ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q.1 2010...ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 3 1.1 DIRECT INTERVENTION (SURGING) The first aspect of the exit strategy is a surge of direct intervention by

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The Afghanistan NGO Safety Of f ice

This early in the year the tactical level data is not as important to follow as are the changes in the strategic environment which will make 2010 substantively different from the last eight years.

Our best assessment is that the International Military Forces are indeed serious about implementing an exit strategy and that NGO’s should anticipate a post-ISAF environment, likely by the end of 2011.

We note that IMF have made their withdrawal contingent on being able to demonstrate two key metrics, or conditions, being a degraded armed opposition and an improved Government security force.

We assess, perhaps cynically, that there is an awareness that neither of these conditions can be genuinely extant by that time and so strategies to create the perception of them are being pursued instead.

For the first metric the plan appears to involve direct intervention of IMF, and presumably ANSF, in just 80 of the 398 districts with the remaining territory braced against AOG influence by an awkwardly stitched alliance of Government forces, tribal leaders and loosely endorsed ‘militias’.

A parallel effort will be made to address the assumed root causes of conflict, via the Peace and Reintegration program, although this stands a chance of backfiring and instead empowering opposition forces by enabling the allocation of their members to the local security apparatus.

For the second metric the simple plan is to outfit Government troops at a ‘minimally combat essential’ level and transfer lead security responsibility as soon as possible. A low starting point, unrealistic force generation targets and problems in hiring a contractor to deliver the training makes even this limited objective unlikely.

While still a little early to assess what comes next we are concerned that the intense devolution of authority occurring during this period could seed new rounds of factional conflict after the withdrawal. At the more im-mediate level we are concerned about the introduction of new armed actors and new conflicts, collateral dam-age and the intensified efforts by all parties to politicize and militarize NGO activities.

On the other side, with this particular conflict drawing down we assess that AOG now see some self-interest in not attacking impartial NGOs as they are likely to attempt to instrumentalize our activities for their own pur-poses in the near future. Resisting this effort will become a dangerous new challenge.

In response to this changed environment we make two policy recommendations. First, we reiterate the impor-tance of not engaging in civil-military coordination activities. Now more than ever NGO have nothing to gain and much to lose by interacting with the IMF who are only interested in leveraging advantage from your activi-ties. Second, we recommend a policy driven engagement with all Afghan parties to the conflict where such can be concluded safely and legally. NGO must develop and apply deliberate communication strategies to ensure that all current and future powerbrokers understand the purpose, and independence, of your activities.

Nic Lee, ANSO Director, Kabul 2010

SUMMARY ASSESSMENT

Jan 1st— March 31st 2010

ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q.1 2010

The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author and do not reflect the views and opinions of ANSO donors or partners.

Page 2 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT

1. OVERVIEW OF PRIMARY CAMPAIGN ELEMENTS


1 . 1 D I R E C T I N T E R V E N T I O N ( S U R G I N G )

The first aspect of the exit strategy is a surge of direct intervention by International Military Forces or as General McChrystal referred to it in his Commanders Initial As-sessment (Aug 09, p.1-3) “a dis-crete “jump” to gain the initiative”.

The purpose of direct intervention is to use IMF advanced fighting skills and technology to degrade AOG capability, in key population areas, to a level where responsi-bility can be strategically consoli-dated in to the ANSF.

Lacking the ability to be strong every-where IMF have identified 80 Key Terrain Districts (recreated in Fig 1 from unclassified sources) which will provide a tactical and operational focus to Regional Command-ers. Although there will undoubtedly be deviation we can expect these areas to be the focus of the surge and ongoing in-country redeployments. It is notable that close to 30% of Key Terrain is in just two prov-inces, Kandahar & Helmand, while the entire North/North East region holds just 8 districts.

The ability of direct intervention to really degrade AOG capability is certainly disputable. The historical re-cord would suggest that AOG tactics in the face of major operations will be to (a) slow the attacking force with stand-off resistance then (b) completely disappear from the target area before (c) stepping up the attack levels during the softer ‘hold, build’ stages of the operation. You could say they employ a ‘Hold on, Clear out and Build up’ strategy.

The 72 hour attack rate data from Nad Ali/Marjah, Helmand Province, for instance (Fig 2) would indicate a small spike of resistance as OP MOSHTARAK got underway (Feb 11-23) a sharp drop off on the ’victory’ day (Feb 25th) and a slow return to the pre-operation attack rate thereafter.

The yellow dot inserts in Figure 1 show the ALDI districts discussed on the next page but are presented here to demonstrate that they are strategically positioned to cover the gaps in IMF direct coverage.

Qalay-I- ZalArchi

Imam Sahib

Chahar Dara

Ali Abad

Kunduz

Khan Abad

Nari

Pech

AsadAbadChapa

Dara

Chawkay

Narang

Khas Kunar

Sirkanay

Marawara

Qarghayi

Alingar

Daw lat Shah

Alishing

Mihtarlam

Puli Alam

Charkh

Muhammad Agh

KhushiBaraki Barak

RodatHisarak

Achin

Lal Pur

Dih Bala

Goshta

Dur Baba

Kama

Surkh Rod

Kuz Kunar

Dara-I-Nur

Shinwar

Bati KotChaparhar

Jalal Abad

Nazyan

Chahar Burja

ChakhansurChakhansur

Khash RodKhash Rod

Kang

ZaranjZaranj

MandolMandol WamaWama

Bargi Matal

Nuristan

KamdeshKamdesh

GomalGomal

DilaDila

Wor Mamay

Waza Khwa

Barmal

Sharan

Zarghun

Shah

UrgunOmna

SarHawza

Ziruk

Mata KhanKhan

Gayan

Nika

Zurmat

Jaji

Gardez

Jadran

Lija Mangal

Jani Khel

Shwak

Shamal

Hisa-I-Awali

PanjsherHisa-I-Duwum

Ghorband

Salang

Shekh Ali

Surkhi ParsaKohi Safi

Bagram

Jabalussaraj

Dara-I- SufDara-I- Suf

AybakAybak

Ruyi Du AbRuyi Du Ab

Khuram Wa Sa

Khuram Wa Sa

Hazrati Sultan

KohistanatKohistanatBalkhabBalkhab

Sari PulSari Pul

SayyadSayyad

SangcharakSangcharak

Sozma Qala WarsajWarsaj

RustaqRustaq

FarkharFarkharChalChal

TaluqanTaluqan

Bangi

KalafganKalafgan

Ab

Chah

Ab

Ishkamish

Khwaja Ghar

KhwajaGhar

ChoraChora

NeshNesh

DihrawudDihrawudTirin Kot

Tirin Kot

Khas Uruzgan

Khas Uruzgan

Shahidi HassShahidi Hass

Markazi Bihs

JalrezJalrez

Nirkh

Day Mirdad

Hisa-I-Awal

Wakhan

JurmJurm

ShighnanShighnan

KishimKishim

Darwaz

BaharakBaharak

RaghRagh

ZebakZebak

Kuran Wa MunKuran Wa Mun

Fayz Abad

KhwahanKhwahan

Ishkashim

Shahri Buzur

Shahri Buzur

QalatQalat

ShamulzayiShinkayShinkay

ShahjoyShahjoy

MizanMizan

AtgharAtghar

Tarnak Wa Ja

JawandJawand

QadisQadis

MurghabMurghab

Ab KamariAb Kamari

MuqurMuqur

Qalay-I- Naw

KahmardKahmard

DushiDushi

AndarabAndarab

NahrinNahrin

Tala Wa BarfTala Wa Barf

Khost Wa Fir

Khinjan

Burka

Baghlani JadBaghlani Jad

Dahana-I- GhDahana-I- Ghori

BaghlanBaghlan

KhulmKhulm

KishindihKishindih

ChimtalChimtal

SholgaraSholgara

ShortepaShortepa

Nahri ShahiNahri Shahi

KaldarKaldar

Dawlat AbadDawlat Abad

Chahar Kint

Chahar Kint

BalkhBalkh

MarmulMarmulDihdadiDihdadi

Chahar

YakawlangYakawlang

WarasWaras

PanjabPanjab

BamyanBamyan

ShibarShibar

Day KundiDay Kundi

GizabGizabKajran

ShahristanShahristan

Anar DaraAnar Dara

GulistanGulistan

Pur ChamanPur Chaman

Bala BulukBala Buluk

Lash Wa JuwaLash Wa Juwa

FarahFarah

Qalay-I-KahQalay-I-KahBakwaBakwa

Shib KohShib Koh

Khak-e Safid

Pusht RodPusht Rod

QaysarQaysar

AlmarAlmar

BilchiraghBilchiragh

KohistanKohistan

Dawlat AbadDawlat Abad

Shirin TagabShirin Tagab

QaramqolQaramqol

Pashtun Kot

AndkhoyAndkhoy

Khwaja SabzKhwaja Sabz

Khani ChaharKhani

Chahar

MaymanaMaymana

NawurNawur

Nawa

GiroGiro

QarabaghQarabagh

GelanGelan

Andar

Ab Band

Ab Band

Muqur

Jaghatu

Bahrami ShahShah Dih Yak

Ghazni

Zana Khan

ShahrakShahrak

ChaghcharanChaghcharan

TulakTulak

SagharSaghar

PasabandPasaband

TaywaraTaywara

Lal Wa SarjaLal Wa Sarja

RegReg

GarmserGarmser

DishuDishu

Nad AliNad Ali

WasherWasher

BaghranBaghran

Naw ZadNaw ZadKajakiKajaki

Girishk

GahLashkar

Gah

Sangin

BaraNaway i Bara

AdraskanAdraskan

GulranGulran

ShindandShindand

GhoryanGhoryan

ObeObe

KushkKushk

InjilInjil

KohsanKohsan

FarsiFarsi

KarukhKarukh

GuzaraGuzara

Zinda Jan

Zinda Jan Chishti SharChishti Shar

Pashtun ZargPashtun Zarg

HiratHirat

ShibirghanShibirghan

Qarqin

Darzab

Aqcha

Khwaja Du Ko

Mingajik MardyanMardyan

AbadFayz

SurobiDih Sabz

Khaki Jabbar

PaghmanBagramiKabul

Shakardara

Istalif

Chahar Asyab

Chahar Musayi

GuldaraQarabagh

Mir Bacha Kot

RegReg

PanjwayiPanjwayi

MarufMaruf

DamanDaman

Spin BoldakSpin Boldak

ShorabakShorabak

ArghistanArghistan

MaywandMaywand

Shah Wali KoShah Wali KotGhorak

Tani

Tere Zayi

Sabari Bak

Gurbuz

Nadir Shah Kot

Jaji Maydan

Nijrab

Tagab

Kohistan

Koh Band

Mazari Sharif

Kalakan

Alasay

Mahmud Raqi

Mando Zayi

Azra

Bolak

ANSO Fig 1: IMF Key Terrain Districts, March 2010

Key Terrain District

ALDI District

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1

3

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Jan Feb Mar

ANSO Fig 2: AOG attacks per 72 hrs Marjah/Nad Ali, Helmand, Jan‐Mar 2010

Period of Op Moshtarak

Pre-OP attack level


1 . 2 L O C A L D E F E N C E I N I T I AT I V E S

The second aspect of the exit strategy is to develop resistance to AOG in-fluence in areas that IMF cannot cover with direct intervention.

There are a number of overlapping ini-tiatives currently operating on this theme. Chief amongst them is the Afghan Local Defence Initiative (ALDI) which as far as we know is operated directly by Special Opera-tion Forces. It entails teams of up to 30 individuals, including develop-ment officers with access to USG funding lines, embedding with tribal communities to help organize their resistance to AOG presence. At this point we believe the program is op-erational in nine districts being Nili, Barmal, Achin, Arghandab, Khakrez, Shindand, Chamkani, Delaram, Ghrishk. (Fig. 3)

The first ALDI to become active, with the Shinwari tribe in Achin/Shinwar of Nanagahar province, not only devastated those areas with inter-tribal conflict but also appears to have ignited a power struggle within neighboring Khogani district as tribal leaders there vie for a similar deal. The assassination of Haji Zaman in Chamtala on 22nd February, which also caused 15 collateral fatalities, was likely the opening shot of an ongoing leadership struggle which is already causing instability across that district. The ALDI in Daykondi is reported to be offering Government security positions to tribal networks, some with deep criminal associations. NGOs have legitimate concerns that these new actors will take a less benign ap-proach towards their work and presence.

Beyond ALDI parallel programs are providing coverage for the Northern Region focused on AOG strong-holds of Imam Sahib, Archi, Khanabad and Chahadara districts of Kunduz (the only overlap with Key Terrain) with very recent reports indicating the start of a new program in Farayab to establish militias forces in Gormach, Badghis and southern areas of Jawzjan. These ’pro-government militias’ are osten-sibly operated by Government security departments, or Presidential appointees with significant leverage in these provinces, and are intended to extend the coverage of the ANSF but reports are already emerg-ing of ‘inter-militia’ skirmishes and road robberies.

The final program of this type is the well known Afghan Public Protection Force (also called AP3) which cur-rently operates in Jalrez, Charkh, Maidan Shah, Nirkh and Sayadabad districts of Wardak province only. NGOs report the program has been successful in bringing some stability to those areas and yet it would appear to be the only program of its type not to have the support of the IMF despite having the full back-ing of the MoI and being transparently integrated in to the National ANP development strategy.

HELMAND NIMROZ

KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL PAKTIKA

GHAZNI

FARAH

HERAT

BADGHIS

GHORDAYKUNDI

BAMYAN

FARYAB

KHOST

BADAKSHAN BALKHJAWZJAN KUNDUZ

SAMANGAN

BAGHLAN

WARDAK KABUL

PARWAN

NANGARHAR

ANSO Fig 3: Community Defence Measures, March 2010

ALDI

Pro‐Gov Militia

AP3


1 . 3 P E A C E & R E I N T E G R AT I O N

The third main aspect will be to try and address the assumed root causes of opposition by offering incen-tives to mid/low level AOG fighters under the Peace & Reintegration (P&R) initiative which emerged, somewhat by surprise, from the London Conference. P&R is also expected to dominate centre court at the upcoming Kabul Conference which is why NGOs need to be aware of it. P&R is distinct from “reconciliation” in that it only targets combatants from the province level down while reconciliation re-fers to higher level settlements between the Government and senior AOG leaders.

It is hoped, by IMF, that by providing jobs and trainings, or by settling some specific local grievance, P&R will lure manpower away from armed opposition groups and so contribute to the metric of ‘degrading AOG capability’. The validity of this causal chain is certainly open to question. Anecdotal reports indi-cate that AOG have been insulted by the suggestion that they fight out of a lack of jobs and money and their spokesmen have dismissed any possibility of their participation.

Logistically it remains in the planning stages with the recent series of ‘Peace Jirgas’ held across the coun-try intended to garner local support ahead of the Kabul Conference launch. The program is expected to be operated by a Presidentially mandated commission linked to a trust fund operated by the Minis-try of Finance. Reports indicate that competition to lead the commission is fierce and that some senior Government figures are opposed. The process is currently being assisted by an IMF advisory team.

The basic stages of reintegration are (i) a combatant renouncing violence, (ii) a community agreeing to accept the return of the combatant, (iii) economic rewards for the community (iv) economic and oppor-tunity rewards for the combatant and (v) the reintegration of the combatant in to the host community. Two models of this approach are being considered with the only difference being at stage (iv) where one model will send combatants to a centralized national training & ‘de-radicalization’ centre while the other keeps it all at a local level.

Of immediate practical concern is that the National Solidarity Program (NSP) is one of the delivery mecha-nism being considered. This would presumably make NSP CDCs responsible for vouching for the sur-rendering combatant and managing community rewards. It is not difficult to see how this would put many NGO staff at risk and ANSO recommends that NGOs prepare to challenge this suggestion at the Kabul Conference or before if possible.

Of more strategic concern is the vagueness of the suggestions of what to do with reintegrating combat-ants after the process ends. Most recommendations seem centered on integrating them in to the local security apparatus be that official ANP or new community defense measures such as ALDI. The plan even considers allowing combatants to retain their light weapons for personal protection.

If this remains the intent by the time of the Kabul Conference it would seem to present a convenient mechanism for discretely turning the opposition in to the Government. This may indeed create local stability in the short term but may seed geographically based factionalism in the long term.


2. THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT & CRIMINALITY ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO)


2 . 1 G E N E R A L N G O T R E N D S

NGO have been involved in 25 incidents this quarter, significantly down from 37 in 2009. Figure 4 indicates that inci-dents remain within ‘normal’ ranges of fluctuation over the longer period also.

A single organization incurred an addi-tional ten (10) attacks but these are not included in the data for reasons ex-plained in 2.2

15 of the 25 incidents were attributed to AOG (Fig 5) this is down from 28 last year. The rate was especially low dur-ing Jan and February likely as a result of NGOs low profile during later winter months and AOGs preoccupation with the February Marjah campaign. Inci-dents escalated in March mostly as a result of a flurry of activity targeting NGO girls schools and compounds in Faryab.

Criminal incidents targeting NGO remain low with just 9 this period compared to 10 last year. No significant changes throughout the period.

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5

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11 11

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1112

8 8

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13

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2322

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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

ANSO Fig 4: Total # Security Incidents directly involving NGO per month

Jan Feb Mar

6

1 1

6

3

8

1312

32 2

11

ANSO Fig 5: NGO incidents caused by AOG, Jan‐Mar period, 07‐10

2007 2008 2009 2010

Jan Feb Mar

4

9 9

3

9

2

43

21

54

ANSO Fig 6: NGO incidents caused by ACG, Jan‐Mar period, 07‐10

2007 2008 2009 2010


2 . 2 T Y P E S O F N G O I N C I D E N T S

In comparison with 2009 the types of NGO incidents caused by AOG (Fig 7) have been mild.

Although weapons have been present at most inci-dents the only solidly ‘kinetic’ attacks have been the IEDs in Uruzgan and Parwan, which sadly both caused fatalities (2 NGO and 2 Civ), and the armed entry of a demining compound in Kanda-har. Compare this with the three small arms at-tacks and four IED of Q1 2009.

Abductions too have become less severe with just 6 persons taken this period, compared to 20 last year, and all of them released without harm after no more than six days. The entry of school sites and NGO compounds in Faryab (x5) resulted in some theft and arson but no armed activity (except a school guard shooting at the AOG).

ANSO assesses that this good track record to date is at least partially due to AOG intent not to target genuinely impartial NGOs. AOG statements to this effect, the early release of NGO abductees and the ‘friendly warning’ given to an NGO in Takhar reinforce this assessment.

By way of contrast Figure 9 details the ten additional incidents targeting the single organization, men-tioned in 2.1. It is targeted so frequently because AOG perceive it as supporting IMF by implement-ing high profile projects in difficult areas. As a re-sult the majority of incidents are kinetic and se-vere. Comparing the two datasets provides a clear account of the relationships between pos-ture, perception and attacks.

Given the unique stance of this organization we do not include these incidents in the NGO count as they are not indicative of general threat trends.

NGO have remained vulnerable to robbery on the road and at home (Fig 8) and personal disputes have involved weapons but fortunately no NGO fatalities so far.

Abduction & Release (#persons)

Threats

Entry of School Site

Entry of Office/Compound

IED

8

4

3

2

2

ANSO Fig 7: Types of AOG incidents against NGO, Jan‐Mar 2010

Entry of Clinics

Entry of Compound

Road Robbery

Attempted Robbery

Personal Dispute

2

3

1

1

2

ANSO Fig 8: Types of ACG incidents against NGO, Jan‐Mar 2010

Armed Ambush (SAF/RPG)

IED

Suicide Attack

Robbery

Threat

3

3

1

1

2

ANSO Fig 9 : Types of incidents against one organization, Jan‐Mar 2010


2 . 3 N G O I N C I D E N T M A P P I N G

The comparison of Q1 NGO incidents per region (Fig 11) shows that the percentage occurring in the North has grown from 8% in 09 to 28% of total this year. This caused mostly by the flurry of incidents in Faryab 2-12 March.

Also notable is the sharp drop in the West-ern region (from 10-1) although additional serious incidents occurred just outside the quarter period.

That the North and Northeast regions ac-count for 40% of the total is also reflective of the density of NGO presence in those areas.

Location of NGO incidents has no obvious correlation to conflict areas.

HELMAND NIMROZ

KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL PAKTIKA

GHAZNI

FARAH

HERAT

BADGHIS

GHORDAYKUNDI

BAMYAN

FARYAB

KHOST

BADAKSHAN

BALKH JAWZJAN KUNDUZ

SAMANGAN

BAGHLAN

WARDAK

KABUL

PARWAN

NANGAHAR

1. Entry of Site/Compound

2. Abduction & Release

3. IED4. Threat5. Robbery/Attemp

ted Robbery

ANSO Fig 10: Location of serious NGO Incidents, Jan‐Mar 2010

2008 2009 2010

5 37

3 5

3

9 8 5

7 8

4

610

1

6

5

5

ANSO Fig 11: Direct NGO incidents per region, Jan‐Mar, 08‐10

N N/E E S W C


3. CONFLICT TRENDS & ANALYSIS


3 . 1 A O G I N I T I AT E D AT TA C K S

Data indicates that AOG initiated attacks have grown by more than 35% on Q1 of 2009. If the exit strategy is to gain traction IMF will be looking for a measurable downturn in this key metric.

Disaggregated data (Fig 9) indicates that the rate of suicide bombings has remained stable while the main growth has been within the close ranges and stand-off attack types. Use of IEDs especially has escalated .

NOTE: Where these key statistics differ from other reporting entities (specifically UNDSS) that is due to the use of different categorization sys-tems.

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ANSO Fig 12: Monthly AOG initiated attacks, 06‐10 (NOTE: Includes only close range, indirect fire and suicide attacks, Does NOT include any criminal activity or events)

Election Period spike

2008 2009 2010

19 31 35

289

503

774398

767

983

ANSO Fig 13: Tactical composition of AOG attacks,Jan‐Mar, 08‐10

Suicide IDF CR

Q1 2009 attack level


3 . 2 C O N F L I C T A R E A

Figure 14 maps AOG kinetic events only such as small arms fire, RPG’s, IED’s, mortar and missile strikes. It does not map any criminal activity. The data confirms a heavy concentration of at-tacks in four provinces, a notable presence in five others and some capability in thirteen more for a total 22 provinces within which AOG are conducting operations at this time (58% of country).

The surprises here are Baghlan/Kunduz, the main road between which has been the scene of intense conflict over the last 1.5 months, and Badghis/Faryab with the AOG in Bilchiagh, Pashtun Kot, Qaramqol, Gormach and Jawand having some successes in frus-trating the elevated security presence. Ongoing, and upcoming, community defense initiatives in these areas may alter the dynam-ics in either direction.

Regional disaggregation (Fig 15) shows the percentage of all attacks occurring in the N/NE has jumped from 5% in 08 to 11% this year with both North and Northeast doubling their actual counts. 2008 2009 2010

20 33 7618 56

137288

573

579297

516

845

63

150

117

78

116

137

ANSO Fig 15: AOG attacks occuring per region Jan‐Mar, 08‐10

North Northeast East South West Central

HELMAND 381

NIMROZ 21 KANDAHAR

228

URUZGAN 49 ZABUL 52 PAKTIKA

43

GHAZNI 71

FARAH 22

HERAT 27

BADGHIS 65

GHOR 3DAYKUNDI 8

BAMYAN 1

FARYAB 38

KHOST 147

BADAKSHAN 4

BALKH 14

JAWZJAN 12 KUNDUZ 79

SAMANGAN

BAGHLAN 35

WARDAK 38

KABUL 24

PARWAN 6

NANGAHAR 76

Area of special concern

Over 100 Attacks

50 – 99 Attacks

20 – 49 Attacks

Less 20 attacks

No AOG activity recorded

ANSO Fig 14: AOG attacks per province, Jan‐Mar 2010(This is NOT a threat map colors represent incident rates NOT level of accessibility)


3 . 3 FATA L I T I E S

Gross fatality figures (Fig 16) show more deaths in all categories over Q1 09 except NGOs which remains at 2. Gross IMF fatalities are 79% higher (66-118). Figure 17 shows a 45% increase in civilian fatalities over Q1 09 (342-496). AOG remain responsible for bulk of these (76%) with IMF decreasing their per-centage of the total from 32% to 24% but increasing in actual terms from 109-116 persons. The leading cause of civilian death so far (Fig 18) is being caught in an IED while civilians deaths caused by suicide attacks have increased by more than 260% from Q1 last year (32-118). On the IMF side airstrikes have killed about 70% more civilians than ground operations and EOF deaths are up by 143% (7-17).

Caveat: Beyond the NGO sector our fatality counts are based on our reports only. We do try to verify major fatalities with hospitals, journalists and NGO at the scene but are often forced to take a ’middle ground’ estimate of counts. We have no independent means of verifying combat casualties and suggest this data be taken as in-dicative of trends rather than wholly accurate counts.

National International Male Female Child ANP ANA IMF

NGO Civilian Combatants

2 0

584

32 24

301

67

118

ANSO Fig 16: Gross fatalities, all causes, per sector, Jan‐Mar 2010

Suicide Bombing

IED's

SAF/RPG Attack

Ground Attack

Airstrike

Escalation of Force

AOG

IMF

118

164

89

35

62

17

ANSO Fig 18: Leading cause of conflict related civilian deaths, Jan‐Mar 2010

Jan Feb Mar Total

113 99

168

380

29 47

40

116

ANSO Fig 17: Total conflict related civilian fatalities and cause, Jan‐Mar, 2010

AOG IMF


REPORT END

For fur ther informat ion [email protected]

© ANSO, Apr i l 2010

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