DISECstorage.googleapis.com/wzukusers/user-17935610/documents...Disarmament and International Security Committee Committee Guide Letter from the chair Dear delegates, Welcome to DISEC!

DISECC O M M I T T E E G U I D E

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Committee Guide

Letter from the chair Dear delegates, Welcome to DISEC! My name is Varun Sampat and I will be your chairperson for the Disarmament and International Security Committee. Your co-chairperson will be Jahanvi Desai. I was very pleased to co-chair IAEA last year at NIMUN 5. Delegates achieved a very high level of diplomacy and debate. This year, my co-chairperson and I expect the delegates of DISEC to exceed our expectations. For the first time in the history of NIMUN, a historic topic will also be an agenda for DISEC’s committee proceedings. As delegates of DISEC, we not only expect to see responsibility for identifying threats to international security, but also resolving them. This year’s topics are highly intriguing and have a lot of scope to debate upon: Nuclear Proliferation of North Korea and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (II: 1972). Power, with respect to weaponry, is a very dangerous possession, if used in the wrong manner. Both these topics question countries’ powers and hence are challenging and highly controversial. We will ensure that committee proceedings bring out the best in you. So take your time to prepare extensively, and do not hesitate in asking us any questions at all. Do not hesitate to contact me at [email protected] if you have any questions. Good luck for preparing and hope to see to you all geared up soon. Regards, Varun Sampat Chairperson


Committee Guide

What is the Disarmament and International Security Committee? DISEC is the first committee in the United Nations General Assembly. It deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to global peace that and seeks out solutions to the challenges regarding international security. The committee works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It comprises of all 193-member states of the UN. The two agendas to be discussed at DISEC are:

A. Nuclear proliferation of North Korea B. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (II: 1972).


Committee Guide

Topic A: Nuclear Proliferation of North Korea Introduction: To date, North Korea has relied almost exclusively on liquid-fuel as the propellant for its ballistic missile fleets. Solid-fueled missiles, in contrast, are more storable and stable than liquid-fueled counterparts. Liquid-fueled missiles require hours of preparation and fueling before one can be used, giving other countries the chance to detect launch preparations ahead of time, while solid-fueled missiles need only minutes of preparation prior to launch. This key difference makes solid-fuel propellants ideal for use in a ballistic missile, but of very high proliferation concern, along with its recent hydrogen bomb tests (which it claims to successfully have conducted), which can be extremely dangerous to world security. Timeline of activities: North Korea has conducted five successful nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2016.

⇒ In 2005, North Korea agreed to a landmark deal to give up its nuclear ambitions in return for economic aid and political concessions.

⇒ But implementing it proved difficult and talks stalled in 2009. ⇒ Then in 2012, North Korea suddenly announced it would suspend

nuclear activities and place a moratorium on missile tests in exchange for US food aid. But this came to nothing when Pyongyang tried to launch a rocket in April that year.

⇒ The UN further tightened sanctions after the 2013 test. ⇒ The 2016 test brought another round of universal international

condemnation, including from China, the North's main ally. In June 2016, DPRK conducted another test, with its trajectory being 400 kilometers.

Historical background and a detailed timeline: In the mid-1990s, North Korea began design and development of the three-stage Taepodong-2. Despite the lack of success in its flight-testing, U.S. intelligence sources consistently asserted that a functional Taepodong-2 could deliver a small payload to the western part of the continental United States.


Committee Guide

In July 2006, North Korea flight-tested several ballistic missiles, including the long-range Taepodong-2. The Taepodong-2 failed at about 40-42 seconds. The North Korean Foreign Ministry referred to the July launches as "regular military drills to strengthen self-defense," and claimed it had a legal right to "continue with missile launch drills." On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched an Unha-2 space launch vehicle—which is a modified version of the Taepodong-2. Although North Korean media immediately claimed that the satellite had been placed into orbit, no orbit was detected by outside observers. The launch of the three-stage rocket was seen as a technical failure with the first stage splashing down in the water between the Korean peninsula and Japan, and the remaining stages, along with the payload, falling into the Pacific Ocean. In 2011, North Korea completed a 10-year initial construction project at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. The new base included a movable launch pad and a gantry tower, which exceeds the needs of North Korea's largest ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. The base is comprised of several missile assembly and testing structures, a launch warehouse, an observation tower, and a rocket engine test pad. The site far outpaces North Korea's Tonghae facility near Musudan-ri, where it has tested short-range, medium-range, and intercontinental missiles. North Korea has since used Sohae to launch the Unha-3 rocket, and possibly test the engine of KN-08 missiles. However, on April 12, 2012 North Korea attempted to launch a satellite into orbit to mark the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung's birth using an Unha-3 rocket. However, the launch failed in seconds. On December 12, 2012, North Korea re-tested its Unha-3 rocket from the Sohae launch facility, successfully putting a satellite into orbit. While North Korea refers to its rocket as a space launch vehicle, the technology is very similar to that of a long-range missile. In order to deliver a nuclear payload, the rocket would require the addition of a re-entry vehicle, which requires technology and advanced materials experts believe North Korea does not currently possess.


Committee Guide

In February 2013, North Korea declared it had miniaturized a nuclear warhead, although it has not been definitively demonstrated to the outside world. In August 2013, satellite imagery detected six construction projects at Sohae Satellite Launching Station. This development coincides with the abrupt halt of construction at the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground. In February 2014, satellite imagery detected that an eleventh level was added to the gantry tower. This will allow the DPRK to launch rockets up to ~50 meters in length, though no such rocket is known to exist in North Korea's arsenal. In addition to the larger gantry tower, new concrete roads leading away from the missile assembly building were built. North Korea launched a series of short-range rockets in the summer of 2014, and also displayed propaganda showing the launch of a variant of Russia's Kh-35 cruise missile. On March 9, 2015, North Korea released photographs showing Kim Jong Un in front of, what it claimed was an implosion style nuclear weapon capable of fitting on the end of a missile. The photographs also depict several partially assembled KN-08 mod 1 and mod 2 missiles. On May 10, 2015, North Korea released images of Kim Jong Un observing the submarine launched ballistic missile Polaris-1 test from a submerged submarine, though analysts have since determined the images were falsified and the missile was actually launched from a submerged barge. In November 2015, based on debris found in the ocean, North Korea likely failed a submarine launch of its KN-11 SLBM. A new type of submarine has been docked at the Sinpo Shipyard since July 2014, with visible conning towers that may house either ballistic or cruise missiles. In September 2015, DPRK state media reported that another satellite launch on a long-range rocket was planned for the near future. In October 2015, North Korea unveiled a new version of the KN-08 with a smaller, less conical warhead.


Committee Guide

In January 2016, North Korean media made announcements that the regime had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. On February 7, 2016, North Korea used the Sohae Satellite Launching Station to launch the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) using the Unha-3 rocket. The launch triggered widespread international condemnation, and in conjunction with a January nuclear test led to additional sanctions being leveled against North Korea. On March 15, 2016, North Korea announced its intention to conduct further nuclear weapon and missile tests. North Korea also released photographs appearing to show a successful test of a heat shield for a re-entry vehicle. Current conflicts: Reactions of the world to North Korea’s Hydrogen bomb (January 2016) testing:

• Former British ambassador in Pyongyang said that "an explosion of that size is quite enough to wipe out a city and I think that, of course, is deeply worrying".

• South Korean President Park Geun-hye, said further analysis was needed to determine the nature of the test, while calling it "a strong challenge to international peace and stability".

• China, North Korea's main ally, said it "firmly opposes" the test • Japan called it a "major threat" to its national security • The US and South Korea agreed that "North Korea's provocations

should have consequences" • Russia warned the action could amount to "a severe violation of

international law", calling for the resumption of talks • The EU urged North Korea "cease this illegal and dangerous

behaviour'' • NATO said North Korea should abandon nuclear weapons. • Bruce Bennett, an analyst with the Rand Corporation (an

American nonprofit global policy think tank), was among those casting doubts on Pyongyang's test: "The bang they should have gotten would have been 10 times greater than what they're claiming. “So Kim Jong-un is either lying, saying they did a hydrogen test when they didn't, they just used a little bit more efficient fission weapon - or the hydrogen part of the test really didn't work very well or the fission part didn't work very well."


Committee Guide

Previous attempt to resolve: Several resolutions were passed with regard to prohibition of testing:

⇒ Resolution 1718 (2006) prohibited DPRK from conducting future nuclear tests or launching a ballistic missile

⇒ Resolution 1874 (2009) strengthened previous measures against

the North Korean weapons development program by tightening sanctions on additional goods, persons, entities, exports and imports.

⇒ Resolution 2087 (2013) recalled the previous sanctions imposed

against the country’s weapons development programs, urging compliance with these resolutions and promising to take further action if the country refused to cooperate or conducted another nuclear test.

⇒ Resolution 2094 (2013) made it more difficult for North Korea to make further progress in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs by hindering its access to hard cash and technological equipment needed to build weapons and pursue uranium enrichment

⇒ Resolution 2270 (2016), adopted on March 2, 2016, condemned

North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and launch using ballistic missile technology.

Pointers:

1. DPRK’s nuclear proliferation as a threat to world security. 2. How DPRK’s focus on nuclear proliferation affects the country’s

citizens and their needs 3. Factors affecting the decisions made by DPRK related to its

nuclear weapons. 4. DPRK’s justification, if any, towards their nuclear tests despite

sanctions 5. DPRK’s purpose of testing.


Committee Guide

Useful links: http://www.nti.org/ (which stands for Nuclear Threat Initiative and is governed by an expert and influential Board of Directors with both current and emeritus members from the United States, Japan, India, Pakistan, China, Jordan, Sweden, France and the United Kingdom.) http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/delivery-systems/ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35241686 http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/ https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea


Committee Guide

Topic B: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (II: Year 1972) Introduction: Although both SALT agreements were only between the USSR and the USA, this year, DISEC will undertake the 2nd talk that commenced in November 1972 among all countries that have been mentioned in the country matrix. It will also focus on the military power possessed not only by the USSR and the USA, but also other countries.

Why SALT 1 was conducted: Originally proposed by the United States in December 1966, the Soviet Union equivocated until May 1968, when the Soviets had numerical strategic parity in sight. A planned opening of SALT at a summit meeting in September 1968 was derailed by the Soviet�led Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in August. With the defeat of the Democrats in the 1968 presidential election, SALT had to await a new administration and its review of defense and foreign policies. The delay of the opening of SALT from fall 1968 to late fall 1969 had one significant adverse effect: during that year, warheads for its strategic missiles—five years ahead of the Soviet Union. As a result, the negotiations placed no restrictions on these missiles and a significant continuing growth in numbers of warheads, seriously undercutting the value of the SALT I and SALT II agreements limiting strategic offensive delivery vehicles.

During the late 1960s, the United States learned that the Soviet Union had embarked upon a massive Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) buildup designed to reach parity with the United States. In January 1967, President Lyndon Johnson announced that the Soviet Union had begun to construct a limited Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense system around Moscow. In 1969, the United States successfully tested and developed deployable MIRV (multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicle).

The Soviet Union was engaged in an increasingly hostile war of words with communist China; border disputes between the two nations had erupted in the past few years. The United States was looking for help in extricating itself from the unpopular and costly war in Vietnam. The May 1972 summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev was an opportune moment to pursue the closer relations each desired.

The development of an ABM system could allow one side to launch a first strike and then prevent the other from retaliating by shooting down


Committee Guide

incoming missiles. While abolition of nuclear weapons would be impossible, limiting the development of both offensive and defensive strategic systems would stabilize U.S.-Soviet relations. Johnson’s successor, Richard Nixon, also believed in SALT, and on November 17, 1969, the formal SALT talks began in Helsinki, Finland. Over the next two and a half years, the two sides haggled over whether or not each nation should complete their plans for ABMs; verification of a treaty; and U.S. concern that the Soviets continued to build more Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and interim SALT agreement on May 26, 1972, in Moscow.

Outcomes of SALT 1: Of the resulting complex of agreements (SALT I), the most important were the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems and the Interim Agreement and Protocol on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons.

I. The ABM treaty regulated antiballistic missiles that could theoretically be used to destroy incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched by the other superpower. The treaty limited each side to only one ABM deployment area (i.e., missile-launching site) and 100 interceptor missiles. These limitations prevented either party from defending more than a small fraction of its entire territory, and thus kept both sides subject to the deterrent effect of the other’s strategic forces. The ABM treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate on Aug. 3, 1972. The ABM Treaty was a significant achievement in arms limitation, although agreement had been facilitated by doubts on both sides as to the cost�effectiveness of available ABM systems. Although the treaty headed off a costly and useless ABM deployment race, it did not have the desired effect of also damping down deployment of strategic offensive missiles, especially because MIRVs were not constrained.

II. The Interim Agreement froze each side’s number of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) at current levels for five years, pending negotiation of a more detailed SALT II. As an executive agreement, it did not require U.S. Senate ratification, but it was approved by Congress in a


Committee Guide

joint resolution. The Interim Agreement froze the level of land� and sea�based strategic missiles (permitting completion of launchers already under construction). The Soviet Union had a quantitative advantage with 2,348 missile launchers to 1,710 for the United States. This was, however, offset in two important ways. First, neither strategic bombers nor forward�based nuclear delivery systems were included, and the United States had a significant advantage in both categories. Second, although the Soviet Union had more missile launchers and deployed missiles, the United States had a larger number of strategic missile warheads and by 1972 had already begun deploying MIRV warheads. Overall, the Interim Agreement placed only modest limits on strategic missiles. In contrast to the ABM Treaty, it was not significant as an arms control measure.

The two nations could not resolve the two other outstanding issues from SALT I: the number of strategic bombers and the total number of warheads in each nation’s arsenal. The first was complicated by the Soviet Backfire bomber, which U.S. negotiators believed could reach the United States but the Soviets refused to include in the SALT negotiations. Meanwhile, the Soviets attempted unsuccessfully to limit American deployment of Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs). Verification also divided the two nations, but eventually they agreed on using National Technical Means (NTM), including the collection of electronic signals known as telemetry and the use of photoreconnaissance satellites.

The primary goal of SALT II was to replace the Interim Agreement with a long-term comprehensive Treaty providing broad limits on strategic offensive weapons systems. The principal U.S. objectives as the SALT II negotiations began were to provide for equal numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for the sides, to begin the process of reduction of these delivery vehicles, and to impose restraints on qualitative developments, which could threaten future stability. A basic problem


Committee Guide

discussed in these negotiations was the asymmetry between the strategic forces of the two countries; the U.S.S.R. having concentrated on missiles with large warheads while the United States had developed smaller missiles of greater accuracy. Questions also arose as to new technologies under development, matters of definition, and methods of verification.

Pointers:

1. Should limits be set on the number of strategic launchers possessed by any country, and if yes, then how much?

2. Means of verification, such as observation satellites, and their regulations.

3. On what basis should DISEC assess nuclear/military activity and how should respective actions be taken?

4. Threats that weaponry has had on international security, with references to history, and framing a method to combat such threats.

Delegates are recommended to know the military position of all countries in the committee matrix, and know how other countries are being affected. Useful links: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O126-SALTTreaties.html http://fas.org/nuke/control/salt2/ http://www.britannica.com/event/Strategic-Arms-Limitation-Talks https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt http://www.coldwar.org/articles/70s/SALTIandII.asp Note that all the data in this guide has been confirmed and approved by the secretariat and hence debating about the credibility of the data is not recommended.

Documents

DISECstorage.googleapis.com/wzukusers/user-17935610/documents...Disarmament and International Security Committee Committee Guide Letter from the chair Dear delegates, Welcome to DISEC!