A Critical Analysis of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s ‘The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,’ With Respect To

Christian Apologetics.

Andy Kench MA in Transformational Theology

2013

MT7401 Transformation Dissertation

Robert Willoughby

    

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A Critical Analysis of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s ‘The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,’ With Respect To Christian Apologetics.

Essay Plan Introduction

What is Postmodernism? Methodology

The Postmodern Condition

Survey of Lyotard’s Work Setting The Scene The Social Bond

The Pragmatics of Knowledge The Legitimation of Knowledge Through Narrative Deligitimation Scientific Research and Education Postmodern Science Summary

Secular Critiques of Lyotard

Coherence Test Balance Test Explanatory Power and Scope Test Correspondence Test Verification Test Pragmatic Test Existential Test Cumulative Test Competitive Competence Test

Christian Perspectives on Lyotard James K. A. Smith Middleton, Walsh and Grenz Groothuis

Conclusion Bibliography

    

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Introduction

The world has changed enormously for Christians and non-Christians since the time of

Jesus’ ministry, death, resurrection and the emergence of the early Church in the first

century AD. During these social, economic, political, industrial and theological changes,

Christianity has thrived both through its accommodation to and opposition to changes in

the world.

Such changes are often accompanied or followed by a change or innovation in the field of

philosophy. Often a new school of thought emerges at an academic level and the

philosophy then gradually tickles down to the general populous.1 The Church must decide

whether to accept or challenge this new philosophy, depending on whether it aids or

hinders the spreading of the Gospel. This is true both of the clergy preaching to the

converted and of apologists spreading the Gospel to those who have not heard.

During the modern era, discoveries in the hugely successful human endeavour of science

and the corresponding philosophy of Positivism, posed a serious threat to Christianity as

scientists working with a naturalistic methodology sought and then claimed to explain the

workings of the world without the need to postulate the intervention of the God of the Bible

or any other supernatural force.

The Western world is now entering a post-industrial era, where information (or knowledge)

is becoming the key resource of individuals, businesses and governments instead of

industrial or military power. Consequently, some philosophers have heralded the coming

of the post-modern age, where science and other ‘modern’ ideas, are scrutinized and their

claims to supremacy over religious or tribal myth are rejected. In this essay, the postmodern

philosophy presented by Jean-François Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition will be

examined and critiqued from the point of view of evangelical Christians engaged in an

active and public defence of their faith. The aim is to show that while postmodernism (as

                                                        1 Smith, Postmodernism, 20. 

    

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Lyotard understands it) may make some observations about modernism that are useful to

Christians engaging in discourse regarding the challenges science may pose to theism,

ultimately to embrace postmodern thinking would require Christians to jettison much of

Christianity’s advantages over competing worldviews including its strong philosophical

and scientific arguments, which hold up well in reasoned debate.

What is Postmodernism?

Before beginning, it will be useful to define the term ‘postmodernism.’ Since it describes a

philosophy by reference to its predecessor modernism, it is first necessary to establish an

understanding of the pre-modern and modern eras that came before it. To gain a proper

grasp of the present, one ‘must see how the situation came about historically,’ and

understand the philosophical developments which have led here.2

Today, many historians and sociologists divide human cultures into three broad categories:

pre-modern, modern and postmodern. These labels can refer to the sequential phases of

Western culture or to the state of different cultures around the world today.3

A pre-modern culture is one with little or no religious diversity, rarely experiencing

exposure to outsiders, bound together with fixed roles and relationships and undisturbed by

secularization or the advent of science.4 In such a culture, one would rarely be challenged

by the ‘culture shock’ of encountering another with wildly different values or beliefs – the

kind of experience that in contemporary Western society one has ‘a couple of times before

lunch.’5 Christendom presents a good example of a pre-modern society; one religion

dominated over Europe, it was deeply enmeshed with the political authorities, prescribed

roles and beliefs and shaped every aspect of people’s lives.

                                                        2 Schaeffer, Escape, 7. 3 Groothuis, Truth, 33. 4 Groothuis, Truth, 33. 5 Anderson, ‘Introduction,’ 5. 

    

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However, modernity arrived in Europe with the Renaissance and the Reformation. For

Schaeffer, there is no doubt that one man was responsible for the philosophical changes that

brought about the modern era. He argues that Thomas Aquinas ‘changed the world in a

very real way,’ when he divided nature and grace into separate realms. According to

Aquinas, man’s will was fallen but his intellect was not and his intellect thus became part of

the realm of nature, independent and autonomous from God. From this point forward,

philosophy was free from theology. Art, music and many other areas of life soon followed.6

Conversely, Groothuis argues the autonomy of philosophy began with the rediscovery of

Greek thought and the development of humanism. Yet he also argues that the Reformation,

with the primacy of Scripture over against Roman ecclesial authority, brought about a

further ‘destabilization of Christendom,’ as Europe was divided in two.7 The

‘Enlightenment’ followed and this is typically regarded as the beginning of modernism, as

not just Roman Catholic authority was questioned but also Christianity itself and even

divine revelation as a source of knowledge. The goal of the ‘Enlightenment Project’ and

modernism was to throw off all superstitions and found humanity on a philosophy and

civilization based solely on rational inquiry, empirical evidence and scientific discovery.8

Beneath this philosophy was the presupposed power of rationality to discover objective

truth and the desire for the progress of humanity through scientific discoveries and the

emancipation of received dogma.9 David Harvey points out that modern thinkers as diverse

as Voltaire and Hume, were all united in pursuing the one answer to any given question and

believed that finding that answer would lead to humanity’s increased control over and

order of the world.10 Their worship of science and reason meant some modern thinkers

rejected theism yet retained deism (belief in a non-personal creator god) but eventually even

this gave way, leaving modernity to be characterised by naturalism.

                                                        6 Schaeffer, Escape, 10. 7 Groothuis, Truth, 34. 8 MacIntyre, Virtue, 3. 9 Groothuis, Truth, 35. 10 Harvey, Conditions, 28. 

    

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The beginning of postmodernity is much more difficult to define. Though it is far more

recent, there is much debate as to when exactly postmodernity arrived, so much so that

some even consider the quest for an inaugurating event to be foolish.11 Others have linked

the moment of change to the fall of the Berlin Wall or the abandonment of the gold

standard.12 Grenz is quite certain that postmodernity was established at 15:22 on July 15

1972 as the Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St Louis Missouri was razed to the ground. As the

walls of this ‘landmark of modern architecture’ crumbled, so also did the aspirations of

modernity to bring about a utopian society through the advancement of science and

technology.13 Other events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall similarly heralded the collapse

of other great modern ideas such as Marxism.

Accompanying postmodernity is postmodernism, a movement in architecture, art, popular

culture and philosophy that includes the work of Lyotard. While modernity held to a notion

of an objective world, understandable through human rationality, postmodernism rejects

this ‘realist understanding of knowledge and truth in favour of a nonrealist understanding;’

objectivism has been replaced by constructivism.14 This means that the correspondence

theory of reality that the modern thinkers extended to all areas of life (believing they could

comprehend everything about the physical world) is rejected by postmoderns. They instead

argue that people don’t encounter the world but rather construct a world using the concepts

they bring to it.15 Postmoderns argue there is no way of knowing if one’s construction of the

world is the ‘true’ construction as no human has a God-like view of the world, only their

own vantage point.

                                                        11 Groothuis, Truth, 32. 12 Smith, Postmodernism, 19. 13 Grenz, Primer, 11. 14 van Gelder, ‘Postmodernism,’ 412. 15 Grenz, Primer, 40. 

    

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Some aspects of modernism continue into postmodernism including atheism, though for

different reasons. Moderns rejected God and all supernatural beliefs as they reduced the

world to material processes based on reason and rejected revelation and narrative as the

product of myth. However, many postmodern thinkers reject theism simply because of its

claims of objective truth.16

The postmodern abandonment of objectivism extends relativism to many areas of life

including art, theology and philosophy but also to basic human structures like morality and

language. Steiner described the splitting apart of the one-to-one associations between

language and reality, whether on the subject of God, art or science, as the breaking of ‘the

covenant between word and world.’17 Consequently, all language is reduced to mere social

construction, no more able to describe objective reality than any myth or story.

The hard sciences such as physics stubbornly resisted the onset of postmodernism and

relativism, holding fast to modernism and realism. But when Louis de Broglie, building on

the work of Planck, Einstein and Bohr, formulated quantum theory, he showed that all

matter has both particle and wave-like qualities depending on how one measures it.

Combined with the parallel discovery of Relativity Theory, science had to admit that the

world was no longer reducible to simple mechanical commonsense processes as supposed

by Newton and others in the modern era.18 Science, in the postmodern view, merely

produces observer-dependent constructions of reality with mere pretentions of grandeur

and objectivity.

Some observers like Groothuis argue that postmodernism isn’t such a radical departure

from modernism but a grown-up version of it. Postmodernism exposes the exaggerated

claims of modernism, ‘that human reason could be completely objective, that scientific study

defined the limits of knowledge (scientism) and that progress is inevitable when science and                                                         16 Groothuis, Truth, 38. 17 Steiner, Presences, 93. 18 Grenz, Primer, 51. 

    

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reason are our tools.’19 Postmodernism derides these boasts as domineering, unrealistic or

mere myths employed to serve the interests of the dominant culture.

It is unclear just how far postmodernism has spread throughout the world today. Indeed,

many argue that the world is not postmodern at all but still ‘deeply modernist;’ a world

where most people are firmly committed to science as the means to pursue objective truth.20

Some even regard the whole postmodern movement as a product of those aiming to

continue the social and political transformation based on the ideals of the 1960s. They argue

that while this movement may have won support in the humanities and social sciences, it

has been thoroughly rejected by those in philosophy and the hard sciences.21 Furthermore, it

is important to note the difference between postmodernism (the philosophy) and

postmodernity (the social conditions) and that to live in a postmodernity (post-industrial

computerised society) does not require people to embrace postmodernism.22

It is important to make clear that the purpose of this essay is not to examine the actual world

in order to determine how postmodern it is; research into the pervasiveness of

postmodernism is the domain of sociologists and this investigation will instead be based on

the philosophy Lyotard outlines in his work, which may or may not be the present or future

state of Western society.

Methodology

Most commentators agree that three authors describe the new outlook of postmodernity

more than any others: Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, and Michel Foucault.23

Lyotard was the first of the three to write, publishing in 1979 a report on ‘knowledge in the

                                                        19 Groothuis, Truth, 41. 20 Craig, ‘Postmodern.’ 21 Searle, ‘Rationality,’ 122. 22 Groothuis, Truth, 33. 23 Others also include Richard Rorty, see Grenz, Primer, 123. 

    

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most highly developed societies,’24 at the request of the Conseil des Universities of the

government of Quebec, Canada.25 Although Lyotard wasn’t the first to write on

postmodernism and borrows the term from its use elsewhere, it was his book The Postmodern

Condition: A Report on Knowledge that ‘put postmodernism on the intellectual map.’26 His

work offers an extensive and thorough insight into the philosophy undergirding

postmodernity and a description of how he perceives the changing way society views

knowledge and science.

Because of its relevance, comprehensiveness and impact, The Postmodern Condition will be

the primary text for this investigation into postmodernism, the first part of which will be a

examination of the book and summary of its findings throughout and the overall conclusion.

Next, a thorough critique of Lyotard’s work will be given. The philosophy of Lyotard will

be examined as a worldview described by the author and critiqued according to various

criteria suggested by Samples in his book A World of Difference. Samples presents a series of

tests that he suggests allows one to evaluate any worldview. For example, he argues that a

worldview must be coherent if it is to be held as true.27 It must be stated that Samples’ tests,

while theologically neutral, are philosophically biased toward modernism. Qualities such as

coherence, verifiability and correspondence to reality are thoroughly modern

considerations. They are therefore only of importance to (and valid rules in the language

game of) those in modern Western society, at least according to postmodern thinkers like

Lyotard. However, when applying the tests suggested by Samples, an attempt will be made

to justify each criteria along with its findings for postmodernism.28

After secular critiques of Lyotard have been considered, three critiques from Christian

perspectives will be examined. For this critique to be fair and full, a range of Christian view

                                                        24 Lyotard, Postmodern, xxiii. 25 Grenz, Primer, 39. 26 Grenz, Primer, 39. 27 Samples, World, 33. 28 Samples lists nine tests but only five have any relevance to Lyotard’s work, so the 

secular critique will be limited to this subset of tests. 

    

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on Lyotard’s postmodernism will be presented, from the straightforward adoption, to

accommodation and finally outright rejection. The perspectives will include not just a

critique of Lyotard’s philosophy but also its impact on Christianity and specifically on

apologetics to those who adopt the Lyotardian worldview. These various opinions will also

be contrasted with one another to ensure they too are scrutinized. This will lead to some

broad conclusions about the general reception and treatment of Lyotard’s work within the

Christian community.

Finally, a conclusion will be drawn as to what the attitude of the Christian community

should be to Lyotard’s postmodernism, given the critiques discussed previously. Some

recommendations will then be made as to how apologetics might operate to those with such

a worldview.

The Postmodern Condition

Survey of Lyotard’s Work

It is important to note that Lyotard’s work is not about issues of faith and apologetics but

about science and its supporting narratives. In the introduction, Lyotard states his main

thesis, that according to science, most narratives (particularly folklore and religions

narratives) are judged to be little more than fables. Yet science itself, he argues, relies on

narrative-based philosophies for its legitimation when making grand claims of universal

scope.

Throughout his work, he uses the word ‘modern’ to refer to ‘any science that legitimates

itself … with an explicit appeal to some grand narrative,’29 and he famously defines

postmodernism as ‘incredulity toward metanarratives.’30 Lyotard predicts that this ‘crisis of

narratives’ just described will lead to future societies resembling less the ‘Newtonian

anthropology’ of a mechanical ‘systems theory’ and more the ‘pragmatics of language

                                                        29 Lyotard, Postmodern, xxiii. 30 Ibid, xxiv. 

    

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particles,’ or language games, the exact meaning of which is explained later.31 Finally by

way of introduction, Lyotard defines himself as, ‘a philosopher, not an expert.’32 He

elaborates this, saying that an expert has knowledge and knows the limits of his knowledge

whereas a philosopher merely asks questions. With this confession, Lyotard admits he does

not have all the answers to the current state of knowledge but believes he is at least asking

the important questions.

Setting The Scene

Lyotard begins by establishing his field of study, the problem he will be addressing and by

describing the method he will use throughout his thesis. He defines his field as the

contemporary post-industrial nations where learning and knowledge are being transformed

by the development of computer technology. Even in the 1970s, he saw that ‘the

proliferation of information-processing machines is having … as much of an effect on the

circulation of learning as did advancements in human circulation (transportation) and later

in the circulation of sounds and visual images (the media).’33 He further predicts that

knowledge will only survive in this new age if it can be adequately captured using

computers, conforming to the ‘set of prescriptions determining which statements are

accepted as “knowledge” statements.’34 Lyotard anticipates that knowledge will become a

commodity, not an end in itself,35 noting that knowledge has already become the principle

force of production, in post-industrial countries and that science in particular plays an

increasingly major part in the knowledge creation industry.36

Lyotard next describes the problem he is addressing, legitimation, and employs the

metaphor of a civil legislator to explain the process of legitimation for scientific knowledge.

Just as a law is promulgated as a norm for citizens of a state by an authorized legislator, so

                                                        31 Ibid. 32 Ibid, xxv. 33 Ibid, 4. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid, 5. 36 Ibid, 6. 

    

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in the scientific world, legitimation is the process whereby a scientific statement must ‘fulfil

a given set of conditions in order to be accepted as scientific.’ A ‘legislator,’ dealing with

scientific discourse decides on these rules and therefore which statements can be included in

the discourse.37 Lyotard denies the metaphor is stretched and points out that even as far

back as Plato, the link was established between deciding what was true (science) and what

was right (ethics). He argues that both ethics and science stem from the same choices, today

based upon reason and made in the Western world.38

Lyotard goes on to describes the method for his report, which is based on Wittgenstein’s

‘language games.’ Lyotard gives examples of common language utterances (denotative,

performative, prescriptions, questions and promises) and points out that all of them have

their own ‘rules’ regarding how the sender, addressee and referents are affected by the

utterance. He makes three observations about language games, 1) that the rules are not self-

legitimating but are a contract between sender and addressee, 2) without the rules there is

no game and any modification of the rules alters the nature of the game, and 3) every

utterance is a ‘move’ in the game.39 He concludes that as in the game of chess, in language

games ‘to move is to fight’ and importantly that the ‘observable social bond is composed of

“moves.”’40

The Social Bond

Lyotard then examines this social bond as it was in the modern era and identifies two types;

those that emphasise the unitary of society as a whole (Talcott Parsons, system theory etc.)

and those that divide society in two (e.g. Marxism). He explains that, ‘it is impossible to

know what the state of knowledge is … without knowing something of the society within

which it is situated.’ If society is seen as one ‘great machine, ‘ then the role of knowledge is

to aid the functioning of that machine but if society is characterised by division, then the

                                                        37 Ibid, 8. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid, 10. 40 Ibid, 11. 

    

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critical function of knowledge is its primary use.41 Lyotard also airs a third alternative, that

knowledge may take both roles.42

However, he rejects this latter ‘partition solution,’ in the postmodern age since new

technology means the nature of knowledge is changing. The ruling class is becoming those

with access to the best knowledge; decreasingly this role is taken by traditional politicians

and increasingly by corporate leaders and the heads of major ‘professional, labour, political

and religious organisations.’43 As a result, the ‘traditional poles of attraction,’ such as nation

states and political parties are losing their appeal. In such circumstance, the grand

narratives that helped form these structures are lost and Lyotard acknowledges that some

see individualism as the only outcome. He rejects this, arguing that each individual exists in

a ‘fabric of relations,’ now more complex than ever.44

Returning to his methodology of language games, he argues that in postmodernity, all are

‘located at a post through which various kinds of messages pass,’ and even the least

privileged have some power over the messages that pass by them. In saying this, Lyotard

doesn’t claim all of society is reducible to language games but that they are ‘the minimum

relation for society to exist.’ Finally, he distinguishes between friendly conversations which

may jump between many language games (questions, narrative and performative

statements) and an institution like the university or the scientific journal, which, ‘always

requires supplementary constraints for statements to be declared admissible.’45

The Pragmatics of Knowledge

Lyotard next looks at the pragmatics of narrative and scientific knowledge but before doing

so, he explains that knowledge and science are not synonymous. Science is a subset of

                                                        41 Ibid, 13. 42 Ibid, 15. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid, 45 Ibid, 17. 

    

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knowledge that requires its statements to be based on repeatedly observable phenomena

and it must be possible for them to be judged valid or not by the appointed experts.

He goes on to argue that knowledge generally (unlike scientific knowledge) contains not just

denotative statements of truth but also statements on ethical, aesthetical and of technical

wisdom and someone with such knowledge, capable of making ‘good’ utterances, is deemed

competent in their respective field. Lyotard argues that these criteria for ‘good’ utterances

are culturally specific and this leads him to narrative knowledge, the ‘quintessential form of

customary knowledge.’46

He says that popular stories within society serve as myths to establish institutions or as

legends or fables representing positive or negative models of integration into those

institutions. Using the example of the Cashinahua people (a pre-modern culture) whose

stories always begin and end with agreed formulae (explaining who the narrator is, how he

knows the story and why others should listen) Lyotard explains that, ‘narrative tradition is

also the tradition of the criteria defining a three-fold competence, “know-how,” “knowing

how to speak” and “knowing how to listen.”’ This is the set of rules that form the social

bond in that society. The same social bond is established in more ‘developed’ types of

knowledge (such as science) but in a more elaborate form.47 Lyotard notes that in less

developed cultures, there is no need to legitimate or authorize a narrator, ‘the narratives

themselves have this authority.’ The people are that which ‘actualizes the narratives,’ by

putting them into play in their daily lives.48

Next and by comparison, Lyotard examines the pragmatics of scientific knowledge. He

states that in scientific research, statements must speak the truth about their referent

(providing proof and refuting opposing statements), the addressee should be able to give

their assent to the statement (implying they too are a potential sender) and the referent                                                         46 Ibid, 19 47 Ibid, 22. 48 Ibid, 23. 

    

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should be expressed, in conformity to what it actually is (adequation). He explains that the

third criterion (adequation) is problematic as the only proof a scientist can provide to show

that the world is the way their statement describes, would itself be a scientific statement.

But what proof is there of this proof? Lyotard outlines two solutions to this: firstly it is

rhetorically permissible to assume the world is as a statement describes if one can provide a

reasonable scientific proof and secondly, it is assumed the ‘same referent cannot produce a

plurality of contradictory or inconsistent proofs.’49 This is what science calls verificationism

or falsificationism and both rely on the consensus of expert opinion. Once a statement has

been sufficiently argued and proven in research, it may then be passed on to students as

scientific fact.50

Lyotard then makes five observations about scientific statements when compared to

narrative statements: 1) scientific knowledge requires the use of denotative statements to the

exclusion of all others, 2) It is therefore separated from those language games that form the

social bond, 3) within research, competence is only required of the sender, not the addressee

or referent, 4) a statement gains nothing from its transmission as it can always be falsified, 5)

the science game has a ‘diachronic temporality,’ whereby to engage in the agonistics, one

must have a memory of the previous ‘moves’ in the game and present a new statement in

respect to these.51

By examining narrative and scientific knowledge, Lyotard aims to show that both are

equally valid forms of knowledge. They are language games featuring various statements

(moves) with their own rules judging which are ‘good’ moves and a good move in one game

may not be a good move in another. While narrative knowledge does not need to provide

its own legitimacy (authorising itself in the pragmatics of its transmission), scientific

knowledge does require proof. Those who hold to narrative knowledge may tolerate

scientific statements but the same is not true in reverse; to the scientist, Lyotard argues,                                                         49 Ibid, 24. 50 Ibid, 25. 51 Ibid, 26. 

    

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narratives are, ‘fables, myths, legends, fit only for women and children.’52 He says this

unequal relationship is the, ‘entire history of imperialism from the dawn of Western

civilization,’ and at the heart of it is the demand for legitimation.53

The Legitimation of Knowledge Through Narrative

Lyotard argues that during modernity, science resorted to narrative forms of knowledge for

its legitimacy.54 He even says this recourse may be inevitable as science requires its

statements to be legitimate but lacks the resources to make this so.55 He argues, ‘Scientific

knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the true knowledge without resorting to

the other, narrative, knowledge.’56

Lyotard notes that modern science has given up the metaphysical search for ‘transcendent

authority’ to decide on the conditions of truth, relying on nothing more than the consensus

of ‘experts.’57 Scientists however, are not content with simply knowing, they also prescribe

based on their scientific knowledge and in their narratives, the subject (humanity) can

become the hero of knowledge or the hero of liberty.58

Lyotard looks at instances of such narratives, focusing first on those that present humanity

as the hero of knowledge, that ‘all people have a right to science.’59 The second comes from

German Idealism, specifically Humboldt’s aim for science to develop the ‘spiritual and

moral training of the nation.’60 This obviously involves teaching on ethical and social

matters that lay beyond the realm of science’s denotative utterances but Humboldt sought to

overcome this with his ‘Spirit.’ This Spirit involved deriving everything from an originating

                                                        52 Ibid, 27. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid, 28. 56 Ibid, 29. 57 Ibid, 29. 58 Ibid, 31. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid, 32. 

    

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principle (science), relating everything to an ideal (ethical) and, ‘that of unifying this

principle and this ideal in a single idea, ’ensuring science was tied up with the pursuit of the

moral good for society.’ It is this all-encompassing Spirit that contains and produces the

metanarratives for science. Lyotard believes this second narrative is today broken so the

first has become more common. With this narrative, knowledge was seen as necessary for

‘the people’ to make wise decisions about self-governance using denotative statements to

derive prescriptive ones e.g. laws.61

Deligitimation

Lyotard now arrives at his most important point, that in contemporary postmodern society

all of these grand narratives have lost their credibility. He argues that speculative apparatus

shows that statements such as ‘A scientific statement is knowledge if and only if it can take

its place in a universal process of engendering,’ is not itself scientific but is rooted in pre-

scientific knowledge and presuppositions e.g. that a universal process of engendering exists

and that ‘scientific’ statements are valid additions to this process.62 However, Lyotard

argues, in a postmodern culture such statements can be accepted as the rules by which one

chooses to play their science game.63

The other narrative, known as ‘emancipation,’ fails because of the chasm between a

denotative and prescriptive statement. The game of science has no special calling to

supervise the game of praxis. Lyotard believes that if this process of delegitimation

continues, ‘the road is then open for an important current of postmodernity,’ where science

plays its own game, incapable of legitimating other games or even itself.64 Importantly, he

admits this can lead to a profound pessimism as the social bond is broken; everyone plays

                                                        61 Ibid, 34. 62 Ibid, 39. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid, 40. 

    

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their own language game, new games are added and there is no metalanguage to unify

them all.65

Scientific Research and Education

Lyotard next looks again at scientific research and the ‘rules governing how a denotative

utterance can obtain its addressee’s assent.’66 The metalanguage for deciding the axiomatic

of science is based on logic. Lyotard lists some of the properties that the axiomatic must

have including that of completeness but then points out that Gödel showed first-order logic

and the arithmetic system fail to satisfy this condition. Natural language is also not sound

as it allows for paradoxes. Thus science finds its legitimation in languages whose rules are

not demonstrable but merely a matter of consensus. There is therefore no metalanguage but

a series of language and axiomatics, some of which allow for what others may consider

paradoxical.67

Lyotard next looks at the impact on the education of scientific knowledge. In a

computerized age, the priority of performativity means that learning is now focused on

areas that best increase the performance of society. This may be training in a particular field

of expertise that aids a nation’s export industries or in skills that are important to the

cohesion of society. No longer is the emancipation narrative employed to motivate learning

for the purposes of liberation.68 If knowledge ceases to be an end in itself to fulfil a

narrative, then the old institutions and methods of teaching are no longer necessary

according to Lyotard. Students need only learn the art of interrogation as they seek

knowledge in libraries and in other ‘memory banks.’69 In a world of perfect knowledge, the

advantage will be to the student with the greatest ‘imagination,’ able to bring together two

areas of knowledge that appear separate, hence the rise of interdisciplinary approaches in

                                                        65 Ibid, 41. 66 Ibid, 42. 67 Ibid, 43. 68 Ibid, 49. 69 Ibid, 50. 

    

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studies.70 Such approaches are specific to an era of delegitimation as in the modern system

of the university this encroachment was considered a sign of confusion.71

Postmodern Science

Lyotard concludes by looking at science in a postmodern world, which he characterises as

seeking a resolution to the crisis of determinism.’72 Modern science attempted to model the

world as stable systems whereby a certain input determinatively gives a calculable output

but quantum mechanics and atomic physics cast serious doubt on this approach. At a

microphysics level, for example, determinism is replaced by probability; a scientist has to

work out what game nature is playing and produce probabilistic rather than absolute

statements.73 Lyotard concludes from this that postmodern scientists do not strive for

performativity or use a deterministic model but strives to produce theories and ideas. The

scientist becomes one who simply tells stories, with the only difference being that, ‘he is

duty bound to verify them.’74

Finally, Lyotard defines these stories as ‘little narratives.’ He concludes that having

dispensed with all the big narratives (metanarratives) is no bad thing since the little

narratives are ‘the quintessential form of imaginative invention.’75 Lyotard also dispenses

with consensus as a tool only of use within metanarratives. He instead champions paralogy

as the new ‘move’ within the science game. He argues that now dissension is the key to

research,’ whereas consensus can not only never be reached but the goal of consensus also

stifles creativity along the way.76 Lyotard sees consensus seeking as a form of ‘terror’ like

                                                        70 Ibid, 52. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid, 53. 73 Ibid 57. 74 Ibid, 60. 75 Ibid, 60. 76 Ibid, 63. 

    

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that of Orwell’s paradox in 1984; players in the science game are told to ‘Adapt your

aspirations to our ends – or else.’77

Lyotard argues that the postmodern science game of discussing denotative statements

requires metaprescriptive statements or ‘rules’ for the game. These are the presuppositions

of science and in a postmodern world these not only need to be pointed out but new ones

can be introduce, legitimated by the fact that doing so will help produce new moves in the

game. The rules of the game become local. Lyotard argues this is also the case in society

where the social bond is flexible and local, not universal. He thus optimistically sees the

computerization of society and the arrival of postmodernism as a good thing where local

stories and metaprescriptives can be discussed and become most productive with access to

perfect information via computers.

Summary

Lyotard believes that the nature of knowledge is changing in the age of computing. This

introduction of technology however, is not the problem, it merely presents a new set of

challenges to and hastens along the exiting crisis which began in the late nineteenth century.

This is a crisis of legitimation and it is this problem that Lyotard addresses in his report.78

To do this, he employs the theory of language games, a belief that all interaction can be

classed as the exchange of various kinds of utterances and these utterances are like moves in

a game. Just like the game of chess, there are rules as to what constitutes a good move and

these rules are agreed by the players. When the Fédération Internationale des Échecs (the

international body responsible for regulating Chess) agreed the rules of Chess, they did so

by consensus in order to synchronise them across all tournaments.79 No one claimed that

these rules were somehow universal or that what constitutes a good move in Chess is a good

move in any other game.

                                                        77 Ibid, 64. 78 Ibid, 38. 79 (unknown), ‘Game.’ 

    

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In language games, Lyotard supposes that the same situation applies. Narrative and

scientific knowledge are both constituted of various ‘moves’ accepted if they are judged to

be good. In narrative knowledge, typical of pre-modern cultures, the rules are set by the

practice of the storytelling and there is no need for legitimation. A culture lives out the story

as it establishes institutions in their culture. Science however is a different matter. People of

science relegate narrative knowledge and promote science as a universal source of

knowledge, objectively true, surpassing all stories and providing justice as well as truth. To

do this, science has, surprisingly, resorted to various narratives in order to legitimate its

imperial claims. However, in the twentieth century, these narratives have been discredited;

Science is delegitimated. The claims of modern science to liberate people through the

enlightenment it provided are seen for what they are, arrogant and inflated. Postmodernism

shows that as a language game, science is not capable of making judgements on narrative

knowledge as this is a different game. Worse, science is not capable of passing judgement

on itself, as there is no scientifically provable utterance that proves science is legitimate.

Lyotard notes that advances in microphysics, quantum theory and mathematics in the

twentieth century have repeatedly backed up this claim and shown modern science to be

built on shaky foundations.

And yet Lyotard does not see postmodernity as the end of the scientific endeavour; in fact

quite the reverse. He believes that modern science’s striving for consensus on scientific

matters with arguments being waged on agreed (supposedly) universal rules stifled

imagination. He argues that the great new innovations in science happen not because

someone plays by the agreed rules but because they dreamt up a theory that broke them.

He therefore argues that the abandonment of consensus will lead to a multitude of language

games being played, each agreeing their own rules and none claiming to be universal.

The consequences of postmodernism as Lyotard describes go far beyond the scientific lab

and impact all areas of human life. The benefit is that no one is able to legitimately claim to

    

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have objective truth, only a local truth. This is also the enormous pitfall of the philosophy as

it spells the end of an objective world with its truth and justice. For Lyotard, the benefits far

outweigh the downside and he believes that this philosophy, coupled with knowledge

shared instantly and freely by computers will lead to ever-greater innovations in all areas of

society.

Lyotard’s thesis does however lack clarity at times or makes unqualified assumptions, for

example, he makes little attempt to legitimate his use of language games, on which his entire

thesis is based. Lyotard also claims that the legitimation of narrative knowledge happens in

its transmission and subsequent performance in a society, something scientific knowledge

cannot do as its legitimation is external. However, is scientific knowledge not legitimated

by its performativity, its application within a community? Is not the employment of science

in electronic devices, medicines and weather forecasting, each integral to contemporary

everyday life, a way in which society actualises scientific knowledge? Even without its

supporting metanarratives, science lives on and is no less trusted today because its

predictions are still ‘true’ in as far they simply appear to work. In other words, does any

care if science can legitimate itself or not? As long as their mobile phone works, they trust

science to provide ‘truth.’

Secular Critiques of Lyotard

One way to critique the philosophy that Lyotard presents in The Postmodern Condition is to

treat his overall thesis as a worldview; a worldview which he presumably holds and

encourages others to adopt or anticipates them adopting as postmodernity spreads.80 It can

well be argued (indeed Lyotard would probably argue himself) that the rejection of

consensus prevents postmodernism from being classified as a single worldview. It is rather,

best characterised as a heterogeneous melting pot of contradictory and paralogical views. In

his A Primer on Postmodernism, Grenz (who is unconvinced by postmodernism) has a chapter

entitled ‘The Postmodern World View’ but on the contents page listing, the word ‘World’ is

                                                        80 Ibid, xxiii. 

    

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crossed out, suggesting Grenz agrees that postmodernism is not a homogeneous world

view.81 He goes on to argue that with the abandonment of the objective world, such unity

within one’s view is no longer possible yet postmodernism still provides a perspective on

the world even if that is a perspective of heterogeneity.82

A worldview is simply the way one sees the world, a lens that, ‘helps people makes sense of

life and comprehend the world around them.’83 Lyotard and others stepped forward to

present their new ‘worldview’ so as to make sense of the world once modernism was found

to be bankrupt. As such, it is quite appropriate to weigh this postmodern philosophy as a

worldview and to evaluate it using the same criteria used to judge others.

Coherence

It is argued by Samples that for a worldview to be ‘true’ it must be coherent or logically

consistent; it must be ‘wholly consistent within itself.’84 Here is the first problem with

judging postmodernism as a worldview by rational categories: postmodernism desires and

promote non-consistence and so one should not expect to find a coherent truth contained

within it. However, if a worldview is to be taken seriously, the basic premises must be

consistent with each other even if its view of the world is deliberately not.

It has been pointed out by many that Lyotard’s theory of postmodernism is incoherent. His

report announces the end of the ‘grand narratives’ and presents his new approach to life

without such narratives, which itself forms a replacement grand narrative. It forms the

metanarrative of postmodernity, the metanarrative that says that there are no longer any

objective realities or narratives to legitimate ‘science,’ except for the universal and self-

legitimating truth of postmodernism. This is a classic example of bootstrapping, asserting

something that is self-contradictory, a theory that is true in all cases, except when applied to

                                                        81 Grenz, Primer, vii. 82 Ibid, 40. 83 Samples, World, 20. 84 Ibid. 

    

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itself. If postmodernity is true, then there are no metanarratives, including that

metanarrative proposed by Lyotard, which must therefore be false. Curiously, Lyotard even

comes close to admitting this problem himself in a later work when he rhetorically asks,

‘Are “we” not telling, whether bitterly or gladly, the great narrative of the end of great

narratives?’85 Tellingly, he also suggests he may have personal motivations for promoting

postmodernism to the wider world, perhaps implying he has a wider agenda in mind.

Related to this is the similar assertion that, if all can be reduced to a mere language game

that may or may not bare any resemblance to the objective world, then postmodernism as a

theory must also accept that it may not claim to legitimately describe the real world.

Lyotard’s postmodern condition may be fairly regarded (by its own logic) as being just a

theory, one that works for Lyotard but bares no resemblance to real human social interaction

and scientific discourse.

Furthermore, Manfred Frank has illustrated what is known as the ‘Frankfurt School

Criticism’ of Lyotard. This also points to the incoherence of Lyotard’s worldview, with

apparently serious pragmatic consequences.86 According to this objection, Lyotard’s

promotion of dissensus over consensus is a ‘philosophical mistake’ since Lyotard apparently

fails to ‘notice’ that an underlying condition for consensus also underlies the successful

communication of his own theories. It is self-defeating, for Lyotard to give an argument that

appeals to reason ‘on behalf of a difference that is supposed to elude it.’87 In defence,

Lyotard may suggest that his report on the state of postmodernity does not depend on

reason but is an observation of the postmodern condition, based as it is on the use and

methodology of language games and not empirical reason.88 However, the more

prescriptive elements to his report, propose a method for postmodern science and this, at

the very least, assume a causality that is grounded in reason. Frank argues this is worse

                                                        85 Lyotard, Differend, 133. 86 Frank, Grenzen, np as cited by Williams, ‘Lyotard,’ 214. 87 Williams, ‘Lyotard,’ 214. 88 Lyotard, Postmodern, 9. 

    

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than just a philosophical fallacy however; it is a move that aligns Lyotard with ‘irrational

forces that often give rise to injustice.’ Having dispensed with reason and consensus,

Lyotard has disarmed and prevented himself from dealing with such injustice. He is thus

reduced simply to testify to it.89 The latter is more of a pragmatic issue than one of

coherence but Frank rightly points out the dangers of Lyotard’s woefully and deliberately

incoherent worldview.

Correspondence

The more that the claims of a worldview correspond to the ‘actual state of affairs in the

world,’ the better it performs in the test for correspondence.90 For a worldview to be taken

seriously it must offer some real-world evidential support. This presents two problems for

this essay: 1) this investigation is not focusing on the spread of postmodernism in the real

world and 2) postmodernism rejects the ‘modern’ correspondence theory of reality on which

this test is based. In answer to the first problem, this investigation is not a sociological study

so the aim will be simply to document whether or not postmodernism is accepted

(particularly in the scientific community) without quantifying this acceptance. In answer to

he second problem, if a philosophy is accepted by individuals, then it can be considered de

facto to correspond to reality, at least reality for those individuals. Lyotard does offer

examples of where he believes contemporary science corresponds to postmodern scientific

pragmatics but these are discussed below in the section on verifiability.

One quite surprising example of a scientist endorsing postmodern praxis is cosmologist

Stephen Hawking. In his book The Grand Design, Hawking begins by announcing that

‘philosophy is dead’ since it has not kept up with advancements in physics. Consequently,

scientists have become the ‘bearers of the torch of discovery’ for the big questions of life and

the universe.91 He goes on to explain at a popular level that classical (modern) physics and

the correspondence theory of reality doesn’t apply on the subatomic level and so                                                         89 Williams, ‘Lyotard,’ 214. 90 Samples, World, 35. 91 Hawking, Design, 13. 

    

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contemporary physics (which he confusingly calls ‘modern physics’) takes over with a new

set of quantum theories. By invoking Richard Feynman’s Sum of all Histories theory,

Hawking argues that systems in scientific models do not have one history but all possible

histories and thus lays the groundwork for a less common-sense approach to physics.92 He

goes on to promote what he calls ‘model-dependent realism,’ his belief that individuals

create models of the world based on the data from their sensory organs, and that there may

be many ways to model the same data. He concludes that, ‘if two such physical theories or

models accurately predict the same events, one cannot be said to be more real than the other;

rather, we are free to use whichever model is most convenient.’93

What is so surprising about this is that such an eminent natural scientist should promote an

anti-realist philosophy of science. In Lyotardian terms, Hawking is advocating that each

person design their own science language game and if it is the ‘most convenient’ for them,

they should play by those rules. Note, Hawking does not concern himself with whether

one’s model corresponds to reality; he is interested in the convenience of one’s game not its

objective truth. Hawking even goes as far as saying that there is no model independent

reality at all and that ‘a well-constructed model creates a reality of its own.’94

This is an example of ontological relativity, where individuals create reality for themselves

based on their own model; this is truly a step beyond even Lyotard. Not only does everyone

play his or her own game but also the game inherently corresponds to the reality of that

individual. This radical endorsement by Hawking has caused critics to speculate why such

an eminent scientist would dabble in extreme anti-realist, postmodern beliefs, not to

mention that Hawking sounds the death knail for philosophy on the first page of his book,

at least a third of which is dedicating to the promotion of his philosophy of science.

                                                        92 Ibid, 15. 93 Ibid, 16. 94 Ibid, 172. 

    

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Physicist and philosopher Roger Penrose argues that model-dependent realism is not a new

theory of Hawking and is not as radical as he makes out. Penrose describes it as a halfway

house between realism and anti-realism with objective reality not being completely

abandoned but ‘taking different forms depending upon the particular theoretical

perspective it is viewed from.’95 He argues that Einstein’s theory of relativity already allows

for different observers to use different co-ordinate systems for local descriptions of a single

objective space-time. He admits this takes much more sophisticated mathematics than

normal Euclidean geometry but ‘the mathematical “space-time”, whereby the theory

describes the world, has complete objectivity’96 To Penrose, model-dependent realism is

nothing new and he is willing to accept it provided the range of competing theories is not

used to deny the objective world on which they are based. In Lyotardian terms, Penrose

believes that relativity theory allows multiple language games to be employed by scientists

yet, regardless of the game chosen, the predictions are both identical to one another and to

experiments conducted in the real world. If a local game didn’t make accurate predictions,

it would be rejected. The different games all lead to the same conclusions and thus

consensus and this suggests that, according to Penrose, relativity theory as an example of

Hawking’s model-dependent realism is not postmodern science but modern science with

the same modern goal of consensus.

In his review of Hawking’s book, Cornwell describes Hawking’s theories as ‘a collection of

unproved and unprovable hypotheses.’ His greatest criticism however is of Hawking’s

claim that philosophy has not kept up with science, which he describes as unfair on the

‘distinguished department of history and philosophy of science in his [Hawking’s] own

university.’97 He concludes by suggesting ‘it may be the oracular Professor Hawking who is

failing to keep up with the philosophers and the theologians, rather than the other way

                                                        95 Penrose, ‘Design.’ 96 Ibid. 97 Cornwell, ‘Design.’ 

    

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around?’98 It is however, unlikely that Hawking is unaware of his colleagues’ work.

Instead, he appears to be trying to draw his readers away from philosophy and theology’s

discoveries, toward a postmodern view that better suits his overall goals.

Craig suggests Hawking chooses this approach because it ‘enables [him] to cloak [his}

amateurish philosophizing with the mantle of scientific authority and so avoid the hard

work of actually arguing for, rather than merely asserting, [his] philosophical viewpoints.’99

To Craig and others, this endorsement of postmodernism is just a smoke screen, a way of

avoiding deep questions posed by philosophy that Hawking is just unable to answer. Such

a reading puts his popular level book on a par with propaganda. In his case, Hawking’s

book has a clear agenda to ‘disabuse the reader of the God-concept’100 and yet to do so he

must resort to postmodern anti-realist theories to usurp the big philosophical questions.

Hawking’s book is an illustration of where an expert scientist willingly endorse Lyotard’s

notion of postmodern science simply for its convenience. Critics however, are suspicious of

Hawking’s motivations for doing so, accusing him of being intellectually evasive, rather

than enlightened by postmodernism.

Verifiability

A worldview is considered trustworthy if its truth claims are testable. If its claims are

shown to be true in a variety of circumstance, it may be considered verifiable. If however,

the claims cannot be scrutinised and falsified, then that belief system is considered to carry

‘little rational weight.’101 In some ways, Lyotard’s postmodernism evades scrutiny by

reducing all enquiry (including the rational) to mere language games of local scope; if this

criteria shows postmodernism to be unfalsifiable, that’s just the result of the rules of this

worldview testing game. However, if Lyotard’s philosophy is to have any application, it

                                                        98 Ibid. 99 Craig, ‘Undertakers.’ 100 Raman, ‘Review,’ 246. 101 Samples, world, 35. 

    

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must present some evidence of its verifiability and fortunately Lyotard attempts to do just

this.

In his section on postmodern science, Lyotard argues that scientific research is in the process

of finding a resolution to what he calls the ‘crisis of determinism.’102 Determinism, he

argues, was the positivist approach to science, based on efficiency. It viewed reality as a

system that could be fully specified. Any input to that system could be accompanied by a

predictable output. His aim is to show, with examples, that today, science no longer works

by these thoroughly modern rules but embraces paralogy and other postmodern aspects like

the local invention of new rules for the science game.103

Spurrett and other scholars have taken Lyotard to task for his attempts to legitimize

postmodernism through the discoveries of contemporary science. Spurrett’s comments are

not limited merely to the scientific aspects however; he also calls Lyotard’s prediction of a

knowledge stock exchange ‘ridiculous,’ not least because knowledge, unlike money, can be

shared with another and yet still retained by the original owner.104 Spurrett regards this idea

of knowledge as ‘profoundly Wittgensteinian,’ although he acknowledges Wittgenstein only

attacked the unity of spoken or written language. Lyotard has extended this theory far

beyond its original field to the whole of knowledge.105

Spurrett rejects Lyotard’s idea that science is dependent on metanarratives or that science

collapses with the rejection of such narratives. He argues that a narrative can be a useful

didactic tool (like Descartes’ Discourse on the Method) or as propaganda, allowing scientists to

achieve their ambitions more quickly than if funders knew what they were really up to. In

both cases, the narratives are dispensable, ‘although pragmatically useful nonetheless.’106

                                                        102 Lyotard, Postmodern, 53. 103 Ibid, 54. 104 Spurrett, ‘Lyotard,’ 34. 105 Ibid, 35. 106 Ibid, 38. 

    

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Spurrett does admit that science is susceptible to political and social forces though his

defence is that scientific knowledge is constituted by the idea of an ‘epistemological “bottom

line” to which it has the best possible kind of access,’ and is consequently somewhat

immune from discourses that do not have this privilege (e.g. myths and religious

narratives).107 This presupposed insight available only to science is behind much of

Spurrett’s criticism of Lyotard and he fails to articulate what exactly he mans by a ‘bottom

line.’ Spurrett is comfortable to simply state that some discoveries of science are just ‘true’

and that political deliberation would be futile. Furthermore, he argues that science is quite

capable of passing judgment on narrative knowledge (contra Lyotard’s argument based on

the incommensurability of different language games) because of its apparent monopoly on

truth.108

Along similar lines, Spurrett attacks Lyotard’s methodology of language games as ‘it is

insufficiently discriminating with reference to the question of the truth of any given

scientific theory.’109 Spurrett’s criticism is based on the work of Bhaskar whose ‘central

paradox’ stated that scientists produce objects of knowledge that are social products yet are

about objects that are not social constructs but very real. He called these ‘transitive’ and

‘intransitive’ objects respectively.110 The flaw that Spurrett sees in the application of

language games to natural science is that the method focuses purely on the transitive

objects, the social activity of theory creation, to the neglect of the intransitive objects, the

reality of the world and the actual truth of scientific theories.111 Since postmodernism

embraces an anti-realist, constructivist view of the world, this is not surprising, nor is it

surprising that a natural scientist would find it objectionable.

                                                        107 Ibid, 39. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid, 40. 110 Bhaskar, , 22. 111 Spurrett, ‘Lyotard,’ 41. 

    

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With all this said, Spurrett examines Lyotard’s chapter on postmodern science and states

upfront what this section must do in order to successfully verify Lyotard’s claims about

postmodern science. He must show ‘a convincing picture of natural science operating

without either legitimation by metanarrative or the expectation of commensurability, but also

to show that such expectations are themselves no longer legitimate in the discourse of

science.’112

Firstly, Lyotard claims that science does not progress by means of the 'positivism of

efficiency,' but the ‘pragmatics of scientific research … emphasizes the invention of new

"moves" and even new rules for language games.’113 That is to say, science progresses not

just by finding out what works and making it work better but by challenging established

knowledge with new ideas. Spurrett considers this a ‘blind truism’ of all science, since any

genuine progress must involve a break with the past. He also warns against a kind of

‘avant-garde’ fallacy whereby new ‘moves’ in the science game are legitimated simple by the

virtue of being novel, a fallacy he believes Lyotard is committing. He asserts that the

legitimacy and acceptance of scientific statements is never based on their age or novelty.114

Spurrett also attacks Lyotard’s assumption that all modern science stands or falls based on

determinism. He argues that a physical description is still preferred over a non-physical one

even if it isn’t fully deterministic. The bar for determinism in scientific theory was

previously lowered by Papineau who said that, ‘physical events are determined, or have

their chances determined, by prior physical events according to physical laws’.115

Importantly, this does not allow for the intervention of supernatural agency in the physical

world (the title of Papineau’s book, Philosophical Naturalism confirms this) but it does mean

that some physical processes cannot have their result determined in every instance, only a

probability of each outcomes can be reliably given.

                                                        112 Ibid, 42. 113 Lyotard, Postmodern, 53. 114 Spurrett, ‘Lyotard,’ 42. 115 Papineau, Naturalism, 16. 

    

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Lyotard gives four examples of where he believes contemporary science has developed to

the point where it is no longer legitimated by the performativity of theories based on stable

systems. The first is in quantum mechanics and his first point is that at a quantum level, ‘a

complete definition of the initial state of a system … would require an expenditure of energy

at least equivalent to that consumed by the system to be defined.’116 This is indeed true of

systems at all levels but Spurrett argues that this only makes the case that some science is

uneconomical, however, ‘expensive determinism is still determinism.’117

Lyotard’s next example is a thought experiment based on measuring the density of a gas

within a sphere. He argues that for a large sphere, accurate approximations can be

measured but as the size of the sphere is decreased to where it is the size of a single particle

in the gas, the measurement may vary down to zero (when no particle is in the sphere) or up

to infinity (when it contains a whole particle). According to Lyotard, the ‘knowledge of the

density of air thus resolves into a multitude of absolutely incompatible statements.’118

Spurrett vigorously denies that Lyotard’s argument proves anything or even has anything to

do with quantum mechanics. He points out that the sensitivity of density calculations to

location and scale can hardly be surprising when density is a ratio between mass and

volume and furthermore, measurements taken at specific places and times will only ever

yield results for those instants. Taking the average of a series of measurements over time

and space give a result ‘equal to the very classical prediction Lyotard thinks he has shown to

be inconsistent with observation.’119

Spurrett concludes that Lyotard has fundamentally misunderstood the current state of

quantum physics. For all its unexpectedness ‘from a narrow classical point of view,’

quantum physics is not paralogical but is now a well-established, tested and successful part

                                                        116 Lyotard, Postmodern, 55. 117 Spurrett, ‘Lyotard,’ 42. 118 Lyotard, Postmodern, 57. 119 Spurrett, ‘Lyotard,’ 46. 

    

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of mainstream physics that is transmitted through the very procedures that Lyotard

describes in his account of scientific education. Furthermore, there is no ‘break within the

hegemony of physics’ and as a result, ‘no one in physics seriously thinks quantum

mechanics shows that any non-physical factor could possibly have any beating on the

development of a microphysical system.’120

In concluding, Spurrett does acknowledge that some of the social changes in science that

Lyotard outlined are indeed occurring, such as the tendency for funding to favour

performativity over theoretical scholarly research. However, he believes that Lyotard saw

natural science as a barrier to the philosophy he wished to promote and attempted to co-opt

science for this purpose, using a number of examples of what he thought were his

postmodern pragmatics in action. However, Spurrett believes that the failure of all of

Lyotard’s scientific arguments shows that natural science is not ‘along for the postmodern

ride.’121

Spurrett is right to say that science is at the heart of The Postmodern Condition and to some

extent, the thesis stands or falls based on Lyotard’s ability to verify his philosophy with real-

world examples. Spurrett’s rejection of these examples is damning but is based on some

presuppositions that he fails to fully address. Firstly, his realist and ‘modern’ belief that

scientists’ theorise are about an objective world is never justified. Similarly, he speaks of an

‘epistemological bottom line’ to which science has ‘the best possible kind of access’ yet never

explains why this is. This philosophy of science is precisely that which Lyotard believes he

undermines with his application of language games, showing that science is just another

game with no special insight into truth, no legitimacy. Spurrett’s supposed defeater to the

language game methodology is the criticism that it focuses too much on the social aspects

rather than the truth claims of science, but this does not completely disarm Lyotard’s

                                                        120 Ibid, 46. 121 Ibid, 49. 

    

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criticisms. To do this, he would have to show that the problem of legitimacy exposed by

language games is not sufficient to produce false positives in scientific discourse.

Secondly, Spurrett plays an methodological sleight of hand by lowering the precision

required for a physical theory to be accepted. He adopts Papineau’s thesis that determinism

requires only that the chance of a physical event occurring be determined as opposed to a full

description of all the variables in that event. This adaptation is one readily accepted by the

scientific community and is in fact therefore a new ‘move’ in the science game, precisely

what Lyotard predicted. Lyotard was wrong however, in thinking this would be a local

move’ in fact it is global, which is why Spurrett so readily advocates it as a part of

contemporary physics. For all of these reasons, Lyotard’s postmodern theory does not

extend to science, at least not based on the example he provided.

Pragmatics

According to Samples, an acceptable worldview must, ‘be sensible and workable and

therefore “externally liveable.”’122 Essentially, if it can be shown that Lyotard’s

postmodernism is ‘unliveable’ or ‘unworkable,’ one may deem the philosophy

unacceptable.

Intricately linked with Lyotard’s philosophy of science is his philosophy of the social bond,

so, though focusing mainly on the scientific, the scope of this pragmatic test goes beyond

laboratories to the everyday lives of those in postmodernity. Shalkwyk argues that Lyotard

unsuccessfully relegates the social bond, not only to the past but also to what is ‘passé’ and

thus fails to convincingly show that postmodernism is a liveable worldview123

It is suggested by Shalkwyk that Lyotard is writing against the work of Jürgern Habermas

whose supremely modern ideas claimed that the goal of all rational communication was to

                                                        122 Samples, World, 35. 123 Shalkwyk, ‘Bond,’ 116. 

    

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find consensus.124 By contrast, Shalkwyk notes that Lyotard sees consensus in postmodern

societies not only as a thing of the past but a danger to the future, ‘for it can only be imposed

as one of the tyrannical myths of the enlightenment, foreclosing all experimentation,

exploration and pluralist dlssensus.’125 Shalkwyk however argues that consensus is essential

for the social bond; it is a matter of ‘what we have to agree in before we can begin to know

what we wish to agree or disagree about.’126

Lyotard argues that since the collapse of the grand narratives, there has been a shift in

science toward legitimacy by performativity and he says that the performativity of a

scientific utterance ‘increases proportionally to the amount of information about its referent

one has at one's disposal.’127 He then invokes the ‘pragmatics of postmodern science’ to

show that paradoxically the search for performativity is destined for failure the closer one

gets to this goal. Using the example of microphysics, Lyotard concludes that science does

not develop by means of commonsense theories and proofs but in fact the opposite, by

inventing counterexamples and seeing the ‘unintelligible.’128 Postmodern science is thus

changing the meaning of knowledge, producing not the known but the unknown.129

For Shalkwyk, postmodern science has become, ‘the exemplar of what was earlier called

“narrative knowledge”, i.e. that which legitimises itself through its own pragmatics,

proliferates incommensurable language games, and constitutes the social subject.’130

Shalkwyk calls this ‘the insight of postmodernity,’ that science plays its own game and

cannot legitimate others or even itself yet he points out that Lyotard, ‘has been able to

outwit the claims of pcrformativity only by appealing to the game of sciatica.’ How ironic

that the way postmodernism can be established by Lyotard is through a recourse to science;

                                                        124 Habermas, Action, 5. 125 Shalkwyk, ‘Bond,’ 117. 126 Ibid. 127 Lyotard, Postmodern, 47. 128 Ibid, 54. 129 Ibid, 60. 130 Shalkwyk, ‘Bond,’ 122. 

    

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Shalkwyk concludes that, ‘no other current language games is sexy enough’ to validate the

postmodern claims.131

Shalkwyk then rightly asks, if the paralogy of postmodern science is the postmodern

condition of all language games (social as well as scientific), what now constitutes the social

bond that was previously established in the forms of narrative knowledge in pre-modern

societies? He argues against Lyotard that consensus still fulfils this role and is not an

unreachable goal but an ‘immanent condition of the very possibility of knowledge and

speech.’132

To illustrate this, Shalkwyk turns to the work of philosophy G. E. Moore. Moore claimed

that there were, ‘certain propositions of which one can be and is indubitably and objectively

certain.’ Wittgenstein (who proposed the language game theory) agreed that there were

certain cases where one can rightly say they are certain of a proposition, citing Moore as the

supplier of some examples.133 Such claims are known as proper basic beliefs; they are not

grounded in evidence as experience speaks to their truth. Wittgenstein takes this further

saying they are beyond enquiry and therefore, beyond both doubt and proof.’134 Shalkwyk

argues that because of this, ‘they belong to a realm of consensus that can neither be rendered

passé by the postmodern turn of events, nor become the subject of testable validity claims’

and that such knowledge constitutes a framework or system which cannot be examined or

ignored because of an ideology.135 To Wittgenstein, this system is ‘not so much a point of

departure as the elements in which arguments have their life.’136

Shalkwyk goes on to defend Wittgenstein’s argument that certain beliefs that make up this

system eventually become ‘hardened into rules’ that take on a logical role and underlie

                                                        131 Ibid. 132 Ibid, 124. 133 Ibid. 134 Wittgenstein, Contrary, 88. 135 Shalkwyk, ‘Bond,’ 125. 136 Wittgenstein, Contrary, 105. 

    

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scientific enquiry.137 He further argues that this is not a form of relativism where human

consensus determines truth but ‘an indication of the conditions necessary for any truth

claims whatsoever.’138

Shalkwyk agrees with Lyotard that science is unable to legitimate itself but based on the

above analysis, he argues legitimation of science is impossible and unnecessary, saying ‘It

makes as little sense to justify the practices of science as it does to justify the claim that you

know that you are a human being.’139 Lyotard’s solution is postmodern science that, like

narrative knowledge, contains within it the pragmatics of its production.140 Shalkwyk rejects

this for two reasons. Firstly he argues that it cannot fulfil the synchronous requirement of

‘immemorial beating’141 that is the essence of ‘narrative self-justification.’ Secondly, the

pragmatics of narrative knowledge are only self-justifying when they constitute the social

bond. Lyotard defines this social bond as the pragmatics of, ‘knowing’ ‘knowing how to

speak’ and ‘knowing how to listen’ and yet Lyotard makes clear from early in his report that

such a bond cannot be established from the learning of science.142 Indeed, Lyotard’s

attraction to postmodern science appears to be its very disruption of the social bond,

favouring dissensus over consensus. Shalkwyk concludes that the social bond is not

something that can be deemed old-fashioned and rejected as Lyotard attempted to do.

Postmodern science’s production of the unknown can therefore not be more self-justifying

than modern science’s production of the known.143

Essentially, Shalkwyk is attempting to take the argument of legitimation one step higher

than Lyotard. He rejects the idea that all can be reduced to language games (as Lyotard

concedes) and argues that while such games do not contain their own legitimation, some

                                                        137 Shalkwyk, Bond,’ 128. 138 Ibid, 129. 139 Ibid, 130. 140 Lyotard, Postmodern, 66. 141 Ibid, 22. 142 Ibid. 143 Shalkwyk, ‘Bond,’ 131. 

    

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beliefs do. These proper basic beliefs cover much of what people generally accept without

question such as the reality of the outside world, memory and other beliefs that ‘do not

require the support of evidence in order to be rational.’144 Here the word ‘rational’ is used to

suggest the belief is used in an argument based on reason, without the need for external

justification. Wittgenstein gives the example that his having two hands is as certain as any

evidence he could provide to support the belief.145 This is a powerful argument against the

perpetual scepticism of the postmodern view; not everything is fluid and a matter of

construction by individuals or local groups, some things genuinely are objective and science

can be built on at least some of these foundations.

The ramifications for this analysis obviously flow beyond the language game of science to

the political, ethical and artistic. It is impossible to live by a system that is sceptical to the

point of doubting if one’s hand really exists and then seek to legitimate all knowledge on the

basis of dissensus and local language games alone. Human knowledge is based on some

proper basic beliefs and to doubt this would be to doubt everything that makes living a

human life possible.

Christian Perspectives on Lyotard

Now that Lyotard’s postmodernism has been critiqued on a secular basis it is next necessary

to look at various Christian perspectives on and reactions to his philosophy. As noted in the

introduction, Christians may choose to embrace or reject a new philosophy depending on

whether it aids their efforts at evangelism. In the following section, various Christian

perspectives of postmodernism will be examined, ranging form the very accommodating to

flat-out rejection. These are treated as perspectives rather than critiques, as the relationship

between postmodernism and Christian apologetics will be discussed alongside an appraisal

of Lyotard’s philosophy. In each case, a summary of the authors’ thesis will be given,

followed by a review of the benefits and drawbacks of their approach and a critique of how

                                                        144 Clark, ‘Reformed,’ 267. 145 Wittgenstein, Contrary, 250. 

    

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they see Christianity existing and being defended in Lyotard’s postmodernity. Of particular

interest is how Christianity maintains its uniqueness within the plurality of competing

narratives and the ability for apologists to apply reason in their defence of Christianity.

James K. A. Smith

Smith has written a number of articles and a book on how he believes Christians ought to

approach postmodernism. Chief among these is Who’s afraid of Postmodernism? In which he

examines the philosophies of Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault and explains why he believes

they are not a threat but an ally to Christianity. He argues that, while the views of these

non-Christians must be critiqued, it is quite possible to benefit from some of their insights.

He draws a parallel to the story of the Hebrews who left Egypt with Egyptian gold that they

later used in their worship of Yahweh (Exodus 12:35-6). Today, he argues, Christians can

similarly ‘find resources in non-Christian thought … that can be put to work for the glory of

God.’146 Smith here is employing an old Christian argument first introduced by the Church

Fathers when they also had to decide whether to accept the philosophies of other cultures.

Based on the command by Yahweh in Exodus 3:22 and its fulfilment in 12:36 this became

known as ‘Spoiling the Egyptians’ and is a powerful argument for plundering foreign

treasures.

Interestingly, Smith notes that the Hebrews’ use of Egyptian gold led them to sins (such as

idolatry in Exodus 32:4) but he doesn’t acknowledge that similar dangers may await

Christians who appropriate postmodernism as he is advocating. Furthermore, the argument

can be rebutted by its opposite, which might be called ‘Devoting the Canaanites.’ When it

came to those nations who stood between the Hebrews and their promised land, Yahweh

was clear that their sin was so great that the Hebrews were to ‘devote them to complete

destruction’ (Deuteronomy 7:2,17). It is unclear why plundering the Egyptians was

acceptable yet only complete destruction was allowed for the Canaanites but, if nothing else,

this shows that Yahweh was selective in allowing treasures from other nations to be

                                                        146 Smith, Postmodernism, 23. 

    

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gathered by Israel. So also Christians today should not assume the Egyptian gold metaphor

stands in all cases.

It is important to note that Smith’s enthusiasm for postmodernism is partly fuelled by his

dislike of modernity and how, for him, the Church has become too modern. He sees an

embrace of postmodernism as a chance for the Church to return to its roots in the pre-

modern era. To that end, he argues that mush of what is described as postmodern in fact

‘constitutes a significant recovery, of pre-modern ways of knowing, being, and doing.’147

Smith’s desire to banish modernism from Christianity means that he rejects classical

apologetics which he argues adopts an Enlightenment view and fails ‘to appreciate the

effects of sin on reason.’148 He goes further, saying that unless apologetics starts with

revelation ‘we have conceded the game to modernity.’149 He appears to assume that the

natural reason game cannot be played and won by the classical apologist and that playing

this game (to use a sporting metaphor) requires apologists to concede their home advantage.

While most apologists would acknowledge the noetic effects of sin, many would disagree

that natural reason has no value whatsoever.

Smith is influenced by the writings of Francis Schaeffer and even describes his work as a

postmodern ‘sequel to Schaeffer’s own engagements with humanism and existentialism.’

He aims to adopt a Schaefferian approach by focusing on the philosophy underlying

postmodernity and by writing in an accessible way so that non-philosophically trained

Christians can engage with his thoughts.150 Exactly how much Smith’s work is a

continuation of Schaeffer’s will be addressed below.

                                                        147 Ibid, 25. 148 Ibid, 28. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid, 21. 

    

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Smith’s examination and response to Lyotard begins with him defining Lyotard’s form of

postmodernism as ‘erosion of confidence in the rational as sole guarantor and deliverer of

truth,’ and a deep suspicion of modern science’s claim to explain ‘everything.’151 He notes

that in the famous definition of postmodernism offered by Lyotard (incredulity toward

metanarratives) the word ‘metanarrative’ is a translation of ‘grand recits,’ literally meaning

‘big stories’ and that there is hardly a bigger story than that presented in Scripture.152 He

acknowledges this suggests that postmodernism and Christianity are antithetical, as many

have argued, however, he sees this as a superficial reading that lacks a ‘careful

understanding of just what Lyotard means by a metanarrative.’153 His apparently more

careful reading of Lyotard leads Smith to claim him as an ally to Christians and further to

claim that orthodox Christianity ‘requires that we [Christians], too, stop believing in

metanarratives.’154

Smith begins his case by pointing out that when Lyotard uses the term ‘metanarrative’ he

doesn’t express incredulity toward these big stories because of their scope, simply for being

‘big.’ If this were the case, Christianity, with its big story from creation to redemption,

certainly could not adopt postmodernism.155 What defines a metanarrative (as Lyotard uses

the word) is not its scope but its attempt to legitimate its claims through ‘an appeal to

universal reason.’156 Myths and religious stories by contrast, are a matter of proclamation or

kerygma, which ‘demand the response of faith.’157 Here, Smith picks up on Lyotard’s

dichotomy of scientific knowledge and narrative knowledge and the association of scientific

knowledge with metanarratives. This explains Smith’s aversion to classical apologetics; to

defend a narrative like Christian Scripture with scientific knowledge and by means of the

                                                        151 Ibid, 62. 152 Ibid, 63. 153 Ibid, 64. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid, 65. 157 Ibid. 

    

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scientific language game is to make the same error as modern science and slip into the

incredulous metanarrative game.

Smith next surveys Lyotard’s conclusions about modern science, concluding that

metanarratives that appeal to universal reason ‘are just another language game, albeit

masquerading as the game above all games.’158 Smith doesn’t speak extensively about

language games and doesn’t question Lyotard’s choice or application of Wittgenstein’s

theory. But for Lyotard’s report to stand, it must be shown that language games are a

suitable method for modelling human communication, that meaningful communication is

not possible except through the use of these language games and that they therefore act as a

barrier between people and reality, hence the anti-realist stance of postmodernism. This

postmodern shift in the view of language has become known as the ‘linguistic turn,’159 and

in an article written against R. Scott Smith’s view of this turn, Smith argues it is a ‘restrictive

understanding of language.’160 He goes on to explain that language is ‘a part of this world,

as are the users of language’ and that it is ‘naive to distinguish language from the world or

even to abstract “us,” its users, as somehow outside the world.’161 It would appear than in

his attempts to defend postmodernism from its Christian critics elsewhere, Smith has

endorsed a quite realist view of language that seriously challenges the methodology and

conclusions of Lyotard, and therefore his own conclusions about Lyotardian

postmodernism.

Nevertheless, Smith agrees with Lyotard that metanarratives are ‘false appeals to universal,

rational, scientific criteria’ and therefore the Christian faith is not a metanarrative, as it is

legitimated by ‘an appeal to faith.’162 Smith does address the classical or evidential apologist

whom he says, ‘might argue that Christian faith is grounded in reason and thus constitutes a

                                                        158 Ibid, 67. 159 Smith, ‘Christian,’ 54. 160 Smith, ‘Postmodernism,’ 222. 161 Ibid. 162 Smith, Postmodernism, 68. 

    

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metanarrative.’ He dismisses this objection on the grounds that it too would fall prey to

Lyotard’s critique of metanarratives, based as it is on an appeal to universal reason.163

However, Smith fails to acknowledge the difference between the appeal to reason in an

apologetic discussion and grounding one’s faith in reason, as he puts it. If one’s faith were

‘grounded in reason’ it would hardly be faith at all. If one’s faith stemmed from an

encounter with God through the Holy Spirit but was backed up and defended by reason,

that would not constitute a metanarrative. Smith mischaracterises apologetics, confusing

one’s grounds for belief (de jure) with one’s defence of their belief (de facto) and hence creates

a straw man argument against classical apologetics. To draw an analogy, the Apostle Paul

probably didn’t believe that his God was the ‘unknown god’ represented by an ‘object of

worship’ in Athens, yet he used this and the philosophy of the Greeks in a discussion, to

explain his monotheistic faith to them (Acts 17:23). If he were consistent, Smith should

probably accuse Paul of conceding the game to polytheism.

Instead of classical apologetics, Smith recommends apologists living in postmodernity to

embrace presuppositional apologetics as this method is aware of the bias imposed by one’s

presuppositions and the role these play in language games, including apologetics.164 Smith

concludes that postmodernism ‘is not incredulity toward narrative or myth; on the contrary,

it unveils that all knowledge is grounded in such’ and argues that this understanding breaks

the false dichotomy that some have constructed between postmodernism and the Christian

narrative.165 He goes further in saying that postmodernism’s critique of science gives new

opportunities for Christian apologetics as it reveals that objections to faith posed by science

lack legitimation.

Much of what Smith says is in keeping with reformed epistemology, which holds that all

begins with faith. Because of their reliance on narrative, he even concludes that ‘every

                                                        163 Ibid. 164 Ibid, 69. 165 Ibid. 

    

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scientist is a believer’ along with theists.166 The problem with the Lyotardian view of

knowledge and the reformed epistemological stance is that, following their logic to its

conclusion leads to ‘the incommensurability of belief systems’.167 Theissen explains this is

the situation where each individual lives in his or her own paradigm or presuppositional

framework, and these incommensurable language games mean that no one can

communicate with anyone else. As Theissen points out, this simply isn’t the case as people

are generally able to communicate well, regardless of their varied beliefs. Furthermore, he

argues, the Christian doctrine of creation, that all are made in the image of God, suggests all

individuals have at least some of their epistemic capacities in common.168 To argue from

everyday experience is always problematic since Theissen does not establish that he is living

in a postmodern society. Lyotard is never clear how postmodern he believes the world is

though Smith appears more certain of postmodernism’s prevalence. But Theissen is right to

appeal to common grace and creation in the Imago Dei to dispel the complete heterogeneity

proposed by Lyotard and seconded by Smith, at least from a Christian point of view.

Amid all his banner waving for postmodernism, Smith does admit one drawback. Though

he doesn’t use the exact word, the problem, in short, is relativism. This is caused by what

Lyotard called the ‘problem of legitimation,’169 which means there is no longer (the belief in)

a supreme court of appeal’ or metalanguage to decide between the different claims of rival

games. This incommensurability has far reaching implication in morality for example where

different concepts of good, conditioned by different historical paradigms, can neither be

contrasted with or imposed on others.170 Smith acknowledges that many lament this feature

of postmodernism but tries to play it down by suggesting that objective morality was a ‘very

modern hegemony of America’ and that the plurality of morals was exactly the situation

                                                        166 Ibid, 68. 167 Theissen, ‘Review,’ 349. 168 Ibid. 169 Lyotard, Postmodern, 8. 170 Smith, Postmodernism, 69. 

    

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that the Apostle Paul and others found themselves in. Smith’s solution is simply for the

Church to be a witness in this plurality of morals.171

Relativism is surely the major criticism of postmodernism advocates and one that Lyotard

and Smith both attempt to refute. Smith’s vision of a plurality of moral games may be more

like Ancient Rome than the modern USA but would he not agree that the values of justice,

rule of law and equality on which his country was built are more Biblical than those of

Ancient Rome, even if these values were based on a misplaced faith in reason? Secondly, it

is difficult to know how one could actively witness to a society without, at least occasionally,

imposing moral values upon others. This imposition of one game’s rules on another is what

Lyotard called ‘terror’ and he saw it as the bane of modern science’s goal of consensus.172 Yet

Paul (not to mention Jesus!) travelled the ancient world preaching the Gospel, which

offended many Jews, Romans and pagans, leading to his persecution, imprisonment, torture

and possibly to his death.173 There is no greater example of terror than execution for

challenging society’s game, so how the plurality would eliminate terror is far from clear. In

fact, who’s to say that terror is wrong anyway? It may be in Lyotard’s rules but others may

find it quite justifiable.

Perhaps most surprisingly, Smith’s enthusiasm for postmodernism and his willingness to

abandon reason for being too modern, stand in stark contrast to the thoughts of Schaeffer.

As noted above, Smith declares his book as a sequel to Schaeffer’s and so it is bizarre that

Smith should disagree with Schaeffer on such important matters as the role of reason and

truth claims. Throughout Escape From Reason, Schaeffer charts the history of the upper and

lower stories, first separated by Aquinas. By this he means the separation of nature from

grace, where grace occupies the ‘upper story’ and nature the ‘lower story.’ Grace included

                                                        171 Ibid, 70. 172 Lyotard, Postmodern, 63. 173 Scholars disagree on whether or not Paul died in Jerusalem as a consequence of his 

preaching.  This was certainly prophesied in the latter part of his ministry (e.g. Acts 

21:11) and would parallel the death of Jesus, which also occurred at the behest of the 

Jewish leaders and was carried out by the gentiles. 

    

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all the things of God, while nature was creation. The latter, it was assumed, was

autonomous from God and over time this ‘lower story’ began to ‘eat up’ more of the upper

story as reason was applied more widely.174

Schaeffer documents an attempt in the 1960s by a new kind of mysticism, to move questions

of religion to the upper story, ‘from the world of the discussable, placing them in the world

of the non-discussable, where you can say anything without fear of proof or disproof.’ By so

doing, one shirks any burden of proof by reducing faith to a mere mystery. Schaeffer

reports hearing a similar move made by his contemporary Christians, replacing the assertion

of truth claims and proofs with the experience of ‘an encounter with Jesus.’ To this,

Schaeffer offers a stern rebuke: ‘When a Christian has made such a statement he has, in an

analysed or unanalysed form, moved upstairs,’ by which he means, placed Christianity as a

whole, beyond reason’s reach.175 Schaeffer argues this is foolish; although it evades the need

to present reasoned arguments, it renders Christianity indistinguishable from other religious

and secular ‘mysticisms’ such as Schaeffer saw emerging from humanism and New

Theology.176 He goes on to ask, if the Scriptures are not discussed and ‘open to verification

where they touch the cosmos and history’ then why should one choose the evangelical faith

over any other, or no faith at all?177 Schaefer’s point is that, while a move toward the

mystical may avoid difficult questions posed by science and reason, to do so also rids

Christianity of its uniqueness compared with other narratives. This includes its verifiability

by modern methods including historical criticism.

The problem for Smith is, this is exactly what he seeks to do through his embrace of

postmodernism. By endorsing Lyotard’s assertion that reason is a myth, he moves

Christianity to the ‘upper story,’ excluding it from reasoned criticism, in complete defiance

                                                        174 Schaeffer, Reason, 9. 175 Ibid, 76. 176 Ibid, 77. 177 Ibid. 

    

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of the warnings from his predecessor Schaeffer.178 Schaeffer, like Smith, also notes that the

real-life consequence of this move is relativism, though he is more comfortable with

admitting this. Schaeffer argues that without a social bond grounded in the ‘upper story,’

there can be no absolute moral values, just social conventions whereby anything can be

declared ‘good.’ Smith’s only reply to this, noted above, is blind optimism and a

comparison to the pre-modern era of Paul. As such, the burden of proof is still on Smith to

show that the benefits of postmodern Christianity outweigh the enormous losses outlined

by Schaeffer.

In his review of Smith’s book, Haskell fears that the uninitiated reader may come away with

the impression that ‘there is no reason to prefer one religion or worldview over another,

except perhaps by who tells the better story.’ He concludes by questioning if worldviews

can be measured at all without legitimation by reason.179 Theissen rightly sums up the

situation by saying that Christians don’t just want to accept their story is one equal among a

plurality of narratives, they ‘also want to say that ours is the best story, indeed the true

story.’ To do this, he believes Christians must participate in ‘modernist apologetics’ with its

appeals to reason and therefore should not ‘cozy up’ too closely with Lyotard, as Smith has

chosen to do.180

It appears Smith’s loathing for modernism means he too readily accepts postmodernism as a

fine alternative. His analysis of Lyotard is quite accurate and he is clear in explaining the

perceived benefits to Christianity. He does however gloss over some of the more

problematic consequences of his proposal, namely relativism and pluralism. He tries briefly

and unsatisfactorily to claim that relativism isn’t a problem and sees a level playing field

between worldviews as preferable. Smith may be right that Christianity was compromised

by blindly becoming too ‘modern’ but his answer is to repeat this mistake, only this time by

blindly becoming too ‘postmodern.’                                                         178 Smith, Postmodernism, 69. 179 Haskell, ‘Review,’ 272. 180 Theissen, ‘Review,’ 349. 

    

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Middleton, Walsh and Grenz

In their book Truth Is Stranger Than It Used To Be, Middleton and Walsh present a very

different Christian perspective on Lyotard’s postmodernism to that of Smith. Grenz’s book

A Primer on Postmodernism takes a similar line so these works will be examined together.

Middleton and Walsh address the issues posed by the onset of postmodernity in terms of a

shift in worldviews, from modernism to postmodern. They define a worldviews as giving

‘faith answers to s set of ultimate and grounding questions,’ questions concerning personal

identity, the problems in the world and the remedies to these problems. Their book surveys

the modern answers and provides some postmodern answers to these questions.181 They

encounter Lyotard when addressing the latter questions about ‘evil and redemption,’ which

they note are ‘typically communicated in narrative.’182 After quoting Lyotard’s key

statement on metanarratives, they outline what they see as the two problems postmodern

thinkers have with metanarratives. In doing so, they are answering ‘what’s wrong?’ and

‘what’s the solution?’ for the postmodern worldview.

The first problem is one of scope. They suggest that if a story claims to be more than just a

local ‘ad hoc account of a community’s experience,’ the universal story of the world from

beginning to end, then ‘such a narrative claims more than it can possibly know.’183 They

maintain that since all knowledge is socially constructed (as they showed in previous

chapters) metanarratives are too, while all the time purporting to be universal. As such,

these overarching stories, blind to their own limitations, promote ‘homogeneity and closure

over difference, heterogeneity, otherness and openness.’184 The second problem with

metanarratives as Middleton and Walsh see it is that they are ‘inevitably oppressive and

                                                        181 Middleton, Truth, 11. 182 Ibid, 63. 183 Ibid, 70. 184 Ibid. 

    

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violent in their false claims to “totality.”’185 This criticism, they say, begins with the modern

imperialist metanarratives and the violence perpetuated in the name of autonomous

progress but also extends to any overarching story that claims to make total claims,

including the Christian narrative in Scripture. So, in the postmodern worldview,

metanarratives are what’s wrong and postmodern incredulity is the solution.186

Grenz argues along similar lines that ‘according to postmoderns such as Lyotard,’

postmodernity is not just the move from one set of legitimating myths to the next (as

happens throughout history) but the ‘end of the appeal to any central legitimating myth

whatsoever.’ However, he continues by saying that the postmodern outlook ‘demands an

attack on any claimant to universality – it demands, in fact, a “war on totality.”’187

It is worth pausing at this point to take note of the assertions of these authors. Middleton,

Walsh and Grenz all take the term ‘metanarrative’ to mean a story that is of universal scope

yet socially constructed. Such a story is incapable of properly respecting the diversity and

heterogeneity of the world (let alone the universe) and when these metanarratives are

adopted, they lead to violence toward anyone or anything that does not fit the narrative.

This rejection of overarching narratives is indeed part of what Lyotard meant when he uses

the term ‘metanarrative’ and in fact his original French phrase ‘grand recit’ literally meant

‘big story.’188 These authors effectively equate ‘meta-narrative’ to ‘mega-narrative’ but

Lyotard meant more than just a ‘big story.’189

Smith correctly argues that Lyotard had a ‘very specific meaning of metanarrative.’190 Lyotard

believed that the metanarratives of modernity were bankrupt because they lacked the means

to legitimate themselves. As a result, they turned to narrative, while simultaneously

                                                        185 Ibid, 71. 186 Ibid. 187 Grenz, Primer, 45. 188 Lyotard, Postmodern, 63. 189 Smith, Postmodernism, 64. 190 Smith, ‘Story,’ 128. 

    

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claiming narrative knowledge was of no value.191 This problem of legitimation has nothing

do with the metanarratives’ universal claims or ‘totality’ as Middleton, Walsh and Grenz

maintain.

These authors all make the same error in failing to understand the nuance of Lyotard’s

complaint about metanarratives. Consequently, they setup a dichotomy between Christian

faith and postmodernism. Grenz states it succinctly, ‘because of our faith in Christ, we

cannot totally affirm the central tenet of postmodernism as defined by Lyotard – the

rejection of the metanarrative.’192 The authors deal with this dichotomy in different ways so

it is best to critique them separately from now on.

Middleton and Walsh offer a reasonable critique of postmodernism (as they understand it)

pointing out its ‘performative contradiction’ of substituting modern metanarratives with a

metanarrative about the end of metanarratives. They also argue that metanarratives are not

the sole cause of violence since, in the case of the Balkan states for example, it was the

modern metanarrative of Marxism, imposed by the USSR that kept local tribal narratives

from developing into warfare. Once the USSR fell, war soon followed.193

They then set the scene for their discussion of Christianity in postmodernity by asking

whether, ‘the Christian faith, rooted as it is in a metanarrative of cosmic proportions, is

subject to the postmodern charge of totalizing violence.’194 They are arguing against

metanarratives because of their scope and the totalizing violence done in their names and as

important as these issues are, they are not what Lyotard, in his ‘Report on Knowledge’ is

discussing.195 In fairness, the authors do concede that in Lyotard’s analysis, ‘it is only

modern scientific culture’ that leads to metanarratives but this admission (in an endnote at

                                                        191 Lyotard, Postmodern, 29. 192 Grenz, Primer, 164. 193 Middleton, Truth, 77. 194 Ibid, 83. 195 Smith, ‘Story,’ 126. 

    

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the back of their book) means they are describing a form of postmodernism, similar to but

developed on from Lyotard’s. They fail to explain why they choose to do this or whose

version of ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’ they are answering.196

Because of this, their defence of Christianity in postmodern times aims to show that the

Christian metanarrative ‘works ultimately against totalization’ i.e. does not cause the

violence and totalizing problems that they attribute to metanarratives. Their argument is

that the Christian narrative in Scripture contains two ‘antitotalizing’ factors: ‘a radical

sensitivity to suffering’ and ‘God’s overarching creational intent.’197 A story, they argue,

which is saturated in the suffering of its heroes (from The Exodus to The Cross) cannot

legitimate the suffering of others, nor can the story of one all-powerful deity over all creation

be employed to legitimate any narrow or local partisan end.198

If one accepts the view of postmodernism presented by Middleton and Walsh, it is still

difficult to agree with their assessment of Christianity since throughout history (albeit

mainly modern history) the Christian story has been used for both of these purposes. From

South African Apartheid to the defence of modern-day Israel over and against the

Palestinian people, the narrative from Scripture has been employed by some to justify

suffering and partisan goals. Even if the wider Christian community rejects these readings

as flawed, the fact remains that the apparent safeguards Middleton and Walsh suppose the

Bible contains have not prevented some from inflicting violence and terror on others.

By contrast, Grenz argues that, contrary to Lyotard, Christians claim that there is a single

grand narrative encompassing all people and that they know what it is. It is ‘God’s action in

history for the salvation of fallen humankind,’ a story that focuses on Jesus of Nazareth.199

Grenz acknowledges the postmodern critique of the Enlightenment project’s search for

                                                        196 Middleton, Truth, 214 n32. 197 Ibid, 87. 198 Ibid. 199 Grenz, Primer, 164. 

    

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absolute truth through natural reason but sidesteps this by saying that ‘Ultimately the

metanarrative we [Christians} proclaim lies beyond the pale of reason.’ He goes on to argue

that while in postmodernism reason is no longer held as a transcendent metalanguage for

discerning truth, the Christian belief in the Word becoming flesh can provide this criteria for

discerning the truth of the Christian narrative and elevating it above all others.200 This

however is wholly compatible with Lyotard’s views since Grenz is suggesting Christians

legitimate their narrative by an appeal to faith not reason. In other words, the narrative of

Scripture is self-legitimating. Inadvertently and as a response to Lyotard, Grenz has

proposed a form of Christianity that is as postmodern as any of Lyotard’s own ideas.201

Grenz is not totally dismissive of postmodernism, in fact like Smith he wishes to salvage

what he can from the philosophy if it may be used to glorify God. He suggests that

Christians may welcome Lyotard’s arguments when applied to science but stop short of

applying his theory to reality as a whole.202 Smith however, finds this unacceptable

describing it as ‘trying to have our cake and eat it too.’ He argues that to apply

postmodernism to science but not to Christianity, because Christians believe the latter, is to

beg the question.203 This somewhat contradicts his ‘Egyptian gold’ metaphor explained

above but he is correct to require consistency in the Christian approach to postmodernism

and not to allow believers to just apply the theories when it suits them.

However, Grenz does note some important observations of postmodern thinkers that fit well

with Christian doctrine and he agrees with Smith that the Church has, in some ways,

become too modern. Grenz argues for example that the ‘certainty of knowledge’ and its

criteria for certainty based in human rationality is both rejected by postmoderns and by

Christian doctrine that affirms some knowledge lies beyond reason. Furthermore, Grenz

argues Christians should affirm the knowledge is not objective and dispassionate but a

                                                        200 Ibid, 165. 201 Lyotard, Postmodernism, 20. 202 Grenz, Primer, 164. 203 Smith, ‘Story,’ 128. 

    

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product of one’s historical and cultural context and finally that not all knowledge is good

and progress is not inevitable. In each case, the postmodern insight is in keeping with

Christian beliefs about the limits of fallen humans and the noetic effects of sin.204

Grenz however, is too quick to concede the game to postmodernism. He acknowledges that

Evangelical Christians have developed solid modern arguments to defend their faith against

secularism in modernity, yet he is willing to give all this up because it belongs to a now

apparently defunct worldview.205 In his attempt to employ postmodern thought to score

points against those who critique Christianity with modern science, he inadvertently

surrenders some of the great weapons for Christian apologetics, since they too are based in

reason. Furthermore, he does so because of his misunderstanding of what Lyotard meant by

‘metanarrative.’

All three authors take postmodernism beyond what Lyotard describes and focus too much

on the social issues and violence produced by metanarratives. While Middleton and Walsh

argue unsuccessfully that Christianity has built-in protection against its use as an instrument

of terror, Grenz unknowingly adopts a somewhat postmodern Christian perspective with

which Lyotard would probably have no problem. In doing so, however, he is too quick to

jettison much of the great work done by modern apologists that allow Christianity to

compete well with the scientific worldview in public debate. In attempting to pull the rug

out from under the feet of his opponents, he fails to see that a great Christian army of

apologists are also standing on that rug and they too tumble to the ground.

Groothuis

The Christian perspective of the authors discussed so far could fairly be described as

acceptance (Smith) and accommodation (Middleton, Walsh and Grenz). From early in his

                                                        204 Grenz, Primer, 167. 205 Ibid, 161. 

    

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book, Groothuis makes clear that for him, both these approaches are ‘deeply problematic.’206

Groothuis sees two major errors made by those attempting to adopt postmodern ways into

Christianity: the rejection of the propositional emphasis on scripture and the replacement of

more abstract and conceptual lines in theology with a focus on narrative.

Groothuis begins his argument with a defence of what he calls ‘propositional revelation,’

(which he claims is central to Evangelicalism) and an inerrant view of Scripture, to which he

subscribes. Even though Scripture contains many genres, Groothuis maintains that all of

scripture can be expressed in propositional truth claims.207 He argues that the Biblical

revelations were given to people in various communities, not socially constructed by those

communities. Essentially he says that whenever postmoderns promote their incredulity

toward metanarratives, deconstruct into language games or celebrate subjective pluralism,

Evangelicals should ‘bring objective truth back to the table.’208

Naturally, this flies in the face of postmodern thinking with its emphasis on narrative.

Smith argues that too many Christians have reduced Christianity to ‘the modernist

verbalisation of modernist facts.’209 He decries the ‘statements of faith’ that reduce Scripture

to that which can easily be encoded in propositions, while God’s revelation was in the form

of narrative. He argues that narrative is a rounded form of communication, activating the

imagination and ‘involving the whole person.’210 However, it is curious that Smith should

deride statements of faith (or creeds) as a trait of modernism; the Apostles Creed and

Nycene Creed probably derive from the Old Roman Creed, a statement of faith for

baptismal confession in the Roman Church, circa 100 AD.211 The act of compiling

propositional statements of faith could therefore predate even the canonisation of Scripture,

so can hardly be deemed a product of modernity.

                                                        206 Groothuis, Truth, 111. 207 Ibid, 113. 208 Ibid, 115. 209 Smith, Postmodernism, 74. 210 Ibid, 75. 211 Badcock, History, 2. 

    

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This point aside, postmoderns like Smith do help the Church recapture the narrative beauty

of Scripture that may have been lost due to the influence of modernism. For example, is

God glorified more by a sermon on the science of how Jonah may have survived inside a

fish for three days (Jonah 1:17) or a sermon on the symbolism of the fish, Jonah’s prayers

and his transformation during his journey to Nineveh?212 Groothuis argues that the oracles

of revelation must be ‘true’ since they are from God but truth can be presented in many

forms and even disguised in parable, allegory and poetry. The process of finding the truth

in such genres of literature is not as straightforward as Groothuis may suggest.213

One of Groothuis’s key arguments against postmodern adoption by theologians is his

defence of reason. Authors such as McGrath and Grenz have argued that one should not

expect revelation to be logically consistent, deeming such rationality as a mere holdover

from the Enlightenment and therefore too modern.214 Groothuis however argues that logical

consistency is a basic fact of ‘intelligible discourse’ and he goes as far as saying ‘humans

cannot believe contradictory things.’215 His defence of this bold assertion is two-fold: firstly

that if the law of contradiction is not universal then God cannot be distinguished from non-

God and secondly, that ‘The Word became flash’ (John 1:3) speaks to the intelligibility and

rationality of the pre-incarnate Christ as the Logos. He argues that logic ‘flows from the

being of God and is intrinsic to our created natures and cognitive structures.’216

To Groothuis, logic and rationality are not just social constructions but are an essential part

of God’s character and hence humans made in his image. Furthermore, to give up

rationality would make it impossible to distinguish between true and false revelation or to

show the falsity of other belief systems. Finally, not to subject Christianity to logical

                                                        212 Zimmerman, ‘Problems,’ 582. 213 Groothuis, Truth, 116. 214 McGrath, Passion, 170. 215 Groothuis, Truth, 121. 216 Ibid, 124. 

    

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consistency would fuel the charge that Christianity is illogical and anti-intellectual.217 The

first of these points is a valid defeater to the employment of postmodernism in theology,

establishing a legitimation mechanism for reason that elevates it to the position of a valid

metalanguage for discerning absolute truth. The latter two points are more concerned with

defending Christianity to modern thinkers as in postmodernism, distinguishing between

incommensurable games makes no sense whether these games be rival theistic beliefs or

reason and logic.

When it comes specifically to Lyotard and metanarratives, Groothuis quotes from Terry

Eagleton who correctly identifies postmodernism as the end of metanarratives ‘whose

secretly terrorist function was to round and legitimate the illusion of a “universal human

history’” heralding postmodernity with a plurality of language games that do not seek to

legitimate themselves.218 Groothuis argues that while the error of modernity was to depend

solely on human reason to the exclusion of divine revelation, postmodernity errs in

abandoning metanarratives and adopting relativism. In this, Groothuis agrees with

Eagleton that Lyotard’s postmodernism does not allow one to condemn social injustice as

objectively evil.219 Because each narrative is legitimated by the pragmatics of its own

transmission, there is no place for argument or proof. This is true for modernism but also

Marxism and Nazism and this inability to critique clearly unjust ideologies is, according to

Groothuis, the result of the postmodern abandonment of universal rationality.

Groothuis also describes how he believes apologetics should be conducted in a postmodern

age. He starts by noting that Scripture makes a distinction between the proclamation,

defence and communal manifestation of the Gospel. He believes that postmodern thinkers

like Smith, absorb defence into the roles of proclamation and manifestation. Along with

Bruce, Groothuis argues that Peter and Paul both describe defence as a distinct activity that

                                                        217 Ibid, 125. 218 Eagleton, ‘Awakening,’ 195 as cited by Groothuis, Truth, 129. 219 Groothuis, Truth, 130. 

    

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later led to the age of the apologists in the second century.220 With this in mind, he sets out a

few ways to uncompromisingly defend Christianity in a postmodern world.

The first part of his approach is to ‘demonstrate that with respect to ethics and meaning in

life, [postmodernism] reduces to nihilism.’221 This is a negative apologetic whereby one

points out the loss that accompanies incredulity toward metanarratives; the universe is

replaced by a ‘plura-verse, … which resists comprehension and cohesion and offers only

chaos.’222 He says Christians should seize on the ‘dizzying meaninglessness’ of

postmodernism and name it for what it is – nihilism – ultimately unliveable.223 Groothuis

argues that the human conditions demands that people praise the good, condemn the evil

and seek value in human activities and argues that Christianity best explains this since

meaning-seeking humans are made in the image of a meaningful God.224 This apologetic

approach was popular in modern times with people like Schaeffer, for countering

existentialism and Groothuis is right to point out its continued use in a new age where

meaning and purpose are still considered illusory, yet most fail or refuse to see this as the

case.

Next, Groothuis argues in favour of foundationalism (as did Shalkwyk above) on the basis

that certain beliefs simply are not cultural but universal. He argues that there are ‘essential

truths of logic’ necessary for intelligible thought and rational discourse and that there are

basic forms of reasoning which are non-negotiable.225 That these truths are necessary is

affirmed by Arthur Holmes who states that ‘Good logic is one of God’s good gifts, and it is

essential to thinking in this and any world.’226 This is not just based on faith, Groothuis

demonstrates that reasoning such as modus ponens and modus tolens are employed by people

                                                        220 Ibid, 163. 221 Ibid, 168. 222 Ibid, 169. 223 Ibid, 170. 224 Ibid, 172. 225 Ibid, 177. 226 Holmes, Contours, 131. 

    

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of all cultures and always have been, regardless of their historical context.227 Lyotard may

counter this belief by suggesting that these ‘moves’ that some call ‘reasoning’ may well be

paralleled by similar moves in other games but this does not make them universal.228

However, Groothuis convincingly demonstrates that it is difficult to conceive even of human

survival without these basic forms of reasoning, so he is right to consider them at least

universal to and necessary within human experience.

Because of this foundation of logic and reason, Groothuis believes that Christianity is ‘public

truth’ available to anyone who looks at the evidence and follows the arguments, as Paul

demonstrated on Mars Hill (Acts 17:22-31). Groothuis argues that Paul’s defence of

Christianity does not involve an appeal for his hearers to adopt a new language game or any

of the techniques employed by Christians who adopt postmodern thinking. Paul simply

argues in a way that people from a completely different culture could understand, using

basic universal reason and evidence.229

Groothuis’s apologetic amounts to a cumulative case argument where he believe it can be

argued that Christianity is the best explanation for ‘a wide range of facts about the universe,

humans and history.’230 He then lists nine aspects of this case which include the logical

inconsistency and existential inadequacy of postmodernism, classic arguments like the

cosmological and moral arguments, correspondence between Christianity and the human

experience and historical evidence for the identify and resurrection of Jesus. He concludes

that there is a wealth of ‘solid apologetic resources’ produced by Evangelicals during

modern times that Christian intellectuals ‘intoxicated by postmodernism’ would be ready to

throw out and he argues this should not be.231

                                                        227 Groothuis, Truth, 177. 228 Lyotard, Postmodernism, 10. 229 Groothuis, Truth, 179. 230 Ibid. 231 Ibid, 183. 

    

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Groothuis is uncompromising in his firm stance against postmodernism. He fails, for

example, even to acknowledge the insights of postmodern thought such as the renewed

emphasis on narrative and the value this brings to Bible study and communal reading of

Scripture. His insistence on Biblical inerrancy and propositional revelation is exactly the

sort of certainty in a matter of faith that postmodern Christians deride. Also, though he

argues from human experience, some of his foundationalism is rooted in beliefs from

Scripture, in other words it is rooted in faith. Here again we find a form of legitimation that

Lyotard would not oppose; he would happily agree with Groothuis that, in a Christian

language game reason has legitimation but cannot pronounce on moves by players of other

games e.g. Muslims, Hindus or postmodern agnostics.

That said, Groothuis produces a strong cumulative case for Christianity, defends this

method using examples from Christian history and includes critiques of other worldviews

from both secular and Christian perspectives. While others quiver, Groothuis stands strong

in his faith, looking to Scripture for inspiration and examples of how to do cross-cultural

mission, a mission that he believes faces the same challenges today as it did in New

Testament times. As such, he encourages apologetics to work the same way as Paul did but

with all the added benefits of arguments and evidence gathered in the modern era.

Groothuis’ principles that certain levels of communication and logic are common to all

humans is not only attested to by the stories of Paul but also in that other great example of

apologetics, the clash between Moses and Pharaoh. This whole confrontation is repeatedly

attributed to Yahweh’s desire that ‘The Egyptians shall know that I am the LORD’ and to

show his superiority to Pharaoh, Yahweh enables Moses and Aaron to perform various

miracles. Many of these could be replicated by Pharaoh’s sorcerers but eventually they

conceded the works must be done by ‘the finger of God’ (Exodus 8:19). Despite believing in

very different theologies and incompatible worldviews, Moses and Pharaoh were quite

capable of engaging in dialogue through the language of miracle working. Pharaoh did not

refuse Israel’s release because he didn’t understand their belief; he understood only too well

    

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that Yahweh was a threat to his claim to divinity and authority. This along with many other

examples in Scripture, show that the Christian (and Jewish) faith is quite capable of being

defended in ways in which people of all cultures can understand.

To summarise these Christian perspectives, Smith believes in accepting most if not all of

what Lyotard describes as postmodernism. He understands what Lyotard meant by

metanarratives and believes that there is much to be appreciated about postmodernism. He

appears to believe that postmodernism is almost identical to pre-modernism and therefore

closer to the philosophy of the Biblical authors. He is happy to ‘Spoil the Egyptians’ but fails

to adequately support his thesis with examples from Scripture, perhaps because Scripture

doesn’t see the world as a competition between incommensurable language games but as a

battle between good and evil, sin and grace, God and Satan.

Middleton, Walsh and Grenz all read their own understandings of metanarratives into

Lyotard’s work. They are not prepared to see a metanarrative in the narrow sense that

Lyotard defines it and therefore don’t find the same fault with metanarratives that he does.

Their arguments are against totalitarianism not false claims to legitimation and their

solutions are largely irrelevant to the problem that Lyotard outlines. Finally, Groothuis,

who is perhaps the most Biblical in his defence, argues for foundationalism and strong

negative and positive apologetics based on basic logic and reason, which he convincingly

argues is common to all.

Conclusion

In some ways, the challenge of postmodernism is nothing new. Christians observe a new

philosophy, critique it and form various opinions on whether or not to adopt any of its

insights. What is new however, is that postmodernism heralds the end of dominant,

overarching modern narratives as it attempts to levels the playing field, reducing all

previous philosophies to a mere plurality of local and temporal myths. One of

    

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postmodernism’s greatest promoters, Lyotard, describes how this situation came about and

how he thinks it will lead to a better future than that offered by modernism.

In his book The Postmodern Condition: A Report On Knowledge, Lyotard describes the crisis of

legitimation facing all metanarratives that attempt to legitimise themselves through an

appeal to universal reason. Chief among these is science, though it also includes many

metanarratives with a much more social focus. To Lyotard, these are just stories that

attempt to legitimate their single, homogenous account of humanity through reason. They

do this, he supposes, in order to justify the oppression of opponents and he appears to

welcome the downfall of metanarratives in postmodernity.

Lyotard takes Wittgenstein’s language game theory far beyond its original scope and applies

it to all of life, without fully justifying his decision to do so. As noted previously, he also

claims that, by his reckoning, science has lost its legitimation but fails to address the issue of

its legitimation by performativity as scientific discoveries are welcomed and adopted by

society in new technologies, medicine, engineering and many other disciplines. Science is

therefore somewhat legitimated simply because its discoveries lead to innovations that

work.

As a worldview, Lyotard’s postmodernism performs quite poorly. It is logically inconsistent

in a variety of ways that mean it approaches the realm of the anti-intellectual. Even Lyotard

admits that he is telling the metanarrative of the end of metanarratives yet for him this is not

a problem. He attempts to verify his philosophy by pointing to examples in contemporary

physics where classical modern approaches yield inconsistent results and therefore where

his postmodern science is apparently emerging as the suitable replacement. Scientists like

Spurrett deliver a devastating blow to Lyotard’s whole thesis with their critique of his

amateurish uses of science. Where Lyotard sees the failure of modern physics, Shalkwyk

shows that physicists simply adapt their methods and expectations to meet the new

challenges in new areas of discovery, producing very successful theories that are widely

    

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accepted. Far from being local narratives with their own rules, these new methods are

almost universally adopted.

In attempting to justify his thesis with science, Lyotard has in fact proposed a ‘God of the

gaps’ type argument. In this case it is the less catchy, ‘Postmodern Science of the gaps’

argument but essentially the fallacy is the same. Lyotard looks for areas of science that

appear to play by different rules, where deterministic description of the entire system is

unattainable or about which scientists are somewhat ignorant and claims that these verify

his postmodern scientific approach. Spurrett points out that while complete determinism

(the modern goal) of for example a subatomic system is indeed problematic, probabilistic

determinism is not. This latter approach has been well tested and is treated as scientific fact

just as Newtonian physics was in the modern era. This is not so much a new local science

game with new rules, but more like a new level to the old game with universal rules specific

to certain particles. There are always areas of science that defy current explanation but to

posit a postmodern method for finding an explanation is as fallacious as posing a ‘God of

the Gaps’ explanation. History strongly suggests that science will find a natural,

deterministic explanation sooner or later and once proven, the new explanation will become

universally accepted as a new rule in the global science game. Spurrett also rightly

questions Lyotard’s assumption that science needs its metanarratives to be legitimate. He

notes various ways in which metanarratives may be useful to science but sees them as

ultimately dispensable, completely undermining the problem Lyotard was addressing.

One example of where Lyotard’s postmodern view of science has been adopted is in the

more recent works of Stephen Hawking. His model-dependent reality has a lot in common

with Lyotard’s views except that Hawking’s philosophy still retains the belief in an objective

world. Hawking’s book is a popular level work written for the purpose of ridiculing the

positing of God, not just in physics but also in metaphysics. To avoid the more difficult

metaphysical questions posed by theology and philosophy however, Hawking pronounces

philosophy dead and attempts to construct his own philosophy of science employing

    

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various postmodern traits. Critics are quick to point out that his theories are neither as

ground-breaking or as sound as he would like and are deeply suspicious of his reasons for

adopting postmodern thought, supposing he simply does so to avoid the more challenging

questions posed by those better trained to deal with the big questions of metaphysics.

Shalkwyk argued against the extreme scepticism of Lyotard, suggesting that certain

propositions are simply beyond reason and therefore beyond doubt. Proper basic beliefs are

firm enough foundations on which to build and, he argues, certain forms of logic are

universal. So, science never needed to be legitimised by narrative and loses nothing if those

narratives are discarded. Science would have done fine and will do fine without resorting to

metanarratives. Shalkwyk also argued that Lyotard commits the genetic fallacy by focusing

too much on the social nature of science and not on the truth of its socially constructed

theories. Even if a theory is produced as a result of various social processes and ‘games’ that

does not, by itself, mean the theory is false.

When it comes to Christian perspectives, there is a wide range to choose from. Smith’s near

hatred for modernity (especially its religious expression in fundamentalism) means he

welcomes postmodernity with open arms. He appears to see postmodernity as a return to

pre-modernity and his fanaticism leaves him unable to fully appreciate the subtleties and

real consequences of this new philosophy. The biggest of these is relativism to which

neither Smith nor Lyotard provide an adequate answer.

Other authors fail to understand what Lyotard meant by metanarrative, believing his gripe

to be with any big story simply for being a big overarching story. Incredulity toward these

stories may in fact be a trait of postmodern Western society but this is not how Lyotard saw

it or what he was addressing. For Lyotard, the problem was with the legitimation of

knowledge and any social consequences that flowed from that knowledge were largely

beyond the scope of his report.

    

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Others like Groothuis show an understandable apprehension toward postmodernism and

refuse to adapt or accommodate to it at all. Groothuis believes there is a greater danger in

abandoning reason and feels there are good grounds (both philosophical and theological)

for holding on to reason and all the apologetic arguments developed during modernity. He

believes that a convincing cumulative case can be given in the defence of Christianity that

not only defends the truth claims of the faith but also the use of reason in defending thee

claims. Interestingly, it may be that in Lyotard’s postmodern world, both scientific and

religious institutions may need to employ apologists for their respective causes and both

may begin by defending reason as key to their arguments.

Grenz and Smith both point out some of the areas in which postmodernism has illuminated

the shortcomings and exaggerated claims of modernity. Many of these resonate well with

Christian theology and Christians should not be afraid to acknowledge these insights. This

is less a case of ‘Spoiling the Egyptians’ with all the inherent dangers that brings, and more

like a wake-up call as a ‘modern’ Church that can re-examine itself and correct its previous

errors in accommodating to the philosophy of the modern era.

In conclusion, postmodernism with its attacks on science, the great foe of Christianity in

modernity may look like a tempting opportunity for Christian and especially apologists.

But as with the fruit in the Garden of Eden, partaking of it will cost man dearly. Christians

have more to gain by defending reason and arguing for their faith by employing reason,

than if they adopt the postmodern thought of Lyotard. In the postmodern plura-verse, there

is nothing that allows Christianity to standout, no unique selling point, and it becomes just

another story competing for acceptance. Furthermore, with Lyotard’s plurality of

incommensurable language games, Christians are not just prevented from arguing over

truth but also arguing for justice, as there would be no appropriate discourse for

pronouncing judgement or issues of morality when each person or culture plays by the rules

of their own game.

    

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Lyotard tries to sweeten the pill of postmodernism by optimistically forecasting a better

future for science and humanity, once his philosophy is adopted. But many are sceptical of

his motivations for attacking science and promoting a philosophy of relativism that has clear

political consequences. Hawking too is suspected of adopting postmodern-like philosophy

in his science as part of an ulterior motive. In his case, it is the promotion of his pro-science

and anti-religion agenda. To couple with these forces would be as big a mistake for the

Church as its accommodation to modernism in the previous centuries. If it is to effectively

communicate the message of the Gospel, the Church must be sensitive to changes in society

(social, economic, political and philosophical) and adapt the message to challenge society

appropriately. The challenge for the Church is to defend to a postmodern audience without

itself becoming postmodern.

Paul was able to empathise with many people groups in order that some might be saved. In

1 Corinthians 9:21-22 he writes:

‘To those under the law I became like one under the law (though I myself am not under the law), so as to win those under the law. To those not having the law I became like one not having the law (though I am not free from God’s law but am under Christ’s law), so as to win those not having the law.’

His example here is one to follow today; Christians should try to understand people in

postmodernity and share the Gospel appropriately with them without ever letting go of who

they are, Christians made in the image of a rational God, who hold to the objective truth of

Christ.

[Word Count = 19,987]

    

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