Angels Sin of General Notes

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General Notes on the Sin of Angels

[May 19, 2009: addition; when one thinks of all that needs discussion here, such as Godand the permission of evil; how he is author of all that is positive and actual in any act, but

is not the origin of the privation in the moral act, etc., this could monopolize the discussion.

I think I should confine myself to what is proper to the angelic sin discussion.]

I am looking at ST 1.63. Clearly one must consider (1) the very possibility of such

sin; (2) nature of the sin (pride, first of all, and envy secondly; (3) desire to be like God,how? Subsequent articles make it clear that the whole discussion starts with the angel

having grace, and all having merited with respect to beatitude. It is in the second moment

that some choose to turn towards themselves, while others turn towards God. (63.5.ad 4)

(also a. 6.ad 4).The psychology is described and should be brought out.

One thing I would like to get at is the sort of knowledge they had of supernatural beatitude

before they made their choice to order themselves towards their own good, not consideringthe rule from on high.

The psychology of the sin is brought out, too, by the consideration of the lower angels as

following the higher in sin: cf. 8.ad 2. Let us look at this text. The objector is arguing

against the idea that the sin of the first, i.e. highest, angel was a cause of the sin of theothers. The objection runs:

the first sin of the angel can only be pride, as was said above. Pride, however,

seeks to excel. Now, it is more repugnant to excellence that someone be subjected

to an inferior than to a superior; and thus it does not seem that the demons sinned inthis way, viz. that they wished to be subject to some one of the highest angels rather

than to God. But it is thus that the sin of one angel would have been the cause of sinfor others, viz. if it led them to being subject to itself. Therefore, it does not seemthat the sin of the first angel was a cause of sinning for the others.1

And the reply:

To the second it is to be said that the proud person (PP), other things being equal,does rather prefer to be subject to a superior than to an inferior. However, if one

attains to some excellence when subject to the inferior that cannot be had

under the superior, then PP will rather choose to be subject to the inferior rather

than to the superior. Thus, therefore, it was not against the pride of the demons thatthey willed to be subject to the inferior, consenting to his primacy: wishing to have

him as prince and leaderso that they might attain by natural power to their own

1ST1.63.8.obj. 2:

Praeterea, primum peccatum Angeli non potest esse nisi superbia, ut supra dictum est. Sed

superbia excellentiam quaerit. Magis autem excellentiae repugnat quod aliquis inferiori subdatur,

quam superiori, et sic non videtur quod Daemones peccaverint per hoc quod voluerunt subesse

alicui superiorum Angelorum, potius quam deo. Sic autem peccatum unius Angeli fuisset aliis

causa peccandi, si eos ad hoc induxisset ut sibi subiicerentur. Non ergo videtur quod peccatum

primi Angeli fuerit causa peccandi aliis.

Lawrence Dewan, o.p. Page 1 4/16/2012

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ultimate beatitude, especially since according to the order of nature they were then

already subject to the supreme angel.2

[We see well that the good thing they opt for is their own natural beatitude. They arecreated in that beatitude.]

[We have to be clear that the whole discussion supposes angels as having grace and ascalled to supernatural beatitude. Let us look at the article on the possibility of sin in the

angels. 63.1.

Here the foundational point is that any creature is capable of an operation ormovement that lacks its proper order. The word peccatum here, translated as sin, is so

general as to apply to mere natural things that lack cognition, and to the operation of the

artist or technician as such, and to the operation of the moral agent, the agent possessing

free choice. Thus, we read:I answer that it is to be said that the angel and any rational creature whatsoever, if it

be considered merely as to its own nature, can sin, and to whatever creature it

belongs that it cannot sin, this it has from a gift of grace, not from the condition of

its nature. The reason for this is that to sin is nothing else but to recede from therightness of the act which [the act] ought to have; [this is so] whether one takes

sin as in natural things or in artificial things or in morals. Now, only that actwhose rule is the very power of the agent [itself] is altogether immune from

receding from rectitude: for if the hand of the craftsman were the very rule of the

cutting, the craftsman could never cut the wood other than rightly, but if therightness of the incision is from another rule, then it happens that the incision be

right and not right. Now, the divine will alone is the rule of its own act, because it is

not ordered towards a higher end. Every will of any creature has rightness in its

own act only inasmuch as it is regulated by the divine will, to which the ultimateend pertains; just as any will of an inferior ought to be regulated in keeping with the

will of the superior: for example, the will of the soldier in accord with the will of

the leader of the army. Thus, therefore, in the divine will alone there cannot be sin;in the will of any creature there can be sin, as regards the condition of its own

nature.3

2ST1.63.8.ad2:

Ad secundum dicendum quod superbus, ceteris paribus, magis vult subesse

superiori quam inferiori. Sed si aliquam excellentiam consequatur sub inferiori,quam sub superiori consequi non possit, magis eligit inferiori subesse quam

superiori. Sic igitur non fuit contra superbiam Daemonum quod subesse inferiori

voluerunt, in eius principatum consentientes; ad hoc eum principem et ducemhabere volentes, ut virtute naturali suam ultimam beatitudinem consequerentur;

praesertim quia supremo Angelo naturae ordine etiam tunc subiecti erant.3ST1.63.1:Respondeo dicendum quod tam Angelus quam quaecumque creatura rationalis, si in sua solanatura consideretur, potest peccare, et cuicumque creaturae hoc convenit ut peccare non possit,

hoc habet ex dono gratiae, non ex conditione naturae. Cuius ratio est, quia peccare nihil est aliud

quam declinare a rectitudine actus quam debet habere; sive accipiatur peccatum in naturalibus,

sive in artificialibus, sive in moralibus. Solum autem illum actum a rectitudine declinare non

contingit, cuius regula est ipsa virtus agentis. Si enim manus artificis esset ipsa regula incisionis,

nunquam posset artifex nisi recte lignum incidere, sed si rectitudo incisionis sit ab alia regula,

contingit incisionem esse rectam et non rectam. Divina autem voluntas sola est regula sui actus,


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The objections and replies are very important. The first refers to Aristotles

teaching that the bad can only exist where there is potency in a thing. The reply focuses our

attention on the realm of intellect: in the angels there is no potency towards natural being. Nevertheless there is

potency in them in function of the intellective part, as regards its being turned

towards this or towards that. And on this account the bad can be in them.4

A second objection notes that there can be nothing bad in the celestial bodies

according to the philosophers, and angels are more perfect still (digniores). The answer

is that such bodies have only natural operation, whereas the angels have the action of thefree judgment or choice.

The third objection argues on the basis that the angels have in them a natural love

for God, and no one sins in loving God. The reply here is crucial:

To the third it is to be said that it is natural for the angel that it be turned towardsGod with a movement of love, inasmuch as [God] is the principle ofnaturalbeing.

However, that it be turned towards him inasmuch as he is the object ofSUPERnatural

beatitude stems from gratuitous love, from which [the angel] can be turned away

in sinning.

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We see how essential to the doctrine of angelic sin is the existence of the SUPERnaturalorder. We are in the domain of revelation.

However, it is by far the 4th objection and reply that fills in the picture of the angelic

sinning. The objection itself is as follows:

Furthermore, appetite is only for the good or the apparent good. However, in theangels there cannot be the apparent good that is not the true good, because in them

either error is altogether impossible, or at any rate cannot precede the fault.

Therefore, the angels cannot have appetite save for that which is truly a good. Now,

no one sins by having appetite for that which is truly good. Therefore, the angeldoes not sin in its use of appetite.6

Here the reply is actually longer than the body of the article:

quia non ad superiorem finem ordinatur. Omnis autem voluntas cuiuslibet creaturae rectitudinem

in suo actu non habet, nisi secundum quod regulatur a voluntate divina, ad quam pertinet ultimus

finis, sicut quaelibet voluntas inferioris debet regulari secundum voluntatem superioris, ut voluntas

militis secundum voluntatem ducis exercitus. Sic igitur in sola voluntate divina peccatum esse non

potest, in qualibet autem voluntate creaturae potest esse peccatum, secundum conditionem suae

naturae.4ST1.63.1.ad 1:

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in Angelis non est potentia ad esse naturale. Est tamen in eis

potentia secundum intellectivam partem, ad hoc quod convertantur in hoc vel in illud. Et quantumad hoc, potest in eis esse malum.

5ST1.63.1.ad 3:

Ad tertium dicendum quod naturale est Angelo quod convertatur motu dilectionis indeum, secundum quod est principium naturalis esse. Sed quod convertatur in ipsum

secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, hoc est ex amore gratuito,

a quo averti potuit peccando.6ST1.63.1.obj. 4:

Praeterea, appetitus non est nisi boni, vel apparentis boni. Sed in Angelis non potest esse apparens

bonum, quod non sit verum bonum, quia in eis vel omnino error esse non potest, vel saltem non

potest praecedere culpam. Ergo Angeli non possunt appetere nisi id quod est vere bonum. Sed

nullus, appetendo id quod est vere bonum, peccat. Ergo Angelus appetendo non peccat.


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To the fourth it is to be said that sin in the act of the free choice takes place in two

ways.

In the first way, by the fact that one chooses something bad: as, forexample, when a human being sins by choosing adultery, which is in itself

something bad. And such a sin always proceeds from some ignorance or error;

otherwise that which is bad would not be chosen as a good. Now, the adulterer errsas regards what is particular, choosing this enjoyment of the inordinate act as

something good to be done now, because of the inclination of passion or of

habituation; even if as regards the universal he does not err, but hangs onto truejudgment about the matter. However, sin cannot have occurred in the angel in this

way, because there are in the angels no passions by which reason or intellect could

be restrained, as is clear from things already seen; nor again could habituation have

preceded the first sin, inclining [the angel] towards sinning.In the second way sin occurs by the free judgment choosing something that

is in itself a good, but not with the order of the due measure or rule: in such a way

that the defect constituting [inducens] the sin is solely on the side of the choice,

which does not have the due order, and not on the side of the thingchosen: as, forexample, if someone were to choose to pray, not paying attention to the order

established by the Church. And such a sin does not presuppose ignorance, but themere absence of consideration of those things which ought to be considered. And it

is in this way that the angel sinned, turning himself through free choice towards his

own proper good, without the order towards the rule of the divine will.7

This is to say that the angels sin consists in seeking8 its own already possessed natural

beatitude, in such a way that it does not seek the divinely appointed supernatural beatitude.

May 19, 2009: there is no doubt that the entire issue of angelic sin is one that belongs torevealed theology rather than natural theology. That is the point of 1.63.1.ad3: the very

possibility of angelic sin involves the relation of the angel to God as to the object of the

SUPERnatural beatific vision. The very existence of such a vision, i.e. such a possible

7ST1.63.1.ad4:

Ad quartum dicendum quod peccatum in actu liberi arbitrii contingit esse dupliciter. Uno modo, ex

hoc quod aliquod malum eligitur, sicut homo peccat eligendo adulterium, quod secundum se est

malum. Et tale peccatum semper procedit ex aliqua ignorantia vel errore, alioquin id quod estmalum, non eligeretur ut bonum. Errat quidem adulter in particulari, eligens hanc delectationem

inordinati actus quasi aliquod bonum ad nunc agendum, propter inclinationem passionis aut

habitus; etiam si in universali non erret, sed veram de hoc sententiam teneat. Hoc autem modo in

Angelo peccatum esse non potuit, quia nec in Angelis sunt passiones, quibus ratio aut intellectus

ligetur, ut ex supra dictis patet; nec iterum primum peccatum habitus praecedere potuit ad

peccatum inclinans. Alio modo contingit peccare per liberum arbitrium, eligendo aliquid quodsecundum se est bonum, sed non cum ordine debitae mensurae aut regulae; ita quod defectus

inducens peccatum sit solum ex parte electionis, quae non habet debitum ordinem, non ex parte reielectae; sicut si aliquis eligeret orare, non attendens ad ordinem ab ecclesia institutum. Et

huiusmodi peccatum non praeexigit ignorantiam, sed absentiam solum considerationis eorum quae

considerari debent. Et hoc modo Angelus peccavit, convertendo se per liberum arbitrium ad

proprium bonum, absque ordine ad regulam divinae voluntatis.8 I had first written preferring, but then wondered if that could be the right word. It suggests a comparison

being made, whereas what Thomas has described is something in itself good while simply not

considering the right order coming from on high; so I just put seeking.


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ultimate end for a creature is an object of supernatural faith for any created intellect

(ST1.1.1; seeSent. 4.10.4D:

Credo autem quod omnia quae sunt fidei, sunt supra naturalem cognitionem

Angelorum, sicut supra rationem naturalem hominum; et ideo mysteria fidei

dicuntur esse abscondita a saeculis in Deo, ut diciturEph. 3.

[I believe that all those things which belong to faith are beyond the knowledgethat is natural for the angels, just as it is beyond the natural reason of human

beings; and therefore the mysteries of faith are said to have been hidden

through the ages in God, as is said inEphesians 3.9.]

And cf. especiallyST2-2.5.1.

Thus, the picture of the angel as open to a first sin is a picture of an angel living

already in supernatural faith, beyond its own actual vision of reality. Obviously, its

natural knowledge of God is far beyond what can be attributed to a human being, but thesupernatural is to it, too, a hidden realm.

The angels, all of them, are seen as freely choosing, in a first moment, a

supernatural subjection to God, so that they actually merit eternal beatitude. It is in a

second moment that the sinning angels are posing a block to such a move into beatitude.Cf. 1.63.6.ad4. Article 6 asks whether there was any delay [mora] between the creation

and the fall of the angels. The fourth objection runs:Furthermore, it was a different instant in which the devil sinned from the instant in

which he was created. Now, between any two instants there occurs an intermediate

time. Therefore, there was some delay between his creation and his fall.9

And Thomas replies:

To the fourth it is to be said that [the premise] between any two instants there is an

intermediate time is true inasmuch as time is continuous, as is proved in Physics 6

[231b9]; cf. also 4 [219a13]. However, in the angels, who are not subject tocelestial movement, which is primarily measured by the continuum of time, time

is taken as the very succession of operations of the intellect or also of the affection.

Thus, therefore, the first instant for the angels is understood to correspond to theoperation of the angelic mind by which it turns itself towards itself through the

evening knowledge, because in the first day is commemorated the evening but

not the morning. And this operation was good in all. But from this operation some[angels] through morning knowledge were turned towards the praise of the Word

[of God], whereas some [angels], remaining within themselves, became night,

swelling with pride, as Augustine says in Commentary on the Text of Genesis 4.

And thus the first operation was common to all, but in the second they aredistinguished. And so in the first instant all were good, but in the second the good

were distinguished from the bad.10

9ST1.63.6.obj. 4:

Praeterea, aliud instans fuit in quo diabolus peccavit, ab instanti in quo creatus fuit.

Sed inter quaelibet duo instantia cadit tempus medium. Ergo aliqua mora fuit inter

creationem eius et lapsum.10ST1.63.6.ad4:

Ad quartum dicendum quod inter quaelibet duo instantia esse tempus medium, habet veritatem

inquantum tempus est continuum, ut probatur in VI physic.. Sed in Angelis, qui non sunt subiecti

caelesti motui, qui primo per tempus continuum mensuratur, tempus accipitur pro ipsa successione

operationum intellectus, vel etiam affectus. Sic igitur instans primum in Angelis intelligitur


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We should say something about the morning and evening knowledge, and the signification

of night here. We should also stress that the angels who fall actually merit in the first act,

but block the effect of that merit in the second act. (Note that all these acts of the angels areacts of free choice.)

In a. 5 the query is whether the devil was bad in the first moment of his creation. Theanswer is that he was good

[Notice that the morning knowledge is had only by the blessed angels.]I look at 2-2.162.6, on pride, and a. 6 is n.b. as finding pride the gravest sin in kind,

because its essence involves contempt for God. Note:

Et ideo averti a Deo et eius praeceptis, quod est quasi consequens in aliis peccatis,

per se ad superbiam pertinet, cuius actus est Dei contemptus. Et quia id quod estper se, semper est potius eo quod est per aliud, consequens est quod superbia sit

gravissimum peccatorum secundum suum genus, quia excedit in aversione, quae

formaliter complet peccatum.

2-2.163.2 nb as comparing man and angel as to first sin, what they have in common

and what was special to the angel.

I should reread 1.63.2 etc.

[Notice that we can never avoid the general problem of divine operation and divinepermission of sin.]

1.60.5.ad 5: on loving God as common good naturally more than oneself and yet also

hating God as the author of particular effect that run counter to the will of the angel (this is

possible because when not having the beatific vision, they know God as the author ofparticular effects.)

Cf. 2-2.34.1 on hating God:

Sunt autem quidam effectus Dei qui repugnant inordinatae voluntati, sicut inflictiopoenae; et etiam cohibitio peccatorum per legem divinam, quae repugnat voluntati

depravatae per peccatum. Et quantum ad considerationem talium effectuum, ab

aliquibus Deus odio haberi potest, inquantum scilicet apprehenditurpeccatorum

prohibitoret poenarum inflictor.

Reading 1.63.1, it occurs to me that the ultimate end is what God provides as the ultimate

end (as in 1.1.1 it is something beyond human rational knowledge). We read (1.63.1):Omnis autem voluntas cuiuslibet creaturae rectitudinem in suo actu non habet, nisi

secundum quod regulatura voluntate divina, ad quam pertinet ultimus finis, sicut

quaelibet voluntas inferioris debet regulari secundum voluntatem superioris, utvoluntas militis secundum voluntatem ducis exercitus. Sic igitur in sola voluntate

respondere operationi mentis angelicae, qua se in seipsam convertit per vespertinam cognitionem,

quia in primo die commemoratur vespere, sed non mane. Et haec quidem operatio in omnibus

bona fuit. Sed ab hac operatione quidam per matutinam cognitionem ad laudem verbi sunt

conversi, quidam vero, in seipsis remanentes, facti sunt nox, per superbiam intumescentes, ut

Augustinus dicit, IV super Gen. Ad litt.. Et sic prima operatio fuit omnibus communis; sed in

secunda sunt discreti. Et ideo in primo instanti omnes fuerunt boni; sed in secundo fuerunt boni a

malis distincti.


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divina peccatum esse non potest, in qualibet autem voluntate creaturae potest esse

peccatum, secundum conditionem suae naturae.

Look at 2-2.5.1:The idea is that the angels before confirmation or fall did not have the beatific

vision, and this is what is primary in faith. In comparison to the immensity of the divine

light, the angels and man had a natural obscurity which constitutes the unseeing characterof faith. They hear about beatitude but still eye has not seen etc.

A. 2 here is also of interest for the good affection of the will moving the

intellectual assent to the faith, even the unformed faith of humans (as distinct from the faithin the demons that lacks the good affection.

Rereading 1.63.1 at the ad 4, I think that the non-consideration of the rule or

measure regarding a good thing is nnnbbb. One could even see this in the person who is

drinking beer, a good thing, and knows the need for limit, but fails to consider it. Themeasure is absent in the choice, not an ignorance of what the measure is.

[Can such non-consideration be inculpable? In humans, yes, but in the angel it is perhaps

one with the very act of the sin.]

1.63.2, on the necessity that the nature of the first sin be one of superbia:In spiritualibus autem bonis non potest esse peccatum dum aliquis ad ea afficitur,

nisi per hoc quod in tali affectu superioris regula non servatur. Et hoc est peccatumsuperbiae, non subdi superiori in eo quo debet. Unde peccatum primum Angeli non

potest esse aliud quam superbia.

We are speaking of sin as something involving the appetite, the affection, of the one whoacts. The angels are spiritual creatures, and the things that appeal to them must thus be

spiritual goods. There is nothing wrong with the pursuit of spiritual goods, unless in the

pursuit of such good the rule of the superior is not maintained. It is that ontological

hierarchy that must be considered. Thus, the first of angelic sins must be not being subjectto the superior in the way that is due. And this is the definition of the sin of pride.

There is one other sort of sin which follows upon the first: that of envy. Thus we

read:Sed consequenter potuit in eis esse etiam invidia. Eiusdem enim rationis est quod

affectus tendat in aliquid appetendum, et quod renitatur opposito. Invidus autem ex

hoc de bono alterius dolet, inquantum bonum alterius aestimat sui boniimpedimentum. Non autem bonum alterius poterat aestimari impedimentum boni

affectati per Angelum malum, nisi inquantum affectavit excellentiam singularem,

quae quidem singularitas per alterius excellentiam cessat. Et ideo post peccatum

superbiae consecutum est in Angelo peccante malum invidiae, secundum quod debono hominis doluit; et etiam de excellentia divina, secundum quod eo deus contra

voluntatem ipsius diaboli utitur in gloriam divinam.

[But consequently envy can also be in them. For it pertains to the same situationthat the affection tend appetitively towards something and that it leans in the

opposite direction. Now the envious person for this reason grieves about the good

of another, viz. inasmuch as he judges that the good of the other is an impedimentto his own good. Now, the good of another cannot be adjudged to be an impediment

to the good affected by the bad angel save inasmuch as he had affection for singular

excellence, which singularity is eliminated by the excellence of someone else. And

therefore after the sin of pride there followed in the sinning angel the evil of envy,


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inasmuch as he grieved concerning the good of the human being; and also

concerning the divine excellence, inasmuch as God uses human good against the

will of the devil himself for the divine glory.Still, everything turns on the doctrine of pride.

Notice that the angels focus on its own goodness involves here the disrespect for

the divine. This is hatred of God.

Dont forget that the first act is good (and this would be like the first act of freedom

doctrine. It is the second act that we must try to envisage, as the change from the first,blocking the merit of the first.

We should try to envisage thegreatness of the angel, as impressing as it must be.

This is needed as a sort of ingredient.

We should also bring in the other dimensions of the act of pride, such as contemptfor God, hatred of God. This in terms of God as author of beatific vision goal for angels, a

goal known only through faith (not vision yet): this is needed to explain rejection.

We should also point out how far from our knowledge the angel is.

What we should ask ourselves is what the idea of the angelic act of sin is. Thomas

speaks of it as a choice of a good, but a choice undertaken without consideration of theright rule, the divine will. How does this tie in with the description of the act of pride as

worst, because it is essentially an aversion from God? Cf. 2-2.162.6

I have been tending to stress that the angel is in a realm of faith in respect to thebeatific vision. One might ask whether I am not offering a sort of excuse for sin, based on

lack of knowledge. It should be kept in mind how great a sin the sin of the angels is. It is

part of this that the thing they seek, namely an appreciation of their own excellence, is a

genuine good, and it is their choosing it not according to the divine order, namely the ruleto accept it as a divine gift (I would say), that they go wrong.

What is the nature of this leaving the rule out of consideration? It is certainly a

matter of free choice. It gets a full description, I would say, in terms of 2-2.162.6 andperhaps 1.63.8, where we see the preference for the natural order over the supernatural

order (re the lower opting in a way for the supreme angel as leader).

In 2-2.162.6 the commutabile bonum that is involved, if we think of the angelssin, is its own excellence; as such, there is nothing wrong with the act. It is the aversion

from the incommutabile bonum (present in every mortal sin) that we must focus on. We

read:

Sed ex parte aversionis, superbia habet maximam gravitatem, quia in aliis peccatishomo a deo avertitur vel propter ignorantiam, vel propter infirmitatem, sive propter

desiderium cuiuscumque alterius boni; sed superbia habet aversionem a deo ex hoc

ipso quod non vult deo et eius regulae subiici.Pride has aversion to God by the very fact that it does not want to be subject to God and his

rule.

And again we read:Et ideo averti a deo et eius praeceptis, quod est quasi consequens in aliis peccatis,

per se ad superbiam pertinet, cuius actus est dei contemptus.

Turning away from God and his precepts, which is in the role of consequence in other sins,

pertains essentially to pride, whose act is contempt for God.


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[Notice that the reasons why, once rationally faced, pride is easy to avoid, are

reasons given primarily for the human being. However the reason taken from Gods

greatness would apply to the angelic case as well.[Notice also this:

Nam per hoc ipsum infidelitatis peccatum gravius redditur, si ex superbiae

contemptu procedat, quam si ex ignorantia vel infirmitate proveniat.This relates to my point about being careful re angels and their faith. Ignorance and

infirmity are not grounds for their infidelity. Better to stick with just what Thomas gives

us.

Reading on pride in humans makes me think that we should treat the case of the

angels as very special.


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Angels Sin of General Notes