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Deepening Democracy or Defendingthe Nation? The Europeanisation ofMinority Rights and GreekCitizenship

DIA ANAGNOSTOU

ABSTRACT This article examines the emergence of European norms and institutionsof human rights and their impact on domestic policies and practices pertaining tocitizenship and minorities in Greece. Since the beginning of the 1990s, with anintensification of Europeanisation processes in Greece, government policy towardsminorities has undergone a process of liberalisation that culminated with the abrogationof Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code (GCC) in 1998, on which this article

focuses. It presents an empirical analysis of the process that led to the abrogation of

Article 19 of the GCC and it is primarily interested in the role European institutionsplayed in it. Was its elimination a product of the reconfiguration of traditional Greekconceptions of citizenship and minorities, or was it an instance of instrumental changetaking place within the given frame of national interests and identities?

Over the past 15 years, the determination of domestic elites across the

major political parties to bring Greece into the mainstream of the EU

after ten years of ambivalence and marginality has marked the

intensification of the Europeanisation process in the country. Specialists

on Greece have explored the latter, encompassing a reordering of policy

priorities, as well as far-reaching restructuring of political-economic

institutions and statesociety relations, notwithstanding its specificity as a

peripheral state historically and geographically situated in Southeast

Europe (Featherstone 1998; Ioakimidis 1995). Drawing from a burgeon-

ing literature on Europeanisation, these studies reflect a shift in academic

interest from supranational institution building to the effects of European

structures of governance and normative frames in reconfiguring domestic

politics and institutions (Ladrech 1994; Featherstone and Kazamias 2000;

Radaelli 2000). Depending on the degree of fit between national andEuropean institutional make-up, integration exerts adaptational pressures,

Correspondence Address: Scientific Advisor to the Greek Ombudsman. Email address:

[email protected]

West European Politics,

Vol. 28, No. 2, 335 357, March 2005

ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online # 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/01402380500059785


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a multifaceted and far from uniform process whereby EU norms and

policies are transposed in variable ways and degrees in distinct national

settings (Risse et al. 2001).

However, studies have paid relatively little attention to the effects ofEuropeanisation on how states deal with minorities and allocate citizenship,

which often touches upon politically delicate and emotionally charged issues

of national membership and identity. In the post-World War II period,

European institutions such as the Council of Europe (CoE) and the

Conference (now Organisation) for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(CSCE/OSCE) engaged in far-reaching elaboration of human rights

principles. Since the end of the Cold War their activities have extended

their standard-setting and normative purview to the protection of

minorities. An interweaving set of provisions and a comprehensive regimeof norms and rules have emerged, enjoining obligations for member states to

respect and protect the rights of minorities (Jackson Preece 1998). Concern

with the rise of minority issues in post-communist Central-East and

Southeast Europe was among the factors that led the CoE in 1997 to adopt

the European Convention on Nationality, seeking to regulate the acquisi-

tion of citizenship and to prevent statelessness and the arbitrary withdrawal

of it. Intent upon safeguarding individual rights and preventing discrimi-

native practices regardless of ethnic-religious origin, European norms and

institutions arguably challenge traditional notions of citizenship premisedupon cultural belonging to the national community and promote a more

inclusive conception of national membership (Soysal 1994).

The proliferation of such norms presents a misfit for member states

(Risse et al. 2001) where the history and development of state institutions

and laws has systematically privileged the interests of national unity often at

the expense of individual rights and minorities. Greece is such a case in point

(Pollis 1992). Historical reasons related to the slow process of unification of

different areas and a sharp sense of insecurity forged an exclusive conception

of the Greek nation that continued to shape formally and substantively the

allocation of citizenship rights beyond the transition to democracy in 1974.

National laws and practices allocating citizenship rights to minorities reflect

deeply ingrained cultural-historical traditions and conceptions of nation-

hood that have a lasting and formative quality (Brubaker 1992). In a society

divided by the legacy of the civil war of the 1940s and the polarised

international climate of the Cold War, post-war Greek governments sought

to disenfranchise minorities, viewing them as a danger to national unity and

territorial integrity that had to be assimilated or defended against.

Scholars primarily from the field of international relations and European

studies depict very differently the specific ways and dynamics whereby theEuropeanisation of human rights bears upon domestic institutions, practices

and collective understandings. On the one hand, scholars argue that

European human rights and minority protection norms influence national

institutions and practices in so far as they are actively supported by domestic

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societal groups that pressurise their governments to comply with these

(Joppke 1998). Alternatively, such norms and principles elicit compliance

when there is a shifting balance towards domestic elite groups that

instrumentally appeal to such norms as a means of furthering particularinterests and strategic ends (Moravscik 1995). On the other hand, other

scholars argue that European principles of human rights and minority

protection can have a deeper effect. They induce through learning normative

and/or societal change among elites, who develop and internalise new

understandings about citizenship and national membership (Checkel 2001a:

182; Risse 1999; Risse et al. 2001: 12). The implications of the perspective

that sees the impact of European norms to be primarily thin and

instrumental and the other one that sees it as thick and normative are very

different (Checkel 2001b). In contrast to the former, the latter seesEuropeanisation as capable of gradually redefining historically formed

collective understandings of nation and citizenship.

This article examines the emergence of European norms and institutions

of human rights and their impact on domestic policies and practices

pertaining to citizenship and minorities in Greece. From the 1980s, Greece

witnessed the mobilisation of numerically small but significant historical

minorities, such as Turkish Muslims and Slavic-speakers of northern

Greece, whose assertion of rights and cultural identity became a compelling

political issue with the collapse of communism and the disintegration ofYugoslavia (Clogg 2002: xixii). With the intensification of Europeanisation

processes in Greece at the beginning of the 1990s, government policy

towards minorities underwent significant changes. Despite the rising tide of

Greek nationalist sentiment, the early 1990s also marked a turning point in

Greek government policy towards the countrys most important minority,

the Turkish-speaking Muslims of Thrace, characterised by a process of

liberalisation of their rights. The latter culminated with the abrogation of

Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code in 1998, on which this article

focuses.

Article 19 of the Citizenship Code and Minorities in Greece

Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code (GCC) stipulated that individuals

who were not ethnically Greek (allogeneis), who left the country without the

intention of returning, could be deprived of their citizenship. Having its

origins in a 1927 presidential decree, this provision was incorporated as

Article 19 in the GCC that was adopted with Law 3370/1955 (Papasiopi-

Pasia 2002: 158). Article 19 provided a means to sever the links between the

Greek state and those who did not assimilate (Stavros 1996: 120). Of centralimportance for the application of this provision was the concept of non-

ethnic Greek (allogenis) that has received two diverse interpretations in the

domestic legal and administrative system. One attributes it to individuals

born of non-ethnic Greek parents, while the other takes it to apply to those

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who lack Greek national consciousness through not having been assimilated

into the Greek nation (Stavros 1996: 119). While a combination of the two

aspects was used to draw the line between Greeks and non-Greeks

(Papasiopi-Pasia 2002: 3738), the development of Greek citizenship hasprimarily taken place along jus sanguinis lines, with the criterion of national

consciousness acquisition playing a subsidiary role (Christopoulos 2004).

The application of Article 19 targeted the countrys historical minorities

(Slavic speakers, Jews, Albanian Muslims), who were viewed as having loose

ties with the Greek state and as potentially threatening the unity of the

latter.

While targeting communists during the Civil War years, the removal of

Greek nationality on the basis of this provision was overwhelmingly

employed from the 1960s onwards vis-a-vis the Turkish-speaking Muslimsin the northeast region of Western Thrace, a small community whose

political salience far surpasses its small size.1 Originally comprising Muslims

of Turkish origin, Gypsies (Roma) and Pomaks whose original mother

tongue is Slavic, who prior to World War II largely coexisted as a religious

community characteristic of the Ottoman millet system, they subsequently

developed a common ethnic Turkish consciousness. Thraces designated

Muslim minority was exempt, with the Greeks of Istanbul, from the

mandatory population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1922, in line

with the international Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Its section on theProtection of Minorities was a bilateral treaty between Greece and Turkey

designated as the guaranteeing powers of the minority rights stipulated in

the treaty (Ladas 1932). On the basis of an explicit condition of reciprocity

(amiveotita), it defined Greece and Turkey as custodians that could monitor

and intervene in the affairs of their kindred minority across the border. In

this way, it established a basis for subsuming the minority under Greek

Turkish relations, which deteriorated over the repression of the Greek

minority in Istanbul in the 1950s and the Cyprus conflict in the 1960s

(Rozakis 1996: 105).

The deprivation of citizenship on the basis of Article 19 was part and

parcel of a broader set of informal but widespread restrictive measures

(katastaltika metra) instituted by Greek governments appealing to the need

to balance out the demographic decline of the Greek population in Istanbul.

From the 1960s onwards, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its local,

euphemistically named Office of Cultural Affairs (Grafeio Ekpolitistikon

Ypotheseon) monitored and circumscribed all economic transactions

involving Muslims. Unofficial but elaborate practices and networks of

employees and interest groups linked to state administration, as well as to

banks and enterprises, systematically prevented most Muslims fromacquiring property or even routine matters such as receiving bank loans

or driving licences, and finding employment (Giannopoulos and Psaras

1990: 18).

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The informal status of second-class citizenship with a restricted set of

rights, implicitly assigned to the minority of Thrace, found its formal

expression in Article 19 which gave Greek authorities wide discretion to

deprive minorities of their Greek citizenship. Out of the 60,000 individualsestimated to have lost their citizenship between 1955 and 1998, about 50,000

were Muslims from Thrace (Kostopoulos 2003: 5960). In attributing

intention of not returning to Greece, state authorities had a virtually

unlimited freedom to deduce it in each case. They often did so in an

arbitrary manner without sufficient justification and without consulting the

interested individuals or families, who would often find out that they were

no longer Greek citizens upon their re-entry to Greece. The Ministry of

Public Order would submit files of individuals deemed to fall within the

remit of Article 19 to the Ministry of the Interior and, following theconsenting opinion of the Council of Nationality, a ministerial order

removing their citizenship would be issued.

With the transition to democracy in 1974, the Greek authorities restored

citizenship to over 1,000 individuals who had been deprived of it during the

dictatorship years. However, the application of Article 19 continued

unabated; indeed, it peaked after 1974 in the aftermath of the Turkish

invasion of Cyprus (Kostopoulos 2003: 65). The Council of Europes

readmission of Greece in 1975 and the process of association with the EU

did not bring any attention to the rights of the Turkish minority, which werefurther curtailed in contrast to the restoration of democratic rights to Greek

citizens in general. Article 19 violated the principle of equality of all Greeks

before the law established with the democratic Constitution adopted in

1974. It went against Article 4 (para. 3), stating that a Greek citizen may be

deprived of his/her nationality only if s/he voluntarily acquires a new

nationality or if s/he undertakes services abroad contrary to national

interest. In order to reinforce its validity despite its conspicuous illegitimacy,

a transitional provision contained in Article 111 of the Constitution kept it

in force until its repeal by law.

In the early 1990s, the politicisation of the minority and the eruption of

inter-communal tensions in Thrace alarmed Greek political leaders and led

to a gradual relaxation of the governments restrictive measures. In

denouncing the latter, in the second half of the 1980s this minority rallied

around a powerful demand for self-determination as a Turkish minority

which found expression in an initiative that promoted independent minority

candidates. It gained mass support in 198990, when an electoral alliance

was formed under the leadership of the late Ahmet Sadik and succeeded in

electing two deputies to the Greek Parliament. Having the backing of

motherland Turkey, it provoked tremendous opposition from Greekauthorities and the public, which viewed it as a flagrant challenge to national

unity and a prelude to demands for autonomy in the region. In January

1990, following Sadiks prosecution by the Greek courts for referring to the

minority as Turkish during his electoral campaign, escalating inter-



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communal tensions erupted into protests and incidents of vandalism in

Komotini (Giannopoulos and Psaras 1990). In a text subsequently produced

by the political leaders of the three largest parties, who urgently met behind

closed doors to cope with the crisis, they recognised the need to abolish therestrictive measures (Giannopoulos and Psaras 1990: 21). A year later, in

May 1991, Prime Minister Constantinos Mitsotakis visited Thrace and

declared an end to discrimination and a new approach towards the minority

based on legal equality equal citizenship (isonomia-isopoliteia) (Tsouder-

ou 1995: 4748).

The relaxation of the restrictive measures and the proclamation of legal

equality equal citizenship set in motion a process of liberalisation of the

governments policy towards the minority of Thrace, which, however, did

not extend to Article 19. As part of the legal frame regulating Greekcitizenship, it fell within the hard core of state sovereignty, which, despite

the countrys democratisation after 1974, continued to place an undisputed

premium on the interests of national unity over the rights of individual

citizens. Legislative changes restoring citizenship to individuals who had

been deprived of it before 1974, a central demand of the Pan Hellenic

Socialist Movement ( , PASOK) and the

Communist parties, provided for its restitution only to groups, such as

repatriated refugees of the civil war, who were ethnically Greek.2

Despite its undisguised lack of constitutionality, the tenacity of Article 19must be understood as an intrinsic expression of a cultural idiom

(Brubaker 1992: 16) ingrained in the laws and practices of the country.

Having its historical referent in Greeces process of nation building in the

ninetiethtwentieth centuries, it reflected and reproduced a fundamental

assumption: only ethnic Greeks are entitled to the rights defining member-

ship in the Greek state and thus to citizenship. Article 19 ultimately retained

in the hands of Greek authorities the capacity to compel the exit or prevent

the entry of individual citizens belonging to minorities which were deemed

suspect and threatening to the unity of the nation. Far from being an

anachronistic vestige of the past, this provision was loaded with historical-

cultural significance, providing a means to sustain control of the gateway to

the Greek national community and to preserve its cherished homogeneity.

The advent of a Europeanised segment of PASOK to the leadership of the

party and to national government under the leadership of Costas Simitis in

1996 coincided with growing European activism and elaboration of human

rights principles in relation to minority protection and citizenship. Although

it has yet to sign the European Charter for Regional and Minority

Languages, Greece did sign the Framework Convention for the Protection

of National Minorities (FCPNM) in 1998, with ratification still pending.Already from the late 1980s onwards, Greeces treatment of the Turkish-

speaking Muslims of Thrace became a target of growing criticism in the

CoE, with charges often brought at the initiative of Turkish delegates

(Eleftherotypia 24.4.1991: 5). NGOs, minority leaders and organisations

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such as the Federation of the Turks of Thrace, established by those who had

emigrated to Germany, systematically brought their grievances in front of

European forums, particularly in Strasbourg (Hersant 2000: 3740).

European institutions such as the CoE drafted reports about the situationof the Muslims of Thrace and expressed concern about Article 19. In June

1998, a bill concerned with electoral issues included a provision to abolish

Article 19, and was voted through by the Greek Parliament with the support

of all major parties (Law 2623/1998, Art. 9, para. 14). The gradual process

of liberalisation of minority rights from the early 1990s onwards, of which

the abrogation of Article 19 was a part, was possibly connected closely to

the growing activism of European-level institutions around human rights

and minority protection.

The rest of this article presents an empirical analysis of the process thatled to the abrogation of Article 19 of the GCC in 1998 and is primarily

interested in the role European institutions played. Was Article 19s

elimination a product of the reconfiguration of traditional Greek concep-

tions of citizenship and minorities, or was it an instance of instrumental

change taking place within the given frame of national interests and

identities? The first part of the article describes the change in government

policy towards the minority in Thrace in the early 1990s. The second half of

the 1990s saw the issuing of critical reports and the proliferation of criticism

with regard to how Greece treated its minorities, and particularly theongoing validity of Article 19 of the GCC. In 1997, the possibility that the

CoE would open a monitoring process against Greece was raised, and

towards the end of the year the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a

series of deliberations with the Ministry of the Interior regarding the

controversial provision of the GCC. On the basis of a series of interviews

with political leaders, experts and officials from the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior, as well as newspaper articles, the

second part of this article traces the process that led to the abrogation of

Article 19 in June 1998. Finally, the third part discusses the nature and

scope of the abrogation of Article 19 by examining the views expressed by

political parties and the MPs in the discussions of the draft law that took

place in the Greek parliament. In doing so, it seeks to identify the underlying

logic on the basis of which a broad cross-party consensus to abolish Article

19 emerged.

The Redefinition of Government Policy Towards the Minority in the Early

1990s

The radicalisation of Muslims in the late 1980s and the escalation of inter-communal tensions in the stormy protests in Komotini in January 1990

prompted Greek political leaders to reconsider state policy in a climate of

urgency and alarm. It compelled them to realise that the policy of restricted

rights hitherto had been detrimental in creating a fertile ground for the



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growth of Turkish nationalism in Thrace and turning the minority towards

Turkey. The umbilical cord with the motherland had been invigorated in

the 1980s and Turkey took the leading role in condemning the

discriminatory treatment of the minority in front of the European forums.This thoroughly annoyed the Greek government and put it in an

uncomfortable position at a time when it was seeking to build its image

as an earnest member of the European Community after more than half a

decade of ambivalence and damaged reputation. In a secret meeting two

days after the events, the leaders of PASOK, New Democracy (

, ND) and the Communist Party of Greece (

, KKE) issued a statement the content of which, however,

did not diverge much in its basic premises from the existing approach (text

appended in Giannopoulos and Psaras 1990: 21). It continued to emphasisethe need to curb the demographic growth of the minority through the

settlement in the region of ethnic Greek refugees from the former Soviet

republics on the Black Sea, in order to pre-empt the perceived danger of

territorial secession. While it called for an end to restrictive administrative

measures, it also called for systematically purchasing land and property

from Muslims and encouraging their migration to towns and urban centres,

which was seen as a means to promote their mobility, standard of living and

modern outlook.

At the same time, in the late 1980s a handful of experts at the Ministry ofForeign Affairs had been participating in the standard-setting activities of

the CSCE (now OSCE) and the CoE. In explicitly extending individual

principles of human rights to the protection of minorities as groups, the

documents adopted in 1989 in Vienna and particularly in 1990 in

Copenhagen were milestones and made a catalytic impression on these

experts. The human dimension of security that they projected, namely that

the protection of human rights and minorities within the frame of pluralist

democracy was an indispensable safeguard for state security, was

diametrically opposite to the fundamental premises guiding Greeces

approach (Heraclides 1997: 215). Through their participation in working

group activities, such as those that eventually led to the adoption of the

Charter for Regional and Minority Languages by the CoE, Ministry of

Foreign Affairs experts were thoroughly aware of the international climate

and the new normative principles emerging with regard to minority

protection. Facing these international criticisms of Greeces negative

attitude towards minorities put them in an uncomfortable position. It was

particularly awkward as they were simultaneously expected to speak on

behalf of the rights of the Greek minority in Albania. This exposed them to

charges of double standards, in so far as the Greek government maintaineda defensive stance vis-a` -vis minorities residing within the country

(Heraclides interview, 10.1.2001).

In formulating positions and drafting responses to reports, Ministry of

Foreign Affairs experts were torn between two diverging imperatives: to

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represent the defensive Greek stance on minority issues on the one hand,

and, on the other, to have a constructive input into the working activities of

European organisations developing rising standards of minority protection.

In trying to mediate between the two, they were forced to work outcompromises that were acceptable to the government and political leaders of

the country.

The release of the 1990 US State Department report on Human Rights in

Greece (published early 1991) was a turning point, both in provoking

nationalist opposition but also in intensifying activity within the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs for a solution to the problem of minorities. In containing

references to a Slavo-Macedonian minority, together with various critical

observations about how Greece treated its minorities, the report had a

watershed impact. In rallying a profusely nationalist public opinion andmedia, it presaged their large-scale mobilisation less than a year later, when

the neighbouring Yugoslav republic would seek international recognition of

its independence as Macedonia. In strong reaction to the report, leaders

across political parties declared it to be preposterous and unacceptable,

an insolent provocation purportedly concealing a plan to destabilise

Greece (Kostopoulos 2000: 331). At the same time, the resulting turmoil

among the directors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs departments and

intensifying contacts with the political leadership presented an opportunity

for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs experts to make a dynamic and effectiveintervention (Heraclides interview, 10.1.2001). Between February and May

1991, three meetings were held with the directors of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs (MFA) departments, diplomats, Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras

and Deputy Foreign Minister Virginia Tsouderou, in which the experts

presented their proposals.

In conveying a compelling sense of inevitability, the circulated

memorandums of the MFA experts urged for an immediate change in

domestic policy towards minorities, and that of Thrace in particular. The

main ground on which they built their case was that the hitherto

defensive and negative approach towards minorities had brought

excessive costs for Greece abroad, which would multiply as more

elaborate and binding texts on minority protection were in preparation.

They argued that a change was imperative in order to improve Greeces

disreputable anti-minority image in Europe and to end its isolation.

Ending discrimination and protecting the rights of minorities, the experts

argued, would bolster the countrys democratic credibility abroad and

thus its leverage vis-a` -vis European organisations and other countries,

especially Turkey, which would no longer have a reason to criticise

Greece. The memorandums contained a comprehensive list of policyproposals pertaining not only to negative rights (ending discrimination

and abrogating Article 19) but also positive measures such as the

protection and promotion of minority cultural identity, respect for self-

definition, affirmative action measures and minority participation in local



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and national decision-making structures. They also proposed recognition

of a Slavic-speaking linguistic minority. None of the positive measures

were adopted. While recognising that Greek public opinion was neither

mature enough nor ready to accept such changes due to the deeplyingrained and historically conditioned perception of minorities as a

threat, the veteran expert Evangelos Kofos nonetheless urged the political

leadership to proceed with these changes by seeking bi-partisan

consensus.3

Initially, the proposal for policy change elicited strongly negative

reactions, particularly on the part of the diplomats and departmental

directors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had direct contact with

the Ministrys political leadership, and who saw it as a challenge to the

countrys most vital national interests. However, they moderated theirposition when it became clear that Prime Minister Mitsotakis had

resolved to proceed with far-reaching changes (Kofos interview,

13.1.2001). Mitsotakis had appointed as director of the Prime Ministers

Office Loukas Tsilas, a diplomat closely linked to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs experts and an ardent supporter of a change of policy

towards the minority. The decision at the highest political level for such

change also led Samaras and Tsouderou to modify their originally

lukewarm response and agree to the necessity of redefining state policy

towards the minority.The new approach was revealed in May 1991 during Mitsotakis visit to

Thrace, when he announced that the government would seek to rectify the

mistakes and injustices committed by previous governments to the detriment

of the minority. While keeping with the Lausanne Treatys designation of a

Muslim minority, for the first time Mitsotakis recognised that the latter

consists of three sub-groups, ethnic Turks, Slavic-speaking Pomaks and

Gypsies. The new policy, the Prime Minister declared, would be guided by

the principles of legal equality equal citizenship in agreement with the

norms of human rights protection enshrined in the CSCE, UN and CoE

documents, but no less strictly within the frame of the Lausanne Treaty

(Eleftherotypia 15.5.1991). The abolition of the restrictive administrative

measures, however, did not extend to Article 19 of the GCC, even though

the Prime Minister himself was in favour of its removal (Mitsotakis

interview, 22.2.2001).

In sum, the reorientation of Greek minority policy in the early 1990s had

limited scope and was driven by domestic factors stemming from pressures

to mitigate ethnic Turkish radicalisation and inter-communal tensions in

Thrace. The decision to eliminate the restrictive measures against the

minority was a much-needed political breakthrough amidst a climate ofuncertainty and insecurity about how to resolve the crisis signalled by the

events in Komotini. In the preceding decades, such measures had led state

minority and inter-communal relations to an impasse. Domestic political

conditions, however, limited the scope for rescinding the discriminatory

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measures, which did not extend to repealing Article 19, despite the fact that

the Prime Minister himself was intent on removing it. Mitsotakis could not

rely on his Foreign Minister Samaras or on his party for support in this

regard. Samaras subscribed to a much more nationalist view, as hissubsequent stance on the Macedonian issue would soon demonstrate,

leading him to diverge from the more moderate and consensual approach of

the Prime Minister. The latter, however, sought to avoid conflict with his

Foreign Minister as the ND government relied on the support of a slim

parliamentary majority, even though, as would become apparent, such a

conflict could only be postponed but not prevented. In 1993, two deputies

leaning towards Samaras withdrew their support from the ND government,

thus bringing it down. The socialist government of Andreas Papandreou

that came back to power after the 1993 elections was even less receptive toissues regarding minority rights. Entangled as it was in an intransigent

maximalist stance over the Macedonian issue laid down as much by the

previous government as by its own negative attitude towards any

compromise solution, it pandered with fresh ardour to the nationalist

sentiment that had engulfed the Greek public (Kofos 1999: 38082).

In sum, the immediate impetus for the abolition of discriminatory

measures vis-a` -vis Thraces Muslims in the early 1990s came from the

domestic context and was directly linked to the need to deal with the

crisis in inter-communal relations. Acquaintance with emerging Europeannorms of human rights and minority protection were limited to the

experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs participating in international

standard-setting activities that took place in a more private and less

politicised setting, but did not extend to the leadership of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs or the government. Their input in urging the Greek

government to redefine its policy acted primarily as a catalyst at a

moment when the latter was desperately seeking to attenuate and resolve

inter-communal tensions. Diffused nationalist sentiment among the

society at large, expressed in the highest echelons of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs led by Foreign Minister Samaras, placed a firm constraint

on the ensuing changes towards the minority, which did not extend to

Article 19.

Sanctioning the priority of national unity channelled through elaborate

administrative practices, Article 19 of the GCC embodied the fundamental

assumption that only those of ethnic Greek descent are entitled to an

unconditional right to citizenship. Maintaining it in force enabled Greek

authorities to ultimately annul the rights Greek citizenship accorded to the

members of historical minorities, by depriving them of their legal status as

such. At the same time, its tenacity was further bolstered by its perceivedsignificance in sustaining a balance in Greeces relations with Turkey, where

the Greek minority had been demographically decimated. It is in the frame

of GreekTurkish relations and in a fundamentally instrumental fashion

underpinned by a realpolitik logic that the Greek government began to



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reflect on the need to respect the rights of the minority. It began to perceive

the necessity of such a change as a means to improve Greeces leverage vis-a` -

vis Turkey and stem international criticisms of how the Greek government

treated the minority.

The Council of Europe, Human Rights and the Abrogation of Article 19

After 1995, the Greek government began to adjust its positions abroad with

respect to European texts on minority protection and citizenship, which had

been proliferating during the preceding years, elaborating further on types of

rights available to individuals and groups. A major step with regard to the

latter was the adoption of the European Charter of Regional and Minority

Languages (ECRML) in 1992 by the CoE, the product of a long process thathad began in the second half of the 1980s (Tsitselikis 1996: 18184). The

FCPNM adopted in 1995 by the CoE was the first multilateral text defining

basic principles of minority protection that signatory states had to respect,

together with a mechanism to monitor them. Under the leadership of Simitis,

the PASOK government that came to power after the 1996 elections set the

goal of full integration in the EU and accession to the EMU as the broad

frame defining the contours of its policies. With its expressed will to pursue

EMU, the PASOK government signed the ECRML without the slightest

reaction on the part of the patriotic opposition (Kostopoulos 2000: 349).Besides the advent of PASOKs Europeanist faction to power, a more

receptive approach towards minorities was occasioned by the impasse,

already discernible by 199394, to which the intransigent stance of the

previous governments over the name of Macedonia had led. The manifest

failure of the maximalist nationalist approach perversely triggered a

reaction among political analysts and academics who engaged in a broader

reassessment of Greek foreign policy and its strategic interests (Kofos 1999:

390). Reflecting an emerging foreign policy contingent that straddled party

lines, they began to view foreign policy priorities through the lens of

strengthening Greeces position within the EU as a means to harnessing the

support of the latter in containing Turkish claims in Cyprus and the Aegean.

They furthermore urged the government to assume a leadership role in

European efforts to reconstruct and stabilise the troubled region of the

Balkans and to abandon its maximalist stance, which was perceived to fuel

further into claims about the existence of a Macedonia minority in Greece.

The ascendance of this cross-party contingent began to pit the ethnocentrists

(advocates of nationalism) against the Europeanists, advocating a compro-

mise approach to the issue of the name, the reorientation of Greeces Balkan

policy along EU lines, and greater attention to human rights and minorityissues (Kofos 1999: 38991).

A number of initiatives taken by the political leadership of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs after 1995 indicate a growing interest in issues of linguistic-

cultural diversity and concern with bringing Greek laws and practices into line

346 D. Anagnostou


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with the emerging international and European norms regarding minorities. In

December 1995, a daylong and little publicised conference on the ethnic,

social and historical origins of the Slavic-speaking population, which was held

in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, witnessed the discussion of views that calledfor a less exclusive understanding of national community and identity. The

latter was further acknowledged by the then Deputy Foreign Minister George

Papandreou in a conference organised by the Minority Groups Research

Centre at Panteion University in October 1998. In his visit to Skopje,

FYROM, two months later, Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos stated

that there is no Slavic minority in Greece, but those individuals wishing to

practise their culture and learn their language are free to do so, and can take

their complaints to the CoE if they feel that Greece denies their rights as such

(Kostopoulos 2000: 35051). Domestically, the government extended therelaxation of restrictive measures to the Slavic speakers of northern Greece in

what amounted to a de facto rather than an openly expressed change

(Kostopoulos 2000: 348). Political leaders, however, sought to keep a low

profile in the aforementioned initiatives and statements, which were given

little public exposure, indicating their underlying concern with arousing

opposition among the broader Greek public (Kostopoulos 2000: 352).

While the aforementioned reorientation in human rights and minority

issues was no doubt limited among individual leaders of the government and

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular, it also reflected a broader, evenif thin realisation among the political elites that domestically respecting

these principles enhanced the countrys standing abroad. This more

receptive political milieu was further confirmed by the decision of the

PASOK government in 1996 to ratify the International Covenant for

Individual and Civil Rights. One of the sticking points that had led Greece

to abstain from its ratification for 30 years after its adoption by the UN (in

1966) was Article 27, on the obligation of states to protect the culture,

language and religious freedom of members of minorities residing in them.

On 29 October 1996, the Foreign Minister Pangalos and Minister of Justice

Evangelos Yiannopoulos introduced the draft law to ratify the Covenant.

The draft law included a reservation stating that the obligations defined by

Article 27 pertained to individuals belonging to minorities, and would not

interfere with the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. In the relevant

discussion that took place in the Greek Parliament, MPs across the political

parties unanimously approved Law 2462/1997 ratifying the Covenant.

Agreeing that the nature of the Covenants obligations did not raise any

issue of interference with the Lausanne Treaty, Greece decided to drop the

aforementioned reservation in order not to give other states a reason to

criticise. In conceding to its ratification, the representative of ND specificallyexplained that instead of foreign governments assessing how these

principles are implemented in other countries, it is better to do this

ourselves, a kind of self-criticism that can lead to better and more qualitative

democracy (Parliamentary Proceedings 1997).



14/23

Despite their political and declaratory character, the elaboration and

proliferation of European texts on minority rights created a more intricate

and binding external frame that reinforced pressures on the Greek

government. Paradoxically, the more direct and intensive such pressuresbecame, the less scathing and externally imposed they were perceived to be.

A central target of growing criticism in the CoE, which increasingly brought

under its supervision issues pertaining to citizenship rights, was Article 19 of

the GCC, the focus of ongoing and strong minority grievances in Thrace.

The adoption of the European Convention on Nationality by the CoE in

November 1997 was designed to facilitate acquisition or recovery of

nationality and to ensure that the latter is lost only for good reason and

cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn.4 A report on the rights of Muslims in

Thrace submitted to the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of theCoE (PACE) in 1997 raised the possibility of opening a monitoring process

to investigate the matter (Hersant 2000: 6465). This report, which

contained a critical assessment of the situation of Muslims (that is,

regarding their educational rights and job prospects in the public sector),

highlighted the ongoing validity of Article 19 as the epitome of unequal

treatment continuing to define Greek state policy towards this population.

In early November 1997, the Monitoring Committee of the CoE discussed

the allegations contained in the report and set a meeting for mid-January

1998 to make a final decision on whether it would proceed with amonitoring process (Eleftherotypia, 9.11.1997).

Even though the actual political weight of the aforementioned report was

debatable (signed by only 12 delegates of the PACE), it made an impact on

Greek political leaders growing increasingly sensitive about Greeces

disputed reputation in the field of minority protection. Its appearance in

the CoE caused concern that the pro-Turkish lobby could capitalise on the

prestige of such a high political body [as the PACE] to compel Greece to

conform to the reports proposals (Eleftherotypia, 9.11.1997). The renewed

criticisms in the CoE put the national government in a particularly irksome

position. The Greek delegate to the PACE, Kimon Koulouris, found it

difficult to defend the latter as it became apparent that government leaders

did not have a united stance on the issue.

The criticisms in the CoE played a catalytic role in galvanising a new

initiative to tackle Article 19, which came from the leadership of the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs which had just signed the European Convention on

Nationality and which during the preceding months had been waiting to seize

such an opportunity. It comprised deputy Foreign Ministers Papandreou and

the late Giannos Kranidiotis, who held moderate and liberal views on

minority issues, and followed in the footsteps of former deputy ForeignMinister Christos Rozakis, a judge in the European Court of Human Rights in

Strasbourg. In the Ministry, they had organised working groups to brief them

on related European developments and were able to convince the more

reluctant Foreign Minister at the time, Pangalos. In 1997, they were given the

348 D. Anagnostou


15/23

green light to proceed by Simitis, who was in favour of abolishing the

controversial provision. Following the appearance of the report, the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs promptly launched a round of deliberations to discuss the

possibility of abolishing Article 19 with the MI that was responsible toadministratively implement it. During the previous months, inter-ministerial

talks held on the issue sought to avoid publicity and revealed a divergence of

views, with the Ministry of the Interior opposing proposals to eliminate the

controversial article (Eleftherotypia, 3.11.1997; 9.11.1997; Apogevmatini,

29.1.1997). Minister of the Interior Alekos Papadopoulos allegedly opposed

the latter on the grounds that it would trigger strong reactions among the

Greek public, particularly in areas such as minority-inhabited Thrace and

Epirus, where Albanian-speaking Tsams who left the country during World

War II could claim back their Greek nationality.Even though the political tones had been deliberately kept low, the

possibility of abolishing Article 19 provoked strong reactions primarily from

the local community in Thrace: the Greek Christian population, local

authorities and the Orthodox Church.5 Speaking through the bishops of

Xanthi and Komotini, the latter characterised its annulment as a national

betrayal (Eleftheros Typos, 18.9.1997; 1.11.1997). Local views opposing the

abolition of Article 19 found an outlet in extreme nationalist newspapers

with limited circulation at the national level. The main grounds for

opposition were that such a change would pave the way for the restitution ofGreek nationality to thousands of minority members and alter the

demographic balance in the region. Striking an alarmist tone, they claimed

that it would pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the country and

invigorate nationalist claims for Turkish self-determination in the region

under the auspices of Ankara (Eleftheri Ora, 31.10.1997). Abrogating

Article 19 would purportedly be a further concession to Turkey, which had

long since breached the reciprocity clause of the Lausanne Treaty by

expelling the Greeks of Istanbul, as well as an act of submission to

international pressures exercised on behalf of Turkey. Viewing Article 19 as

a means to safeguard national security, Emilia Ladopoulou, president of the

National Union of Northern Greeks, appealed to the power of Greek

consciousness . . . and the interests of the Greek nation . . . to turn down the

instigators of this anti-national plan (Nemesis, October 1997: 54).

Significantly, the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the

Ministry of the Interior largely avoided making public the divergence of views

between them. These only faintly leaked to the press, possibly suggesting that

in spite of such differences there was strong determination to reach an early

consensus on the issue (Ta Nea. 24.1.1998). By mid-January 1998 an

agreement between the two ministries to abolish Article 19 was reached,however, on the basis of a firm limitation: that its annulment would not be

applied with retroactive force. The latter would have been a corrective

measure enabling tens of thousands of individuals and their families who had

been deprived of Greek nationality to reclaim it, and it was a demand strongly



16/23

supported by the minority in Thrace (Eleftherotypia, 8.12.1997). On 23

January 1998, the cabinet unanimously decided to abolish Article 19 by law.

Simitis characterised the decision as an important step that should have

occurred earlier, fully compatible with the governments policy on humanrights, while Papadopoulos declared it to be in accordance with the principles

of legal equality equal citizenship (Ta Nea, 24.1.1998; Avriani, 24.1.1998).

In contrast to local society and press in Thrace, newspapers with

nationwide circulation responded positively and with moderation to the

announced change. Leftist papers heralded the decision as an extension of

democratic rights, putting an end to the status of second class

citizenship to which the minority had been relegated (Exousia,

23.1.1998; Rizospastis, 17.12.1997). The centre-right daily Kathimerini

also received it positively (17.1.1998). It stated that the governmentassigns great importance to this initiative anticipated to contribute to the

isolation of extreme nationalist circles, whether Greek or Turkish, in the

region of Thrace . . . and to disarm Ankara and the international

organisations that condemn our country for discriminatory treatment

against a group of citizens. On 9 June 1998, the Greek Parliament voted

to abrogate Article 19 (Law 2623/1998, Art. 14, Government Gazette,

Issue 258 A) with the support of all political parties with the exception of

the nationalist-socialist Democratic Socialist Movement (

, DIKKI).Both the timing and the manifest determination of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs to push ahead with the abolition of Article 19 suggest a

direct connection with the goal of averting the opening of a monitoring

procedure by the CoE. A report drafted after the visit of CoE delegates

on a fact-finding visit to Greece concluded that following the decision to

abolish Article 19 there was no need to open a monitoring procedure

against Greece. It stated that Greeces signing of the Framework

Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) on 22

September 1997 and the commitment made by the Greek government [to

abolish Article 19] constitute gestures of good will on the part of Greek

authorities (Hersant 2000: 6465). The close link between the abrogation

of Article 19 and the CoE is also evidenced in a letter from Foreign

Minister Papandreou (dated 24 January 1998), which informed the

president of the Monitoring Committee in the CoE of the positive

decision regarding Article 19. It assured him that the Greek government

has always shown a sensitivity towards human rights and has the political

will to continue to work, in cooperation with the competent committees

of the CoE towards the same direction in the future (Hersant 2000: 66).

Following the approval of the law that abrogated Article 19, ApostolosKaklamanis, President of the Greek Parliament, informed the President

of PACE of the outcome and expressed his regret that the Bureau of

PACE hastened to refer to the possibility of a monitoring procedure

(Hersant 2000: 65).

350 D. Anagnostou


17/23

Expanding Citizenship: European Norms and the Interests of National Unity

In June 1998, the draft of the law that included the provision abrogating

Article 19 (Law 2623/1998) was introduced for discussion in the GreekParliament. It is noteworthy that this controversial provision had the

support of all four largest parties represented in Parliament (PASOK, ND,

Coalition of the Left, KKE), albeit with several MPs from both the

governing party PASOK and the ND opposition dissenting. The prevailing

logic on the basis of which the abrogation of Article 19 was defended in

parliament was largely instrumental: to deprive Turkey, the minority and

other European states of another reason to criticise Greece for discrimina-

tory treatment of minorities. Only the representatives of the parties of the

Left (KKE and Coalition of the Left), as well as the three Muslim deputies,advanced a strong argument in favour of abolishing Article 19 on grounds

of principle. In reference to European norms and principles, they appealed

to the need to strengthen legal equality and the protection of human rights

and to deepen democracy in Greece. This group of representatives proposed

that the abolition of Article 19 should have retroactive force, namely to

allow for the restitution of Greek citizenship to individuals who had been

deprived of it through this article in the preceding decades. However,

reaching cross-party consensus was only possible on a more restrictive

clause providing that the abrogation of Article 19 would only be valid forthe future and would not have retroactive force. Those seeking to regain

Greek nationality would have to apply for it and undergo the lengthy

naturalisation process required by law.

A number of MPs both from PASOK and ND defended the preservation

of Article 19 as imperative in order to continue to counterbalance what they

saw as Turkeys expansionist policies towards Greece. They strongly

opposed its abrogation as an unjustifiable and humiliating compromise to

external pressures that went against Greeces vital national interests vis-a` -vis

Turkey. In invoking the reciprocity clause of the Lausanne Treaty, PASOK

MPs (Christos Kipouros, Kyriakos Spyriounis, Anastasios Peponis) saw the

abolition as an asymmetrical response vis-a` -vis Turkey, on the grounds that

it had violated the rights of the Greeks of Istanbul. They cautioned that a

possible resettlement of Turks in Thrace would further Turkeys plans to

destabilise the region. Kipouros claimed that no European state, not even

one of the Third World, would behave so submissively [as Greece] towards

whichever external pressures (Parliamentary Proceedings, 9.6.1998: 10377).

Even more passionate was the defence of the rights and unity of the Greek

nation that came from ND MPs (Apostolos Andreoulakos, Elias

Vezdrevanis and Eugenios Haitidis). Invoking national poets and valuesof national honour, they called the abrogation of Article 19 an instance of

national mutilation, urging the Assembly to demonstrate national bravery

and not to accept lessons of human rights from the Europeans and the

Americans (Parliamentary Proceedings, 9.6.1998: 10378). In a provocative



18/23

tone, Andreoulakos exclaimed that first comes the nation and then

democracy (Parliamentary Proceedings, 9.6.1998: 10378). The proponents

of Article 19 vehemently defended the treatment of the minority in Thrace as

flawlessly democratic and contended that Greece should not be taken to taskabout it. While criticising ND for nationalism, Kipouros nonetheless stated

that the present compromise is not in harmony with the reasons for which

PASOK was founded and has existed, alluding to PASOKs ardent appeal

to national sovereignty in the 1970s and 1980. Moreover, the Turkish

problem cannot be redressed through surrender (Parliamentary Proceed-

ings, 9.6.1998: 10386).

A firm response to the vehement assertion of national interests and identity

came from the deputies of the Left and from the three minority deputies

elected from the ranks of ND, PASOK and the Coalition of the Left. Reactingstrongly to accusations of lacking in patriotic feeling, the MP from Coalition

of the Left, Fotis Kouvelis, stressed the imperative of abolishing Article 19 in

order to expand democracy and submitted an amendment to extend it

retroactively. Assenting to the latter as necessary to correct an injustice,

Stratis Korakas of KKE characterised Article 19 as a product of an abnormal

and unjust era that has to be eliminated in order to safeguard legal equality

equal citizenship for the minority (Parliamentary Proceedings, 9.6.1998:

1038485). Achilleas Kantartzis of KKE dissociated Article 19 from Greek

Turkish relations and the logic of bilateral reciprocity, emphasising that theabolition of the former has to do with basic human rights . . . what was said

with regard to defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity is

another matter (Parliamentary Proceedings, 9.6.1998: 10387). Representa-

tives of the Left were committed to its repeal on grounds of principle, possibly

due to a sense of historically conditioned affinity with minority members

victimised by it, given that thousands of communists had also been targets of a

similar provision during the 1940s.

The three minority deputies (Birol Akifoglou, Galip Galip and Moustafa

Moustafa) heralded the governments initiative to abrogate Article 19 as a

decision putting an end to a provision that for years arbitrarily deprived the

minority of its rights in the name of national unity. While heralding it as a

step in line with European norms of human rights, they lamented the

governments refusal to extend it retroactively. According to Akifoglou,

such backing reinforces the impression that the government proceeded to

the abrogation not because it believes in the need to bolster democracy and

rule of law but because it is subject to external pressures (Parliamentary

Proceedings, 9.6.1998: 1038182).

Even though it was the governing party PASOK that initiated the

abrogation of the controversial provision, the defence on behalf of thisinitiative on the part of the partys representatives in parliament was rather

modest and lukewarm. Besides Minister of Interior Papadopoulos, who

introduced the provision abrogating Article 19, only three other PASOK

MPs came to its support. While MPs such as Papadopoulos and Grigoris

352 D. Anagnostou


19/23

Niotis defended the minority MPs who became a target of nationalist

remarks insinuating that they were agents of Turkey, socialist support for the

abrogation was professed in mild and ambivalent terms, possibly in order to

pre-empt more vocal reactions. While assuring that the government was firmabout its decision not to extend retroactively the proposed abrogation,

Papadopoulos justified the latter in legalistic terms in reference to the

Constitution. By allowing Article 19 to remain in force only until its repeal by

law, the constitutional lawmaker, as he stated, intended it to be a transitory

provision. Phoebus Ioannides of PASOK deemed the abrogation of Article

19 to be a positive step that will not pose a problem for our country . . . and it

is of course with a sense of patriotic duty that the government proceeds to it

(Parliamentary Proceedings, 9.6.1998: 10379). While instantly and sharply

reacting to Andreoulakos view granting the nation primacy overdemocracy, Ioannides countered in a restrained manner that neither should

be prioritised and that Hellenism and democracy are one and the same

(Parliamentary Proceedings, 9.6.1998: 10379). At the same time, Ioannides

felt obliged to express his understanding of the nationalist reactions by

recognising that Hellenism had suffered greatly from Turkeys political-

military establishment. Juxtaposing the two countries, Ioannides depicted

Greece as a fully fledged democracy that respected human rights and ensured

equal treatment of the Muslims of Thrace.

While the ND opposition officially endorsed the abrogation of Article 19,it did so on the grounds that enhancing Greeces democratic reputation

promoted national interests vis-a` -vis Turkey. On behalf of ND, MP

Prokopis Pavlopoulos, a leading member of the opposition, felt compelled

to elaborate the partys stance and clarify that ND conceded to the

abrogation but defended its substantive content, which it did not consider to

be unconstitutional or illegitimate. Pavlopoulos emphatically stated that its

abrogation must not be seen as an act of regret for a mistaken policy of the

past. Instead, he argued, Article 19 was a right decision of the Greek state,

which for the same reasons that it once instituted it, today believes that it

should abolish it (emphasis added), implying that it was national interests

vis-a` -vis Turkey that render the latter imperative. The Greek government

arguably does so in order to remove the last reason from those who seek to

exploit this provision in order to attribute to our country an intent that it

does not have and never had (Parliamentary Proceedings, 9.6.1998: 10380).

The discussions that took place in the Greek Parliament show that the

strong determination of the government and the leadership of the large

parties to abrogate Article 19 went hand in hand with significant

reservations, if not opposition, within the ranks of the two main parties.

Restricting it to the future, the law that abolished it would not haveimmediate repercussions and thus only limited political cost, while

upgrading Greeces democratic image in the CoE. It was the firm resolution

to prevent its retroactive force that made it possible to arrive at a consensus

with ND and with MPs, who otherwise defended Article 19 and did not



20/23

consider it to be a source of democratic deficit. Capturing the delicate

balances that had to be kept, towards the end of the discussion in parliament

Kouvelis (of the Coalition of the Left) sought to cushion instead of

challenging the government:

I am aware that it is on the basis of the will to deepen democracy that

the government promotes this measure. There may have been external

pressures in the past, but I dont think that these drive your decision to

abrogate Article 19. I will not insist on the amendment [to extend it

retroactively], not because I dont believe in it but because I realise the

climate that exists. (Parliamentary Proceedings, 9.6.1998: 10388)

Conclusion

Article 19 of the GCC was the last fortress of a long-term discriminatory

policy towards the minority, which began to liberalise in the early 1990s.

Being instigated by the possibility that the CoE open a monitoring

procedure, its abrogation in the second half of the 1990s was no doubt

connected to the European regime of human rights norms largely emanating

from the CoE. The latter played a decisive role by what has been called

shaming: namely creating an international climate at the European level

critical of national practices (Moravscik 1995: 161). In the Greek case, sucha climate in the second half of the 1990s catalysed the initiative of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs to repeal Article 19 and to shift the balance

between government and party elites towards those who were eager to avoid

undermining Greeces reputation abroad. The role of European human

rights norms should not be underestimated because reference to the latter by

opponents of Article 19 was cautiously and systematically avoided. In post-

1974 Greece, complying with external imperatives often fell prey to

nationalist reactions depicting it as a humiliating submission. Such

references were only indirect, with the abrogation of the controversial

provision seen to confirm Greeces purportedly robust democracy that

scored high in comparison to Turkey in the European system of human

rights and minority protection.

On the whole, however, the determined initiative on the part of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs to rescind the controversial article was made

possible by a wholesale pragmatic reassessment of the style and strategic

goals of Greek foreign policy vis-a` -vis Turkey and the Balkans in the second

half of the 1990s (Ioakimidis 2000: 364). It began to move away from an

overwhelming emphasis on and narrow conception of national issues

(ethnika themata), as well as from the symbolic weight foreign policyacquired as political leaders in the post-1974 period customarily used it to

make resounding declarations of national sovereignty. In this respect, the

abrogation of Article 19 can be seen as having been driven by an

instrumental logic of national interests and strategic ends. Retaining it

354 D. Anagnostou


21/23

was now perceived to have many costs (criticisms from European

institutions) and few benefits for GreekTurkish relations, in which Cyprus,

the Aegean and Turkeys pursuit of EU membership became the centre of

gravity. The necessary cross-party consensus between PASOK and the NDopposition was possible to achieve only on the basis of a restricted clause

and of an instrumental logic that depicted the abrogation of Article 19 as a

positive step for Greeces national interests vis-a` -vis Turkey.

At the same time, the reconceptualisation of foreign policy interests,

particularly the belief that deepening democracy by protecting human rights

and minorities enhanced rather than undermined security, was itself made

possible by a process of normative change. Limited as it may have been in

specific quarters and among individuals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

and the government most closely involved in the workings of Europeaninstitutions, the view that respecting the individual rights of minorities was

something to be proud of rather than threatened by began to gain currency.

It was not accidental that from the second half of the 1990s onwards the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs has consistently had a leadership of liberal

orientation. Unlike in the early 1990s when Greeces treatment of minorities

was also subject to international criticism, such criticisms in 1997 had an

immediate domestic effect precisely because significant acquaintance with

and conversion to European liberal norms of human rights had already

taken place in the course of the decade.The redefinition of minority policy that culminated with the abrogation of

Article 19 in the 1990s far from attests to a broader endorsement of minority

rights or to a redefinition of citizenship in a post-national direction among

parliamentary representatives and Greek society at large. In 1999, the

twenty-fifth anniversary of Greeces transition to democracy, the three

minority deputies at the time issued a public appeal urging the government

to recognise national minorities and to ratify the FCPNM. Their appeal

provoked strongly negative reactions across political parties and leaders,

even from those known to have a more sympathetic approach to the issue,

such as former Foreign Minister Papandreou and the Coalition of the Left

and the Progress (Papanikolatos 1999). Their manifest hesitation to endorse

the aforementioned declaration was possibly driven by consideration of the

political costs such a stance might have with national elections less than a

year away. The widespread disinclination to approach minority issues and

policy through open and direct reference to European texts of minority

protection such as the FCPNM is further linked to the possibility of revising

or abandoning the Lausanne Treaty in case Greece ratifies the Framework

Convention. Greek political elites and representatives continue to strongly

resist such a prospect. While there is little evidence indicating areconceptualisation of national identity in a multi-cultural direction,

nonetheless the liberal view that the guarantee of equal rights to all

individuals is important for Greece as a member of the EU has acquired

widespread acceptance among the Greek elite.



22/23

Notes

1. The overall population of Thrace is 340,000. The size of the Turkish Muslim population in

Thrace is a matter of dispute due to their large-scale immigration over the years and the lackof an official census since the 1960s. Alexandris estimated the minority in 1981 to be about

120,000, with 45% Turkish-speaking, 36% Pomaks and 18% Roma (Alexandris 1988: 524).

2. Decision 106841/29-12-1982 of the Minister of Interior provided for the restitution

citizenship to ethnic Greek individuals who had left the country as political refugees during

the civil war (194649), but made it very hard to restore it to individuals who were from

Slavic-speaking areas (Kostopoulos 2003: 68).

3. Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Memorandum of Alexis Heraclides, 26 February 1991;

Evangelos Kofos, Questions and Answers for our Minority Policy, 29 April 1991.

4. See European Convention on Nationality, Summary of the treaty that opened for signature

on 6 November 1997 and entered into force on 1 March 2000. See http://conventions.coe.int/

Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/166.htm5. This was also emphasised to this author by the Deputy Minister of Interior at the time

Lambros Papadimas (Interview, Athens, 19.4.2004).

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