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r-rn:PCl?T on · Tfig ?-1ID-AIR COLLIS IOU· 'D'i-~.ffBL"N 'l·'YlI '• ·,r f '!T13 155055 ' ·~rl) '. rrYlI •. r" .,.~1?: 1 ~~051 .) ~ i~7\A .LI- .:d • u.l.\. ;tld'i. 1~ :(• rt'ef~~ zlo

1 . ThQ .. ·.ircr~ft /.c ci dcnt Invest i ::;:ati o!4 Tex.r~ ( ..... __ : i ) c onsis t ing of I,Jn::.:: J . :D. CJ.!.l·L'lELL and L1J.DR l!. J . G-OJ)l?~W:Y c on ­vened in th o ~~light :-;af ety 0cntre , .:1.:".IUS 1;:.Y\ll1.A at 0830 i"rida.y 10th July 1975 . Ito pur1.,osc ln~n t o inv~ :.1ti g.:ite the c il"CU~­stnncen ourroundinG the mid-air collision involvin r 3kyhawk aircraft 1!13-1550 51 o.nd 1!13-155 055 on 17th Ju ly 1975 in ~ccord:1.n ce ,,.,i th Comr:Jodore ' o 1i 1er.tpo1·n.ry Eonorand u:::i ?Io. 6/7 5. ~'he AI .. l i' did not carry out an invc3ti ;Zation into the c ,.ltHJe of th e accident ac the :Jlar; Off icer Commandine J ast .:;uotralia I.:rea•o :Soc.rd of Inquiry convene d almont immediately.

·Jommenta

2. Tho inveBti guting teara !ntarvimved twelve ~-ti tnes aea . i1hese consisted of the pilot of H13-155051, othar ~eober s of his flight and :Beecroft Range personnel who \·ti tne5 oed the collision rrrid/or subseqllent evento . The investi g:lt in t; t eal!l is oatiof:ted that a correct oequcnce of events is coni;o.ined i11 the naz·rative .

; . ~he pilots of the aircraft involved were: ·

a . LC:l-l G. 3 . KIHG b . : .. ~L~ 1: .i':. HcCOY c . LEUi J . :: • CLl.RK d . LJD.:: 13. J . :JI!l 1C-1ID e. .3LL'.i : .• n. GIImLLLl

1·ieathcr in the urea was;

a. \'find ,20° LIGHT b. Vioibility 30 1'h o . Glo·ud lUL d . 1000 tt Wind 320/10

(?113-155051 ) :elt a Leader (lJ1 '.'5-.155055) Delta 2 -

:elt a 3 Lelt a 4 -, l ·5 · .ve ta . ,.

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5. Pivo :ik·.rhrn,!r. pilots , h1cluc.!11i the JJilot o of .~1r ... craft n13-155055 {..:~~1~ IIoCOY) und U13-1550!> 1 (JD:)1~ zz:,GJ, · wore briefed r..t OS1 s:·: to curry out a rive o.ircra.tt ntril:.e _. againot lil'·ii'-B I10n.,·~.:::1~, thiLJ l-rc.n to 1)0 followed· by ·,.(11 vici onu.l ~co.do:·1ic 20 dive bo '!1bing on J3ccc:::·oft !:m1.Gc uaj.ni I:i! 76 pro.ctic o bombn.

6 . :he f ive ~,;kyha•,.11:s, in t" .. ·o fliehtn , 1~1uri.o:1er; ~t i0925IC procccdccl accordi nr to th~ '!Jriof i~1:: xaJ C:l.rl"ie·<1 i:-,u:t rd 'il:.~tcd a ttacks agaius t It~'~:·> :1on:..:1~. C!l cc:.1pl~tion t ~1:;3 1~·.,1c~· ( ,·:.ir .. craft 1I13-155051 ) , ITo. ~ (Lircrc.f t 1113-1550 55) ~d :ro. ;5 c.ep::u.•tcci for Bcccx-oft ::ange for the c.cade?:lic bo :r:'b! ?~g r.il'L)be oi the sortie . .'.p-prouchint:; the c o~st t:1e fli~ht ::r.i1i to hcd to ?.une~ frequency, 2E2.2 lJI.~ , und !"coeived clear::i...'1.Cc to carry · out a 'live• c.ivi~donul ntt:.1c1, on th e bo.mbin[~ ta.r r:et . Lean.­while the ::econd flir:ht proceeded to the holdit 1g _pc,zi t i on at 3000 ' ,;mi tine to be c alled in for thoir ntto.c1'::.

7. At a:ppro:,:ima tely 10241: the Leader , l!o. 2 nnd !:o . 3 pulled up to 5000 ' for a starbo~rd roll-in onto thfr tt.;.riet , at thio tir:e no. 2 and Ho. 3 uerc correctly pooi tionc d. in the formc.tion. Once eotoblished in the dive both l!o . 2 o.nd i-:o. 3 co.lled 'in ' ind.ic r,.ting thct they 1mre otill correctly J>001 t!oned in tho form:.tio11 for the bo1abinc: run. .At boob re loaoo point , 2600 • indicated , the Lender in 1I13- 155051 ,mo hit viol<:ntly by !:o . 2 in 1!13-155055. lfo . 3 unawnre of the coll ieion dropped hia bo~b and pulled out of the dive.

a. Lt the collioion point IJo . 2 , 1!13-155055, had tho canopy and noce scctio:n torn off, tho u.iroro.ft th!:n rolled to the left and bpc..oted the ground in a le!t '\':!ne noz:t: do'.rn

· o..tti tude . The aircr::.lft exploded on !opact and the ··~Tacko.ge covered a l:.rGe .?.I'~~ . ~ crash diugraa is at

. 9 • . The 1,ilot of ~Jcyhm·rl;: 1:1,- 155055 uaa 1(1lle d.' inetantl:, •

10. 1:eam.'hilc l,Jj)J l ~ll~ G in !!13-15 5051 , tho u~;,ht ~~.-r.t hie 2.ircr~ft hud stf.f crcd a aevcre C:Y.:ploGion in the .rec.r s ,:etion becau3e the airc:::-dt pi tchcd no:1e do,·m and. the pilot ,°,J;;.tJ thrown violently aca.inst the canopy otriking h13 he~d. .,·,l tha~ch the

· ·· pilot ,·:as elie}ltly dazed by thin experience hie 1:ti 't'ial aaaoao ­L1ent of the pro bleo ~,an furthe1' cup:portod by the 1otia ct all electrical power , engine ilh were rapidly decrca.e.!Jlg a.n.d. 1he hydraulic systeti had failed.

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11. W:.J.a. KI1:G1 s initial ronction uas to eject ,' however the aircraft ,,,as 1n a steep dive ru1d an e jectiou t1ndcr these conditions ,,ould have been fatal , instead he pulled · b~ck hard on the control colur,m o.nd the uirc·ra.ft rcnpontlcd, roach1r'8 level f'licht at app~'oxi.mately 150C' and 250 Kto . Uuvin~~ re­go.ined some control over the u.ircrnft the pilot der,l.oyed the cmercency ecneruto1· a.nt.l us soon un oloctrioal p0\·1e.: ha.d bean · ('~ restored, tranmn ttcd a •I·jj.Y".1.)i .. Y• call which wuo a.oknowledced. ?; 13y noi., the cngil ,e l~l=ii had sta.b ilizcu ut 22;; · (no;mal .£0:c a ,

1 wind.-r:!illin[! encine) so u reliellt t·ms atte~pted, t!:io was nuoceo:1- ~,-.ful and po·.-.~cr· l.rn.s set at eo~.:. .

12 . · 1-a the pilot turned tm·1c.rtls 1-IAS HO~{RA he no-tic ed · a pall of black ~~oke over the J.nnge but ·assumed that 1 t was po.rt of hiG O'\·m aircruft , Guch as u drop tank I thnt ·hnd come off 6.urini: the explosion . He then culled for one of the other Skyhm·,l:a 1n the nrca to carry out a viou nl inopeotion of the aircr::i.ft (l-:13-155051) and gi ve m1 co timate of the dumc'lge, this \·1aa do:1e by LCTI~t DI./JiOir.LJ Clo. 4 in the .fo~.ction) .

13. He reported thnt tho Leader was los ing n l~1rcro amount of i\101 .fro:11 the rear of the a ircr:-if't nnd . at this otnge thee ·was no sign of a fire . The fUel looe uas coni'!me d by" the .fuel quantity eauge ~ the cockpit , however it ar,peared ta the pilo't tho.the had sufficient fuel remnining to re~cll the airfield at 1~0·.m.1. LCJR DLU~Cxf.J alao reported th~t the a.rrentor hoo1: wan down.

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14 . · C'n the final approach to the airfiel d an n:tt·e6pt to lo,·rer tho undercarriace was un~ucceso.ful due to failu:ro ot the cµrcr~t hydraulic systom. The undercarr .!age w~ lowerod ua.J.n~ · the energency method . The loso of hydrauli~~ also denied the , pi1ot the use of ~laps, spoilers nnd speed b?nkea in+ine th~ " al)proo.ch and landing . To n1n1mizc the pocsibill ty of fire on lillld.1.ng the engine was shut do·wn as the aircri:4t · priasod over · the .runwo.y threshold . Tcuch-do-:m we.s at 160 Zto :-JUQt -uho::t ot the arrestor uire on ~unway 26, engager1ont· \13.S non:?al but.· the r~ose wheel colln.:psed during the landinb 1i.rn. Ji.a soon M -the aircrc..ft ctopped the pilot ocde the ejection oeut · .' 8uf.e • and rapidly evacuated tho cockpit . He wa!l then -ta.ken by ·the' .;AB; helicopter to HT 723 squadron 1.1here ho 'fO.S ex::i.mi~cd by· a Hedieal O!ficcr . .

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15. : · · Fire vehiclco qu1okly surrounded · 1n3 .. ·155051 and began ,:r~hint; aua.y the fuel spillage ui~h high '' presottro wo:te;r je~. .

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. The Craeh ~"..rea at Beecroft Rnnee

16. J.t 10251~ when Skyhawk K13-15505 5 crashed on the bombine ranee :POqLG N. ilAru;.y who \las manning the radio called •l(AYDi~Y• but did not receive a reply, o.t the so.me tilut, the Ra.nee So.fety Officer, k:i1JT v""I11L3lt and tho remainder of the range party immediately proceeded to the impn.ct area to a.ssist the pilot. if poasiblc nnd to oxtil'l.rruioh aofile 02:lnll brunh :tires.

17 . A tL:;AKI1~'1 helicopter on a tra iuint~ fli€h,t in . Ghon.1-hilven I!iGht area ,:n.o <]ivcrted to the ilru1ce .to contir:.1 the.t C..Yl. uirc~ui't h~d cr~shcd rmd to provide every assiota.nce ponr,ible. At approximately 1037K the 8JAKilfG lo.nded at the. impact ai te a.nq. the Chief Flrin3 Instructor (W Dit u.~J.rr~D.BLL, a mcmbo.:r of the lL !3 l{O.:J .. 't f~\.I:i:) discu1bnrkcd nnd naoumod 0011ti:ol o.t thQ. nrea.

18 . . A search o! the arcc. confirmed that the pilot \'tas dead und this info1:·mc..tim1 wac relayed to Uf:.S lW:·:RJ ••

19. Eecause of the remote locality aentrie~ were not _.~ immediately posted , instead all available persomtel were ~aed . to determine the extent of the n.rea covered by the wreckage· •

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20·. At approxiriately 1115K the Senior · l:edical O!!ioer. CHDR I . Pl!i:Kr;.,.1., the Qual ity Control Of.fie~, .W:OR: 1'. n to\.1: and a photographer arrived by Uessex helicopter and the task o:f photographing and plotting all the wreckage cotmier.i.eed.

Li~ Traffic Control .Aspects a

21. Initial nir traffic control action col!121enced at 1025K with the · sich tin~ of a pall of . blaok cmoke .. :on ~eorott 1a.nze by the Local Controller , SBL~ HIGGS. Almost 1i:::il~cU,ately a •l'·lAYDAY relay ' call was received on .Approach for aircraft' U13-155051 which ha.d suffered an engine .t~ure.

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· 22 . : .:1. further t\110 11-~~YDAY•s• were called .onltange :'i,eq.:...: .. ·'. ue~cy , one by the pilot of 1113-155051 and. the oth~·b.y 7.. .. 0,\B..:lu1~ who ·was mannlng the rancre radio . 2hese ~calla r~te~~d to .two separate aircraft but this waa not made clear at the.time and some confusio~ exiat"ed as to the number of 'ai.1-crdi invqlved in the accident. ·

' 25. The larr.c number of tro.nomlasioria on all !r~quenolea toeether v,1 th tho ohnneo o.r oalla1r,;na by two n~cra.tt ot _ :ptlti lJiviaion, bccomlng Hnwlc Section , ao.uaod·a. delay ot 101:&1nutea 1n contirruing tho.t uiroru.tt ~n,-155055 ,l1t\d in fn.oi o~,b~~ on the Ilange. · tormo.nent :rooordu of theue tl'aiwmiooil".us · ·vco no, ava1lable due to a malfunotion in tha tape,reoar4fa' a,•t1"1 :110:mnlly ;r:eoo~ding on .A~rodromo Contr~l~ .G01\, Uomu ~~ .. ppr()~ •

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24; :· . 1lnersency services uere alerted and di s:pa.tohed t o the thraohold of ·Rum·ray 26 , thoy .:f'ollm.red 'th e airorntt down the runway after it landed nnd uned high .. p.reanure W(!.ter to · ·wo.sh the lealdng fuel away . .from the a ircraft . ' Poai tio:ri.ing of the f ue vehiclea in the 1aor; ·t cifc cti ve fire .fi~ltin~~ poo-i tion. uao hampered by the clone proxiwi ty or th~ 6.ti.ll holio~ptex-to tdrcr~t N13-155051. 1

~~ecor.-micnda tions

25 . :ouc to th0 cor.role:-c r.1;. tur ~ cf thia e.ociu.ent the ;L'i!J: l~ecollt:le?nds tho. t Elt :i.3?.::..:~~, a. senior re searc h- ccie_ntist v~i t:n L.eronuutical. TI.eseP.rch Laborn.toric n, an eA"POrt in_ mid.~~ colli s ionn, be re quoc:tou to us n1r>t in rcorm~t1"'·1.1c;.1f ,. · t1 1, air collioio11 sequenc e, relutiv G niro _'r..ft ·o:tti tudon 1l1id ttii:c:i.'.;1i:tt· · closing r ntc ::uid direction.

26 . T110 high det;reo of. ol::111 outst a.11.ding cou;rage l"llld profeooional ability displayed by ic Drt G. s. ~KD1G throughout

· the \'Thole sequence of . events fron the :point. of coll1oi:on to the successful a:crested landing at N.AS HOH11li., warrants in the opinion of the .A.AIT recognition in the form of an awa:,:d 4t o. level similar to an il.ir 1?orce Cross .

~7 . : . :lecommend that aircraft should n~t . c~ge q;u.lsigns in i;ligh~ \'ri thout noti ,fying _the contro ll!~ au·thox-1 t"i,.. .

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28~ . necoxr.raend that durinc t)~orgency lt'..ndinCG ~e J~'l. helicopter remains well cle:.:i.r of the duty runwn;v. u;nlor,s carrying the Helo .. ~orne Firefighting '.Lquipment (RDiE) e.nd .f'iresui tmen . .~ ..

· 29. Recomnend that Vohiclco not direc tly involve"1 in firefigh t ing and rescue opera.tiona at-e . not :·to · pr6()eed to the· crash ai t e until clecred to do . so by Air . iTa.;(f i C: ·Oon·~_cl aJl.d they nz-e to maintain liotening ,·ratch only:. ·. ·

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30·. .. . . :me to the safety aspocta involv ed , . re'comgiend that the :recording .. equipment in the Gontrol Tcn·191~. be 11p~~tecl --'to R.!.JJ? sta:ndardb ~t the earliest opportunity~

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ANNEX A t. :' :·. . 0,.. OA 109-2/75 ·

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STATIDIBNT BY LODR G. S. KING PILOT OF AIRCRAFT N13 155051

1. . Briefini~ I . briefed five pilots, SBLT McCOY, LEUT CLARK, LCDR DIANO D l?-nd SBLT SINCLAIR at 0815K for a five .. plane A4 Strike against HM.AS HOBART group (EAXP Serial) , ·. ·1-!,:J followed by · a divisional academic 20 dive bombing on Beeorof~ Ranee using .1'1K 76 Practice Bombs. · · ·· ·,~

2. The division of five A4's in two flights launched at 0925 for the briefed navigation route to the target all at low level over the sea . Weather conditions throughout· flight were CAVOK with visibility in excess of 30 KM.

3. Flight flew planned route without incident and attacked target as briefed (simulated ordnance). My flight {CO, McCOY, CLARK) then departed for Beecroft Range for · divisional bombing .

4 . Weather on ·approaching Range was CAVOK visibility 30 KM+. Range was contacted on 282.8 and clearance received to make a 1;ve MK 76 divisional pass, one bomb using our standard 20 dive . I executed a pull up 3 miles from Bowen

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Island hea3ing 330° for a right roll in from 5000' onto a · ·: ·r· LOA of 045 H. I called pulling up and saw that my No. 2 (Moo gt) i. } was on my port wing in Low Level Strike formation (approx. 20 , .. , :. angle off; 150-200 yards back - normal).

0At this stage my NoiL,:5

was not visual to me. I rolled into a 20 dive on the Range practice bombing target · on LOA. No. 2 and 3 called 'IN'. r. did not notice any aircraft from this point in my rearview, ,r·

nor did I look as I concentrated on my dive and release para­meters. At release altitude of 2600 ft indicated, I think I

· pickled the one bomb a11d called "Del ta Lead OFF". However, .L .. , -r. at that precise moment my aircraft suffered a violent buffet,ing and what appeared to me to be a severe explosion from the rear of my aircraft which threw my aircraft violently nose down and I recollect being throvm about the cockpit and being thrown against the canopy very hard. I was slightly dazed by this, but my immediate indications were that I had exploded because all lighting and instrumentation went off and the engine was. rapidly running _down with the throttle at about! travel to full open. I ·immediately prepared to eject, however, I was in a steep dive and attempted to recover the aircraft from the dive. This worked and I pulled the ·aircraft out to near lev~l ~,';/t,·· f~ight maintaining not less than 250 Kts. Altitude at this ·~r~~t;'. time. was 1580' on QNH. r~y posi t~on was right on the coast ·~·1:\lit, :(: heading 045 M. I transm1 tted a :MAYDAY which appeared to go :. ':--t1;-;::. ·<~ out but stopped at the_ last MAYDAY call due to no main generator~ '· ,' I then deployed the Emergency Generator, regained power and , = • .• :

retransmitted a MAYDAY' which I believe was acknowledged, but · · : ' am unsure from whom. I didn't transmit my intentions right then as I wasn't sure what was about to happen but did say the,:t .. ''., I had flamed out. My altitude was now decreasing and I was at :, r· · 1200' descending towards the sea. I then noticed that with ~::\.{/: -~·

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emergency generator on , my instrumentation appeared normal and that my RPM was stable at 22% and by moving the throttle I had fuel flow . Basically committed to ejection over the sea I decided to attempt a relight in the hope of gaining. height and heading back towards the Range·. I carried out a normal relight in PRIMARY and I got immediate ignition and light up and eventually stable at idle (62%). I set 80% with all normal indications , turned port and connnenced a slow climb back over the Range towards Base . I had n9w climbed to ;000' directly over the Range between ORS circles and CURR.AWONG.·· :\I ; noticed a pall of black smoke on the Range and immediately assumed that it was some part of my aircraft - such as drop tanks or underwing stores . I then called for help from my No. 2 or any aircraft to form up on me and look me over. ; There was a lot of RT on Range frequency with the Range trans­mitting and eventually ~he second flight (SP, SINCLAIR) sighted me and told me they \·rere coming to my assistance. I then directed . , that the SP and myself to Tower frequency No.;. On checking in I declared a further MAYDAY and informed them that I was setting up for a straight in Runway 26 for an emergency landing. I w~s._ nicely set up at 10 miles in the centre of the Bay and as th e,t :'"\ engine appeared to be running normally I elected to do an LPA

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onto 26 runway . The SP then told me I had a large amount of ... fluid or fuel coming from my aircraft but no fire . As I continued I noticed my fuel reading was rapidly decreasing from initially. >. 4000 lbs now down to 2500 lbs. My fuel transfer light was on, : my utility hydraulic failure light then came on, boost pump light was on. The rate of fuel . usage appeared to be sufficient for , .. :': return and I continued at 80~~ po·wer. At 7 NH on extended centre- . line the SP told me my hook was down. The hook handle was still up . I selected gear down but wheels did not unlock or go do·wn •. ·.·· I then called selecting emergency down and pulled the 'Emergency

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u/c' handle and all gear went down. SP reported gear down and ... ' I checked 3 wheels were down at 4 miles. I asked to confirm Runway 26 arrestor gear rigged and heard that acknowledged, ~ expeoted problems on touchdown as speed control was difficult·· without Flaps or Speedbrakes . I continued approach on a higher than normal glide slope and when over runway , shut the engine

· down. The aircraft touched down just short of arrestor gear and a positive engagement occurred at 160 KIAS. Immediately on engagement the nose gear collapsed and I crune to stop on centre.;. line of runway with severe smell of fuel fumes . I manually ,;._. '..i opened canopy, quick disconnected, pulled seat head.knocker to · SAFE and alighted the aircraft and ran to the southern side of runway fearing an explosion . I was very shaken and had some difficulty in avoiding two fire tenders coming down the port· side of runway . I gave a thumbs up to the SMO in the ambulance on the other side of the runway and boarded the SAR helicopter and was flown to 723 line . The SNO came and picked me up and . after questioning he drove me back to 'J' Hangar . At this stage I realised that there was another aircraft involved but do

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.4f?ci.~ /~ Jang)

Lieutenant ommander RAN

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IHTTIODUCTIO?l

RESTRICTED ANNEX G to OA109•2/75

REPORT ON MID AIR COLLISION BETWEEN. SKYHAWK N13-125022 .A.ND SKYHA\lK N1~-1Q50~1

SQUADRON COMM.AMDERS REPORT

1. Preceeding reports made by me as Bria.ting Of£ioer, Authorizing Officer , Flight Leader and Aircraft C~ptain cover in detail tho events leading up to the accident and· final recovery of N13-155051 to NAS NOWRA. No further oomt1ents on these facts can be made by mo aa Squadron Commander. llowever,

saome coruuents a.re necessary tor clarification purpoJea 0 on other statements made in the report .

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2. Annex B ATC Heport para 5 unnumbered. . I a~ree that some confusion existed as to who was

involved in the acciden t as at the time I had not realised there had been a mid air collision and the1'etore could sive EJJlY more information in my MAYDAY call other tr..an the indications I had at the time - namely loss ot fuel.~ tll1

earliei- tlameout and loss or hydraulics. On the aubject ot divisional position: cal l-signs which apparently created con­.fusion on the ground appeared to be straightforward. The entire flight was briefed as Delta Section or three aircraft and Hmtk Section of two aircraft. This was wa.:r.'nod out on to.-:er .frequency as such 1 however, Hawk 2 went U/8 after start and aa only four airers.rt were going I altered the call­signs to make the flight or four Della L, 2, 3 and 4. Almost immediately Hawk 4 became ' S' and I then transmitted tho reversion t o the briefed callsig ns,and to the beit of my .... 1

knowledce all aircraft continued to use these o/s i.e., Delta and Iluwk. The confusion appeared to arise when other agencies started using the term Hawk, meaning Beyhnwk and thf;S conflicted with Hawk Section . · · ·

3. I Qonoider the response that I received to 'J!lY Hayd.ay and the c;round f'ncilities proparednoas fo~ Jfl3"~eooveJ:7 were e:tcallent , al thoueh I had ditfioul ty in usi:O:S the n~ beduusa ot the amount of Il/T transmission nnd Gu~d override. Thie \IUD ouod nomewllnt whon I iaolatod GuSJ.'d. »1,e:l vei.

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RESTRICTED

Am·'iAI·IEHT on AIRCRAFT 4. Some comment has been made because I had armament on my aircraft and the Armament Ua..l'!frrswitch was atill on. I waa aware that I e~ri ed 611.K ?6 Practice Doi,ba and was also aware thut the:r.-oontnined no explosive device. The thought or j ettison was conaidorod but rejected as I felt their presonoa·waa in no \toy degrading to t he perrormo.noe ot ~· . Bircra.tt at tho point or recovery., I wno nwaro the Uaster Switch was on but I did not consider it during the recovery. On landing my irunediate consi dornti on was to vaca ·iie the aircrart as quickly as poss i blo and the only pr iority to switchology that I consi dered uas to Safe th e ejection seat before egress w:i no other · switches · with 110 power on the aircraft co·uld nct i va to a.v tune ti on .

5. LJtatoment by POQMG N. DARRY unnunbered. po~a 2. I a'!l somewhat conoerncd at , the par~rapn which

albeit cleo.rly states a f'ull radio transmission allegedly heard by PU BARRY. Both the alleged transmission content on.d ito apparent timing to the aotunl acci dent v..?'o wo~thy' of co:tll!lont. ll.B th o Flight Leader , my reoponsiblity is t() ge1; the fligh t to the right roll in point and subsequantl:, doun the correct dive. On commencing pull-up I made a normal .tl:o.nmnission to the f l ight, namely 'PULLING UP, FULLIIIG Ull' • This is the oxecutive signal tor No 3 to move into the attack/ echelon poei tion during pulJ...up. IIalfw a:y through this nau.o~r- ·e I realised that we would need to flatten the pulJ:­up othcruise I would arrive nt roll in point prior to the briefed roll in line of attack. I thon trw:u:ni tted that the pull up would be shallower and I would be flattening out prior to roll in '. My only other transmission up to point of collision were ' Delta Lead roll.in~ in ' and ' DIVB 18 €i66D'.

COKCLUSIONS 6. The accident and all its connotations was admit~ edly a disaster to this squadron , however, in retr ospect I consider that all aspects of tho flight, previous training , experience and the type of sortie that was being conduo·ted was well wi thin the capabilities of th e squadron and i ts members and the preparations for the flight·were adequate . Divisional bombing attacks are our squadrons primary met~cd or delivert,ag against defended targets and mneh emphasis · and training -is devoted to their succeoaf'ul conclusio n~ They- D.!'<3 in no way any more dangerous than any Qther fo rm of att~ck, f ormation etc., providing all members ot the flight 111o.intoin 1ihe basic ingredie nts or good airman.ship including lookout . The prime ro oponsi bility ot any pilo.t f:tlyil.16 i n toruution , whether it be close or tact ical .formation is ·~o maintain hi s relative position \)y nwo.renead o:t the aircraft nlloud rmd to follow hio l ond throu( .~hout tlio rnatU>f.!Juvre. ·

I t) ,'1 ,-' 11"~~,

.. .?"'ea. o. YJ.l:! G / LODI RAN

001 j[l~~,~ Offl9~ Vll8()!> DQDN .. '

• I

•· ·I

' i ~ I , I

S'l'AT~l'L~NT BY LJDI?. j]. J . • DI;u . .Lmrn - ~:'ILO'l1 Oi HAWK LEADER

1. On 17th Jul y 1975 I ·.·ra.s the lP.ader of ti oec "t1.on of two n i::-cr o..ft , wLich 1 m:.·metl part of n .nh"isio n of five a i r craf t under the le ad ership of the Coi~uanding Off icer Vi 805 0quadron ilJl)i{ ~1 • . J . KL-JG !{AH, n.nd was briefed to carf;Y out a simulated att ack on Hhi1.C HO.BiUiT in :posi tio~ 050 J:oint Perpendic 11lar 30 FH. On c ompletion of th e attack on HOBJ:;.RT ai rcraft ·wer e t o proceed to the 1tange a t which time t he Di~ ision w2a to spli t into two s ections - Delta Section und er the c orr1r.c1.no. of L'JD~{ c:.. ~. KnJG RAJ\ and Ha":rk Section und er the co mmand of LCD~<. B. J-. j)l /J··10ff.0 l\N .

2 . Del to. !3ection was briefed to carr y out one Div-isional .Attgc 1c on j oi nine- the Ranf.:e , then proceed with academic 20 lJive :Bombing . H2.1:rk Section in the meantime "·'as t o proceed to the wal t ing positio n until Del ta Section :had co nple ted their armament , then j oin the Rang e for a simil or weap on pr act i ce .

3. The brief ing ri ve n was c ons i der ed ade quate and the briefing board had be en prepared by SBLT I-i. K . I! c COY RAN.

4 . The attac k ar.::-ainst HOB \ t1' ~.·:c:1.s as briefed and on pu ll off from the tnr ~et , ai rc rr\ft f ormed into lo w leve l b2..ttle fo rrno.tion :t'or the transit t o the Rane e . Del t a Leader positioned the :Jivision f or a Divis ional Attack onto the Range at approximately 10 miles east of l'oint Perpenui cular and in t h is posi t ion Haw1~ ,;ec tion vrere dett1.,ched .

5 . HaHk Lec1.der c.nd Tuo flew to the waiting position a t 3000 ' and held, ready to b e c alled in \ilien Delta Secti on had c ompleted their .'.'.1.rmament .

6 . At approxim 2.tely 1025 a !i .. i.Y.DAY cal l was heard from both Beec r oft nanr;e and Del ta Lcnd f:r i1l aircraft 870 . Both agenci e s were trans mittinc 2.t the scne time , and i t was diffi ­cult to ascertain wha t had occu r red , ns the Range did not nomin8te the nature of th e emergency . A cloud of black smoke was observed on the R.anr,e and furt her transmissions were heard from 870 (Delt a Leader) indic a tin 1:, th~ t the aircraft had flruned out and had su ccessfully been r eli t , and was now heading to Base .

7 . At t h is t ime Del t~ 3 trnnm~i tted and s~id he was r_;oing NO\'TH.A Al)l>iWACH to rel ay informat i on . Del ta Leader re q11ested arrnistnncc and ns th ere was no reply from Del ta 2 , I then j oine d 870 wit h Hawt 2 i n comp~ny , and escorted 870 to Bone .

/n. Aft I had

'!

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s . As I had not heard from Delta 2 during the emergency I felt there may have been further proble:cis , and aft er instruc t ­i ng my No . 2 to land , passed 1:ov-Ter a ~>I'E~P of the situation as I knew it and stated I would rer:ain airborne until the states of 872 nnd 87 4 was cl ar ified . I 1;ms ::mbscquently informed that 872 had cras h ed on t he llarw e and n7 4 ,·,as rctur ninr; to Ba.se . I \'.rn.i ted l1:1ti l 87 4 wr:w in s i tr.h t the n followed hi m in for a full stop landine .

.1

/ ll) \ I)/ I .

//(:'/ ~ ('ll .~ . ~

Lieute~1ant Commander R.:1.N !

STAT1.;NJ~NT BY LI~U'.f J .c, CL\lUC - rILOT OF DELTA :2

The flight of five aircraft \·1aa adequately briefed to carry out a Ship Strike followed bf divisional bombing . The formation was led by CO VP805, LC.DR G. s . KIMG RAM. I we.a DJLTA 3 .

On completion of the Ship Strike DELTAs positioned for the divisional attack on B::EO\ OFT 1u\NGE . Pull up waa normal . Lead rolled into the dive, followed by No. 2 and followed in tu1 .. n by me. li..s ,m rolled in I watched both the Leeder anc. Ho. 2 to nchieve separation . I rolled in inside the two ai:L:'oraft a.he tid o.nd the n 0110-0 f.H1.tiofied tha t aopru:ation ex!:Jted oonoentrated on uoh1ev1ng tho ool"reot oir;ht piotura. Prom then on I wan com.:ciouH of the prooceding airora.tt only in my peripheral vie ion ns I \·ms looking through the guruJight . !Jo thing oecaed abnormal in tho di vc.

At 2650 ' I re lea.a ed. the bor..!b and executed a normal 4iG recovery. T>uring my recovery the Lend aircraft trans­mitted u HAYDAY call on Chnnncl 1, statir..g that he had expar­ienced a flaroeout . I then turned left and saw the Leader headincr sout h , desc -endine , f'ucl vC"ntinJ from the undersido of his a.1rcr2..ft . I o.loo noticed maoke c1riftinG from the vicinity of t he tareet nrcn , but nt that time thinking that the CO had jettisoned his drop tanks did not know that an &ircraft had crashed on the Range . As the CO transmitted hio l·IAYl>AY call another El:..YDAY wao tro.nsmi tted from the Ro.nse Hut but thio wns overtra....-1smi ttcd by the UO t~nd I ·thought tho. t these calls we~c given becmtnc of the bohnviour of tha Co• u aircraft .

After hearing the CO•s cull I called th~t I woulu relay the call to NO~i? • .A APIROACH and switched to Channel 7. I then called AP?I{OLCH statinG that the CO had experienced a flameout and uas descending and possibly would eject • .A.tter acknowledaeBent I then returned to Chc':.4.llllel 1 and found that the other aircraft were no longer on that frequency. By this time :WDR DLU-10ND had joined the Lead aircraft and was escort­ing hil!l toward lW~fi:Ut. I then decided that the best policy \-.ras to to.kc charge of the other two airoro.ft and hold until the CO had landed oaf ely . Upon returning to NO,;H.A .A.PPR.CA.CH frequency I stated my intention::; and asked i:f the other flight members of th e fli ch t were on thu t frequency . ~iPPROACH ea.id t hnt ho thought they wero on Dhmmel ~ UO.,'llA Tmmn. nnd I then told him to bring ·Lhe,11 u.o.1..·000 to CJh(mnel 1.

!;hortly o!'terwnrdc thr-: AI·lll O .. \ClI Controller asked me my nJ.do numbor hml then !.Wlmd .n() to oal.1 clif'i' or.c1nt tre,1uenoie ~ endeu.vourin, r to 0 01"1.tc.tot the other. two 1non1boro of thn flight .

/I then ewitohed

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I then switched bac k to B.K.:::CROPT lUJlG£ ( Channel 1 ) and aub­sequen tly ,·,as told that an aircraft had crashed on tho Ran~e in the vioinitt of the bombing target . I overflew the Hange and called lWJ~tA li.I!PROACH once more ctating that the missing a.ircro.ft had crashed in the Hange nrca. l then recovered to !~.AC NmllUi..

(J.C . Clark) Lieutenant !l.AM

I

STATfilll:NT DY 0DLT A .• n. Sl1W:f.AIH. - l'ILO!l' OF HAWK 2

On the morning of 17th July 1975, I was flying wingman to wna B.J. Dii.HONJJ Ii../.II, Benior Pilot Vl:1805 Squa.clron. We \/Cre a secti.on in a five aircraft formc1.tion, led by mnn. G.s . KIIJG RAN, the Commandine Officer VJ.!'805 Squadron, briefed to garry ont a low level attack on HKA3 HOBART in position 050 roint Perpendicular ;o miles; to be followed by two aep-arate section , one pnos

0div!s1onn.l at tacks on Beeorof·t Range ,

f ollov,ed by ~oadeLJio 20 di vc bor.1bing. I considered the briefing adequate .

After completing th e utrike on HMAJ HOBART the formation split into Delta Division of thrco aircraft lead by !JJDR G. s . KING, and !Io.wk Section lecl by LODH D.J • DiiJ•lONJJ. Del ta Di vioion heuded f or the Hanr,o area nnd lCDR DI.tU·lOND a.nd myself headed for the we.it pos i tion at St . George3 Head . Ao we were approachinr; St . Geor~es Head, Delta Leader was heard "pulline up" a&"'ld describinr~ the tar ge t . I heard other calls to the effect that the pull up \m.s not quite ritiht and the Leader \-ms flattening out , followed shortly after by the roll- A in call . ·1

;~hortly after , Beecroft rran~e transmitted "Mayday Layday Maydo.y11 folloued by u call to 724 Squadron base. There was no indication as to the nature of the emergency . Delta. '.L'hree called 11Going button seven ·to relay" . Del ta Lead then en.me ,1p with Eaydny, flruneout and nskine all agel!oies on that net to keep quiet; that he had the emergency. A short time later , he c onfirmed a relight and requested visual inspection . No further calls \;ere heard from the other members of Del ta Tiiviaion . LCDlt DIJil :mru headed to\Tnrds Del ta Lead •s aircraft which Has atreo.mine fuel from the belly . I followed my leader as he accompanied the otrickcn uircraft back to baoo . LCDa J il~·iOlm remained airborne tryine to get a SITREr on tho rest of Del ta di vision ,-,hile I rec over ed on the vacant runway .

(.A.n. Sinclair) JBLT JLEX(P) RAN

II I

ANNEX B to OA109-2/75

AIRCRAFT OCCURRENCE REPORT ON ACCibprq-- ·

INVOLVlUG A4G N13-1550;1 and N13-l 25022 ON 17 JULY 1975

Report by LCDR G. S . KING R.A.N.

IBIEFING OFPICERS Ry;PORI

as BRIEFING OFFICER/ AUTHORISING OFrICER

1 . Preliminary planning for this flight commenced on 16 July and involved /~LT McCoy and S:iLT Sincla ir who were tasked with preparing the navigational details for the flight . They were given the relevant information by the S . P., LCDR Diamond as to the aims and parameters of the sortie . The plan was to specifically use McCoy and Sincla ir as wingmen on the c.o. and S . P. respectively so that they could be shown at the highest level our Squadron ' s requirements .

I directed ASLT McCoy and SllLT Sin clair to prepare for and place a briefing on our briefing room board . ~ot~ officers did this on the 16th July and before 0800 on the 17th I went to the briefing room and added some minor additions and placed on the board the attack parameters for the divisional passes for the flVrht .

! commenced briefing at 0815 and covered all domestic information . I made comoent that the board contained possibly too too much information for what we needed . The fli~h t of fi ve aircraft were briefed to conduct a simulated s tr ike against HHAS Hobart followed by a s tandard 200 divisional pass .at ieecroft Hanie.

I stressed that the strike on HHAS Hobart would be a three plane 20° divisional pass and the remalt11ng two aircraft a level rotand attack as a separate section. The altitude or release ,ms briefed as 26,'0ft so that it would be the same parameters later ut Leecroft Range. Formation positions throughout the flight were briefed including details of the divisional attack . I ascertained at t he brief that McCoy and Si nclair had prevmously done divisi onal bombing. The interval down the dive was briefed as two seconds and I asked for all member3 or the flight to call rolling IN and call OFF after release . I briefed the attack on HHAS Hobart to be dwnmy and then briefed that we would do the same attack for one pass live on Leecroft Range on completion or the strike . Formation positions, roll in int erval , en try and release altitudes were to be identical to those previously briefed . The flight was briefed . The flight was briefed to make switches for a divisional line pass and on completion of this pass we were to continue with academic bombing. The second fli ght was briefed to detach from us on the run in to ~eecroft Range and wait 1n the holding posi tion until my flight had completed .

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.On completion or the attack and bombing briefing , I tben covered the safety and emergency points .

The emergency discussed was collision with the ground or water and I stated the difference between that and mid-air collision in that there is no chance of survival if anyone flys below the leader or flys into the water . Other specific points mon:tioned applicable to the accident were:

a . Lookout, particularly for other aircraft as be were expecting to be bounced

b • .Stay with the leader and do not ever fly below him c . Hinimum pull out altitudes in the attack d. N:1n1mum altitudes f'or the flight e • . Aircraft lin1itations I Pilot limitations t . Fuel considerations and Dingo calls g. Peputy leader details h. R/X discipline The briefing concluded with any queri es and all the flight

woro satis f ied with the briei'ing and the briefing concluded. :· ·

£\.U'l'HOHISIIlG OFFICERS REPORT

On completion of the briefing all aircrew signed the authorisation book and I personally authorised the entire flight . I was completely satisfied that all th e flight were competant to carry out the assigned task and that the briefing was more tham adequate ror tho m1os1on.

••• • • •••••••••••••• G. C Kii~ LIEUTENANT COMMAliDER RAN COMMANDING OF 'ICER VF805'

,, l'

STAT3IIBNT RY LEUT A. \•l. ORIDDL:J~, UN -

SAR HELICOPT~R PILOT

I wn.n ~cr:ut1bled at opproxirnn"loly H)4S Jjocal fo:-c the Skyhaw l~ inciuent at nee cr oft Jtan·"e . fly f irtlt instructionn \'!ere to cle2..r two civilian contractors off Runway 26 . This was accomnlished and I \rent into n left ci rcuit low level on 26 . le sa:vr the crippled ;3kyha1·1k flov:n by LC:Di! ::nm. at approx-imately one mile on finals at this ti me. I adjusted my circuit to p2.rallel 26 on the erass , on the south side of the runway, v1hi8h t12.s the dovmlrind side , the wi1:.d being ap:pr.oxit:1ately 290-300 5 Kts , 8. t the time . .ie panscd the fire true kc c:..i.i.d rescue Yehiclec whic l1 2..t thnt time were stnttoned <.)!l t~e:1 upwind s.ide of the thre8hold of 26 . Af:1 h!.lM JaIIti- ' t-:~ aircrn .. tt c;ar.10 to a h~i.l t I landed on the grass ndj2.cent to the aircraft (our job being to · pick up the pilot rmd take hi.m to 723 di:,pernal to be collec ted by the Doctor) . I ,·ms subnequently inf'orrned that one of th e i'ire tenders c oriir~_ .. up the rtm'.rar had co rr:.e danger­ously clone to our tail rotor . At the time we were hovering over the ;-:rass alongG itle the :kyhawl: . At no time did we crons onto the rllnwav· or flv 2.cross their 1.1ath . ·re i.·~ere ctationary at the time [l.nd the fire wagon had come from behind. us , outside our field of vision .

I hnd deliber ately ~)laced mr.:elf on the do\·mwind side because as I understand procedures at Nowra , the fire trucks fight the fire from the up'dind side of the c rashed aircraft , 2..nd the vehicles should have been on the other sid e of the airc raft fro:n me , there beine; ade(luate roori1. The aircraft had s to uned exactl -r or. the ce ntre lj ne . }f a.s was stated the powder ~~om this f~re tender wan dispersed , I sueceot it was bec2.use they spt>ayeu it into wind , and not do·.rn',Iincl.

I returned LJJJH. KIIJG to 723 dispersal , and, as .from the radio co 1mnunications I underatood they wore out of contact ':·i th a further Skyha,··k , I as iced to cle ar to l~eecroft . l ,.lfflS told to hold on the airfield . i'_fter eie;ht ~nutes I again 2.sked to r;o t o Beecr oft as it became i:1crensingly obvious that anothc1 ... aircraft v.ras missinr; . I ·w2.s finally r;i ven permission to nroceed &""'ld on ar:..."'ival at Bee croft aGsisted in the initial se2.rch for the remains of t:i1e pilot . \Je :flew the remains back to Nmn·a.

A subr:cqnrmt sorti c w::tfl f'lowr. to SP rch the Rren of t l10 111 i <l- 11 i ,. col J :l n.1 nt1 , • ~HO \.'fl f't)t11a1 t 1 , t:-.. ,ckpi t pti.l' ts of tht! clo1·1I1EHt oi1·craft ln an area O~"i0 - 090 , 4tX'I :'{Gl.,ds fro1:'i the tall fire tot1cr .

/A further sortie

- 2 -

A further sortie was flo\·m . to talce members of the Board to the ac ci dent s it e .

( .r\ . \I. Uriddle) Liouten!'.rrt HN

I

.,..17 1t;t::.nr:c: 11 .. 17 J ,., ·~ I, 2- <:J\i".)j ,.cl •. !•-

ANNEXE to OA109-2/7'5

... ::· ··. < ?nccn•.s ru:PCRT

1 . Ir~vc nH :·a-· i o ,: ~ o t· e q ! :1 ti.::.r collision i nd icate ,kyha.wk :~13-155< '55 i mpacb )d V:e 'l:.nJrr:; · · c •.•f .:th,·::~.: !13-155051 in n level attitude , a t a rc ln t · v c .....,it c _ ·. 2 c f"'f ~, , :md a relat i ve velocity or 30 knots .

2 . Initi nl i ::: )nct ,.::--c .'t!<' e 1,:· t~~c . cn r1o oy of N13-1 55055 strikin g the 3.ft c~:i ·i:' e c c:ce~-: :L c, .. f ·~1 :~-1 5505 1. Fol lowin ,~ ini ti.tl iMpact , the c ~no:1y cf 1: 1:1-1; . ., · •,; ... :c •d .... 1. ' i.o t he a ft onr,ino t\COEHlS

c ompaT"tment of ::13- 15~t ~1 r!.' ct ri ll_ t' •o r.~ .. -~·hoa rd membor or tho nrros tor hook ' l\ 1 fr Mno : 1111~ cn,t• i nt: O"~ :· O!l!:. ~ vc:- dama?~e to nej\i-by hyc\ra uU o linea .. The cn.no .!y ~~ wtt (• t' r:, ' ••• ,t ·1 11 \~vn -ii ., ,.~ 'tlX from the up , er rer1:r secti on of the c :.:!nopy o: h.r,::,l t· c 1 ... ·t t· • corn,.artrn ant . ( ncveral pi oees 1.1oro f otm d i.n : 13-1 ~.~~ :-1 ·1 tc1"' t ·c ncc i de n t ) , The bop ot 1:13.155055 ejec tion ocat t'·c n co· t ··,ct od t.1:o ron r t1p:1r ot N13-15~•051 infli cting rHtvcrc clnn:::ice t o V c ... r r- n.:··r1 f .!..:O') torque tube . Tho top of the ejection sea t and t11c c:: ,~: o :1y :cch n~.:tc~; 1 U:>. o rt noscmbly of N13-15 5055 £Gperate d fro m the aircrnft . ~hcc c ito ~~, ~cs et hor ~ith N13- 155051 aft c ngin o n ccesa pan e l ::i.nd L 1}-1 .::;;· · 5~; c::m.:ip:;· , 1.rcrc found oomo 1 9 200 y:irds from the ground : :~~ ct ~oin t .

3 • .:..n a 20° down . field mode)

Aft er i rll!UC't : ·1 ·-:-1 r:~)c~·, co .. ·.· :i t·cd towards the t arge t nrea dive n.:::l -::1po c°t{:d t'w :.~01:r1' :1t 1

.: ·'1 ·a p eo rl wi t h 900 l ef t wi.ng n 13-1 5 )(1~1 rcb::" n.c-1 t o .: ., r;'::."'' : . • a c n rriod ou_t an ernergency

urrest wit~ th e noco ~~~c re~~rin -e <ol ~~s i ng (in the retract on wire e~~acc~ c~t .

4 . Invoctir;.:lt:i. c:1 failures which c oill."l h,, v c c cxam i 11atior- o f · ·:y!w •:.l: ·1:·- 1 ni rcraft r~ c rd3 .

.:.'°. n · 1 :. ~ ·~e .. :~ :· i cnl defects or equi pment t· id ·· · · 1, c ol l i s ion waa limi tod to

1 , ? • c , :·~·c .. -:~o ot N13- 155055 . and the

.5. E):~l · iir10.tior. o~'": 1 ::0 rt :.1·cz-r. t _ c .r .. D iridic ntc both Aircraft \,ero ser"'• i ce a :llo r ~.1r ti13 .. ·':-"o\ ·r ":lr H~ _1 -r ~ ·· d ti ll TA 100-:,-2 en tries were correct . ·~.:, r.crv ::cin .:; vr ~: !:.:;:1cc t :.cw · ~en s '.9ere overdue and all liied compori e?1tc · c:rc \;:. t 1 :: •• 1.:·. ~-c . '.o ,· c :m~r·ccl def'octa or limitation , rc c c rded in tho J.'A 1CC-2 c.f cit or ~·.:i.l· .. ~·.t 't , ;1ct.l d h~ve af fected their ~}erf ormnnce ir. t::~e '.; 07.11· i11 • :r·-.::.c.

( . Exn.::1inati01: 1,i ~:1~·- 1~;~,..-1 fl .:} t con trol .:J and u13.155055 flit~ht con trol ourf: :,.cea ncA·t~nt ,r :. , r e c v e:r c.•tl 1 rc,n the c r:ish oito , rev eal ed no evi 1· c;· co of 11 tc c·1:· : c.:i.l ch.• . .'oc t or e<1_ui pmcn t failure ha vi ng cauRed thif'1 aec :ltl o. t , , m'"; .n!' .i vr: ··l, ~ ;:.l t 1

• o~ rd' the ace l dent ct.u1s• i t1

tho nub.fffc.it of !'.\ 1 M\l't t o f :n.tn l l ':f •

7 , Invo:.1t ·· r;ation of tho Ii13- 15> 1, 1 noC\o genr colla p$e revealed the cnt1se lo bf) t\ :-~nli' m ct :l o· o'' the .cc' ,., 1·tc nl down l oclt aosombly . TA 121 dt~fe ct iuv ooi~i·; nti.oz nct ;to 5o (' .1• t t .ul t1 .•

8 . iiltyha.wk 111~ .. 1y,r :_i:, W!lfl {o :-J'I'O? cd. . Denne• Buntained by ?113-15505 1 WAG ncRCCTOod r\O f o1J.m·!o :

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c,~ t.'1n o, i ' O H t Mcc,:uus ch,u r fr~m• • \ (1 ) Uncl' l:l n

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l'r, ct,· re. ('I~ ~: ry .1: t r\ Cc om1 door aud

t. ·c ,itt~ c • c • ..t· h ingo .

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J ,·d on ce ntr6li ne juot ,, :1liehtly wri nk led ,md

~~-I·cr. "d't l'c· .1· c; 1:1r fr· .~ ·i . rc:rl .and flap a ctuating to1 .. qt1c "tt.~.)O hm t nt :-• ·.:·cr;d' t oer1treline .

Jj•r,~n.i!l~: ~ •,··.cl clC C!t :t'::.C.'1 .!l:!stemG dnmaeed in r c::ion n:.10\P,:; en. i l! O a ·t ... 1.cce ss door .

( G) Arrc::ito 1--1:oo1: ou Y' o !:t ~ : ·~ A frame right leg f'r:ictnro l .

( 7) it'uGcl n ";O :::. ~ d i'la:) ,·::.; .1 hu c!,;led end torn near J of t r,1.-. r o:·,:, ~·.

{ l} ) 1ht C'!l·:l:t ··,,.., of f1tnolat:o ·;' !10ok cd:t:-i c·,nc:· t :)oi. t .

a dj ncent t o arrestor

( 9) Cc!'?.tr0.1 i:.c rronnn:'.n ~.1"'.c~. fn · ring assembly exten­c.:i v el:i to1•:1 .• nd d:r.t rtc :1.

( 1C) Dn:-:n ':.:nc-! nn::l r ·~:ht :::.11- tFTi~eel n ft fa.iring i n{lo~·. to d .

(1 1 ) :·~· :.· ,1 ··o1·f·r:: :-1 rJ ·~ r·c· ··w el. r:loor nh rai dod .

:lot ~-·.lotl cc'!".~ .. r..t:i )1~ of aiJ·.~·rn ·;c c.lama.ie will be made by ~A :n ar..c! 1.:.t:1.c ;:_--. .... :')!. cJ . •

llo vi r.~nbJ.c (}a •n ·o ~nti··-:nt:.o - ): )Cl"~0 :1~ 01 .

to ~· cc ~ ~= c ~as ev i de nt . Detailed · i J :,, ~:o by SA:m and ~nn taa

-~~ ~-- " I· ( D . ·"'. Forry) Commander, RAN Air Engin eer Ottioer

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STATEMENT BY LIEUTENANT A, PAY• APPROACU CONTROLLER ; ( " ,,

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RE OR.ASH Ob' SKYHA UK A4-87i

At 170025Z Tower advised me on App~o.oh IIotline that there W3.S a large pall of blaok smoke ~ver tha Range area and would I oheok my aircraft . Almoat e1multaneoualy Delta 3 (!4-874) on.mo up on Approach trequenoy 362.2 c.nd relayed a IILJ'I.YDAY oall for Dolta Leader , otating that Dolta Leader A4-870 had an engine failure on the Range and that he (874) would advise further and could I liaten out on Button 1 wh1oh is Range Primary . I told 874 that I did not have that frequency but ,1ould use Guard. 874 acknowle:cteed this .

I then told To\·t0r to aoramble the SAR helicopter, which they had already done . I told OPS that it appea.:red that an ~4 h~d crashed on the Range and tho SAR had been scrambled .

I had 2 Sea Kings in Shoalhaven Bight and I co.lled them on Gua.rd to report in . They did so, and I d!raoted them to the Range area . v.'hilat they were in transit, I saw the A4'a departing the Range, heading towards Base. Delta 3 (874) oame back on f~equenoy saying that Delta Leader waa mo.king a straight in approach to llunway 26 and that he .(874 ) would hold 1.ireck Bay area at 10,000 ft. I did not know at this stage who was with Delta; and what aircraft had returned to Base . I was under the impression Hawk Section who were pa.rt of Delta Division , were with Delta 3, who lleld over \'/reek Bay at 10,000 ft .

! did not realise that an aircraft had crashed on the Range, ao I told the Sea Kings that Tower had advised that 870 (Delta ·Leader) had landed with a oolla~sed nooe wheal but we.a safe. The Sen Kings returned . to ~hoalhaven Bight. Thia wao at time 17002oz.

For the next 5-10 minutes confusion reigned as the Tower controllers , myself and 874 tried to sort out how many A4' s were airborne and should be airborne. After checks on all frequencies with 874 I ascertained that 872 was missing. I told 874 to transit to the Range and ascertain that an air• · craft had crashed on the Range. 874 did so and advioed ·ma that we had lost an aircraft on the Range • . The s,a.Kinge then oame up on frequency and asked it they could o.aaiat. I directed thelil to the Range and the smoke and awaited a ijI!rREP. 906 a Sea King advised that they were near a parachute and would adviee. 906 then advised that the pilot waa killed and tho.t the ground party from the Range hod foun~ pieoea of tlle body ( tirae 1,./0037Z) . ,

~~bet tJAH wao doeJlntohod trom the fowcr to ·tho Rango to naoiot tho Sea Kings.

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OPS requested th~t . 893, SAR Helo oo~irm that the pilot was killed . 893 did ao by saying quote rrthe largest piece of the body found ia about three inches square" unquote.

At 170056Z, 824 was despatched with the QCO, SMO and iHOT to the Hange.

Throughout this inoidont I was hampored by airoratt calling up aaking if thay could aid tho a!roratt and I had to ignore many of the calla ao as to continua with the task in hand .

The confusion about hou many aircraft were loat wae compounded by the fact that the Delta Division had spli t into Dolta and Hawk Divisions . !l.'he Tower did not know this fuct and thoueht I wn3 referring to aircraft 88S and 882, who had flown a.s CAP nircraft , when I was asking Tower bow llla.J."'lY Jiuwka they had .

Aoourate time s are not available !or nll sequences and no tape transcript is available , because of the unknown unaervioeability of the tape reoordor. A tapo transoript io forthcoming from Department of Transport who were talking to me at stages throughout the incident .

(A.LL Pay) Lieute~ . RAN

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ANNEX C to OA109 .... 2/75

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL Rl~P0:8.T ·.AIROR.AFT occumv.i;nci~ - 11 JULY 1975

At 1025K, the tower controller , SBLT HIGGS sighted a pall of black smoke on Beecr oft range . He activated the crash alarm , and made a general broadcast that there was a nsuspected crash on Beecroft range" . All safety faciliti es were alerted .

At 1026K Delta Leader (870) called a "NAYDAY" on tm·1er fre quency, advised that he was losing fuel rapidly a.nd was making a straight-in approach to runway 26, for a ahort field arrest . Runway 03 vras dirty at the time . A radio equipped vehicle had to be despatched immediately to clear civilian works perso1mel from runway 26 - this was ~ohieved by 10211 .

Delta Leader landed , arrested su cc essfully but the nose wheel collapsed as it ran out . ~uel was spilling onto the runway but there was no fire .

All emergency services were at the sc ene almost at once . The pilot vacated . the aircraft rapidly and ran to the SAR helicopter which had positioned off to one .side of the runway . Other aircraft airborne were recovered on runway 21 .•

11here was some delay in establishing that an air­craft had actually crashed on the range , as other aircraft involved were unaware of the accident . Confirmation of the cr ash was hampered by confusion with divisional/section call­signs , some of which were change d after departure from ~owra.

At 1034K;i· when it was confirmed that a crash had occurred, the SAR helicopter was despatched to the range .

The quick response of emergency servic es to aid the pilot of 870 was due mainly to the vigilance and alertness of the tov,er controller who took action on sight ing smoke , 15 miles distant . ·

The tape record ing frequences in use, was impounded, but was subsequentiy found to be of no use to the inquiry due to a malfunction in the recorder . Action has been taken to correc t t~is situation .

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t/\Ji/~ .w. Curri~

Lie,& ant Collllllander RAN S.A.T.c.o.

S!£ATh"'t~1ENT BY 3BLT G. BIGGS - DUTY A..:HODRO?-!E OOMTROLLER

PERIOD 162130Z - 17022oz (170730: 1712go LOCAL)

.At 0025Z I noticed a pall of black smoke rie.ing from B' oroft Range. I seleoted the Hotline to Approach and almost immediately overheard a }li~YDAY-relay :from Dol ta 3 (874) to Nowra Approaoh. I then hit the crash alarm and piped "This is .Air Traffic Control , suopected crash on Beecroft Range, safety facilities close up". The Surface Movement Controller acro.mbled the Si~t Helo.

At 0026Z Del ta Leader ( 870) oalled n N.AYD.c\Y on my frequency c,05 . 2) ndvised thn.t he wns losing fuel rapidly and was going for a straight in approach for Runway 26 with a short field arreot . I observed Delta Leader approximately ten miles to the Eaa t \'ti th a lone blao k plumo of emoke trail­ing from the aircraft . He was in company with two unidentified Skyhawka. By this time I had also ordered the Regulating . Office to action. a radio vehicle to cleur ·.10.rko personnel and vehicle from Runway 26.

By 0026}/0027 it was apparent that the radio vehicle would not be able to clear tha Runway in time, ao I diverted the S!ul. Helo 893 to wt..rn the Works personnel while the Air Traffic radio vehicle cleared the Uorlcs vehicle . The Runway was clear a t 0027! .·

At 00271? Delta Leader (870) wua cleared to land checking wheels and hook. He advised that he had lost both hydraulics and was shutting do\'m the aircraft. He wa.a o:.:i very short finals . Luring the arrest Delta Leader•a (870) nose wheel oollapoed . The aircraft was almost 1.mmediatel:, surrounded by the craoh faoil1tica and I noticed tho pilot rapidly vacating the cockpit . :Juring this timo I had oatab• 11shed that the two Skyhawks which had accompanied Delta Leader were 11Hawk Leader" and "Hawk Two" ·this waa the first time I had heard this callaign since coming on watch. I believed them to be two of the five aircraft which had taxied aa Delta Division .

At 0027 t I changed the Runway to 21 and advised Hawk Leader and two to position for landing Runway 21.

At 0028 Hawk Two positionod for Runway 03 and was cleared to land . Hawk Leader elected to hold on top and ascertain the whereabouts of the other two Skyhawks. l3y ·. this time there was acme oonfuoion with ohllll.go in oalleigns and after consultation with Hawk Lender I asked Approa~h to check the whereabouts of 874 nnd 872 (~olta Throe and 1'wo} this wao approx 003oi. Approach ndvioed that ho was in. oon­taot with 874 (Delta Three) but hold arnve far~a for a72.

At 0034X l.})J)roaoh oontirmod .that 072 (Delta Three ) had oraohed on Bocoroft R~e . I then diapatol1.ed tl10 ~ .. U{ Helo 893 to Doeol'oft with due hasto.

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Between approximately 004oz and 005oz I then recovered Skyhawks: Hawk.Leader, Delt~ Three, · aa2 and Se~ Kings 906 and 907. Also during this time 824 taxied I.Uld after advising that he wae available for .SAR, wae asked to transport the QCO and a I>IIOT to Beecroft. · 824 · departed at 0056Z with the <JOO, ~hO and a PHOT on boa.rd.

Runway 26 waa finally cleared of 870 and fuel spillage by approx 01,oz.

Cono.enta, Accurate times are not always available for sequences

nor ia a tape trnnaoript ava.ilablo as tho tape recorder ·,n,a subsequently found to be unserviceable.

The contusion in the circuit from approx 00282 to 00;5z waa due to aircraft changing callaigna in flight. : !Chis directly oontributcd to the dela.y in ascortaining that 872 had in fact oraahed .

. Had the Works personnel not been we.med in time. (this happened with approx 30 seconds to spare), ·the inoidont could have proved more tragic . I ouggas·t tha·t W01:ka vehiolea be equipped with radio.

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STATEMENT BY LEUT K.G. BARDER .... .

DUTY srr.RFACE MOVEr•IENT CO~T~QLLEif '·

I wna the Duty Surfaco Movetient Controller 'in Mowra Tower on the morning of the 17th July 1975 • . :At 0025Z the Local Controller, SBLT G. HIGGS, drew my attention to a muah;~ . room shaped oloud of black smoke rising from.Beearoft Peninsula. It appeared as though an aircraft had orashed .on Beecroft Range.

~~e .n.pproaoh Controller was contaoted by liotline intercom , ci.nd asked to cheolc all his airora.tt. I then heard Delta; , aircraft 874, relaying a 'MAYDAY• on Chaxmel 7, ,62 . 2. Thia oame through the Hotline loud speaker.

The Local Controller then hit the orash alarm, and piped "Suapeoted oraoh on Daeoroft llanga, satety faoil!iieo close up 11• I .further alerted 723 oquudron ~o scramble 893 via the SJ...R phone . ,

I then arranged for tuo firoou!tmen to go to 723 squadron to boo.rd the SAR niroratt , and directed the ambulanoe with Medica.l Officer there alao .

At 0026Z, Del ta Loader, aircraft 870, declared a ~HAYDlY• on Channel 3, 385. 2. The pilot indicated he waa joining for a straight-in approach, Runway ·261 with a ahort field arrest . Runway 26 wns oocupied by Department o:f Works personnel. They were at tho far end of tha Runway, ha.vins left their vehicle at the near end . Thia vehicle was not fitted with radio .

The radio contr ol vehicl e wua dispatched to remove this vehicl e, by rau.1IIling if necessary , and 693 flew o,er the personnel in an . effort to alert them. This provad oucoenstul . The peraonnel vacated the Runway, and the Works vohiol e was driven off by sailors from the R.c.v.

At 0027iZ 870 landed on Runway 26, and carried out a successful short field arres t during whioh . the noao wheel collapsed . I had by this timo diverted the ambulanoe to join the fire vehicles and salvage vehicle close to the hold!ns · point on Runway 2€. Onoe 670 had taken the gear, tht orash vehicles prooeeded to the aircraft . The pilot vacated the aircraft, which spilt a quantity of fuel on the Runway, but did not burn . ·

At 0034Z, The Approach Controller informed the rower that he had con:tirma tion tl1a t 872 had or ashed on lleeoroft Peninsula, killing the pilot . 893 ,me dia:patohod to thtl soeno.

. .Ai 0056Z, 824 waa diepntchcd to oro.sh soeuo, convey. ina·the Senior Modioo.l Oftioer , Qu~lity oontrol ot~ioer. and Photography sailor .

870 wruJ removed from the Runway, and tb& Runva.v washed down. The nunwey waa olenred, and ;•ea.dy tor uc.,e l)J ' 01:,oz.

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It is apparent that confusion arose during thin inciden t ov-er aircraft oalls!gne . Del ta Division \fa.l."1lled out aa a division of five aircraft. Later, on Approach frequency, this Division split into Delta Division cont .1nu~ the original Delta Leader, One and Two, and Hawk Section; containing tho originnl Delta Four nnd Five . ·

The practice at Nowra of operating Department cf Works peraonnel in non-radio vehicles on the airfield could have compounded this incident. ·

(K. G. Bal .. ber) L.EUT SLEX ATC RAB

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ANNEX D to OA109-2/75

METEOROLOGICAL REPORT 17 JULY 1972

1. Weather conditions at Beecroft Range at the time of the accident have been determined by exarn1nat1on ot NA$ Nowra observation at 1030K, Point Perpendicular at 0900K and NAS Nowra upper air observation at 0915K,

2. Wind/Temperature: surface • ,20°/01 kn 11°0 . 1000 ft I :;10°/10 kn 9.5°CJ 2000 ft • ,,5°/oa kn a0o • ;coo ft • ,ss0/24 kn 1°0 •

Weather • Fine • Cloud • ff Ci 25000 ft. • Via • 40 km • QNH • 1022 mb (30 . 18 ms) .

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3. The squadron Meteorological Briefing was given by /t 1

Lieutenant I .J. BOFINGER at 170805K and covered all relevant meteorological details .

~ (c.o. Robson) Commander RAN

Senior Neteorologioal Ott1cer

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