An Oifig Buiséid Pharlaiminteach Parliamentary Budget Office

Pre-Budget 2019 Commentary

Séanadh

Is í an Oifig Buiséid Pharlaiminteach (OBP) a d’ullmhaigh an doiciméad seo mar áis do Chomhaltaí Thithe an Oireachtais ina gcuid dualgas parlaiminteach. Ní bheartaítear é a bheith uileghabhálach ná críochnúil. Féadfaidh an OBP aon fhaisnéis atá ann a bhaint as nó a leasú aon tráth gan fógra roimh ré. Níl an OBP freagrach as aon tagairtí d’aon fhaisnéis atá á cothabháil ag tríú páirtithe nó naisc chuig aon fhaisnéis den sórt sin ná as ábhar aon fhaisnéise den sórt sin. Tá baill foirne an OBP ar fáil chun ábhar na bpáipéar seo a phlé le Comhaltaí agus lena gcuid foirne ach ní féidir leo dul i mbun plé leis an mórphobal nó le heagraíochtaí seachtracha.

Disclaimer

This document has been prepared by the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) for use by the Members of the Houses of the Oireachtas to aid them in their parliamentary duties. It is not intended to be either comprehensive or definitive. The PBO may remove, vary or amend any information contained therein at any time without prior notice. The PBO accepts no responsibility for any references or links to or the content of any information maintained by third parties. Staff of the PBO are available to discuss the contents of these papers with Members and their staff, but cannot enter into discussions with members of the general public or external organisations.

Summary of key messages 2

Introduction 4

Economic and Fiscal Context 5

Macroeconomic context and major risks 5

Public finances 7

Key Message 1: To Implement Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy 11

Key Message 2: To Foster Stability and Sustainability of the Public Finances 15

Revenue 15

Expenditure 17

Key Message 3: To Enhance Transparency and Accessibility 21

Voted expenditure 21

Capital expenditure (including PPPs) 23

Performance budgeting 23

Revenue 23

Key Message 4: To Promote Evidence-based Policy-making 24

Key Message 5: To Promote Innovations in the Budget process 25

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Pre-Budget 2019 Commentary

Contents

The Parliamentary Budget Office’s (PBO) Pre-Budget 2019 Commentary builds upon the analysis produced by the

PBO since its establishment in August 2017. The key messages set out in this body of work, that the PBO would

like to bring to Members’ attention while they are preparing for this year’s Budget are, the need:

To implement counter-cyclical fiscal policy

While current best estimates of the cyclical position of the Irish economy do not highlight a current risk of overheating,

this could potentially occur in the near future. It is important to avoid the pro-cyclical policies of the past.

The Expenditure Benchmark (part of the EU fiscal rules) may no longer be a desirable anchor for fiscal policy making

in Ireland given its reliance on pro-cyclical estimates of potential output growth. There is merit in adopting a prudent

fiscal stance for Budget 2019 and not spending the maximum amount permitted under the Expenditure Benchmark,

but instead targeting a more sustainable budgetary position, i.e. closer to a balanced budget.

To foster stability and sustainability of the public finances

The tax base should be broad and focused on less volatile sources of tax revenue. The sustainability of recent increases

in corporation tax and the concentration of tax revenue from a small number of firms, and to some extent higher earning

individuals, are risks that should be recognised and mitigated. The easiest way to mitigate against these risks is to avoid

basing permanent expenditure increases on potentially unsustainable and volatile revenue sources.

Public capital investment has been highly pro-cyclical in Ireland. The National Development Plan, the Government’s

10-year strategy for Ireland’s public infrastructure committed to increasing investment. Increases to the level of public

capital investment, while addressing infrastructure deficits, will likely increase pressure on the capacity of the

construction sector, thereby contributing to inflationary pressures and potentially undermining value for money. This

risk can be mitigated by taking appropriate measures that would dampen activity in other sectors of the economy.

The public sector wage bill has also been pro-cyclical over time, with the pay bill increasing in the early/mid 2000s,

falling with the economic crisis and increasing subsequently. To avoid repeating the mistakes of the past and in the

context of the long-term commitments being made, caution should be exercised when making decisions in relation

to public sector pay and numbers. Today’s policy decisions should be underpinned by a long-term strategic approach

to workforce planning.

Population ageing will put more pressure on the State’s finances, particularly in the area of health and social protection,

as well as contributing to reducing the potential growth in the capacity of the Irish economy. Such pressures should be

taken into account in formulating Budget policy in order to ensure sustainability.

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Pre-Budget 2019 Commentary

Summary of key messages

To enhance transparency and accessibility

The PBO has, since its establishment, used many of its publications to focus on how accessible and/or transparent

budgetary information, particularly on the expenditure side, is. Overall, the PBO’s view is that the existing budget and

related documentation is unduly complex and therefore poses a barrier to a more effective level of parliamentary

engagement. The PBO has identified many areas of improvement in its publications.

To promote evidence-based policy-making

Ex-ante analysis should form an intrinsic part of policy design and should be carried out before the implementation

of new tax and spending measures. It would also help inform ex-post evaluation by identifying the type of data

required for successful policy review. At present, data limitations risk restricting evidence-based policy-making and

place a constraint on the capacity to undertake effective performance budgeting. As a consequence, Exchequer funds

risk being directed towards programmes for which there is little-to-no evidence of effectiveness in achieving policy

goals. More generally, the PBO would encourage a systematic approach to data collection and monitoring, and to

programme review and evaluation, as an integral part of future policy design.

To promote innovations in the budget process

The economic and financial crisis of 2008 was the key driver behind the implementation of several institutional

reforms to the budgetary architecture in OECD countries. Examples of these budgetary innovations introduced

in Ireland, include:

nPerformance-based Budgeting;

nSpending Reviews;

nIndependent Fiscal Institutions (such as the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) itself and the Irish Fiscal

Advisory Council (IFAC));

nThe Equality Budgeting initiative (focusing on gender initially).

The PBO recognises the value of introducing such innovations strengthening the Budget process and contributing

to improved policy debate, scrutiny, accountability and transparency. The PBO has in its first year focused on gender

budgeting and how to better integrate climate-related issues into the budgetary process. The PBO has also launched

a quality assurance service for political parties and groups in respect of the costing of their shadow budget proposals

carried out by Government Departments.

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The Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) was established in August 2017 within the Houses of the Oireachtas as a part

of the recent institutional reforms to Ireland’s budgetary framework. The PBO’s main focus is on assisting Members of

the Houses of the Oireachtas and its Committees. This is done by providing impartial and sound economic and fiscal

analysis directed to improve budgetary scrutiny, fiscal transparency and accountability.

This is the PBO’s second Pre-Budget Commentary that builds upon the analysis produced by the PBO since

its establishment. This work can be grouped in to five main themes or key messages, each playing a key role

in parliamentary oversight of the budget process. The key themes are as follows:

1. Counter-cyclical fiscal policy;

2. Stability and sustainability of the public finances;

3. Transparency and Accessibility;

4. Evidence-based policy making;

5. Innovations in the Budget process.

In addition to providing analysis on the specific themes mentioned above, the PBO monitored and assessed key

Government publications framing Budget 2019 such as the Stability Programme Update (SPU), the Summer Economic

Statement (SES), the Mid-Year Expenditure Report (MYER), the Spending Review (SR) and the Tax Strategy Group (TSG)

papers.

The PBO’s Quarterly Economic Commentary (QEC) also provided, on a quarterly basis, an update to Oireachtas members

on key economic and fiscal developments.

This year saw a focus also on events happening outside Ireland with an overview of the Commission’s proposals

for the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027, which will underpin the future EU Budget. The PBO

produced an analysis of sectoral and regional implications for Ireland of future reforms to the Common Agricultural

Policy (CAP), which is the largest area of expenditure of the EU Budget, due to their potentially significant financial

impact on rural Ireland and the agri-food sector.

Before analysing the main themes and highlighting key messages, the next section outlines briefly the macroeconomic

and fiscal context for Budget 2019.

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Pre-Budget 2019 Commentary

Introduction

Macroeconomic context and major risks

Key macroeconomic indicators published by the CSO show that the Irish economy is performing strongly and it is now

approaching full employment. Carrying on the positive trend started in 2013, real GDP increased by 7.2% in 2017, making

Ireland the fastest growing economy in the EU-28. The unemployment rate fell to 5.6% in August 2018, continuing on its

downward trajectory and approaching its pre-crisis level of 5%, while employment (in Full-Time-Equivalents) increased

by 3.4% (2017 vs 2016). Alternative indicators such as Modified Domestic Demand and Modified Gross National Income

(GNI*), which attempt to temper the globalisation effects distorting the measurement of the Irish economy,

are consistent with robust underlying economic growth (Figure 1b).

Figure 1a: Trends in the Economy

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

%

Ann

ual %

Cha

nge

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Unemployment Rate (RHS) Real GDP (LHS)

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

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Economic and Fiscal Context

Figure 1b - Trends in the Economy, alternative indicators

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Ann

ual %

Cha

nge

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

Real Model Total Domestic Demand GNI * at current market prices

Source:  CSO

While the economy is expected to continue performing well in the near future – the Summer Economic Statement

(SES) 20181 forecasts real GDP growth of 5.6% in 2018 and of 4.0% in 2019, risks to the economy remain tilted

to the downside. External risks include:

nthe possibility of a hard Brexit: In spite of significant uncertainty over the final outcomes of Brexit, research2

has shown that a no-deal (WTO scenario) would have a negative impact on economic activity in Ireland over

the medium to long-term (compared to a non-Brexit baseline);

npotential trade disruption among Ireland’s main trading partners;

nchanges to international tax regimes;

nincreasing oil prices; and

na tightening in ECB’s monetary policy.

1  Department of Finance (2018). Summer Economic Statement 2018.

2  Copenhagen Economics (2018). Ireland and the Impacts of Brexit Strategic Implications for Ireland arising from Changing EU-UK Trading Relations, report prepared for the Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation, for the Government of Ireland.

  Bergin, A., A. Garcia Rodriguez, N. Mc Inerney, E. Morgenroth and D. Smith, (2017). Modelling the Medium to Long Term Potential Macroeconomic Impact of Brexit on Ireland, Economic and Social Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, Autumn 2017, pp.305-316.

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On the domestic side key risks include:

nthe potential overheating of the economy;

nthe concentration and volatility of corporation taxes;

nlabour and skill shortages, most notably in information communications technology, financial services,

engineering (IMF, 2018)3 and construction (Society of Chartered Surveyors Ireland and PwC, 2018)4;

nthe productivity gap between domestic and foreign-owned enterprises;

nthe shortage of housing supply; and

nthe associated negative impact on firms’ competitiveness.

Public finances

The General Government Balance is projected to be -€780 million in 2018, a deficit of -0.2% of GDP. A budget surplus is

expected for 2020 (€895 million or 0.3% of GDP). As measured by the annual change in the Structural Primary Balance,

the pace of fiscal consolidation (which during the crisis period was faster in Ireland than in other European countries),

has slowed down in recent years (Figure 2). Lower-than projected debt interest payments (Figure 3a) and higher-than

expected corporate tax receipts (Figure 3b) have been used to fund additional increases in Government current and

capital expenditure.

Figure 2 – Change in the Structural Balance excluding interest payments (SPB)

2011 201420132012 2015 2016 2017 2018-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Perc

enta

ge P

oint

s

European Union Ireland

Source:  PBO based on AMECO. Positive changes (improvements) in the SPB indicate fiscal consolidation, while negative changes (dis-improvements in the SBP) are associated with fiscal expansion.

3  International Monetary Fund (2018). Ireland 2018 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 18/194, IMF, European Dept.

4  Society of Chartered Surveyors Ireland and PwC (2018). SCSI/PwC Construction Market Monitor 2018.

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Figure 3a: Budgetary forecasts for interest expenditure

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

€m

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

Budget 15 Budget 16 Budget 17 Budget 18 SPU 18

Figure 3b: Corporate tax – forecast in previous year vs expected outturn for current year

2015 2016 20170

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

€m

Budget 15 Budget 16 Budget 17 SPU 18

Source:  PBO based on Department of Finance (various years) Economic and Fiscal OutlookPre-

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As shown in Figure 4a, the level of public debt, which has decreased steadily as a percentage of GDP from a peak

of 120% in 2012, is still high both in historical terms (the Debt-to-GDP ratio was 23.6% in 2006 vs 68.4% in 2017)

and scaled by alternative metrics such as GNI* (111.1% in 2017) or General Government Revenue (263% in 2017).

In nominal terms, General Government Debt was €201.3 billion in 2017 (vs €43 billion in 2006), and is projected to

increase to €211.4 billion by 2021 (while as a percentage of GDP this will fall to 58.7%). In an international context,

when GNI* is used as a denominator, Ireland shows the fourth highest debt burden in the EU-28, after Greece, Italy

and Portugal (Figure 4b). Scaling by population size, Ireland had the highest debt burden in the EU-28 in 2017, with

Government debt per person at €41,918.

Figure 4a: Trends in Irish Public Debt

2000 2003 2007 2009 2011 2013 20152005 20082001 20042002 2006 2010 2012 2014 2016 2017

% €m

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

Debt to GNI* (LHS) Debt to GGR (LHS) Debt to GDP ratio (LHS) Gross Government Debt (RHS)

Source: PBO based on CSO and AMECO data

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Figure 4b: Debt-to-GDP ratios in the EU-28

Esto

nia

Luxe

mbo

urg

Bul

gari

a

Czec

h Re

publ

ic

Rom

ania

Den

mar

k

Lith

uani

a

Latv

ia

Swed

en

Pola

nd

Mal

ta

Slov

akia

Net

herl

ands

Finl

and

Ger

man

y

Irel

and

GD

P

Hun

gary

Slov

enia

Croa

tia

Aust

ria

Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

Fran

ce

Cypr

us

Spai

n

Bel

gium

Irel

and

GN

I*

Port

ugal

Ital

y

Gre

ece

%

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Source:  PBO based on CSO and AMECO data

There are well-acknowledged difficulties with the accurate measurement of Ireland’s economy. GDP tends to

overestimate Ireland’s economic size and performance. The inclusion in the national accounts of certain activities

of multinationals such as Intellectual Property (IP) assets, contract manufacturing and R&D expenditure, imply that

alternative metrics such as GNI* must be used to assess Ireland’s fiscal sustainability. GNI* points to an Irish economy

that in 2017 was 38% smaller than using GDP. Therefore, it is more informative and realistic to present debt and deficit

ratios using GNI* as a denominator.

The EU fiscal framework (The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)) identifies a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio as a prudent target

to aim at. In recognition of measurement problems affecting GDP, the Government’s strategy is to achieve a long-term

debt target of 45% of GDP. Even accounting for the average long-term maturity of Government debt (nearly 11 years) and

that over 95% of Irish sovereign debt is at fixed rates (Department of Finance, 2018)5, further progress in reducing public

indebtedness is of strategic importance to minimise the vulnerability of the public finances to any negative shock that

could arise in the future.

5  Department of Finance (2018). Annual Report on Public Debt in Ireland.

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There is a great deal of debate on whether the Irish economy is currently at risk of overheating and thus growing

above its “normal”/potential capacity. A good understanding of the so-called ‘cyclical position of the economy’ is

critical for Government to conduct appropriate counter-cyclical fiscal policy. If the Irish economy were at risk of

overheating, optimal principles of fiscal management would recommend not introducing budget measures which

overall would generate additional economic activity. The SES 2018 identified the need to avoid the pro-cyclical

mistakes of the past as a key policy objective. The outcome of these pro-cyclical policies are outlined in Figure 5,

showing how during the pre-crisis period Government revenue, expenditure and nominal GDP all increased at an annual

average growth rate of approximately 10%.

Figure 5: Pro-cyclical fiscal policy in the past

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 20070

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

%

Revenue growth Expenditure growth Nominal GDP Growth

Source:  PBO based on CSO data

The Output Gap (OG) is the key indicator used to assess whether an economy is fully using its resources (i.e. capital and

labour) or whether there is still spare capacity. This is the gap between the current level of economic activity (generally

measured by GDP) and its potential level. If it is positive, the economy is assumed to be at risk of overheating. Pre-

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Pre-Budget 2019 Commentary

Key Message 1: To Implement Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy

Potential output and the OG underpin the calculations of the two pillars of the EU fiscal rules of the Preventive Arm

of the Stability and Growth Pact: the Medium-Term Budgetary Objective (MTO) and the Expenditure Benchmark (EB).

However, given that these are unobservable variables, they are estimated with a high degree of uncertainty in real-time

and are subject to significant ex-post revisions. This has been particularly true for Ireland. Current best estimates

of the OG produced by the Department of Finance and by the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFAC) using alternative

methodologies to the EU Commonly Agreed Methodology (CAM) do not highlight an immediate risk of overheating

in the Irish economy. These models estimate GDP to be close to its potential level, however they do suggest overheating

could occur in the near future (potentially from 2019 onwards)6. It must be noted that the uncertainty surrounding these

estimates is significant and highly dependent on the modelling approach used. As such, there is no definitive answer.

Figure 6: Real-time estimates of historical reference rates

2004 2005 2006 20070

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Refe

renc

e Ra

te, %

Boom period - permitted real expenditure growth

2010 2011 2012 20130

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Refe

renc

e Ra

te, %

Recession period - permitted real expenditure growth

Source:  PBO calculations on European Commission data

6  Note that the OECD and the IMF estimate that Ireland is already growing beyond potential.

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The above mentioned measurement issues impact on the estimation of the underlying fiscal position (the Structural 

Balance (SB)) and on the calculation of the growth rate limit applied to Government expenditure (the Expenditure 

Benchmark). As shown in Figure 6, in an Irish context the EU Expenditure Benchmark has a tendency (at least

historically) to allow for pro-cyclical outcomes (i.e. failing to sufficiently constrain government expenditure

growth when the economy is growing fast).7

The Government in the Summer Economic Statement 2018 highlighted these issues as well as the potential risks of

economic overheating. Its response was to set out a fiscal policy stance that envisages a partial use of the fiscal space

available under the Expenditure Benchmark. The Expenditure Benchmark, calculated as the medium-term growth rate

of potential GDP (minus the convergence margin), has been inflated by high potential GDP growth rates. This is

explained by the CAM (somewhat hampered by a necessity to fit all Member States) showing a propensity to generate

estimates which do not show the underlying position of the economy but instead closely follow actual GDP. The allowed

expenditure growth rate for 2019 is 5.3%, which compares with an Expenditure Benchmark of 2.5% for Budget 2018,

only one year ago.

As outlined in Table 1, the Expenditure Benchmark would accommodate for an overall gross fiscal space of €3.9 billion

increased to €4.5 billion by accounting for the revenue raised through the non-indexation of the tax system. Of this,

€2.3 billion is already pre-committed and €500 million will be set aside for the Rainy Day Fund, whose purpose is to

increase the fiscal buffers in case of a negative economic shock (although it is not currently designed in a fully counter-

cyclical manner). The Government fiscal stance is to use €800 million of the available fiscal space to target a deficit of

0.1% of GDP for 2019. As such, Government have decided that €900 million of extra available fiscal space permitted

under the Expenditure Benchmark is not going to be used in Budget 2019. This means Ireland is focussed not on

spending the maximum amount permitted, but instead targeting a more sustainable position of close to balance.

7  For an analysis of these issues see PBO Briefing Paper 6 of 2018 “Potential Output, the Output Gap and Associated Key Issues for Fiscal Policy-making in Ireland”.

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Table 1: Fiscal Space for 2019

€ billions (unless stated) 2019

a. Reference rate, % 4.5

b. Convergence margin, percentage points 0.6

c. EB in real terms, % (a-b) 4.0

d. GDP deflator, % 1.3

e. EB in nominal terms, % (c+d) 5.3

f. Corrected expenditure aggregate year before 73.2

g. Gross fiscal space under EB (e*f/100) 3.9

h. Non-Indexation of Tax System 0.6

i. Adjusted fiscal space (g+h) 4.5

Pre-Committed Expenditure Measures 2.3

Rainy day fund 0.5

Net fiscal space to be allocated 0.8

Extra available fiscal space under EB 0.9

Source:  Summer Economic Statement 2018; PBO calculations.

The Summer Economic Statement 2018 states that in 2019 there will be a budget deficit of €350 million (0.1% of GDP

and a structural budget deficit of 0.4%). If the additional fiscal space under the Expenditure Benchmark was used

(without additional revenue-raising measures) it would postpone the achievement of the MTO by worsening the

Structural Balance from -0.4% to -0.7% of GDP and require additional borrowing. IFAC and the Central Bank of Ireland

have called for the implementation of counter-cyclical fiscal policy and an anticipation of a budget surplus in 2019.

The PBO would also highlight the potential to re-prioritise funds within the overall fiscal parameters by building upon

the work of the Spending Review, as well as evaluating the cost-effectiveness of certain tax expenditures and ending

them where necessary.

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Revenue

Recent years have seen a dramatic surge in Corporation Tax receipts, which increased by 95% since 2012 (with a

49% increase in 2015). Corporation Tax receipts have played a key role in reducing the Government deficit. The share

of corporation tax in total tax revenue has increased over time. In 2013, Corporation Tax revenue accounted for 11.3%

of total tax revenue (€4.3 billion). In 2017, it accounted for 16.2% of total tax revenue (€8.2 billion), which is above

the long term-average over 1995-2017 of 13.4%. While additional corporate tax receipts have the benefit of providing

additional resources to fund public services, the inherent volatility, due to the responsiveness of this tax category to

economic conditions and to changes in tax regimes (internationally and domestically), represents a key vulnerability.

Data from the Revenue Commissioners8 highlights that Ireland’s corporate tax receipts are also very concentrated with:

nthe top 10 taxpayers accounting for 39% of receipts in 2017; and

nforeign-owned multinationals accounting for 80% of corporate tax receipts.

As result, Ireland’s tax base is highly exposed to firm and sector-specific shocks.

It must be noted that there is also a potential systemic risk due to the number of high-income individuals linked to

the activity of multinationals (either directly employed or indirectly involved). Individuals employed by foreign-owned

multinationals make up 21% of the income tax base (Revenue, 2018). Budget 2018 also saw an increase in the Stamp

Duty rate for non-residential properties. Income from Stamp Duty has historically behaved as a very volatile source of

revenue, given that this is a transaction-based tax (it increased by 36% in 2006, and fell by 48% in 2008).

8  Revenue (2018). Corporation Tax 2017 Payments and 2016 Returns.

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Pre-Budget 2019 Commentary

Key Message 2: To Foster Stability and Sustainability of the Public Finances

Figure 7: Tax shares over time

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

0

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Income Tax VAT Excise Corporation tax Stamp Duties Other

Source:  PBO based on Department of Public Expenditure & Reform – Databank

External bodies such as the European Commission and the IMF have emphasised the desirability of broadening Ireland’s

tax base. Historically, this has been an issue related to the income tax base (see Figure 7 above). Income tax (which

includes the Universal Social Charge (USC)) is the largest revenue stream of the Exchequer, accounting for 39.4% (€20

billion) of total tax revenue in 2017 (35.5% over 2003-2017). During the pre-crisis period, budget measures that

narrowed the income tax base were introduced. As a result, the income tax share fell to less than 30% in 2006. The

financial crisis of 2008 reversed this trend as income taxes were increased and several exemptions reduced. As result,

the income tax share peaked at 42% of total Exchequer tax revenue in 2013 and 2014. In recent years, notwithstanding

the implementation of measures which have contributed to the narrowing of the income tax base, income tax receipts

have experienced strong growth, increasing by 27% since 2013.

Income tax shows a significant degree of concentration with 13% of total income tax units (those with gross income

above €70,000) accounting for 64% of total income tax paid (including USC) in 2016.9 This also highlights the high

progressivity of the Irish tax system. Ireland is the OECD country that shows the highest reduction in the market Gini

coefficient (a measure of income equality) from 50% to 28% (i.e. equalising disposable incomes) due to the impact

of the tax-benefit system.

Value-Added Tax (VAT) is the second largest revenue stream accounting for 26.2% of total tax receipts (€13.3 billion)

in 2017, below the average over 2003-2017 (29.2%). Similarly to income tax, VAT receipts have increased by 28.7% since

2013. However, the VAT share in total tax revenue has decreased in recent years due to an increasing share of corporate

tax. While in an international context Ireland’s standard rate of 23% is higher than the EU (21.5%) and OECD (19.2%)

9  Revenue (2017). Income Tax and Corporation Tax distribution statistics.

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average, it applies more exemptions and a greater number of lower rates (PBO, 2018).10 Consideration is currently being

given to the reassessment of the 9% VAT for the hospitality, catering & restaurant sectors. Estimates from the Revenue

Commissioners indicate that a return to the 13.5% rate would yield €598 million in 2018. A review paper produced by

the Department of Finance11 emphasised that in the current positive economic environment there is little rationale for

maintaining the 9% rate. It was also found that the 9% rate has a regressive impact. Households on a higher income

spend a larger share of their budget on items such as restaurants and hotels subject to the reduced rate.

The PBO also highlighted other key issues impacting on the revenue side:

nOptions around the revaluation of the property base for the Local Property Tax (LPT) and the continuation

of certain exemptions;12

nThe significant surplus income experienced by the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) in recent years (€1.8 billion

in 2017) due to the CBI’s purchase of financial assets. As the CBI sells off these assets, surplus income will

decrease over time.13

The PBO would conclude that while certain revenue streams such as corporate tax and stamp duties have a high growth

potential, particularly when the economy is growing fast, these are also highly volatile and in a recession they may

decline rapidly. It is important that to the largest extent possible Ireland’s tax base consists of revenue streams that

are more stable and less volatile, as historically has been the case for income tax and excise duty.

Expenditure

On the expenditure side of the budget, spending increases have been effectively limited by the fiscal rules in recent

years. However, the gap between expenditure and revenue growth has narrowed. Over 2019-2021, the SES forecasts

total gross voted expenditure to increase on average by 3.7% each year (current expenditure to go up by 2.5%, while

capital expenditure by 14.3%). Voted expenditure is concentrated in three main areas – social protection (33% of total

voted expenditure), health (24%) and education (15%) – collectively accounting for more than 70%.

While the period 2008-2014 saw a contraction in capital expenditure, more recently there has been increased investment

in public capital expenditure. Public capital investment has been highly pro-cyclical in Ireland. Periods of positive output

growth have been historically associated with increases in public investment, while recessions have been correlated

with expenditure cuts to this area (Bedogni and Scott, 2017).14

Gross voted capital expenditure is set to increase from €5.8 billion in 2018 to €8.6 billion in 2021, an increase of almost

50% (with an increase of 26% in 2019). With the publication of the National Development Plan, aligned with the direction

of the National Planning Framework (which emphasises balanced regional development), the Government set out a

10-year strategy for Ireland’s public infrastructure and committed to increasing investment.

10  PBO Briefing Paper 7 of 2018. Value Added Tax: Overview and Issues for Budget 2019.

11  Department of Finance (2018). Review of the 9% vat rate, analysis of economic and sectoral developments.

12  PBO Briefing Paper 2 of 2018. Local Property Tax: Issues to be considered with the revaluation of the base. 

13  PBO Note 5 of 2018. Note on Central Bank of Ireland Surplus Income.

14  Bedogni, J and Scott, R (2017). The Irish Experience: Fiscal Consolidation 2008-2014, DPER, IGEES staff paper. 

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Expenditure which funds efficient capital projects has the potential to remove infrastructural bottlenecks, to address the

current housing crisis, and as a result to tackle homelessness and competitiveness issues. As the PBO has observed in

the context of the use of PPPs,15 the construction sector is currently facing capacity issues in addressing an accumulated

housing stock deficit. Increases to the level of public capital investment would likely increase pressure on the capacity of

the construction sector, thereby contributing to inflationary pressures and potentially undermining value for money.

While recognising therefore that more capital investment raises aggregate demand in the economy and has the

potential to contribute to overheating, it is essential that this be mitigated by taking appropriate measures that would

dampen activity in other sectors of the economy. In addition, it is important that public investment is efficient. Increases

in public capital expenditure will not yield long-term gains if the projects that are funded do not meet the desired social

and economic goals at a reasonable cost.

There are two main drivers that will impact on government spending in the medium to long-term:

nThe impact of changes in size and structure of Irish population – the so-called demographic effect; and

nGovernment’s policy in relation to public sector pay and recruitment;

Trends in the public sector wage bill have been pro-cyclical over time, that is, they have tracked developments in the

wider economy. The share of Exchequer expenditure which equates to pay has reduced from a peak of 38% in 1994

(Figure 8b). Public sector pay currently makes up 28% (€17.4 billion) of Exchequer expenditure (€61.7 billion). This is

below the peak in 2009 of €20 billion. High growth rates in pay expenditure were experienced in the early 2000s, with a

peak annual growth rate of 17% in 2001 (relating to both increasing staff numbers and increasing cost of staff ).

The increase in the public sector wage bill from 2002 to 2007 was mostly due to increases in pay rates (PBO, 2018).16

This period also saw significant pay increases in the wider economy.

15  PBO Note 20 of 2018 (p.2).

16  PBO Briefing Paper 8 of 2018. Public Sector Pay and Pensions: Features and Key Determinants. 

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Figure 8a: Trends in Government Expenditure

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

Capital

€m

Non-pay Pay Pension

Figure 8b: Trends in Public sector pay expenditure

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

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2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

Growth rate in pay (LHS)

Ann

ual %

Cha

nge

%

Pay share in Exchequer expenditure (RHS)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Source:  Department of Public Expenditure & Reform – Databank

To respond to the economic crisis of 2008, pay (and numbers) consolidation measures under Financial Emergency

Measures in the Public Interest (FEMPI) legislation were introduced in 2009/2010 (pay expenditure decreased by 16.4%

in 2011) and expenditure on this area was reduced until 2014. From 2015 to 2018, with the decision to unwind FEMPI

measures, pay expenditure increased on average by 4.3% each year (vs 3.4% for total expenditure and 13% for capital

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expenditure). The public sector wage bill is not only driven by changes in pay rates but also by changes in public sector

numbers. At the end of 2017, the number of public servants almost reached its pre-crisis peak (317,500 vs 320,387),

and is expected to be surpassed in 2018. The education and health sectors account for nearly 70% of all public service

staffing (DPER, 2018).17

To avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, current decisions in relation to public sector pay and numbers should

be taken cautiously. Today’s policy decisions should be underpinned by a long-term strategic approach to workforce

planning. This is particularly important due to the phenomena of population ageing which will hit Ireland in the future.

Ireland currently has a positive demographic profile, with the lowest proportion of people aged 65 and above in the

EU-28. As a result, it spends less than other EU countries in the area of social protection mostly due to comparatively

lower spending on old-age pensions.

However, the fraction of the population aged 65 and more will increase dramatically over time, with the old-age 

dependency ratio – the number people aged 65 and above as a fraction of the working age population (15-64 age cohort)

– estimated to double to 46% by 2050.18 This will mean that there will be just over 2 workers available to support each

person aged 65 and above. Population ageing will put more pressure on the State’s finances, particularly in the area

of health and social protection, as well as contributing to reducing the potential capacity of the Irish economy.

The PBO considers it crucial to link expenditure decisions on pay and numbers to stable and less volatile revenue

streams. Experience has shown that it was unwise to implement public sector pay increases, while at the same time

narrowing the tax base, as well as funding permanent spending through volatile tax revenues. An opportunity to review

the recruitment policy will arise due to the age profile of the public sector and the significant number of retirements that

will happen in future years.

Finally, concern has been raised in relation to the financial management, accountability and transparency in both the

Health and Justice sectors. The Garda Vote necessitated a Supplementary Estimate in 2017 in relation to Garda pay and

overtime (at the end August 2018 current expenditure in the Justice Vote Group was above profile by €53 million), while

the Health sector repeatedly experienced expenditure overruns requiring additional funding in 2016 and 2017 (and a

Supplementary is also expected for this year). Analyses from the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform’s

Spending Review papers19 emphasised key management issues and the lack of an appropriate accountability

framework.

Health is the second largest area of expenditure. From 2016, public expenditure on health increased by an annual

average growth rate of 4.75% and is projected to reach its highest level ever (€15.3 billion) in 2018. Recruitment by

HSE has also increased significantly in recent years. While the sector highlights the lack of resources, which is consistent

with latest OECD statistics20 at least in terms of number of doctors and physical resources, cross-country comparisons

show Irish public health expenditure is relatively high and there is potential to achieve significant efficiency gains.21

17  Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (2018). Mid-Year Expenditure Report 2018.

18  European Commission (2018). The 2018 Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States (2016-2070).

19  Dormer, E (2018). Overtime Spending in An Garda Síochána Efficiency and Control, DPER, Spending Review 2018. Connors, J (2018). HSE Staffing Levels: Management and Sustainability, DPER, Spending Review 2018. 

20  OECD (2018), Health Statistics 2018. 

21  International Monetary Fund (2016). IMF Country Report No. 16/257. Ireland Selected Issues.

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A consistent theme within PBO analysis and commentary since it was established has been the role of the Houses

of the Oireachtas (Dáil Éireann and its Committees in particular) in relation to the scrutiny and approval of budgetary

information. In that context, the PBO has focussed on how accessible and transparent budgetary information,

particularly on the expenditure side, currently is.

It should be borne in mind that the PBO was established in the context of Dáil reform, one element of which is to

improve parliamentary engagement with the budget process. One important means of furthering that objective is by

the simplification of complex budgetary information. If this could be achieved it would promote the transparency of

the budget process and (potentially) enhance the credibility of the budget forecasts.

The PBO has expressed its view that the Budget documentation presented on Budget Day is unduly complex,

especially in the context of achieving a more effective level of parliamentary engagement.

The PBO also notes that it has often found it necessary to provide the Houses with tables (within its publications)

summarising the amount of Voted expenditure in respect of which approval is being sought by Government or which is

being evaluated (for example, in respect of the Supplementary Estimates, Revised Estimates and Spending Review).

The provision of such tables by Government would seem to be a simple but necessary element of transparency and

accessibility. The PBO also found it necessary to provide an accessible overview of the budgetary process and therefore

published a calendar in respect of 2018 setting out the key documents, when they would be published, whether they

related to the EU semester process22 and the role of the Houses of the Oireachtas.

Voted expenditure

Public expenditure on a General Government basis is expected to be €79.3 billion in 2018. Of this, approximately

€72 billion is Exchequer expenditure, with approximately €61.8 billion proposed as voted expenditure. In that

context and in light of the role of the Dáil and its committees in approving and scrutinising that amount, the PBO

paid considerable attention to Voted expenditure. Two of the stated aims of PBO Briefing Paper 3 of 2018, Revised 

Estimates for Public Services 2018, were to:

1. explain what the Revised Estimates for Public Services are and their role in the wider budgetary process; and

2. detail to what extent the Revised Estimates are being developed with regard to utility and transparency.

22  PBO Note 1 of 2018 focussed specifically on Ireland’s budgetary process and the European Semester 2018.

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Key Message 3: To Enhance Transparency and Accessibility

Specifically, the paper provided an analysis of the Revised Estimates with regard to how transparent they are. Amongst

its key findings were:

nThe inclusion of Appropriations-in-Aid as receipts, which may be retained within Votes, leads to a gap between

the net amount approved by Dáil Éireann and the gross amounts available for programme expenditure, thus

reducing process transparency’;23

nThe availability of capital carryover from year to year similarly leads to a level of complexity whereby this amount

must be added to the programme/subhead allocations of the relevant Votes if a complete perspective is to be

obtained as to what resources are available in the year in question. While this partly arises because of the legal

requirements, it also adds a layer of complexity to each year’s estimate for voted capital allocations and when

attempting to track trends over time;

nThere is, in many cases, no clear linkage between funding for programmes (and specific subheads) and the

metrics provided. In other cases, the metrics provided do not translate financial inputs into programme outputs

but relate instead to activities such as enacting legislation and implementing actions within strategies;

nThe fact that the Christmas Bonus in respect of eligible social welfare and insurance payments is not included

in the 2018 allocation for Employment Affairs and Social Protection means that the estimate for this Vote and

the SIF are not a reliable guide for whole of year expenditure. This could be partly addressed by including a

table (for information only) setting out the estimate for the payment of the Christmas Bonus based on the

previous year’s Cabinet decision;

nSimilarly, the almost annual and automatic use of Supplementary Estimates in respect of certain Votes

means that these estimates may not be definitive;

nThe financial allocation of certain programmes within Votes is very significant – this situation may

militate against the provision of sufficiently granular information at subhead level or meaningful

linkages between funding and metrics.

The PBO did however note that the Revised Estimates 2018 no longer included ‘Qualitative Statements of Outputs

and Activities’, a move which places greater emphasis on streamlined quantitative metrics in relation to performance

budgeting and should facilitate greater monitoring and tracking of performance over time.

In order to illustrate the lack of transparency overall in the approval of voted monies (and issues around budget

management) the PBO published Infographic No.4 of 2018 – Total Gross Voted Allocation and Expenditure Cycle 2017.

This illustrated that between Budget 2017 and December 2017, the allocation approved by Dáil Éireann increased by

€920 million, but the subsequent outturn was €422 million lower than this. The PBO provided the breakdown for the

outturn. Such reconciliations should be provided by the Government to the House in future years.

PBO Note 16 of 2018, Mid-Year Expenditure Report 2018, analysed the Exchequer spending position at mid-year and

provided more transparency than was previously available by highlighting that in 2018 current expenditure is above

profile, and that the seemingly positive overall position at end-June is due to underspending in capital. The PBO analysis

further highlighted that any pressure on current expenditure (esp. those that result in Supplementary Estimates) in 2018

may constrain the availability of resources for further increases to be distributed among Vote Groups in Budget 2019.

23  PBO Notes 18 and 19 of 2018 addressed specific aspects of Appropriations-in-Aid within the Revised Estimates, including the implications of the current system for transparency.

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Capital expenditure (including PPPs)

As noted in PBO Note 20 of 2018, the PBO had previously (PBO Briefing Paper 5 of 2018) suggested that transparency

could be enhanced through a more disaggregated estimate of forthcoming PPP unitary payments. The Central PPP

Policy Unit (within the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform) subsequently expanded the level of detail

provided in respect of unitary payments on its project tracker website. This and the recommendations made by the

Inter-departmental Agency group on PPPs aimed at increasing transparency (the publication of Cost Benefit Analyses,

Public Sector Benchmarks, post-project reviews, and more detailed information regarding future commitments in

respect of PPPs and Concessions to be included within Budget documentation) are to be welcomed. As the PBO

noted, this increased transparency may also be useful in better assessing overall value-for-money with regard to

capital expenditure if also implemented in respect of ‘traditional’ procurement.

Performance budgeting

An important initiative taken by the Government with regard to increasing the transparency of voted expenditure is

the publication, on annual basis, of the Public Service Performance Report. This initiative has been welcomed by the

PBO. However, PBO Notes 2 of 2017 and 9 of 2018 make recommendations which if implemented, would make it easier

to navigate and utilise the report. At present, the lack of targets presented means that the report is an activity report

rather than a performance report. Ultimately, discussion of the impact of voted expenditure on public services cannot

take place without transparency around inputs (funding, staff etc.) and the outputs produced.

In that context, PBO Infographic 3 of 2018 illustrated that 40% of expenditure is concentrated in just 10 subheads

or 1.5% of the total number (676) of subheads – conversely, the bottom 50% of subheads (by value) contain just 1% of

expenditure. This concentration in a limited number of subheads has implications for how scrutiny is carried out of the

Revised Estimates by select sectoral committees. It also has implications for the implementation and development of

performance budgeting, i.e. correlating performance indicators with expenditure.

Revenue

With regard to revenue issues, the PBO issued an infographic (PBO Infographic No. 2 of 2018) to illustrate the key

months in respect of the collection of certain taxes – this high level overview not otherwise being available to the

Houses of the Oireachtas.

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Ex-ante analysis should be an intrinsic part of policy design and implementation of new tax and spending measures, and

would help inform ex-post evaluation by identifying the type of data required. The lack of appropriate data to facilitate

ex-post analysis and review is a recurring theme across PBO publications. As a consequence, Exchequer funds risk being

directed towards programmes for which there is little-to-no evidence of effectiveness in achieving policy goals.

More specifically, in the context of labour market activation programmes (ALMPs), the PBO has emphasised24 that the

lack of data relating to participant outcomes makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of activation programmes. In

terms of performance budgeting, almost 50% of expenditure on ALMPs since 2011 has been on Work Programmes, which

are considered to be the weakest means of intervention in the labour market (with the available programme reviews

reporting poor employment outcomes). The collection and monitoring of outcome data will aid programme evaluation,

and allow for better evidence-based policy design. In addition, the routine assessment of the effectiveness of ALMPs is

crucial to ensure that Exchequer funds can be allocated towards those programmes which are successful in meeting

policy goals, and directed away from programmes which are proven to be ineffective.

The need for ex-ante analysis to form an intrinsic part of effective policy design was also emphasised by the PBO in an

analysis of tax expenditures. Although tax expenditures represent approximately 10% of total tax revenue, they are not

subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny. The publication of the aggregated cost data for each year, as well as the

publication of the estimated cost of tax expenditures for the year ahead (on an individual and aggregate basis) would

facilitate greater scrutiny and evaluation of tax expenditures. Furthermore, a rigorous approach to the routine review of

all tax expenditures should involve ex ante review to assess their appropriateness and planned implementation (and the

likely data requirements for sufficient ex post analysis), and timed ex post assessment of their effectiveness and success

in implementation.

The PBO concludes that data limitations risk restricting evidence-based policy-making and places a constraint on the

capacity to undertake effective performance budgeting. More generally, the PBO recognises that a systematic approach

to data collection and monitoring, and to programme review and evaluation, should be an integral part of future policy

design. It is important that enhanced in house economic expertise (e.g. through the Irish Government Economic and

Evaluation Service (IGEES)) is leveraged to strengthen the use of evidence in public policy-making.

24  PBO Briefing Paper 10 of 2018. Active Labour Market Policies. 

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Pre-Budget 2019 Commentary

Key Message 4: To Promote Evidence-based Policy-making

The financial crisis of 2008 was the key driver of the implementation of several institutional reforms to the budgetary

architecture in OECD countries. Examples of these budgetary innovations, which have also been introduced in an Irish

context, are the Performance-based Budgeting Framework and the Spending Review, both centred on the assessment

of the rationale, efficiency and performance of government expenditure. The PBO itself is a further example of

an institutional reform to help Oireachtas Members better engage in the Budget process.

Last year saw the start of an Equality Budgeting initiative led by DPER by way of a pilot programme carried out in

six departments (Education, Business, Transport, Culture, Health and Youth Affairs). This pilot was the first step of

a strategy intended to mainstream equality considerations, gender initially, into the budget process. The pilot is

published as a part of Revised Estimates for Public Services, and for a number of existing expenditure programmes

administered by the six Departments it defines high level gender objectives and indicators. The PBO recognises25 the

importance of equality proofing and welcomed the initiative. The PBO also noted that there is scope for building upon

and enhancing the metrics and indicators employed in the pilot. In particular, key issues were highlighted in relation to:

nthe consistency and quality of ‘Key High Level Metrics’ and ‘Context and Impact Indicators’;

nthe weak link between monetary allocations and metrics;

nthe focus on outputs rather than on performance; and

nthe identification of the impact on performance of factors not under the control of the Department.

In the context of gender proofing, the PBO commissioned the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI)

to undertake a project to enhance the potential to scrutinise the gender impact of budgetary policies in Ireland.

The goals of the research project were as follows:

nto refine the analytical approach developed in a 2014 pilot project;

nto assess the gender impacts of budgetary policies taken over the last 10 years; and

nto enhance the analytical capacity of the ESRI’s SWITCH model to enable gender impact assessments

in the future to be routinely performed prior to the budget or for ex-post analysis.

The final report will be published in October.

Following a request from the Select Committee on Budgetary Oversight, the PBO produced a briefing paper

investigating alternative approaches to better integrate climate-related issues into the budgetary process.26 The

reasons for strengthening the Budget process to address climate change more effectively include individuals’ focus

on the present and governments’ accountability to the current electorate, the negative environmental effects from

greenhouse gas emissions, and the need to achieve EU climate and energy targets.

25  PBO Briefing Paper 4 of 2018. The Gender and Equality Budgeting pilot in the Revised Estimates for Public Services 2018. 

26  PBO Briefing Paper 12 of 2018. An Approach to Better Incorporate Climate-related Considerations into the Budget Process.

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Key Message 5: To Promote Innovations in the Budget process

Informed by first-hand survey evidence on other countries’ practices, the findings indicate that for most of the countries

that were analysed, climate change has no special position in the annual budgetary process. However, it was possible to

identify key learnings and useful case studies from international experience. Four main reform options were proposed on

the basis of an analysis of the original elements of four case studies – Austria, Sweden, Italy and Norway – and of an

assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Ireland’s current framework.

In addition, the PBO recognises that the provision of an accurate, comprehensive and impartial costing service is

important to ensure that parliamentarians have the required resources to engage in an informed and productive debate

on policy proposals. This is particularly true in the context of the annual Budget process. On that basis, PBO launched a

quality assurance service for political parties and groups in respect of the costing of shadow budget proposals carried

out by Government Departments.

Specifically, the PBO published two notes on the costing of shadow budget proposals by the civil service. PBO Note 12

provides an overview of the existing costing service operated by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform

(DPER), and the Department of Finance (DFIN), while PBO Note 13 outlines PBO’s quality assurance service in respect

of these costings.

The PBO recognises the value of introducing innovations in the budgetary process which contribute to improve

policy debate, scrutiny, accountability and transparency.

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Commentaries

Quarterly Economic and Fiscal Commentary (Q2 2018) 10 July 2018

Quarterly Economic and Fiscal Commentary (Q1 2018) 16 April 2018

Quarterly Economic and Fiscal Commentary (Q4 2017) 23 January 2018

Briefing Papers

Briefing Paper 14 of 2018  The HSE National Service Plan and its Relationship with the Health Vote 24 September 2018

Briefing Paper 13 of 2018  Tax Expenditures in Ireland: Key Issues for Consideration 21 September 2018

Briefing Paper 12 of 2018  An Approach to Better Incorporate Climate-related Considerations into the Budget Process

18 September 2018

Briefing Paper 11 of 2018  Analysis of Spending Review 2018 17 September 2018

Briefing Paper 10 of 2018  Active Labour Market Policies 22 August 2018

Briefing Paper 9 of 2018  An Overview of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in Ireland and potential regional and 

sectoral implications of future reforms 17 August 2018

Briefing Paper 8 of 2018  Public Sector Pay and Pensions: Features and Key Determinants 16 August 2018

Briefing Paper 7 of 2018  Value Added Tax: Overview and Issues for Budget 2019 24 July 2018

Briefing Paper 6 of 2018  Potential Output, the Output Gap and Associated Key Issues for Fiscal Policy-making in Ireland

11 May 2018

Briefing Paper 5 of 2018  An overview of Public Private Partnerships in Ireland 16 March 2018

Briefing Paper 4 of 2018  The Gender and Equality Budgeting pilot in the Revised Estimates for Public Services 2018

27 February 2018

Briefing Paper 3 of 2018  Revised Estimates for Public Services 2018 20 February 2018

Briefing Paper 2 of 2018  Local Property Tax: Issues to be considered with the revaluation of the base 15 January 2018

Briefing Paper 1 of 2018  European Semester 2018 and how it interacts with Ireland’s Budget 2019 15 January 2018

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Publications 2018

PBO Notes

Note 20 of 2018  Report of the Inter-Departmental/Agency Group (IDAG) on PPPs 17 September 2018

Note 19 of 2018  Public Sector pensions in the Revised Estimates for Public Services 14 September 2018

Note 18 of 2018  Appropriations-in-Aid in the Revised Estimates for Public Services 14 September 2018

Note 17 of 2018  Taxation and the Economy 22 August 2018

Note 16 of 2018  Mid-Year Expenditure Report 2018 16 August 2018

Note 15 of 2018  Economic growth for 2017 and Q1 2018 25 July 2018

Note 14 of 2018  The Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 of the EU – the European Commission’s proposals

11 June 2018

Note 13 of 2018  The PBO’s approach to enhancing the civil service costing facility 8 June 2018

Note 12 of 2018  An overview of the existing civil service costing facility 8 June 2018

Note 11 of 2018  2018 European Semester: Draft Country Specific Recommendations for Ireland 28 May 2018

Note 10 of 2018  2018 European Semester: European Commission’s Assessment of the 2018 Stability Programme for 

Ireland 28 May 2018

Note 9 of 2018  Public Service Performance Report 2017 11 May 2018

Note 8 of 2018  An overview of the Social Insurance Fund (SIF) 11 May 2018

Note 7 of 2018  Note on Sugar Tax 27 April 2018

Note 6 of 2018  Overview of the Stability Programme Update 2018 23 April 2018

Note 5 of 2018  Note on Central Bank of Ireland Surplus Income 22 March 2018

Note 4 of 2018  2018 European Semester: Country Report Ireland 22 March 2018

Note 3 of 2018  The Multiannual Financial Framework of the EU 9 February 2018

Note 2 of 2018  Note on Revaluation of the Local Property Tax base 15 January 2018

Note 1 of 2018  Note on Ireland’s budgetary process and the European Semester 2018 15 January 2018

Infographics

Infographic 4 of 2018  Total Gross Voted Allocation and Expenditure Cycle 2017 27 April 2018

Infographic 3 of 2018  Revised Estimates for Public Services, subheads by expenditure 23 April 2018

Infographic 2 of 2018  Exchequer revenue – Significant months 2018 6 March 2018

Infographic 1 of 2018  Budgetary Cycle 2018 10 January 2018

Tax Strategy Group Summaries - Pre-Budget 2019

Income Tax, USC and PRSI issues and options 21 September 2018

Stamp Duty, Capital Gains Tax, Capital Acquisitions Tax, and Local Property Tax Issues and Options 21 September 2018

Energy and Environmental Tax Issues and Options 18 September 2018

Excise Tax Issues and Options 18 September 2018

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Contact: PBO@Oireachtas.ie Go to our webpage: www.Oireachtas.ie/PBO Publication date: 1 October 2018

Houses of the Oireachtas Leinster House Kildare Street Dublin 2 D02 XR20

www.oireachtas.ie Tel: +353 (0)1 6183000 or 076 1001700 Twitter: @OireachtasNews

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