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An Efficient and Secure RFID Security Method with Ownership Transfer. Authors: Kyosuke Osaka, Tsuyoshi Takagi, Kenichi Yamazaki, Osamu Takahashi Source: Computational Intelligence and Security, 2006 International Conference on Presenter: Hsin-Ruey Tsai. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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AN EFFICIENT AND SECURE RFID SECURITY METHOD WITH OWNERSHIP TRANSFER
Authors: Kyosuke Osaka, Tsuyoshi Takagi, Kenichi Yamazaki, Osamu TakahashiSource: Computational Intelligence and Security, 2006 International Conference on Presenter: Hsin-Ruey Tsai
FIVE REQUIREMENTS 1. Indistinguishability
2. Forward security
3. Resistance against replay attack
4. Resistance against tag killing
5. Ownership transferability
INDISTINGUISHABILITY No adversary can distinguish output from
RFID tags.
FORWARD SECURITY Even if present data on RFID tags are leaked
to an adversary, past data still remain secure.
No tamper resistance
RESISTANCE AGAINST REPLAY ATTACK
No adversary can succeed in a replay attack that spoofs a legitimate RFID tag.
RESISTANCE AGAINST TAG KILLING
RFID tags shall be resistant against a large number of incoming queries.
no additional memoryno upper limit
OWNERSHIP TRANSFERABILITY
Ownership is transferable without violation of previous and present RFID tag owner’s privacy.
ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS SCHEMES
Challenge–Response Type Schemes
Ohkubo Type Schemes
Other Type Schemes
HASH LOCK SCHEME 03
RANDOMIZED HASH LOCK SCHEME
HASH-BASED ID VARIATION SCHEME 04
THE RKKW SCHEME 05
KANG–NYANG’S SCHEME 05
OHKUBO SCHEME
MODIFIED OHKUBO SCHEME
UNIDENTIFIABLE ANONYMOUS ID SCHEME
OWNER CHANGE SCHEME 05
PROPOSED METHOD The protocol of the proposed method consists
of:
• A writing process
• An authentication process
• An ownership transfer process
PROPOSED METHOD
INDISTINGUISHABILITY
FS & RA Because of updated by changing symmetric
key. Even if Eki (ID) is leaked to the adversary, neither the ID nor Ekj (ID) leaks to the adversary, where i > j. Unless the ID is leaked, the encryption function E satisfies the one-wayness. This means that the adversary cannot compute Ek j (ID) from Eki(ID) unless the ID is leaked.
TK & OT 1. Tags require no additional memory for
storing random numbers each reading a tag. 2. Tags have no upper limit of reading tags
1. A protocol to be able to securely change an
owner’s key used for encryption is built into
the RFID system. 2. Owners can change their key at any time..
EFFICIENCY OF PROPOSED METHOD