Issue: 01/2014

Dear Colleagues,

As we celebrate the 40th year

of the inception of Anglo

Eastern Ship Management,

we all stand tall with pride of

being part of the Anglo family.

I take this opportunity to take

forward the theme of the year

“Proud to be Mariner”. I look

forward to another successful

year with combined efforts

from us all.

Weakness in bridge team

organization and management

has been cited as a major

cause for marine casualties

worldwide. This issue alerts

us all towards complacency

and neglect of basic practices

of a bridge team which can

lead to severe consequences.

It has become more important

in today’s electronic age to

redefine the ways and means

of vigilance.

Wishing you safe voyages.

– Pradeep Chawla

[Contd. on page 2]

Bridge Team Management is the effective management and utilization of all resources, human and technical, available to the Bridge team to ensure the safe completion of the vessel’s voyage.

Accidents are frequently caused by team management errors. Proper Bridge team management reduces the risk of maritime casualties by helping a ship’s bridge crew to anticipate and correctly respond to the ship’s changing situations.

Bridge team relationship with the pilot is most crucial for the safe passage of vessel within congested and confined waters of a port. Below are some guidelines to ensure the two complement each other in keeping the vessel safe.

Master-Pilot information exchange is very critical. Besides the Pilot being informed about the vessel’s details and intentions using the Pilot card, the Master must also receive information from the Pilot regarding the plan he intends to follow till completion of pilotage.

Following are examples of some points besides those covered in C/L D-07 that should be clearly discussed. The discussions should be done near the VDR microphone to keep a record of your master/pilot exchange.

● Handing over of Pilot Card with all the relevant details.

● At times it may not be possible to complete the information exchange soon after boarding due to traffic or sea room constraints. In such circumstances after carrying out minimal exchange soon after boarding the Pilot should be politely

informed that the exchange would be completed later when situation eases. All information required for safe navigation must be sought politely but firmly.

● If ship’s plan is in variance with Pilot’s plan, own plan should be amended only after discussion and being convinced that Pilot’s plan is safe to be executed.

● Minimum depth available if agreed plan is followed.

● At times Pilot may have latest information which may not be charted as yet. Here it will be good to have the Pilot’s response – example: “the buoy shown on the chart has been removed temporarily”.

Bridge Team Management

Tips from the Trainer – ECDISFire Door

Regulation UpdatesShipboard Concentrated QHSE Campaign No. 3

Bridge Team Management

Plan the port approaches

[Contd. from page 1]

Fire Door

● Pilot’s often do not follow prescribed channel limits strictly – mainly taking advantage of vessel’s draft which may be less than maximum allowed. The Pilot should discuss this in the initial stage and if not discussed or there are any concerns, same must be raised.

● Tugs often inform Pilot that they are not able to develop full power. Any conversation regarding this is important and must be documented and discussed.

● Any concern raised regarding excessive speed of vessel.

● Condition of fenders at berth. ● Tugs making heavy contact. ● Heavy contact of vessel with berth or speed concerns

while berthing. ● Contact or suspected contact with any navigational

mark or suspected touching bottom. ● Speed limitation while passing close to other vessels

at berth. ● Any other concern raised with Pilot regarding safety of

vessel and personnel.

BTM meetings are also important and must be given due importance.

SBP 3.5.1 specifies that such meetings are to be held “prior entering into congested locations, port arrival/departure, heavy weather etc. or whenever he deems necessary” & should be discussed clearly.

When short port stay is expected, the arrival/departure meeting could be held before arrival provided that there is not going to be any change in the team due to officers signing off/on.

During the meetings we need to discuss:

● Passage plan with particular reference to navigation in the approach areas – this will include Watch Keeping manning level, traffic density expected, tide/current at time of passage, UKC expected, the alignment of the approach channel and navigation aids to be used for transiting the channel.

● Brainstorm and confirm that the plan is correct and follows the recommendations given in navigation publications.

● Any details regarding moorings and berthing received from ashore.

● If specific details are needed to be discussed with Pilot for the passage from POB position onwards a short note must be made of same.

● Restrictions, if any due to machinery problems. ● Length of passage.

Keep in mind that during the time ship is being finally secured, opportunity should be taken to discuss with the pilots, the outward plan generally followed. Inputs received could be used for departure plan.

Contributed by Capt K.S Sodhi

Why do we really need Fire doors on board ships? When did they begin to be applicable on board ships?

Let’s have a look to the history briefly which brought about the existence of fire doors:

In 1914 Maritime states developed the first global safety agreement for shipping, the International Convention for the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS).

In 1934 Fire on board the RMS Morro Castle resulted in the introduction of fire retardant materials, automatic fire doors and ship wide fire alarms.

1974 SOLAS tightened fire safety provisions for tankers and defined minimum standards for construction and equipment to be carried on ships.

Purpose of fire doorsA fire door is a door with a fire resistance rating and used as part of a passive system to reduce the spread of fire or smoke between compartments. Thus fire door does a function to stop spread of fire and to break up ship into various fire zones. Thus fire protection bulkheads and the use of passageway doors will prevent smoke spreading.

The AVCS Base and Update disks contain a ‘README.TXT’ file which includes important safety information.

The file is located in the ENC_ROOT folder on each disk and contains the following information:

● Specific charting practices of some ENC producers which may be significant to navigation.

● Specific updating practices of some ENC producers such as delays between the issue of paper NMs and

● ENC updates. ● Identified overlaps between ENCs which may

cause problems in display systems. ● ENCs which have been withdrawn from service

for any reason and which should not be used (permits will not normally be issued for these ENCs).

● Specific license and disclaimer text required by some ENC producers.

The README.TXT file is updated every week and changes are highlighted in a ‘Latest Corrections’ section at the beginning. The file should be read as part of the weekly ENC update process to ensure that all relevant changes are understood.

Tips from the Trainer – ECDISREADME.TXT File

The bulkheads divide the ship into various fire zones such as:

Class A: Subdivided into A60, A30, A15, A0.Class B: Subdivided into B15, B0.Class C.

Fire resistance of doors and doorframes fitted to bulkheads and decks is to be, as far as is practicable, at least equivalent to the bulkhead or deck in which they are fitted

Maintenance/InspectionA fire door cannot perform on its own. Its task relies on the correct operation of other components such as the door frame, hinges, closers, seals and glazing systems which must be compatible with the door and which make up the fire door assembly. Hence regular inspection and maintenance of the fire doors is required.

The following points should be checked for Fire Doors:

1. Each fire door should be properly marked as FIRE DOOR and with proper ID number.

2. Check condition of door for corrosion, buckling or any other damage.

3. Check hinges of the doors to ensure same are not damaged or bent.

4. Ensure doors are not blocked. 5. Ensure that fire doors (except self closing doors)

are never kept permanently open and there is no permanent arrangement to keep the door permanently open.

6. All unauthorized holdbacks must be removed. 7. Test all fire doors located in main vertical zone

bulkheads for local operation. 8. Check operation of the self closing device. 9. Ensure that all doors can be closed efficiently and

correctly. Grease all closing mechanism and hinges of the doors if required.

10. Test all remotely controlled fire doors for proper release.

11. Check and ensure that the Fire Retardant packing at the door is in good condition.

Contributed by Capt Ashwani Kumar

QHSE Superintendent

Be sure to check the Fire Training Manual Chapter 5 on Fire Doors and Fire Maintenance Manual Chapter 10 on Fire door maintenance

Unauthorized hold back for the Fire Door

Hole in Fire Door sill of Engine room

Fire door packing is missing

Additional packing in use for the fire door. The door does not seal properly. Damaged

packing

Signs showing misalignment of the door

Anglo Eastern Group23/F, 248 Queen’s Road East, Wanchai, Hong Kong

Tel: (852) 2863 6111 Fax: (852) 2861 2419

Email: aeqa.hkg@angloeasterngroup.comWebsite: www.angloeasterngroup.com

Summary of deficiencies noted in the campaign conducted from July to Oct 2013 – Prevention of Injuries and Heat Stress management

Prevention of Injuries1. On some vessels the entire mooring area has

not been painted with non skid paint, to prevent mooring crew slipping on deck. (SBP 7.2.1)

2. Some portable ladders were found not fitted with rubber stoppers at lower end in order to prevent shifting. (H & S 7.1.4.1)

3. It was observed that in some cases the ship staff did not keep one hand free to grasp the handrail when using stairs and companionways. (H & S 7.1.9, COSWP 14.2.6)

4. The ‘One Minute Hazard Identification Guide’ and PPE slide guide are not used by some crew members for carrying out a risk assessment for routine tasks. (H & S 3.6.3 and H & S 6.1.2.14)

5. It was observed that on some vessels the correct type of gloves was not selected for the type of work being undertaken or when a particular substance is being handled. (H & S 6.1.2.4)

6. The booby hatch covers were not secured using all securing pins when opened.

7. Some cases were observed where the ship staff had overloaded the electrical socket with a multiple plug point. (H & S 5.6.2.2)

Heat Stress Management1. Some ship staff were found not aware of the heat

illnesses and Heat Stress Management guidelines. (H & S 8.2)

2. It was observed that on some vessels that adequate supply of Oral rehydration salts/electrolyte replacement liquid was not placed in areas where it can easily be accessed. (H & S 8.2.1)

Shipboard Concentrated QHSE Campaign No. 31st January 2014: Tokyo MoU on Port State Control

(PSC) introduced a New Inspection Regime (NIR) from 1st January 2014, replacing the existing ship target factor system. (RU-78). See “SQ/MSG/034AS/14 - Tokyo MoU: New Inspection Regime - Ship Risk Profile Calculator” for determining the Ship risk profile

1st January 2014: The amendment to the FSS code adopted by the resolution MSC.327(90) on 25th May 2012 entered in force. The amendments include amendment to Chapter 6 Fixed foam fire-extinguishing systems and Chapter 8 Automatic sprinkler, fire detection and fire alarm systems. (RU-88)

14th January 2014: AK-APC-NTV operating procedures for Cargo and Passenger Non Tank vessels were issued to vessel. In case the vessel is operating in Alaska waters or is in transit within the boundaries of U.S. EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) while calling to or from a US port, the vessel will require to be enrolled with Alaska Alternative Planning Criteria for Non Tank vessels. (US-65- SQ/MSG/009AS/14 refers)

Regulation Updates

Heat Stress Management booklet published by AESM – Ensure you have a copy and use the guidance to your benefit