An objective analysis of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary Strategic Review.pdf

8/17/2019 An objective analysis of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary Strategic Review.pdf

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An objective analysis of the Metropolitan

Special Constabulary Strategic Review

March 2016


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An objective analysis of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary Strategic Review

Aims

This analysis will systematically review information provided in the Metropolitan Special

Constabulary Strategic Review.

Statistical analyses will be made on Home Office statistics regarding workforce sizes of all 43 special

constabularies and the joiner/leaver figures since 2010.

Statements made in the strategic review regarding the strength and attrition of the Metropolitan Special

Constabulary (MSC) will be compared to this data to identify any trends and how the MSC ranks compared

to other constabularies.

A statistical analysis will also be made of the performance and productivity data provided in the review

An overview of findings will be summarised in the Executive Summary. A more in-depth analysis and

discussion, as well as evidence of the supporting statistics, will be presented in the objective analysis.

Terms

National Workforce – the total number of

special constables throughout all 43

constabularies

Net Gain – A percentage of special constables

gained by a constabulary relative to their total

workforce.

Abbreviations

ERPT – Emergency Response Policing Team

ESP – Employer supported policing

GMP – Greater Manchester Police

IPS – Independent patrol status

LMP – Local Policing Model

MPS – Metropolitan Police Service

MSC – Metropolitan Special Constabulary

MSF – Most similar force

PO – Public Order

Std. Dev. – Standard deviation

TVP – Thames Valley Police

Data Sources

p224312 (2016) Metropolitan Special Constabulary Strategic Review. London: Metropolitan Police Service

Home Office, UK (2010) Police workforce, England and Wales Statistics: 31 March 2010 London: National Statistics Home Office, UK (2011) Police workforce, England and Wales Statistics: 30 September 2010 London: National Statistics Home Office, UK (2011) Police workforce, England and Wales Statistics: 31 March 2011 London: National Statistics

Home Office, UK (2012) Police workforce, England and Wales Statistics: 30 September 2011 London: National Statistics Home Office, UK (2012) Police workforce, England and Wales Statistics: 31 March 2012 London: National Statistics Home Office, UK (2013) Police workforce, England and Wales Statistics: 30 September 2012 London: National Statistics Home Office, UK (2013) Police workforce, England and Wales Statistics: 31 March 2013 London: National Statistics Home Office, UK (2014) Police workforce, England and Wales Statistics: 30 September 2013 London: National Statistics Home Office, UK (2014) Police workforce, England and Wales Statistics: 31 March 2014 London: National Statistics Home Office, UK (2015) Police workforce, England and Wales Statistics: 30 September 2014 London: National Statistics Home Office, UK (2015) Police workforce, England and Wales Statistics: 31 March 2015 London: National Statistics Home Office, UK (2016) Police workforce, England and Wales Statistics: 30 September 2015 London: National StatisticsG. Allen, N. Dempsey. (2016) Briefing Paper Number 00634: Police Service Strength. House of Commons Library, UKScottish Government Justice Analytical Services (2011) Scottish Policing Performance Framework Annual Report 2010-

2011 Scotland: The Scottish Government

The author of this document is a current serving Special Constable.


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Executive Summary

Executive Summary

Introduction

A recent report by the MSC Strategic board highlights perceived problems in the MetropolitanSpecial Constabulary (MSC) and makes several recommendations to the MPS. Statistics used in

the report do not effectively compare the MPS to other special constabularies in England and

Wales. We make this analysis, which shows MPS performance is strong in comparison to other

constabularies.

Workforce

Attrition, recruitment, retention and overall workforce strength form the basis of many

recommendations in the MSC Strategic review (2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 15). This analysis expands on the

strategic review, making a comparison of the MPS and other constabularies. We confirm a

national trend in the decline in of special constables which was also observed in a recent Police

Service Strength analysis by the House of Commons (Allen and Dempsey, 2016). This is largely

due to a large recruitment drive during the London Olympics. Our results demonstrate that

workforce performance of the MPS, whilst declining in line with national trend, is the strongest

out of the largest 12 special constabularies. Whilst other special constabulary workforces are

declining in strength due to leavers, the MPS is declining due to a recruitment failure at a

corporate and government level. These are extrinsic to the MSC not due to internal problems.

Recruitment strategies are highlighted in the strategic review, but we raise concerns on their

efficacy.

Tasking

Recommendations 8, 9, 11, 12, 13 and 16 proposed in the review will result in more resources

and funding for further development and support of special constables. This improvement will

be welcomed by the MSC as few formal opportunities are currently offered by the MPS. Current

tasking priorities include neighbourhood policing, ERPT, Operation Omega and level 3 aid which

is organised by the MSC leadership.

Structure

The review makes an unanticipated recommendation (17, 18 and 19) for the Management Board

to delayer the MSC rank structure, claiming it will reduce isolation. It will result in a lack of

support from experienced special constables and the privation of an MSC leadership governance

which relates and reflects this historical voluntary organisation that predates the MPS.

Comparisons are made with Northumbria special constabulary who abolished their rank

structure in 2006. Our analyses show Northumbria is a poor performing special constabulary

currently has the second worst rate of decline of workforce.

This structure change is not appropriate for the MSC. The review misleadingly claims limitations

of tasking are due to MSC isolation, despite admitting that the MPS does not support further

development of specials which would greatly widen their tasking opportunities.

Support from regular MSC co-ordinators exists currently and is welcomed. However, this support

network is not dependent on a new governance structure.


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Executive Summary

A - Review of Statistics of the number of Special Constables

1. The MPS ranks above all but one of its bordering forces in net gain percentage from

2012-2015. A net gain of -28.6% places the MPS at position 30 of 43 constabularies.

With the exception of TVP (-26.0%), the MPS scores above all of its bordering

constabularies. (section 1b)

2. The majority of special constabularies (31 of 43) have been decreasing in size since

2012 (section 1b)

3.

The MPS net gain percentage for 2015 (-19.4%) is significantly better than the

preceding years since the Olympics, showing a marked improvement in net gain during

2015 compared to previous years (section 1c)

4. The MPS 2015 net gain percentage is healthy in comparison to other constabularies. The

histogram of 2015 net gain percentages for each constabulary is normalised and the

MPS places within one standard deviation of the mean (section 1c)

5. The strategic review (section 4.2) compares GMPs growth since 2012 as being healthier

than the MPS. Our analysis shows this is no longer true; GMP’s 2015 net gain is negative.

(section 1d)

6. Our analysis also shows GMP ranked worst of the 12 largest special constabularies in

reducing the number of leavers in 2015, compared to the years since 2010. Overall it

ranked 40th of the 43 constabularies for this statistic. (section 1g; table 5 and appendix

D)

7. West Yorkshire appears strong in net gain rankings because it has rapidly doubled its

force size within a year via extensive recruitment, it has not reduced the number of

specials leaving the special constabulary. (section 1e)

8.

The MSC size gradually is returning to the baseline level before the excessiverecruitment of specials for the 2012 Olympics. The number of specials who left the MPS

in 2015 was significantly lower than preceding years (30% fewer leavers). (section 1d,

1e and 1f; table 4 and figure 3)

9. Negative net gain in the MPS for 2015 is due an intrinsic failure of the police service to

recruit new special constables during 2015 (59% reduction in recruitment during

2015). It is not due to poor retention or unusually high leavers/resignations. (section 1f;

table 4)


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Executive Summary

10. If the MSC had recruited as many people in 2015 as it did in 2014, it should have seen its

first growth in size since 2011 (there were 1,256 joiners in 2014 and 1,226 leavers in

2015). (section 1h)

11. 29 constabularies have shown in increase in the number of people leaving in 2015

compared to 2010-2014. 29 constabularies have also shown a reduction in the number

of new joiners over the same period. These both represents a majority of constabularies.

(section 1g)

12. Of the 12 largest constabularies, 11 (including the MPS) have shown an increase in the

number of leavers in 2015 compared to 2010-2014. Humberside was the only

constabulary to demonstrate a reduction. Despite an increase, the MPS still ranks

strongly in comparison- 3rd of 12 in this ranking. (section 1g; table 5)

13. Of the 12 largest special constabularies, the MPS demonstrated the best percentage

change in the number of leavers during 2015, compared to 2012-2014 (i.e. since the

London Olympics and the introduction of LPM). (section 1g; table 5)

14. The strategic review claimed that if decline continues, there will only be 1,500 special

constables remaining in the MSC. This was a biased calculation as only downwards data

since 2012 was used. It should not be interpreted literally and does not take other

factors into consideration. (section 1h; figure 4)

B - Review of performance of the MSC

15. The strategic review only lists performance data of the last 12 months. It does not

analyse how this data has changed over the previous years.

16. For integrity and transparency, the author of the strategic review must repeat the

analysis for previous years to see if there is marked improvement or decline since the

introduction of LPM.

17. There are several limitations of using CARMs data for performance – e.g. resignations

not removed, includes some officers in training (section 2a)

18. Over 10% of special constables are missing from the performance data used – this is an

observation made by us which is unexplained in the strategic review (section 2a)

19. Average performance by each MSC officer in 2015 is 187 hours (93.4%) (section 2b)

20. Estimated standard deviation of ±99% for hours performed. Therefore 68.2% of officers

performed 187 ±198 hours. (section 2b)


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Executive Summary

C - Review of Discussion

21. The strategic review blamed attrition of the MSC on the loss of dedicated regular

sergeant support (8.0). This is not evidenced. Workforce has fallen since 2012, however,

the Olympics occurred at the same time as LPM began. (section 3b)

22. The MPS is now starting to improve as evidenced throughout section (1). Boroughs still

do not have dedicated regular borough support. Therefore, the attrition of the MSC

cannot be equivocally blamed on LPM and the lack of dedicated regular sergeant

support. (section 3b)

23. The recommendation to apply London residency criteria to MSC applications will result

in a loss of quality MSC candidates from the rest of the country. (section 3c)

24.

Attrition is affected by special constables joining the regular police service. The flawedsystem of regular constable recruitment must be reviewed, not the MSC recruitment

criteria. (section 3c)

25. Morale is low because there are no incentives and rewards provided to excelling MSC by

the MPS. Career development beyond IPS is not supported by the MPS. E.g. Level 2 PO,

PNC courses, Response driving etc. (section 3d)

26. The MPS asks London organisations to be part of ESP but does not provide ESP support

to its own staff. This needs to be reviewed (section 3e)

27.

Several DDOs have resigned from the MSC since the introduction of 12-hour shifts dueto lack of ESP support (section 3e)

28. Recommendations to delayer the MSC rank system due are not supported by any

accompanying evidence. Limitations of tasking are due to a total lack of support by the

MPS in formal training and development of special constables into specialist roles such

as level 2 PO. Local taskings work on borough priorities. (section 3f)

29. Northumbria is one of the smallest special constabularies and does not have a specials

rank structure. Northumbria is a poor performing constabulary (section 3g and

appendix D).

There was a reduction in the number of joiners in 2015 (-40.6%).

130% more specials left Northumbria in 2015 than 2010-2014

It is ranked it the second worst constabulary in England and Wales for number

of leavers in 2015 compared to 2010-2014

30. In order for any change to the MSC to be successful it should reflect the wishes and

desires of the Special Constabulary and not be unduly influenced by a political

agenda or a regular service which is not part of the MSC culture.

31. Any drastic change to the MSC should only ever be attempted with the support of a

significant majority of the thousands of volunteers who form this historicalorganisation.


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(1) Number of Special Constables: an objective mathematical analysis

(a) Data Trends

The strategic review states that the MSC has reduced in size by 40% since 2012 (point 4.1), whilstthe rest of England and Wales has only lost 13.5% of Special Constables. A more careful analysis

of the data from the Home Office Police Workforce Statistics shows a different perspective of the

results with more transparency on national trends and the performance of the MSC relative to

these national trends.

Calculation of these statistics from the original Home Office data also identifies some basic

mathematical errors* in the strategic review, which only casts doubt on the accuracy of other

statistics it presents.

(b) The National Special Constabulary Workforce (2012-2015)

In 2015, the MSC dropped to 65.6% (*this rounds to 66% not 65% as the review suggests) of its

2012 workforce (5,123 to 3,359). However, the national Special Constable workforce also

dropped over this period to 84.0% of its total 2012 workforce (table 1). Whilst it appears the MSC

workforce is dropping at a higher rate than the national total, it must be reminded that these two

figures are not directly comparable because the MSC forms part of the national statistic itself.

Table 1 – Analysis of Home Office Police Workforce Statistics 2012-2015

2012 2013 2014 2015National Total 19,154 18,068 17,789 16,101

Metropolitan Police 5,123 4,690 4,587 3,359

MPS % of total 26.7% 26.0% 25.8% 22.7%

A more reliable analysis can be found in calculating the net gain percentage of the 2015 workforce

relative to 2012 for each constabulary, by proportion of the total workforce.

Overall, the MSC constituted 26.7% of the 2012 total workforce, whilst the second largest

constabulary (Thames Valley Police; TVP) represented only 4.0%. This shows that the MSC is the

largest special constabulary by a significant margin; because of this, any slight change in the MSC

workforce is amplified in national statistics.

The national total workforce lost 15.94% of its Special Constables from 2012 to 2015. A weighted

score of the 2012-2015 net gain clearly places the MSC as the largest contributor to this loss

(7.64% of the 15.94%), which is to be expected due to its size. However, ranking each

constabulary in order of their own net gain percentage relative to themselves places the MSC at

position 30 of 43, with a net gain of -28.6%. TVP, a bordering constabulary, is only slightly higher

at position 27 with a similar net gain of -26.0%. It is worth noting that with the exception of TVP,

all of the other constabularies bordering the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) lie below the MPS

on this on this ranking (table 2). Of the 43 special constabularies, 31 of them have negative net

gains over this period.


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Table 2 – Workforce sizes by constabulary from 2012 to 2015 with relative and weighted

net gain percentages

Constabulary

2015 2014 2013 2012

of 2012

workforce

2012-2015 net

gain

weighted

score

Net Gain

ranking

Avon and Somerset 453 529 541 590 3.08% -23.22% -0.72% 25

Bedfordshire 227 196 187 210 1.10% 8.10% 0.09% 9

Cambridgeshire 277 284 260 199 1.04% 39.20% 0.41% 4

Cheshire 390 363 348 387 2.02% 0.78% 0.02% 12

Cleveland 93 82 88 124 0.65% -25.00% -0.16% 26

Cumbria 119 126 114 153 0.80% -22.22% -0.18% 23

Derbyshire 212 271 283 329 1.72% -35.56% -0.61% 36

Devon and Cornwall 673 627 544 580 3.03% 16.03% 0.49% 7

Dorset 227 211 224 234 1.22% -2.99% -0.04% 16

Durham 110 85 77 91 0.48% 20.88% 0.10% 5

Dyfed-Powys 147 196 182 202 1.05% -27.23% -0.29% 29

Essex 366 426 475 525 2.74% -30.29% -0.83% 31

Gloucestershire 115 122 155 182 0.95% -36.81% -0.35% 38

Greater Manchester 703 730 727 709 3.70% -0.85% -0.03% 14

Gwent 124 143 102 134 0.70% -7.46% -0.05% 17

Hampshire 456 576 573 572 2.99% -20.28% -0.61% 22

Hertfordshire 303 413 434 412 2.15% -26.46% -0.57% 28

Humberside 416 401 367 361 1.88% 15.24% 0.29% 8

Kent 248 289 352 397 2.07% -37.53% -0.78% 39

Lancashire 376 490 440 361 1.88% 4.16% 0.08% 11

Leicestershire 254 307 268 276 1.44% -7.97% -0.11% 18

Lincolnshire 229 250 245 191 1.00% 19.90% 0.20% 6

London, City of 61 82 74 95 0.50% -35.79% -0.18% 37

Merseyside 309 420 519 615 3.21% -49.76% -1.60% 42

Metropolitan Police 3,659 4,587 4,690 5,123 26.75 -28.58 -7.64 30

Norfolk 257 240 272 318 1.66% -19.18% -0.32% 21

North Wales 131 126 136 143 0.75% -8.39% -0.06% 19

North Yorkshire 184 155 289 273 1.43% -32.60% -0.46% 33

Northamptonshire 412 311 154 161 0.84% 155.90% 1.31% 1

Northumbria 248 308 305 281 1.47% -11.74% -0.17% 20

Nottinghamshire 252 319 349 375 1.96% -32.80% -0.64% 34

South Wales 68 79 87 132 0.69% -48.48% -0.33% 41

South Yorkshire 443 410 377 262 1.37% 69.08% 0.94% 2

Staffordshire 318 402 426 484 2.53% -34.30% -0.87% 35

Suffolk 234 233 250 302 1.58% -22.52% -0.36% 24

Surrey 122 182 217 311 1.62% -60.77% -0.99% 43

Sussex 393 366 387 372 1.94% 5.65% 0.11% 10

Thames Valley 562 667 711 760 3.97% -26.05% -1.03% 27

Warwickshire 257 280 277 259 1.35% -0.77% -0.01% 13

West Mercia 299 313 356 305 1.59% -1.97% -0.03% 15

West Midlands 374 422 457 537 2.80% -30.35% -0.85% 32

West Yorkshire 824 452 443 526 2.75% 56.65% 1.56% 3

Wiltshire 176 318 306 301 1.57% -41.53% -0.65% 40

Total 16,101 17,789 18,068 19,154 100.00 -15.94 -15.94


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(c) The National Special Constabulary Workforce (2015)

The national workforce statistics were similar in 2015 to the period of 2012 to 2015. A net gain

percentage for this period can be calculated from the National Workforce Statistics by the number

of joiners minus number of leavers divided by the total workforce for each constabulary. This

data is available in the Home Office National Workforce Statistics 2015.

Ranking the constabularies by their net gain ranks the MPS at 34. The net gain percentage has

increased to -19.5%, a significant improvement from the -28.6% from 2012-2015 (figure 1).

Figure 1 – Net gain percentage of special constables by constabulary over 2015

A descriptive analysis of figure 1 shows a non-weighted mean of -5.57%, median of -6.09%, which

implies the national workforce is still declining. There is a wide range in the data (82.3%) with a

standard deviation δ of 17.95% (variance 322.3%2). This means there is some disparity between

the constabularies at opposite end of the graph.

Despite the variance, a visual observation shows the data appears quite normalised – i.e. we can

draw a line from one end to the other and most of the data will fall very close to this line. If the

data of all constabularies is normalised, this is good and means constabularies follow a typical

pattern as a whole (some are high, some are low, but most are somewhere in the middle). A

histogram of the data can show us what the curve looks like. (figure 2).

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Net gain (%) of Special Constables by constabulary over 2015


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Figure 2 – Histogram demonstrating normalised distribution of net gain percentage

The data is of platykurtic normalised distribution with a negative kurtosis value close to zero

(kurtosis = -0.03063). This translates into meaning that none of the constabularies stray off of a

normalised curve. The kurtosis value being slightly negative means that the two ends of our curve

are not like fish tails – i.e. no constabularies are too far off of this curve. The data does exhibit a

slight right-skewed distribution (skewness =0.2902). This translates into meaning that whilst the

data fits into a normalised curve, more of the constabularies are negative than positive.

The descriptive analysis of the 2015 data paints a good picture on the task force of the MSC. The

data being normalised is very comforting and is what we should expect. The MSC net gain

percentage lies well within one standard deviation (1δ) of the non-weighted mean. This tells us

the MSC lies firmly near the middle of this normalised curve than to the edges.

(d) Comparison of National Special Constabulary total workforce from 2012 to

2015

Figure 1 appears very similar to figure 2 presented in the review (page 13) which shows the net

gain percentage by constabulary since 2012 in a similar way (a copy of this chart is shown in

appendix A). The MPS occupies the 30th position in both charts suggesting the MPS was

consistent with the rest of the country in workforce changes between 2012 and 2015.

This national trend is supported in point 4.2 of the strategic review, where the MPS position iscompared to three most similar forces (MSF). The review highlights that Greater Manchester

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Percentage range

Histogram demonstrating normalised distribution of net gain

by constabulary

Frequency


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Police (GMP) and West Yorkshire are in the positive spectrum of the 2012-2015 chart; however,

figure 1 shows GMP is in the negative when the data is recalculated for 2015. West Yorkshire is

still a strong gainer occupying the top ranking for percentage gain in 2015, mostly due to a

massive influx of special constables which almost doubled their size from 2014 to 2015 (452 to

824 special constables).

(e) Comparison between Joiners and Leavers of MPS and West Yorkshire

Comparing the 2014 and 2015 workforce data for joiners and leavers allows us to see exactly

why West Yorkshire is at the top of the chart in figure 1.

Table 3 – Joiners and Leavers of MPS and West Yorkshire over 2014 and 2015

Constabulary 2014 Joiners 2014 Leavers 2015 Joiners 2015 Leavers

West Yorkshire 134 169 522 168

Metropolitan Police 1,256 1,803 514 1,226

The data (table 3) clearly shows that the main changing variable which influences West

Yorkshires position is completely different to the variable which affects the MPS position.

An almost identical number of people left West Yorkshire in 2014 and 2015 (169 and 168

respectively). However, in 2015 West Yorkshire recruited an astonishing 522 special constables,

which almost doubled its 2014 workforce of only 452 special constables.

On the other hand, the MPS had a significant reduction in the number of leavers (1,803 leavers in

2014 and 1,256 in 2015). This is good news; 30% fewer people resigned in 2015 than 2014.

Unfortunately, the number of joiners fell by an unprecedented amount in the same period (1,256

joiners in 2014 but only 514 in 2015). This resulted in the MPS having a negative net gain despite

a reduction in the number of leavers.

This data reveals the real truth behind the statistics. The negative gain in Special Constables in

the MPS during 2015 is not due to poor retention as the review suggests. It is due to an intrinsic

failure in recruitment by the MPS.

(f) Data trend of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary

The failure of recruitment is evident when analysing rolling 12-month statistics of Home Office

workforce data specific to the MPS (table 4).

Table 4 – Joiners, leavers and total size of the MSC from 2010 to 2015*

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Total 3,177 4,944 5,752 5,303 4,587 3,659

Joiners 1,180 2,396 2,211 1,187 1,256 514

Leavers 600 597 1,318 1,151 1,803 1,226

*This data is published bi-annually. For integrity of analysis, all data sets were collected from the March publications.


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The table (table 4) supports the hypothesis made in section 1(e) that the negative gain is due to

a failure in recruitment. An emphasis was placed on recruitment of Special Constables during the

lead up to the 2012 London Olympics; a fact supported in 4.5 of the review. Since the Olympics,

unusually high levels of leavers have been observed. Until recently, the impact in percentage

change of the work force of the MSC was balanced out by similar levels of recruitment. However,

in 2015 recruitment levels dropped steeply from 1,256 new special constables in 2014 to just 514new special constables in 2015; a decrease of over 59%.

Figure 3 – Joiners, leavers and total size of the MSC from 2010 to 2015

A visual representation of the data (figure 3) demonstrates this observation; the MSC is still

losing special constables as a result of the excessive recruitment for the Olympics. While special

constable numbers have been slowly returning to their baseline, the net gain percentage has been

dampened by healthy recruitment. This gradual return to the baseline is evident in figure 1 of the

strategic review which is attached as appendix B. A sharp decline in this recruitment during 2015

is the cause of the poor net gain percentage, not poor retention

(g) Data trend of joiners and leavers across all Special Constabularies in England

and Wales

We identified the impact recruitment during 2015 had on the net gain percentage of the MSC. This

trend was reflected across the majority of forces; 29 of the 43 constabularies showed a reduction

of the number of new joiners in 2015 vs the average joiners of 2010-2014 (appendix D).

Coincidentally, 29 constabularies also showed an increase in the number of leavers during 2015

vs the average number of leavers in 2010-2014.

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Joiners, Leavers and total size of the Metropolitan Speciaal

Constabulary

total joiners leavers


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Eight of the fourteen constabularies which had an increase in new joiners during 2015 are

amongst the twelve largest constabularies in England and Wales. Of these twelve largest

constabularies, eleven of them (including the MPS) showed an increase in the number of leavers

during 2015 compared to 2010-2014. Humberside was the only one of these twelve to show a

slight improvement (-3.3%) in reducing the number of leavers. Although showing an increase,

the MPS is still in the ranked in the top 3 of the twelve constabularies at 6.3% for this statistic(table 5).

If we repeat the analysis for the change in number of leavers for post-Olympic statistics (2015

leavers vs the average leavers of 2013-2014), we see that three of the twelve forces (MPS, Avon

and Somerset, and Cheshire) have shown a reduction in their 2015 leavers. The MPS showed the

largest reduction of leavers (-24.6%). Overall, the MPS has showed the best reduction in the

number of leavers in 2015 compared to other years since the Olympics.

Table 5 – The percentage change in joiners and leavers in the 12 largest special

constabularies*

Special Constabulary

(12 largest)

2015 Total

Special

Constables

% change from

2010-2014

JOINERS

% change from

2010-2014

LEAVERS

% change from

2013-2015

LEAVERS

Metropolitan Police 3,659 -68.8% 6.3% -24.6%

West Yorkshire 824 252.7% 41.9% 3.1%

Greater Manchester 703 12.5% 99.6% 33.4%

Devon and Cornwall 673 48.7% 39.9% 11.6%

Thames Valley 562 -21.7% 84.0% 26.4%

Hampshire 456 -57.0% 81.7% 43.2%

Avon and Somerset 453 -60.0% 5.7% -13.5%

South Yorkshire 443 59.9% 6.7% 19.8%

Humberside 413 29.4% -3.3% 17.6%

Northamptonshire 412 94.8% 38.4% 15.9%

Sussex 393 57.0% 87.0% 50.0%

Cheshire 390 28.0% 16.0% -3.2% *The best 3 and worst 3 percentages for each column are shown in green and red respectively

Section 4.2 of the strategic review directly compares the MPS to the Greater Manchester Police

(GMP); it glorifies an illusion that a 17% increase in the size of GMP since 2012 is “healthy”. We

have already demonstrated the negative net gain for GMP during 2015 in section 1(d). The

analysis presented in table 5 definitively shows that GMP had lost significantly more Special

Constables in 2015 than 2010-2014 whilst the MPS showed a strong reduction in the number of

leavers during 2015, placing them amongst the top 3 of the 12 largest forces in reducing the

number of leavers since 2010 (GMP ranked 12th of 12) and the best special constabulary of the 12

largest in reducing the number of leavers since the Olympics (GMP ranked 10th of 12).

The MPS holds strong in comparison to the 12 largest forces and also in comparison to all other

constabularies. The mean percentage change from 2013-2015 average leavers vs 2015 leavers

(the far right column in table 5) for all 43 constabularies was 11.2% (positive; i.e. an increase in

leavers), with a standard deviation δ of 44.6%. The MPS score of -24.6% places it firmly on the

desirable side of this curve, within 1δ of the mean (standard error ±6.8%).


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(h) A prediction of future workforce size

The number of special constables in the MPS has been declining since 2012. The executive

summary of the strategic review stated that if the MSC continues to decline at the same rate it

has since 2012, there will be fewer than 1,500 special constables by 2021.

It is believed this calculation was made using a power-based trend line of biannual data. A

replica of this calculation is shown in figure 4. We can see the line reach approximately 1,600

officers in 2021.

Figure 4 – Power trend line of MSC workforce data since 2012 is biased

The trendline in figure 4 fits the dataset relatively well (R2 =0.9539) – i.e. the line intersects as

close to many of the points on the graph. However, representing a power trend line like this

using only the downwards side of a graphed is biased and will obviously show a downwardstrend. The mathematics takes no consideration of any data before 2012. Additionally, it must be

reminded that trend lines are purely mathematical and are not affected by any factors which a

human could predict.

We have already mentioned that the MSC workforce was at a peak due to a massive recruitment

drive for the London Olympics (section f) and we are now observing a reduction in special

constables as the workforce naturally returns to its baseline level. A visual representation of

this peak can be shown by plotting all known data from the National Workforce Statistics from

2010-present (figure 5).

We can see this baseline level clearly in figure 1 of the strategic review, which is attached as

Appendix B.

R² = 0.9539

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

M a r - 1 2

J u l - 1 2

N o v - 1 2

M a r - 1 3

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M a r - 1 4

J u l - 1 4

N o v - 1 4

M a r - 1 5

J u l - 1 5

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M a r - 1 6

J u l - 1 6

N o v - 1 6

M a r - 1 7

J u l - 1 7

N o v - 1 7

M a r - 1 8

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M a r - 1 9

J u l - 1 9

N o v - 1 9

M a r - 2 0

J u l - 2 0

N o v - 2 0

M a r - 2 1

J u l - 2 1

Power trend line of MSC workforce data since 2012


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Figure 5 – MSC workforce from March 2010 – September 2015

To suggest the MSC workforce will decline beyond this baseline is an overgeneralising of the

trendline and must not be taken too literally.

It is impossible to accurately predict future growth; however, the MSC recruitment for 2015 was

at its lowest rate since before 2010 (there are no workforce statistics from before 2010

available on the Home Office datasets).

A crucial observation is that if the MSC had recruited as many people in 2015 as it did in 2014, it

could have possibly seen its first growth in size since 2011 (there were 1,256 joiners in 2014and 1,226 leavers in 2016).

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

Jul-09 Nov-10 Apr-12 Aug-13 Dec-14 May-16

MSC Workforce


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(2) Performance of MSC over 2015

(a) Limitations of the strategic review performance and productivity analysis

Section 7 of the strategic review is dedicated to performance and productivity of the MSC by

analysing duty hours performed. Duty hours is a good indicator of performance of the MSC,

using 200 hours / year quota as a benchmark.

The most fundamental flaw of the strategic review analysis is that it only looks at figures for the

last 12 months. No data is provided on historic data to allow for a meaningful interpretation of

the data. This is important as nothing is known about the same figures in the years surrounding

the introduction of LPM, which seems to be a key argument in the review.

For integrity and transparency, the author of the strategic review must repeat the

analysis for previous years to see if there is marked improvement or decline since the

introduction of LPM.

Unfortunately, there are also several limitations of this data as it relies on analysis of CARMS

which has problems

There are many reasons an officer can mistakenly show on CARMs as underperforming:

Some officers on CARMS have resigned and have not been removed New officers are added to CARMs before they are attested

MSC compliance with CARMs is unlikely to be 100%

To which extent these inaccuracies exist is unknown. It must be considered because these

inaccuracies will only ever contribute to a picture of underperformance and never over

performance.

Additionally, there appears to be a problem with the data used:

A sum of the frequencies in Appendix C is 3,053

There are 3,434 Special Constables as of September 2015 At least 381 special constables (over 10%) are unaccounted for, potentially more due to

the limitations of CARMs listed above

(b) Analysis of 2015 officer hours for compliance

A banded compliance percentage chart is shown in the review as figure 12 and is attached in

Appendix C for reference.


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An example of the histogram is shown in Figure 6. It is possible to do a descriptive analysis on

this data as frequencies of each group are listed on the chart.

Figure 6 – Histogram of banded duty hours data from the strategic review

There is no additional data supplied other than the frequencies of officers in each range. In

order to calculate descriptive statistics we can make an assumptions that the average

compliance of each group is probably around the midpoint of the ranges, (whilst keeping 300+

range as just 300 to avoid artificially shifting data to the right). The sum of hours with this

assumption using midpoints is around 606,000. Whilst not perfect, this is close enough to the

570,000 hours listed in section 7.1 to do some simple analyses and gain an overall picture. A

summary of this data is in table 6 for transparency of how the numbers are derived.

Table 6 – Estimating variance and standard deviation of the grouped data

Bin range

(%)

Frequency Midpoint (%) Midpt^2 Estimated (%)

sum

Estimated sum of

hours of group

0 405 0 0 0 01 to 49 560 25 625 14000 28,000

50 to 99 756 74.5 5550.25 56322 112,644

100 to 149 723 124.5 15500.25 90013.5 180,027

150 to 199 233 174.5 30450.25 40658.5 81,317

200 to 249 121 224.5 50400.25 27164.5 54,329

250 to 299 72 274.5 73350.25 19764 39,528

300 + 183 300 90000 54900 109,800

TOTAL 3,053 267876.25 302822.5 605,645 hours

Est. mean: 99.1885 % Mean Mpt Sq 87.74198 est. Std. Dev 98.76 %

Est.mean^2:

9838.359 Est. Variance -9750.617 Real Mean 93.36%

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

0 1-49 50-99 100-149 150-199 200-249 250-299 300+

F r e q

u e n c y o f o f f i c e r s

% of minimum hours (200)

Histogram of banded duty hours


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The mean hours completed using duty hours data provided in the strategic review is 93.4% - i.e.

the average officer hours is around 187 hours.

The crude analysis in table 6 estimates a standard deviation of 99% which is very big. Standard

deviations are useful; 34.1% of the cohort will always lie within 1 standard deviation of the

mean (13.6% within two standard deviations). An illustration of standard deviations is shown

in figure 7 for your benefit.

Figure 7 – Example of standard deviations (δ)

The approximate standard deviation (δ) of the duty hours is 99% (198 hours), We know the

average hours is 187; so, 34.1% of officers will lie 1δ (198 hours) either side of 187.

This tells us that 68.2% of officers hours in 2015 were in the range of 187 ±198 hours.


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3 Discussion

The data analysed throughout section (1) regarding the size, growth, retention and attrition of

the MSC relative to other special constabularies presents a new light on the performance of the

MPS compared to other constabularies. Despite the claims made in the strategic review, growth

of the MSC has been excellent compared to the other largest constabularies. In 2015, the MSCranked top amongst the 12 largest special constabularies in reducing its 2015 leavers since the

Olympics.

(a) Recruitment

This data shows that retention is not the issue we need to overcome in improving net gains in

the size of the Special Constabulary. The MSC was let down at a corporate level by the

Metropolitan Police Service by poor recruitment of new special constables in 2015, this was

highlighted in section (f).

Analysis in section (i) explained how net gains of the MSC in 2015 could have been markedly

different if the MPS had upheld their duty to recruit new members to the Special Constabulary.

The issue of recruitment was highlighted in an honest and open manner in the strategic review

and recommendation 7 (address recruitment strategies) is one that is welcomed and supported

by the MSC.

(b) Attrition is unfairly blamed on lack of dedicated regular sergeant support

The strategic review (section 8.0) explicitly blamed attrition of the MSC on the loss of dedicated

regular sergeant support on boroughs following the introduction of LPM. This is a misleadingaccusation. We have already discussed throughout section 1 the importance the effects the

London Olympics had on the workforce of the MSC. The Olympics and the introduction of LPM

occurred at the same time; to blame the subsequent attrition of an oversized workforce on LPM

is not supported by any evidence in the review.

The MPS is starting to improve as evidenced throughout section (1). However, boroughs still

do not have dedicated regular sergeant support therefore the attrition of the MSC cannot be

equivocally blamed on LPM and the lack of dedicated regular sergeant support.

(c) Attrition is affected by specials joining the regular service

It is common knowledge that a large proportion of the special constabulary join with an

intention of joining the regular service. It is because of this that t he term “career specials” was

used to identify specials with no intention to join the regulars. The strategic review claimed the

lack of London residency criteria is what attracted many to the MSC, viewing it as an easier

route to the regular service; as a result it recommended the residency criteria be applied to MSC

recruitment. This is a disastrous recommendation which does not consider simple data such as

which proportion of applicants from outside of London already apply with a view to join the

regular service, neither does it consider the number of quality applicants we can attract from

the rest of the country. A decision to restrict recruitment at a time where the main problem is

that we are not recruiting enough specials is bizarre and unjustified. A more logical solution


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would be to review the flawed recruitment system of regular constables which is resulting in

the MSC being used in this manner to begin with.

(d) 56% of MSC have considered leaving

The MOPAC survey showing 56% of MSC have considered leaving brings reality to the gravity of

the solution. Morale in the MSC is influenced by removal of rewards and incentives for special

constables with long service and contribution. For example, disbanding of the Operational

Support Unit, discontinuation of Level 2 Public Order (PO) training, no funding for MSC

response driving courses and lack of PNC course availability.

(e) Employer Supported Policing (ESP) programme

The review admits the hypocrisy of the MPS asking London organisations to be part of the ESP

programme whilst not affording the same benefits to MPS staff. Development of the ESP(recommendations 8, 11, 12 and 13) is a welcomed improvement and is encouraged as several

designated detention officers have resigned from the special constabulary since the

introduction of 12-hour working days.

(f) Removal of the MSC rank structure

The recommendation to delayer the MSC structure is not supported by any evidence that the

change will result in a benefit. Section 11.4 states the current rank structure promotes isolation;

however, this is not supported by any evidence of isolation.

It also states “[isolation] is reflected in terms of tasking, management and performance

accountability”.

We have already mentioned that the limitations of tasking are confounded by a total lack of

support by the MPS for further training and development of special constables. Section 10.3

states the MSC is an untapped resource of Aid. This is not true of level 3 aid where the MSC plays

role in events such as Trooping the Colour, Gallipoli, London Marathon and football. The

observation is completely accurate in terms of Level 2 aid; however, this is fundamentally due to

the MPS lack of funding to train Level 2 PO MSC and is not due a problem of tasking – you

cannot task a resource that you do not have.

The management aspect of the quote above is not supported in the review, no evidence ispresented to show any breakdowns in leadership. The accusation of isolation being reflected in

management should be documented with any objective findings that lead the author to reach

that conclusion.

Performance accountability being a reflection of isolation is also unsupported. Section 7 of the

strategic review is dedicated to discussing statistics regarding performance and productivity;

however, it only outlines the numbers of special constables not performing their hours recently.

Underperforming specials is not something new and presentation of recent data should not

result in an assumption that these figures are any better or worse than preceding years. The

author of the strategic review has failed to make any comparisons by not including any

comparisons to statistics since before the introduction of LPM. Therefore, the statistics aremeaningless in the context of isolation and management factors.


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It should be reminded that in order for any change to the MSC to be successful it should reflect

the wishes and desires of the Special Constabulary and not be unduly influenced by the political

agenda of a regular service which is not part of the MSC culture.

Any drastic change to the MSC should only ever be attempted with the support of asignificant majority of the thousands of volunteers who form this historical organisation.

~


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Appendix

(A) Chart from the strategic review showing change (%) in size of Special Constabularies

since 2012

(B) Chart from the strategic review showing Historical number of Special Constables

since 1970


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(C) Chart from strategic review showing Banded MSC officer compliance by hours in 2015


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(D) Percentage change rankings in Joiners and Leavers by constabulary

Constabulary 2015

% change 2010-2014

JOINERS vs 2015 Rank

% change LEAVERS

2010-2014 vs 2015 Rank

% change LEAVERS

2013-2014 vs 2015 Rank

Avon and Somerset 453 -0.600000 38 0.056818182 16 -0.134883721 13

Bedfordshire 227 1.264573991 3 0.848958333 37 0.893333333 41

Cambridgeshire 277 -0.096534653 16 0.450892857 28 0.140350877 25

Cheshire 390 0.28968254 12 0.159793814 20 -0.032258065 19

Cleveland 93 0.05 14 -0.689922481 1 -0.680000000 1

Cumbria 119 -0.268867925 27 -0.059405941 12 -0.321428571 7

Derbyshire 212 -0.575342466 37 -0.127604167 10 -0.118421053 14

Devon and Cornwall 673 0.487068966 9 0.398891967 26 0.116022099 24

Dorset 227 1.012987013 4 0.131805158 19 0.224806202 31

Durham 110 0.85483871 6 -0.304635762 4 -0.343750000 6

Dyfed-Powys 147 -0.507042254 33 1.360000000 43 1.809523810 43

Essex 366 -0.151329243 19 -0.148471616 9 0.098591549 23

Gloucestershire 115 -0.122137405 18 -0.025974026 14 -0.259259259 9

Greater Manchester 703 0.124648547 13 0.995515695 40 0.335000000 34

Gwent 124 -0.35483871 28 0.260162602 23 0.441860465 37

Hampshire 456 -0.569892473 36 0.817307692 34 0.431818182 36

Hertfordshire 303 -0.532312925 34 0.776018100 33 0.221789883 30

Humberside 416 0.293859649 11 -0.033333333 13 0.175675676 27

Kent 248 -0.394572025 29 -0.068825911 11 -0.297709924 8

Lancashire 376 -0.187969925 21 0.876122083 39 0.962441315 42

Leicestershire 254 -0.566532258 35 0.042253521 15 -0.163841808 11

Lincolnshire 229 -0.107648725 17 0.840909091 36 0.408695652 35

London, City of 61 -0.651162791 40 0.600000000 30 0.185185185 28Merseyside 309 -0.471210341 32 0.186540732 21 -0.142857143 12

Metropolitan Police 3,659 -0.687727825 42 0.062575836 17 -0.246465888 10

Norfolk 257 -0.032663317 15 -0.253731343 5 -0.375000000 4

North Wales 131 -0.254032258 26 -0.166666667 8 -0.032258065 18

North Yorkshire 184 2.271028037 2 0.104972376 18 -0.069767442 16

Northamptonshire 412 0.947743468 5 0.383928571 25 0.158878505 26

Northumbria 248 -0.405829596 30 1.306122449 42 0.269662921 33

Nottinghamshire 252 -0.457013575 31 0.230769231 22 -0.089430894 15

South Wales 68 -0.182692308 20 -0.437751004 2 -0.377777778 3

South Yorkshire 443 0.599190283 7 0.666666667 32 0.197674419 29

Staffordshire 318 -0.196277496 22 0.461538462 29 -0.037974684 17

Suffolk 234 -0.208860759 23 -0.411057692 3 -0.458563536 2

Surrey 122 -0.83805668 43 -0.249329759 6 -0.363636364 5

Sussex 393 0.570397112 8 0.870026525 38 0.500000000 38

Thames Valley 562 -0.217352415 25 0.839684625 35 0.264108352 32

Warwickshire 257 -0.211409396 24 0.631016043 31 0.694444444 40

West Mercia 299 0.421052632 10 1.063492063 41 0.664000000 39

West Midlands 374 -0.654696133 41 -0.166666667 7 0.037974684 21

West Yorkshire 824 2.527027027 1 0.418918919 27 0.030674847 20

Wiltshire 176 -0.628571429 39 0.266666667 24 0.085714286 22

Documents

An objective analysis of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary Strategic Review.pdf