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ENGAGING THE 'FlRANKENSTEIN9 OF MODERNITY:
POSTMODERNISM AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY
A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies
of
The University of Guelph
by
IAIN M. GRANT
In partial fultilhent of requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
January, 1998
Q Iain M. Grant, 1998
National Library I*I of Canada Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
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A bstract
ENGAGING THE 'FRANKENSTEIN' OF MODERNITY:
POSTMODERNISM AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY
Iain M. Grant University of Guelph, 1998
Adviser: Professor W. Graf
This thesis is an investigation of Development Theory, said to be at an Impasse
because of the 'faiiure' of neo-modedng and neo-Mantist theory. Pnmarily, it seeks to
assas the potenrial of posmiodemism to negotiate this Impasse. Mer sunrmarizuig the
bases of the Impasse, the basics of postmodernism, and postmodemism's strengths and
weaknesses, it is argued that postmodeniism is il equipped for this task. It is then argued
that a re-oriented postmodemism would be better suited to the task than the current
variety, which defkes itself primarily in ternis of its posture of counter-modemity. The
ultimate aim of this discussion is to argue in favour of such a re-orienteci postmodernism,
which would in tuni enable a development theory 'synthesis' based on a combination of
interest- and ethics-driven development imperatives. Such an approach necessady would
incorporate elements £tom both the postmodem and the 'modem' canon.
Dedrcaed to the memory of my &, who. @te wrongly, newr believed himselfmpable of sirch a work,
and never gor the chance to try.
- Iain Grant J a m q 1998
Table of Contents
Chapter One - Introduction . . i . Postmodemism and Development Theory . ü. Postmodernism and the Development 'Frankenstein' . K. Devefopment b r y and the North-South Cornplex . iv. Summary .
Cbapter Two - Tbe Roots of the Impasse . i. Modeniization Theory . ü. Neo-Marxist Theory üi. Defining the Impasse: The Failure of Development Theov
Chapter Tbree - Poatmodemism: The Basics . i. Modemity: Main Themes - ii. Postmodernism: Main Themes .
Cbapter Four - Assessing Postmodernism: Shmgths . i. Generd Strengths . ü. Deconstructing 'Development Theory' . üi. Deconstnictinig 'Impasse' .
Chapter Five - Asswsing Postmodernism: Weaknesses . i . Semantic and Conceptuai Confusions . ii. The Modemity 'Frankenstein' .
Chapter S U - The haterest-Ethics Dicbotomy . . i. Interest-Ethics: An Explmation . ii. Interest . üi. Ethics iv. Jushficatory Versus Revelatory Ethic .
Chapter S e m - Toward a Synthesis . . i. An Interest-Ethics Synthesis? . ü. Summary -
Conclusion .
Chap&t One: Introduclion
In Western popular consciousness, the imagery invoked by the name Frankenstein
is iikely to be fàiriy consistent: a bolt-headed, green-skinned monster goes berserk wreaks
murderous havoc, and ultimately tums against its creator. Although these elements are
present in the actual Mary Shelley novel which engendered it, the Frankenstein metaphor
is more tricky than it a p p m . We infer 'monster' fiom the very Nune Frankenstein, and
assign it the character of expriment-gone-awry, but these are both blatant mistakes:
Frankenstein, in the origuial tale, is Doctor Frankemstein, the creator; the so-called
monster is the actual creation.
In al1 fairness, the popular conception of Frankenstein does not miss the mark
entirely. It aiiows for the novel's presentation of the scientist's attempt to alter nature as
oiisguided, and for the elernent ofjust desserts in which that atternpt is punished by the
unanticipated violence of the monster. But as a result of the basic cognitive error that the
misidentification of Frankenstein represents, two problerns result: first, the name of
Frankenstein becomes associated with d sorts of unseemly traits which are more
appropnately assigned to the creature; second, the misidentification obscures or obliterates
altogether the essenMy admirable quality of Dr. Frdenstein and the objectives which
drove him in the est place. In their absence, the monstrous Hdoween caricature and the
mad scientist are ail that rernain.
A similar dymnic is discernible in the relationship between modernity and
posîrnodemïsm. As with the popular conception of Frankenstein, postmodernism correctly
identifies some aspects of the pst-Enlightenrnent body of ideas typically referred to as
modeniity - the effort to master nature through science and rationaiity, or even, arguably,
the image of a destructive 'creature' going out of wntrol. One might even extend the
application of the Frankenstein metaphor to point out that, as was the case in the novel,
ùuioceut others are vidmized while the creaton emerge relatively unscathed (although
Frankenstein at least felt gdty about it). Despite these apparently accurate identifications,
though, postmodemism features cognitive and amibutive flaws sirnilar to those visible in
the popular Frankenstein myth. These errors center around the tendency of
postmodemists to associate modernity with an oppression - oft-cited examples are the
Holocaust or the Stalinist purges, which are put forth by Lyotard as inevitable outcornes
of the fàith in modemity - that derives fiom the tendency of science to be "enlisted by
capital and subjugated to aciency rather than truth."'
First, as was the case with Fcankenstein myth, postmodeniism's association of
modemity with Stalinism or the Holocaust misrepresents modemity's nobler aspects, or
obscures them dtogether. While it may be worthwhile for postmodemists to point a
critical hger at technocratization or at so-called grand narratives, the merits of the
Enlightenment which are "given shape in the assumed emancipation of hwnankind:
liberation from povew, slavery and ignorance," ought to be beyond reproach.
Postmodemisrn's tendency to understate or ignore these ments is surely no more fair than
history's reduction of Dr. Frankenstein to mad scientist, and of his good name to hideous
creation .2
Second, the identification of modernity with the Holocaust, for example, takes
insufncient account of the fundarnentally difEerent character of the two 'events', thus
committing an attributive error similar to that of the popular mistreatment of Frankenstein.
There may be merit to postmodem arguments which suggest that rnodernity gave birth to
styles of thought and practice which made the Holocaust possible, but as Laclau suggests,
'khen the theorists of the eighteenth century are presented as the initiators of a project of
'mastery' that would eventually lead to Auschwitz, it is forgotten that Auschwitz was
repudiated by a set of values that ... also stem from the eighteenth cent~ry."~ Another
error is made in the degree of inevitability which postmodernism tends to assign to
modernity's path to oppression. Again, though there is arguably a relationship there that is
worthy of exploration, there is a danger of oversimplifcation; as Docherty points out, ''the
development of hiaory over the last two hundred years has not been an inexorable
progress towards evil.'"
It would be difncult to find a better context for an exploration of the modemity
Frankenstein than Development Studies. For the postmodernist, the field encapsulates the
contlict between the modem and the posmiodem in the neatly demarcated match-ups of a
geographic division (North-South), a 'temporal' division (new-old), and a politiCO-CUItural
division (capitalist/SOCialist-indigenous). Moreover, the postmodernist h d s a vast
literature wtiich spells out the mindset behind Northern incursion in the South, rnainly in
the form of neo-Marxist and neo-modemihg literature. Juxtaposing these discourses
agaùist the indigenous ones of the pst-colonial South, postmodernists are able to carry
out their analyses in the style with which they seem most cornfortable, i-e. as a critique of
the dominant paradigm.
But Developrnent Studies also provides an ideal context for those who wish to
take issue with postmodernism for the cognitive and attributive errors of the 'modemity
Frankenstein': where postmodernism tends to obscure the nobler side of modernity by
failing to separate it from the external influences that usurped it, so does it aiso tend to
oversimpl~ the Us that plague the South by failing to separate the structures, processes,
Laclau, in Dochaty (1 993 : 33 1 ). ~ocherty (1993: 11).
agents and context of Northein incursions into the South fiom core 'modemist7 ideas like
citizenship and rationai inquiry.
The most obvious feature of the postmodem approach to development theory is
one that is very typical of postmodemism in general: in its opposition to that body of
post-Enlightenment ideas generally identified as 'modernity', postmodemism "proposes to
set itselfup outside the modem paradigm, not to judge modemity by its own criteria but
rather to contemplate and deconsmict it.775 In its restnicturing and redefinition of the
argument, postmodenllsm in its development theory application cannot credibly be
considered a response to the impasse. That is to say tbat, rather than w o r h g within the
context of what Camille Paglia d l e d %e exhausted stereotype of Lefi versus Right,"
postmodernists stmcture their arguments within the wntext of what might best be termed
the modern-postmodern debate! The main ciifference is that postmodern arguments are
far less likely to base themselves on articles of fàith like the fiee-market ideology of the
neo-modemking camp or the socialism of the neo-Mancists. Moreover, it is arguably
postmodemism's most central feature that articles of fath represent the core of the
problem and therefore serve as the focus of the postmodem critique.
Ln relocating the development theory problematique to the modem-postmodern
debate, postmodernists - as wu be argueci below - focus their attention on modernity. The
impasse-lodged theones fiom the Right and the Lefi are, essentially, recast as competing
strains of theory within the body of modemity rather than as theoretical polar opposites as
they have been typicaiiy understood. In the eye of the postmodemist, they emerge as
opposite sides of the same coin; were postmodeniism to choose a viiiain of history, it
would be as likely to point to Voltaire or Rousseau as to Maoc or Adam Smith.
The postmodern antipathy toward the modem cannot be overstated, rnanifesting
irself as Rosenau has suggested in a postmodem attempt to 'tearrange the whole social
science enterprise." As she continues on to say,
Those ofa modern conviction seek to isolate elements7 spec* relationshipq and formulate a synthesis; post-modemists do the opposite. They offer indetemllnacy rather than detemllnism, diversity rather than unity, Merence rather than synthesis, cumplexity rather than simplification.
At the root of the antipathy is the strident assertion that modernity has not hed up to its
original lofty rhetoric which is "given shape in the assumed emancipation of humanl8nd:
liberation fiom poverty, slavery and ignorance."* Instead, postmodemists point to the
darker associations of modeniity - Lyotard's conviction that modern@ led directly to
Auschwitz is perhaps the best example, but others have been cited:
As we in the West approach the end of the twentieth centu~, the 'hiodemy' record - world wars, the nse of Nazism, concentration camps (in both East and West), genocide, worldwide depression, Hiroshima, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Persian Gulç and a widening gap between rich and poor - makes any belief in the idea of progress or fath in the füture seem questionable.
The crucial point is that while postmodemists are willing to acknowledge that nich iUs
derive more from the rnanner in which Enlightenrnent ideais have been usurpeci and
warped than Eom any evil innate to modemity, they stili lay the blame at modemity's
door. In short, modernity was loaded with Wawed assumptions" from the start,
postmodernists assert, eventually becoming something of a Frankenstein which îurned
against its ma ton and wrought the havoc of genocide, war, environmental degradation,
and so on.
Rosenau (1 992: 8). Schuurman (1993: 23). Kamper and Wulf, cited in Rosenau (1 993: 5) .
P-roderism ~d the Devefopment Frruhstein
When postmodemism is advanced as a possible basis for a new and improved
development theory, it brings its tendency toward cognitive and attributive confusion with
it - now, thougb, the object of its hostility is not modemity but the neo-modernizing and
n e o - W s t development paradigms said to be lodged at an 'Impasse' that has paralyzed
the field. The postmodem position in regard to these paradigms is straightforward: they
emerge as equaily oppressive, 'modemist' institutions by which haked interest is disguised
by a veil of rhetonc, as evinced by the profile of terms like progress, demmratization or
emamiWon. Underneath the veil, poamodemists suggest, the real purpose of the drive
toward mode* is to establish and maintain control over peoples through the 'cultural
imperiaiism' of a hornogenizing definition of progress, and the siiencing of voices wbich
represent altemtives to it.
But the relation of postmodernisrn, in its anti-modem posture, to development
theory is problematic in that the 'why?' of the whole enterprise is feft undehed. That is,
since modemity itselfcannot be the engine behind modemist oppression - it is only an
inanimate body of ideas, after al1 - it is obviously necessary to consider acton. And yet,
postmodeniists assert, the modemity that is pushed on the South is oppressive in nature: it
is therefore reasonable to inquire as to the relevant acton' motives. Two possibilities
present themselves: first, that the driving forces of modernity represent a conspiracy of
sorts, Le., a deliberate cover-up of interests which would be exposed as blatantly unethical
if left uncovered by the rosy rhetoric; or second, that the drive toward modeniity
represents honest but misguided conviction on the part of the forces which carry it out - forces which are also, fnistratingly, often left undefined.
As was the case with Frankenstein and modernity, postmodemism obscures the
nobler side of these 'modemist' development theones: modemkation's emphasis on
democracy, participation, and material wefl-being are washed over in postmodemism's
emphasis on ailturd homogenization, consumerism, and power relations. Neo-Marxism's
emphasis on stnicturd hequities and the oppressive side of international capitalisrn are
similady brushed off in favour of attention to that theory's supposed homogenitùig
tendencies in the politico-economic arena, specifically through its own 'grand narrative'.
But again, these trends alleged by postmodeMsts are ofien left unexplaineci in temu of
why they happen: do 'modernia' theories oppress the South through a deliberate
wnspiracy and campaign of misdirection, or through a misguideci fàith in the rectitude of
thei. respective brands of progress?
The attribution of these traits to neo-hilancist and neo-modernizing theory is
reminiscent of the error in attribution which history has made in relation to Fcankenstein
(who 'kiiied') and which postmodemism has made in relation to modemity (which
'oppresses'), but there are ciifferences in the conceptual parameters of the two examples.
In the first case, the error is fàirly easy to identify, not only because of the blatant nature of
the error, but also because of the limited number of variables to consider: the mistake
e>asts within the confines of the novel and the stereotypic 'Frankenstein' of popular myth.
In the second case, however, the matter is not so simple; in advancing the Holocaust and
Stalinist purges as proof of the 'Ylawed assumptions" of modemity, postmodernists open
something of a Pandora's Box of complicating factors. Postmodemism might credibly
draw attention to the icy technical efficiency with which both processes were carried out,
and the use of narratives which serve- as justification for these events - racial or
ideological 'purification', for exampie - but understates certain extemaiities which were
cmcial to both processes: the pmoia and evident madness of Hitler and Staîin, the long
history of ad-Semitism and Russian totalitarianism, the role of World War 1 and the
Treaty of Versailles in fomenting German nationalism in the 1930s- the long list of
European (and, in 1 9 18- 19 19, American, Canadian, French and British) invasions of
Russian and the Soviet Union, and so on. In al1 of these extemaiities, the spectre of
modernity is far less visible than it is in postmodem assertions of technocratie rationality
and grand na~fative obfiiscation. Far more visible are real-world events, personality cults,
historical enmities, and various associations, perceptions, pressures, historical
idiosyncracies, etcetera - in short, a very complex set of variables which make arguments
that lay the Holocaust at modemity's door far l es convincing.
The point is that with this flawed application of postmodemism to development, as
with its application to modemity, there is a danger of cirastic oversimplification of the
situation, first in its inability to idente a clear motive for the 'oppressions' of
development theory - i.e. was it conspiracy or naiveté?; and second, in its fiiilure to
account for extenial factors. In &g these mistakes, postmodernism runs the nsk of
administe~g the wrong theoretical medicine. The ills which are cited as evidence of the
failure of neo-Marxist and neo-Modeniizing theory are undeniable, but it is just as certain
that if the symptoms are to be cleared up, the disease must be diagnosed correctly.
The question to which this discussion is intended to provide an m e r , namely,
whether or not postmodemism might serve as the basis of a new developrnent theory,
presents interesthg problems which inspire another question: what is it, exactiy , that
postmodemism mi@ alter or replace? It seems as though the initial question
oversimplifies the matter to the point where it cannot be answered directly, mainly by
presuming that previous development theories were somehow neutral ones in which their
advocates simply believed, and which wdd be replaced simply by force of supenor
argument. This is a Bawed notion for two related reasons.
Fust, 'superior' ody has meaning if some sort of ordinal d e exists, i.e., in a
range of less to more desirable, the critena which define 'desirable' are agreed on by ail
parties: this has never been the case. The articles of f&th attributable to the neo-Marxist
and neo-modemizing camps make any universal 'beîter' impossible to dehe because,
simply, what is beîter to a neo-Mamist is not necessarily better to a neo-modeniizer. The
c o ~ e z t i o n between development theory and political partisanship is a tricky one: on the
one hand, modernizers k e Parsons could credibly rest their theories on a gemiine Wh in
the 'good' to be brought about if structural functiohalism were allowed to work in the
South like it had in the North. SUnilarly, neo-Manrists like Cardoso could just as honestly
say that their calls for better terms of trade or even for a degree of delinkage wnstituted a
'good7 for Latin Arnenca. On the other hand, some have ascribed far less honest intentions
to these theonas, and have suggested a more intimate link between these theories and the
political partisanship of the Cold War.
Modemization theory was unambiguously and directly an expression and agent of the then-hegemonic US imperialism. For i ts part, dependency theory was, 'in the last instance', a justifkation and tool of revolutionary strategies.
The second problem with the perception of development theory as neutrai is that it
fails to address the complex of structure, process, agent and wntext that cornes as part
and parcel of a working ideology. Once a link between development theory and Cold War
ideology is suggested, the discussion is no longer restricted to the sentiments or motives
of individual theori~is - instead, development theory becornes intimately lùiked to entire
societies, i.e. the complexes and drives within and between them, and the political tenets
which order them. In this case, as Munck asseris, the neo-modemking theory of the
'West ' derives fiom "U. S. imperialism" and n e o - W s t theory fiom "revolutionary
strategis."
Io Munck (1993: 113-1 14). It is difficult to discuss structure in these t m s without reference to the Cold War
bipolarity that obtained throughout the formative years of development theory; in this
The concept of structure is central to the neo-Manllst critique represented in
dependency and world systerns theories. It was best dculated in the tore-periphery'
temiiwlogy which Walierstein, for one, applied not only to the relations between North
and South, but also to those within Southem counmes as well. The literature on this topic
is vast, but the key idea is that power differentials exist between periphery and wre which
both enable exploitive practices and are maintained by them.
in drawing attention to the importance of the North-South power differential,
multinational corporations, local elite groups, and class structure within developing
countries, development theorists paint structure as institutional weighf, Le. as activities
which embed themselves in structures of varying visibility and which perpetuate hequities,
yet which have been - with very few historical exceptions - strong enough to resist efforts
to change them. The power differentials reflected in this notion of structure may indeed be
meamrable, but in more abstract increments like infiuence, rank and comrnon economic
'culture' among elites and elite institutions.
'Process' refms to the types of politico-economic activity that have dominated
North-South relations since the beginning of European exploration and colonization and
which, despite the altniistic motives o f certain development actors, continue today. l2 It is
tempting to divide process for analytical purposes into the political and the economic, but
sense, strrdchrre refen to a rneaswernent of the distribution of power dong the lines laid out in the structural realia school of international Relations. While such theoiy did tie these measurements to less empiricaf forces like the 'national interest' or the anarchic character of international affairs, the mode1 was stubbomly state-centnc and rejected the internai afliiurs of states as irrelwant to stmctural theory. l2 A distinction wili later be drawn between self-serving development actors and those actors whose activity might better be describeci as being dnven by altruism or ethics, i.e. between a MNC and OXFAM or Doctors Without Borders.
it is difncuit to separate the two, as the influence of Cold War cornpetition again muddies
the conceptual waters somewhat. One can examine ' M ' s t ' development theory through
Soviet-Cuban relations, for exarnple, but it is no easy matter to point to a specific process
and explain exactly why it is occumng. The proces of Soviet development efforts in Cuba
rnay have been intended to serve economic interests through, say, the procurement of
tropical foodstufb or local minerais for Soviet consumption, or to serve the political
interests of domestic entities like the rnilitary or the planning bureaucracies of the
Communia Party of the Soviet Union. Or, ifthe stnicturd redists are correct, the process
served the realpoLitik of the Soviet governrnent in its struggle with the West, in which case
getting Cuba 'on-side' represented a tremendous coup in strategic and tactical terms. On
the other hand, the 'me' dynarnic of modernization theory is no easier to singIe out:
depending on whom one asks, Western development protected the economic gains of
extractive and exploitative business interests, fiirthered the domestic political interests of
various security agencies, or responded to the demands of international political
wmpetition through counter-insurgency and the drive to keep developing countnes frorn
'crossing over'. In characterihg process, then, it is perhaps better to leave the political
and the economic unseparated. Process mi@ better be defineci as the politico-economic
demands of international capitalism or international socialism: in both cases the
seIf-serving practices of the North - i.e. East or West - have resulted in extraction,
exploitation, environmental damage, and, in many cases, violence which has tended to
accompany arms transfers and the tactics employed to protect politico-economic process,
regardless of whether the ' 6 d o m fiaers' in question were counter-insurgents or
revolutionaries.
Agent (Actor)
Because the difficuity in separating the political f?om the economic arises again, it
is kely better to define the 'agent' sub-area of the North-South complex as those entities
with interests in development processes and who, where necessary, do what they can to
mobilize the amcmres and processes that over-arch them in order to serve those interests.
This may be an 'unscientinc' approach, but a systematic classification of a m is of less
interest here than the conceptual confiict between individual actor interest and a wider,
more egaiitarian sense of development. To use a particularly notorious example, the
naturai interests of the United Fruit Company in Central America were directly at odds
with the ethicdly unchallengeable ca l for land refonn throughout that region. l3
Two things need to be noted regarding the ~e~interested actors of the
development complex. Fust7 there is nothing conspiratorial about an aaor's pursuit of its
interests: for an International Financial Institution (IFI) to impose structural adjusmient
packages to ensure repayment on loans, for example, or for an engineering firm to bid on
the construction of a dam is both a natural extension of the purpose of such entities and a
naturd result of organizational pressure on individual decision-makers within those entities
to produce. One could most certainly oppose both of these examples on fairly solid ethical
or environmental grounds, but the point is that such opposition can only acquire meaning
within a ceriain fiarnework of rationality; in the rationaiity of the LFI or the engineering
firm, the pursuit of these interests is perfectly desirable.
Second, actor self-interest is for the most part consistent with the dictates of
development theory, arguably because of the intimate relationship between econornic and
political interest. Thus a dam project which dislocates thousands and which lads to
problems of soi1 erosion and desertification is 'desirable' because it also mates jobs,
provides electricity and inigation, thereby furthering 'modeniization' (its attendant
benefits for hydroelectric finns and agribusiness are, presumably, a happy coincidence).
l3 On the United Fruit Company in Central America, see LaFeber (1984).
Sùnilarly, a Cuban or Sandinista land re-organization or the nationalization of an industry
might compromise productive efficiency, but wiil aiso fwther the theory's egalitarian
ideals and politicai objectives. l4
Like the three sub-areas discussed above, 'context' is only artificially separable
fiom the iarger complex of North-South relations. That is to say that none of the four
exists Uidependently of the others, and that no real-world example of structure, process,
actor-agent or context can be understood without reference to the other t h e .
If a North-South wntext is to be discussed, it will have to be defined in neoliberal
terms primarily because of the loss of credibility that the Left has suffered since 1989, but
dso because neo-Marxist theory, iike its antecedents, defines itself in ternis of its
opposition to what has histoncally been the dominant paradigm, namely, an extractive
capitalist or nediberal one. l5 'Context' is intended to refer, then, to the neoliberal ethos
which pemeates 'official' interaction between North and South, and which provides
conceptual parameters which defme the acceptable and the unacceptable. For example, the
fact that decades of heavy lending to Latin Amencan countnes by Fis has resulted in a net
tnuisfer of fiinds out of those countries wouid, one wouid hope, be considered
l4 This is not to argue that Cuba or Nicaragua are good examples of neo-Man& theory in action, but rather that they represent two notable examples of the 'counter' bent of neo-hilarxist theory in relation to the hegemony of modernization evident elsewhere. l5 It might be argued that the popuianty of dependency and wodd systems theory in academic circles denoted, particularly in the late 1960s and 1970s, a hegemonic context of sorts, but again this represented a critical view of the 'official' hegemony of neoiiberalism - neo-Mancist theory held great sway, but within a limiteci sphere. The sarne is tme of a d 'leftist' development practices discemible at various times in Nicaragua or Cuba or, for that matter, Bulgaria: again, the hegemony of such theory in these pockets was undeniable, but as is particularly evident in the Latin Arnerican examples, their situation in the midst of a larger neoliberaf context bas made them the targets of relentless pressure f+om the dominant wmplex of neoliberalism.
objectionable in terms of what is îypicdy considered fkir, but is perfêctly desirable ifthe
assessing 'gauges' are the balance sheets and shareholder returns of the Northern banks
which control the process. l6
The Devefopmenî Metqhor and the Interest-Ethics Dichotomy
This breakdown of the North-South complex is intended to illustrate the vastness
of the development process, and to mess the importance of this vastness in lirniting the
potential of any new deveiopment theory to effect change. It might even be argued that
the very term development ought to be viewed with suspicion, tidily positionhg as it does
the complexity of North-South interaction under one banner: the extractive practices of
coprate enterprise, the financial ties of Multilateral Lending Agencies (MLAs),
international banks and their investors, private investment, NGO involvement, IGO
involvement, academic study, and, increasingly, New Social Movements and indigenous
development alternatives in the South. Because an individual who says dhe works "in
development" is jua as likely to conjure up the image of the jet-setting bankllig consultant
as that of the khaki-clad Peace Corps volunteer, it must be recogNzed that the term is
redy a loose ceiling for a multitude of meanings.
Another way of looking at this is to divide the agents of the development cornplex
dong the lines of their motivation. Even in the list just presented, a distinction can be
made between two groups: those who participate in the development process in order to
serve pecuniary interest, and those who do so on humanitarian grounds like the Pace
Corps volunteer: this motive will be loosely labeled ethics. To be sure, these labels are
both fàirly loose - the division of development motives into these two categones does not
wnsftute empiridy rneasurable social science data, nor does it purport to represent a
tkory: it does not delineate the relevant system cleariy, nor does it generate predictive
l6 This trend is weil documenteci in Feinberg (1 989).
ability. It is intended merely to illuminate the gap in motivation between individual
development agents, and in doing so illuminate the *ers and losers in the development
process: as was pointed out above, this is crucial when development theorists are
clamouring for a new theory in Iight of the supposed 'tàilure' of the conventional ones.
Where this implies that 'we' had it wrong somehow with neo-modemizing or neo-Marxist
t heory, the interest-et hics dichotorny highlights the fact t hat certain interest-pursuing
agents had it very, very ri@. This is, perhaps, just another way of saying that if we are to
determine whether one of the dominant development theones has 'fded', we need to be
clear about what it was intended to accomplish in the first place, and whom it was
intended to serve.
Attention to the North-South complex aüows for the illumination of three things:
first, the comection tetween development theory and political partisanship, and their
common evolution throughout the duration of the Cold War; second, the structures,
processes, agencies and wntext, and the mass and inertia they possess - not only would
they not be easily re~rdered dong postrnodern lines, they exist as credible explanations in
themselves for many of the ills of the developrnent process, explanations at least as
credible as postmodern ones which focus on deconstruction, discourse analysis and
diversity. Lastly, it provides an alternative to development theory as a target for
postmodern hostility. The cognitive and attributive emors which postmodemism rnakes in
relation to Frankenstein and modemity are just as misleading with neo-modemization and
neo-Marxism: these theoies are saddled with unseemly traits that are fiir more attributable
to externdities traceable to the vanous dynamics of North-South relations in general. Just
as unfair is the obscuring of these theories' nobler aspects: in deriding them as
'modeniist', postmodemism fails to give these theories their due. They are certainly
imperfect, but this is not the same as suggesting that there is no good in them and
advocating th& complete disposal.
I f postmodeniism is to negotiate the development theory Impasse, it must go
beyond deconstruction: it must artidate the concephial material of development in a
sense which allows for the correct identification of the problems rather than the cognitive
and attributive enors of the modemity Frankenstein. This would at least create the
possibility that such development might be brought about in light of the institutional
weight of the larger North-South cornplex as sketched above.
The latter point is, of course, the ditncuit one. Postmodernism certainly brings a
fiesh perspective to development theory, and its skepticism and ability to cut through
iconic obfùscation ought to render it indispensable to any honest attempt to eEect change,
but it is not enough to point to the modernist grand narratives and cry foul; nor is it
enough to advocate the grass-roots assertion of alternative voices. It is weU and good for
postmodeniists to decry modemity's 'Ylawed assumptions" and argue that humankind
took a wrong turn at the Enlightenrnent, but the fact remains that we are two hundred-odd
years into the 'modem' era and are thus saddled with two hundred-odd years of
'modemia' baggage. Postmodenùsm, ifit is to rnake any significant impact, must do more
than contest Enlightenrnent arguments that are two centunes old: it mua do something
about the baggage.
It wi l be atgued below that this is where postmodernism breaks down. Because of
its Mure to accurately - or at least reaiistically - wnceptualize the North-South compleq
because of its tendency to point to al1 its ills as the products of a misguided modernity, and
because of its frustrating vagary, postmodemism is unmitable as the bais of any new
development theoiy. However, it wiii also be argued that the posmiodem critique has
much to offer development theory, and that a version of the postmodem approach placed
within the context of interest versus ethics might stand a better chance of achieving
theoretical coherence, although its practical usefiiness migtit still be questionable. This
latter deficiency rnight be considerd irrelevant in an exploration of theory, but the
development 'theoretical' is of particuiar importance to the practical given the severe
socio-economic, political and environmental &es fàcing the developing world. The
theoretical might be safèly detached from the troublesome demands of the practical in
linguistics, philosophy, or even socioiogy or political science, but the above crises make it
imperative that development theory be accorded no such Iuxury.
Following a brief summary of the roots of the Impasse in the second chapter, the
third d s u d e the fiuidamentals of postmodemism: this chapter will take the fom of
a surnmary of the main themes discemible in the literature rather than a comprehensive
orgahtion of iî, for reasons tbat wiU be made c h . The fourth chapter will explore
postmodemism's strengths, and the fifth will explore its weaknesses. The sixth chapter
will present the interest-etbics dichotomy in greater detail, and the seventh chapter wiü
suggest that a modified version of postmodeniism, which wiil be described as a synthesis
of both the 'modem'-postniodem and interest-ethics dichotomies, wiii be far better suit4
to negotiating the impasse than postmodemism in its current, limited state.
Chapter Two: The Roua of the Ihqmsse
Like 'development', the two schools of thought referred to rather loosely as the
neo-modernizing and neo-Man& development paradigms encompass wider ranges of
opinion than the ternis suggest. Those who argue tbat an Impasse exists generaily refer to
these schools of thought, but there are variations in the tenns used to represent their
opposition to each other. Scott, for example, refers to a "'stdemate" in development
theory between the ''modeminng" and "dependency" nïimeworks, whereas Smith begins
an exarnination of development theo~y's ''state of crisis" by contrasting dependency with
"de~elo~mentalisrn." In another example, O N s seeks an accomodation between
neoliberalism and structuralism. l8
The looseness of the laquage of the impasse might be bothenome to some,
glossing over as it does important Merences among the terms: cleariy, smichiralism,
dependency and neo-h4arxism are not identical. On the other h d , they are aii based in an
antipathy toward the neo-liberal paradigm; to lump them together, then, need not be to
commit to a methodological sloppiness if it is made clear that these headings encompass a
diverse range of literature with important substantive, contextual and temporal
distinctions. With this disclaimer, then, the general labels of neo-modemkation and
neo-Marxism might be left intact, viewed as labels for the contending camps in a general
conflict between those theories traditionally understood to have emanated fiom the Right
and the Left. Thus Schuurman places dependency theory, modes of production theory and
World S ystems theory under the banner of neo-Mancist theory. l9 Similady, the general
neo-modemking heading rnight be assumed to encompass a wider body of ideas
l7 Scott (1995: 2); Smith (1985: 532). l8 Onk (1995: 97) l9 Schuurman (1993: 2-14).
aitematively wntextualized as liberalism and neoliberalism, rnodernization and
neo-modernkation.
Development theorists typidy begin a description of rnodernization theory with a
su- of Amencan policy in the years foliowing Worid War ii. For exarnple,
. . . development studies, which has always been dominated by Amerïcan academics, was founded in the first years &er World War iI, when the United States assumed leadership of a ravaged worid in which the problems of containing the Soviet Union and dealing with national liberation movements throughout much of Asia and Afica were the country's top foreign policy priorities.20
Modernization theory was thus bom in an era in whch larger world order was changuig,
mainly in the form of an mer-inte-g Amencan hegemony reflected in the ambitions
of the Marshail Plan and the Bretton Woods conference. Within a few y=, battle Iines
were drawn between the remnants of the western alliance and the Soviet Union:
containment became the basis of the Arnerican stmtegic position, the Cold War took shape
and, afler the Berlin crisis of 1958-59, it was played out almost exclusively in the s 0 4 e d
TIrird World.
The primary feature of Amencan policy toward Europe, the Far East and,
increasingiy, Latin Amerka was the drive to re-organize these areas dong liberal
democratic lines21 Dwelopment in this period is therefore bea understood as
20 Smith (1985: 533). 21 Where the U.S. was in a position to be proactive in its postwar policy, the European wuntnes were not. Losing their grip on their c o l o d possessions, the European development 'drive' might therefore be better characterized as reactive in nature, designeci to ensure that the coniing transfer of power in Afnca and Asia did not prove too detrimental to European interests. As Apter (1 987: 12- 13) suggests, early development research "took on considerable political urgeacy as nationalism intensifieci and pressures for independence mounted. How to promote development on ternis favorable to the
synonymous with c h g e or as the means through which this re-organization was to take
place. To quote Apter again,
M e r the war when preoccupations with the reconstruction of Europe receded, interest focused on development including colonial and so-cded backward areas. These latter required a re-thinkmg of conventional ideas about political economy and the state, and incorporation of new kinds of knowledge about exotic cultures, customs, social practivces, values and beliefs. The following question was central: Which combinations of n o m and institutions wodd impede, and which fàciiitate, development? Which type of political system might best induce growth became a matter of the creation of new societies, social organitations, and political e c o n ~ r n ~ . * ~
The centraiity of c b g e to the development process rnay have been clear enougb,
but the formulation of a coherent means to bring it about proved to be problematic. The
field itself was, in the postwar years, so diflcùse that, as Smith suggests, 'the divisions
among the academic disciplines and the avowediy eclectic concerns of many working in
the field made it difficult to label developmentalism a '~chool ' . '~~ The Arneiican approach
- one dnven by policy needs which, Apter niggests, "fàr outstretched academic thinking,"
- was geared toward the acquisition of infionnation about specific developing areas:
One needed to know a great deai about development concretely, as it was particularized in terrns of experts and area specialists. In the United States and elsewhere, programs of research on developing countries were estabfished in virtually every major university. Area experts were trained in considerable n~rnbe r s .~~
The initial potential for contlsion in terms of defining the field may have thus been
mitigated by its close relationship with U.S. foreign poli^^.^^ Since what was sought was a
metropolitan powers was the fkst question. " 22 Apter (1987: 12-13). 23 Cornbining elements of behavioraiism and 'operationalism', development researchers fiom the fields of anthropology, economics, sociology and political science worked primarily dong empirical, quantitative and comparative Iines to gather information about the developing wodd (Smith (1985: 533)). 24 Apter (1 987: 13). 25 As Smith suggests, 'Yomal" mechanisms such as the SSRC and 'Worrnai" ones like
wodd re-ordered dong liberal lines, the uieory that emerged denved fiom the sociological,
political and economic aspects of liberalkm prevalent in the United States at the the. In
sociological te-, this invariably leads us to structural fiuictionalism and the work of
Talcott Parsons in partinilar. Parsons developed a sophisticated typology of social systems
from a macro or structural perspective: bis notion that societies could be best understood
in struaural texms that the fundamental unit of the social structure was the stdus-de,
and that the arrangement of w i t s depended on the anangement ofpattern variabes
proved to be enormously influenthi on the structural fùnctionalism of the 1950s which
Davis refmed to as "synonymous with ~ o c i o l o ~ ~ . " ~ ~ h development terms, to re-order a
society, one needed only to re-balance the pattern variables.
The importance of structurai hctionalism to early modemkation theory lay in its
role as the theoretical basis for the types of change envisioned in U.S. policy:
. . . the development project is "modernization" of %ditional" societies through the establishment of networks and institutions similar to those of advanced industrial socides, including strategic norms of work, values of social discipline and beliefs about equity and motivations representing the intemakation of these norms, values and beliefs in a rnanner ensuring role performance through appropriate behavior2'
In terms of specific policy, the spirit of modernization as defined above is clearly
identifiable in a 195 1 publication of the United Nations' Department of Economic Mairs:
There is a sense in which rapid econornic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed, and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons
the personal and professional connections of the academics in the field aided in this process (1985: 533). 26 On Parsons statu-roles, see Ritzer (1 992: 105); on pattern variables, see Parsons (1% 1: 67); Davis (1959). 27 Apter (1 987: 16).
who aumot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a cornfortable life hstrated. Very few cosnsnwlities are willing to pay the fidl price of economic pro gr es^.^*
The economic and political dimensions of modeniization theory, also consistent with
liberal principles, are best representeci in terms of growth and democratization. The most
pro& econornic 'modernizer' is Walter Rostow, whose 'stages of economic growth'
thinking was as uinuential to economic modenllration as Parsons' work was to
suciological modemkation. Rostow conceptuaiized a fiestep transition nom
"traditional" society to the society of "hi& rnass consumption," i.e. the 'bighest ' stage of
modemitation. E s conception is characterized by a curious mixture of the exaltation of
capitalism on the one hand, and acknowledgement of the demise of traditional cuitures on
the other. In his Stages of fionomic Growth, he writes that "it takes t h e to transfomi a
traditional society in the ways necessary for it to exploit the ôuits of modem science, to
fend off dirninishuig r e m , and thus to enjoy the blessings and choices opened up by the
rnarch of compound interest." On the very same page, t h g h , comparing the
modernkition of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe with subsequent
development, he acknowledges that
The more general case in modem history ... saw the stage of preconditions (for modemkation) mise not endogenously but fkom some extemal intnision by more advanced societies. These invasions - literal or figurative - shocked the traditional society and began or hastened its undoing . .. 29
28 Cited in Escobar (1984: 377). Interestingly enough, this spirit of 'paying the price" is visible in a more recent document. A June 1996 Globe article reviewing the World Bank's annual report was entitled "Get real about ccrpabilities, Wodd Bank tells p r i ~ ~ o n s , , " and, in the article's subtitle, this helptùl trailer "In xts mmal report, agency suys cmntries are going to have to take hard looks ut w h they c m accom~ish, and reduce hreat~cracies. " (26 June: A 1 6). 29 Roaow (1960: 6).
Samuel Huntington's Pofificui Order in Chanpitg Societies (1968) is referred to
by Smith as a work which "moa North American specialists would agree to be the finest
work in developrnentalism by a politicai s~ient i s t . '~~ Like the sociological work which
preceded it, the study of political development took a comparative approach, adyzing the
building of political hitutions in the Third World in order to find as Baum suggests,
'the political analogue of the industrial re~olution."~ Specifically, attention was devoted
to "the growth of speciaüzed politicai structures, such as parties, pressure groups,
legislatures, executive and judicial offices."32 Though the rhetoncal buzzword that
dominates this literature is 'democratization', the actual meaning of political development
is less than clear, as Smith pointed out in 199 1 in an anaiysis of John F. Kennedy's
AUiance for Progress. While it "seemed obvious that democracy entaileci such things as a
decline in class polarization thanks to a growing middle class, and the incorporation of the
working class into politics," Smith suggests, the United States was in no hurry to
encourage the type of social democracy which existed in Europe and involved state
intervention to assure social weWe and incorne redistribution: iristead, U. S. objectives led
it to encourage Liberal dernocracy on the lines of the North American rn~del . )~
In sum, modemkation theory was a loosely amalgamatecl body of literature
initidy characterized by disparateness, but which was eventuaily pulied together and
directed by the United States' domestic and foreign interests, whkh translated into an
Arnerican desire to re-shape the developing world dong North American lines. The works
of Parsons, Rostow and Huntington represent the sociological, economic and political
dimensions of an ' organismic' modemkation theory, developing systerns of classification
30 Smith (1985: 542). Baum, in Harvey (1972: 22).
32 lbid. 33 Smith (1 99 1 : 75). The profile and use of this term are al1 the more questionable when one considen the fàct that programmes tike the Alliance hoped to 'inject' democracy fiom the top dom.
and prescriptions for the transformation of Southern dtures, seeking to 'design' the
South in a fàshion which reflected the 'tniths' that had already been determined about
American society. The inter-relatedness of the three perspectives is spelied out by Smith:
in emphasizing the impact of Parsons' pattern variables, he draws attention to ''their
assumption that cultural values are of a whole with economic, social, and political systems
in such a fashion that mial organization should be conceptuaiized as a self-reinforcing
uni@." The underlying idea, cleariy, was that the transformation of the economic, social
and political systems wodd achieve, by definition, the transformation of the CUItures in
question.
As was mentioned earlier, 'neo-ManOst' theory is a loose label intended to cover
several sub-schools of developmeut theory: three that will be treated here are
smicturalisrn, dependency and worid-systems theory. The main point of commonality
which each of these schools shares with classical Manrism is an opposition to the
liberai-capitalist approach which is built on exploitation, but apart fkom that there are
important difFerences between Marx's work and the 'neo' development theories that it
iduenced. Three of these differences are summacized by Schuurman. The first lies in the
question of point of view: where ciassical Marxism is 'Eurocentric," examining
'hperialism from the perspective of the central capitalist wuntries," neo-Marxjsm looks
at it from the perspective of the peripheral countries. Second, neo-Manosm takes issue
with the '%istorically progressive role of capitalism:" where M d s t s envisioned a straight
progression from feudalism to capitalism to socialism, neo-Mamists argue that impenalism
and capitalism "are more likely to lead to underdevelopment in the periphery than
development ." Lastly, where classical Marxism emphasizes the revolutionary potential of
the proletariat, neo-Mao<ists emphasize that of the p ~ ~ . 3 4
Struauralist development theory, '%barn in cnticism of received (Le. rnodemizing)
doctrine," is rardy mentioned without some reference to Rad Prebisch, an Argentine
economist who wrote a now-bous report for the United Nations' Ecomonic
Commission on Latin America in 1 9 5 0 . ~ ~ Prebisch's central contribution was to argue that
practices deriving fiom classical economic theory and modernization theory were not
living up to their promise in Latin Arnerica, and that this faihire was due to untàir and
worseniog terms of the region's trade with the industriaked countries. Another pillar of
his critique, and that of the structuralists in general, was the assertion that the
elite-dominated and intemationally 'connecteci' social stnichire "prevalent in Latin
Amerka (consti~ed) a serious obstacle to technical progress and, consequently, to
economic and social de~elo~rnent."~~ This was a clear departure fiom the modemizing
position that traditionalist 'pathologies' and parochialisrns were to blame for the slow
economic progress of the region.
Though dependency theory has "its roots in the stmcturalism of the ECLA
economists, it arose most directly and forcefully as an extended critique of the
modernization perspective."37 Leys backs up this assesmeril, pointing more specifically
to "the early 1960s when UDT (underdeveloprnent and dependency theory) emerged as a
militant critique of the ruling ideas of de~elopnental ism.~ The main ideas of
dependency theory, as eiaborated by its foremost Engltsh-wrîting representative Andre
34 Schuunnan (1 993: 2-3). 35 Street, in Dietz and Street (1987: 105). 36 Ibid, p. 107. 37 Fitzgerald (1 983: 15). 38 Leys (1 983 : 3 1) He also refers to the "intellectud deserts h m which UDT rescued us," citing as examples inkgration, nation-building, politid development and rnodeniisation.
Gunder Frank, centre around the UIlSUifability of the experience of the indusîrialued
nations as models or guides to understanding the Third World. For Frank, this was where
modernization theory went wrong: it faileû, first, to to consider the histokal experience
of the colonies in shaping its relations with the industdized world and, second, to
"explain the structure and development of the capitalist system as a whole and to account
for its sirnultaneous generation of underdevelopment in some of its parts and of econornic
development in others. t'39 Underdevelopmextt, for dependency theorists, does not result
fiom the absence of modemization, resistance to modernization or the flawed application
of modemization theory, but "was and still is generated by the veiy same historical process
which aiso generated économie development: the developrnem of capitalisrn itself. "40
The world-system theory of Immanuel Wderstein emerged in the mid- 1970s and
was "strongly based on the ideas of.. . Frank and other dependenti~las.'~~ Two main
features distinguish it fiom dependency theory. First, world-system theory introduced the
concept of the semi-periphery in an effort to account for the development evident in places
iike Brazii or the NIES of East Asia. These states were viewed by Wailerstein as buffers
between the core and periphery whose sale of production set them apart from peripheral
countries, yet which were still dominated by the core. The second point of departue fiom
dependency theory is what Fitzgerald refers to as world-system theory's breadth of
dys i s : rather than viewing the worid in simpler wre-periphery terms,
World-System analysis places a new emphasis on the multilaterai relations of the system as a whole . .. rather than on the unilateral relations of metropole and satellite characteristic of dependency theory. Thus wre-core and periphery-periphery relations becorne as central to the d y s i s as do me-periphery ones!*
39 Frank (1992: 107-108) 40 Ibid, p. 1 12. 41 Schuumuui (1993: 7). 42 Fitzgerald (1983: 19j.
Like dependency theory, world-systems analysis is less a program of action than a
description of poiiticd and economic reality as envisioned by Walierstein, and a critique of
the assumptions of modernization theory. Rejecting the state-centric approach of
modernization, Wderstein chose as a unit of anaiysis the 'broad econornic entity within a
division of labour that is not circumscribed by political or cultural boundaries," i.e. the
w o r l d - ~ ~ s t e m . ~ ~ The system, as he viewed it, is characterized primarily by this
international division of labour, and is based on the developrnent of capitalism itse& which
"provided a basis for the growth and development of a world-economy . . . without the aid
of a unified political stnicture.'* For Waiiersteh, the economic form of domination
represented by the world-system has proved more eEectve than the political domination
of earlier empires.
In sum, 'neo-Manrist' theories serve primarily to question the theoretical bases of
modernization theory, but also to draw attention to the domination that lies behind it. As
Smith summarizes, dependemistas (and, we might include, stnicturalists and world-system
t heorias)
... share the view that the power of international capitalism setting up a global division of labor has been the chef force responsible for shaping the history of the South. Onginally as mercantilism, then as free trade, later as finance capitai, and most recently under the auspices of the multinational corporation, capitaiism over the 1st five centuries has created a wodd economic ~~çtern.4~
Defning the Imprrse: Ine FPiure of Deyelopment meorp
The very notion that an Impasse &sts rests on the ascription of 'failure' to
neo-modeniizing and neo-Mmcist development theocy. While the conceptual danger of
reducing such broad strands of theory to singular entities which can be somehow deemed
to have succeeded or failed will be treated in greater detail in the next section, there can be
littie doubt that, unlike select periods in the past four decades, neither view holds decisive
sway among development theorists today. The su- can now turn to the various
critiques of n e o - M h s t and neo-modemking theory said to have brought the field to this
point.
Factors advanced as expfanations or proof of the Mure of modemization theory
seem to Ml into four groups that mi& loosely be entitied methodological flaw, structural
flaw, misrepresented intent, and real-world conditions. Critiques which have posited this
school's methodoIogicuIflàws mi& take a positivist form in one instance, or more of a
'postmodern' form in another: the difference is that the former accepts the general
assumptiom of positivist social science but questions the quality of particular hypotheses,
propositions or themies. Thus Smith, drawing out the reasons for the Mure of
"developmentalism," argues that:
... the models in m . cases were so formal and abstract that they proveâ too stifling, too tyrannical, and dtimately too sterile for the empincal work they sought to organize. The other problern was that the models were too loose, too incoherent, and too incomplete to act as adequate guidelines assuring the interco~ectedness of research.
Smith does provide a compelling enou& explanation of this apparently contradictory
statement, but the point is that while he acknowledges the faiiure of "developmentalism,"
he suggests a fmlty application of a sound research method rather than a misguided
method itself Similarly, he States that
(the) s t h g shortcornhg of the (developmentaliçt) school was its inability to articulate a unified mode1 of comparative political economy, just as it lacked any broad-based comparative historical perspective into which the problems of mid-20th-cenhiry development could be placed.
46 Smith (1985: 536)
Apter, on the other han& points to the limitations of the positivist approach in a passage
which appears, for him, uncharacteristicaiiy 'posmiodern':
Postive scientific knowledge (especidy quantitative) has relied on conceptual schemes thst are unable to incorporate the range, scope, and number of variables required to understand development problems. It obliterates the tentativeness of more w c e d and intenial knowledge. Quantitative or formalized styles of thinlOng in social analysis have Ied to poor predictions, stated with more pretentiousness than a ~ t h o r i t y ~ ~
Critiques addressing modernization theory's st~cturaiflaws are not necessariiy
derivative of sfnrchtrakm, but they do seem to be d a lefiist bent. However, it does not
require a M-st to rnake the point: such flaws rnight just as easily be called logical flaws
as structuraf ones. Structural flaws, then, refer to impediments to modernization by
resisting or complicating entities like class structure or the conflict in neu-liberalism
between the self-interest inherent in capitalisrn and the egaütarianism inherent in
democracy. Baran, for example, argues that
.. . contirnous capitalist development is irnplausible for the Third World because of the power configuration betweem foreign and domestic decision makers and the people . . . capitalist development in (most underdeveloped) countries was not accompanied by the nse of a strong property-owning middle class and by the overthrow of landlord domination of society. Instead, an accommodation was reached between the newly arrived monopolistic business and the socially and politicdy entrenched agrarian ari~tocrac~.~
The point, obviously, is that modernization is an unattainable goal given the realities
inherent in the method of its propagation, namely, an injected capitalism. In a criticism
pointed more directly at neoliberalism, Schuurman questions the notion that neoliberal
econornics and democracy can go together:
47 Apter (1987: 14) 48 (1992: 82).
... how meaNngfÛi, or even seaire, is that democracy when the new wave of capitalist modernisation is accompanied by W-sale privatisation, and the withenng away of the social and economic fiinctions of the peripheral state - this in societies already severely wrroded by d e r waves of capitalist moderni~ation?~
Critics who point to misreprsented intent highlight the connection between
modeniization theory and U. S. geopolitical interests. The most obvious critique of this
sort would be any Maocist one which painteci the theory as a simple cover for imperialism
and naked interest. Some analysts, though, have been more restrairied in their conclusions.
For Schuurmm, modemkation theory "gave discursive credibility to the expansion for
United States investments, and more Mportantly to the ditfiision of American geopolitical
power." Smith takes a similariy benign view of this connection, acknowledging that '%me
were those Iike W. W. Rostow and Samuel Huntington . . . who indeed explicitly intended
to make their work an instrument of Amencan foreign policy," but suggests that this
served oniy to compt the punty of an otherwise credible theoretical approach:
In view of the ideological .. . concems of those working in developmentaiism, it is dficult to see how .. . they might have sponsored the kind of work in comparative history or political economy that . . . would have ensured more broad-range mode1 building . . . and more robust constructions of theories . . ."%
Neo-Mano'st development theory is aiso widely held to have failed, having been
attacked by Manas and n o n - M s t alike 6om the late 1970s and through the 1980s. It
might then be argued that the demise of the East Bloc and the subsequent
"delegitimisation of socialism as a viable political means of solving the problem of
underdevelopment" in the early 1990s was merely the final stage in a gradual erosion of
credibitity that had been occurring for some tirnee51 For -me, the main faiing of
neo-Marx& theory was simply a Baw in logic inherent in the concept of dependency.
49 S c h u u m (1993: 96) Smith (1985: 542). Schuurman (1993: 10).
Bernstein, for exarnpl~ argues that ifthe difference between the core and the periphery is
defineci by the existence of two development processes, Le. one autonomous and one
dependent, then the core's exploitation of the periphery 'to oppose the Ml in the rate of
profit" suggests that the core c a ~ o t be autonomous: as Schuumian writes, "one carmot
describe the development process of the core as independent if that process depends on
exploitative relations with the peziphery in order to keep the dynamics of its own
development going."52
ûthers have criticized the neo-hlan0st approach for what Booth refers to as its
generaiised and economistic explanatory frameworks" which "aspirecl to excessive
expianatory power" and thus "fàiltàiled to reflect and were incapable of explaining the
diversity and complexity of the r d world of deve~o~rnent .~~ The major problem, for
Booth. was a metatheoretical "commitment" inherent in Marxist theory to "demonstrating
that the structures and processes of las developed countnes are not only explicable but
necessary under capitalism." The result, he suggests is that this cornmitment creates
"distinctive preoccupations btind spots and contradictions" in the Mancist (and
presumably the neo-Mantist) vie^.^ Both Smith and Apter make sirnilar points about the
inabihty of neo-Mmcist theory to account for the apparent victories of modernkation, that
is, for situations in which it appears that capitalism might actudy be generating something
positive. Apter suggests that dependency theory '%as been too dire in its critiques of
capitalism," arguing that neo-Marxists have fded to appreciate the ''ttransfomuitive
potentiaî" of capitalism that Marx himself sugge~ted.~~ For Smith, this point tums - as it
did for Bernstein - on the question of dependence &self Pointing to the possibility that
actual economic growth might occur uader conditions of 'dependencyY7 that ''the shape
52 Ibid, p. 13. 53 Booth (1993: 50).
%id, p.5 1. j5 Apter (1987: 28-30).
and pace of this change" might be d&ed and enacted locaiiy, and that the supposedly
dependent state is responsible for it ail, he argues that:
. . . one quite plausible uiference wouid be that the ability of imperiaiism to make these areas 'dependent' is deciining, and that therefore the cardinal reference poinî of the dependency approach is fast losing its utility as a lodestar. Ironicaily, then, dependencia . . . may be spreading just as the situation that gave nse to it is coming to an end, and the very sophistication of its method can be used as its own cannons tumed against itseE?
Booth has also criticized the neo-Marxist approach for conceptual-rnethodologicai
flaws existing in the form of teleology and tautology, drawing attention respectively to
Marxism's tendency to define capitalism "in teims of laws that produce inescapable and
fixed outcornes (for example, a socialist revolution)," and to the depemkntiriu tendency
to define underdevelopment 'Po terms of the degree of dependence" while at the same time
citing dependency as the cause of underde~elo~ment.~~
As t h g s currently stand, neo-modemizing and neu-Marxïst development theories
might best be understd to have fàiied because of the gap between, on the one hand,
their lofty, predictive rhetoric and their volume of academic attention, and on the other,
their real-world performance. As Apter suggests of modemkation theory, 'the record of
genuine accomplishment seems a good deal more meager than the outpouring of books on
(developrnental science and political development) might a t t e ~ t . " ~ ~ Indeed, the profile of
the academic debate in the North between tbe Rostows and the Wailersteins of the
development theory world might be said to have developed at the expense of actual
development wncerns in the South: as Munck writes, 4he debate on 'marginality' may
#i Smith (1985: 545). 57 Schuman (1993: 3 1; 38 - fh. 11). As Schuunnan points out, modemkation theory is also g d t y of teleology in its presentation of living conditions like those in the United States as an inevitable end product of development in the South. 58 (1987: 13).
have passeci into histoty but not the people it referred t ~ . " ~ ~ men motivated by partisan
politics, and more oflen spiralling into esoteric analysis and jargonistic commentary, the
various strands of development theory have brought thernseives to this Impasse; the
challenge now is to re-instate - or perhaps to instate - Munck's marginalizedpeople and
the degree of control they are able to exert over their own lives as the central focal point
of development theory. Succeeding chapters wiii evaluate the potential of postmodernism
to bring this about.
59 Munck (1993: 1 14).
Chupter 3: Pustmodemism - the Basics
To attempt a definition of Postmodemism is to wade into a morass of sorts. Not
ody are its ideas cornplex and, ofien, interrelated, they are also ofien implicitly underlined
by disclaimers centering around postmodernism's discodort with the very ideu of
defaion, forcing commentators to choose their words very carefuîly lest they betray
assumptions for which they might later draw deconstructive fie. As a result, it is diflicult
to be precise about what postmodemism achially is. This point can be demonstrateci by
looking at an interesting discursive quirk of postmodemism, narnely, the tendency of the
words typically mounding 'postmodemism' or 'postmodemist' to commit an author to a
specific direction. For example, ifone refers to a postmodemist 'position', it might be
inferre- that postmodemism represents some sort of ethos. If we refer to the postmodern
'response', it becomes a critique. If we are enticed to say something like "postmodemists
feei that ...", postmodemism might be construed as an a g e d . And, ifit is used simply to
highlight the 'Ylawed assumptions" of rnodernity in the Third World, it might even be
interpreted as an alternative ~ h e o r y . ~ The &est m e r , in aii Wtelihood, is to step back
slightly and characterize postmodemism as a 'quasi-paradigm', Le., a generai qstem of
ideas, both descriptive and prescriptive, which developed in response to the assumptions
of modernity.
If it is acceptable to thus accept the ambiguity inherent in the tenn, the best
approach might then be - to borrow from an approach taken by Stephen White - to extract
the main themes from the extremely disparate body of ideas across which the
' postmodem' is scattereâ, and then hi@@ their relevance to developrnent theory6l
Such an approach does not do justice to the heterogeneity of the liteniture, but the
alternative is to risk bogging the discussion down in the maddening, hair-spiitting
differentiations and relentless esoterica so typical of postmodernism. Before summarizing
these themes, though, it is necessary to perfonn a similar task for modemity, to which
postmodemism is a criîicai response.
Typicaily said to date k m the Enlightenment, modernity feahies what Boyne and
Rattansi refer tc as "the progressive union of scientific objecfivity and potitico-economic
rationality.d2 The key idea in this union is the notion of 'progress' which underlined this
new objdvity and ratiodty: as Featherstone writes, the 'Tdea of progress implies some
direction to history and suggests the finitude of hiaory, the evennial deliverance into, or
amival at, a better or ideal Society or a 'good s ~ c i e t ~ ' . ~ ~ M m than anything else, then,
modeniity is characterized by a fath in the possibility of this kind of progress, and in the
ratiod modes of inquiq to be employed as means to a desirable and achievable end.
%s based on scientific inquhy and reamn, the Enlightenment is purported to
represent a conscious break fiom the ''past of antiquity," and a promise to free hurnankind
fiom the oppressive political fonns and the erstwfüle mysteries ~ f n a t u r e . ~ ~
'Emancipation' - Wtely the most-used word in explanations of rnodeniity - frequently
appears in this context, in tandem with 'universai'. In relation to the social world,
modemity is said to have promised deliverance fkom, as Schuurman presents it, poverty,
61 White identified four such themes in 'postmodemity': a "'growing incredulity toward traditional rnetanarratives, new awareness of the costs of societal rationalization, the explosion of informational technologies, and the emergence of new social movements." (1991: ix). 62 (1993: 190). 63 (1995: 170).
Habermas (1993: 98).
slavery and ignorance through the ideals of liberty, equality and f ia ter t~i ty~~ So delivered,
the individual subject would be dowed to develop what White calls "an isolated mind and
wiil," enabhg humankind to then tum to the natural world, bring it under the control of
reason and "thus make it available for human projects.'66 As White continues, the
''modem orientation toward a reason aimed at enhancing human d and control has no
limits. It manifests itself Nially in the twentieti~ centuiy as (what Heidegger terms) a 'W
to planetq ~ r d e r . ' ~ ~ Though the scattering of tenns üke '%il" and "projectY' could be
said to imply an excessive 'consciousness' to the sea change which the Enlightenment
represented, their ubiquity has served in no s d measure to make modemity a nahirai and
obvious basis for postmodem and feminist deconstruction and critique. For example:
The Enlightemerit ide& . .. dehe modernity in terrns of rationalization, as an 'advance' in cognitive and instrumental reason. This produces particular categories and systems, through which historical development and social evolution are concepîuaiized, based on the notion of progress as the guideline for a universalist p j e d 8
Lefi in their own terms, the 'objectives' of modemity seem understandable enough in light
of the history of Inquisition, superstition, tyrmy and disease h m which they emerged.
Taken at a giance, modemity's ernphasis on progress, emancipation and reason thus seems
incontestable, an attitude undoubtedly shared by the proponents of rnodemity clearly
identifiable at both the individual and institutional fevel in the world around us.
Nonetheless, this attitude has been the target of ferocious aitickm by postmodemists; the
main themes of that criticism foliow below.
65 (1993: 23). 66 (1991: 3) 67 Ibid. 68 Richard, in Docherty (ed.) (1993: 463)
It is important to note that the division of postmodernism into the thernes
discussed beiow is an amficial one made for anaiytid purposes only. As it is hoped the
following discussion will make clear, postmodemism represents a comprehensive response
to and critique of modeniity at different levels sidtaneously. Thus standing as a general
'counter-paradigm', it does not offer a tidy, point-by-point refbtation. Furthemore, the
initial purpose of this discussion was to assess postmodernism's relevance for
development theov the division of postmodernism into thernes will d o w for a far more
comprehensible - though equaily ai-tificial- 'matchcp' with tbat body of theory, which is at
times just as imposing and just as problematic as postmodemism. From that broad corpus
of literature, three themes seem particulafly ubiquitous:
1. A strong disaffection for the totalking narrative. 2. The identification of hidden power relations in modem& discwrse. 3. The notion of Other and the assertion of the local natrative.
Docherty has suggested that the c'disenchantment" with the totalinng narrative
conaitutes the "min core" of postmodernism. A creature of modemity, the tomiking
narrative incorporates a cornmitment to the rational-objective methods of Uaquiry and
organizition; a faith in both the rectitude and utility of those methods; and a view of
modemity as a superior mode of thlliking and being. It is, moreover, a crucial aspect of the
grand narrative that the superiority of the modem 'way' is not viewed in relative terms,
Le., as the most desirable of a group of altemative modes of thought: the superiority is
viewed as absolute and, therefore, as the naturai basis for human thought and behavior in
general .
In deveiopment terms, the postmodeniist suspicion of the grand narrative is fairy
obviously represented geographically: clear battle lines are drawn between the
meta-narratives of 'modem' Northern incursions into the South and the indigewus
narratives under pressure to accede to them. The movement of modem Europeans into
the Southem hemisphere quite obviousiy represented a clash between a totaliting
European modernity and indigenous cultures, a clash which prompts Lyotard to present
grand narratives as "great codes which in their abstraction necessarily deny the specificity
of the local and traâuce it in the interests of a global hornogeneity, a universal history. -69
Even in this cursory definition, two bases of the postmodem challenge to the grand
narrative are disceniible: the identification of its logical flaws, and the critique of its
inherent S c h u u m addresses the f o m point, arguing that
Universal values do not exist and metatheuries ... which take umversal values as given and see society as 'makeable' are suspect and merely contribute to an apparent reality. The Enlightenment ideal of the ernmcipation of humanity has not been achieved, nor can it be achieved. 'l
The 'makeability' of human societies - a dificult and perhaps impossible undertaking even
withui the w l l e c t ~ t i e s of the relatively homogeneous, 'modem' North - becomes
increasingiy doubtfbl when one considers the number and complexity of alternative
dtures with which modernity came into contact in the South. Because it rests on an
engineered displacernent of the indigenous outlook by the modem one, postmodernists
argue, the rectitude and the viability of the metanarrative as a viable bais of action is
thrown into question:
It was not only the awareness (on the part of development theonsts) that redity in the developing countnes took on such a pluralist c h c t e r that no metanarrative
69 ~ocherty (1993: 11) This terminology is used with hesitation since both points would likely cause discornfort
for the postmodemist: the identification of a 'logical flaw' rests on the assumption of a commonly agreed-upon logic, and 'arrogance' implies an ethicai nom which spells out acceptable and unacceptable behavior. 7L Schuumüui (1 993: 23)
adequateiy could explain it. It was specifically the disenchantment with metanarratives as such that constihited the main core of the postmodeniist point of vie^.^^
Apart nom the viability of the metanarrative, its rectitude stands as a major point of
contention for the postmodemist. R e f h n g to metanarratives as "those foundational
interpretive schemes that have constituted the ultimate and unquestioned sources for the
justification of scientific-technologid and political projects in the modern world,"
Lyotard draws aîtention to the ethical questions mounding the imposition of a totalinng
view on alternative cultures. 73 Summarinng him, Docherty addresses the manipulative
and destructive elements of metanarratives, arguing that they
. . . operate Iike Enlightenment reason: in order to accomodate widely diverging local histories and traditions, they abstract the meaning of those traditions in a 'translation7 into the tenns of a master code, a translation which leaves the specific traditions simply unrecognizable. As metanarratives, they also become mercive and normative: Lyotard argues that they effectively control and misshape the local under the sign of the universai. Such a cfrive to totality carmot respect the historical specificities of the genuinely heterogeneous. 74
Escobar takes this point one step fkther, addressing the point of this need to abstract,
coerce and control; the power that lies behind the metanarrative, he argues, "is exercised
chiefly to maintain economic exploitation," and manifests itself in various ways:
In the Third World, mechanisms of exploitation and domination prevail, aithough contemporary f o m of subjection (from Coca-Cola as a cultural item to therapies for the rniddle classes, consumer values, life-styles, and so forth) are increasingly gaining importance and contibuting io the maintenance of exploitation and class dflerentiaf~.~~
72 Ibid, p. 188. Emphasis added. 73 White (1 99 1 : 5 ) 74 ~ocherty (1993: 1 1) 75 Escobar (1 984: 383).
Posmiodemism thus "challenges" totaliong worldviews, "(disrnissing) them al1 as
logocentric, transcendental meta-matives that anticipate aii questions and provide
p r e d e t d e d an~wers ."~~ Instead of examinin8 an issue in the terms in which it is
presented, postmodeniism seeks to deconstruct "iogocentrisms" of a discourse, and
argues that instead of accepting discursive icons and articles of fith as absolutes, we do
better to view thern as possible points of view arnong many. in the place of objective tnith,
the postmodeniist niggests, we are lefi with myriad, biased subjectivities.
The second theme to be acamined here is the postmodernist assertion that grand
narratives conceal hidden power relations, and that the purpose of postmodernism is to
break down the conceaiment. Rosenau rnakes this point in somewhat neutral terms, but
Kegiey and Wnkopf hint at postmodernism7s more subversive, revelatory fbnction:
"Postmodernisrn is an approach . .. which emphasizes the study of texts, hidden meanings
and diswurse . . . (objective reality) is inherentiy intangible, and what we assume to be
''tme" masks the vdues on which we base our analyses."77 The act of deconstruction,
Ryan suggests, is thus inîrhsically politicai, seeking to break down authoritative claims to
objective mith and to expose "a power phenornenon where it was claimed that only reason
e~isted."~*
The power relations said to lie hidden are traceable to the technico-scientific
rationality that orden post-Enlightenment thinking. Most importantly, postmodernists
contest the notion that this rationality is neutral: 'reason', in postmodem parlance, rarely
appears without the word imtmmental in fiont ofit. This tendency toward instnimentality
creates an automatic scenario for power imbalance when some becorne "fluent in the
language of reason," while others do not: in a world to be interpreted through modemist
lenses, such iiiiteracy puts one at a decided disadvantage. The element of conîrol and
76 Rosenau (1 992: 6) 77 (1997: 28) 78 cited by white ( 1 99 1 : 16)
manipulation alluded to eartier is a h present here, mainly in the altered view of the
natural world espoused by rnodemity. Postmodernists assert that this view reshapes
knowledge itself in such a way that iastrurnentality becomes its underlyïng principle: as
Adorno and Horkheimer suggest, "Enlightenment behaves toward things as a dictator
toward man. He knows hem in so fàr as he can manipulate them. The man of science
knows things in so far as he can make them (sic)."79 The point echoes an eariier one made
by Lyotard who presents the notion of "petformaticity" as a new conceptual determinant
of the worth of knowledge. Under the imperatives of perfomticity,
What counts is not why an act is done or why a thought is thought, but how efficiently and to what irnrnediate end. Applied science is the home of instrumental rationality which . . . gradually cornes to be the standard aga& which al1 knowledge is measured. 80
In the end, the ability of reason to free humanlgnd by enabling the mastery of nature fdls
short: in the creation of a scientitically defined 'reaiity', mode* provides a ready-made
vehicle for a division of humankind into in-groups and out-groups, i.e. those 'in the
know', and those who are not. With its predilection for manipulation and control,
post-Enlightenment rationality enables not so much the mastery by humankind of nature as
the mastery of people by other people. Its failed promise to free humanity from t y r a ~ y is
lamenteci by DeMan:
(The) Enlightentment itself is not the great demystifjmg force that will r e v d and unmask ideology; rather, it is precisely the locus of ideology, thoroughly contaminateci intemaliy by the ideological assumption that the world can match - indeed, can be encompassecl by - our reasoning about it ... Enlightenment, postulated upon reason is - potentiaily, at least - undone by the form that such reason take~!~
79 cited in Docherty (1993 : 6). 8o During, mmmarizing Lyotard (1 993 : 45 5) . 81 Ibid, p.8.
The relevance of al1 of this to development theory is fairly clear: rather than being
characterized by a neutral desire to modernize the South, Northem devdopment activity is
considered to represent a highly skewed interaction in which Northern rationality
represents a lever with which to manipulate the South. In obvious practical terms this
could be taken to apply to things Wre technology transfer or econornic or military
capability, but it is also discernible in the more subtle machinations of organizational
technocratization, education, media incursion, or academic publishing, each of which tend
to be steered into line with the Northern '~ne thod ' .~~ The Seminal work on this topic is
likeiy Edward Said's menfaIism, a work which lays out in detail the author's conviction
that an ostensibly neutral realm of academic specialization (Oriental Studies) bas served
primady to reflect, inculcate and perpetuate European domination over the 'Orient', an
artificial entity conceptually 'constructeci' by the lengthy process of politico-economic
incursion and domination by the West. As Said writes in one passage,
Orientalism can . . . be regarded as a manner of regdmzed (or ûrientdized) writing, vision and shidy, dominated by imperatives, perspectives and ideologicd biases ostensibly suited to the ûrient ... The Orient that appears in Orientalism, then, is a system of representations fi-amed by a whole set of forces that brought the Onent into Western leaniing, Westem consciousness, and Iater, Western empire. 83
The third theme of postmodemism to be exaMned here concerns the notion of the
ûther, how it is created and what it means for local namitives which, it is argued,
postmodemism advances as having value. This latter point is to be sure, a somewhat
touchy one: more vigorously nihilistic postmodernists would undoubtedly bride at the
notion that they are advancing anything. But in the wake of the postmodern denial of the
grand narrative, an impiicit assignment of wonh to local ones seerns obvious.
82 For an interesthg commentary on the role of academic publishing in this context, see Tomlinson (1991: 14). 83 (1 979: 202).
The 'Other' represents a fàirly high-profile concept in postmodemism. It is
presented as the inevitable dect of the cornmitment by 'modem' collectivities to rational
mindsets which. as was diScusseci in the p r d i section, cannot but create in-groups
and out-groups. The out-groups, particularly those differentiated âom the in-group of the
predorninantly white, 'European' North by any combination of language, skin wlour and
geography, are what is meant by the postmodem notion of the Other. White, surnrnarizing
Foucault's treatment of this concept, argues that the 'modem' rational muidset to which
Enlightenment Europe and subsequent Western societies have subscribed cannot btct
produce an Mer.
If the underlying effect ofour Western cognitive machinery . . . has been to introduce clarity, metanarrational unity, and consensus into our lives, then Foucault's purpose cm be described as that of elucidating how an Other is a h q s pushed aside, marpinaiized, forcibly homogenized, and devalued as the cognitive machinery does its work. 84
The creation of Othemess need not be understood as a vindictive or cunscious process:
from the identification of self as 'modem', it is a very short step to the identification of
other as backward. Since the values or opinions of the backward Other are therefore
incredible by default, the dynamic has a seifkeinforcing logic that has, historicdly, given it
great resilience:
Here, Derrida exposes the West's tendency to legitimite itself: the West is reasonable because it says so, and, since it is the definer and bearer of reason, it must be universaiiy reasonable to accede to this proposition. This, as Demda argues, is clearly a false and troubling logic.
Foucault, Docherty implies, is more cutting in his critique of this phenornenon,
going beyond its cognitive aspects to hint at darker political purposes. In his oft-cited
M&es and Civîiiration (1 %S), he argues compeiiingly that that particular Other - madness - "has to be identified and imprisoned in order to enable reason to legitimize
itsetf." in other words, as Docherty writes, "(r)eason, in short, has to produce the
'scandai' of its Other to keep i t s e ~ ~ o i n ~ . ' ~ ~
Overt action k e impnsonment is an extrerne result of the second step in the
creation of the other the identification of an out-group as backward (and therefore
inferior) as a bais for action This aiso may take different forms - we might conceive of a
spectnim in which, at one extreme, this identification l ads to more passive and subtle
forms of oppression like the 'denial of narrative' posited so oflen in postmodem literature;
at the other, the identification is more actively and consciously used as the justification for
more active and blatant forms of oppression like temtorial conquest or even genocide - in
short, for the use of violent coercion. The case of the Spanish anival in the western
hemisphere provides a backdrop for both e~tremes!~ At the more subtle end, the defàult
conception of the indigenous peoples as savages that seems to have existed in the minds of
the early explorers - particularly Columbus - predisposed the Spanish not oniy to discount
the indigenous worldview, but to not consider it in the first place. This manifested itself in
such presumptuous practices as the wning of the Caribbean islands which they
'discovered'. As Todorov wrïtes,
. . . Columbus knows perfectly well that they aiready have names, naturd ones in a sense (but in another acceptation of the tem); others' words interest him very hale, however, and he seeks . .. to give them the nght m e s ; moreover, nomination is equivaient to taking possession. 87
85 (1993: 14). 86 This despite the tenuous assigmnent of 'modem' to the Spanish Kuigdom of the nfteenth century. However, as will be suggested in later chapters, these practices are perhaps more attributable to the pursuit of interest than the 'practice' of modeniity. 87 (1 982: 27).
In the actual act of colonization, the e f f i s of the colonizer on the Other start to
becorne more tangible. It is, arguably, a prerequisite for the establishment of control that
the coatroiier define and manage the value system of the controlee: in the context of
colonitatioq the colonizer is obliged to alter the existing relationships of indigenous
peoples with each other and with the natural world - the sarne relationships so altered by
the European departure dong the modem path - to a degree that, as some assert, their
very history is redefined:
(Indigenous) particularisms, social usages and specificities - ofien rnaintauied without recours to written history, but in altemative fonns and modes such as customs, myths, rituals and oral traditions - were simply mbsvmed under the history of the colonizer . 88
At the fàr extreme of the spectnim, of course, lies the most tangible form of oppression
enabled by the creation of the Other: the p o m y a l of the ûther as savage and therefore as
wonhless or threatening - in either case, desening of what wmes to them - which in tum
serves as a justification for structural violence. As is well documented elsewhere, this
The development implications of Othemess are, once again, f ~ r l y clear. Since we
cm perceive a clear North-South distinction in the history of development, we are
concemed with the mmer in which Northem 'modem' discourse presumes the
backwardness of the South, creating a situation in which, by default, the North exists as a
88 Graf(1997: 3). Emphasis mine. A more conternporary - and proximate - example might be the Canadian practice of removing native childrm tiom their f a d e s and placing them in buarding schools where indigenous language and dress were stridy forbidden. 89 On the Spanish relations@ with indigenous peoples, see Las Casas' writings, cited extensively in Todorov (1 982). More wntemporary examples include the Nazi characterization of Jews in the 1930s, the Arnerican govemmmt's portrayal of the Soviet Union throughout the postwar era (see Holsti's 1962 work on John Foster Dulles) or its cornparison of Saddam Hussein to Hitler pnor to and durhg the Gulf War, described by John Sad as "%o overstatd as to insult our intelligence" (1992: 224).
naîural blueprint for the 'modeniization'of the South. Indigenous views of how indigenous
reality ought to be stnictured simply fidi by the wayside, ifthey enter Northem
consciousness at all. Aside fiom the arrogance which this presumption represents, it also
illuminates an understated but important aspect of the postmodem critique - the value of
local narratives to development theory. It is something of a corohy to the first theme
explored above: in eschewing the totaluing narrative, postmodemism advances the local
or the particular narrative in its stead. In this way diversity, rather than sameness, becornes
a central ordering pnnciple. To be sure, this is something of a contradiction, but the point
is that a postmodem approach seeks to replace the desire for a totalizing narrative with a
line of thinking which is prepared opriori to value the existence of numerous smaller ones
instead. Postmodernists advance local narratives as having worth simply by virtue of their
uniqueness, each a subjectivity amid other subjectivities.
Chaptet 4: Assessing Postmodernism - Stteflgths
The attempt to esses posmiodemism's strengths is troubled fiom the outset by
three complications. The first wncems postmodemism's nebulous definitional character,
which was discussed at the begimiing of the previous chapter, cleariy, a school of thought
which decries the vev idea of concrete categorization is Micult to evaluate in traditionai
terms. The second problem is that, in addition to postrnodemism's amorphous character, a
duality is evident within it; it exists on the one hand as a method of critiquhg other
theories, and, on the other, as a body of theory itself. As a result, an analyst always runs
the nsk of sliding back and forth between these two roles. The best approach rnight
therefore be to acknowledge postmodeniism's dual role before embarking on any andysis,
and to be specific about which 'hat' is being wom at a particular time. The third
complication centen around the very t m 'strength3, which impiies the existence of
critena that defie both strength and weakness, that is, a scale against which the evaiuated
body is deemed good or bad, adequate or hadequate, and so on.
This complication is the most troublesorne. As was asserted earlier, a main theme
of postmodemism is its hostility toward metanarratives and its perpetual suspicion that
they serve Iargely as window dressing for power imbalances and naked interests. This
resentment of supposedly neutral values which serve instead, in the postmodem view, to
cover decidedly partisan ones, casts a shadow ont0 any effort to evaluate postmodemism
itseK Put sirnply, can a neutrd assessment of posmiodernism's 'strengths' ever be
achieved, or mua an assessment invariabiy represent another fom of partisanship?
To meet these cWculties, a two-stage approach will be adopted. In the first,
general 'strengths' will be discussed. It is acknowledged here that the absence of a List of
criteria by which 'strength' is deiïned represents a certain abdication of responsibility, but
these criteria will be made clear in the. For the moment, it is hoped, it will sufnce to say
that the strengths listed take the ineffectveness of traditional development theory as given.
That is to say that insofkr as it represents a means by which these ineffectuaities mi@ be
articulateci, postmodernism has 'strengths'. Granted, this too requires discussion, a need
that, again, d l be attendeci to below.
The second section will represent more of a practical application of
posmiodemism's cntiquing role. Two cornerstones of the current topic - development
îheory and 'Impasse' - wil be eXBmjned. The intention is to look at the icons and
assumptions which they contain, and to reveal and explore the cornplex relationships
behind them. The a h is not to adhere to any strict deconstructive methodology or to
represent 'postmodeniism in action', but rather to represent postmodemism's suspicious
spirit. It will proceed under the assumption that there is value in such an inquisition of
development langage.
The most immediate strength of the postmodern approach is its inherent suspicion.
To be sure, this can be viewed as an advantage only if one accepts that cutting through
efforts to advance a particuiar 'Tmth' represents a desirable end - it therefore exists as a
useful tool for the subversive, and as something of a curse for what Chomsky has
repeatedly identified as the "cultural Predisposed to disbelieve, the
* Chomsky elaborates on the notion of 'cultural management' in the documentary Mamrfacturing Cornent: Noam Chomsky and the Media (1 992). His basic premise is that American socieîy in particular is dominated by large media conglomerates who, by vimie of their interwnnections with the upper echelons of the American business comunity in general, have a vested interest in managing the flow of information to the public in such a way that the basic ordering principles of U.S. society - capitalism, punuit of seIf-interest, etc. - do not appear in mainstream debate. It is a subtle fom of social control, but control nonetheless.
postmodemist refuses to take iconic language in the terms in which it is presented, and
thus represents a position f?om which 'givens' might dwap be deemed questionable.
In its abihty to 'step outside' rnetanarratives, postmodernism accomplishes a very
difncult task. Such a step requires tbat the adyst idente those aspects of a particular
discourse that defuie a particular reality - not an easy task when the anaiyst has
experienced a lifetime of inundation by that discourse. Two ofi-cited examples of such a
step corne to mind. In the first, Canadian efforts to translate the la~guages of particuiar
Inuit peoples are said to have revded that no translation for the word for 'snow' exists in
those languages. The daily reality of the people in question demanded the contiguration of
what we understand as snow in separate conceptuai enîities. In another example, early
European explorers of Canada discovered that certain First Nations languages which they
encountered had no word for 'ddemess', for much the sarne r e a s ~ n - ~ l The point is that
these examples resulted from culture clashes in which the hpuiistic givens of one group
had to be reconciled with the real-world conceptualkations of another. But through the
critical tools of postmodemism, it hm becorne possible to accomplish this same
luiguistic/discursive evaluation within the boundaries of our own culture. in other words,
postmodeniism has served to articulate a separation between the totalinng narrative and
conceptual alternatives to it - no s d accomplishment since the primary trait of a
narrative's 'totalizing' character is its tendency to appear naturd and therefiore invisible to
those bom and r a i d under it.
in development terms, this refers to the marner in which posmiodeniism is able to
extract elements of the dominant development discourses - the 'new socialist man' or
economic growth, for example - and question their relationship to the more sacred cows
of the same discourses: progress, dernocratization, modemization, etc. Its rnost basic
advantage is that it serves to undennine the irresponsible use of iwns as sales tools for
' On the latter example, see Enahgered Spces.
potentiaily unpopdm policies like, for example, the 'ernployment card' for a fhctory that
WU have a negative environmental impact. Negative icons can aiso serve this purpose, as
is perhaps the cax with the creation of the ûther or the incantation of budget deficits as
proof of the need for fiscal constriction. As Booth puts if the postmodem approach "may
have a sienificant practical impact in the longer term, contributing in some small way to
the demise of political cultures based on appeais to spunous necessity and the denial of
choice by leaders and politicai rno~ernents."~~
The second strength of postmodemism to be examined here is its potential to
provide a wmpelling iine of argument in relation to the development theory Impasse. Left
in their own ternis, conventional dweiopment theories interpret their own 'faiures' - if they admit to them at all - largely in tems of extemal pressures over which they had no
control. Thus, to the particularly stubbom neo-modemizer, modemization has not been
achieved in the South because of corruption, careless spmding, comrnunist incursion, or a
'natural' disinclination toward 'progress' - in short, the farnous 'pathologies' of the South.
Similady, the particularly stubbom n e o - e s t might point to the imperidkt pressures of
the West as the root cause of failure in the pumit of a viable socialist society in Cuba or
Nicaragua, or even the Soviet Union. The important point is that though ail of these
factors undoubtediy had an impact on rd-world events, conventionai development theory
persists in looking outside its own assumptions when it comes time to place the blame.
Postmodernism, in contrast, argues that the rasons for the failure of both the Lefl and the
Right in the developing world l e within those modemist projects thernselves, and not to
pathologies or interference by 'outsiders'. As was mentioned eariier, neo-modemking and
neo-Wst theories represent projects whose t o t a b g objectives were, fkst, impossible
to realize tiom the start because they underestimate the depth and breadth of diversity in
the South, and, second, more acnirately describeci as disguised politico-economic projects
whose coercive nature is by definition at odds with the normative-iwnic language of
'development'. As Munck puts it, the collapse of both rnodernization and dependency
theory was "due less to their conceptual inconsistencies than to theû collapse as political
strategie~.'"~ Posûnodeniisrn is therefore able to highlight a disjuncture between what
development theory has traditionally 'said' it is (a progressive plan for the bettement of
developing c o d e s ) and what, postmodemists assert, it has traditiody been (window
dressing on Northem self-interest).
From the line of argument which the postmodern approach enables a theoretical
basis for altemative developrnent approaches emerges. Such approaches are predisposed
to emphasize the wishes of the local (geographically defined, as in the case of Chiapas
natives) and the particular (issue-defined, as in the case of lesbians and gays), and find
theoretical articulation in the postmodem valuation of narrative diversity. One approach
currently very much in vogue is that of participatory action research (PAR). As it is
summanZed by Escobar, PAR has ernerged fiom "'expenences in popular education and
grass-roots activism . . . and it is presently one of the most hopeful lines of research and
action in the Third Worid." A bottom-up approach, PAR is devoted to 'the investigation
of the mechanisms necessary to develop popular counter-power for social transfomation
and their relation to the production of k n o w l e ~ l ~ e . ~ ' ~ ~ Such an approach can be ciearly
interpreted as postmodem in that it bases itselc theureticaily at least, on the need to reved
and subvert what Escobar refers to as 'Western disciplinary and normalking rnechanisms"
t hat make up the development discourse. 9s
The third general strength of postmodemism is the introduction of paradox and
dissensus, both of which are implicit in the desire to factor diversity into a social theory,
into development. To advocates of modernity, this would seem antithetical to the
perfecfibility of the human condition, which ostensibly rests on coherence, universalism
and harmony. But it is just this sort of narrativefy-defined harrnony that postrnodernism
opposes. It is at the rwt of the creation of the m e r cited so often in postmodern
literature. As White writes, for example,
. . . our modern cognitive machinery operates to deny the ineradicability of dissonance. The harmony, unhy and ciarity prornised by this machinery have, for the postmodern, an inmitable cost .. . couched in the hguage of an ûther that is always engendered, devdued. discipline& and so on, in the idnite search for a more tractable and ordered wor~d?
uistead, as has been outlined previously, postmodemism advocates a
predisposition toward acceptance of various smaller narratives instead. Citing Foucault,
whom he suggests is "engaged in the task of describing phenomena in a way that 'incite@)
the experience of discord or discrepancy between the social construction of self, tmth and
rationality and that whkh does not fit neatly within their folds'," White summarizes this
point:
. . . Foucault is proving the reality of his ontological view kdirectly, that is, by exposing the persistent and ineradicable, but submerged, presence of dissonance in Our Iives. Dissonance, in other words, is allowed to show itself to us, an experience that has an unsettling effect on our modern, deep-rooted quest for harmony and unity, for a world of problems finally solved. 97
Unlike a 'perfiable' society, then, postmodemisrn envisions one that is to be ever
characterized by dflerence. Unlike the modemist, though, the postmodernist would not
view such an arrangement as anarchic or chaotic. indeed, such a view implies that an
imposed, centdy defined order is preferable; instead, s/he would view an organued
acceptance of difference as a desirable basis for society.
The issue of dissensus has been addressed at length in socio-political theory, most
notabiy by means of its opposite: consensus. Two notable treatrnents are provided by
Parsons and Gramsci. For Parsons, the issue was a difficuh one, and anaiysts of bis work
stili debate Parsons' position on it today. Lechner, for example, argues that Panons' point
was that the 'large social system was hefd together by value consensus, smoothly
institution&ed.'** Aiexander, on the other hand, suggests that 'Parsons' perspective
does not focus on integration alone, nor does it assume consens us.'^ Though a resoiution
of this point of difference lies beyond the scope of this discussion, the point is that
Parsons' work - even after his death - appears to wrestle with the relationship between
consensus and values "'as the foundation of social order and s t a b i ~ i t y " ~ ~ Curiously,
though Parsons has b e n referred to as a 'theorist of modemity' by Robertson and Turner,
he espouses what seerns to be a postmodern point of view on this point, arguing that
'Yolerance of difference is itself a value, and at the very least fhis must be institutionalized
in a highiy pluralistic way."loL Gramsci was more concernai with the meam by which
consensus could be manufactureci artificially, as he expressed through his notion of
'bourgeois hegemony'. This concept refers to the marner in which a set of ideas achieves
hegemonic stahis les through coercion than through a process of careful cultural
management. Hegemony in this sense, as Green points out, thus entails "?hose aspects of
power relations in which domination commands consent and in which . .. coercive aspects
of domination becorne Iess obtrusive." It represents, then, a process of cultural
management which achieves "a kind of social balance or equilibrium, in wbich the
dominated a d e or adjust to their dornination."lo2
98 Lechner ( 1 99 1 : 174). Cited in Robertson and Turner (1991: 16).
IOo Ibid, p. 1 O. 'O1 Parsons (1991: 41). lo2 Green (1993: 195).
Again, the postmodernist would envision a sort of institutionalized dissensus by
which societies becorne predisposed to value dflerences of opinion and namitive. In the
en4 the most critical point is that all the questioning, the deconstnicting, the negotiation
and the suspicion never en&; a form of social organktion based on the constant
willingness to recvaluate, to listen, and to d e concessions thus takes the place of one
based on the drive to win entire populations over to a single point of view.
The positivist theoretical approach which has typically been employed by the
naturd, physical and social sciences is fairly well understood. Traditionally, theory has
been intended to do two things: h s t , to allow researchers to make observations and
hypotheses wncerning the interrelation of component parts of a system, tbat is, to
detemine what is tme within that system. Second, it has serveci as the basis of "if ... then"
relations orpredictiom, i.e. because X is tme, action Y will have result Z. In development
theory terms this translates into the patently modernist asswnption that rational modes of
inquiry could lead- first, to an accurate understanding of the 'system' in question, and then
to a viable prescription for its transformation. Such assurnptions represent irresistible
targets for the postmodena, for two rwisons.
The first concerns the limited potential for developmnt thwry to be neutral in the
politicai sense. Such neutrality is not difficult to maintain in, for example, Newtonian
physics. Political sentiments c m safeiy be predicted to have little effkct on an individual
who, observing a solid ob~ect fall to the gound, will Orely accept the deiineation of the
component parts (object, gravity, ground), the chain of caudty (gravity on object) or the
end result (object hits ground and stops) as obvious. But even if the cornponent
identifications in the development 'system' were as clear-cut as those in the Newtonian
example, there is still the thomy problem of the end r a f t : instead of an object cotliding
with the ground and cornhg to rest, the end result of modemkation theory was (and is)
modernkation.
This term is obviously fk more complex: in addition to the tàct that it represents a
mdtivariate change that goes beyond a simpler SM nom '£âiling7 to 'not falling', there is
far too much room for subjective interpretation of the term 'modeniization'. If we
understand it as a process designeci to change 'underdeveloped' areas into 'developed'
ones, it is difncuh to see how it can be separateci fiom the particularities - Le. that bundle
of politicai, social and economic assumptions, aims and prescriptions - of the designer's
vision, which in tum define for hirn/her the difference between underdeveloped and
developed. Two Cold War physicists - one Soviet, one Amencan - could easily have found
common ground throughout the brief saga of Newton's apple, but the same could not
always be said for dwelopment planners fiom these two countries during that penod:
developed, modem and progres wuid (and did) take on drasticdy different meanings.
Quite cleariy7 then, the question of political preference must be factored into any
assessment of development theory. Rather than assuming a neutrai, or universal, definition
of development, we need to ask, 'fwhat kinc and '%y and for whom?"
The second target of the postmodem critique of development theory is its
presumption of viability. Where, again, the Newtonian example features a limited set of
variables and thus dlows for fhirly simple prescriptions, development theory is difFerent .
To take the case of modembation theory again, a positivist delineation of the system in
question identifies countless and ever-differing structural wmponents (states,
administrative hierarchies, govemrnental departrnents IGûs, NGOs, economic sectors)
and equally innumerable process components (economic inputs and outputs, GNP, trade
baiances, regime type, etc.). Because the sheer wmplexity of nation-states - let aione an
entire hemisphere - &es it highly doubtful that the data could ever accurately represent
the complex reality of any large coiiectivity, the viability of the Parsonian approach is
thrown into question. Even if it were possible to take an accurate 'snapshot ' of the
complex reality in any one area, would the data still provide an accurate representation at
the end of the time pend such a comprehensive description would require? Further, as
any good postmodemia would point out, there is the question of 'tvho speaks?' when the
information is sou& - are existing pattern variables to be assessed on the basis of official
govenunent statistics and interviews, or would researchers also include the views of
groups who dser dong lines of class, gender, ethnicity, age, occupation, geography and
so forth?lo3 Such questions &ken back to one of the two points of contention of
postmodernists, namely, the status of the grand narrative as a 'good idea': is the
comprehensive acamcy and temporal consistency required by a grand narrative even
for collectivities of more than a few dozen?
Furthemore, even ifthe 'description' demands of the positivist approach - i.e.
accurate deheation of the system's parts and boundaries - could be met, the viability
problem is aggravated by the fàct that mmkrni~anlion is not a measurable term - surely no
srnail problem if'it is to serve as the basis for a positivist theory, which, in modemization
theoiy, it does. We are left, then, with a measurement problem, namely, how to arsess the
transformation implied by the term 'developrnent'. Despite the methods of economic
measurement devised and employed by institutions such as the World Bank, and despite
the belief'amongst the more technocratic development bodies that these terms have been
operatiodized, tenns Lice m h m , progres and deveioped de@ meaningfil linear
measurement. They f i l to account for the wmplexity of nation-states by fading to retlect
actual conditions across and within highly cornplex, variegated populations. The
technocratic reliance on and fZth in GNP, trade, and employment statistics as accurate and
desirable refiections of social reatity stands, therefbre, as a key point of contention for the
postmodeniist.
IO3 In addition to 'who speaks?', the question 'who is spoken about?' is a key feature of posmiodemism, particuiarly in its anthropological application.
The third problern concerns the surgical tidiness of the iwns tossed about within
development discourses. To continue with the example of modemization theory, it rnjght
be asked what is typically meant by modemidon. That is, were a modernkition theorist
asked what couid be iisted under the heading of modemization to describe it, what ideas
or values or changes wodd apped Very likely, another series of apparentiy selfrdefining
and selfendent ternis would corne forth. Democrucy would almost certainly appear at the
top of the Est, perbaps to be foUowed by progres, loosely understood as some
combination of technological and social ahcmcement. It would be highiy unlikely,
however, that any of these icons would be p r d e d by a reference to economics. It is a
touchy issue because, aside from the conceptual problem that it is both a means and an
end, it does not lend itseif as easily to the high-blown language of vahes as democracy
and progress do.
Backtracking slightly, the core assumption of the industrialized Northern states is
that they have achieved 'modem' status, and that they therefore represent a natural and
obvious blueprint for development in the South.lo4 But the notion that our society, insofar
as we want to replicate it elsewhere - i.e. to give 'them' what 'we' have - is characterized
solely or even mainly by those nobler icons cited above is flawed. W e normatively we
(the industrialized North) are relatively democratic and 'modem', we are also capitalist
states, an uncornfortable word in any official Northern discourse, due to its association
with the Mmcist critique. In characterizing Northem society, then, the substantive
component of economic method - Le. capitalism - must be cited alongside the normative
cornponm represented by Democracy and Modem. lo5 Though each of these ternis rnight
O4 in addition to b%lueprint", Schuunnan suggests the photographic metaphor of the South as a latent positive", waiting to be "developed" by a Northem 'hegative" into a ositive print (1993, pp.26-27).
It mua be pointeci out that the substantive economic processer within modemking theory are not devoid of their own nonnative aspects: in place of the decidedly Manrist label of '%apitalist" - let alone "capitalist mode of production7' - one is far more likely to
be said to have elements of both within them, what is of conceni here is the rnanner in
which the substantive aspects tend to rem& in the shadow of the normative ones where
official discourse is concerneci. An interesthg litmus test would be to c d the official
speeches of American hesidents over the lasî Hky years, and compare the number of
times the words 'capitalist' and 'democracy' appear. We might also factor in ternis üke
'communia' and 'sociaii~m'~ and, just for fim, look into the speeches of Soviet leaders as
well.
Since development theory has been similarIy guilty of emphasizing the normative
side over the substantive, we would do weU to concentnite on conceiving of development
theory as having a dual content: the normative and the substantive. The former rdects
what it is that the developer wants the dewfopee to change h o ; the latter the means to be
used to get there.
The point is crucial because, in serving as a blueprint for the Soutb, the North is
delivering not just the normative and not just the substantive, but a combination of the
two. For example, when 'technological advancement' is trotted out as a cornerstone of
development policy, it conjures up visions of highway constmction, hydro-electnc dams or
water purification plants. What it does not typicaIiy invoke are the wntracts, lobbying
efforts and institutional cu~ections between private Nonhem producers and Southem
governrnents that are vital paris of the process. Apter, for one, has touched on this point:
'Industdization (which results from a process of augmentation of rnanufàcturing
outputs) derive@) from the application of. .. (scientific and technological) innovation to
the productive infi.astru~ture."l~ So, rather than Uiheriting Northeni values, the South
inhents the matrix of our values and our methods. Otten presented in neutrai, self-defining
tem, those values and methods are inseparable fiom the cornplex of interests that
enccnuita terms like '%ee market ideology" or ''fiee trade7'. IOa Apter (1987: 16)
interacts with the normative values of Northem societies. Note, for example, the
difference in the treatment that "technoIogical progressy' receives in its iconic forrn as a
nonnative component of modenrization theory, and by Apter as an inseparable,
substantive part of the "productive infrastnrcture."
To summarize, it has been argued here that development theory's neutrality,
viability, and self-defin;@ discursive foundations are ail vulnerable to the postmodm
critique. It has been further argueci that rather than viewhg development theory as a
mtural guide by which the substantive aspects of development might manifest the
normative aspects, we do better to view it as a combination of substantive and normative
components in itselj: The developing world, then, does not just inhezit the North's
normative icons or substantive practices, but the matrix of these two entities and dl of the
conflict and contradiction that tbey contain.
4 iii. Deconsftirdrgng 'Impasse'
The tidy metaphor 'Impasse' serves to highlight a key strength of postrnodernism:
its inherent suspicion of terminology and its ability to question the assumptions which that
tenninology generates. The aim of this section is to examine this metaphor not so much in
postmodem language, but in postmodemism's suspicious spirit. This, admittedly, will not
enable the discovery of any hard tniths about development theory or offer any solutions - this rnay, in ôict, represent one of the more serious shortcomings of the postmodem
approach. Nonetheless, this section will proceed under the assumption that there is value
in such an initial 'inquisition' of development language.
The original objective of this inquby - the assessrnent of postmodemism's potentid
to serve as a solution to the Impasse - is more problematic than it appears. In its simplesi
conception, 'Impasse' implies that a fded neo-Mmist theory and a f i l 4
neo-modemking theory are somehow lodged in such a way that the development theory
field is p d y z e d or stagnant. This rnay lead the observer to take for granted the
composition of the parties involved, their motives7 the nature of their cornpetition, and the
context of failure in which all of this is situateci. Such presurnptions seme only to
oversirnplify the issue. Before evaluating postmodemism's potential as a solution, then, it
is necessary to delve into that which it is supposed to be a solution tu.
The very term 'solution' is troublesome, implying that some sort of 'undoing' is
called for, in this case, presurnably, an undoing of the knot tied by neo-modernizing and
neo-Maixist theory. The problem with this conception is that it suggests an unwarranteci
'matching' of the two bodies of theory in ternis of composition and opposition to each
other - a misleadhg suggestion. Obviously, Impasse cannot reaily be intended to refer to a
deadlock of development theones; theones are inanimate and therefore cannot compete
with each other. Terrns f i e Impasse, knot, and deadlock might better be understood to
refer to a disagreement among groups of development theoris~s, but even this is
misleading - it implies a contest of some sort replete with measurable increments which
refiect the 'score' in the marner of a sporthg match.
There is, certain&, evidence of a theoretical debate which has been characterird
now by the assertions of one side, now by the critiques and counter-assertions of the
other, but it rnight be argued that the bases of these theones are so incompatible as to
represent apples and oranges of sorts. Instead of two cornpeting sides in a sporting event,
then, the Impasse is better viewed as the chaos of two groups piaying different games on
the same field. IIf, then, the conception of the Impasse as cornpetition is found wanting, it
might be more useful to view the Impasse as a lack of consema. Rather than suggesting
that neither 'competing' side can measurably defèat the other, we then do better to
suggest that neither side can convince the other. By definition, this implies that each side
has mamged to convince itse& a notion that opens somethhg of a methodologicai
Pandora's Box through the immediate question of the basis of that conviction: if
modernizing or neo-Mancist theory proved wnvincing to some people at some the , why
did it do so?
To recd a point made earlier, developrnent in its early postwar stages meant
moderaization, part of a (primarily) Amencan plan to align the economies of Europe and,
later, the developing world with that of the Uniteci States and the r e m t s of the alliance.
But the onset of the Cold War amplified the political aspects of this process; hstead of
humanitarian/economic policies intended to put war-ravaged Europe back on its féet, the
bipolar hostility which dominated the next forty years created political incentives to keep
developing countries fiom crossing over to the other side: this became a drivùig principle
of development. The relevance of this to the convictions of development theorists is clear.
In its status as a contexi for the research that was taking place, and on *ch development
theory was ostensibly baseà, the geopoliticd imperative forces us to reconsider the basic
assumption of positivist social science: that mearchers draw conclusions (and,
presumably, convictions) from what their observations reveal.
In the development theory context, the notion that conclusions could be drawn
from an unsullied process of objective, methodologically sound observation is flawed. The
most irnrnediate problem has been touched on above - because it was starbng fiom scratch
as a new field, development theory had to construct some son of coherent identity from
sociology, anthropology, political science, geography, economics and so on. Instead of a
coherent identity, then, development theory was poorly wnceptualized, i.e. un-integrated,
from the start. lo7 However, a more serious methodological problem existeci in the fom of
two conceptuai spectra evident within the acadernic communities of the developed states
which were building the theories. The first concems, once again, the neutrality of
IO7 See pp. 3-4, chapter two.
development theory. WMe we cannot assume that all theorists dlowed their political
preferences to colour th& work to the degree that Samuel Huntington did - surely there
were some who achieved a greater degree of neutrality - it is necessas, to consider his
degree of ideological cornmitment as one possible extreme of social theory. We might,
therefore, conceive of a spectrum on which social theory in its most neutral, objective
seme sits at one end, with ideology in its rnost partisan, subjective sense at the other. In
such a conception, the neutrality of development theory must be viewed as a relative
measure.
The second specmim encompasses the range of research approaches between the
qualitative and the quantitative - a contentious enough distinction when the research
subject is relatively limited, but development theory has traditiody sought the
transformation of an entire (southem) hemisphere. With aii the marner of variation that
this Mpiies, the limitations of both the idiographic and nomothetic approaches are
magnified, while their advantages are minimized: qualitative analysis becornes too
particularistic to be generaiized, quantitative analysis too general to be particularized.
When we consider the atomization of the field and the researchers' general unfamiliarity
with the developing world - they were coming fiom the industrialized North, after ail - the
vast potential for epistemological, ontologicd and axiological bias and simple error
becorna apparent. Io*
These complications were augmented by the timing of early development research.
As the rnethodological problerns cited above suggest, enough potential for fallacious
research would even have existeci had the development theorists of the 1950s extensively
reseerched underdeveloped coumries and then aarted the processes of development. As it
was, though, the theorking began several centuries &er the commencement of the
log It ought to be noted that Latin Amencan 'stnicturalists' and the Depndentista school were able to clah initial credibiiity because, Latin Americans, they could argue that they possessed a Iegitimate understanding of the 'bigger picture' in the South.
rd-world processes that characterize 'development' to this day: foreign investment,
extractive enterprise, and considerable foreign infiuence over local &airs - or, more
pessimistidy, exploitation, colonization, and impenalism. It might be argued that
neo-Manrist or structuralist thwry had sometbing of an advantage in this regard - because
it existed as a response to modeniization theory, stnicturaiists trying ''to be ngorously
inductive in their reasoning from the available data," were responding to a body of theory
that was already in place. The work of modernization theorists thus serveci as the basis for
the theoretical M e w o r k of coreperiphery relations, dependency, etc. log But
modemkation theorists twk an opposite approach - the application of the structural
functionalism of Parsons, for example, was based on the episternologically and
ontologidy contentious assumption that the 'tmths' already determined about Arne&
society could be transfened to deveioping ones. Modemization theory is thus
characterized more by a deductive approach wbich manifestecl itself in processes üke
capital injections and the 'democratization' envisioned in programmes like the Ailiame for
Progress.
The relevance of timing lies in the unijkelihood that any development theory
emanating f?om the Nonh (and specifically the United States) could ever have suggested
any course of action other than one which complernented these longstanding economic,
political and military processes, and which reflected domestic, i.e. Northem, interests
rather than Southem ones. It rnight be pertinent to ask whether the ideas of Parsons or
Rostow were accepted by the pmctical arm of the U.S. policy-making establishment
because they were the most convincing ones available or because they most closely
reflected the actual processes that were aiready deeply entrenched. The question of
wnvincibility, then, is a simple one: to whorn, exactly, does a development theory have to
be convincing in order for a consensus - i.e. the opposite of Impasse - to exist? Has one
existai before? In the development theory titerature, it is typically implied that the 1 950s
and better part of the 196ûs represented the heyday of modeniization theory, but Munck
disputes this notion, pointing to the McCarthyism of the early 1950s and arguing that
Amencan academics were under severe pressure during this period not to depart tiom a
strict ideological line. Simiiariy, the period of neo-Manrist ascendmcy in academic circles
was wntemporaneous with the writings of avowed 'neoliberals' of which Huntington is
likely the best exarnple. If we are to believe that developrnent theory overcame the
methodological problems at hand, we are almost forced to accept its ab* to mesh with
the entrenched practices mentioned above as a happy coincidence.
The implication of 'Mure' in the Impasse metaphor, Le. "development theory is
at an Impasse because wnventional theory has Meci," presents us with a tùial problem.
Have either of them actually fàiled? If so, how is that failure defined? Despite the deged
ills of the neo-modemking model, treated in chapter two, it is obvious that it has created
beneficiaries: international banks, private investors, multinational corporations (MNCs),
and Southern elites are likely brectthing easier than ever before, now that the East Bloc
villain is no more. To such entities, neo-modernizing theory would likely represent a
resounding success. At the same tirne, the neo-Marxist theorists who advocated delinkage
and are now 'discredited' could lay daim to development successes and point to what
might have been in Arbenz's Guatemala, Castro's Cuba, Mende's Chiie or Sandinista
Nicaragua without the blatant interventionism of the United States. The point is thaf
particuiariy with the aeo-modernking modei, the theories of the Impasse have cleariy
produced winners and losers. In addition to asking why a theory can be deemed
convincing, then, we need also address the question of whom to ask - the Manhattan
invesîment banker or the Penivian political prisoner, or conversely, the Mexican oil baron
or former Flint auto worker?
In surn, bebind the tidy term 'Impasse' lies - yet again - a cornplex web of
structure, process, agency and wntext. By conceiving of it as a hck of consensus among
individual theorists rather than a deadocked wmpetition between self-evident and
self-standing camps, we d o w for the range of wmnifmentq opinions and political
striping within each camp. We also dow for the potential of methodologid complication
to befoul developrnent theory research, and for the influence of entrencbed practice and
interest on ostensibly objective theory construction. nie point is that the development
theoreticai - even the metatheoretid - is inseparable fiom the demands of the
developrnent practical.
To summarize, the strengths of postmodemism denve fiom both sides of its dual
nature, Le., fiom its existence as a body of theory, and from its existence as a critiquing
method. The former provides a hdthy skepticism in regard to iconic language, which has
created in tum a language capable of negotiatïng the wnceptudiy tregcherous bridge from
an apparently 'natural' discourse to something which is able to stand 'outside' it and look
in. It dso represents a theoreticai basis for 'postmodem' development policy through its
emphasis on diversity and the value of the indigenous perspective. Lady, the postmodem
'canon' introduces and legitllnizes the concept of paradox or dissensus as a basis of social
organization, mainly represented in its advocation of a predisposition to value the
existence of numerous points of view within larger coktivities. Whiie there is
undoubtedly much work to be done to even begin to bring such an ethos into being, it
does represent a am. The strengths of postmodemism's critiquing roie lie in its ability to
investigate general concepts and deconsmict the termin01ogy that one encounters there; in
the developrnent field, the concepts of 'development theory' and 'Impasse' represent two
notable possibilities for such an inquisition of language.
It is argued above that, as a vehicle of critique, postmodernisrn offers much. Its
deconstructive and inherently suspicious character cm be brought directly to bear on the
theoretical maiastays of any dominant paradigm, which brings mimediate metfioâological
and theoretical benefits: instead of taking icons and 'isms' at face value - be they
neo-modemking iwns ükeprogres or growth or neo-ManSst ones Wte c k conj7ict - a
postmodem critique is armed with a healthy skepticism that cuts through rhetoric. In
addition, it is dificuit to dispute the notion that the postmodem critique makes an ethical
contribution, particulariy in its function as channe1 for "'transmitting the voice of the
tnarealized and dominated."l l0 If it is accepted that the narratives and choices of the
rnarp.iaiized and domùiated have value - a view which, it is argued here, is implicit in
postmodeniism - then a school of thought which legitimates channels of articulation for
alternative narratives must be viewed as desirable.
Despite these advantages, posûnodemism is encurnbered by a number of problems
which lirnit its potential to negotiate the impasse. Observable wealaiesses in the
postmodem approach can be deemed to fd Uito two categories: fiindamental semantic or
conceptual confusions, and the cognitive-attributive errors of the modemity Frankenstein
discussed in chapter one.
'wst I rn- - As numerous observers have noted, the 'post ' in
postmodernisrn implies a temporal break, as if"we have wimessed a histonc transition
fiom rnodernity to posmiodernitytynL1l In attempting to cl* this point, Docherty argues
that the word pstmodern bas îraditiondy descrïbed an "outside" of modernist thuikin&
though '%s meaaing was somewhat obfiiscated by the prefix post." Since even a cursory
glance at the institutions and processes around us reveaf a modemism that is alive and
weü, we likely do better to conceive of any manifestations of the postmodem as being
scattered over a b i d e t of modernity which has had a two-hundred-year head start. 112
Rather than a clear departure from the modem, then, postmodemism represents a
coexistent critical position which Lyotard has referred to as "a mood, or a better state of
mind."l l3 White, in the postrnodern spirit of dissensus, seems tiiUiy cornfortable with this
less tidy distinction between the modern and the postmodem, and hke Lyotard seems able
to conceive of the two as coexistent. Arguing in hvour of a 'postmodem modernity', he
tolerates the vagary on the grounds that ' h o d m is nven by phenornena that are not
easily comprehended within fàdbr cognitive and social structures. If the tem is
awkward and arnbiguous, so is the social reaiity it claims to describe."l l4
The lack of clarity concerning the precise meaning of the term 'postmodem' is not
simply a semantic problem. Definitions which emphasize a temporal progression imply that
the world itself has somehow become 'postmodm', ie., real-world conditions have
changed and 'posmiodern' is simply a better description of them. This almoa impties in
tum that a conscious rejection of modemity has taken place, which brings the definition
directly into conflict with Schuurman's assertion that discontent throughout the South
represents more a demand for access to modemity than a rejection of it. l lS On the other
hanci, definitions which portray postmodemism as an 'outside' of modemist thinking
l l Meiskhs Wood (1 996: 2 1). l l2 Even within the context of development, this is obvious. The technocratie, rational policies of the IBRD, or the mechanies of tied aid are good examples. Il3 ?n White (1991: 5). lL4 Ibid, p.4. l IS (1 993: 27).
emphasize its critical, subversive posture. In this view, rather than reflecting conditions in
an already-changed worid, postmodmiism represents a tool by which it might be changed.
This is not to argue tbat there is no rmm for overiap between these two views, only that
there is also room for confusion as the term is currently 'dehed'. 4 kxd': A more serious problem lies in the need for some son of
reconciliation between the postmodemin suspicion of the grand narrative and the impiicit
need for an ethos necessary to protect the autonomy of the local one. This is problematic
theoretidy because, as Laclau suggests, "the very idea of the abandonmeril of
metanarratives is logidy contradictory, for it reproduces within postmodern discourse
the "logic of foundations" that supposedly characterized modemity." l6 Quite obviously,
an 'ethic' which assigoed value to the local narrative would be, by definition, universai, a
notion cleady at odds with the postmodern rnindset.
There are other points of connlsion. One concerns the relationship between the
size of a collectivity and the attribution of the label 'local' to its narrative; ie., how large is
a collectivity is aliowed to get before its local narrative becomes a totalizing one? And
even if some dividing line is determined, is there any guarantee that these local narratives
remain local? As Flogstad rather snidely puts it,
1 suspect that this enthusiasm (over the 'defeat' ofmodernity) is premature, or rather, that those who want to shout with joy shodd huny up and do it now, before the minor narratives ?bey are so jubilant about begin to grow again. l l7
Beyond the question of the size of a coliectivity, there is also a need to consider
the related question of the character of its narrative. It might be argued that decqhg the
grand narrative implies a de fhcto legitimation of local ones which may tum out to be far
more oppressive - the harsh pend codes and political policies of the Taiiban in
Laclau (1993: 329). H7 In Schuurman (1 993: 25).
Afghanistan, or the more general practice of female genitd mutilation consthte two fairly
blatant examples. There is, therefore, no reason not to believe that even the most local
coliectivities might becorne rigidiy oppressive: the line between a totalizing namative
which rationahes the oppression of four billion and one which does the same for forty
thousand or, for that matter, forty, is left undenned. In other words, it is difficdt to teU
where the grand narrative ends and the indigenous voice begllis, or to teii where
legitimacy is to be 'granted' and according to what criteria. There may be ment to the
argument that the postmodern celebraàon of the local represents a potential "suurce of
resistance to logocentrism7', but oniy from a sort of macro perspective; when we consider
the gohgs-on within a parûcular locality, it would appear that the local also represents a
potential source of srnalier, individual logocentrisms.
Another problern centers around the theoretical
coherence - utility being too hard-headedly instrumentalist a term for the postrnodemist - of dEerence as the ordering basis of a body of theory. Corbridge, for one, has
vociferously asserted its lack of suitab*:
(Postmodem.ismrs) careless espousal of relativistic and nihilistic positions, and its iilogical extension of the critique of aprioristic notions of progress to cover al . . . enquiries about process, render it singularly unsuiteci to the task of reconstituting the basis of social development research. l I8
Booth has been more moderate, ashg '?O what extent ... an interest in the variety of
thkgs . .. amount(s) to a single 'approach' let alone a coherent theoretical or
met hodolog i d framework. "' l9
To backtrack slightiy, the postmodern emphasis on diversity or difference might be
considered the corollary to its distrust of tmth daims: in place of a single objective tmth,
I l 8 Booth (1993: 59). I l 9 Ibid, p.56.
postmodernists wouid advocate that humankind somehow predispose itself to value the
existence of wuntless subjective ones. While it is difiicult to -est the notion that
alternative voices ou@ to be automaticdly considered as having value, the
postmodemism of Lyotard and others which argues that the pursuit of howledge ou@
to be abandoned is "a dangerous and potentidly disabling set of ideas for aitical .. .
theorists to a d ~ ~ t . ' ' ~ ~ ~ Arguing that the point of theorking is to arrive at an hpoved
understanding of things so that real-worid problems might be addressed may leave one
vulnerable to a postmodem attack, but as Parker assertq
Somewhere in my anaiysis 1 have to leap corn the convenient (but philosophically unchallengeable) distance of postmodem relativism to what 1 think is happening, and what 1 think might be possible. To restate the point, how else cm 1 assert thaî what 1 am doing is worthwh.de at a11?121
The gap between the %orthwhileY' and the frustrating nihilism and relativism cited
by Corbridge might represent postrnodernism's most debilitating weakness. Despite the
fact that it serves to initiate a stimulating discursive investigation, it dso serves, as White
puts it, to create LCdistnist" of postmodernism among theorists out of "concern about the
ways in which postmodeni modes of thinking sometirnes seem to revel in a refusal to
engage problems cemral to any continuity of modern discour~e."~~~
et Of && The last semantic-conceptual confusion
to be treated centres around the concept of culture; it will be argued here that 'culture'
represents a far more problematic concept than postmodemism seems to presume. The
ditticuity emerges fiom the problematic relationship between nanative, culture, and
temtory, a relationship that postmodeniism seerns to treat inwnsistently. Gupta and
Ferguson refer to the need to challenge the "naturalism" inherent in the "ethnological habit
12* Parker (1995: 553). 121 Ibid, p.559. 122 1991: ix
of taking the association of a culturally unitsuy group (the 'tribe' or the 'people') and 'its'
temtoiy as naairal ..." Citing ''transnational culhiral flows, and mass movements of
populations," they question the very possibility of homogeneity and insulanty where
cuiture is concemeci. In the 'poshnodern' world, because culture emerges as
heterogenews, disparate, and endlessly permeable rather than as homogeneous, united,
and hermetically seded, ''the illusion of a naturai and essential wmection between the
place and the cuiture (is) broken." By way of example, they argue that English-ness,
. . . in conternporary Uiternationalized England, is just as compiicated and nearly as detemtoriaiized a notion as Pdestinim-ness or Armenian-ness, since 'England' C'the real England") refers les to a bounded place than to an imagllied state of being or moral location. 123
I f this is indeed the postmodem interpretation of the 'naturalisrn' that Gupta and
Ferguson sought to address, one has to wonder if the postmodern association of the North
and its meta-narratives is not somewhat overstated. That is to say that, rather than
painting meta-narratives as conscious or tangible reatities, we rnight better present them as
theoretical conceptions whose intangible character is defined by the very absence of a
coherent consciousness within them. If we assume the existence of a coherent
consciousness, we assume the existence of a coherent corps of dyed-in-the-wool
neo-modernizers or neo-Marxists whose words and deeds are founded on a commitment
to their doctrllially def'ined tnith. We also assume that this corps is eflecntve in its
propagation of the metanarrative, Le., with the population and the culture it presumably
guides: the meta-mtive defines the culture, and the culture contains nothing significant
that is not accounted for by the meta-narrative.
But when we assign coherent consciousness, bas& on a meta-mative, to a state,
we drastically oversimplify the inner workings of states. Thus, when we look at a
'23 Gupta and Ferguson (1992: 10-1 1).
country's latest policy or action, we o f h assume that since we have classifiecl that
country as "aeoliberal", it is that govemment's commifment to neoliberalism which
explains the policy or action We might credibly note that states' actions seem to have a
certain sameness or continuity over tirne, but the presumption that the pattern is explaineci
by a prearisting meta-theoretical bent îs a careless one. It might be better to conceive of
such contuluities as the product of other shaping forces, mmy of which have been
exploreci at great length elsewhere: bureaumatic politics, self-interest and rational choice,
pressure-group politics, boundeà rationaîity, political culture7 domestic political and
economic pressure, technologid, economic aad bistorical idiosyncrasy, structure-agency
relationships and conspiracy theories. When these shapuig forces are assigned value,
policy continuities appear to result from a much looser, conflict-ridden and ever-evolving
cornplex than neat theoretical consmicts - our b'isms'7 - suggest.
This view is, on one level, rougidy in lioe with the conceptual re-evduation of the
p o s t - W s t critique. ûriginaily intended to get beyond the conceptual monolith of class
structure, post-Mancism, as it is outlioed by Laclau and Mouffe, seerns to provide a more
credible portrayal of social 'reairty'. In the place of simple class conflict, post-Mamists
argue that societies contain a number of socid confiicts "of which one is not by definition
more important than the ~ t h e r . " ~ ~ ~ The conaicting groups, moreover, do not necessarily
have a unifid or single goal, or the same opponent. Ladyy Laclau and Mouffe argue that
the "outcorne of conflicts is not pre-determin4 by structural factors but by the interaction
between the intemal dynamics of social movements on the one hand and the reaction of
extemal actors on the ~ t h e r . " ' ~ ~
Post-Menasts thus provide the helpfùl portrait of societies as more fluid in their
coalitions, causes and c o ~ e n t s . It may make for a les tidy delineation of societai
components for the pirposes of theory construction, but to restate White's point, the
tmnhology with wfnch we comprehend cumplex structures ought to rdect the
ambiguous social reality it is attempting tu describe. The postrnodem treatment of
'culture' niils to reflect the ambigtities inherent in the societies that are symbiotically
linked to 'dtures'.
A further ambiguity is evident in the relationship between the offeMgs of
mode- and the right of Southern individuais to choose whether or not to accept them.
A sound argument c w l d be made that 'modemist' incursion um represent an oppressive
force, but this does not mean that it must be so. To imply that it does is to presume the
existence of some sort of cuitural 'pwity' which must be protected - a risky proposition
when one attempts to define such pu* or protection. Even worse, there is just something
hypocritical about a postmodeniism that has emerged fiom the industnalized North and
which would presume to advocate that the South be spared the evils of modernity:
self-proclaimed postmodemists who would take such a stand are likely do so fiom a
comfortable geographic or professional isolation which aliows them to tear into the
depredations of modernity while taking fiiU advantage of its achievements on a daily - if not hourly - basis. As Schuurman argues, conditions in Southern couhes more closely
resemble an "aborid modeniity project" than a postmodem or a cornpleted, modernisî
one, and manSestations of discontent in the South like the New Social Movernents "are
not expressions of resistance against Modemity; rather they are demands for access to
it."lZ6 If Schwnnan is correct, it would seem that sorne ground for disagreement exîsts
between postmodeniists who insist that the South is better off without modernity and
Southern inhabitants who are convinced of the opposite. Furtbermore, there is something
that smacks unwmfortably of ethnocentrism in the very act of teliing the South what they
need and what they do not - at the very least, something no les ethocentic than
preaching to the South the miracles of modemization or ManSsm. That this evident
codict between postmodem Nonherners and desperate Southem 'modemists' ought to
gR.e would-be theorists cause for hesitation is aptly swnmarized by Tomlinson, who
devotes an entire section of his 199 1 work on cultural imperialism to the question of
'%ho speak~?"l~~
Furthemore, in another argument presented by Tomlinson, the notion that the
autonomy of the local culture so vaiued in the postmodemist discourse will be, by
definition, lost through the incursion of modemity rnight be overstated. It is undeniable
that the obliteration of certain traditional social connections was at one time a centrepiece
of official Northem policy, as is evinced by a 195 1 publication of the United Nations'
Department of Ewnomic AfEairs:
There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed, and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who aumot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a cornfortable He mistrateci. Very few communities are willing to pay the fiil pnce of ecommic progress. 12*
However, as Tomlinson suggests, 'culture' is a fàr more cornplex bundle of ideas and
values that may be fm more resilient and durable than postmodernism typically holds. It is
one thing to say that a 'culture' is under attack when an organization such as the United
Nations deliberately seeks to "disintegrate" traditional foms of social organization, but it
is quite another to argue that the same is true when, say, an Arab or Guarani scholar
acquires a cornputer. The difference is that the former example constihites a deliberate
attack on a social fhric, while the latter represents the acquisition of a tool, a hr cxy fiom
the destruction of the complex cultural net of tradition, language, belief and subjective
12' Tomlinson (1991: 1 1- 18). 128 Cited in Escobar (1984: 377).
reality of Arab-ness or Guarani-ne=. It mi@ even be argued that such fniits of modemity
as cornputers or the intemet represent means by which cultural uniqueness cm be
maintaineci or altemative voices aired. 129
The 'Frankenstein' of modemity, it will be recalled, referred to the cognitive and
attributive errors in both the popular conception of the Frankenstein myth and the
postmodernist conception of modemity. Ln both cases, negative traits are rnistakeniy
assigneci to essentially positive entities, and the positive traits of those entities are
obscured fiom view as a result. in the development context, these erron manifest
themselves in postmodemism's £Sure both to separate modemity fkom interest-dnven
processes typically associateci with it, and to give due aedit to modernity's nobler aspects:
an ernphasis on democratic representation, for example, or the ability to advance medical
science. As Meiskim Wood puts it, 'a has bemme the height of fashion to attack the
so-cded Enlightenment project ." I3O
In its opposition to modemism, postmodemism might better be termed anti- or
counter-modemism. However, this lads inevitably to the question of what it is that
postmodernism is wunter fo. Arguing that postmodemity is better conceived of as
counter-rnodemîty, Habermas posits tbat modemity is an "incomplete project" whose
noble objectives have been thwarted by the misguided logic of postmodernism. 131
Docherty takes this further, arguing that the nobler promises of modernity were in effect
hijacked by forces which it spawned, interests which brought about its "barbarous face' in
the form of the Stalhist purges or the Holocau~t.~~~ The key question then, as Laclau puts
i29 See, for example, CarnpbeU (1993) or Burbach (1994). 130 1996: 27 1 3 ' Habermas (1993: 98-109).
&id, p. 12-13.
it, is that ' k e must agree on what, in Modemity, is k i n g put to the test." Rather than
"jettison(ing) al1 that is best in the Enlightenment project," postmodemists ought to be
obligated to be clear about what specific aspects of modemity are being critiqued by
postmodemism, and on what groutfds. 133
Ifit is accepted that modeniity contains within it 'noble' objectives and
characteristics which ought to be considered safe from the postmodern critique, it is
important to identiSr the point of distinction between those objectives and characteristics
and others which are fair game for the postmodeniist. In other words, what emerges out
of the rnodemist project that can be deemed oppressive (despite the cnticisms of the
postmodern approach sketched eartier in tbis chapter)?
In a thoughtfid 1996 article by EUen Meiskins Wood entitled 'Modernity,
Postmodemity, or Capitalism?", the relationship between these three elements is critically
assessed. Citing Jarneson and Harvey as proponents of a view that recent economic
transformations toward 'late capitalism' or 'post-Fordism' evince an "epochai s W that
represerrts the departure fiom modernity into a condition of postmodemity, she questions
these theorists' assurnption that "modemity and postmodeniay represent two different
phases of capitalism." Arguing instead tbat the "so-called project of modernity may have
little to do with capitalism," she directly challenges the automatic association of the two
which many theorists seem to make. A good example is found in a work by Catherine
Scott, in w k h a passage surnmarizing the work of W.W. Rostow contains the argument
that,
During the t h e before take-off (ie. the stage in a society's wolution that, in Rostow's model, preceded its en- into modernity), 'limiteci bursts" of entrepreneurid activity and ''encilaves of modem&?' emerge, spurred on by "enterprizing men" who are w i h g to "take risks in pursuit of profit or rnodetni~ation."~~~
n3 Meiskins Wood (1996: 28) 134 Scott (1995: 31).
Such an association - whether it is actually being made by Scott or Rostow - reflects, for
Meiskins Wood, a misunderstanding of the relationship between rnodemity and capitalism.
Through a cornparison of socio-economic and politico-economic conditions in
Enlightenment-era France and Engiand, she argues that France, the acknowledged center
of the Enlightenment, was chamcterized by a decidedly non-capitalist mode of production.
Enpiand, on the other han& the acknowledged cerner of fiee-market capitalism, fkatwed
no disceniïble philosophical cornmitment to Enlightenment values; "the 'invisible hand' of
classical political economy and the philosophy of British empiricism7' predorninated. 135
Her point is simply h t there is no reason to associate modeniity with capitalism. If her
point is taken, then, it behooves the postmodernist to separate the two when fomulating a
critique of 'modem' policy in the South.
Still, though, there is iikely fodder within the wider concept of modeniity for the
postmodem critique. Having adailateci its separateness fiom capitalism, Meiskins Wood
makes an important observation:
... if you want to look for the roots of a destructive " m o d e r n i ~ - the ideology, say, of technocentrism and ecological degradation - you might start by looking (at Eniighteament-era E n a d ) , not in the Enlightenment but in the project of 'hprovement," the subordination of di human values to productivity and profit. 136
What emerges, then, is a sort of bastardized modernity, one '%ijacked" by other forces, as
was aliuded to in the introduction. Granted, the use of mysterious temiinology like "other
forces" is vague, but it is not intended to refer to some dark wnspiracy. Instead, as much
of this discussion has been devoted to arguing, any "suborclination" that takes place is
more convincingly said to result fiom a dismticulated and disparate cornplex of pressures,
aluiough it may be said to possess a certalli 'character'. It is, then, neither conspiracy nor
accident.
Looking at the developing world and the history of Northern-controlled activity
there, the postmodernist sees greed, injustice, and all mamer of manipulations and
machinations of wntrol. The processes of capitalism, and al1 aspects of m o d e m - the
ccdestnictive7' side duded to by M e i s b Wood and the nobler side of emancipation and
howledge - are cast in together under an excessively broad 'Modeniity'. The aim of the
argument up to this point has been to cast doubt on the bases of this conceptualization of
modemity - in short, to muddy the conceptual waters which postmodemisrn has
unconvincingly attempted to make clea.. This is not to argue that the postmodem exercise
has been a pointless one; those aspects of it cited as strengths in chapter four stiîl stand as
such.
But sornething is still missing. Northem incursion into the South rnay not represent
conspiracy, but it is driven. Cleariy, then, it is in the best interest of development studies as
a field - to say nothing of 'development' as an hitution - that the drive behind Northem
activity be identined correctly. In response to the misidentifications and weaknesses of
postrnodemism's opposition to a blanket modemity, the remainder of this discussion wiU
be devoted to re-situating the modern-postmodem conflin into an altemate context of a
codict between interest and ethics.
Chapter 6: The Interest-Ethics Dichotomy
The approach adopted for this chapter is based on the premise that
postmodernism, as it stands, is ili equipped to serve as the theoretical basis for a new,
improved development uieory. The roots of this inadequacy lie in the dynarnics of the
'Modernity Frankenstein' described at length in the introduction. To recap briefly, the
Modernity Frankenstein reflects a two-fold, foundational weakness of postmodemism:
first, modernity is assigneci d rnanner of negative and destnxtive traits that it does not
desene; and, second, modemity's positive and constmctive traits are obscured altogether.
A possible solution to this dilemma is to remove postmodemism from its position
of across-theboard opposition to modemity and relocate it within the context of an
interest-ethics dichotomy, which wiii be outlined in detail below. From this new position,
it will be argued, postmodeniism stands a much better chance of serwig as the basis of a
new, improved development theory; its strengths will be accentuated, and its weaknesses
palliateci. Admittedly, this approach brings us no closer to a theory in the conventional
sense of the term: no concrete system or constituent parts are identifid, and no predictive
ability is gaineci. It is merely intended to dlow postmodemism to direct itself'at the 'right'
targets, and to leave the 'wrong' ones alone.
In a 1977 article entitled "The Prediuunent of Liberal Democracy", Alan Wolfe
delves into what he refers to as the crisis of contemporary iiberal democracy. The main
points of his argument, though not entirely original, serve to illustrate an important aspect
of politics that ofken goes unnoticed. Spdcal ly , he posits that it ought to surprise no one
that wnternporary Liberal dernomcies are currently nven by conflict and contradiction.
The reason, he argues, is that the original theory of Liberal Democracy contains within it
the seeds of these same ills. In other words Wolfe suggests it is not the contemporary
appiication of Liberal Democracy that is flawed, it is the theory of Liberal Democracy
itself. The main difficulty is that the two conceptual piilars of Liberal Democnicy -
egslitarïanism and self-interest - are uiherently at odds. Given its cornmitment to the
preservation of these two tenets, Wolfe argues3 liberal democracies c m o t but be riven by
wnflict and contradiction.
The view of the supposedly 'modem' industrialized, liberal democracies which
Wolfe provides stands in stark wntrast to the push for consensus said to be a key aspect
of modemity. Though the notion of a politics dominated by competing, self-interesteci
actors is not new - it is represented in poLitical writings h m Hobbes' 'warre of every man
against every man3 to contemporary bureaucratie-politics models - the notion of the
cd ic t between the pursuit of interest and a constraining, egalitarian ethic as the central
defining feature of any politics rnight weîi be.13' Again, fiom the point of view of social
science theory, it is suspect. On the other hand, there is precedent for theoretical work
which advanced particular systemic elements, and disrnissed others as imelevant. One
notable example, fiom the international relations fiterature, is the structural realism of
Kenneth Waltz. Waltz, building on the classid realism of Morgenthau and others, argued
that international relations could largely be explaineci by a structural theory built on two
key elements: the division of the global system into competing nation-states, and the
interplay between the security dilemma and the 'national interest'. Dismissing the inner
workings of nation-states as irrelevant to the structural explanation, Waltz built a career
on a limted set of ideas which, though widely criticized for leaving out dl sorts of relevant
components remains remarkably rdient to this day. 138
13' In Macpherson (1985: 185). 13* For a tidy (and slightly seIf-congratdatory) explanation of structural realism, see Wdtz (1986: 27-46).
Cleariy, Waltz' work stands much more solidly as a 'Theory' than does the
interest-ethics dichotomy, again, no such grandiose status is bemg claimed for the ideas
below. But if such provocative debate can be engendered by a body of work iike Waltz',
which so eeely admits the importance of 'process' to real-world politics in one breath
wMe blithely asserting its imeIev8nce to a structurai theory in the next, perhaps the
interest-ethics dichotomy bas potential. It is difiailt to see how it wuld ever be as tidy as
Waltz' theory - which is remarkably simple (note: not simpiistic) - but we are again
remindeci of White's argument that ambiguity ought not to be feared in theory if it is
staring one in the face in practice. Its development into formal theory would require an
approach aimost opposite to Waltz'; structure muid be downplayed in favour of process.
Rather than being delineated by the static structural aspects of the system's cornponent
parts, then, an interest-ethics theory would be more dynamic, ie., it would have to be
concemed with the ebb md flow of the interest-ethics codict which never really stands
still. Also, unWce structural realism, ir would have to encornpass both the submtional and
supranational lwels of analysis. There is clearly much to be worked out, but the immediate
task would seem to be to define the basic terms of the dichotomy, and to demonstrate
their importance to the larger task at hand.
'Interest' is intended to refer here to a motive for behavior, a force which &ives
political, economic and social events. Its main characteristic is that it is seKserving, i. e. it
is not intended to serve the general weffme; by its very nature, interest is exclusive, not to
be s h e d when realized. Ifrealized, interest results in some sort of pwniary, social or
political privilege for a particular in-group within a larger collectivity. For interest to be
served, two conditions must be met: the sub-group in question must have the capacity to
organize the actual task of securing its pnvilege, and it mua then be able to defend its
interest. The key issue, then, is control: privilege, rarely of use if it is a one-the flair,
refers by definition to a protnicted social relationship. In Weberian terms, interest as the
'~urpose of the organization" supersedes, or at least cornes before, any universal ethic or
sense of the general good. 139 It is hardiy an origVial theoreticai concept, but interest has
been given rather short shrift in development theory literature, except perhaps in its more
leftist variants. Even these, though, tend to overstate the matter, presenting interest as an
organized political force by whicb, for example, the North exploits the South, which
borders uncodort8bly at thes on conspiracy theory. H m , interest is intended to refer to
something fàr more decentralized and disparate; societies encompass countîess
seKinteresteci orgarhtioos, and their attempts to influence the policies of other
organitations (mcluding states) consthte a very naturai and predictable attempt at interest
realization. Stated Wkrently, there is nothing conspiratorial about the motive
self-interestecl entities have to shape events and poticies in their favour.
In wncrete terms, interest is intended to refer, for the most part, to corporate
enterprise, but also to Northern organizations (Le. 'modemia', rational bureaucraties) like
states or their various subdepartments. 141 The best example of non-MNC sub-state
organkational interest pursuit in the South might be the long history of U.S. military ties
to Latin Amencan courtterparts - through hemispheric arrangements with Latin militaries,
U.S. officiais were able to shape hemispheric security policy on U.S. terms on issues
ranging f?om the core strategic and tacticai values (i.e. anti-cornmdsm and
139 Whiie the concept of seKinterest is not new to the social sciences, having had a long tradition in the rational choice fiterature of public policy, in organkation theory, and in the realist school of international relations, the conception advsnced here is more general. The 'seif' has been dropped primarily to distance this treatment of interest from that previous theoretical work. 140 Conspiracy is a valueladen term which, again, irnplies a confiict between ethics and interest: if it is acknowledged that interests are naturai, they can oniy becorne "cunspiratorial" when their pursuit contravenes an ethicai code of some son. I4l individuals as seff-interestecl entities could perhaps be inciuded in this group, particularly insofar as they exert pressure as shareholders.
counterinsurgency) to the most mundane logistics (Le. exclusive purchase of US-made
weapons and supplies). Simiiar anangernents existed between the Soviet Union and its
clients.
There are several good reasons for postmodenùsm and development theory to take
account of interest. One is provided by two authors who, arguing completely diEerent
points, make very sunilar mistakes. The first is Michael Edwards, who c d s for a change in
the objectives of development theory fiom "practice based on the philosophy of
knowledge, to practice based on the philosophy of wisdom, to a fonn of enqujr in which
what we do and w b t we are matter more than what we k110w."~~~ The desirability of
such a change, he suggests, is besed on "two fundamental assertions, one concerning
erhics, the other conceming t n e t h o d ~ . " ~ ~ ~ The second is Schuuman, who makes the
seemingly innocuous comment that the 'Enlightenment gave birth to modemity, a beiief in
the rational politico-economic projects leading to universal h m emancipation.
Socialism and capitalism became the f o r e m pro~ects of r n ~ d e n i i t ~ . " ~ ~ ~ Schuman's use
of the term "projects" and Edwards' of "methods" are troubling. Taking "projects" first,
we can assume that a project requires three things: a coherent group of project architects
and managers; a firm and identifiable ethos of wmmitment to the project, and some
evidence that the projects - if they are the Enlightenment projects - steadfiistly adhere to
the normative foundation of modemity. It is doubffil whether either of the 'foremost
projects" cited here meet any of these requirements. The project managers of capitalism,
for example, are difncult to identie and are certainiy not coherent - instead, capitalism is
dominated by a dizzying array of corporate mtities characterizai mainly by cornpetition.
Funher, as Meiskins Wood cunvincingiy argued, capitalism has had Little to do with the
philosophical foundations of the Enlightenment. Lastly, to take Wolfe's point, capitalism is
142 1993: 79. 143 Ibid, emphasis in original. 144 Ibid, p. 1 87, emphasis mine.
decidedly at odds with the spint of implied in Eniightenrnent thinking,
largely because of its built-in incentives for corporate actors to seek non-level playing
fields. Similar arguments could be made for socialism, with the pro* that the basis of
the cornpetition was iikely more political-bureaunatic than economic.
Edwards' error lies in bis reliance on the term "methodsn as a da mental
assertion" for the reorientation of development. There is no reason not to excoriate
'Northm' rnethods - one need only look at any one of the problems that have plagued the
South since the arrivai of Columbus; clearly, something is wrong - but there is a
womsome implication here that all that is required is some sort of reconsideration in order
that development practice be 'corrected'. This sort of thinking is flawed for the same
reason that State of Nature or S o d Contract theories are: it implies that a Rawlsian 'veil
of ignorance' descended at some point, that time sornehow stopped wMe we pondered
the best way in which to bring about 'just' development, and that everyone bewne
neutrai, forgetting th& identities, capabilities, associations and interests. From this benign
but 'blind' cornmittee, our current development 'methods' thus emerged.
As has been argued repeatedly throughout preceding chapters, our methods are
better viewed as naturai outflows of the stmctureprocess-agent -context 'corn plex '
discussed earlier. Furthemore, given the inertia, mass and character of this cornplex, the
methods that fiow out of it are not things that can easily be changed. To imply that they
can is to presume a coherent 'we' that is accessible and willing to alter Ïts course through
the persuasive force of a rnoraliy superior argument - Robert Reich's 199 1 book, The
WarR of Na-tio~, wntains a chapter entitled 'Who is Us?' that provides an interesting
critique of this presurnption. 145 The main point, then, is that interest is inseparabfe not
ody from development practice, but tiom Northem behavior in generd.
145 Reich questions the viebility of the 'national interest' as a cuhesive force, i.e. as reflective of a common interest within large nation-states, where pst-Fordist economics are aiigning interests dong decidediy non-national lines. Che good example is Detroit auto
The identification of hidden interest - Le. interest 'hidden' behind an iconic,
discursive veil of 'progress'or 'modernization' - is certainly a mainstay of the
postmodernist position. But development theories characterized as postmodem tend to
stress the proactive side of postrnodernism rather than its (critical) reactive one - the two
'hats' of postmodemism, one representinp it as a critical posture, the other as a separate
body of theory, wiil be recalled here. Postmodern developrnent theory, stresshg diversity
and local@ as bases of development policy, tends to wncentrate on micro-level activity.
This is a point of contention for Booth, who acknowledges the value of micro-level
research and project implementation, but asks how we might %concile insights about
indigenous alternatives and room-for-manoeuvre in local settings with the kinds of
understandings of larger structures without which they will lack r e a l i ~ m . " ~ ~ His centrai
point is that development theory needs also to address the rnacro Ievel in order to give
"proper attention to structural constraint."lq7 It is argued here that the son of "'stmctural
constraint" he refers to is represented by the development cornplex. Again, this refers to
emtrenched structures, etc., that have been built on the pursuit of interest, Le. not having
emerged out of a vacuum or by accident.
Generaily, then, t a h g greater account of interest would allow postmodeniism to
move beyond its Limiteci role as a critical exercise; as Parker comments, ''suggestive
metaphors and linguistic play are simply not enough."14* Forcing the discussion omo
concrete issues instead of a vaguely conspiratonal modemism would be a welcome step:
we can examine the forces that cdiw a particular action rather than the discursive cloak it
drapes itself in. In focushg on the 'window dressing' aspects of modernism, i.e. on the
linguistic- or discourse-oriented processes which are obfuscative in nature, posmiodernism
manufacturers' effective abandonment of local employees in favour of production plants in Mexico. 146 1993: 60. 14' Ibid, p.6 1. 148 1995: 562.
has devoted insufficient attention to whar is obfuscated, and why. Modemism cannot be
'responsible' for, say, environmental degradation in the MaScan maquiladoras, the
destruction of the rainforest, or the growing gap between rich and p r . To argue that it
cm is to attnbute to modeniism a consciousness that it cmot have, to essign will to an
im. An im might be cited as a justification for an act, or be associated with the means by
which an act became possible, but it cannot be an act &self Nor can it be serveci or not
served, or have objectives or aims. In other words, modemism cannot win or lose because
it cannot be an agent: it can only be a context for agents. But since North-South relations
have so consistently produced winners and losers, the most relevant question to ask mi@
be one which explores the issues of winning, i.e. who wins, and what it was that was won.
But More we can determine which 'player' won, we ne& to know what made hirnher
step ont0 the field: at its most fundamental ievel, to do this is to delve in to the entire
question - or institution - of want.
'Ethics' is intended here to refer, first and foremost, to an opposite of interest:
where interest is individudistic and seif-se&% an ethics is universalistic and coacerned
with service of the general good. It is a code which acts - tangibly or otherwise - as a
constraint on interest by reflecting a more general group conception of what is fàir and
what is not. Behavior which benefits the few at the expense of the many is decried, while
behavior which provides more even benefit is valued. 'Ethics' represents an over-arching
ethos of epeiitarianism or 'fairness' which values structural integrity and social cohesion
over individual interest. Admittedly, the term is as general and unscientific as interest, but
just as essential to the postmodern critique of modeniism: there is LittIe other raison for
postmodem analyses to attack the Creation of the ûther, the silencing of the indigenous
voice, or the general obfuscative workings of interest than that these practices are unbst.
The uneasy reiationship between postmodemism and ethics has been hinted at
throughout this discussion. Where the advantage of interest as an dyt ica l concept is that
it enables postmodeniism to be more clear about what t stands opposed to, ethics aliows
it to be clear about why. II is a question that is rarely asked: if postmodeniists deny the
worth of ali things universaliong - which premmably (ifnot most especially) includes
universalizing codes of ethics - then what is the basis for their opposition to oppression
and control? Quite simply, why do they m e ? The implication is that postmodemism,
whether postmodeniists k e it or net, is already underlined by an ethical base. Events Like
the Holocaua or processes like the global demise of indigenous cultures - which
postmodemists cite as evidence of modeniity's 'barbarous face' - have no meaning if an
ethic is not already king atnrmed. There is7 surely, more at stake here than narratives: to
argue this point is to suggest that the tragedy of the things cited above is the denial of
Jewish or Apache namitives - an absurd notion. Postmodemists, k e the reg of us, one
would hop, stand opposed to these things on conscientious, humanitananethical grounds
which precede any consideration of narrative or deconstruction.
The major difficuity with this line of reasoning lies in the postmodemist antipathy
toward the totalizing narrative, a headhg under which any conception of a (presumably
universal) ethics must be said to fdl. Quite cleariy, any postmodemist of a more nihilistic
bent wouid have no part of this, but others have been willing to explore the possibiiity of a
relation between postmodemism and ethics. Pauline Rosenau dserentiates between a
nihilistic and negative "skeptical" postrnodeniism and an "afh~ative" postmodeniism
which does not "shy away f?om atlinning an ethic (and) rnaking normative c h o i ~ e s . " ~ ~ ~ In
another example, Docherty argues that the postmodem emphasis on diversity and
dissensus represents "'the basis of an ethical demand for the postmodem" through its
objective of ' real' democracy . lH) And Amin, echoing Schuurman's view of development
in the South as an "'aborted modernity project," argues for a "popular intemationalism that
can engender a genuinely universalist value systern, complethg the unfinished project of
the Enlightenment ... ."lS1
There are dso exampies of theorists who emphasize a natural connedon between
ethics and development. Edwards suggeas that ethics "are ever-present in debates about
developrnent, because development is about things which ough to take Citing
lmmanuel Kant's suggestion that 'ought implies cm', he argues that
. . . the deveiopment debate is as much about practice (or how to bring about what 'ought to be7) as about pnnciple (or what 'ought to be' in the ahtract). Relevant research must help us to develop both good practice and good principle. However, this does not free us fiom defining what 'ought to be' in the first place: in other words, fiom dennùig what we mean by 'developrnent'.
Combining the three elements' then - i.e. postmodeniism, development and ethics - forces
the discussion ont0 specifics. Schuurman stresses the compatibility of heterogeneity with
"certain ernancipatory goals" Wre citizenship and participation, under the mbnc of radical
democracy. 153 For Corbridge, a 'Yocus on development ethics" serves to 'tender
problematic the proposition that there are no alternatives to a given fom of social and
ecunomic organization (and development)." In a point reminiscent of Schuurman7s
assertion that one of the major assets of postmodemism is its potentiai, through skepticism
and deconsmiction, to facikate the demise of political cultures '0uilt on appeals to
spurious necessity," Corbridge asks whether it is "reasonable7 by virtue of stnictural
adjument, to condernn large numbers of people ro a life devoid of some basic human
needs?"lS4 And Habermas provides possibly the best reason for postmodemists to factor
ethics ùito their considerations Listing his 'Wee 'theses' of neoconservatism," he puts at
nimber two its need to keep politics "as far aloof as possible from the demands of
moral-practical justification." l 55
Where an advantage of factoring interest into postmodemism enables it to launch a
more fmused critique on iconic language, the addition of ethics allows it to advance an
alternative; as Slater puts it, to ask "wb.at has been happening to poverty, to
unemployment, and to e q u a l i ~ l M But this highlights the need for a clarification with
regard to the concept of ethics in this contefi, derïving fiom the tendency of the
supposedly oppressive development forces to make eaensive use of these same words. It
is an important distinction - ifit is possible to imagine a group of conservative
neo-modemizers s i h g across a table fiom a group of radical postrnodeniists, and the
latter asks the former why it was doing nothiog about poverty, unemployment or equality,
the result is iikely to be an exasperated assertion that this is precisely what they were
attempting to do with policies f i e stmctural adjustment.
Though it is likely impossible ever to determine which side of the development
coin - the postmodem or the 'modem' - is t d y cornmittecl to such ethics, we can safely
point to a discrepancy between the two. It has been argued throughout this paper that the
postmodem 'stance' is essentiaily an ethical one, but this is not to suggest that there is no
relationship between modemity and ethics, even beyond the ethic impticit in a body of
154 Ibid, 130; 133. 155 (1993: 108) If there was wer a theoria who would welcome a re-tooled postmodemism, it is Habermas. Cited by White as its "arch enemy," Habermas proceeds in this same article to e w e postmodernists with neocunservatives. IS6 1993: 105.
theory aiming at providing universal emancipation. There iq for example, an obvious
ethical appeal in the icons of modemity discussed earlier: progress, democracy and
freedom on the modeniization side, or the new sociaiist order and end to imperialist
oppression on the neo-Man9st side represent good examples. It is of course a major part
of the postmodem 'position' that the practicai applications of these theories have
historically Wered greatiy fkom their lofly rhetonc, but there is no denying their
ostensible 'ethical' character. If we are to adopt a criticai posture, what necessarily
emerges is a dual conception of the ethical: ajwstr9~arot-y ethic which accompanies the
pursuit of rnodemist interest, and a rewlatory one advancecl in the postmodern critique.
The former cm be considered justifiatory because it serves to put a humane face on
processes that are decidediy at odds with typical conceptions of the '£kir': this rnay be
sornething of a moral relativism, but it is diflEidt to see how any modernist enfity wuld
openly suggest to the people t encountered upon its arriva1 in the South that they were
there to subjugate their populations, innuence their politid decisions, plunder th&
resources, and take ali steps necessary to maintain a healthy investment climate. The latter
can be considered revelatory in its intention to expose the interests and motivations behind
the rhetonc. In short, it is important to distinguish between the initial interest that drives
the North-South 'modernizing' relatioaship, the justificatory ethic which helps to "seli" it - Le. to promise mutual benefit from processes which are essentially self-serving - and the
revelatory ethic that illuminates the two. It is the bridge between the assertion that the
North acts out of beneficence, and the suspicion that it acts out of self-interest.
To summaize, the interest-ethics dichotomy presented here is inteodeci to re-focus
postmodemism. It has been argued that, since its diametric opposition to modemity has
cornmitteci it to perpetuate the errors of the Modernity Frankendein, both postrnodemism
and postmodem development theory wouid be b ~ e r served ifthey sat thernselves
squarely within a view of politics and development as a conflict between interest and
ethics. The deveioprnent as which we see in the South today thus re-emerge as creatures
of unconstrained interest rather than a misguided or conspiratord rnodemity, we are thus
able to get past the idea that modernity is to blame for alien incursions into the South.
Drawing from Todorov's exploration of Las C m ' writings, we find that many of the
sarne a s that bave plagued the South throughout recent decades - hegemon-spoasored
violence, exploitation, colonization, etc. - were blatantiy evident at the t h e of Columbus7
who was the zeaious representative of a decidedly pve-rn&m kingdom. As Todorov
writes, 'there is nothing of the modern empiricist" visible in the methods of Columbus. A
pious man who sou@ gold in the New World in order to finance a crusade a e s t
Jenisalem, Columbus was dnven by simple financial interest on the one hand7 and what
niight be identified as the justificatory ethic of a crusading Christianity on the other. 15'
15' Todorov (1 982: 1 7)
It was arped in the preceding chapter that a posmiodernism which took a view of
politics as a contlia between interest and ethics would be more fmsed than
postmodernism is in its curent position of staunch counter-modemity. It was also argued
that such a resrientation would allow postmodernism to avoid the enors of the modexnity
Frankenstein, and would provide it with a more tangible target at which to direct its
greatest strengths - its skeptid, deconstructive bent, and its ability to articulate the
difference between the justificatory and the revelatory ethic.
But what about postmodem déveIoprneni theory? That is, how is a postmodeniisrn
situated within the interest-ethics dichotomy better able to negotiate the development
theory Impasse?
A postmodern development theory which focuses on interest-ethics is an
improvement over one which focuses on modernity for several reasons. First, in its
awareness and achowledgment of the disparate nature of the interest-dnven Northem
cornplex, it c m move development theory past posmiodernisrn's apparent impression that
a concentration on micro processes - the development theory rnani5estation of
postmodeniism's emphasis on locaiity and diversity - is enough to produce change. As
Booth suggests in regard to the research aspects of this same question, it is 'legitirnate to
ask how we are to ensure that the findhgs of local-action studiw reflect ... the constraints
upon action that may only emerge at the regional or national l e v e ~ . " ~ ~ ~ The point, one
might infkr, is that a development theory based on local development 'choices' is well and
good insofar as it represmts the nght to opt out of the 'modernkt project', but no matter
how fonhnghtly development theorists laud such an approach, there is still the thomy
question of what to do when it conflicts with some powerful interest. There are many
potemial points of such conflict, depending on where the local approach diverges fiom the
interests of any of a number of extemal forces; the point of diierence might be politid,
social or economic. Politicaily, for example, a localif/ which sought to unilaterally re-order
its system of representation (or its lack of it!) might wnfiict with an existing one which,
like the Northem compleq did not pop into king by some accident; again, existing
structures derive fkom existing interests. A conflict might also result fiom a local initiative
which diverge- fiom an existing social institution iike ananged mmiages, racial
segregation, chiid labour, or even something as specinc as fende genital mutilation. The
potentiai for ewnomic codict is wen easier to envision through a local refusa1 to allow,
Say, the plmting of a certain crop, the construction of a certain fàctory, or the mining of a
certain mineral. Clearly, there is plenty of room for local initiatives to clash with existing
institutions, property and power relations.
There is also a conceptual problern in the relation between geographically defineci
locality and the postmodem emphasis on c h g e , which postmodemism has been remiss in
addressing. Surely, there is nothing in the postmodeni position which requires that a
locaiity be defined in geographic temu - a village, or a region - in order for its 'narrative'
to be assigned value and thus deemed defendable. It also needs to accwnt for narratives
or commitments to Lifesty1es that diverge fiom the perceived 'mainstream' of the larger
coilectivity: reiigious preference, sanial orientation, politid sentiments, or, for that
matter, the desire to smoke or eat meat represent 'sub-narratives' that cannot be defined
tenitorially and which therefore demand some sort of atemtorial political definition.
The temtonal question a h begs that the relationships between
temtoriallydefined potiticat structures be addressed. It will be recalied that dependency
uieory defines core-periphery relationships not only in North-South terms, but also within
Southem countries. A postmodemism that foarses on countering modemity or on
diversity leaves open the question of exactly where the change is to take piace and wtiere
administrative bodies at the local, regional, national or supranational levels f3 into the
equation. The reaiities of 'aterritorial' issues and existing geopolitical structure neeâ,
therefore, to be addressed in some fàshion by postmodeniism.
An interest-ethics focus aiiows development theory to achieve this to a greater
degree than 'traditional' postmodemism does, in that it highlights the limitations of an
'opting out' approach. We rnight easily envision a locality that chooses not to 'toe the line
where official political messages or eçonornic policies are concemecl, or chooses not to
study science or to reif'y technology, but such choices cm only be made where they do not
wnflict with the interests or predispositions of larger entities. A Cuban village which
opted to remove Fidel Castro's portraits fiom public spaces and establish a private bank
would likely experience just as swifi a reprisal as a 1970s Nicaraguan one which swght to
remove Somoza's portraits and close a private bank. The point is that, in light of the
ability of interest to act as a shaping force of existing power relations, the ability of
postmodem development initiatives to affect the overall design of development is
extremely limited. Development history is full examples in which 'dissident' approaches
intended to disengage peoples fiom the dominant paradigm were violently werced back
into line - again, we can look to the Guatemalan, Cuban, Chilean and Nicaraguan
examples. We rnight also consider the comectjve action directeci at would-be innovators in
Hungary in 1 956, in Czechoslovakia in 1 968, in the Solidarity movement in Poland in the
early 1980s, or in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
On the other band, to recall the point made by Docherty, the last two hundred
years have not been an inexorable progression toward evil. Politics in general may be
driven by interest, but the sense of ethics that has been employai here is certainly visible as
well; even the most repressive examples of despotism have occasionaiiy l m e d the bard
way that it is possible to lean too fàr toward the 'interest' end of the scale, Le., away corn
the 'ethics' end fiom which popular conceptions of the ' f i 3 and the 'unfair' take their
shape. lS9
Ifit is accepte& then, that imerest represents an unavoidable obstacle, one which
cannot be ignored, development theory needs to account for the (probable) fact that it
cannot be removed. On the other hand, even from a strict dwelopment point of view,
there is no reason to sunender to it and aUow it excessive reign - a shortcoming, it mi@
be argued, of neo-modeniizing theory. The constraining force thaî ethics potentiaily
represents ought also to be factor& in.
A dwelopment theory which sought to take the best of both might, therefore.
stand on h e r theoretical ground. Such a theory would combine modemity's emphasis on
emancipation, its scientSc achievements and the productive tiuits of interest with
posmiodernism's releotiess suspicion and willingness to d e c o m a in order to reveal
interests that might prefer to remain hidden, dong with an aflSmiation of the worth d
alternative voices (i-e. the postrnodem 'ethic'). The ideal result would be a development
theory based on a never-ending postrnodem critique design4 to constrain interest, and
which sou@ to work with and within existing 'modeniist' institutions to d e h e political&
the rights to fieedom and choice implicit in the term 'cultural autonomy'.
Theorists £Yom numerous fields, confionted with diametncally paireci, oppositional
approaches, have advocated 'synthesis' approaches. In socd science theory, Radder has
put forward a "refèrential r d s m " through which ''it is possible to reject ontological
relativism without endorsing a realist theoiy of conceptuai representations in science."lm
In economicq Onis has attacked the neoiiberal obsession with cornpetition by pointing to
159 Notable examples pehps include the Shah of Iran, Ferdinand Marcos, Anastasio Somoza and Fulgencio Batista. I6O Cited in Gandy (1 996: 35).
econornies which achieved 'successfuly development through "a mix of cooperation and
cornpetition and the creation of appropriate institutions designeci to sustain a desirable
mix."161 In cultural theory, Said has rejected both the imnisive 'colonking' discourse and
the nationalist post-coloniai one, arguing that the realities of Me in formerly colonized
areas make the choice between either extreme option impractical. lti2 And, in development
theory, Grafhas refmed to a "productive (and necessary) synthesisy' of postmodemist and
modernist approaches similar to the one put forth above. Another endorsement is given by
Gandy who, citing the critical realism of Andrew Coilier, presents perhaps the strongest
endorsement of the interest-ethics dichotomy by arguing that:
the task of critical realist philosophy is to uncover an ethicd ontology whereby our knowledge is predicated not so much on the dixovery of new values as on the uncovering of ~0rtshistoricaI moral trufhr such as social justice and the preservation of biological diversity. The support for political dissent as a harbinger of a new society is thus founded on the possibility for exposing musai inter-rehi'onships between social +es and underlyrng generarive prCiCessesy rather than a relativist endorsement of difference in the absence of any theory of ~ausality!~~
Before proceeding, a brief chification is in order. In iight of the number of
opposing conceptual pairings that have appeared in the pages above - interest-ethics,
postmodemism-rnodemity, neo-modemking-neo-Marxist, and by extension
capitalism-socialisrn - it might be helpfil to specify wbich thesis and which mithesis we
are dealing with: it is interest-ethics. Moreover, no attempt is made here to superimpose
the interest-ethics dichotomy over any of these other pairings, i.e., to suggest for example
that a synthesis between capitalism and socialism represents a synthesis of capitalism as
interest and socialism as ethics: the pairings are not asserted here as being parallel.
uistead, it is suggested that interest and ethics be extracted fiom these othet pairings and
qmthesized into a new development theory, though aspects of the other pairings will no
doubt be visible. It iq as Slater suggests, an attempt to "think of ways in which
development c m be recast in a quite new kind of project."164
The 'Vecast" theory wodd feature four cornponents. The first is an
acknowledgment of the 'productive' capabilities of interest, emphasizllig iîs capabilities,
not its direction. Its ability to drive endeavours which have often (though cextaidy not
always) led to innovations of indisputaHe benefit to hummkind bas been mentioned
earlier, obvious advances Ui medical research, communications and transportation corne to
mind. But beyond this, a more pertinent fature of interest-driven activity ex& The
material scarcity evident throughout the South can safèly be said to have a direct,
deaimental impact on the qualis, of life there - some notable examples might be the need
for more readily accessible water treatment bcilities, comunications or f d distriiution
kfkstructure. This is not to suggest that any interest-driven activity cannot be tumed to
maiign purposes or cannot r d t in the rnass production of items fiivolous or fetishist
beyond description, but rather that there is thepotentiuï for interest to complement human
Me in a constructive way. Tied into this of course7 is an assumption that there is some
innate desire in humam to improve their material conditions, a notion that becornes all the
more salient through even the biefest glance at the gap between Nonh and South where
available goods are concemeci.
The problem, of course, is that interest has a tendency to create conditions in
which the desires of some are reaîized at the expense of the rights of othen. 165 The
second wmponent of a synthesized development theory, then, is one which seeks to
164 (1993: 108) 16' One notorious development-related example is that of the extractive activity of Shel OiI in Nigeria: the self-interested behaviour on that corporation has had a politicai, economic and enviromenttil impact on Ogoni tribespeople that cm ody be oonsidered detrimental.
counterbalance the acknowledgment of interest's productive side with an ethical
foundation designed to keep it in check.
It might be pointed out that such a foundation is, ostensibly, already engmined in
classical liberalism. But Corbridge, citing Crocker, suggests that the current version is
poorly suited as the basis of 'desirable' society:
There is an urgent need for 'mord reflection on a society's basic goals because such things as economic growth and modernisation may be moraliy problmtic and in need of replacement, modification, or supplernentation with more adequate concepts of ' W e s s of beeig". ' l 66
ûther theorists have aiso touched on this point. Slater, for example, argues that 'ivithin
the official dixourse of the World Bank, IMF and a broad range of related international
organizations, one rarely if ever encounters a discussion around the need to r e t M the
privute sector . .." Further, he argua, such nediberal touchstones as ' U e market, 6ee
trade and investment, the functioning of capitalist enterprises, the politics of
accumulation" are "predominantly protected tiom any questionhg ~ r i t i ~ u e . " l ~ ~ What is
asserted in these critiques is at best, then, an interest-ethics combination that has gone out
of whack.
Numerous e th ic s -bd suggestions have been put forth as to how to deal with this
dilemma. Edwards has cited empawennent as a desirable bais for new development
theory, defining it as Tncreasing the control which the poor and powerless people . .. are
able to exert over aspects of their own lives which they consider to be important to
them."168 Similarly, Schuurman argues that development theory ought to concm itseîf
with inequality, that is, "inequality of access to power, to resources, to a hurnane
existence - in short, inequality in emancipation. If we were to let go of this, there would be
no justification for the existence of development theory." l 69 He M e r argues that
. .. too great an emphasis placed on diversity and specificity lads to a voluntarist, pluraîist approach to the development problem, allowing no space for e universalistic emancipation discourse ... a new explanandm for development studies should not be restricted to 'diversity' but be expiicitly concerneci with 'hequality' .. .
ûthers have ernphasized social or radical democtacy as a solution. In an article subtitled
'The Transformative Potential of Social Demmcy", Munck went so far as to suggest
that "social dernocracy @ad by the 1980s) becorne hegemonic in Latin Arnerican political
discourse," and that it was ''the inteliectual common sense of the era, the framework in
which debates take place and th& inevitable horizon." As for radical democracy, White
sunmarizes its trament by Hannah Arendt, who cited '%nef moments in various
revolutions from the eighteenth to the twentieth century" in which there was an "attempt
to free the public do- f?om the coercive weight of the previously dominant principles
and institutions. To this White adds "the goal of mtualiy generating and maintainuig
legitimate procedures for keeping politics open" as a desirable tenet for radical
democracy . l
This brings us to the third f-re of a qmthesized development theoiy: the need to
"keep politics open" through the establishment of dissensus, paradoxica11y7 as a central
ordering p~ciple . As has beem discussed earlier, this is a clear depamire fi-om the
previous 'modenlla' metanarratives which stress the need for consensus in social
organization. But dissensus - or, as Sad terms it, disinereest - also has a noteworthy
theoretical foundation in Habermas' treatment of 'communicative action'. l 72 In this
169 1993: 30 %id.
171 1991: 52 172 For Sad's matment, see 7he Unconcims Civi~zzatiort, particularly cbapter three (pp.72- 1 12).
theory, dissensus cm be interpreted as the basis of an "exchange of knowledge" and as a
"mutuaily 'iuterpretive and cognitive process' through which 'knowledge is built upon the
accwlluiated social expience, commitments and culturally-acquired dispositions of the
actors invo~ved'."~~~ It therefore d s t s as more than an ackncmdedpent of an existing
multipiicity of voices; Habermas argues that it represents a crucial process of "social
integration and ~ociali7ation."~~~ It will be recalled fiom chapter three that this idea is,
despite Habermas' alleged N i t u s as the 'arch enemy' of postmodernism, not that f u
removed fiom the postrnodeniist emphasis on the value of cultural mdtiplicity, i.e., from
its advocation that large heterogeneous collectivities pred-e thernselves to value the
existence of the numerous smaller ones within them.
The son of CUItural 'give and take' irnpiied within dissensus bnngs out an
interesting pardel with interest. In its predisposition to 'give', to concede something for
the purpose of greater social cohesion, dissensus is to homogenizing metatheory what the
willingness to forego pecuniary gain is to seKinterest. Restated, insofhr as interest-driven
societies are based on the reification of the profit motive and the resulting obligation to
base action on the 'bottom line', the willingness to resrient interest-driven action to give
greater weight to an egalitarian ethic parallels the willingness of the would-be propagators
of a metatheory to give greater weight to the local matives within its sphere.
Obviously, it is easier to suggest that dissensus be given 'greater weight ' than it is
to outline viable po1iticaVlegal measures by which it might be operationalized. In strictly
theoretical terms, though, it is clear tbat we are r e f d g to the rights of subgroups to
make choices. And, in a nod to the theonsts cited on the second component of this theory,
this refers to the need to base development on empowennent, equaiity, and the rights of
subgroups where the nature of their commitment - or lack of it - to the wider development
173 h g and Villareal (1993: 146), cituig Habermas. 174 Habermas (1987: 39)
process is concerned. In other words, this is directed at the limited ability of sub-groups to
'opt out' of development objectives that are defined at higher levels.
The final cornponent of a synthesked development theory is the need to maintain
the postmodem suspicion of interest, and to enshrine this suspicion as healthy rather than
subversive. This component takes an often under-ernphasized aspect of the postmodem
critique - its resistance to the modemist idea that societies can eventually reach some
condition of homogeneous perfection thrwgh rational inquiry - and pushes it to the fore.
It is something of a paradox where traditional forms of human organization are concerned:
instead of constnicting hierarchies which breed syco phantic behaviour and 'grou pthink ' ,
this component would encourage ever-vigilant dissent and wbat might be termed a
'healthy disrespect' for authonty. There is, to be sure, room for debate around the
potential of this component to co-exist with one which articulates the ethical foundation
recommended in the second component, but it is argued here that the posmiodem
tendency toward skepticism and deconstruction, embedded as a key pan of that ethicai
foundation, would serve to combat the dangers of iconic obfùscation so prevalent
throughout human history. In short, it is intended to embed the revelatory ethic in the daily
processes of development.
aii Summav
Emerging fiom al1 of this, in a between-the-lines sort of way, is the need to arrive
at a redefinition of the term 'development'. It might be argued that this is what
postmodem development theories have essentially done aiready, but, as has been
repeatedly emphasized here, postmodernism's bais in a posture of counter-modernity has
consigned it to a position that is of limited helpfiilness. But, given the ease with wtiich
interest-driven practice has been able to adopt and dign itself with the so-calleci modemity
project, the same could be said for modemity: despite its nobler side (emancipation,
discovery, universal ethics, etc.) it has hardly serveci as a recipe for a 'just' global society.
As White has suggesteâ, by way of asseshg the potentid of 'Weideggerian-postmodem"
thinking to negotiate a new politics based on radical democracy, neither modemity w r
postmodernism is adequate by itselfto bring such a Tust' wciety about because
they have at their disposal only two ways of thinking about action: the condemned teleological modes spawned within the Gestell (Le. the 'constituting' tendency by which reason creates reality), or the countermodes that have no goal, no 'bvhy", or at least none other than that of unmasking metanarratives and rationalization processes ... This point is often glossed over by posünodems. 175
It might be argued that the lack of a coherent and comprehensive definition of
development is at the root of the success of 'modernist' development discuurses, that is
their resilience and success in selling themselves as viable models and in attracting corps of
adherents. A raiefinition which SOU@ to cut through their iconic language, to cultivate
the principles of dissensus, to articulate an ethical foundation based on the right to choose,
but which also acknowledged the productive potential of interest, might palliate this
problem.
To say that injecting this definition into official development theory and practice
would be a difficdt task is to drastically understate the magnitude of that challenge. This is
a point picked up on by Corbridge, who argues the need to "(intenogate) present policy
arrangements to test their fairness or unfàimess, and then ... to s p i @ some combination
of institutions and processes through which l e s u n f i outcornes might be effied," but
acknowledges the dEcuity of defining the "institutional f o m in and through which these
alternative policies might be put into operation (and argued for)."lw It is a crucial
question, but to seek to answer it at this juncture is to look too far ahead: the objective of
this discussion has been to assess and articulate the theoretical aspects of the development
pro blematique.
175 199 1 : 52 (text in brackets added). 176 1993: 135-137.
Munck has argued that 'hone of the 'ways out' of the development theoy impasse
are adequate to conshict a new paradigm, be it pst-imperialism, regdation theory, a
gender focus, or Miche! Foucault." His conclusion, then, is that ''the underlying choice is
dl between modernisation and dependency theory."ln Beyond the fact that these two
schools are already weU articulated and well known, they do contain ideas to cornmend
them, i.e. strains of the synthesized development theory as spelled out above.
Unfortunatel they stiil represent schools of thought prone to essentialism, partisanship
and the pursuit of exclusive interest, despite their grandiose Ianguage. This is especially
tme of neo-modernizing theory, which has been riding an unprecedented wave of
perceived credibility since the ciramatic politicai changes in Europe and the Soviet Union
from 1989 to 199 1. Ultimately, then, in view of Fukuyama-esque proclamations tike the
'end of history', to abandon development to these two paradigms is to abandon it to
progress, democratization and healthy investment c h t e s as they are defined in a
nediberal ethos. The potential brake on this iine of thinking which dependency represents,
and has always represmted, is unlikely to be effective. Though this may change in time,
the degree to which 'socialism is dead' thinking has been accepteci by the vast rnajority of
the Northern cornplex has Likely jaundiced the dependency approach beyond recovery: at
the very Ieast, if neo-Marxists hope to advance their ideals, they would be weU advised to
change theù name.
104
Conclusion
It is ho@ that the central objective of this discussion - to determine whether or
not postmodemism has the potential to solve the development theory Impasse - has been
met. Saddled with the concephial and atîributive mors of the modernity Frankenstein,
placing too much stock in the concepts of locality and diversity, and troubled by semantic
and conceptual weahesses, postmodernism is, in its m e n t forin, ill-equipped to serve as
the basis of a development theory that d l have to suppiant the institutions of
neo-modemizing and neo-Mantist theory.
However, it has also been argueci, as Schuurman puts it, that 4he postmodem
debate has resulted in an understanding which can benefit developrnent shidies, without it
being necessary to adopt the entire baggage of postmodm idea~."l'~ If the strengths of
postmodemism - its relentless suspicion, its talent for deconsmiction, its reveiatory ethic
and other aspects of its critiquing 'hat' - are retained, and postmodemism is repositioned
so that these strengths can be brought to bear on a politics and a 'development' which it
views as a conflict between interest and ethics, there is potential for it to evolve into a
sound and constructive theory.
In order for it to solve the Impasse, though, postmodemism wiu have to do more
than engage neo-modemization and neo-Marxist theory in strictiy logicdethicai or
normative terrns. Postmodemism has held its own in this regard, but this success has
rested on the willingness of other 'debaters' to extract fiom these other theories only their
philosophicd foundations, i. e., the logical or ethical points of argument which modernizers
or Manrists are likely to bring out in the disembodied arena of debate. The problem is that
these theories - udike postmodeniism - c m o t be separateci fiom the political agendas
which drew them together, gave them direction, and allowed them to be manifêsted in
practice. In order for postmodemisrn to supplant either of these development theones, it
wiIi have to defeat not 09 their IogicaVethical aspects, but also the massive practical
aspects to which they are attached. As has been discussed, these aspects are tightly
intertwined with the economics, domestic and global poiiticai imperatives, and
bureaucratie structures (ranghg firom the World Bank to the U.S.' miIitwj and
inteIiigence orgmbmtions and their industrial suppliers) that tend to be both intransigent
and unfathomably huge.
To accomplish this, postmodenùsm will need to get beyond its fixation on the
rationakations of moderniîy. This does not mean that its criticai, revelatory role should be
abandoned; a critique of the type postmodemism offers of the various discourses that
emerge wiU aiways be beneficial. But postmodernism needs to acknowledge its own
ethical cornponent and the 'good' in modemity and interest, that is, the side that espouses
the desire for universal ernancipation and the benefits of production, innovation and
technologicai advancement to wider society. h other words postmodemism and
development theory need to allow interest at least some fiee reign. At the same time,
though, postmodemism should advance itself as a tool by which interest might be
constrained and manageci. In s e ~ n g as such a brake on interest, postmodemism might
provide parameters for development by advancing a universalistic ethic - referred to eariier
as an 'ethical foundation' - based on sub-group autonomy and the right of such groups to
make choices. Clearly, this would be apolitical process. The result, ifd postmodemias
were to somehow become committed to such a 'program', would be a clearly deheated
universalist ethic that would protect these rights and fieedoms. Again, getting the main
controllhg entities of the age - govenunents, IGOs, corporate enterprise, and elites - to
commit to and enforce such a code is another issue altogether. On the other hand, there is
always hope: postrnodemism has undoubtedly had an impact on developrnent theory and
practice through the popularity of participatory schemes and actorsriented approaches,
for example, and gender issues have achieved a higher profiie in the field than they have
ever enjoyed More. Whether or not these changes have r&ed fkom some sort of official
disillusionment with 'traditional' Northem practice is an open question, but they can be
viewed as improvements.
It is also crucial that this discussion be moved es fm as possible fkom the idea that
the implementation of a synthesized development theory, were it ever to corne to pas,
would represent the crossing of some sort of temporal threshold into a brave new era.
Wthin the confines of individual Northem societies, hiaory has been dorninated by a
constant see-saw conflict between interest and ethics t b t has never been resolved, and
likely never WU be. Even recent Ontario history, which has seen a shifk from nght to left
and back again, fiom taik of social contract to the heavy-handed amalgamations and
budget slashes of the Hanis govefnment, would seem to bear this out. 179 There is also the
global context to consideq at present, the interest-ethics conflict is taking place within the
parameters of fàirly rigid principles - the victory of the 'democratic' and the 'fiee' over the
dark forces of socialism, the universal pursuit of '%ee markets, fiee speech and f k e
elections," and the end of history, but there is no reason to assume that this context will
never change.
In the end, a postmodem developrnent theory that manages to negotiate the
Impasse wiil have to do so with two ironies. Fust, its ability to achieve a high enougb
profile in development studies that it cm be said to have supplanted or negotiated the
179 And, by way of an aside, given the unresotved nature of our own interest-ethics dilemma, it is Little wonder that our development policy is characterized by a contirsed mixture of both. 180 These words, taken h m George Bush's inaugural address, are attacked by Sad: "The order given to the three fkedoms is astonishing from the mouth of a man assuming the chief responsibiüty for the exercise of the Amencan constitution . . . The world is nUed today, as it has often been in the past, with nations that embrace fiee markets, close censorslip and fdse or no general eledons. Singapore and China spring to mind. And the more cornplete these markets, the tighter the controls become on the other two fCeedoms"(l995: 44-45).
blockage of the other theones rests on the achievement of some sort of consensus, among
development theorists, that it is superior and preferable to existing models. Second, it will
likely have to do so on the strength of its ethicai foundation, Le., t hat which asserts the
value of sub-culture narrative and the ri@ to make lifèstyle choiws. In light of the
pressing environmental, socio-economic and political problems in the South, the ethical
'card' may be the strongest one postmodeniists can play. Mer ail, the ability o f
rationaking discourse to jus* activities which perpetuate such as rests on the ability of
the architects of t h t activity to distance themselves fiom the effects on real people. AU
postmodemism has to do is bring this idea home.
Though it is unWtely that development theoy can ever jar the Northem compleq
as the perpetuating engine of the worst aspects of 'modemity', into some new, more
humane orientation, it is apparent that development theoriss are obligated to try: there is
an ethical Unpemtive that demands no less. As Shelley's Frankenstein - the Doctor, that is,
not the creatuce - says in his dying breath,
In a fit of enthusiastic rnadness 1 created a rational creature and was bound towards him to assure, as fiu as was in my power, his happiness and well-being. This was my duty, but there was another SM paramount to that. My duties towards the beings of my own species had pater claims to my attention because they included a greater proportion of happiness or misery. 181
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