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Introduction
• Single-firm conduct is the most challenging area of antitrust analysis. – Primary challenge is distinguishing
predation/foreclosure (bad) from intense competition (good)
– Overly aggressive intervention can discourage intense competition, with high costs to society
• Goals of this talk– To identify and discuss key questions of economic
theory in the context of existing legal rules re: predation
– Review economics of actual cases related to predation
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Outline of Talk
I. Unified theory vs. single firm “boxes”
II. Predation: classic story and its critique
III.Predation: modern game theoretic analysis
IV. Legal tests
V. Recent cases3
Is There Unified Theory of Single Firm Conduct?
• Not in practice. Some possibilities that have been floated:– “No economic sense” test– “Equally efficient competitor” test– Welfare test
• But, none of these are perfect, and there is no consensus on a single framework
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Some Legal “Boxes” For Single Firm Conduct (In US)
• Price Predation: Price below cost + recoupment
• Tying: In the United States, “per se illegal.” In practice, structured rule of reason
• Refusals to deal: US DOJ advocates “no economic sense” test in Trinko brief, some of which is adopted by Supreme Court
• Bundling: “Ortho test” of bundling as effective predation
• Exclusive dealing: Extent of “market access”5
Price Predation: “Classic” Story
• Dominant firm prices product very low with the express purpose of driving competitors out of business
• Dominant firm outlasts competitors during loss period (“long purse”). Once competitors exit, predator raises price to recoup losses and make extra profits
• Consumer and total welfare harmed
• But does this make sense…?6
Critique of Classic Story
• Predator, with larger market share and capturing even more with low prices, should incur more losses than prey
• Financial markets should be willing to fund prey for this reason. Prey can “wait it out.”
• Consumer inventory behavior: won’t consumers stock up in the predatory period and make recouping losses more difficult?
• Selten’s “chain store paradox”: Predatory strategy unwinds via backwards induction from final period
• For critiques, see, e.g., Easterbrook (Chicago Law Review 1981), McGee (JLE 1958)
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“Post-Chicago” View
• Predation may be more targeted, and therefore less costly, than Chicago view assumes
• Chicago view assumes complete information, no principal-agent problems
• Under incomplete information on various dimensions, predation can be a rational strategy
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Predation As “Signaling”
• Predation signals efficient incumbent or aggressive posture; incomplete information means that this costly signal may induce exit/lack of entry and ultimately be profitable– Kreps and Wilson (Journal of Economic Theory
1982)– Milgrom and Roberts (Econometrica 1982)
• Also, “signal-jamming” predation; “test market” predation
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Predation as Exploitation of Principal-Agent Problems
• Bolton-Scharfstein (AER, 1990)
• Basic logic: a bank will not give a firm unconditional funding, due to principal-agent problems in financing
• Predation leads to poor firm performance which leads to a cutback in external financing, which may lead to exit
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What is a “Principal-Agent” Problem?
• A broad category of contract design problems in which one party, the "principal," writes a contract to induce another party, "the agent," to achieve some outcome he likes.
• For instance, owners of a firm want to write a contract to induce managers to maximize profits. One might think that the optimal solution to this problem is simply to write a contract that says: “if you achieve x profit, the maximum possible, you are compensated with y dollars, otherwise you get zero.” Problem with this contract is future uncertainty. Who knows if x profit is achievable? Suppose the agent does everything right and still doesn't achieve x profit? Why would the agent sign such a contract?
• Problems arise due to hidden actions and hidden information that manifest themselves after the contract is written.
• Generally, principal agent problems highlight inefficiencies due to an inability to write what is called a "complete contingent contract," a contract that specifies payoffs depending on all possible states of the world
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Bolton/Scharfstein Model of Predation
• Two firms, A & B. B depends on external financing• Two periods with possible profit realizations π1 (low)
and π2 (high) each period.• Firms incur fixed cost F each period• B and financier sign contract at time zero that
specifies period 1 payment and probability of period 2 financing as a function of period 1 reported profits
• Optimal contract terminates period 2 financing upon low reported period 1 profits
• Possibility of predation changes optimal contract, and predation still sometimes occurs in equilibrium
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Where Are We Now?
• Consensus that welfare-reducing predation can happen
• Semi-consensus that classic price predation is probably rare and difficult to identify
• Difficulties in identification, and balancing type I vs. type II errors, lead courts to rely on price-cost tests + recoupment criteria
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Legal Test
• Brooke Group Test in US, other jurisdictions use similar criteria
• Part 1: Finding Price Below Cost
• Part 2: Finding Likelihood of Future Recoupment of Losses
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Price-Cost Tests
• Areeda-Turner test (P<AVC presumptively illegal)
• Bolton, Baumol test (P<AIC presumptively illegal)
• Joskow-Klevorick test (P<ATC presumptively illegal)
• Problem is that none of these is either necessary or sufficient for harm from predation
• Areeda-Turner probably most popular in United States
• EC Article 82 Discussion Paper advocates P<AAC presumption of predation. AAC<P<ATC, may be predation but no presumption
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Price
Profits Profit-Maximizing
Price
P=ATCP=AIC
P=AVC
Price-Cost Tests (2)
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Problems with Price-Cost Tests
• Price below even marginal cost not always predatory– Introductory prices to promote consumer learning– Two-sided markets: price below “cost” on one
side of market may be efficient– Network effects/scale economies may make below
cost pricing efficient during initial periods
• Price above cost may be predatory in some sense if strategy involves profit sacrifice and recoupment
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Recoupment Criterion
• Are market conditions susceptible to recouping losses?– Entry barriers– Few firms left to reap profits– Inelastic demand
• Is this a market structure screen? Or a test for consumer harm?
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US v. American Airlines (2001)• American’s response to low-cost carrier (LCC) entry at its
Dallas hub (DFW) is low fares and more capacity. This is good for consumers on these routes in the short-run. Is this competition or exclusion?
• US Says that American Airlines has monopoly power on many DFW routes. Alleges predation on 8 nonstop city-pair routes out of DFW against LCC’s Vanguard, Sunjet and Western Pacific.
• Says American Airlines matched lower fares of some entrant LCCs and expanded capacity in an attempt to drive competitors from DFW and establish a “reputation” for predation
• Capacity increases were alleged to be beyond what would have made economic sense, but for competitor exit. – Internal memos from American made this argument– Government’s economic expert Professor Barry reached the same
conclusion
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AMERICAN AIRLINES PRICING AND CAPACITY ON DALLAS ROUTES BEFORE,
DURING AND AFTER PREDATORY PERIODS
DFW-ICT
DFW-MCI
DFW-COS
US v. American Airlines (cont.)
• DOJ advances four price-cost tests that the various route-episodes fail
• Tests 1 and 4 compare incremental costs and benefits of capacity additions, assuming constant price (essentially: is p<AIC for capacity expansion); Tests 2 and 3 measure overall profitability of route after capacity additions, including allocated overhead costs.
• American Airlines, in contrast, emphasizes price vs. short-run AVC, more narrowly defined (not including overall plane costs, for example)
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Decision: US v. American Airlines
• Court rules for American in Summary Judgment phase– Focusing on American’s cost measure, rules that
American’s price was “above cost,” and thus fails Brooke Group test
– Says that straightforward comparison of price to AVC on a route is the appropriate test for price predation, and there is no separate test for “capacity predation”
– In addition, rules that American would be entitled to summary judgement regardless because it never undercut competitors’ prices
• US appeals but fails to overturn decision25
Conclusion
• Lack of clear economic (and legal) consensus about how to judge predation, exclusionary acts
• Extreme care is required in prosecuting, since these “bad acts” (e.g., low prices, new marketing strategies) are hard to distinguish from intense competition, which antitrust laws are expressly designed to encourage
• Articulating clear standards is important for consistency, continued evolution of thinking
• Nevertheless, narrow focus on particular price-cost tests could miss instances of predatory behaviour
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Some References• Motta, Massimo, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press,
2004 (in particular Section 7.2: “Predatory Pricing.”)• DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to
exclusionary abuses (Brussels, December 2005)• Easterbrook, F. (1981). “Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies,” University of
Chicago Law Review 48:263-337.• Kreps, D. and R.Wilson, 1982, “Reputation and Imperfect Information,” Journal of
Economic Theory 27: 253-279.• Bolton, G. and D. Scharfstein, 1990, “A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in
Financial Contracting,” American Economic Review, 80: 93-106.• Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, 1982, “Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence.”Journal of
Economic Theory 27: 280-312.• David Genesove & Wallace Mullin, 2006, “Predation and its Rate of Return: The Sugar
Industry 1887-1914,” RAND Journal of Economics 37(1): 47-69.• Scott Morton, F, 1997 “Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929.” Journal
of Economics and Management Strategy 6:679-724.• Jung, Y.J. , J. Kagel,and D. Levin, 1994, "On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An
Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game," RAND Journal of Economics 25(1): 72-93 .
• United States of America v. AMR Corporation, American Airlines, Inc., and American Eagle Holding Corporation. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (2001).
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