux.org.) This model would also work well for the

proposed system if the ATMs processors were not powerful enough to quickly perform the facial

recognition algorithms. In terms of the improvement of security standards, MasterCard is

spearheading an effort to heighten the encryption used at ATMs. For the past few decades, many

machines have used the Data Encryption Standard developed by IBM in the mid 1970s that uses

a 56-bit key. DES has

been shown to be rather easily cracked, however, given proper computing hardware. In recent

years, a “Triple DES” scheme has been put forth that uses three such keys, for an effective 168-

bit key length. MasterCard now requires new or relocated ATMs to use the Triple DES scheme,

and by April, 2005, both Visa and MasterCard will require that any ATM that supports their

cards must use Triple DES.

ATM manufacturers are now developing newer models that support Triple DES natively;

such redesigns may make them more amenable to also including snapshot cameras and facial

recognition software, more so than they would be in regards to retrofitting pre-existing machines

. There are hundreds of proposed and actual implementations of facial recognition technology

from all manner of vendors for all manner of uses. However, for the model proposed in this

paper, we are interested only in the process of facial verification – matching a live image to a

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predefined image to verify a claim of identity – not in the process of facial evaluation – matching

a live image to any image in a database. Further, the environmental conditions under which the

verification takes place – the lighting, the imaging system.

10 METHODOLOGYThe first and most important step of this project will be to locate a powerful open-source facial

recognition program that uses local feature analysis and that is targeted at facial verification.

This program should be compilable on multiple systems, including Linux and Windows variants,

and should be customizable to the extent of allowing for variations in processing power of the

machines onto which it would be deployed.

We will then need to familiarize ourselves with the internal workings of the program so that

we can learn its strengths and limitations. Simple testing of this program will also need to occur

so that we could evaluate its effectiveness. Several sample images will be taken of several

individuals to be used as test cases – one each for “account” images, and several each for “live”

images, each of which would vary pose, lighting conditions, and expressions.

Once a final program is chosen, we will develop a simple ATM black box program. This

program will serve as the theoretical ATM with which the facial recognition software will

interact. It will take in a name and password, and then look in a folder for an image that is

associated with that name. It will then take in an image from a separate folder of “live” images

and use the facial recognition program to generate a match level between the two. Finally it

will use the match level to decide whether or not to allow “access”, at which point it will

terminate. All of this will be necessary, of course, because we will not have access to an actual

ATM or its software.

Both pieces of software will be compiled and run on a Windows XP and a Linux system. Once

they are both functioning properly, they will be tweaked as much as possible to increase

performance (decreasing the time spent matching) and to decrease memory footprint.

Following that, the black boxes will be broken into two components – a server and a client – to

be used in a two-machine network. The client code will act as a user interface, passing all input

data to the server code, which will handle the calls to the facial recognition software, further

reducing the memory footprint and processor load required on the client end. In this sense, the

thin client architecture of many ATMs will be emulated.

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We will then investigate the process of using the black box program to control a USB camera

attached to the computer to avoid the use of the folder of “live” images. Lastly, it may be

possible to add some sort of DES encryption to the client end to encrypt the input data and

decrypt the output data from the server – knowing that this will increase the processor load, but

better allowing us to gauge the time it takes to process.

11.AUTOMATED TELLER MACHINEAn automated teller machine or automatic teller machine". (ATM) An automated teller

machine or automatic teller machine". (ATM (American, Australian, Singaporean, Indian,

and Hiberno-English), also known as an automated banking machine (ABM) (Canadian

English), cash machine, cashpoint, cashline or hole in the wall (British, South African, and Sri

Lankan English), is an electronic telecommunications device that enables the clients of

a financial institution to perform financial transactions without the need for a cashier, human

clerk or bank teller. On most modern ATMs, the customer is identified by inserting a

plastic ATM card with a magnetic stripe or a plastic smart card with a chipthat contains a unique

card number and some security information such as an expiration date or CVVC (CVV).

Authentication is provided by the customer entering a personal identification number (PIN). The

newest ATM at Royal Bank of Scotland allows customers to withdraw cash up to £100 without a

card by inputting a six-digit code requested through their smartphones

FIG .11.1 AN NCR PERSONAS 75-SERIES INTERIOR, MULTI-FUNCTION ATM IN THE UNITED

STATES

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Using an ATM, customers can access their bank accounts in order to make cash withdrawals,

get debit card cash advances, and check their account balances as well as purchase pre-paid

mobile phone credit. If the currency being withdrawn from the ATM is different from that which

the bank account is denominated in (e.g.: Withdrawing Japanese yen from a bank account

containing US dollars), the money will be converted at an official wholesale exchange rate.

Thus, ATMs often provide one of the best possible official exchange rates for foreign travellers,

and are also widely used for this purpose.

11.1 EtymologyJust like the word 'account' can be traced back to 'count' or 'counting', the word 'teller' can be

traced back to counting as well. The Roman word 'count' (French compter, Italiancontare,

Spanish contar, and that also resurfaces in the word compute) has its Germanic counterpart

in tellen (Dutch) and zählen (German). Linked to this word is also the verb 'to pay', which in

Dutch is 'betalen', and in German 'bezahlen'. The word 'teller' therefore refers to both 'someone

(something) counting' and 'someone (something) paying out'.

The same pair of 'count' and 'tell' are seen in English with 'recounting a story' or 'telling a story'

having the same meaning, albeit with a different coloration. To recount (count again) is 'her-

tellen' in Dutch and 'erzählen' in German.

11.2 HistoryThe idea of self-service in retail banking developed through independent and simultaneous

efforts in Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. In the US patent

record, Luther George Simjian has been credited with developing a "prior art device".

Specifically his 132nd patent (US3079603) was first filed on 30 June 1960 (and granted 26

February 1963). The roll-out of this machine, called Bankograph, was delayed by a couple of

years, due in part to Simjian's Reflectone Electronics Inc. being acquired by Universal Match

Corporation. An experimental Bankograph was installed in New York City in 1961 by the City

Bank of New York, but removed after six months due to the lack of customer acceptance. The

Bankograph was an automated envelope deposit machine (accepting coins, cash and cheques)

and did not have cash dispensing features. In simultaneous and independent efforts, engineers in

Japan, Sweden, and Britain developed their own cash machines during the early 1960s. The first

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of these that was put into use was by Barclays Bank in Enfield Town in North London, United

Kingdom,  on 27 June 1967. This machine was the first in the UK and was used by English

comedy actor Reg Varney, at the time so as to ensure maximum publicity for the machines that

were to become mainstream in the UK. This instance of the invention has been wrongly credited

to John Shepherd-Barron of printing firm De La Rue, who was awarded an OBE in the 2005

New Year Honours. This design used paper cheques issued by a teller, marked with carbon-

14 for machine readability and security, that were matched with a personal identification

number.

FIG.11.1 AN OLD NIXDORF ATM

The Barclays-De La Rue machine (called De La Rue Automatic Cash System or DACS)[14] beat

the Swedish saving banks' and a company called Metior's machine (a device called Bankomat)

by a mere nine days and Westminster Bank’s-Smith Industries-Chubb system (called Chubb

MD2) by a month. The collaboration of a small start-up called Speytec and Midland

Bank developed a third machine which was marketed after 1969 in Europe and the USA by

the Burroughs Corporation. The patent for this device (GB1329964) was filed on September

1969 (and granted in 1973) by John David Edwards, Leonard Perkins, John Henry Donald, Peter

Lee Chappell, Sean Benjamin Newcombe & Malcom David Roe.

Both the DACS and MD2 accepted only a single-use token or voucher which was retained by the

machine while the Speytec worked with a card with a magnetic strip at the back. They used

principles including Carbon-14 and low-coercivity magnetism in order to make fraud more

difficult. The idea of a PIN stored on the card was developed by a British engineer working on

the MD2 named James Goodfellow in 1965 (patent GB1197183 filed on 2 May 1966 with

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Anthony Davies). The essence of this system was that it enabled the verification of the customer

with the debited account without human intervention. This patent is also the earliest instance of a

complete “currency dispenser system” in the patent record. This patent was filed on 5 March

1968 in the USA (US 3543904) and granted on 1 December 1970. It had a profound influence on

the industry as a whole. Not only did future entrants into the cash dispenser market such as NCR

Corporation and IBM licence Goodfellow’s PIN system, but a number of later patents reference

this patent as “Prior Art Device”.

 FIG 11.2 1969 ABC NEWS REPORT ON THE INTRODUCTION OF ATMS IN SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA.

PEOPLE COULD ONLY RECEIVE $25 AT A TIME AND THE BANK CARD WAS SENT BACK TO THE

USER AT A LATER DATE.

11.2 Hardware

FIG 11.3 A BLOCK DIAGRAM OF AN ATM

An ATM is typically made up of the following devices:

CPU (to control the user interface and transaction devices)

Magnetic or chip card reader (to identify the customer)

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PIN pad EEP4 (similar in layout to a touch tone or calculator keypad), manufactured as part

of a secure enclosure

Secure cryptoprocessor, generally within a secure enclosure

Display (used by the customer for performing the transaction)

Function key buttons (usually close to the display) or a touchscreen (used to select the

various aspects of the transaction)

Record printer (to provide the customer with a record of the transaction)

Vault (to store the parts of the machinery requiring restricted access)

Housing (for aesthetics and to attach signage to)

Sensors and indicators

Due to heavier computing demands and the falling price of personal computer-like architectures,

ATMs have moved away from custom hardware architectures

using microcontrollers or application-specific integrated circuits and have adopted the hardware

architecture of a personal computer, such as USB connections for peripherals, Ethernet and IP

communications, and use personal computer operating systems. Although it is undoubtedly

cheaper to use commercial off-the-shelf hardware, it does make ATMs potentially vulnerable to

the same sort of problems exhibited by conventional personal computers. Business owners often

lease ATM terminals from ATM service providers, however based on the economies of scale, the

price of equipment has dropped to the point where many business owners are simply paying for

ATMs using a credit card. New ADA voice and text-to-speech guidelines imposed in 2010, but

required by March 2012  have forced many ATM owners to either upgrade non-compliant

machines or dispose them if they are not up-gradable, and purchase new compliant equipment.

This has created an avenue for hackers and thieves to obtain ATM hardware at junkyards from

improperly disposed decommissioned ATMs.

The vault of an ATM is within the footprint of the device itself and is where items of value are

kept. Scrip cash dispensers do not incorporate a vault.

Mechanisms found inside the vault may include:

Dispensing mechanism (to provide cash or other items of value)

Deposit mechanism including a check processing module and bulk note acceptor (to allow

the customer to make deposits)

Security sensors (magnetic, thermal, seismic, gas)

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Locks (to ensure controlled access to the contents of the vault)

Journaling systems; many are electronic (a sealed flash memory device based on in-house

standards) or a solid-state device (an actual printer) which accrues all records of activity

including access timestamps, number of notes dispensed, etc. This is considered sensitive

data and is secured in similar fashion to the cash as it is a similar liability.

Fig. 11.4 Two Loomis employees refilling an ATM at the Downtown Seattle REI

ATM vaults are supplied by manufacturers in several grades. Factors influencing vault grade

selection include cost, weight, regulatory requirements, ATM type, operator risk avoidance

practices and internal volume requirements. Industry standard vault configurations

includeUnderwriters Laboratories UL-291 "Business Hours" and Level 1 Safes, RAL TL-30

derivatives, and CEN EN 1143-1 - CEN III and CEN IV.

ATM manufacturers recommend that an ATM vault be attached to the floor to prevent theft,

though there is a record of a theft conducted by tunnelling into an ATM floor.

11.3 SoftwareWith the migration to commodity Personal Computer hardware, standard commercial "off-the-

shelf" operating systems, and programming environments can be used inside of ATMs. Typical

platforms previously used in ATM development include RMX or OS/2.

Today the vast majority of ATMs worldwide use a Microsoft Windows operating system,

primarily Windows XP Professional or Windows XP Embedded.[citation needed] A small number of

deployments may still be running older versions of Windows OS such as Windows NT,Windows

CE, or Windows 2000.

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FIG 11.5 A WINCOR NIXDORF ATM RUNNINGWINDOWS 2000.

There is a computer industry security view that general public desktop operating systems have

greater risks as operating systems for cash dispensing machines than other types of operating

systems like (secure) real-time operating systems (RTOS). RISKS Digest has many articles

about cash machine operating system vulnerabilities. Linux is also finding some reception in the

ATM marketplace. An example of this is Banrisul, the largest bank in the south of Brazil, which

has replaced the MS-DOS operating systems in its ATMs with Linux. Banco do Brasil is also

migrating ATMs to Linux. Indian-based Vortex Engineering is Manufacturing ATM's which

operates only with Linux. Common application layer transaction protocols, such as Diebold 91x

(911 or 912) and NCR NDC or NDC+ provide emulation of older generations of hardware on

newer platforms with incremental extensions made over time to address new capabilities,

although companies like NCR continuously improve these protocols issuing newer versions (e.g.

NCR's AANDC v3.x.y, where x.y are subversions). Most major ATM manufacturers provide

software packages that implement these protocols. Newer protocols such as IFX have yet to find

wide acceptance by transaction processors.

With the move to a more standardised software base, financial institutions have been

increasingly interested in the ability to pick and choose the application programs that drive their

equipment. WOSA/XFS, now known as CEN XFS (or simply XFS), provides a common API for

accessing and manipulating the various devices of an ATM. J/XFS is a Java implementation of

the CEN XFS API.

While the perceived benefit of XFS is similar to the Java's "Write once, run anywhere" mantra,

often different ATM hardware vendors have different interpretations of the XFS standard. The

result of these differences in interpretation means that ATM applications typically use

a middleware to even out the differences between various platforms.

20

With the onset of Windows operating systems and XFS on ATM's, the software applications

have the ability to become more intelligent. This has created a new breed of ATM applications

commonly referred to as programmable applications. These types of applications allows for an

entirely new host of applications in which the ATM terminal can do more than only

communicate with the ATM switch. It is now empowered to connected to other content servers

and video banking systems. Notable ATM software that operates on XFS platforms include

Triton PRISM, Diebold Agilis EmPower, NCR APTRA Edge, Absolute

Systems AbsoluteINTERACT, KAL Kalignite Software Platform, Phoenix Interactive

VISTAatm, Wincor Nixdorf ProTopas and Euronet EFTS.

With the move of ATMs to industry-standard computing environments, concern has risen about

the integrity of the ATM's software stack.

11.6 SecuritySecurity, as it relates to ATMs, has several dimensions. ATMs also provide a practical

demonstration of a number of security systems and concepts operating together and how various

security concerns are dealt with.

Physical

FIG.11.6 A WINCOR NIXDORF PROCASH 2100XE FRONTLOAD THAT WAS OPENED WITH

AN ANGLE GRINDER

Early ATM security focused on making the ATMs invulnerable to physical attack; they were

effectively safes with dispenser mechanisms. A number of attacks on ATMs resulted, with

thieves attempting to steal entire ATMs by ram-raiding.  Since late 1990s, criminal groups

operating in Japan improved ram-raiding by stealing and using a truck loaded with a heavy

21

construction machinery to effectively demolish or uproot an entire ATM and any housing to steal

its cash.[

Another attack method, plofkraak, is to seal all openings of the ATM with silicone and fill the

vault with a combustible gas or to place an explosive inside, attached, or near the ATM. This gas

or explosive is ignited and the vault is opened or distorted by the force of the resulting explosion

and the criminals can break in  This type of theft has occurred in

the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany and Australia. This type of attacks can be

prevented by a number of gas explosion prevention devices also known as gas suppression

system. These systems use explosive gas detection sensor to detect explosive gas and to

neutralise it by releasing a special explosion suppression chemical which changes the

composition of the explosive gas and renders it ineffective.

Several attacks in the UK (at least one of which was successful) have emulated the traditional

WW2 escape from POW camps by digging a concealed tunnel under the ATM and cutting

through the reinforced base to remove the money.

Modern ATM physical security, per other modern money-handling security, concentrates on

denying the use of the money inside the machine to a thief, by using different types of Intelligent

Banknote Neutralisation Systems.

A common method is to simply rob the staff filling the machine with money. To avoid this, the

schedule for filling them is kept secret, varying and random. The money is often kept in

cassettes, which will dye the money if incorrectly opened.

Transactional secrecy and integrity

FIG 11.7 A TRITON BRAND ATM WITH A DIP STYLE CARD READER AND A TRIPLE DES KEYPAD

The security of ATM transactions relies mostly on the integrity of the secure cryptoprocessor:

the ATM often uses general commodity components that sometimes are not considered to be

"trusted systems".

22

Encryption of personal information, required by law in many jurisdictions, is used to prevent

fraud. Sensitive data in ATM transactions are usually encrypted with DES, but transaction

processors now usually require the use of Triple DES.[50] Remote Key Loading techniques may

be used to ensure the secrecy of the initialisation of the encryption keys in the ATM. Message

Authentication Code (MAC) or Partial MAC may also be used to ensure messages have not been

tampered with while in transit between the ATM and the financial network. In some countries a

system has been developed that if the ATM card holder is told to withdraw the cash forcefully by

the thief then if he entered his card password starting from the last digit to the first digit then the

alarm will sound in the nearest police station

Customer identity integrity

FIG 11.8 A BTMU ATM WITH A PALM SCANNER(TO THE RIGHT OF THE SCREEN)

There have also been a number of incidents of fraud by Man-in-the-middle attacks, where

criminals have attached fake keypads or card readers to existing machines. These have then been

used to record customers' PINs and bank card information in order to gain unauthorised access to

their accounts. Various ATM manufacturers have put in place countermeasures to protect the

equipment they manufacture from these threats.[51][52]

Alternative methods to verify cardholder identities have been tested and deployed in some

countries, such as finger and palm vein patterns,[53] iris, and facial recognition technologies.

Cheaper mass-produced equipment has been developed and is being installed in machines

globally that detect the presence of foreign objects on the front of ATMs, current tests have

shown 99% detection success for all types of skimming devices.[54]

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Device operation integrity

FIG 11.9 ATMS THAT ARE EXPOSED TO THE OUTSIDE MUST BE VANDAL AND WEATHER

RESISTANT

Openings on the customer-side of ATMs are often covered by mechanical shutters to prevent

tampering with the mechanisms when they are not in use. Alarm sensors are placed inside the

ATM and in ATM servicing areas to alert their operators when doors have been opened by

unauthorised personnel.

Rules are usually set by the government or ATM operating body that dictate what happens when

integrity systems fail. Depending on the jurisdiction, a bank may or may not be liable when an

attempt is made to dispense a customer's money from an ATM and the money either gets outside

of the ATM's vault, or was exposed in a non-secure fashion, or they are unable to determine the

state of the money after a failed transaction. Customers often commented that it is difficult to

recover money lost in this way, but this is often complicated by the policies regarding suspicious

activities typical of the criminal element.[

Customer security

FG 11.9 DUNBAR ARMORED ATM TECHS WATCHING OVER ATMS THAT HAVE BEEN

INSTALLED IN A VAN

24

In some countries, multiple security cameras and security guards are a common feature.[57] In

the United States, The New York State Comptroller's Office has advised the New York State

Department of Banking to have more thorough safety inspections of ATMs in high crime areas.

Consultants of ATM operators assert that the issue of customer security should have more focus

by the banking industry;  it has been suggested that efforts are now more concentrated on the

preventive measure of deterrent legislation than on the problem of ongoing forced withdrawals.

At least as far back as July 30, 1986, consultants of the industry have advised for the adoption of

an emergency PIN system for ATMs, where the user is able to send a silent alarm in response to

a threat. Legislative efforts to require an emergency PIN system have appeared

in Illinois, Kansas and Georgia,  but none have succeeded yet. In January 2009, Senate Bill 1355

was proposed in the Illinois Senate that revisits the issue of the reverse emergency PIN

system. The bill is again supported by the police and denied by the banking lobby.

In 1998 three towns outside the Cleveland, Ohio, in response to an ATM crime wave, adopted

ATM Consumer Security Legislation requiring that an emergency telephone number switch be

installed at all outside ATMs within their jurisdiction. In the wake of an ATM Murder in Sharon

Hill, Pennsylvania, The City Council of Sharon Hill passed an ATM Consumer Security Bill as

well. As of July 2009, ATM Consumer Security Legislation is currently pending in New York,

New Jersey, and Washington D.C.

In China and elsewhere, many efforts to promote security have been made. On-premises ATMs

are often located inside the bank's lobby which may be accessible 24 hours a day. These lobbies

have extensive security camera coverage, a courtesy telephone for consulting with the bank staff,

and a security guard on the premises. Bank lobbies that are not guarded 24 hours a day may also

have secure doors that can only be opened from outside by swiping the bank card against a wall-

mounted scanner, allowing the bank to identify which card enters the building. Most ATMs will

also display on-screen safety warnings and may also be fitted with convex mirrors above the

display allowing the user to see what is happening behind them.

As of 2013, the only claim available about the extent of ATM connected homicides is that they

range from 500 to 1000 nationwide, covering only cases where the victim had an ATM card and

the card was used by the killer after the known time of death.

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Alternative uses

FIG 11.10 TWO NCR PERSONAS 84 ATMS AT ABANK IN JERSEY DISPENSING TWO TYPES

OFPOUND STERLING BANKNOTES: BANK OF ENGLAND NOTES ON THE LEFT, AND STATES OF

JERSEY NOTES ON THE RIGHT

Although ATMs were originally developed as just cash dispensers, they have evolved to include

many other bank-related functions. In some countries, especially those which benefit from a fully

integrated cross-bank ATM network (e.g.: Multibanco in Portugal), ATMs include many

functions which are not directly related to the management of one's own bank account, such as:

Deposit currency recognition, acceptance, and recycling[68][69]

Paying routine bills, fees, and taxes (utilities, phone bills, social security, legal fees, taxes,

etc.)

Printing bank statements

Updating passbooks

Loading monetary value into stored value cards

Adding pre-paid cell phone / mobile phone credit.

Purchasing

Postage stamps.

Lottery tickets

Train tickets

Concert tickets

Movie tickets

Shopping mall gift certificates.

Gold[70]

Games and promotional features[71]

Cash advances

CRM at the ATM

Donating to charities[72]

26

Cheque Processing Module

Paying (in full or partially) the credit balance on a card linked to a specific current account.

Transferring money between linked accounts (such as transferring between checking and

savings accounts)

Increasingly banks are seeking to use the ATM as a sales device to deliver pre approved loans

and targeted advertising using products such as ITM (the Intelligent Teller Machine) from Aptra

Relate from NCR. ATMs can also act as an advertising channel for companies to advertise their

own products or third-party products and services.

In Canada, ATMs are called guichets automatiques in French and sometimes "Bank Machines"

in English. The Interac shared cash network does not allow for the selling of goods from ATMs

due to specific security requirements for PIN entry when buying goods. CIBC machines in

Canada, are able to top-up the minutes on certain pay as you go phones.

FIG 11.11 A SOUTH KOREAN ATM WITH MOBILE BANK PORT AND BAR CODE READER

Manufacturers have demonstrated and have deployed several different technologies on ATMs

that have not yet reached worldwide acceptance, such as:

Videoconferencing with human tellers, known as video tellers[

Biometrics, where authorisation of transactions is based on the scanning of a customer's

fingerprint, iris, face, etc.

27

Cheque/Cash Acceptance, where the ATM accepts and recognise cheques and/or currency

without using envelopes Expected to grow in importance in the US through Check

21 legislation.

Bar code scanning

On-demand printing of "items of value" (such as movie tickets, traveler's cheques, etc.)

Dispensing additional media (such as phone cards)

Co-ordination of ATMs with mobile phones

Customer-specific advertising

Integration with non-banking equipment

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12. CONCLUSIONWe thus develop an ATM model that is more reliable in providing security by using facial

recognition software. By keeping the time elapsed in the verification process to a negligible

amount we even try to maintain the efficiency of this ATM system to a greater degree. One could

argue that having the image compromised by a third party would have far less dire consequences

than the account information itself. Furthermore, since nearly all ATMs videotape customers

engaging in transactions, it is no broad leap to realize that banks already build an archive of their

customer images, even if they are not necessarily grouped with account information.

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