An Overview of South Africa’s Promotion of Democracy in Africa (1994 – Present)

Justin Ooi

26260611

AZA3641 Research Essay

Due date: Friday 16 September, 23h55

Lecturer: Dr Victoria Graham

An Overview of South Africa’s Promotion of Democracy in Africa (1994 – Present)

I, JUSTIN OOI, hereby confirm that I have read

and signed the plagiarism form on Moodle.

Justin Ooi Monash University

Abstract:

Since its liberation from the apartheid regime, South Africa, for the most part, has articulated its intention

to promote democracy in Africa. Under Mandela from 1994 to 1999, this came about mainly through

unilateral approaches through peaceful means. Mbeki however, during his presidency from 1999 to 2008,

felt Mandela’s approaches were impractical and opted for a more multilateral approach, emphasizing

instead on African stability through unity. Zuma maintained Mbeki’s approach in emphasizing African

unity during his presidency from 2009. However, with increased pressure to focus on domestic welfare,

Zuma has claimed to engage in foreign affairs with the goal of serving ‘national interests’. This paper

will explore the different methods of each of these three presidents and discuss the effectiveness of South

Africa in the promotion of democracy throughout the African continent. In light of this analysis, this

paper concludes that South Africa, though an icon of democracy, has failed to bring about significant

democratic reform in its African counterparts due to inconsistencies in its objectives.


Table of Contents 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 1

2. Democracy Promotion under Mandela (1994 – 1999) ........................................................................ 1

2.1 Obstacles in Mandela’s Promotion of Democracy ........................................................................ 2

3. Democracy Promotion under Mbeki (1999 – 2008) ........................................................................... 3

3.1 Obstacles in Mbeki’s Promotion of Democracy ........................................................................... 4

4. African “Unity” and “Stability” Promotion under Zuma (2009 – present) ......................................... 5

5. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 6

6. Reference List ..................................................................................................................................... 7


Justin Ooi (26260611)

Monash South Africa


Due date: Friday 16 September, 23h55 Word Count: 2735

1

1. Introduction

South Africa’s foreign policies, under the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC),

are clear and concise in articulating the nation’s aim to promote democracy throughout the African

continent. However, since the ANC’s installation in Pretoria after the 1994 elections, South Africa has

failed more often than it has succeeded in promoting its democracy ideals. This is due to the many

obstacles surrounding the nation’s self-imposing role as the vanguard of democracy in the region.

Throughout the presidencies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and Jacob Zuma, South Africa has often

found itself entangled in issues such as foreign resistance to its intervention, competing priorities

between domestic and continental development, and contrasting strategies in maintaining stability on

the continent – all of which have caused it to alter its approach and to contradict its initial aim to promote

democracy. Thus, this paper will discuss the strategies, efforts, and struggles of South Africa throughout

the presidencies of Mandela, Mbeki, and Zuma in its promotion of democracy across the African

continent during the post-apartheid era.

2. Democracy Promotion under Mandela (1994 – 1999)

Under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, South Africa was steadfast in the belief that its foreign

policy was not a separate element, but an integral part, and a broadening of its national interests (African

National Congress, 1994). The struggle of Nelson Mandela and the ANC during the apartheid system

was in itself a battle for democracy and human rights. Thus, when the ANC clinched victory and grasped

hold of Pretoria after the 1994 elections which involved universal suffrage, and in the meantime,

establishing South Africa as a global icon of democracy, it was no surprise to anyone when it articulated

principles of its foreign policy in the 1994 Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa

document to include beliefs in “Human Rights which extends beyond the political, embracing the

economic, social and environmental”; that “just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can

only come through the promotion of Democracy, worldwide”; and that its “foreign relations must mirror

[its] deep commitment to the consolidation of a democratic South Africa” (African National Congress,

1994). In the same document, the ANC also expressed intention as the government of a “democratic

South Africa”, to “promote the objectives of democracy, peace, stability, development and mutually

beneficial relations among the people of Africa as a whole” (African National Congress, 1994).

Furthermore, in 1993, Mandela proclaimed that “South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we

do not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that brought ruin to

its various parts” (Kraxberger & McClaughry, 2013, p. 11). Thus, Mandela-led South Africa believed

that focusing on the development of a democratically united Africa would safeguard not only its national

interests but also all those of other nations of Africa.



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In implementing the principles of its foreign policy, the Mandela administration was quick to

stamp its influence both globally and regionally. By 1996, it had “124” diplomatic missions abroad, “a

membership of 45 international organizations”, and was prominently involved in organizations such as

the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO),

and the Commonwealth (Barber, 2005, p. 1082). In Africa, it obtained membership in the Southern

African Development Community (SADC), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which was

later replaced by the African Union (AU) in 2001 (Barber, 2005, p. 1082). Its extensive involvement in

organizations proved that South Africa was committed to engaging and influencing other states

worldwide not only unilaterally, but also multilaterally.

In Africa, South Africa’s democracy promotion was demonstrated through its attempts to settle

disputes using soft power diplomacy in dealing with other African nations mainly through peaceful

mediation between conflicting factions to achieve peace (Landsberg, 2000, p. 109; Masters, 2012, p.

77). During a 1994 crisis in Lesotho for example, Mandela, together with other SADC leaders, through

threatening to “impose sanctions”, were able to pressure King Letsie III and Prime Minister Ntsu

Mokhehle to end the power contest and to restore peace through constitutional order (Landsberg, 2000,

p. 110). Similarly, in the case of Angola, Mandela was able to broker a truce between President Jose

Eduardo dos Santos and the rebel leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

(UNITA), Jonas Savimbi, to work together to achieve peace in the nation (Landsberg, Promoting

Democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine, 2000, p. 110). Although the peace in both Lesotho and

Angola did not last long, the temporary stability achieved through South Africa’s mediation in these

countries demonstrated Mandela’s non-military and peaceful strategy in his promotion of democracy.

The only time South Africa used armed force in democracy-promotion under Mandela was during the

height of the Lesotho crisis in 1998, in which the SADC members unanimously took action to restore

democracy in the country (Khadiagala & Nganje, 2015, p. 7).

2.1 Obstacles in Mandela’s Promotion of Democracy

Although Nelson Mandela’s efforts were very much admired by many democracies around the

world, they were not entirely well received in the African region for various reasons which proved to

be a major impediment. Firstly, the ANC’s hesitancy to distance itself from “anti-democratic regimes”

such as North Korea, Libya, and Cuba dented its image as an advocate for democracy in Africa

(Khadiagala & Nganje, 2015, p. 6). Secondly, considering South Africa was a rather new entrant at the

time, many African leaders refused to be “lectured” by the Mandela administration on how to run their

countries (Khadiagala & Nganje, 2015, p. 5). They accused South Africa of being involved in a

“Western project”. For this reason, Zimbabwe, Angola, and the DRC, as Landsberg argues, further

responded by “openly defying South African policy” and by trying to “isolate South Africa politically”

(2000, p. 107). Thirdly, South Africa’s peaceful approach in achieving democracy contrasted to that of

its SADC allies’ “confrontational approach” which caused much friction between them (Barber, 2005,



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pp. 1085-1086). One such case was the 1996 conflict between President Mobutu and Laurent Kabila

and their factions in the DRC in which Mandela unilaterally attempted to broker a truce. However, his

SADC allies from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia intervened with armed forces to help Kabila to his

eventual victory (Barber, 2005, pp. 1085-1086). Thus, strong resistance from other African states

proved to have limited the effectiveness of South Africa’s policies in Africa.

Domestically, citizens were torn in two factions pertaining to the focus of the Mandela

administration’s foreign policies in democracy promotion. On one hand, there were those who believed,

like Mandela, that “democratization [through diplomatic intervention] fosters peaceful and stable

neighborhoods”, and on the other, those who believed in “leadership by example”, respect for national

sovereignty, and devotion of fewer resources to other countries (Khadiagala & Nganje, 2015, p. 16).

Consequently, the call for a less resource-straining and domestic-focused strategy set the tone for the

Mbeki administration in the manner in which it handled the promotion of democracy in Africa.

3. Democracy Promotion under Mbeki (1999 – 2008)

Though Mbeki played a pivotal role in carrying out Mandela’s strategies in democracy

promotion as deputy president, he did not carry out his predecessor’s unilateral methods and principles

during his term as president as he counted them as “high-minded” and “impractical” for the nation and

its economy (Khadiagala & Nganje, 2015, p. 8). Instead, he opted for a more “pragmatic” and

multilateral approach with a mix of quiet diplomacy through working closely with the SADC, AU, and

the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), emphasizing solidarity among African

nations through campaigns such as the “African Renaissance” (Alden & Le Pere, 2003, pp. 29-30;

Vines, 2010, p. 54; Kraxberger & McClaughry, 2013, p. 15). Thus, the adoption of instruments such as

the “African Charter for Democracy, Elections and Good Governance; the AU principles Guiding

Democratic Elections in Africa; and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)” as well as the

“SADC principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections” by the AU and SADC became

vehicles for Mbeki’s multilateral strategy in democracy promotion in Africa (Khadiagala & Nganje,

2015, pp. 9-10).

The Mbeki approach was instrumental in peacekeeping most notably in the Great Lakes region.

In 1999, South Africa, together with the UN, turned its focus to Burundi which successfully helped

them resolve its civil war. Consequently, in 2005, South Africa and the UN were again instrumental in

facilitating Burundi’s national elections which led to stability in the country after the inauguration of

President Nkurunziza (Khadiagala, 2013, p. 101). A similar approach was taken together with the UN

and the AU in dealing with the DRC which eventually brought about an end to its civil war in 2006

(Khadiagala & Nganje, 2015, p. 9). In these two nations, Mbeki’s approach experienced a breakthrough

in the promotion of democracy. However, analysts argue that the successes in the Great Lakes region



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“belied the formidable dilemmas” that came as a consequence of his multilateral approach (Khadiagala

& Nganje, 2015, p. 9).

3.1 Obstacles in Mbeki’s Promotion of Democracy

Mbeki’s tolerance for undemocratic regimes both in Africa and globally cost South Africa

substantial credibility in promoting democracy. Regionally, South Africa used ‘quiet diplomacy’ in

regards to Angola and Swaziland which were at the time in the midst of domestic power struggles

(Khadiagala & Nganje, 2015, p. 9). On a global scale, he was friendly towards dictators such as Castro

of Cuba and Gadhafi of Libya with whom he offered support and friendship for having been supportive

of the ANC cause during apartheid (Olivier, 2003, p. 821). Furthermore, in the UN, South Africa

attracted extensive attention when it, together with Russia and China, voted against the 2007 United

Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution condemning the human rights abuses in Burma, to which

some critics responded by calling the decision “dismal”, claiming that it made South African diplomacy

“even more murky” than before (ReliefWeb, 2007; United Nations, 2007).

Mbeki, however, was most criticized for his “moral indifference” towards his Zimbabwean

counterpart Robert Mugabe. Mugabe, despite his apparent human rights violations and undemocratic

ways, garnered support from the Mbeki on numerous occasions. For example, when Western nations

from the European Union (EU) placed economic sanctions on Zimbabwe due to its commitment of

“political violence, serious violations of human rights and restrictions on the media”, South Africa

provided Rand 1 billion to Zimbabwe as an “economic rescue” while refusing to join in the international

criticism of the Mugabe regime (The Guardian, 2002; Khadiagala & Nganje, 2015, p. 9).

In regards to Zimbabwe’s elections, Mbeki remained supportive of Mugabe. During the 2000

parliamentary election and the 2002 presidential election, despite the fact that many election observers

reported obvious political suppression of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition

party and electoral fraud, Mbeki denied any wrongdoing on Mugabe’s part and even endorsed the

elections as both “credible” and “legitimate” (McKinley, 2004, p. 360; Khadiagala & Nganje, 2015, p.

9). The 2008 election was no different, except this time Mbeki acted as mediator between Mugabe and

the opposition, which resulted in the reaching of the agreement for both factions to sign the Global

Political Agreement (GPA) and forming a coalition known as the Government of National Unity (GNU)

(Khadiagala & Nganje, 2015, p. 10). To Mbeki, the forming of a coalition between the two Zimbabwean

factions was considered a victory on his part. However, South Africa’s campaigns to promote

democracy across Africa were gravely affected due to the way it handled Zimbabwe. As Khadiagala

and Nganje argue, “Zimbabwe became the global barometer for South Africa’s inability to live up to

the values of democratization” (2015, p. 10). Thus, under Mbeki, it became even more difficult than

before for South Africa to promote democracy to African authoritarian regimes both through unilateral

and multilateral channels.



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Critics claim that the Mbeki administration accumulated a poor record in democracy promotion.

They argue that his multilateral approach and the advocacy for an “African Renaissance” through the

AU and the SADC were too “vague” and “impractical” and were means to avoid isolation from his

African counterparts and from being labelled a “lackey” of the West as was the case of his predecessor

(Clark, 2016, pp. 34-35; Landsberg, 2000, p. 119; Olivier, 2003, p. 817). In addition, the instruments

that were put in place by the AU and the SADC such as the APRM mechanism were regarded as merely,

as Olivier argues, “toothless mechanisms of African unity” (Olivier, 2003, p. 818). In other words, these

mechanisms did nothing to enhance democracy as they were often compromised. Furthermore, South

Africa’s treatment of Zimbabwe, under Mbeki, proved that it preferred garnering regional allies – hence

its multilateral approach – rather than imposing what many of its African counterparts regarded as

“Western ideals”, even if it meant that it was to stand by these allies through their undemocratic

practices.

4. African “Unity” and “Stability” Promotion under Zuma (2009 –

present)

When Jacob Zuma came into office in 2009, he was faced with demands to focus on domestic

welfare rather than on foreign policy schemes that were frequent during the presidencies of Mandela

and Mbeki. Indeed, soon after his inauguration, Zuma proclaimed a “new foreign policy paradigm”, of

which national interest would become the central focus through the strengthening of the “African

agenda”, of “South-South cooperation”, “South-North relations”, and “foreign political and economic

ties” (Landsberg, 2010, pp. 273-274). Furthermore, despite resisting pressure to “scale down” Mbeki’s

policies, Zuma’s own foreign policy, as articulated in the 2011 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign

Policy, seemed to lack Mandela’s ideals and are even silent on the promotion of democratic values

(Khadiagala & Nganje, 2015, p. 11).

Instead, Zuma’s diplomatic approach in Africa thus far proves to be similar to that of Mbeki’s,

in that it is more concerned in African “unity” and “stability”. For example, regarding the International

Criminal Court (ICC) case against the Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir in 2009, the Zuma

administration sided with the AU against the ICC for the sake of “regional security” (Khadiagala &

Nganje, 2015, p. 15). A further display of the Zuma administration’s concern in African unity and

stability can be seen in the Ivory Coast 2010 elections, in which Zuma, together with Angola and

Uganda, attempted to initiate a settlement between the two Ivory Coast factions. In addition, regarding

the UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya on 2011, Zuma publicly questioned the UN for not giving “space”

for the AU to foster a solution to the Libyan crisis (sanews.gov.za, 2011).

Critics question Zuma’s approach through his domestically-driven foreign policy. They argue

that South Africa now seems to have abandoned its role in democracy promotion and instead pursues



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diplomatic relations with authoritarian countries based on commercial interests (Khadiagala & Nganje,

2015, p. 13; Landsberg, 2010, pp. 273-274). In other words, they question Zuma’s commitment to

African “stability” and “unity” and whether it is a facade of underlying commercial interests such as in

the cases of Sudan, Libya, and Ivory Coast. Time will only tell how Zuma will shape South Africa’s

foreign policy during his presidency, and whether he will continue the status quo or shift back towards

a more democracy-promoting one as in the days of Mandela.

5. Conclusion

Although Mandela, through his ideals, sought out to right the many wrongs of his African

counterparts through a mix of unilateral and multilateral approaches, his efforts were not well received

which consequently resulted in the political isolation of South Africa by other OAU and SADC

members. This, in turn, influenced the way his successor Mbeki shaped foreign policy to operate

through multilateral schemes in an effort to avoid political isolation. However, Mbeki’s tolerance for

undemocratic regimes such as the Mugabe administration gravely hampered South Africa’s ability to

promote democracy where it counts. Towards the end of Mbeki’s term, the leadership faced increasing

pressures to focus on domestic welfare rather than foreign policy schemes which set the tone for the

Zuma administration. Presently, questions continue to arise regarding the Zuma administration’s

foreign policy which seems to lack focus in democracy promotion and instead on African unity based

on “national interests”. Thus, South Africa’s constant altering of approaches in its role as a democracy

promoter has garnered widespread controversy and has hampered its ability to make significant

democratic improvements across Africa especially during a time of scandals under the Zuma

administration. Time will only tell if the leadership of South Africa is able to once again restore

democratic credibility to its name.

(Word count for main body of essay: 2735 words)


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6. Reference List African National Congress. (December, 1994). Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South

Africa. Retrieved from African National Congress: http://www.anc.org.za/content/foreign-

policy-perspective-democratic-south-africa

Alden, C., & Le Pere, G. (2003). Mbeki and the Foreign Policy of Consolidation. The Adelphi Papers,

43(362), 27-35.

Barber, J. (2005). The New South Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Practice. International Affairs,

81(5), 1079-1096.

Clark, J. F. (2016). South Africa: Africa’s Reluctant and Conflicted Regional Power. ASPJ Africa &

Francophonie, pp. 31-47.

Khadiagala, G. M. (2013). Burundi, 2002-2012. In J. Boulden (Ed.), Responding to Conflict in Africa:

The United Nations and Regional Organizations (pp. 101-119). New York, New York:

Palgrave. doi:10.1007/978-1-137-36758-7_6

Khadiagala, G. M., & Nganje, F. (2015). The Evolution of South Africa's Democracy Promotion in

Africa: From Idealism to Pragmatism. (July, Ed.) Cambridge Review of Internation Affairs, 1-

20. doi:10.1080/09557571.2015.1058655

Kraxberger, B. M., & McClaughry, P. A. (14 June, 2013). South Africa in Africa: a geo-political

perspective. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 47(1), 9-25.

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2013.778063

Landsberg, C. (2000). Promoting Democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine. Journal of Democracy,

11(3), 107-121.

Landsberg, C. (December, 2010). The Foreign Policy of the Zuma Government: Pursuing the 'National

Interest'? South African Journal of International Affairs, 17(3), 273-293.

doi:10.1080/10220461.2010.533890

Masters, L. (2012). South Africa's Emerging Parliamentary Diplomacy and Soft Power. Strategic

Review for Southern Africa, 37(2), 74-93.

McKinley, D. T. (2004). South African Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki. Review of

African Political Economy, 31(100), 357-364.

Olivier, G. (2003). Is Thabo Mbeki Africa's Saviour? International Affairs, 73(4), 815-828.

ReliefWeb. (18 January, 2007). DA slams SA's UN decision on Burma. Retrieved 15 September, 2016,

from http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/da-slams-sas-un-decision-burma

sanews.gov.za. (13 October, 2011). SA foreign policy independent, says Zuma. Pretoria. Retrieved 16

September, 2016, from http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-foreign-policy-

independent-says-zuma

The Guardian. (18 February, 2002). EU imposes sanctions on Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe. Retrieved 16

September, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/18/zimbabwe

United Nations. (12 January, 2007). Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Myanmar,

Owing to Negative Votes by China, Russian Federation. Retrieved 15 September, 2016, from

http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc8939.doc.htm


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Vines, A. (2010). South Africa’s politics of peace and security in Africa. South African Journal of

International Affairs, 17(1), 53-63. Retrieved from

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10220461003763841


Documents

An Overview of South Africa’s Promotion of Democracy in Africa (1994 – Present)