Ankersmit- Commemoration and National Identity

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eCommemorationandNational Identity

F. R. A N K E R SM I T

Groningen Universty

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N

Snce the publication of Nora'sUeux deMéoire somefifteen years ago

its has become a commonplacein corttemporaryculture: we live in an

age of commemorations. This should invite us to consider the question

of the significance of commemorations for our time. Should we see

commemoradons as attracdve and decorative social phenomena but without

any real import from an academc point of view? Or is there more about

commemorations than immediatelymeets theeye?More specifically, can, or

do theyreally add something to our understanding of thepast?Or should

weagreewithNorathat commemorations primarilyexpresssomething about

howwe relateto thepast,while not adding to our understanding of thepast

itself? Commemorationexpresses or exemplifies a feeling that wehave, or

are expected tohaveabout apastevent, and has, as such, its origins exclusivelyin ourselves and not in the past. Or, so it may seem. For this question

immediately raises a further one: namely the question whether a clear-cut

distinction can alwaysbemadebetween theissueof how werelateto, or feel

about thepast, on the one hand, and our understanding of it on the other.

Obviously, these feeelings about thepast will often be associations that we

havewith apastevent; and suchassociationsare notnecessarilyat odds with

ourunderstanding of thepastand may sometimes, evenimportantlycontribute

to it. For example, theassociationsthat survivers of the Holocausthavewith

this event maywell beworth the historian's attention,sincetheseassociations

could embodyor suggesta new and unexplored dimension to it. So it could

well be that commemoration not onlyshowsus how we feel about thepast,

but isalsoa deposit of hithertoneglected evidenceabout thepast itself. And



F. R. A N K E R S M I T

there is no apriori reason to believe that theeventsof a remoter past shouldnecessarilybe excluded fromthis. So perhapscommemoration could in certain

casesbe a guide for how to transcend the limts of existing historical

understanding.

These, then, are some of the topics that I hope to investigate in this

essay

2. T H E T E R M ' C O M M E M O R A T I O N '

I n English the two words 'commemoration" and 'remembrance' can

both be used for our remembering the past. There is a slight difference in

meaning between the two terms: 'commemoration' is primarily related to

the act of remembering something, whereas 'remembrance'is more intimately

associatedwith the object, or content of what is remembered. Thanks to this

performative dimension (to use Austin's termnology) 'commemoration' ismore suggestive of a social and public event than 'remembrance'. In this

context it is of interest to note that French only knows the word

'commemoration' and has no equivalent of the word 'remembrance'. I f

language is areliable indication of the social practices of a communityof

languageusers,as has famously beenarguedbyPeterWinch1, it would follow

that for the French a commemoration is a more solemn and public event

than for the English. This difference between the two terms is furtherenhanced

by the fact that 'commemoration' is a remembering together, whereas'remembrance' primarilyis a private affair. This fact suggeststhat we should

doubt the commonsensical opinion that the contemporary memory cultus

shouldconflict with what weexpect fromhistory. I t has often been argued—

for example by Hobsbawm and by Megill2 — that memory is private and

uncertain, whereas history is public and, becauseof this, the repositoryof

truth. But the foregoing suggests already that things are more complicated

and thatsincememoryis notnecessarilyprivate it mght, in principie,shareinthe public revelation of truth. Unless, of course, one were to postulate a

necessaryconnection between memoryand falsity But the fact that memory

mayoftendeludeus, doesnot warrent the extrapolation that itahvaysdoesso.

Both the English and the French variants derive from the Ladn verb

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C O M M E M O R AT I O N A N D N A T I O N A L I D E N T I T Y

'commemorare', in which the emphasis is on the act of remembering.

'Commemorare' meansboth 'to recall to memory and 'to remnd somebody

of something', and inboth casesthe act of remembering and not its object is

at stake. 'Commemorare' and its English and French derivatesare therefore

halfway between memoryitself and its object or content, on the one hand,

and a remnding of, on the other, as in, for example, 'this building remnds

me of as cigarbox'. Here we mayalsodiscemthesemanticaffínity between

'commemorare' and its English and French derivateson the one hand and

the Latin word 'monumentum on the other. This Latin word is derivedfrom 'moneo' meaning 'ali that remnds somebody of something'. The

monumenttherefore is not itself theincorporationor expression of a memory,

but has a merelyintermediaryfunction. Wehavelearned toassociatea certain

memorywith a monument; but someother monument could fulfil this task

just as well, or may-beeven better. The monument is, in this way much like a

word or sign that also tiesa meaning to athing, but which is itself a wholly

arbitrarydevice for doing so.

'Commemoration' therefore presents us with a semanric tryptich. I n

the first placecommemoration maysuggest remembrance in thesensethat

somebody recallssomething to memory. I n thiscasethe subject of the act of

memoryand the person in whose mnd a memoryis evoked are identical.

A nd this even isnecessarilythecaseheresincemymemories aresuigenerisnot

identical with those of others persons, even if we recall ourselves thesame

events. Memories, like thoughts, are always tied to personsand do not float

in some im- or intra-personal limbo. I cannot recall your memories, for thesimplereason that your memories arenecessarilyyours, even if their content

doesnotdiffer in anyway fromthose ofmne. I n opposidon to this wehave

the 'remnding of' effected bythe monument;herethethingthateyokes the

memory— i.e. the monument — must be distinguished from the person or

persons in whoma memory has been evoked. A monument does not

remember itself something, but it maymakeusremember something. These

two opposed meaningsof 'remnding of' can be dramarized in the paradox

that ' I may remnd you of something or somebodywithout remnding you

of something or somebody. That is to say I can draw your attention to

something that you should remember, without evoking, as a person, any

special memories in you. Lastly, and in the third place, between 'recalling to

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F. R. ANKERSMIT

memory and 'remnding of' lies'commemorare' (and their English and French

derivarives) combiningelementsof both. And this is at it ought to be. For

what we expect of a commemoradon is that itmakesus recall byremnding

us of something. There is, first, thephaseof remnding and onlythen, will

memories present themselves to us. Without remnders, memories will not

be 'acrivated', so to say And we can onlyadmre thegeniusof languagebyso

appropriatelycombiningthesetwo things in thenotion of'commemoration'.

Next, German is acaseapart. Let us, for a moment playHeidegger's

gameand try to connect somephilosophical insights to the etymologicalpeculiaridesof the German language.There is, in German, in the first place

the neutral term'Erinnerung' and, next to it, the more specific nodons of

'das Andenken' and of 'das G edáchtnis'. I t must strike us that theseGerman

words, unlike their English and French equivalents, associate memory and

monument with 'denken', hencewith hought and are, moreover, remarkably

free from associadons with pastness. Furthermore, it lacks the public and

performative dimension we found to be so clearly present in

'commemoradon' or 'commemoradon'. Andenken' and 'G edáchtnis' seemrather to belong to the private sphereof the human individual. Apparendy,

when commemorating something in Germany, one primarily does so

individually rather than collectively. Here the Germans show themselves,

onceagain, to be 'das berühmte Volk der Innerlichkeit', to quote Nietzsche.

This may suggest, next, that the nationalist collectivism in recent German

historyhas in ali likelihoodbeena forced and extremst attempt to overcome

a characterisdc of the German mnd rather than an expression of thischaracterisdc. And this mght explain why this German collecdvism could

takeon such nastyfeatures. For people are alwaysat their worst, when they

do not coincidewith themselves.

3. R E T H T N K I N G AN D RELTVING

Commemoration brings us back to thepast and has the pretensiòn to

momentarilyachieveakind of communionwith thepast. I t is suggestiveof

aclosenessto thepastand of adirectnessin our relationship to it that will be

absent in our more normal interaction with our collective past. I f we

commemorate some tragic past of our colelctive past during a solemn

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ceremonywe are for amoment close to those who fell for thefreedomof

our nation, or to those who were theinnocent victíms of the crimes of the

past. Andthis raises theobviousquestion towhat extent the past is actually

're-lived'at such occasions.

I f so, our experience of such ceremonies would come close to

Collingwood's well-known argument in his The dea of hstoryabout the

epistemological conditions of historical knowledge.C~!lingwood required

of thehistorian 'a re-enactment of the past in his own mnd'. For if the

historianwishes to explain the actions of individual statesmen or generais, heshould, accordingtoCollingwood, re-live the past in exactly thesameway as

itsrelevantaspectspresented themselves to thehistorical agent. I nthissense

thedistance separating thehistorian fromhisobject should temporarily be

undoneby thehistorian.

However, when wecommemoratesomething fromthe past, there can

be no question of a 're-enactment of the past' in theCollingwoodian sense;

for the past maywell be the occasion of, or theobject of commemorationbut noeffort is made todimnish, let alone to destroy the distance between

thepresent and therelivedpast.O n thecontrary,commemorationonlymakes

senseon thebasisof the distance of fifty, onehundred , twohundredyears

etc. that separateus from thecommemorated past. We commemorate the

past precisely because of the distance between it and the present.

Commemorationhas adifferent aisondêreandrelatesto adifferent experience

of the past, thanwhat is suggested by thenotion of 'relivingthe past'.

This does not exclude that a reliving of the past may be part of thecommemoration of the past. Commemorations of certain events of the

SecondWorld War, such as D-Day, theHolocaust, the resistance against the

Nazi's or of the Liberation mayinvite in people who participated in these

events a re-living of these events. And for them the commemorated past

maythen comequiteclose again. But even these people will not actually

relive the past in theCollingwoodian sense. For thequite real and intense

feelings that theywill then havewith regard to these events will be feelingsaboutthese events, feelings that they haveaboutthepast fromthe perspective

of the present, but certainly not a reproduction of the feelings they had

during these events themselves. They will then experience feelings about

feelings, though I should immediately add that feelings about feelings may

sometimes be no lessintense than the original feelings occasioningthem.

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F . R. ANKERSMIT

Remorse is a good example: remorsemay start with the feeling that we didsomething wrong in the post, but then this feeling of regretmaystart tohave

a life of its own and develop into a feeling about this inirial feeling of regret.

And as such it maybegin to domnate our frame of mnd that is whollyout

of propordonwith the event itself.

And so it is with history. For in historyit may also happen that these

'secondary feelingsbecomemore intensethan the 'primary ones.A striking

exampleis the first commemoradon of the Fali of the Bastille inJuly1790—

I shall return lateron to later nineteenth century commemorations of July

14th. Justly famous is Michelet's hyperbolic account of this first

commemoradon in hisHistorede IaRéolution Françase Preciselybecauseof

Michelet's intendon to identifyhimself completelywith this commemoration

and to present in his account a true 'résurrection' of the event - precisely

becauseof this can his account bring us closest to theenthusiasmthat must

haveinspired this first commemoration. 'Gleichesdurch Gleiches', to quote

Nietzsche. What must strike us in Michelet's account is how commemorationand reliving are inextricably bound up in this caseand how this made this

first commemorationof July14th 1789 intoaneventparadoxically surpassing

the commemorated event itself in symbolic meaning and significance. Michelet

himself is well awareof this and this may explain why, in his opinion, the

essenceof the French Revolution could announceitself more clearlyin this

first commemoration of july14th than in anyother event of the period. The

counter-intuitive fact suggestedbyMichelet is, therefore, that theessenceof

the Revolution is to be found in a commemoration, and, even more so, inone that took placewhen the Revolution still had to get under its way This

commemoration, spontaneous, emanating fromthe most vividand authentic

awarenessof the commemorated eventis trulyherearésurrection à la Michelet

of thepast in a waythat history— letalonehistorical wridng— is rarely, if ever

capable of producing. The commemoration here becomes more real and

more intense than what is commemorated and the re-lived past becomes

moreactual than thepast itself.

'Un sentiment inoui de paix, de concorde, avaitpénétré les ames'5, thus

Michelet when wridng about this commemoration: ali ofFrance, yes even ali

of Europe had itseyesturned toParison this july14th 1790 in theawareness

that the revolutionaryélan, and the unityand fraternizadon of the French on

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C O M M E M O R A T I O N AN D N A T I O N A L I D E N T I T Y

that day announced thebirth of a new epoch in the historyof mankind:

'Cettefoi, cettecandeur,cet immenseélan de concorde, au bout d'unsiècle de

disputes,ce fut pour toutesles nations 1'objetd'un grand étonnement comme

un prodigieux rêve'6.

I n this way the 'Fête de laFédération', as this first commemoradon of

the Fali of theBastillewas to be known, becameso much the realizadonof

the ideal of nadonal unitythat Michelet considered to-be theessenceof theFrench Revoludon, that the commemorated event itself lost its logical priority

to its commemoration. By aparadoxical inversion it now looked as if july

14th 1789, the Fali of the Bastille itself, acquired the character of a

commemoradon, of a commemorative anticipation of what would take

placeonlyoneyear later in the 'Fête de Fédération'. CharlesPéguy, who was

in his socialist phaseno lessa mythologist of the French Revoludon than

Michelet had been, expressed this inversion as follows :

'laprisede la Bastille, dit l'histoire, ce fut proprement unefête, ce fut lapremièrecélébration, lapremièrecommemoration at pouransidire le premeranniversarede laprisede la Bastille. Ou enfin lezeroième anniversare.Onsesttrompé,ditl'histoire. On a vudansunsens,il falatvoirdans1'autre.On avu. Cen'estpas

lafêtede laFédération qui fut lapremièrecommemoration, le premeranniversarede laprisede la Batille. Oest laprisede laBastillequi fut lapremière fête de laFédération, uneFédération avantla lettre'7.

Indeed, the perspective has been reversed and july 14th 1789 now

became birthday 'number zero' of itself or, rather, the 'mnus first'

commemoration of the"Fête deFédération'. And in this waythe simulacrum

of the relived commemoradon could cometo outshine even an event such

as the Fali of the Bastille.

4. T H E R E L I G I O U S ORIG INS O F C O M M E M O R A T I O N

There is one more element in Michelet's account of this first

commemoration of july14th thatwill demandour attendon. Lionel Gossman

TE XT OS D E H I STÓRI A , vol. 10, n 1/2 20



F . R. ANKERSMTT

has emphasized that for Michelet the French Revolution has been an event ofan almost religious significance. And it is undoubtedlytrue that Michelet,

despitehis hatred of religion as the ideological support of polidcal repression,

deliberately usesa religious vocabulary in his exposidon of the 'Fête de

Fédération'. HecomparesFrance to the Infant Christ on thealtar, mracles

occur such as octogenarian sailors who suddenly recuperate the energyof

their youth and the no lessamazing mracle of Kant whoabandonshis daily

rhythm in order tohearthelatestnewsfrom France— and ali this is expounded

to thereader in twochaptersentided 'De la religion nouvelle'. I n this mood

of religious exaltation that Michelet ascribed to the French in 1790, a higher

and trans- tempotal realityannounces itself such as the one promsed to the

believer in the true creed. 'Le temps a péri, 1espaceapéri, ces deux conditions

matcrielles auxquelles la vie est soumse' - and if Micheletarguesherefor the

abrogation of the dimension of time, this may lend extra force to this

inversion of the commemorated past and its commemoration that we

observed a moment ago. The concepts 'before' and 'after' have lost theirmeaning and can no longer determne the relationship between thepast and

its commemoration.

Thisreligious dimension Michelet projects on commemorationwill lead

us to Freud's speculationsabout what one maywell see as thearchetypeof ali

commemoration: namelyFreud's account of the origins of societyas depicted

in his Totemund Tabu. According to Freud societycarneinto being after the

slayng of the primeval father byhis sons who wished to put an end his

sexual domnion over the femalesof the tribe. Ali that we see as essendal to

society conscience,social organization and social cohesion, the internalization

of social norms, sexual repression, religion, the incest taboo etc. was not

implausibly related byFreud to the drama of this murder of the primeval

father. And, as Freudgoeson to say

'Die Totemmahlzeit, vielleicht das erste Fest der Menschheit, wàre die

Wiederholungund die Gedenkfeer dieserG edenkwürdigen, verbrecherischenTat, mit welcher sovie ein Anfang nahm diesoziaeOrganisation, die sittliche

E inschrànkungen und die Religion'9

Hence, in this first commemoration in the historyof mankind, and that

would rituallybe re-enacted ad infinitumnothing lessis celebrated than the

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birth of society itself. Commemoration is thus, right from the beginning,inextricably tied up with taboo, ethics, the internalization of social norms,

hencewith thestrongestand most important foundations of ali society.So ali

the elements that we may hope to discover in the phenomenon of

commemoradon can be retraced byestablishing their placeand funcdon in

Freud'sstoryabout the origins of society.And this isalsowherewe can find

out about the mutual relationships between theseelements.Thus, as issuggested

byFreud's myth, this repertory of elements includes the ceremony of the

commemoration, the endlessly repeated rituais, the effort to let the

commemoration be the equivalent of the commemorated event and the

foundationalist potential of the commemoration in the double senseof

founding societyand of sacralizing its origins. I n sum, within Freud's

conception the commemoration is most intimatelybound up with religion

and we should be profoundlyaware of this in order to properlygrasp the

psychological and the sociological properties of the phenomenon of

commemoration.

Pierre Nora himself has also recognized this religious dimension of

commemoration as wil l be obvious from his characteristic of

commemorations as 'des sacralités passagères dans une société qui se

désacralise" 0. And sactality and religion will not have lost their hold of

commemoradon in asocietylike ours that still has so many remniscencesof

its Christian past. HenceJacquesLe Gof f : Tenseigement Chrétien est donc

mémoireet le culteChrétien est commemoration'11

. The Christian backgroundof our civilization not onlycontributed to our love of commemoration, but

has also confirmed its religious dimensions.

5. C O M M E M O R A T I O N , R E P E T I T I O N AND DECONTEXTU AL IZ AT ION

The close relationship observed by Freud between commemoration

on the one hand and ritua repetition is amplyconfirmed bythe organizarion

of theEcclesiastical Year.TheEcclesiastical Year is,amongstother things, the

yearlyrepeatedseriesof commemorations of the crucial eventsof thegospel

as told to thebelievers. Eachyear Christ isborn anewand eachyear Hedies

againon thecrossfor the remssion of our sins.Andeach time that such an

event is commemorated the suggestion reallyis that, in a certain sense, the

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F . R. A N K E R S M I T

commemorated events happen again. But of importance in the presentcontext is the fact that in this recurring commemoration historical reality is

robbed of its original cohesion and subjected, instead to the ritual and the

schematism of the commemoration. To return to the present example, the

cohesion of Christ's life, the way He lived it, is abandoned for the fixed

schematismof the Ecclesiastical Year. The major eventsof hislife,as recounted

in the gospel, are detached from their original context, their chronological

order is abandoned now that to each of themis assigned a fixed placeand

datein the Ecclesiastical Year.

And preciselyhereeachcommemoration, however sublime or humble,

shows itself to be the heir of the religious commemoration — its primeval

prototype. For just as with these major events of the gospel, so does

commemotation ordinarilyintroduce a schematism that is alien to what is

commemorated and to thepast itself. Crucial isherethe recognition that the

commemoration always complies with the compulsion of round numbers.

For example, Mozart's death was commemorated not in 1985, or in 1995but in 1991 when his death was exacdytwo hundredyearsago. And probably

onewill decideto commemorate his death again in 2041 or in 2091, but not

in somearbitrarilychosenyearsomewhere in between. Hence, the relationship

between the commemorated event and its commemoradon (and between

commemoradons mutually) is not determned byanylogic or aspect of the

historical processitself, but exclusivelybyour preference for the convenience

of roundyearsand for the logic of lustrums. And this has its grounds in the

contingent fact that wehave five fingers onboth our handsand— obviously- íis fact has nothing to do with history in general nor with the

commemorated event itself.

The direct occasion for commemoradon therefore is a-historical and

exemplifies a double de-contextualizadon. This will be clear if we realize

ourselves that in commemoration the crucial axis is the axis between the

commemorated event, on the one hand, and us who commemorate, on the

other.And thisaxiscutsrightacrossali contextualizations that historywoulddemand us to respect. For in the first placethe commemorated event is now

taken out of its own historical context and considered exclusively in terms

of its relationship to us. I n the second placewealsode-contextualize ourselves

with this same movement insofar as our historical present is temporarily

narrowed down to a fixation on the commemorated event. And in both

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C O M M E M O R A T I O N A N D N A T I O N A L I D E N T I T Y

casesthe brutalityof this double de-contexnaalization is symbolized bythesacrifice of therichnessof historical context itself to the attracrions of round

numbers.

But this is onlyhalf of the story. The human mnd is associative and

feesan irresisribleneedof contextualization.Afguablynothingis more unnatural

to us anddemandsagreater intellectual exertion than theeffort not torelate

something to somethingelse— we hardlyever succeed in doing this and our

invincible desire of contextualizadon will almost always gain the victory.

Probably this is part of the explanadon of whymathemadcs is so difficult

for most people; for mathematics requires of us an effort of de-

contexualization by means of the most rigorous abstraction and that

completely defies our natural propensity to contextualizadon. I n this way

mathematics is a discipline which is at odds with what one mght call 'the

logic of our mnd'. I f, then, we combine this with the de-contextualization

effected bycommemoration that wediscusseda moment ago, this mayfurther

contribute to our understanding of the nature of commemoradon.Perhapsthis canbestbeexpressedbymeansof thefollowingmetaphor.

Compare our memoryto aslate.Ordinarilythisslateiswrittenali over already

and itwill most often bedifficult to find an open and still inoccupiedplace

forwridngdown our newexperiences.We shall thenhaveto write the memory

of thesenewexperiencesover somethingelsethat was alreadywritten down

somewhere on theslate— hencethe complexityand thechãos of our memory.

And where italsodiffers so conspicuously fromthe memories of our PCs

where we havewell-defined maps for ali our old and new documents. De-

contextualizadon can, in this metaphor, best be compared to our wiping

clean of a litde corner on theslate. Becauseof this theexperienceswe may

have, just after havingcreated some cleancorner on theslate,will preferably

bewrittendown there. Wehavemadetheresomeemptyspace,after ali. And

this will produce a condngent, but,nevertheless quite intimate and almost

indestructible relationship between what is commemorated and thekindof

experiences we contingently happen to have when commemoratingsomething. I n short, it is part of the nature of commemoration to tie in this

way'macro-historical'eventsof the historical and polidcal past to the 'mcro-

events' of our personal life and that happened to occur when we were

commemorating something. I f, then, we conceive of commemoration as a

formof collective memory, wewill haveevery reason to agreewith David

Lowenthal when he writes that 'memory converts public events into



F. R. A N K E R S M I T

idiosyncratic personal experiences"2

.Something simlar can be observed for statues and monuments — no

lessprototypkal of Nora's ieux deméoire than the commemoration. Takea

statue. I t ordinarilystandssomewhereright in the mddle of thebusdeof a

largecitywhereabsolutelynothing remnds us of the historical personality

who is honored bythe statue. This contextlessness of the statuemay thus

bringabout that the public, insofar as it isawareat ali of thepresenceof the

statue,will be inclined tosubsumethestatuein the context of its daily roudne

without there being anything in thestatuteitself, or in the collective memoryit incorporates in stone or in bronze, that could effectively resist this. The

statueis akindof protuberance of thepast in thepresentandwherethepast

and thepresent 'meet', while having turned there back to each other, so to

speak. In this sensethestatueis thehelplessvictimof ali that we can project

on it with impunity. As Diderot recognized already, byits imperturbable

contexdessnessthestatueis an object that meeklyand passively adapts itself

to even our most capricious desires of contextualization. 'Diderot himself

hadgreat reverencefor statues', thus Banville:

'he thought of themas livingsomehow; strange, solitarybengs, exemplaryaoof, closedon themsevesand at thesametime yearning in their mute andheplesswaytostepdown in ourworld, to laugh orweep,knowhappinessandpain, to be mortal, like us. "Suchbeautiful statues",he wrote in a letter to hismstressSophieVolland, "hidden in the remotest spotsand distant fromoneanother, statueswhich cal to me, that I seekout and encounter. Thatarrestme

andwithwhich I havelong conversations'13.

Preciselythisreadinessto start playng a role in ourconversationsand to

be carried along in our preoccupations is a fact that can be ruthlessly exploited

for the 'invention of tradirion' and for the construction and enhancementof

nadonal identity. I mention an example. When the celebration of July14th

was introduced in France in 1880, the government decided that the

schoolvacationsshouldalsobegin at that verysamedate. I t iseasyto imaginethat in this way akind of conflation was effected of the prospect of being

ftee for two months fromhomework and from stuffyclass-rooms, on the

one hand, and the freedomthat hadbeenpromsed bythe Revoludon and in

terms of which theThird Republic wished to legitimate itself on the other.

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Here wewill find the function that statuesand commemorations mayhavefor the constitution of a national identityor for the legitimzation of a certain

ideology, politics or of a specific regime — hence for thekind of thing that

has so intenselybeen discussed sincethe publication of Nora'sstudieson the

'lieux de mémoire'1 4.

However, the de-contextualization by the compulsion of the round

numbers observed a moment ago is not free fromits ironies. Indeed, human

memory is constituted bycontextualization and determned bya complex

and ever-changing web of associations. The anomymous author of the Ad

Herennium,the treatisethat determned Western thought about memoryfor

almost two thousand years,was verymuch awareof this fundamental aspect

of memoryand it was herethat he hoped to find theanswer to the question

of how to optimze thecapacitiesof our memory. 'Constat igitur artificiosa

memóriaex locis et imaginibus' (artificial memoryis constructed outof places

and images)— thus the author of theAd Herenniumb. That is to say memory

has its best and most reliable support in the association of what is to beremembered with certain spadal representations, places and other images

alreadypresent in our mnd. Hence, bythe way this nodon of the 'lieu de

mémoire'. We shouldrealize,then, that association is the most egalitarian and

and-elirist facultyof our mnd. UnlikeReason, association doesnot connect

what has equal rank; on the contrary, association has a natural affinitywith the

méaliance Reason is aristocratic and class-conscious, whereas association is

democratic and the leveller par excelllence of ali our mental faculties.

Association has no respect for what we respect most and itdoesnothesitate

toconnect the sublime and the most augustwith the banal and thetrivial.I n

his associations even the most narrow-mnded and boring neurodc may be

no lessfascinating than thegreatestartist or poet.

A n illustrative example of this democracyof association and, hence,of

memoryis theassassinationof Kennedyin november 1963, and the question

often askedin this connection 'do you still remember where youwerewhen

youheard about theassassinationof Kennedy?' The unintendedconsequenceof this contemporary mnemotechnical link between memory and place is

thatashift is effected fromthe object or content of memoryto theplacethat

weassociatewith the memoryin question. We tend to become more intrigued

bythe fact that wewereat that time at a specific placethan bythe remembered

fact itself. Put differendy, the support of the recollection maythen become

TEXTOSDE HISTÓRIA , vá 10,ns 1/2,2002




stronger than the remembered fact itself. And something simlar will havetaken placewith those nineteenth century French schoolchildren to whom

eachyear their libertywas restored forseveral months onjuly14th. Certainly

thiswill havecontributed to their sympathies for the Great Revoludon and

for the Third Republic so emphatically presenting itself as the heir of july

14th 1789. Pavlov would not have organized it differendy. But the effect

aimed at by the regime produced a confladon of contexts — that of the

Ftench revolution and that of freedomfromschool for two months and the

prospect of a vacation on thebeachof Deauville or at theBassinof Arcachon.However, this confladon of contexts could just as well work in the wrong

way And in such acasethe unintended result will be that theassociationof

july 14th with the prospect of a vacation will trivialize the Revolution and

revolutionaryideology, insteadof enhancing and cultivatingit. The prospect

of a vacation then no longer contributes to the Revolution's prestige, but

reducesit to the homelylevei of the school-vacadon. Just as in the Kennedy

examplethe historical sublime is then infected byeverydaylifeinsteadof the

reverse— and it is impossible to predict whether association will lead up to

the sublime or downwards to the world of everyday life.

Selfevidendy this mechanism occluding the commemorated event behind

associations that are irrelevant for the commemorated event, may also be

effective on amacro-scale. Once again an example. The Eiffel Tower was

constructed in 1889 at the occasion of theWorldExpositionthat was organized

that year inParis in order to celebratethe one hundredthanniversaryof the

French Revolution. So initiallythe ideawas to anchor the memory of theFrench Revolution as deep as possible in the French mnd by such an

exttaordinary structure as the Eiffel Tower. However, now, more than one

hundred years later, few people still know what originallywas the occasion

for the building the tower. And in this way the extraordinary height of the

tower is a striking metaphor of the extent to which the the reinforcement of

a collective memory may stand supreme above the commemorated past

itself.

Thisdialecticsof memorywas alreadyrecognized at the time, asbecomes

clear from the fact that was aware of the dilemma of 'commémorer ou

célébrer', as Pascal Ory so succincdy put it1 6. For apart of the need to

commemorate the French Revolution, there alsoexisted, what Oryrefers to

as 'un volontarisme célébratif and which made one see in the

T I D A D E E H ISTO RIOGRAFIA




commemoration of the Revolution littlemore thanawelcome occasion forcelebrating the triumphs of nineteenth centuryscienceand technology. I n this

way onewould celebrate thenineteenth century rather than theFrench

Revoludon— an objection that was contested atthe dmewith the somewhat

hypocritical argument that ainineteenth century sciendfic progresshad its

roots in theFrench Revolution17.Thequestion now arose how these two

elements hadbest bebalanced. And though onesincerelytried tofind the

justemlieubetween 'commemoration' and 'célébration', itcan not be denied

that in 1889 afust step hadbeen made into thedirecdon of acompletecontemporanizationofthis festivity. In thiswaythe commemorationof the

Revolution degenerated into litde more than awelcome occasion for a day

off, some collective fun and theenticing prospect ofending this day in

somebody esesbed. July14th now lost aicapacityofbreathingsome new

and ideological life into the memoryof an important historical event suchas

the French Revolution. 'Lerituel devenu routinier s'accomplit chaqueannée

dansuneambiancetouristique qui parait aprioridépourvue depuis longtempsdéjàdetoutcaractèrepartisan etmlitant'18.Thus ChristianAmalvi in his history

of the commemoration of July14th.

6. C O M M E M O R AT I O N AN D T H E WR I T I N G O F H I ST O R Y

I n thisphaseof myargument itmaybehelpful to disdnguish between

two kinds ofcommemoration. Compare thecommemoration of july14th,

asdiscussed amoment ago,with, for example, thecommemorationof the

discovery of America in 1994, or with the two hundredth anniversary of the

publicationofAdamSmtiVsWealtho Nationsin 1976. I n commemorations

such asthose ofjuly14th thefeeling ofsolidaritywith some conspicuous

event in the national pastgradually fades away;and sometimes each attempt

is even abandoned tocall attention to thecommemorated event. This is

different with theother type ofcommemoradon; forhere the aimis torescuesomething fromoblivion. Hereai thespotlightsarefocussed on the

commemorated event. Thedifference between the twokinds of

commemoradon can bestbeexpressed in terms of thenotionof 'collective

memory. Inbothcasescollective memoryis central. Butwhereasthekindof

commemorationasexemplified bythe festivities of July14thisnourished by

TEXTOSDE HISTÓRIA ,w. 10, ns 1/ 2,2002




what collective memorywe still have of July 14th 1789, the other kind of

commemoradon tries to add a new itemto collecdve memory— for example,

byattempting to show that the writings byAdamSmthhavemost importandy

contributed to the birth of the modern world and that we therefore have

every reason to honour thisgreat man at the occasion of the two hundredth

anniversary of the publication of hismagnumopusin 1776. This is also where

such a commemoration differs from, for "example, a conference on Adam

Smth. Theorganizersof such a conference maybe no lessconvinced of the

importance Smth's intellectual legacy— nevertheless, theyapparendy do notendeavor to include AdamSmth in our collecdve memory. Their interest is

exclusivelyhistorical.

But we may now ask ourselves, what is fot ali pracrical purposes the

difference between a commemoration of AdamSmth in 1976, on the one

hand, and a conference atsomeother rime devoted to hiswork and influence

on the other? Supposethat wehavetwo collections of papersofwhich one

was written for commemoradon of AdamSmth in 1976 whereasthe other

contains thepapersof a conference that took place, let'ssay in1993?Apart

from the title pageand the introduction there maywell be no appreciable

difference. Ofcourseone mghtargue1976 will haveproduced more books

and collections on Smth than theyear 1993, so the difference mght well be

the difference between existenceand non-existence. And this is obviouslyno

small difference. But thisdoesnot yet answer the question in what wayboth

collections of papersmaybe expected to differ.

I n order todealwith this question itwill behelpful, onceagain, to recallthenotionof collective memory. We owe this notion to Maurice Halbwachs

who developed in the interbelluma theoryon collective memorythat still is

thepoint of departure of most reflections on memoryand commemoration.

For Halbwachs eachmemoryessentiallyis a collective memoryand there are

no individual memories in the strictsenseof theword. His argument for this

surprising claimis that wealwaysmstakenlyinfer the non-collectivecharacter

of memoryfromits complexity.Sincememoryis so tremendously complex,

we tend to believe that the abstractumof the social collectivitycannot be thesubject and content of memory— or, at least, onlyin a derivative sense9.

Obviously, this is not a veryconvincing argument. For in thefirst place,why

shouldthere be a paralellismbetween the dichotomyof the collectivityversus

the individual on the one hand and the dichotomyof simplicityversus

I D E N T I D A D E E H ISTO RIOGRAFIA




complexityon the other? Who would wish to contest that personal memories

can sometimes be quite simple, whereas collective memories may well be

quite complex? And, secondly even if weassumethat there should be such

a thing as collective memory, it does not follow that there could beonly

collective memory. Why shouldn't we have botbindividual and collective

memories?0

But if we elimnate this extremsm fromHalbwach's conceptions, we

will haveat our disposal this most fruitful notionof collective memory. Fruitful

in thisnotion isespeciallythe insight that thescopeof the notionsof memoryand of recollection should not be restricted to individual memoryand that

we should attribute a memoryto collecdvides, such as nations, social groups

or professional groups as well. We shouldrealize ourselvesthat memoryand

recollection often are social conventions, sometimes even intentionally

produced - as in Hobsbawms 'invention of tradition' - bythe collectivities

thatwe are part of. And that implies the no lesssurprising and fruitful insight

that each individual — as the representative of a certain group— mayrecall or

remember in the proper senseof theword apast that antedaring his or her

birth. Nobody will dispute that we can recall or remember statements or

historical narratives about a distant past, but we would normallyrestrict the

possibilityof actually recallingor remembering the past to the events that we

havewitnessed ourselvesduring our lives. You mayremember that the Bastille

fell onJuly14th 1789, but you cannot remember the event tsef. There is a

subtle, but nevertheless crucial difference between 'remembering' and

'remembering that'.But in agreement with the logic of his notion of collective memory

Halbwachs extendsthe domain ofeventsthat we effecdvely can 'remember'

beyond our birth. He gives as an example of how he himself still had a

'collecdve memory' of the atmosphere of the late Romanticismof half a

century before his birth21. Collective memory leads its own life, it diesoff,

renewsitself anddevelops in an indefinable limbo between pastand present.

Andwhere it isstill alive, thepastwill still bewith us; a direct and immediatecontact with thepast still is open to us. Here we may find at leastpart of the

explanation of the intense nostalgic feelings for a sometimes quite remote

partof thepastthat we mayfind in the effusions ofsomemajor representatives

of theWest'scultural tradition. One maythinkhereof Petrarca'sorHólderlin's

nostalgia for, respectively, Roman and Greek Antiquity, of that of Viollet-le

T EXTOS DE H ISTÓRIA , vo. 10,




Duc for the MiddleAges or that of Spengler for the second half of theeighteenth century2. And in ali thesecaseswe have to do with a nostalgic

remembrance of apast that one cannot have lived through personally. The

nostalgic past is not yet cut off fromus and fromthepresentand maypersist

in thekind of individuais that havea specific sensitivity for it. Indeed, it is a

remembrance of the past that we should primarilyattribute to individuais

and not to the collectivities that Halbwachs had inmnd himself; thegênesis

of this kind of remembrance of thepast takesplaceon the linesof fracture

between certain collecdve traditions and of how the historical awarenessoftheseindividuais articulated itself. Though, indeed, in this waythis individual

remembrance can onlycomeintobeingagainstthe background of a collecdve

cultural or historical past that is, in principie,sharedbymany.

O f importance now is how Halbwachs distinguishesbetween collecdve

memoryand the wridng of history. We mayagreewith Lowenthal when he

writes that our first intuition will be that memory is 'inescapableandprima

fade indubitable',whereashistorical wridng is 'contingent' and gropinglytries

to find its way around in the complexides of thepast23. But as we know

sinceNietzsche and Freud, memoryis, aboveali, what we want and wish to

remember. Memoryis not 'objecdve' — and therefore inneedof correcdon

byhistorical writing. I n continuationwith this Halbwachs seessome crucial

differences between memory-.nd historical wridng. Firstly, historical wridng

periodizes thepast in more or lessclosed temporal wholes, whereasmemory

knows of no such clear demarcations. Second, historical writing strives for

clarityand synthesis,whereasmemoryis as multiple as there are social groups

entertaining a specific relationship to thepast24.Norafollowsherein Halbwach's

steps when claimng a straightforwardly antithetic relationship between

collective memoryand thewriting of history. Though this may not be the

purpose of the wridng of history, its effect is, nevertheless, according to

Nora, to correct memory as deceitful and fraudulent — and as such it is a

'délégitimation dupassevécu'2 5.

But this distinction between memoryand historicalwritinggoesdeeper

than theseobservadonsat first sight seemto suggest. For we should recallnow that (collective) memoryshould be related not to knowledge about the

past but to the past itself: for as we saw a moment ago we should stricdy

distinguish between 1) knowledge of the past and 2) the remembrance of

the past. And the remembrance of the past is not merely an insecure and

M E M Ó R I A , © E N T I D A D E E H ISTORIOGRAFIA




personalized form of pseudo-knowledge, that weshould always doubt

because of itsuncertain foundations —thedifference is, rather, that in

remembrance thepast itself persists in usand, therefore, still ispresent in

ourselves. So, in thesamewaythat we cannot say of thepast itself that itis

trueorfalse— for the terms 'true' and 'false' areonlyapplicable to what we

sayorwriteabout thepast - so it iswith memory. I t maywell bethat our

memorymaymakeus saytrue or falsethings about tii_ past,butwhatvte say

on thebasisofmemoryshouldbedisdnguished frommemory tsef.And the

crucial distincdon is,once again, that memorybelongs to theworld, morespecifically to theworld of he past, whereas speaking andwriting, more

speciftcally historical wridng,givesusknowedgeabout theworld. I t therefore

is acategorymstake tocriticize memory for itsbeing unreliable — for this

cridcismappliesto theworld (of thepast) criteria that can onlymeaningfully

be used forknowedgeof theworld. I nthis way we canadmre the

appropriateness of Nora's observation that historical writing achieves a

'délégitimadon dupassevécu'. There is anintrinsicoppositionbetween history,

on the one hand, and memoryor 'lepassevécu', on the other. But we should

not interpret this claimasexpressingthe victoryof sound historical knowledge

over thevagariesof memory. The claimexpresses,rather, theshift fromwhat

we have knowledge of — indeed, 'lepassevécu' — to knowledge.

Here, then, may wef ind thedifference between memoryand

commemoradon on the onehand andhistorical writing on theother - or

between acollection of essayson AdamSmth published in1976 andone

thatis published in 1993. The aimof the 1993-collection simplyis to contribute

toour knowledge and understanding of Smth's writings; the 1776-collecdon

undoubtedlyhasthis sameaim, but, primarily, also toadd anew dimension

to the thepast itself. A pasthascome into being that isricher than the one

that we had before: wenow carry alongwith us inthepresent the memory

of AdamSmth and his Wealthof Nations just aswe carryalong the memory

of the historyofour nationor ofWorld War I I . Historicalwritingaddsto

our knowledge of thepast,whereascommemorationenlargesthepast itself.I t should berecognized, however, that inpractice aclear and well-defined

dividing line between thetwo cannot bedrawn. The 1993-collection will

inevitablyhaveacommemorative dimension to itaswell,whereasthe 1776-

collectionwill alsoattempt to provide uswithnew insights in Smth's writings.

A l i historical writing is, to acertain extent, commemorative; and ali

TEXTOSDE HISTÓRIA , vo. 10,n1




commemorationis, to a certain extent historicalwriting.But this is no argument

against the distinction nor against thenecessityof making it. For as Ernest

Nagel put it long ago, it maywell be that we cannot pinpoint with absolute

precision where our neckendsand our shoulder begins, but this is no argument

against the meaningfulness of thedistinction. I t is one of our most fallacious

and intellectuallyparalyzing beliefs that distinctions not permtting of clear

dividinglinesshould be abandoned (a fallacywhich is, bythe way the lifeblood

of deconstructivism).

Lastly, we wil l now also understand why commemoration almostinvariablygoestogether witha double de-contextualization that was discussed

in the previous section. At first sight we mght be tempted to discern in this

de-contextualization a movement againsthistory. For is contextualization not

the hallmark and condidon of ali historical understanding? We historicize, we

understand historically, bycontextualization. Hence, the de-contextualization

o f commemoration appears to effect a relationship between the

commemorated past,on the one hand, and ourselves, on the other, that is at

oddswith both the nature of ali historical understanding and anopennessto

how the past actually has been. But this is a misunderstanding of

commemotation. For recall now that this de-contextualization had no other

purpose than tocreateacleancorner on 'theslateof our memory — a corner

where now something new could be inscribed and that wouldrespect better

the authenticity of the remembered or commemorated event than when

new contents of memorymnglewith contents thatwerealreadypresent on

the slate of memory. I n this way commemoradon will come closer to a'résurrection' of thepast than we mayever expect from historical writing.

Historicalwriting,bycontextualizing thepast,inevitablydissolvesthe authenticity

of the past in the vagaries of its 'Wirkungsgeschichte'. There is no more

appropriate wayfor expressing this difference between historical wridng, on

the one hand, and commemoradon on the other than bysayngthat historical

writing may give us an understandingof the past, whereas commemoration

will give us thepast tsef.

7. C O N C L U S I O N

I n the lengthyafterwordNorawrote for thehugeserieson the 'lieux de

«5TTDADE E H ISTO RIO GRAFIA



C O M M E M O R AT I O N AN D N A T I O N A L I D E N T I T Y

mémoire' edited byhim, he spoke of 'an acharnement commémoradf desdeux ou troisdernières décennies'2 6. Sincethefirst ambitious commemorations

of the last few decades — that of the two hundredth anniversary of the

AmericanRevolution and thatof the French Revoludon thirteenyearslater—

the stream of commemorations gradually increased and would in the last

ten to fifteen yearserupt in a truedelugeof commemorations.

I f we ask ourselves how to interpret the coniemporray cult of

commemoration, two closely related considerations immediately come to

mnd. What must strike us in the first place is that commemoradon must

invitea certain trivialfzation of thepast.Traditional historical writingalways

sought to transcend personal or group inspired oriented conceptions of the

past— though,needlessto say it was far frombeingsuccessful in this attempt.

Nevertheless, onealwaysaimed atsomeintersubjective andtimelesshistorical

truth. Commemoration, however doesnot aimat historical depth and truth;

it is content with its superficiality. The banal and the trivial are openly and

unashamedlywelcomed. I n the secondplace,commemorationre-emphasizestheplaceof the historical subject. Traditional historical writingalwaysrequired

of the historian to beabsenthimself fromhis writings:think of Ranke's'ich

wünschte meinSelbstgleichsamaus zu lõschen'. But this is whollydifferent

with commemorations: it is wewho commemorate something and we

commemorate thepastonlybecauseof what itmeanstousCommemoration

is hodiecentric.

One wouldhaveexpected that this abandonment of supra-historical

truth and the celebration of the historical subject would have made

commemoration into the plaything of ideology and of political aims. And

this expectadon is byno means incorrect, as wehaveseenwhen discussing

above how powerfullycommemoration contributed to the 'invention of

tradition'. But two considerations should be taken into account. The first is

thathistoricalwritinghas been nolesstheeasyvictimof ideologyandpolitical

aims. Think of Michelet,thinkof the historians of thePrussianschool such as

Treitschke, Sybel or Droysen, think of Marxist historical writing. We needonlyrecall examplessuch as thesein order to realize ourselvesthe hypocrisy

of those historians believing that historicalwritingis the selfevident censorof

the irresponsible effusions of commemoration.And this brings me to a second

consideration. For thetruthof the matteris thatordinarilytwerethe historians

themselves who most powerfully contributed to the politicizarion of

TEXTOSDE HISTÓR IA , vo. 10 , nB l/ l




commemoration. The politicization of thepast beganwith historical writingand fromthere it triclded downintocommemoration. Moreover, Nora offers

anamazingargument suggestingthat commemoration is intrinsicallya-political

rather than political. Heobservesthat commemoration is most often inspired

bythe preoccupadon of individuais and of individual groups, whereas the

state, as the incorporadon of (national) polidcs, often is the outsider in

commemoradon. Of course the state also celebrates its commemorations,

but as we haveseen, thesenadonal commemoradons tend to be overgrown

bysendments that have litde or nothing to do with the occasion itself of acommemoration. Theyare likethesestatuesinlargecitiesto which everybody

attacheshis or her own personal associationsand that ordinarilyhavelitde or

nothing to do with the person or event that is honored bythestatue. In this

way the commemoration exemplifies, perhapsbetter than anythingelse,what

one maydescribeas 'the privatization of thepast'2'.

As Nora puts it, commemoration 'est devenu, pour chacun desgroupes

concernes, le fildissemnedansle tissu social qui leur permettra, aupresentà

établir un court-circuitavecunpassedéfinitivement mort'. The national and

political past is dead, and has now been replaced by the many individual

relationships to the past of individuais and of individual groups. Just as

traditional poütics died in the dissemnation, or 'displacementof polidcs', so

did the the politicizedpastof traditional nationalist historical writingdissolve

into how individuais and individual groups like to imagine their past. I n this

sense the contemporary cult of commemoration testifies to this death of

polidcs that has been observed and apprehensivelydiscussed by so manycontemporarypolitical theorists. We can thereforeagreewithCS. Maier when

he writes that 'the surfeit of memoryis as sign not of historical confidence

but of aretreat from transformative politics'28.

This privatization of the past does also have its consequences for

commemoration itself: the commemorations originating in, or stimulated by

the political center will more and more lose their power over the people

while the periphery will become the natural locus of ali commemorative

desire.Andherewe mayfind, onceagain,a striking illustrarion of Tocqueville's

capacityfor prophedc insight into the sociology of democracy. Forprecisely

this-hepredicted.alreadyin 1839 for that otherparadigmatic 'lieu de mémoire',

thestatue: 'ainsi, ladémocratie ne porte pas seulement à faire une multitude

demenusouvrages (i.e. of small statues [F.A.]);elleles porteaussi àélever un

EMÓR lA, I D E N T I D A D E E H I S TOR IOGRAF I A




petit nombre detrês grandsmonuments. Maisentre ces deux extremes, il n'ya rien'2'. So it has primarilybeen democracy,and the de-politicizing potentialies

of democracy, that produced this movement awayfrom the political center

and towards the priority of the local over the national commemoration.

'L'histoires'estprodigieusement disséminée'3 0 as Nora puts it, and the vicissi-

tudesof the commemoration exemplify this process.

But the strained relationship between commemoration and historical

writingobeysa different logic. Crucial hereis, as wehaveseen, that historical

writing is to beassociated with knowledge of thepast and commemoration

rather thanwith thepast itself. Byits very nature knowledge of thepast is a

more helplessand vulnerable victimof polidcizadon than past reality itself.

Political ideologiesare themselvesalreadypartlyorganizations of knowledge

of the past and can therefore more easilybe infected byideology than the

past itself. Realityitself issupremelyindifferent to what we may or maynot

writeabout it, whether inspired bypolitical ideologiesor not.Surely, there is

a political dimension to what partsor aspectsof thepastwewill be interestedin — and this is whycommemoration alsocouldplayits role in the 'invention

of tradition'and in the formation of national identity. Butevenhereit followed

historical wridng rather than guiding it. So i f Norais right when claimng that

'le modele memorial l'a emporté sur le modele historique'31 we can observe

in this a pardal victoryof thepast itself over historical writing.

NOTAS:

' P. Winch, The dea o asocial sce/ ice, London 1958; Wittgensten's notion of the

language gamewas Winch's mansourceof inspiration. Thesameideawasexpressedareadysometwentyyearsbefore in the Sapir-Whorf thesis.

2

E.W.Hobsbawm The historian between thequestfor the universa and thequestforidentityDiogenes168 (1994); 51 -64; A . Megill, Historymemory identityHistoryo the

humansánces 11 (1998); 37 - 62.

3 F. Nietzsche, VomNut̂ en und Nachthel der Historieür dasL^ben, Stuttgart 1970

(Reclam);41.

4 But onlytemporarily For as CoUingwood insists the re-lived will aways reman

TEXTOSDE HISTÓRIA, vo\




'encapsulated' within the historiatVs thought. So re-enactment and the temporarydissolution of thedistancebetweenthe historian and his objectaways,andnecessarilytakesplacein the historian'spresent.

5 J.Michelet, Hw/lwv?de aRevoutionFrançase Vo. /,Paris1952; 419

6 Michelet,op. á.;4\ 4.

7 Quoted in C. Amalvi, 'Le 14 juillet', in P. Nora ed., Les ieux deméore Vo. : La

Republique Paris1984; 426.

8 L . Gossman, Between hstoryand iterature,Cambridge(Ma) 1990

9 S Freud, Totemund Tabu, inid.,StudienausgabeBandIX. FragenderGeselschaft,UrspriinderReigon, Frankfurt amMain 1982; 426.

10 P.Nora, Entremémoireet histoire,in id. éd., Les Lieux deméore Vo. :LaRepublique

Paris1984; xv.

11 j . LeGoff, Passeetpresentde lamémoire, inP.denBôer andW.Frijhoff eds., Lieux

deméoire e dentiténationales,Amsterdam1993; 35

12 D. Lowenthal,Thepast s aoregncountry,Cambridge1985; 195

13 J. Banville, Ghosts London 1993; 196,197.

14 See forexampleJ.R. Gillis ed.,Commemorations: he oiticso national dentity,Princeton1994.

15 Quoted in F.Yates,Theartof memory,Ayesbury1966; 22.

16 P.OryLecentenarede la RevolutionFrançaise, inP.Noraéd., ^es ieux deméoreVo.I : La RepubliqueParis1984; 546 ff.

17 Apparentlyone had forgotten the words pronounced bythe public prosecutor

Fouquier-Tinville when Lavoisier, thediscovererof theprocessof combustion, was

condemned to the guillotine: 'la Revolution n'a pas besoin desavants!'

18 C.Amalvi,Le 14 juillet, inP.Noraéd., Les ieux deméore Vo. : LaRepubliqueParis1984; 466.

19 M . Habwachs, He collectievegeheugen,Leuven 1991; 13 ff.

20 Habwachsweakenshis clamwhenspeakingof theparadoxthat we recal with the

greatestdifficultywhat, as memory is our mostpersona (andhencenot collectivey

shared) possession. When sayng this he seems to recognize the possibility of an

exclusiveypersona memory See Habwachs, Colectieveeheugen;14. A problemis that

Habwachsdoesnot distinguish between•!) the content ofamemoryand 2) memory

(3 8 M E M Ó R I A , I D E N T I D A D E E H ISTORIO GRAFIA




as thestateof consciousnessof a certansubject.Forexample,it maywellbe that A andB bothremember that Kennedywasassassinatedin 1963— and fromthisperspectivetheir memories are identica - but fromthe other perspectivethe memoryof A can

awaysbe distinguished fromthat of B. We cannot remember the memories of other

personsevenif the memoriesof otherpersonsare, qua content,exactlythesameas our

own. See for ananaogousargument Lowenthal,Past, 195

2 1 Habwachs, Colectieve eheugen; 22.

2 2

See for this thelastchapterof myHistoryandtropoogy,Berkeey1994.2 3 Lowenthal,Past, 187.

2 4 Habwachs, Colectieve eheugen;31 ff.

2 5 Nora,Entreméoire ebistore;xix ff.

2 6 'P.Nora,L'èrede la commemoration', in id. éd., jesUeux deméore V ol . II: IJ:S

France 3: D e Farchiveà1emblèmeParis1992; 983. For furtherdetalson the contemporary

cult of commemoration, see asoWJ. Johnston,Postmodemsmeemlléare lecultedes

anniversairesdans aculturecontemporaine,Paris1992.

2 7 For this privatization of thepast, see my'Die postmoderne "Privatisierung"der

Vergangenheit', in H. Nagl-Docekal Hrsgb., Der Sinn des Historischen.

GeschchtsphlosophscheDebatten, Frankfurt amMain 1996; 201 - 235

2 8 CS. Maer, A surfet of memoryHistoryandMemory.Studies n he epresentationo the

past5 (1993); 150 Maer asoseesan intimate relationship between the contemporaryinterest for memoryand thelossof projects that are supported byai of society 'why

to return to the question that motivated thisdiscussionof public commemoration,doesmemorynowseemtoplayalargerrole in political and civiclife?Myown belief is

that at the end of the twentieth centuryWestern societieshavecome to an end of a

massivecollective project'(p. 147).

2 9 A . de Tocqueville,De adéocratie enAmêique V ol . I,Paris1981; 69.And becauseof

its aristocraticpastEuropespossessesfar more monuments than the US, as isamusingyobserved byDonadBartheme: 'everytackylittlefourth-ratedéclasséEuropean country

has monuments ai over theplaceand one cannotturna cornerwithoutbangngintoan

eghteen-foot bronze of LebroucheticklingtheChambermadsatVachewhile planningthe Battle of Bledsoe,orsomesuch'. Quoted in Lowenthal,Past, 322.

3 0 Nora, 'L'èrede la commemoration'; 1011.

31 Nora, 'L'èrede la commemoration'; 988.

TEXTOSDE HISTÓRIA, vo. 10,n"1/2,2002



F . R. A N KER SMIT

R E S U M O : Vivemos emuma era de comemorações. Comemoração

exprimeou exemplifica o sendmento quepossuímos, ou que se supõe

que devamos ter, acercade umevento dopassado, e cuja origemestá

em nós e não nopassadoemsi mesmo. Comemoração seapresentaa

nós em um tríptico semântico: a rememoração a si mesmo, a

rememoração de alguma coisa e acomemoração, situada entre asduas

formas de rememoração. O repensar, o reviver como formas de

comemoração, suas origens no campo da religião, sua

descontextualização, os processos de sua privatização e de sua

apropriação pela autoridade, assim como sua contraposição à análise

historiográfica levamarefletir sobre a(pseudo)oposição entrememória

ehistória.

P A L A V R A S - C H A V E S : comemoração, memória, história,

historiografia

Documents

Ankersmit- Commemoration and National Identity